

# AFRICANIA

İNÖNÜ UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF AFRICAN STUDIES

Cilt/Volume:4 Sayı/Number:1



# AFRICANIA

İNÖNÜ ÜNİVERSİTESİ ULUSLARARASI AFRİKA ARAŞTIRMALARI  
DERGİSİ

*İNÖNÜ UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF AFRICAN STUDIES*

Cilt / Volume: 4, Sayı / Issue: 1, (Ocak / January 2024)  
(e-ISSN: 2757-8925)

**Yayımcı | Publisher**

**İNönü Üniversitesi Afrika Çalışmaları Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi (İNÜAFAM)  
adına**

*On Behalf of İnönü University Center for African Studies*

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**Çevrimiçi (Online) Yayın Tarih | Online Release Date**

30 Ocak/January 2024

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**Dergi Adı | The Name of the Journal:** AFRICANIA

**e-ISSN:** 2757-8925

**Yayın Aralığı | The Range of Publication**

Yılda 2 Sayı (Ocak & Temmuz) - Biannual Issue (January & July)

**Dergi Web Sitesi | The Website of the Journal**

<https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/africana> - <https://https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/africana>

**Yayın Başlangıç Tarihi | Publication Start Date**

Ocak, 2021 - January, 2021

**Baş Editör | Editor in Chief**

Dr. Osman KARACAN

**Yayıncı | The Publisher**

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# DEMOCRACY: A REFLECTION ON GHANA'S REPUBLICS, 1960-1992

## DEMOKRASİ: GANA CUMHURİYETLERİ ÜZERİNE BİR YANSIMA, 1960-1992

Yıl 4, Sayı 1, ss.01-23.

Year 4, Issue 1, pp.01-23.

Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi

Article Type: Research Article

Geliş Tarihi: 29.04.2023

Submitted: 29.04.2023

Kabul Tarihi: 06.10.2023

Accepted: 06.10.2023

DOI: 10.58851/africana.1290002

### Atf Bilgisi / Reference Information

Abass, U. (2024). Democracy: A Reflection on Ghana's Republics, 1960-1992, *Africana Dergisi*, 4 (1), 01-23.  
<https://doi.org/10.58851/africana.1290002>

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### Abstract

Since 1992, Ghana has been held up as a beacon of democracy in Africa. As the country prepared for independence from Britain, educated natives formed political parties based on Western models to advance their demands. Two of the earliest political parties were the UGCC and the CPP, formed in 1947 and 1949 respectively. People from different ethnic groups joined one of the two parties to create a consensual democratic model. It was the adoption of a British type of representative government, but with a unicameral legislature. The 1951 elections gave Ghana its first taste of democratic voting, allowing the people to choose leaders they trusted to alleviate their hardships. Elections in 1954 and 1956 further consolidated this. The country is endowed with enormous human and natural resources. When the First Republic was announced in 1960, politics was all about development, massive projects, sound policies and improving the welfare of the people. By 1966, however, the rivalry between Nkrumah and the army and police introduced coups into Ghanaian politics. Since then, Ghana has experienced five coups in its young history. As a result, Ghanaian politics has been reduced to economic stagnation, corruption, propaganda, ill-conceived policies and the emergence of short-sighted and ultra-credit-hungry leaders who borrow to consume, leading to the impoverishment of the citizens. Perhaps Ghana would have been more developed than it is now if the first coup had not taken place and if Nkrumah had had enough time to realise his vision for the country. It is from this perspective that the paper assesses Ghana's republics. The paper uses archival sources, mainly newspapers, and secondary sources to explore the country's democratic trajectories to the present day.

**Keywords:** Ghana, Democracy, Putsch, Politics, Development.

### Öz

Gana 1992'den beri Afrika'da bir demokrasi feneri olarak lanse edilmektedir. Ülke İngiltere'den bağımsızlığa hazırlanırken, eğitimli yerliler taleplerine ulaşmak adına Batı modellerine uygun siyasi partiler kurmuştur. Kurulan en eski siyasi partilerden ikisi, sırasıyla 1947 ve 1949'da UGCC ve CPP idi. Farklı etnik gruplardan insanlar, uzlaşmacı bir demokratik model oluşturmak için iki partiden birine katıldı. İngiliz tipi bir temsilî hükümetin benimsenmesiydi, ancak tek meclisli bir yasama organı vardı. 1951 seçimleri, Gana'ya, insanların sıkıntılarını hafifletebileceğine güvendikleri liderleri seçebilecekleri ilk demokratik oylama deneyimini verdi. 1954 ve 1956 seçimleri bunu daha da pekiştirdi. Ülke muazzam insan gücü ve doğal kaynaklarla donatılmıştır. 1960'da ilk cumhuriyet ilan edildiğinde, siyaset tamamen kalkınma, büyük projeler, sağlam politikalar ve halkın refahını iyileştirme ile ilgiliydi. Ancak 1966'da Nkrumah ile ordu ve polis arasında ortaya çıkan husumet, Gana siyasetine darbeleri getirdi. O zamandan beri Gana gençlik tarihinde beş darbe görmüştür. Sonuç olarak, bu durum Gana'yı ekonomik durgunluğa, yolsuzluğa, propagandaya, kötü düşünülmüş politikalara ve tüketmek için borç alan dar görüşlü ve aşırı korkak liderlerin ortaya çıkışına indirgedi ve böylece vatandaşların yoksullaşmasına yol açtı. Belki de ilk darbe yaşanmasaydı ve Nkrumah'ın ülke vizyonunu gerçekleştirmek için yeterli zamanı olsaydı, Gana şu an olduğundan daha gelişmiş olacaktı. Bu açıdan, makale Gana Cumhuriyetlerine ağırlık vermektedir. Makale, ülkenin bugüne kadarki demokratik gelişimini keşfetmek için ikincil kaynaklarla birlikte başta gazeteler olmak üzere arşiv kaynaklarını kullanmaktadır.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Gana, Demokrasi, Darbe, Siyaset, Gelişim.

## STRUCTURED ABSTRACT

The African continent was a scene of imperial tussle between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Several European countries were there and established their dominance over the native states. However, in the twentieth century, due largely to the consequences of the Second World War and the Cold War Era, African Nationalism came to the fore and by the mid-1950s almost the entire continent came knocking for independence from their European suzerains. The independence demands and grants converged on one crux condition: the need for establishing governments by democratic precepts. Thus, the closing years of the twentieth century ushered in a paradigm political shift from chiefship-centred administrations towards multi-party politics and the spread of democracy.

As the newly independent African countries tried to institute Western prototype democracies in their countries, along their development trajectories, the Bretton Woods institutions made it a condition for granting financial assistance to such countries which were democratic and incorporated minorities. Thus, on paper, although most African countries are democratic, in practice they are ruled by autocrats who profess politics of intimidation, gagging of minorities, clientelism, corruption, nepotism, and enacting flawed policies. For decades in Africa, public policies conducted in bad faith have been the impetus to socio-developmental failures, election choices, and military takeovers, thus, standardising it as a political-philosophical charter.

Ghana is no exception to that. Ghana was the first sub-Saharan African country to gain independence from Britain in 1957. In preparation for self-rule, the natives formed political parties along Western models and two of the earliest parties to be formed were the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) and the Convention People's Party (CPP) in 1947 and 1949 respectively. In 1951, elections were held to choose political leaders and legislative representatives for the people. The members included chiefs, who were elected indirectly by the governor, and a section of educated Africans who were elected directly at the polls. This election gave Ghana a taste of what the British democratic model was. Subsequent elections were held in 1954 and 1956, to consolidate democracy in the country and towards the grant of independence. The Ghanaian society is a heterogeneous one and so salience of cultural differences, religion, and partisanship politics exist. Nonetheless, for the sake of independence, the various ethnic groups and religious affiliations worked in hand to attain self-rule through consensus democracy.

Independence was granted on 6 March 1957 and Kwame Nkrumah was the leader who championed that struggle. Thus, from 1957-1966, he undertook massive developmental projects and pursued sound socio-economic policies towards elevating the welfare of Ghanaians. But the enmity that ensued between him, on one hand, and the army and police on the other, led to the introduction of putsches in the Ghanaian body politic when his government was toppled in 1966 by a team of army-police officers. This was followed by four more putsches, with dire consequences for the country. One of such consequences is that politics in Ghana has been reduced to economic stagnation, propaganda, ill-thought-out policies and the production of short-sighted leaders thus worsening the plights of the common citizen. It is from this perspective that this paper attempts to evaluate Ghana's democratic path to the conclusion that the putsch against Nkrumah has taken the country back and stagnated its growth because all the subsequent leaders to have followed to date had failed to mimic the socio-economic success of Nkrumah.

Democratic precepts, on the other hand, are not new to Africa. As postulated by Chuka "apart from voting formalities, democratic principles such as participation, equality, representation, local autonomy, rule of law, and accountability" (1998, p. 9) were inherent in traditional African forms of rule. But these tenets capitulated to the European model. They capitulated because of attempts to institute British colonial policy; the chiefs had become greedy because of the introduction of western capital in the mines and other

sectors, the subsequent rift that emerged between the chiefs and their subjects, and later with the educated natives when, in 1925, the chiefs felt that they were the right group to administer the country and not the educated natives and thereby decided to work with the British administrators instead of the educated natives (see Abass, 2023, pp. 497-500). The chiefs remained at the helm of affairs up to the decade leading up to independence when the educated natives formed political parties along Western models and succeeded in taking up the administrative mantle of the country, through democratic elections, at independence. In the wake of that emerged a burlesque of what exists in Europe and the USA. In such eroded democracies, “political parties use political rhetoric to politicise, problematise and frame social issues” (Helbing et al, 2013, pp. 103-105) not towards development but towards cultural distinctions. The outcome of this is that the tenets of transparency and accountability are overlooked thereby leaving the citizens who cannot hold their democratic leaders to account to turn their “trust in religious and traditional leaders” (Bratton & Gyimah-Boadi, 2006).

Democracy, instead of uniting the Ghanaian society, has rather stratified and widened the gulf between the educated and uneducated, leaders and followers, and it has become an avenue for the politicians and their compeers to enrich themselves whilst providing little returns to the populace. Ghana has been under four Republics: 1960-1966, 1969-1972, 1979-1981, and 1992 to present. However, the common themes under all the republics are nepotism, favouritism, selective justice, ethnic-based politicking, and economic mismanagement. The paper shows that charges of malversation that led to the toppling of Nkrumah’s regime and thence prevented the full realisation of his policies for Ghana are nothing compared to what transpired under subsequent administrations. Had Nkrumah stayed long enough, perhaps he could have done more for Ghana in terms of development.

#### **Introduction**

Democracy in Ghana is a recent development. Before its appearance, the various native States were ruled by Paramount Chiefs or Chiefs aided by their council of elders. These councils of Elders served as instruments of checks and balances against the traditional rulers. Whenever Chiefs contravened established laws and customs, they were reminded to uphold the established decrees and could even be deposed by the councils should they fail to heed such advice. Members of the society in tandem with the rulers were under the same norms and customs. What’s more, the rulers served as custodians of community lands and worked to ensure that their denizens were well cared for. However, the encounter with Western Europeans from the fifteenth century began to alter the function of the traditional rulers. Exposure to the wealth of the West turned them into greedy rulers who instead of advancing the welfare of their people sought to enrich themselves and their royal families. The denouements of such exposure were that the traditional rulers came to actively engage in the colonial enterprise as agents and established enterprises independent of their States. With their consent, modifications were made in the native laws to accommodate European laws which led to the capitulation of the former. Their puppet roles in the colonial enterprise fuelled a group of educated natives to form political parties along Western models in 1947 to free the country from the yoke of colonialism and have since become the basis of politics in the country. This group of educated natives succeeded the chiefs as the administrators of the country. However, their performance as administrators is no better than the chiefs they took over from. In the wake of that emerged a system of governance, which at best could be described as a parody of what exists in Europe or the USA, proffering hope and equality on paper, but undermining and hindering the progress of the people in the name of flawed policies, nepotism, stagnation, and embezzlement of the coffers of the State.

The Ghanaian political scene since the 1950s has gone through remarkable changes. It was characterised by political liberalisation, media expansion, and the participation of various groups from different walks of life. This represented the beatific vision and fad Ghanaians had about their native government after colonial rule towards political and economic freedom. However, it proved to be a mirage, for shortly after independence politics, in Africa in general, changed into one-party politics, dictatorships,

or military regimes. One-party politics was introduced in Ghana by Nkrumah in 1964, to advance the interests of the nation. This limitation of politics to just one political party aroused intense criticism from civil groups, political dissidents, and military-police cadres alike. The upshot of this was the eventual overthrow of Nkrumah's administration by a group of military and police officers on charges of arbitrary detention of political dissidents, socio-economic burden, and corruption. Thus, this paper attempts to show that charges of malversation that led to the toppling of Nkrumah's regime and thence prevented the full realisation of his policies for Ghana are nothing compared to what transpired under subsequent administrations. The paper utilises archival sources, primarily newspapers, with secondary sources in the form of books and journal articles to explore the argument. The contribution of this paper is towards understanding the dynamics of politics in Ghana.

### 1. The Concept of Democracy

Democracy thrives in societies where the rulers and masses respect the political boundaries of groups and individuals. The fundamental basis for achieving such an end is when the traits of fairness, justice, and respect for the views of individuals and groups prevail in a particular society. Of utmost importance to democracy, is the freedom, not only of the majority or dominating group, but the extent to which the minorities can freely voice their concerns without persecution, mobilize to make their concerns known, form associations, elect their representatives, and participate in national discourses that have the potency to affect the lives of both the majority and the minorities.

Democracy is widely believed to have started in classical Greek societies. According to Jack Goody (2006, p. 248), democracy in ancient Greece was referred to as "the rule of the people" and stood against autocracy and "tyranny". From there, it later expanded to other countries, first, in the Western world. Samuel P. Huntington (1991, p. 12) for instance, classified the spread of democracy into three waves; the first 'long' wave, which began in the 1820s up until 1926. The United States was the front-runner in this phase and was subsequently followed by France, Britain, Canada, Argentina, and Italy, among other countries. The second wave came into effect after the successes of the Allies in World War II and peaked in 1962. More countries in Europe, especially Eastern and Balkan countries through the efforts of the United States and the EU embraced democracies. Lastly, the third wave commenced from the 1970s to about the 1990s with Spain and Portugal and other countries in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

Democracy seeks to provide political equality and representation by and for the masses. Goody (2006, p. 247) states that democracy is tied closely to the notions of 'freedom', 'equality', civic participation, and human rights. Regardless of the form of democracy being practised, whether the consensus (liberal democracy) model, which tries to share, disperse, restrain, and limit (political) power in a variety of ways; the majoritarian ("populistic" democracy) model of democracy, which concentrates political power in the hands of the majority (Lijphart, 2007, p. 112); or Dahl's polyarchal democracy, which seeks to promote popular sovereignty and political equality by increasing the "size, number, and variety of minorities whose preferences must be taken into account by leaders" (Krouse, 1982, p. 443), the basic goal of democracy is the degree of inclusiveness of all citizens in national discourses towards development.

However, the example of Ghana, which on paper could be regarded as a consensus democratic model, has proven to be the bane of the nation's progress. It has rather widened the gulf between the educated and uneducated, leaders and followers, and enriched the few cliques of politicians and their compeers whilst subjecting the rest of the populace to poverty. The unprecedented delict and corruption of the Fourth Republic are robbing citizens of their present and future right to exist. It is within such detrimental effects as these that this paper attempts to show that democracy in Ghana, apart from holding periodic elections, is a burden on the masses and hinders the development of Ghana through the actions of elected politicians. Three political ideological strands characterised Ghana's political space since 1949. These are state

socialism, liberalism, and populism (Pinkney, 1997, p. 34). State socialism was the ideological policy of Nkrumah and the CPP; liberalism was the ideology pursued by the UGCC, and its offshoot parties, which included the United Party (UP), National Liberation Council (NLC), the Progress Party (PP), and the Popular Front Party (PFP), all the way down to the New Patriotic Party (NPP) of the Fourth Republic. Populism characterised Rawlings' ideology starting with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in 1979, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) to the National Democratic Congress (NDC) under the Fourth Republic.

But how did political democracy evolve in Ghana? The various traditional rulers ruled their native states. Each native state has a Stool. This Stool represents authority. Would-be chiefs were selected from the Stool's royal family. The selection was done in consultation with the respective council of elders, who in modern political structure constituted the "legislature", of each Stool. Once the council is satisfied with a chosen chief, he is then entooled (enthroned). Only those who entooled the chief could destool (dethrone) him if he contravened his authority and the custom of the state. Denizens could initiate the destoolment of a chief through the next senior chief in their clan, who would then take up the matter to the council of elders. However, the latter power of the people was transferred to the governor under British rule. The transfer of such power, according to Drake "released the chiefs from many of the popular checks and substituted a system of "bureaucratic tutelage" for one based on "traditional authority" (1956, p. 78). In the wake of that, provincial and legislative councils of chiefs were constituted for the chiefs to participate in the colonial enterprise. These chiefs were appointed by the Governor and served as an advisory council to the British colonial government until 1946 when it became an elected legislature (Drake, 1956, p. 78).

The educated natives opposed the establishment of the provincial councils because they felt they would eventually undermine the authority of the native chiefs. This was because, in the working structure of the provincial councils, the British administrative officers were placed above the chiefs (see Abass, 2023, pp. 504-505). However, this was not the only reason. The other reason was that the educated natives believed they were more capable of participating and representing the people because of their education than the chiefs, whom the British had decided to rule through. Thus, the gamut of this contention between the chiefs and the educated natives paved the way for the development of modern politics in Ghana. In 1947, it led to the formation of the UGCC by a group of educated natives and some chiefs and demanded that authority be returned to the chiefs in addition to the grant of "self-rule within the shortest possible time". The political change was expedited by the Ghana Revolution of 1948. In that year, an Accra chief, Baffoe Bonnie, led a boycott of European goods due to their high prices. The protest coincided with a peaceful procession of some ex-servicemen, who were on a march to present their petition to the Governor for the promises made them during World War II to be fulfilled. These officers were ordered to stop by a European police officer. Their refusal led to an order to open fire on the ex-servicemen, thus, killing three and injuring many others. It occurred on 28 February 1948. It resulted in the looting of European stores in Accra and other major towns of Ghana and the destruction of properties. In the aftermath of this, the British blamed the leaders of the UGCC for the insurrection and ordered the arrest of its leaders. Six of them, including Nkrumah, were arrested, and became known as "The Big Six". It was upon their release from prison that Nkrumah formed the CPP in 1949 and demanded "self-government NOW".

A committee, the Watson Committee, was constituted in March 1948 to investigate the causes of the insurrection and to make recommendations. A year later, another committee, the Coussey Committee, was constituted to draft a constitution towards self-rule for Ghana. "The Big Six" was exonerated and released from prison because of the findings of the Watson Committee in 1948. It found out that the people were not pleased with the role of the chiefs in the colonial administration and thence made recommendations for an election to be held to elect the people's representatives. It was based on its recommendations that the Coussey Committee was constituted to bring its recommendations to fruition. The election occurred in 1951 and Nkrumah and his party won. Nkrumah became "the Leader of Government Business". This position was scrapped in 1952 for the Prime Minister position. Another election was called for in 1954 to

do away with the appointment of chiefs to the legislative council by the governor. In 1954, every individual was to be elected directly from the polls. But the chiefs opted not to contest. This was an all-African cabinet with a unicameral legislature. The 1954 cabinet had more authority than the 1951 one. For instance, it had absolute “legislative, judicial and executive authority”, except for matters about “public order, defence, and external affairs which were reserved for the Governor” (Drake, 1956, p. 79).

In 1956, another election was organised towards the grant of independence. This election was unnecessary and only came about because of the opposition of the National Liberation Movement (NLM) to the government of Nkrumah. It was an Asante-based party and criticised Nkrumah about how he handled and regulated cocoa prices. The NLM attracted the other opposition parties and had the support of the Asanteman Council. It called for a federal form of government and went to the extent of presenting a petition to Westminster in London. Nkrumah, on the other hand, stood by his demands for a unitary state. To settle the impasse the colonial government was left with no choice, but to organise a fresh election towards granting independence by a simple majority. Nkrumah’s party won and he carried on with his unitary form of government.

According to Drake, there was an attempt to blend indigenous political institutions with Western ones. For instance, Nkrumah and the CPP were keen on “adopting Western parliamentary forms in their entirety at the national level, and of introducing a form of local government which leaves economic and political power in the hands of the electorate but gives the traditional rulers ritual and advisory status” (1956, p. 80). This was their original status under colonial rule. The restoration of the same was geared towards recompensing them for their ouster from the legislative council in 1954. The chiefs to date constitute the Council of Chiefs as an advisory body to governments.

Thus, David Apter was apt with his assessment of the role of Nkrumah in introducing democracy in Ghana. He maintained that the success of parliamentary democracy in Ghana was because of how Nkrumah “used his immense personal appeal and symbolic status to invest democratic institutions with authority”, by getting “the legislature despite its youth to function well, a judiciary not influenced by politics, a civil service relatively free from favouritism, and the protection of civil liberties” (Drake, 1956, p. 82). Thereupon, political democracy in Ghana was measured by the level of press freedom, freedom of speech and representation, and more importantly economic success. The latter indicator is the pith of all the putesches that occurred in Ghana as would be observed below.

## **2. The First Republic: 1960-1966**

Ghana was the first-ever black African colony to achieve independence, the first to become a Republic, and the first to return to civilian rule after a period of brief military rule (Clegg, 2 Oct. 1969, p. 7). Ghana became independent on 6 March 1957. The people, in their euphoria, on the eve of the announcement were hopeful for a propitious future under self-rule. However, their expectations were fugacious. Ghana was one of the wealthiest British colonies, and its former name “The Gold Coast” attested to this. As put forward by Jeff Haynes, it had an impressive transportation system, a highly educated workforce, and a professional bureaucracy (1995, p. 92). It exports cash crops and mineral resources. For instance, the main export crops are cocoa and timber, and the mineral resources include gold, diamonds, manganese, bauxite, and oil. The country’s wealth manifested in diverse developmental projects in the early years of independence. It became a Republic in July 1960. Between 1960 and 1966, Nkrumah’s government was accused of gagging free speech, arbitrary detention of political dissidents, implementing a one-party regime, corruption, and materialism (see Assensoh and Alex-Assensoh, 2001, pp. 69-70). These were not mere accusations against Nkrumah. They occurred as would be demonstrated later by citing Nkrumah’s own justification, for instance, for implementing a one-party state. The combination of these accusations evanesced all the good work he carried for the country. Consequently, on Thursday 24



February 1966, his government was toppled by a team of military and police officers who subsequently formed the National Liberation Council (N.L.C). The question is, was Nkrumah's malversation worse than what is happening currently under the Fourth Republic or the previous ones?

The above question will be answered towards the end of the paper. In the meantime, the question to ask is, what were the actual reasons for the putsch against Nkrumah? The army since 1965 had resolved to overthrow Nkrumah because of changes he made in the military hierarchy. For instance, in 1965, he dismissed the Chief of Defence Staff, Major-Gen. S.J.A. Otu and his deputy. Before 1965, he had set up the President's Own Guard Regiment (POGR), which handicapped the position of the police and left them yapping. Nkrumah's distrust of the army was vivid in his speeches years before the putsch. For instance, in 1961, in his address to cadets of the Ghana Military Academy, he emphasised that:

it is not the duty of a soldier to criticise or endeavour to interfere in any way with the political affairs of the country; he must leave that to the politicians, whose business it is. The Government expects you, under all circumstances to serve it and the people of Ghana loyally (Nkrumah, 1967, p. 25).

Regarding the one-party system, which he introduced in 1964, his objective was to consolidate Ghana's young democracy and prevent the abuse of power. In his words,

a people's parliamentary democracy with a one-party system is better able to express and satisfy the common aspirations of a nation as a whole, than a multi-party parliamentary system, which is in fact only a ruse for perpetuating, and covers up, the inherent struggle between the 'haves and the have-nots (Nkrumah, 1970, pp. 100-101).

Although with a "good intention", the decision to introduce the one-party system was followed with the passage of the Preventive Detention Act (PDA). Whilst the one-party system took away the people's right to freely participate in political discourses, the PDA was used to gag any form of government opposition. Thus, the putsch had more to do with these factors in addition to the shaky position of the police and the army because of the changes Nkrumah brought to them. Lt.-Col. E.K. Kotoka and the Commissioner of Police J.W.K. Harley schemed and carried out the putsch whilst Nkrumah was in Vietnam on a peacekeeping mission. Before the Radio announcements to broadcast the putsch, military movements were detected in Accra. A bulletin was subsequently issued justifying the putsch. According to the bulletin,

The Armed Forces, in co-operation with the Police have felt it necessary to take over the reins of power and dismiss the former President Kwame Nkrumah, the Presidential Commission and all Ministers and to suspend the Constitution and to dissolve Parliament. This act has been necessitated by the Political and Economic situations in the country. The concentration of power in the hands of one man has led to the abuse of individual rights and liberty. Power has been exercised by the former President capriciously (The Ghanaian Times, 25 Feb. 1966).

Furthermore, the putsch intriguants charged Nkrumah with nepotism, favouritism, and selective justice, thus leading the country to the brink of bankruptcy. They said:

The operation of the laws has been suspended to the advantage of his favourites and he has been running the country as if it were his own personal property. The economic situation of the country is in such a chaotic condition that unless something is done about it now the whole economic system will collapse. In fact, the country is on the brink of national bankruptcy. In 1957 when we attained independence the country had massive overseas reserves, the nominal value of which amounted to nearly £195 million. All these have been used and the country has virtually no free reserves now. The old Government claimed on many occasions that these reserves have been used to carry out the economic and social development of the country. The question is not what we have now but what we could have got(ten) had the reserves

been used wisely. By this standard of assessment, the old Government had nothing to its credit. Economic mismanagement coupled with incessant lip service to planning were the only things they gave to the country by way of leadership in the economic sphere. All of us have suffered in one way or the other from the gross economic mismanagement of the old Government. We have all been hit by shortages of essential commodities. The present mounting unemployment has affected almost every family. Rising prices have reduced the real income of all of us. Available information indicates that within the past three years alone prices have risen by nearly 66 percent implying that in effect those whose incomes in 1963 amounted to £100 per annum are now receiving only £33. We cannot for long continue with the lowering of our standards of living which these figures indicate (The Ghanaian Times, 25 Feb. 1966).

Nkrumah's budget for 1966 was seen as imposing economic burdens on the people. The leaders of the putsch said the budget only increased the economic burdens and hardships of the population. They thus decided that what they needed was a radical rethinking of the country's economic and financial policies. They opined that:

Ghana should have been a much better country than what it is now, but it had been appalled by the exorbitant prices of food in the country. We shall give top priority to this to ensure that all of us get enough to eat and at reasonable prices too (The Ghanaian Times, 25 Feb. 1966).

Ghana has always been blessed with sufficient manpower and resources. However, successive governments have underutilised or mismanaged them collectively. The Army in 1966 was hopeful that with efficient utilisation of the nation's resources, high economic growth would be achieved. They were dissatisfied with the economic growth of Ghana over the past few years by only 3 percent per annum, which they said was "really unthinkable" considering the country's vast potentialities (The Ghanaian Times, 25 Feb. 1966).

In 1966, Ghana's population stood at around 7,500,000. The people celebrated the putsch as a day of true redemption from dictatorship and looked up to the military to curb the spending spree of the politicians. A Commentary was published in *The Ghanaian Times* on Friday 25 February 1966. It ran as follows:

Today, tyranny is dead. The people of Ghana have been freed from the great burden which was imposed on them by the corrupt Government of Kwame Nkrumah. For more than a decade, Ghanaians from all walks of life have been denied their fundamental human rights, and have been subjected to arbitrary rule, injustice and undemocratic practices of a so-called peoples party which was in effect a one-man party backed by unscrupulous hirelings and hangers-on. A new class was born into the Ghanaian society after the country became independent and it proceeded to empty the state treasury of reserves exceeding £190 million and commit so many crimes on the pretext of creating a socialist state. but today, Kwame Nkrumah and his new class are no more. How was it possible that Ghanaians could put up with so many injustices and arbitrary acts for such a long time without even a formal protest? Was it not because of the fantastic so-called security system which Kwame Nkrumah created, which harassed so many innocent people and brought disaster to many families—all in the name of socialism? Today, democracy is reborn. And Ghanaians are grateful for the timely intervention of the Army and Police who have saved us from the clutches of the tyrant Kwame Nkrumah who ran Ghana as a madman would run his house. Where are the Hitlers and Mussolinis of yesterday who used the name of the people to try and build up huge empires for themselves and their families? Surely, it is not possible for the ambitions of a dictator to override the interests of the whole people. The people of Ghana forever remember this day as a day when they saw the first rays of true freedom. It is our bounded duty as people who have been witnesses to the tyranny and arbitrary rule of Kwame Nkrumah and his CPP to give full support to the Army and Police authorities in the present situation. One has only to take a short stroll through the streets of Accra to become aware that the people of Ghana fully support the National Liberation in its determination to clear up the mess created by Kwame Nkrumah. LONG LIVE GHANA (The Ghanaian Times, 25 Feb. 1966, p. 2).

A day after the putsch, people from various stratifications poured into the streets to celebrate. In

Accra, a score of market women, clad in white clothes, danced to demonstrate their appreciation of the overthrow of Nkrumah's regime (The Ghanaian Times, 26 Feb. 1966, p. 4). The lack of clear separation of powers of the three arms of government—the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judiciary—was said to have sparked the woes of the country. In an Editorial in *The Ghanaian Times*, it was expressed that the entire nation had

... been silent and ineffectual witnesses to a decade of one man's rule, degenerating into a personality cult where their liberties were taken one after the other in the name of security and order, to the extent that the flower of their manhood was sent arbitrarily into detention, whilst careerists, opportunists, and incompoops rose into power (The Ghanaian Times, 28 Feb. 1966, p. 5).

Nkrumah's cabinet members were tagged as a "set of illiterate and semi-illiterate people" ruling over the average sensible Ghanaian. Nkrumah was said to have taken the country for granted and he was reminded of his interview on the BBC in London in 1957, where he was quoted to have said: "Ghanaians could only understand by signs because the majority of them were illiterate and that they could not even understand that the country was independent" (Daily Graphic, 8 Mar. 1966, p. 5).

The Chiefs, who in the years leading to independence were at loggerheads with Nkrumah, expressed their happiness to see him removed from office. In a series of messages sent to the National Liberation Council, N.L.C., (The Ghanaian Times, 28 Feb. 1966), first, the Eastern Region House of Chiefs' congratulatory message to the N.L.C. called on the Council to accept their "hearty congratulations on this much-awaited deliverance from tyranny and injustice. ... May Ghana never be placed again with unwholesome ideologies and disregard for human rights". Also, the Volta Region House of Chief, in a message signed by Togbe Adedza II, Awoamefia of Anlo and President of the Council, pledged their loyalty and that of their people to the N.L.C. They expressed their "hearty congratulation on the release of political prisoners. This they said, "demonstrated the sympathy and readiness of the National Liberation Council to restore Ghana's glorious reputation". The Chiefs and the people of Ga Traditional Areas were not left out. They said:

We the elders and people do fully and actively support the N.L.C. which rightfully took over the Government of Ghana from Kwame Nkrumah. That we and our people fully dissociate ourselves from the person, Kwame Nkrumah and all that he stood for. That we and our people will do everything possible to assist Lieutenant-General Ankrah and his band of righting the wrongs which heroic Soldiers and Police in the old government have, for the past 15 years, inflicted on the people of this country (The Ghanaian Times, 28 Feb. 1966).

The Asantehene, Otumfuo Sir Osei Agyeman Prempeh II, also pledged his fullest support for the N.L.C. He charged the military council to work "towards the prosperity of Ghana and restore her lost liberties". The Omanhene of New Juabeng, Nana Kwakye Boateng II, on behalf of his chiefs and people congratulated the N.L.C. for the overthrow of Nkrumah and added that their action had relieved

... the country from the tyranny of Kwame Nkrumah and his gang, thieves, and hangers-on. Thanks to the N.L.C. we are now breathing the air of freedom and are no more under the wicked notorious autocratic and dictatorial government of Kwame Nkrumah (The Ghanaian Times, 28 Feb. 1966).

The Message from the National Association of Local Government Councils on behalf of all local councils in the country backed the military regime by expressing that: "Had it not been for the bold and timely action taken by the Council the country would have collapsed economically before long" (Daily Graphic, 3 Mar. 1966, p. 9). Students were not left out, especially those of the Local Government Training School, who called on the Council to "restore real democracy in Ghana". The Accra market women said, "For a long time we have been accused of supporting the corrupt regime of that tyrant and political demagogue, Kwame Nkrumah. We are now in a position to kick against his aggressive laws". At Winneba

the staff and students of the Specialist Training College thronged the streets of the town with placards saying, “Satan is away forever”, “Liberty is born”, “Down with Lucifer Kwame Nkrumah”, and “We support the National Liberation Council”. Joined by the townfolks they destroyed the sword-bearing effigy of the deposed Nkrumah. Even the chiefs and people of his birthplace, Nkroful, in a message signed by Nana Kwasi Kutuah IV, congratulated the Council for the “overthrow of the wicked regime of Nkrumah” (Daily Graphic, 3 Mar. 1966, p. 9). On 7 March at Nkroful, angry demonstrators demolished the hut in which Nkrumah was said to have been born. Before the demolition started the demonstrators were led by Nana Kwa Kutuwa IV to parade the streets with placards saying “Kwame Nkrumah, you have disgraced us”, and “Nkrumah must be tried and punished” (Daily Graphic, 8 Mar. 1966, p. 1). The Chief told reporters that “we support the Police and the Army and condemn Kwame Nkrumah’s waste of funds in establishing prestige projects” (Daily Graphic, 8 Mar. 1966, p. 3).

The Chiefs of the Gbese Traditional Area in Accra likened the fall of Nkrumah to Satan. Signed by Nii Okai Pesemaku III, Gbese Manche, they said: “The fall of Kwame Nkrumah is more spectacular than that of Satan, a most vivid warning and an appreciable lesson to all who pursue the mirage of (the) political kingdom and its volatile treasures” (Daily Graphic, 7 Mar. 1966, p. 6). Barely a week after the putsch, the Ghana Police on 2 March published what it termed as one of Nkrumah’s crimes against the people of Ghana. Here, Nkrumah was said to have lavished money recklessly on luxuries and girls but asked the people to tighten their belts. Miss Genoviva Marals, a slim fair-coloured South African woman was one of those girls. Nkrumah was said to have appointed her as the Head of Programmes of Ghana Television and as part of the riches he bestowed on her was a luxurious Ford Thunderbird car, which was air-conditioned and convertible bearing the number plate TV 4141, which the two used for their jolly-rides (Daily Graphic, 3 Mar. 1966).

The N.L.C. set up an Economic Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. E.N. Omaboe to investigate and assess the economic position of the country. To salvage the economy, the Committee came up with four areas that needed tackling: the correction of the then imbalances in the country’s foreign payments; the arrest of inflationary pressures; the provision of more jobs for the rising population, and the restoration of balance to the Government budget. Ghana needed C36 million (£15 million) in overseas aid in the interim to tide the country over foreign exchange difficulties (Daily Graphic, 4 Mar. 1966). At one of the meetings of the Economic Committee, it was revealed that Nkrumah had taken C108,000 (£45,000) from the coffers of the State for his trip to Hanoi. Aside from this, the cost of his flight, the VC10, was estimated at 2,400 cedis per hour (Daily Graphic, 4 Mar. 1966). Thus, Nkrumah was proclaimed “a black capitalist” whilst he preached socialism. Mr E. Eyeh-Kumi, a former economic consultant to Nkrumah, disclosed that Nkrumah owned the sum of about 6,000,000 cedis (£2,500,000) which was mainly in Ghana; the Guinea Press; the Lartebikorshie Estate in Accra; Republic House and NADECO Ltd., a private company at the Republic House which was worth 2,400,000 cedis (Daily Graphic, 5 Mar. 1966).

Nkrumah was in Peking when he heard the news. According to him, the Chinese Ambassador in Accra came to meet him in Peking to inform him. His words were, “Mr. President, I have bad news. There has been a coup d’état in Ghana” (Nkrumah, 1968, p. 9). Nkrumah was taken aback and asked, “What did you say? A coup d’état in Ghana, Impossible”. However, he later acknowledged that and added: “But yes, it is possible. These things do happen. They are in the nature of the revolutionary struggle” (Nkrumah, 1968, pp. 9-10).

According to Nkrumah, the soldiers were misled by their commanders who said Nkrumah had plans to send “them to fight in Vietnam and Rhodesia [today’s Zimbabwe]”, and that he had also deserted Ghana taking with him £8 million. Thus, “there was no government left in Ghana, and it was their duty to assume control of the country to maintain law and order” (Nkrumah, 1968, p. 21). It was further alleged that Nkrumah had invited Russians and their planes were landed on a secret airstrip in northern Ghana in tandem with a secret tunnel from the airport in Accra connecting the Flagstaff House, by which Russians had been

arriving (Nkrumah, 1968, p. 22). These all proved to be misapprehensions after the putsch.

Nkrumah was not enthused by the position of the intellectual and professional classes who he said had always been against his government for challenging their privileged position (Nkrumah, 1968, p. 29). Foreign countries were said to have instigated the putsch. Nkrumah remarked that:

... banners and posters prepared in advance in the U.S. Embassy were pushed into the hands of the willing demonstrators, and many of the slogans' words used in the demonstration, newspapers and bulletins issued immediately after the seizure of power were quite foreign to the Ghanaian people, and in some cases completely incomprehensible (Nkrumah, 1968, p. 30).

Nkrumah debunked what he termed “fabricated big lies” (see Nkrumah, 1968, p. 75-96) against him and more importantly the assertion that he had mismanaged the economy. He provided figures and data to prove his inculpability and blamed the N.L.C. for setting Ghana back by abandoning most of the development projects and plans already in motion. Nkrumah never saw Ghana again. He died in Romania in 1972. After his demise, the role of the CIA in his overthrow came to light. On 9 May 1978, in *The New York Times*, Seymour Hersh, a journalist, cited first-hand intelligence sources about the role of the CIA in advising and supporting the intriguants (Vieta, 1999, p. 139). Yet again, in 2001 newly released US government files showed the entrenched positions of the United States, Britain, and France in the putsch (Biney, 2011, p. 158).

### 3. The Second Republic: 1969-1972

There was an interregnum rule of the military between the first and second republics. However, the military regimes fall outside the purview of this paper and will not be discussed. The military regimes have extensively been discussed elsewhere (see Hettne, 1980; Assensoh and Alex-Assensoh, 2001). On 1 October 1969, Busia's Progress Party won the elections to constitute the Second Republic. It must be remembered that Busia was the leader of the Ghana Congress Party and later the United Party (a merger of all opposition parties supported by chiefs of Asanteman and Akyem Abuakwa Councils) which fought with Nkrumah towards gaining independence. Busia was on record to have travelled to London to get the British government to deny granting independence until their proposed Federal form of government had been accepted. His main goal according to him was “to enable every man and woman in our country to live a life of dignity and freedom” (Busia, 1969, pp. 3-4).

But how did his cabinet effectuate? It was a cabinet bent on borrowing. Shortly after his inauguration, together with his finance minister, J.H. Mensah, he travelled to the U.S., the U.K., and Mexico in search of aid, and ended up inviting the IMF to Ghana. The U.K. and the U.S. were to lend between \$170 and \$270 million to the country. For access to financial assistance, Ghana was required to devalue the cedi and reduce the import level (Valerie, 1973, p. 665). The country was so pressed economically that in 1971, he passed the “austerity” budget. The impact of the budget was so grievous that it led to a total ban on all imports of autos, TVs, cigarettes, soda, aluminium sheeting, and an increase in petrol duty, inter alia. The government went to the extent of abolishing civil servants' and army officers' vehicle maintenance allowances and further tried to cut military costs and increase the productivity of the forces (Valerie, 1973, p. 667).

His governance was characterised by nepotism, corruption, party patronage, and ethnic discrimination (see Maxwell, 1972). During his inaugural address in 1969, Busia said:

... rulers cannot accomplish what is expected of them unless they are invested and entrusted with adequate power. Our own recent history has taught us that the sweet heady wine of power is apt to besot and turn rulers into oppressive tyrants (Busia, 1969, p. 1).

The imperious posture of the party led Busia to believe no other group but himself could administer the country. He jabbed that even the opposition parties would concede that, if his government failed the nation, there would not be another such group of men with integrity to manage the country's affairs (Daily Graphic, 1 June 1971). In the meanwhile, as the Prime Minister imposed his austerity budget on the denizens in tandem with scrapping incentives and reducing salaries of civil servants and the military and job losses were rife, he was busily setting up a mansion of an admitted cost of C155,000 in his hometown (Maxwell, 1972, p. 57). Yet again, on 13 January 1972, the army (the National Redemption Council (NRC), and later the Supreme Military Council I&II (SMC I&II) struck to topple his government whilst he was in London. According to reports, he went to London for eye treatment from whence he left for Paris (Daily Graphic, 15 Jan. 1972) upon hearing the putsch.

Colonel I.K. Acheampong delivered a radio broadcast of the putsch. He said,

I bring you good tidings; Busia's hypocrisy has been detected. We in the Ghana Armed Forces have today taken over the Government from Busia and his ruling Progress Party. With immediate effect, the Constitution is withdrawn, Parliament is dissolved, and the Progress Party and all political parties are banned. Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia is removed from office. The Leader of the Opposition is dismissed. All Government Members of Parliament should report at the nearest police station for their own safety (Daily Graphic, 14 Jan. 1972).

The army Colonel added that the malpractices, corruption, arbitrary dismissals, economic mismanagement, etc., that they fought some years ago had returned under Busia. He was charged with dismissing some army and police officers under the pretext of retirement; putting other officers in certain positions to suit the whims of Busia and his colleagues; taking the few amenities and facilities which the army and police enjoyed under Nkrumah; the dismissal of over 1000 civil servants; disorganising the Trade Union Congress (TUC); abusing the Constitution and making a mockery of it. Thus, the army and police resolved to stop him from "committing further blunders and to prevent him from totally collapsing the country before he runs away to enjoy the huge fortune he has acquired outside the country" (Daily Graphic, 14 Jan. 1972, p. 3). The army also undertook to review his policies. In a column dubbed "Graphic view", it was expressed that:

... the situation is precarious because we are in the throes of economic strangulation and contrary to expectation the measures Doctor Busia's government took to arrest the situation have obviously misfired. If anything, those measures especially the recent devaluation of the Cedi, have aggravated the situation and increased the hardships of the already hard-pressed Ghanaians. This unhappy situation has been brought about by the ever-growing external debts, lack of meaningful export trade, non-productive public expenditure and a massive rural development programme which has imposed an extra financial burden on the ratepayers and on our foreign reserves. Our economic plight is grave and therefore requires radical surgery if any headway is to be made towards survival (Daily Graphic, 15 Jan. 1972, p. 2).

The entire country supported the putsch. In Ho, people thronged the streets to express their support for the N.R.C. with the message "Pro Shock! Down with dialogue with South Africa, Captain A.A. Afrifa is a rogue and Busia is a thief; Down with tribalistic Government, and long live N.R.C" (Daily Graphic, 18 Jan. 1972, p. 9). By then South Africa was under white rule. Busia was slammed as "a puppet of Western powers". Thousands of workers (of the T.U.Cs., Makola markets, VALCO, Ghana-Italian Petroleum Company—GHAIP, GIHOC, etc.) and private people in Accra, Takoradi, Sekondi, Tema, Kumasi, Tamale thronged the streets to support the intriguants. In Nigerian newspapers, the independent "Daily Express" expressed that Busia

... should thank his stars that he was out of Ghana when those who appear to love Ghana more tried to rescue the country from his bunglings that he called governing. Dog, they say, does not eat dogs. Busia was loudest in denunciation of Dr Nkrumah, yet events have proved he was in all strata of government

machinery a misfit-in-chief (Daily Graphic, 15 Jan. 1972).

Under Busia, Ghanaians were classified among the highest tax-paying “people in the world”, coupled with other problems facing the country such as “unemployment, corruption, apathy, careless dissipation of funds and waste” (Daily Graphic, 17 Jan. 1972, p. 2). In a similar fashion to what happened to Nkrumah in 1966, the chiefs endorsed the putsch. For instance, Nana Attakora Amaniampong II (Mamponghe), Nii Amugi II (The Ga Mantse), Nana Kwaw Fraiku III (Shama), Nana Nyarko Eku IX (Agona Nyakrom) and their respective councils (see Daily Graphic, 19 Jan. 1972, p. 3) all endorsed the intriguants. The country remained under military rule until 1979 when the Third Republic was ushered in.

#### 4. The Third Republic: 1979-1981

The Third Republic headed by the government of Dr Hilla Limann and his People’s National Party (P.N.P.), after winning the elections supervised by the A.F.R.C., is the infant of Ghana’s republics. Under this republic, Ghana adopted an American-style presidential system. The economy he took had nothing to write home about as the interregnum military rule had left it in tatters. His reforms targeted at controlling government expenditure, improving agriculture, and taxation failed to revive the economy. He was thus left with the option of beseeching the Bretton Woods Institutions. He took a one-billion-dollar (Chazan, 1983, p. 312) bailout from the IMF. By 1981 the loan had exceeded 1.4 billion dollars (Chazan, 1983, pp. 313, 315). In simple terms, the country was in a recession accompanied by shortages of essential commodities and hyperinflation, and the President lost grip of the situation as he failed to coordinate the various sectors in tandem with his distrust of the army and rancour with student bodies (see Chazan, 1983, pp. 313, 315; Dzorgbo, 1998, p. 220).

As Ghanaians were preparing to celebrate the New Year of 1982, the military declared a “Holy War” led by Flight-Lieutenant J.J. Rawlings on 31 December 1981 to oust the Third Republic. The aim he said was “to enable the soldier, the farmer, the worker, the policeman and other poor people to be actively involved in the decision-making process of the country”, and further described the leadership of the P.N.P. as “a bunch of criminals” (The Ghanaian Times, 1 Jan. 1982). The revolution was dubbed “the people’s revolution” under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). The first action by this military council was to order taxi drivers and tro-tro drivers (drivers of commercial privately owned passenger vans), market women and traders of perishable food items to reduce their fares and prices, respectively with immediate effect. The rationale per the council was “aimed at enabling prices to meet the pockets of the ordinary man” (The Ghanaian Times, 2 Jan. 1982).

Limann was not a listening president. Mr. S.T. Provençal of the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG) said Limann had victimised the people and the Armed Forces through “corruption and elitist *laissez-faire* policies which had destroyed many homes and driven most Ghanaians out of the country to become ‘economic refugees’ in foreign countries” (The Ghanaian Times, 4 Jan. 1982). The radio broadcast followed a similar pattern to what had happened to Busia to dismiss the president and his ministers, suspend the constitution and proscribe all political parties. One other reason for the putsch was that Limann had abandoned his pledge to the AFRC which handed it power, in 1979, to purge the country of its corrupt elements. Rawlings in his speech echoed the PNP’s failure to undertake this promise and its failure to provide for the social and medical needs of the people and further denied the masses their fundamental rights. Thus, he remarked that “they have turned our hospitals into graveyards and our clinics into death transit-camps where men, women and children die daily because of lack of drugs and basic equipment” (The Ghanaian Times, 4 Jan. 1982).

Furthermore, a few political cliques possessed most of the wealth of the nation. Thus, Rawlings added that “when some people in the society have more than enough of the nation’s produce while others of the

same society cannot have their basic needs, the system doesn't make sense" (The Ghanaian Times, 9 Jan. 1982). Looters, plunderers, and profiteers were hunted and arrested; an action which caused prices to drop. For instance, prices of items locally produced and imported immediately started decreasing—a tin of milk was slashed to between C4 and C6 from C10; mackerel from C16 to C12.50; a tin of Cerelac baby food from C25 to C20; a large-sized canned tomato puree from C72 to 70; cushion foams from C120 and C150 to C80 a piece" (The Ghanaian Times, 5 Jan. 1982), etc. Yet again, people from all classes endorsed the collapse of the Third Republic. Rawlings remained at the helm of affairs and ushered the country into the Fourth Republic in 1992.

## 5. The Fourth Republic: How long can it hold? 1992-present

This is the longest republic in Ghana's young democratic history. At the end of the first elections to be organised in Ghana in 1951, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in his speech in the House of Commons, said those elections

were accorded unprecedented publicity in the Press and Parliament in this country (the U.K.) and elsewhere and that their significance for the future both of the Gold Coast and Africa as a whole has been widely recognised", and further expressed his hearty congratulations to all members of the Government Service on "this auspicious start to the new constitutional phase in the Gold Coast (ARG 1/24/9, Circular No. 16/51 File No. SCR.1038, 1951, p. 1).

The overall expectation was for the elections "to create and establish electoral machinery that would enable these elections to be the authentic voice of the people of the Gold Coast" (ARG 1/24/9, Circular No. 16/51 File No. SCR.1038, 1951, p. 1). But have the elections been the voice of the people? The simple answer, to a larger extent, is no. Elections in Ghana, especially those under the Fourth Republic have thus far been those of mere rhetoric, propaganda, spending spree, borrowing, and politics of discontinuities. For instance, Ghana's debt as of November 2022 was 575 billion cedis, representing 93.5% of GDP (All Africa, 2023). The IMF has projected Ghana's public debt to rise above \$98 billion in 2023 (IMF, 2023) due to high government borrowing. As a matter of fact, in December 2022, the Finance Minister, Ken Ofori-Atta, admitted that debt payments were taking up between 70% to 100% of the government's revenue and that the ratio of the country's public debt to its GDP had exceeded 100% (Singh, 2023). For the first time, the government suspended its debt service payments on external debt, including commercial and bilateral loans, as it focused on restructuring its domestic debts. The consequences were dire and led to economic burdens on the people and the economy. For instance, by December 2022 inflation was at 54.1%, the highest in 20 years; housing, electricity, water, gas and other fuels rose by 82.3% year-on-year by the end of 2022, the cedi lost 54.2% against the dollar (Singh, 2023), unemployment increased, there was a freeze in hiring into the public sector- the largest employing sector of the economy, and passage of various forms of taxation.

The incumbent administration came to power in 2016 on a promise to stop borrowing, reduce taxation and propel the economy "from taxation to production" (Aziamor-Mensah, 2023) as was said by the current vice-president in rallies leading up to the 2016 elections. However, the administration has introduced more taxes and borrowed more with little progress in production. In 2017, for instance, the government introduced the VAT Flat Rate Scheme (VFRS) for retailers and wholesalers at 3%; in 2018 it turned GETFund Levy and NHIL into "straight levies" that cannot be reclaimed; in 2019 it introduced Communications Service Tax on calls; in 2021, there was the Covid-19 health recovery levy, a 1% levy on imported and exported goods and services, except those exempted, financial sector clean-up levy (5% levy on profit before tax of banks), energy sector recovery levy (20 pesewas on every litre of diesel and petrol, and 18 pesewas on every kg of LPG), and a 1.5% (but in March 2023 reduced to 1%) e-levy on all electronic money transfers (Adonu, 2023), among others. Despite all that, the government had to go to the IMF for a bailout because of its excessive expenditures on consumption instead of production.



In the early 2000s, Ghana's debt was cancelled by the IMF and the World Bank through its Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiatives. However, between 2007 and 2015 the debt began to rise again. Singh (2023) said this was due to the increases in cocoa and gold prices, which increased lending. Thus, the external loans stood at \$18.2 billion and \$8.7 billion in debt payments. Ghana was designated to be at high risk of debt distress by 2015. However, the World Bank went ahead to give another \$1.16 billion in loans to the country (Singh, 2023). These loans are difficult to account for and it is even more difficult to know or trace how they were utilised. Tim Jones said that "many lenders and governments around the world are very opaque about what loans are used for and even the terms on which they are made" (Jones, 2016, p. 16). In the case of Ghana, Jones stated that of the main external debts owed by Ghana, he had not been able to find the interest rates or terms of the non-bond private sector loans, nor for many of the loans from other governments (Jones, 2016, p. 16). Loans with multilateral institutions are only made public after they have been agreed upon. Thus, Jones put forward that in such instances, it could be assumed that "the scrutiny of such loans by parliamentarians, civil society and the media in the borrowing countries before contracts are signed" (2016, p. 17), are not duly performed. The lack of proper checks on government borrowing, especially for infrastructure like schools, roads, and health facilities, is leading to politics of discontinuities. There have been countless uncompleted projects in the country since the 1960s. Instead of continuing them, governments borrow to start afresh similar projects and only to leave them uncompleted when they lose power, and the cycle goes on like that without accountability. For instance, several structures of the E-Blocks Project, which was signed between the Government of Ghana and the World Bank Group in a \$156 million project spanning 2014-2019, towards providing and improving secondary education in deprived communities have been abandoned when the government changed hands in 2016. In addition to this loan, the Ghana Education Trust Fund (GetFund), in 2018 used 40% of its revenue to secure a loan of \$1.5 billion for the provision of educational infrastructure (The Fourth Estate, 2022). The country still faces shortages of classes to educate its children and yet these projects are left to rot. Similarly, in 2020, about 53 abandoned health facilities whose constructions started in 2017 and are 60% and above complete were brought to the attention of the president (Darko, 2020). Instead of completing them to improve access to health in the country, the president made a new commitment to build 88 new district hospitals within a year in 2020 (Ghana Web, 2020), but has not even fulfilled the promise.

Ghana has applied to the IMF for a bailout package seventeen times since 1966. The seventeenth requested bailout of \$3 billion, is yet to be granted but is expected any time soon. Rawlings' rule as a civilian president starting in 1992 started the Fourth Republic. Elections have been held every four years since then. In 2000, he handed over power to the cabinet of J.A. Kufuor who ruled for 8 years. Prof. J.E.A. Mills won the 2008 elections to form the next government, but died in power on 24 July 2012, barely five months before the 7 December 2012 elections. His then-vice-president, John D. Mahama assumed the mantle of power and went on to win the 2012 elections. In 2016, Mahama lost to Nana A.D. Akufo-Addo, who again won the 2020 elections to continue as the President of the Republic. But what do they have in common? Rawlings was known for his disrelish for corruption; Kufuor espoused zero tolerance for corruption like Mills and the others to follow suit. Rawlings was mostly accused of his human rights records and the use of fear to get the economy running. However, Mills was the one who lived up to expectations with his fight against corruption and sound economic policies even to the encomium of the opposition. Ghana's economic fundamentals have not been the same since his demise and even worse under the current regime accompanied by colossal malversation and disregard for the law, albeit the sitting president doubles as a lawyer.

Kufuor's administration was thought to be the most corrupt in the early years of the Fourth Republic, even though he introduced Free Maternal Healthcare under the Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme, built hospitals, the school feeding programme, etc. There were several cases of conflicts of interest and embezzlement. Some of these include (see Apaak, 27 Oct. 2009) the Hotel Kufuor saga involving the son of President Kufuor to the tune of \$3.5 million funded by Prudential Bank partly owned by SSNIT, and the National Investment Bank; overlooking the ruling of CHRAJ against Dr R.W. Anane following findings

of abuse of power and conflict of interest and offered him a portfolio; the several cocaine sagas—several parcels of cocaine vanished under police surveillance and some even turned into powder; eight ministries under him lost 440,814,014,679 cedis public funds due to factors such as corruption, maladministration, inefficiency and sheer negligence. On 1 July 2007, Kufuor’s government decided to redenominate the cedi by removing four zeros, due to inflationary pressures and increasing debt. Ten thousand cedis were shrunk to one cedi. Per the Bank of Ghana, the move was necessitated by “increasing difficulty in maintaining accounting and statistical records; and problems with accounting and data processing software” (PwC, 2007, p. 2). This was simply a ploy to divert public funds and to turn the public’s mind away from the increasing debts of the administration.

Under Mahama (July 2012-2016), although his administration was also characterised by enormous malversation, there were massive infrastructural programmes to advance the welfare of the people in the form of schools, hospitals, data centres, roads, etc. The cedi to a dollar under the Mills/Mahama administration was two; but deep towards the end of the Mahama administration, it sold at four cedis, three pesewas (Ghc4.3). One malfeasance that stood out was the GYEEDA saga (see Ministry of Youth and Sports Report, July 2013). It led to the imprisonment of its coordinator Mr Abuga Pele, and a businessman Mr Philip Akpeena Assibit to six and twelve years respectively, for defrauding the state to the tune of 4.1 million cedis. The youth development agency was used to divert state funds into private pockets through questionable contracts. There was also the SADA saga – a scheme meant to help and develop the northern part of the country. However, due to a lack of due diligence GhC1,059,649.04 was lost on consultancy services alone (see the SADA saga, Myjoy Online, 24 April 2014). As part of the SADA initiative, an amount of GhC47 million was blown on guinea fowl and afforestation projects in the north. SADA entered a venture with Azontaba Cottage Industry to form a Guinea Fowl Production and Marketing Company at an estimated amount of GhC15 million. However, in the end, only a handful of the birds were reared. When queried about the whereabouts of the other birds considering the amount of investment, the management said, “They may have flown to an unknown destination in Burkina Faso” (Ghana web, 19 Oct. 2015).

Another saga under Mahama’s administration was the Airbus saga. Mahama was fingered in “a case of kickbacks in the contract for the sale of Airbus military equipment to Ghana” (Holmey, 11 May 2020). This was the sale of three Airbus C-295 military planes to Ghana at £50 million (Ghana Web, 2020, 20 June). The report said that a subsidiary of Airbus had hired the brother of a high-ranking Ghanaian elected official, a friend of this said brother, and a third person to serve as commercial partners in the sale of three military aircraft to Ghana. The company, which had no experience in the military industry, took advantage of the family ties of one Samuel Adam Mahama with a member of the government. The British judge who sat on the case found that Airbus, through the kickbacks, sought to obtain an “undue favour from a member of the Ghanaian government (Holmey, 11 May 2020). A full-scale investigation into this scandal was launched by the then special prosecutor, Martin Amidu, who in his report tagged this elected official as “Government Official 1”. However, no further actions were taken thereof. While the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), the Christian Council, and the Council of Chiefs were constantly criticising him on one hand, there were threats of strikes by labour unions on the other. The president became frustrated to the extent that he said he had “the dead goat syndrome”, which meant that he was not perturbed by whatever actions the labour unions decided to pursue.

The current Akuffo-Addo administration is tawdrider than those cited above. It is engulfed in several scandals, and economic mismanagement, and has the most plenteous cabinet (with above 100 ministers, each with multiple deputies to govern a population of a little above 30,000,000) under the republics with unprecedented access to wealth and revenue than any of his predecessors. Although on paper it came with good plans such as Free SHS, One Village One Dam, its intent to build factories, etc., their implementations were ill-done and he has ballooned the country’s debt to GDP to above eighty percent of GDP, with very little to display. When he took the economy, the cedi to the dollar was four cedis, three pesewas; but it is almost thirteen cedis to the dollar currently.

In 2020, under a shady deal with his compeers, he attempted to monetise all of Ghana's mineral royalties to an offshore company, Agyapa Royalties Ltd (see Amidu, 26 Nov. 2020). The company was registered in "the British Crown Dependency of Jersey in the British Islands". The government intended to

... sell 49 percent of the shares of this company through public offering and keep a 51 percent stake, in a move, it regarded as an innovative financing solution to help ease the country's debt crisis, but it valued the gold rights at far less than they could be worth (Transparency International, 31 Mar. 2022).

But the Special Prosecutor in November 2020 released a report citing "incidences of rigging and corruption, including opening doors for illicit financial flows and money laundering", with "millions of dollars already paid out to companies without legally required approvals". Databank, a bank owned by the finance minister who is also a cousin of the president was selected without recourse to procurement laws (Transparency International, 31 Mar. 2022). For instance, they valued the mineral resource at \$1 billion, which IMANI said amounted "to undervaluing Ghana's resources by over 65%" (IMANI, 27 Aug. 2020, p. 1). In the end, it was dropped as the public outcry grew stronger.

Instead of travelling by Ghana's Presidential Jet, Akufo-Addo resorted to charting luxurious jets for his trips abroad. According to the North Tongu MP, S.O. Ablakwa, in a space of thirteen months, the President has spent a whopping GhC34 million on ultra-luxury-chartered jets (Ghana web, 26 June 2022). Recently, when a journalist contacted the RTI (The Right to Information) Commission about the procurement method used to select the company from which the President rents private jets, the cost involved, and the reasons why he is not using Ghana's Presidential Jet, the Commission responded that it has decided, for national security reasons, not to make public the cost of the President's travel (Aziamor-Mensah, 26 Jan. 2023). What's more, several decades after independence, as unemployment is raging among the youth, schools in deprived communities are without desks to sit on, soaring inflation, increasing impoverishment of the masses, etc., the President and his cousin-cum-Finance Minister are bent on building a National Cathedral to praise God. When the masses complained of hardship in the country, unlike the reaction of the people of Nkrumah's birthplace when his government was toppled, the Paramount Chief of Akyem Abuakwa Traditional Area Osagyefo Amoatia Ofori Panin, where the current President hails, asserted that:

... we should stop, we should be appreciative, we should appreciate him for his efforts; we should protect him. As for the insults, it's for children of illiterates; if you are trained properly, you won't do that unless you are a witch or wizard (Yalley, 24 Oct. 2022).

The once-vocal Christian Council against the erstwhile administration has gone dead-silent under the current cabinet. When asked about the silence, one of the members, Rev. Prof. E. Martey said he has changed his style of commenting on national issues. He said, "Those I need to communicate with them I communicate. Sometimes through text messages and a lot of things have happened because of my intervention. So, I'm still speaking" (Ghana Web, 25 May 2022). Thus, with recent waves of putsches across the African continent, -- in Mali (August 2020), Guinea (September 2021), Sudan (October 2021), Burkina Faso (January 2022), Niger (July 2023), and Gabon (August 2023) --, because of issues such as corruptions and embezzlements, security concerns, dynastic-styled political democracies, economic dependencies and bad governance, and unemployment among other reasons, one is right to be concerned about how their countries are governed and how the politicians are quick to become wealthy after only brief years in politics. Recently in Ghana, the Minister of Sanitation and Water Resources, Cecilia Abena Dapaah, lost a cash sum of \$1,000,000, 300,000 euros, and 350,000 Ghana cedis, in addition to other personal items including handbags valued at \$35,000 and \$95,000 worth of jewellery (Nunoo & Zane, 25 July 2023) through a theft at her house. She reported the incident to the police but could not explain the source of the sums. She resigned and is currently under investigation. This is just one person. How many

of Cecilia Dapaah are there in Ghana? It is rare in Ghana for a cabinet minister, or a political figure accused of corruption and malversation to resign because they know the public outcry is brief and would die down naturally. Charges of malversation take too long to be solved, if at all, and end up dying in the court of public opinion.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, to answer the question posed above whether the malversation under Nkrumah was worse than what is currently happening in the fourth republic, it is simply no, and incomparable. But first, the paper will compare the various republics. Nkrumah championed the development of political democracy in Ghana. Immediately after the grant of independence, he undertook social reforms and economic reforms that would open Ghana to industrialization. Key among them was his instrumental role in the establishment of the Akosombo Dam, textile factory, GIHOC Fibre Products Company, glass factory, sugar factory, Bonsa tyre factory, roads, etc., and enormous investments in education and other sectors of the economy. Thus, in Nkrumah's fifteen-year rule (1951-1966), Ghana was left with lasting development in all spheres of the economy, and it was the "Star of Africa" with a concrete development path. However, his decision in 1964 to introduce the one-party system ended up suppressing the civil liberties of many and brought to a halt the vibrant political space he had spearheaded. He followed this policy of his with the PDA which led to the arbitrary arrest of his political opponents and dissenters. This prevented several investors from coming to Ghana (see Attuquayefio, 1974, p. 70). Nkrumah at a point did not trust the security services and used any public space he had to remind the army that politics was not for them. He went a step further to reshuffle some army and police officers. This, together with the suppression of political freedom and selective justice was the main cause of the putsch against him because the economic charges seemed frivolous. For instance, after 15 years in power, Nkrumah was said to own £2,500,000, an estate, a Press, and a private company, which did not seem out of proportion considering the number of years he had been in service.

For Busia under the Second Republic, it was a combination of economic and interference in the security services that got him ousted. For instance, his borrowing of \$180 million and \$270 million from the West, devaluation of the cedi, his austerity budget of 1971 which led to an outright ban of all imports of essential goods, his decision to build a mansion whilst asking the masses to sacrifice for the economy, dismissal of over 1000 civil servants and forced retirement of army and police officers, complacency, high unemployment and economic mismanagement culminated for his ouster. Contrarily, Liman of the Third Republic was not a strong leader, and he was unlucky to have inherited an empty coffer. He immediately headed to the IMF and the World Bank for \$1 billion in aid. Despite obtaining the aid he failed to coordinate the various sectors of the country and was at loggerheads with the army and students. His administration was characterised by hyperinflation and corruption as a few people possessed most of the nation's wealth.

It is 31 years now since the commencement of the Fourth Republic. Almost every administration under the Fourth Republic, except the Mills administration, has been to the IMF for a bailout. The administrations of this republic are notable for malversation in increasing order. There were various reforms such as GYEEDA, SADA, Free SHS, health insurance scheme, etc., that would have changed the social conditions of many people and offered improved healthcare and education to many others had they been executed thoroughly. However, these social intervention programmes served as avenues for looting the scarce resources of the state in millions of dollars. Another notable feature of the Fourth Republic is nepotism. This undermines the precept of democratic equality, and it is dangerous for a country should these blood relatives put their heads together to siphon the state. For instance, under the current administration, the president, his cousin-cum-finance minister, and his nephew attempted to monetise Ghana's mineral royalties (at \$1 billion) and formed a company, Agyapa Royalties Ltd., for that purpose without going through due processes. They were to keep 51% and sell 49% through public offerings. They undervalued the minerals by over 65% and paid millions of cedis to the company without legal approval.

However, the scheme failed due to public outcry. Whilst Nkrumah devoted lots of energy to invest in educating the nation's youth, the incumbent is bent on building a \$400 million cathedral (Mensah, 18 April 2023) when hundreds of school-going kids do not have desks to sit on or clean water to drink. The president has spent over \$58 million to dig a giant hole for the cathedral. Also, the travelling spree of the incumbent president is alarming as he spent over 34 million cedis in thirteen months of travel. Due to public outcry, the presidency has decided not to make public such travelling costs.

Thus, Ghana's politics post-Nkrumah is without a concrete direction and there is no national target. Nkrumah was a visionary leader who ruminated on the future needs of the country and drew a progressive growth path for it. Thus, to answer the question posed earlier, the malversation of the Fourth Republic is worse than what Nkrumah and the other republics were charged with. Indeed, Nkrumah may have had his snags, but economic mismanagement was not the real cause of the putsch against him. It had to do with retroactions, especially among the elements who fought him as he prepared for independence and the apprehension of the army towards his personality and intrusion into their affairs. Ghana has never had a clear vision since then and the country has been subjected to the politics of borrowing and a vagarious system.

Democratic institutions are still fragile in Ghana, especially those of checks and balances. There is still violence and deaths during national elections, almost every four years (see Bekoe et al., 2012; Dumenu & Adzraku, 2020). Elected officials easily get away with wrongdoings because "the police and judiciary services are among some of the most corrupt state institutions" (Fobih, 2011, p. 589) in the public sector. Therefore, getting those institutions to function properly, to borrow Fobih's phrase, will help "political institutions to be more accountable and thus more responsive to the people's needs" (Fobih, 2011, p. 585). Transparency is important in building a healthy political society. Thus, as the political and public institutions are strengthened, there is a need for enhancing civic education towards deepening the relationship between the people and their elected officials and spelling out their respective roles in the political strata. Lastly, there is the need to elect charismatic, policy-oriented and responsible leaders who are competent and not or less corrupt.

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## BATI SUDAN TARİHİNDEKİ ÖNEMLİ HAC YOLCULUKLARI VE ETKİLERİ (XIII-XIX. YÜZYILLAR)

### THE IMPORTANT PILGRIMAGE JOURNEYS AND THEIR EFFECTS IN THE HISTORY OF WESTERN SUDAN (13th-19th CENTURIES)

Yıl 4, Sayı 1, ss.24-40.

Year 4, Issue 1, pp.24-40.

Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi

Article Type: Research Article

Geliş Tarihi: 22.07.2023

Submitted: 22.07.2023

Kabul Tarihi: 14.01.2024

Accepted: 14.01.2024

DOI: 10.58851/africana.1328035

#### Atf Bilgisi / Reference Information

Musa, M. (2024). Batı Sudan Tarihindeki Önemli Hac Yolculukları ve Etkileri (XIII-XIX. Yüzyıllar), *Africana Dergisi*, 4 (1), 24-40. <https://doi.org/10.58851/africana.1328035>

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#### Öz

Hız İbrahim'in Mekke topraklarında Kâbe'yi inşa etmesiyle birlikte Mekke hac merkezi olarak belirlenmiş ve bu topraklar kutsal kabul edilmiştir. Kâbe İslam'dan önceki süreçte putperestler için de önemli bir konumda idi. İslam'ın yayılmasıyla beraber Kâbe çevresindeki putperestliğin izleri de zamanla zayıflayıp yok olmuştur. İslam'ın temel prensiplerinden biri olan hac, Gerekli imkânlarla sahip bir Müslüman için ömründe bir kez gerçekleştirilmesi gereken kutsal bir görevdir. Bu görev ve ibadet bilinciyle Dünya'nın dört bir yanından inananlar, İslam'ın beşinci rüknü olan hac farızasını yerine getirmek için bu topraklara gelmiş ve asırlar boyu kesintiye uğramadan devam edegelmiştir. İslam tarihinde, Batı Afrika olarak bilinen bölge dâhil olmak üzere, hac yolculuklarıyla ilgili birçok örnek bulunmaktadır.

Batı Afrika, kutsal yolculuklarıyla öne çıkan bir bölge olmuştur. Tarih boyunca bu coğrafyanın önemli şahsiyetleri hac için hac yolculukları gerçekleştirmişlerdir. Sultanlar ve âlimler gibi önemli şahsiyetler 13-19. yüzyıllar arasındaki sınırlı imkânlarla meşakkatli hac yolculuklarına çıkarak bu kutsal görevin gelenekleştirilerek yaşatılmasında önemli katkılarda bulunmuşlardır. Başta âlimler ve sultanlar gibi önemli şahsiyetlerin yaptıkları hac ibadetleri, Batı Sudan üzerinde derin izler bırakmıştır. Bu bölgede İslam'ın etkisiyle birlikte kutsal topraklara duyulan özlem ve bağlılık daha da güçlenmiştir. Bu çalışmanın amacı; Batı Sudan tarihinde 13.-19. yüzyıllar arasında hac farızasını eda etmek için o zamanın kısıtlı imkânlarında zahmetli yolculuklarla Mekke ve Medine'ye giden meşhur sultan ve âlimleri ve onların hac yolculuklarını gün yüzüne çıkarmaktır. Çalışmamızda bu şahsiyetlerin haclarının Batı Sudan üzerinde bıraktığı etkiye de ışık tutulacaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Batı Afrika, Batı Sudan, hac, sultan, âlim.

#### Abstract

Since Prophet Ibrahim's construction of the Kaaba in Mecca, the tradition of pilgrimage to the sacred lands has continued without interruption. This development, accompanying the rise of Islam, effectively eradicated remnants of idolatry surrounding the Kaaba. The pilgrimage, a fundamental pillar and obligation of Islam, to be fulfilled at least once in a lifetime by financially capable Muslims, has drawn believers from all corners of the globe to these sacred lands. This sacred duty, known as Hajj, stands as Islam's fifth pillar.

In Islamic history, there are numerous examples of pilgrimage journeys, including the region known as West Africa. West Africa has stood out as a region prominently associated with sacred journeys. Throughout history, significant figures from this geography have undertaken pilgrimage journeys for Hajj. Figures such as sultans and scholars, despite limited resources between the 13th and 19th centuries, embarked on arduous pilgrimage journeys, making important contributions to the tradition and preservation of this sacred duty. The Hajj performed by prominent figures, especially scholars and sultans, has

left a profound impact on West Sudan. The influence of Islam in this region has strengthened the longing and allegiance to the sacred lands. The aim of this study is to bring to light famous sultans and scholars from West Sudan's history who undertook the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina despite the limited resources of their time. The significance of this article lies in revealing the challenging pilgrimage journeys undertaken by some West Sudanese sultans and scholars and their impact. Through our study, significant personalities who embarked on pilgrimage journeys will be introduced, shedding light on the traces they left on West Sudan. The scope of the study will be limited to presenting sultans and scholars who undertook pilgrimage journeys between the 13th and 19th centuries.

**Keywords:** West Africa, Western Bilad Sudan, pilgrimage, sultan, scholar.

## **STRUCTURED ABSTRACT**

This article deals with an important topic of African Islamic history. Unfortunately, writers and researchers have not given this topic the right to research and write. This topic is centered on "the relationship of Africans with the Hajj throughout history". This study is of utmost importance because it is about one of the most important acts of worship for Muslims. This worship is a part of the hajj, which is considered one of the five pillars of Islam. Muslims in various parts of the world are doing everything they can from money, time and effort to perform this duty and visit the Kaaba. When we turn the pages of Islamic history, we find that the Africans and their Sultans have not lagged behind on the hajj at any era, but we find them in the first rows among those rushing to visit the tomb of the Prophet Muhammed and the holy places in Mecca and Medina. The history books have immortalized many names of those who made pilgrimages and performed great deeds on the way of this holy journey, when they arrived in Mecca and Medina, and while they were also there.

When one looks at the world map and the geographical location of West Africa from that map, it comes to mind that Muslims from this region in those times, I mean the 12th-19th centuries, it was impossible for them to go to Mecca to perform the Hajj due to the long distance and the danger of the road, especially if we know that many Muslim sultans who ruled countries relatively close to Mecca could not perform the Hajj due to political considerations and security concerns. But the Afars from West Africa wrote less heroic epics in this area. If anything, this indicates the strong relationship that Africans have with the Hajj as a religious ritual, and with Mecca and Medina as holy places for Muslims.

The topic of Hajj among Africans in West Africa is a big and very important topic that deserves to be addressed independently, by referring to the motives of Hajj among Africans and the effects it leaves on them before and after the Hajj, as well as touching on the results of this trip in religious, political and economic terms. But we see that the books that dealt with this topic did not talk about it radically and did not address it from various aspects, but rather talked about a certain period and a certain character in the framework of talking about some incidents that occurred in a certain period of time. Therefore, this article, in terms of covering these incomplete aspects, is considered one of the works that deal with this topic in a detailed and independent manner.

Through this study, it can be concluded that the role of Hajj trips in enriching the history and civilization of Islam, documenting and strengthening the bonds of brotherhood and love among Muslims is very large. Performing a pilgrimage is considered one of the most difficult and difficult tasks, especially in the Middle Ages. Because such a trip is fraught with road hazards, physical and mental exhaustion. This physical suffering and security concerns are shared by the Sultans, the rich, the poor and the common people. Indeed, the risks of this trip and its possible negative consequences for Sultans and Kings are much greater than for the general public and the poor, because the Sultans, besides physical exhaustion and security concerns on the pilgrimage route, their greatest fear is centered around power, because some people with political ambitions may be encouraged by the absence of the sultan from the capital of political decision to carry out a rebellion that may lead to things going wrong and a coup in the regime and the removal of the sultan from the throne. It is for these reasons that when we look at historical sources, many kings, Sultans and caliphs appear before us who could not perform the Hajj, despite being geographically closer to Mecca than Africans. Hence, it appears to the reader that the African kings and sultans who made


the trip to Mecca and Medina to perform the hajj is considered a great act of unparalleled courage and great sacrifice, because they know what the loss of power and rule could entail on this trip, yet they preferred to perform the Hajj and immortalize their names in the pages of history to remain in power and authority. This is what made "the subject of pilgrimage among Africans in past eras" a worthy subject of scientific research and academic works.

As a result of the sacrifices made by Africans in those centuries, the western Sudan region deserved to be among the places that witnessed the historical pilgrimage trips of many Sultans and Kings. One of the most important results of the Hajj trips was the strengthening of religious, political and cultural ties between the Islamic countries of western Sudan and other Islamic countries. In addition, the role of Hajj was very important and powerful in the significant spread of the Arabic language in this region, thus Arabic became the official language in administrative and commercial affairs during the reign of the Mali Empire and the Songay Empire. Because most of the pilgrims who went to Mecca for Hajj from western Sudan stayed there to seek knowledge. And these pilgrims, when they returned to their countries, brought with them a lot of Arabic books, and they also brought with them many scholars specializing in various scientific fields. Due to this cognitive and tourist movement that arose due to the Hajj, the centers of Islamic sciences became widespread and famous in western Sudan, especially in the 15th and 16th centuries.

## Giriş

Afrika'nın Büyük Sahraaltı bölgeleri için Sudan adı ilk olarak Araplar tarafından kullanılmıştır (Mükaddim, 1425/2004, s. 41). Müslüman coğrafyacı ve tarihçiler tarafından 4./10. yüzyıl akabinde Atlantik Okyanusu'ndan, Afrika Büyük Sahra'nın güneyindeki Çad Gölü'ne kadar yer alan bölgeye Bilâdü's-Sudan (Kara Afrika) ismi verilmiştir (Şükrî, 1420/1999, s. 57). Bilâdü's-Sudan bölgesinin batısında bulunan ve bugünkü Batı Afrika adı ile tanınan Batı Sudan veya es-Sudanü'l-Garbî toprakları üzerinde Gana, Mali ve Songay (Songhai) devletleri kurulmuştur (Şükrî, 1420/1999, s. 59). Müslüman coğrafyacıların Sudan adını kullanmaları, öncelikle ten renginin dikkate alındığı görüşlere dayanmaktadır. Bu bakımdan Sudan adı, siyah renkli insanların yaşadığı bölgeyi belirtmektedir ve Mağrib'de (Kuzey Afrika) yaşayan beyaz tenli Berberi kabilelerinden ayırmak amacıyla kullanılmıştır (Şükrî, 1999, s. 59).

Tarih boyunca Batı Afrika için Sudan kavramı, bu bölgenin bugünkü bilinen ülkelere bölünmesinden önce kullanılmaktaydı. Batı Sudan olarak adlandırılan bölge üzerinde bugün Batı Afrika adı altında Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambiya, Gana, Gine, Gine-Bissau, Fildişi Sahili, Liberya, Mali, Moritanya, Nijer, Nijerya, Senegal, Sierra Leone ve Togo başta olmak üzere 5.112.903 km<sup>2</sup>'lik bir alanı kapsayan 16 ülke bulunmaktadır. Batı Afrika'nın nüfusu Aralık 2023 istatistiğine göre 445.297.858'dir (Worldometer, t.y.).



**Harita 1:** Batı Afrika'da kurulan Gana, Mali ve Songay devletlerinin siyasi haritası (Occidental Dissent, 2018).



**Harita 2:** Batı Afrika'nın günümüzdeki siyasi haritası (Istok, t.y.).

Bilâdü's-Sudan veya Kara Afrika üç ana bölgeye ayrılmıştır:

- Doğu Sudan; Nil Nehri ve Nube'nin (Nubia) güneyinde bulunan bölgeleri kapsamaktadır.
- Orta Sudan; Çad Gölü'nü ve çevresini içeren bölgedir.
- Batı Sudan: Senegal havzası, Gambiya, Yukarı Volta ve Orta Nijer Nehri bölgelerini kapsayan bölgedir (Mükaddim, 1425/2004, s. 41).

#### **a. Batı Sudanlılar İçin Haccın Ehemmiyeti**

İslam'ın beş şartından biri olan hac farızası, genelde Müslümanlar için ve özelde Batı Sûdanlı Müslümanlar için büyük bir öneme sahip olması hasebiyle ayrıcalıklı bir konuma sahiptir. Batı Sudânlılar, bütün ibadetlere önem göstermek ile beraber hac ibadetine ayrı bir ehemmiyet vermektedirler. Tespit edebildiğimiz kadarıyla bu durum da şu birkaç sebebe dayanmaktadır:

1. Sudanlı Müslümanların, İslam dünyası ile İslam kardeşliği bağlarını güçlendirmesi açısından haccın rolü oldukça büyüktür. Ticaret, ilim talebi ve hac başta olmak üzere Müslüman ülkeleri Batı Sudan bölgesine bağlayan üç yol vardır (Şükri, 1999, s. 237).

2. İmkânlar açısından günümüzdeki şartlara kıyasla geçmişte ulaşım sıkıntılarından dolayı hac farızasını yerine getirmek ve kutsal toprakları ziyaret etmek oldukça zor bir işti.

3. Mekke ile Batı Sudan arasındaki mesafe; hacca gitmeyi isteyen Sudanlı bir Müslüman için aylarca hatta yıllarca sürecek binlerce kilometrelik yolu kat etmesini gerektiren oldukça zorlu bir yolculuktu.

4. Yolun meşakkati ve tehlikesi; o zamanlarda hac ibadetini ifa etmek isteyenlerin Afrika'daki Büyük Sahra'yı aşmış Mağrib'e (Kuzey Afrika), oradan da kutsal topraklara doğru seyahat etmek zorunda olmalarından kaynaklanmaktaydı. Büyük Sahra'dan hacca gitmek en tehlikeli hac yollarından biri sayılmaktaydı. Çünkü haydut ve eşkıyalar her an yolculara saldırıp mallarına el koyabilir, hatta bazen de yolcuları öldürebilirdi. Hac yolculuğuna çıkan başta bazı sultanlar olmak üzere birçok insan eşkıyaların saldırılarına hedef olmuş, birçoğu da hayatını kaybetmiştir.

5. Batı Sudanlı Müslümanlar için hac yolculuğunun ehemmiyeti; Kâbe'yi, Hz. Peygamber'in kabrini ve onun şehri olan Medine-i Münevvere'yi ziyaret edenlerin takdir edilmesinden, onlara aşırı saygı ve takdir gösteriliyor olmasından kaynaklanmaktaydı. Çünkü Sudanlılar'ın nezdinde hacca gidip bin bir zorluğu atlatarak, ailesine ve memleketine sağ sâlim geri dönen kişi, bir veli ve bir kahraman olarak görülmekteydi (Niyânî, 1988, s. 157).<sup>1</sup>

O zamanlarda hacca giden Batı Sudanlılar'ın karşılaştıkları zorluklara karşın hac farızasını ifa etmek hiçbir zaman kesintiye uğramamıştır. Batı Sudanlılar, yola çıkıp başlarına gelebilecek zarar ne olursa olsun her zaman seve seve hacca gitmeye devam etmişlerdir. Ayrıca bölgede hac, siyasi ve ekonomik açıdan tarihsel bir öneme sahiptir. Dolayısıyla hac konusunda Batı Afrikalı bazı sultanlar tarihte unutulmaz izler bırakmıştır.

## b. Batı Sudan'dan Hac Yolculuğuna Çıkan Bazı Önemli Şahsiyetler

Batı Sudan tarihinde farklı devir ve farklı devletlerde hac farızasını yerine getirmek için yola çıkan birçok insan bulunmaktadır. Bu kutsal yolculuğa çıkanlar, sadece sultanlar gibi meşhur kişilerden ibaret olmayıp toplumun farklı tabakalarına mensuplardır. Ama ele alacağımız şahsiyetler bu yolculukta büyük iz bırakanlarla sınırlı olacaktır.

### I. Zâfûn Meliki'nin Hac Yolculuğu

Zâfûn melikinın yaptığı hacın Batı Sudan tarihinde hükümdarlar ve sultanlar tarafından yapılan ilk hac yolculuğu olduğu tahmin edilmektedir. Bu melikin ismi ve hacca çıktığı yıl belirtilmemekle beraber onun hac yolculuğu hakkında bilgi, ünlü Müslüman coğrafyacı Yakut Hamevî'nin (ö. 626/1229) eserinde şöyle yer almaktadır:

Zâfûn, Mağrib ile komşu olan Bilâdü's-Sudan'da bulunan bir bölgedir. Bu bölgenin meliki çok güçlüdür ve başşehrinin ismi de Zâfûn'dur. Melikin özelliklerinden biri tek bir yerde kalmayıp çoğu zaman fazla yağmur ve su bulunan yerlerde yaşamayı tercih etmesidir. Zâfûn Krallığı, Mağrib'teki Murabitlar devleti kadar güçlüdür ve Murabitlar, Zâfûnlular'ın gücünü tanıyıp bazen bazı konularda onların görüşüne başvururlardı. Yıllardan birinde Zâfûn meliki hacca gitmek amacıyla yola düştü ve Mağrib'e vardığında Murabitlar'ın sultanı Emîrü'l-Müminîn tarafından güzel bir şekilde karşılandı. Karşılama töreninde Mağrib sultanı yaya iken Zâfûn meliki atın üstündeydi. (...) Saraya ulaşana dek bu durum devam etmiştir (Hamevî, 1397/1977, s. 127).

Hamevî, bu melikin adı ve hac ibadetini eda etmek maksadıyla Mekke'ye gittiği yılı zikretmemiş olmasına karşın Mahamadou Doukoure<sup>2</sup> gibi bazı araştırmacılar; bu melikin takip ettiği yolu, Mağrib'te hüküm süren sultan için kullanılmış unvan ve Mağrib sultanı tarafından Zâfûn melikine gösterilen güzel muameleden yola çıkarak bu melikin hac yılını ispatlamaya çalışmıştır. Doukoure'ye göre bu melik hacını 465-537/1073-1143 yılları arasında gerçekleştirmiştir (Doukoure, 2022, s. 85). Yani onun hac yolculuğu ya Mağrib'deki Murabitlar sultanı Yûsuf b. Tâşfîn (1061-1106) ya da ondan sonra iktidara geçen oğlu Ali b. Yûsuf b. Tâşfîn (465-500/1073-1106) döneminde yapılmıştır. Doukoure'nin tercihi şu gerekçelere dayanmaktadır:

Hamevî, Zâfûn melikinın hacını, ismini zikretmediği Murabitlar'ın sultanı 'Emîrü'l-Müminîn' döneminde olduğunu yazmaktadır. Ayrıca o, *Emîrü'l-Müminîn* lakabını sadece Yûsuf b. Tâşfîn ve oğlu Ali

<sup>1</sup> Hatta bazen hacca giden kişiye el-Hâc unvanı verilir. Örnek olarak bk. (Sa'dî, 1981, s. 72)

<sup>2</sup> Profesör Doktor Mahamadou Doukoure 1967'da Fildişi Sahili'nde dünyaya gelmiştir. O, Nijer Cumhuriyeti'nde bulunan meşhur üniversitede (Islamic University Of Niger) İslam Temel Bilimleri alanında akademisyen olarak çalışmaktadır. Onun en meşhur eseri: "Mense Musa, es-Sultan el-Hâc" kitabıdır.

çin sık sık kullanılmaktadır (Hamevî, 1977, s. 146; Hamevî, 1977, s. 310).

Hamevî, Zâfûn melikinin hacca gittiğinde Merâkeş'ten geçtiğini zikretmektedir. Tarih kaynaklarında belirtildiği gibi 470/1078 tarihinde Merâkeş şehrini kurup onu Murabıtlar'ın başkenti haline getiren kişi 'Emîrî'l-Müminîn' Yûsuf b. Tâşfîn'dir (Hamevî, 1977d, s. 94).

Hamevî'nin belirttiği Zâfûn meliki, Murabıtlar'ın emiri tarafından oldukça büyük bir takdir ve saygı ile karşılanmıştır. Bu davranış ise Batı Sudan Müslümanları ve Mağrib'deki Müslümanlar arasındaki ilişkilerin o zaman da ne kadar iyi ve güçlü olduğunu göstermektedir. Batı Sudan'da Murabıtlar'ın etkisinin zirveye ulaştığı altın çağ 469/1076-77'de Murabıtlar'ın Gana İmparatorluğu'nun başkenti Kumbi Salih'i ele geçirmesi ile yaşanmıştır. Bu tarihe baktığımızda Murabıtlar'ın sultanı Emîrî'l-Müminîn Yûsuf b. Tâşfîn dönemine denk gelmektedir. Bütün bu karşılaştırmalardan hareket ederek Doukoure, Zâfûn melikinin hacı 465-500/1073-1106 yıllarına tekabül eden Yûsuf b. Tâşfîn döneminde gerçekleştiğini tespit etmiştir (Doukoure, 2022, s. 85). Bizce de bu doğru bir tercihtir.

## **II. Mali İmparatorluğu Döneminde (627-868/1230-1464) Meşhur Hac Yolculukları**

Mali İmparatorluğu, Batı Sudan tarihinde iz bırakan en önemli Müslüman devletlerden biridir. Bu devlet 627/1230 yılında Mandê halkı<sup>3</sup> tarafından kurulup Batı Sudan'ın geniş bir kısmında 15. yüzyılın ortalarına kadar hüküm sürmüş ve hem bahse konu olan devlet hem de İslam tarihinde iz bırakan büyük sultanlar geçmiştir. Çalışmamızın bu kısmında da hac yolculukları ile meşhur olmuş isimlere ve yolculukları sırasında bıraktıkları izlere ışık tutmaya çalışacağız.

### **a. el-Müslimânî, Mense Ali (Mansa Oli) ve Sultan Sâkûrâ'nın (ö. 699/1300) Hac Yolculukları**

Bazı tarih kaynaklarına göre Mali Devleti'nde hacca giden ilk sultan, Konate hanedanından gelen Bârâmandân el-Müslimânî'dir. Kitâbü'l-İber adlı eserinde İbn Haldun da Mali sultanları arasında hacca giden ilk Batı Sudanlı sultanın Bârâmandân'ın olduğunu vurgulamıştır (İbn Haldûn, 2000, s. 496). Bârâmandân'ın seyahatini müteakiben Keyta (Keita) hanedanı Mali Devleti'ni ele geçirdikten sonra Sultan Mense Ali (Mansa Oli) bu hanedandan hacca giden ilk sultan olarak tarihe geçmiştir. Tarih kaynaklarında Sultan Mense Ali'nin dindar, iyi bir Müslüman olması dolayısıyla tahta geçer geçmez yaptığı ilk işlerden biri hacca gitmektir (Rukez, 1986, s. 71). Mali Devleti'nin en büyük sultanlarından sayılan Mense Ali'nin hac seferi Mısır Memlük Devleti Sultanı Baybars'ın (ö. 1277) hükümlerinde gerçekleşmiştir (İbn Haldûn, 2000, s.496). Sultan Mense Ali'nin yaptığı hac yolculuğunun olumlu sonuçlarından biri, Müslüman ülkelerin nezdinde Mali'ye dikkat çekip önem kazandırmasıdır (Niyânî, 1988, s. 157).

Mali Devleti tarihinde hac ibadetini eda etmek için hac yolculuğuna çıkan üçüncü sultan Sâkûrâ'dır. O, tahta oturduğunda memleketin iç meselelerini halledip iç güvenliği sağlandıktan sonra 699/1300 senesinde hac farzasını ifa etmek amacıyla yola çıkmıştır (Niyânî, 1988, s. 157). Bazı tarihçiler, Sâkûrâ'nın hacca gitme kararının devletin iç politikasıyla ilgili olduğunu belirtmişlerdir. Onlara göre, bir gerileme döneminin ardından tahta geçmeyi başaran ve devletini güçlendirip iç sorunları çözmeye amaçlayan Sâkûrâ'nın en büyük hedefi devletin eski gücünü yeniden canlandırmaktır. Dolayısıyla Sâkûrâ için hac yolculuğu, dini ve siyasi açıdan devletin gücünü artırmak ve halk arasında itibar kazanmak için kaçınılmaz bir fırsattır (el-Nagar, 1969, s. 70). Sâkûrâ'nın hac dönüşünde Tâcûrâ<sup>4</sup> denen bir yerde Sahra haydutlarının saldırılarına maruz kalarak şehit düşmüştür (Niyânî, 1988, s. 157).

<sup>3</sup> Mandê halkları, Mande dillerini konuşan etnik gruplardır. Mandéliler, günümüzde Batı Afrika'nın en büyük milletlerindedir ve Batı Afrika'nın birkaç ülkede bulunmaktadır. Fazla bilgi için bk. Mandé peoples - Wikipedia

<sup>4</sup> Libya'da bir şehir.

### b. Sultan Kankan/Mense Musa'nın (ö. 737/1337) Hac Yolculuğu

Sultan Kankan/Mense Musa 712/1312'de tahta oturmuş ve ondan önceki sultanlar tarafından başlatılan hac yolculuğu geleneğine devam etmiştir. Böylece 25 Receb 724/18 Temmuz 1324 tarihinde hac için hizmetçi, asker ve bazı devlet adamları başta olmak üzere yirmi bine yakın kişi ile birlikte yola çıkmış ve Kahire'ye gelince el-Karrâfe adlı bir yerde yerleşmiştir. Sultan Musa çıktığı bu hac yolculuğu esnasında Kahire'deki halife, Süleyman el-Müstekfi Billah Ebu'r-Rabi' el-Hâkim Biemrillah el-Abbâsi (ö. 740/1340) ve devletin yöneticisi de Memluk Sultanı Mihmandâr en-Nâsir Muhammed b. Kalavûn'dur (ö. 741/1341). Sultan Mense Musa, Mısır'da kendine yaraşır bir şekilde karşılanarak Kal'atü'l-Cebel'de Memluk sultanının huzuruna girdiği zaman Memluk saray geleneğine göre sultanın huzuruna çıkanların sultanın önündeki toprağı öpmeleri gerekmektedir. Mali sultanından bu geleneği yerine getirilmesi istense de o *"Ben Mâlikî mezhebine mensup bir Müslümanım. Allah'tan başka kimseye boyun eğmem ve secde etmem."* diyerek bunu kabul etmeyince Memluk sultanı bu durumu anlayışla karşılamıştır (İbnü'd-Devâdârî, 1982, s. 314; İbn Hacer, s. 383; İbn Kesir, 1988, s. 112; İbnü'l-Verdi, 1996, s. 266; Makrizî, 1997, s. 73; Nüveyrî, s. 54; Safedî, 1998, s. 477; Yâfiî, 1997, s. 204; Zehebî, 1985, s. 69).

Mısır Memluk sultanı, Sultan Mense Musa'ya armağanlar verip onun haccını kolaylaştıracak gerekli tüm hazırlıkların yapılması için emir vermiştir. Sultan Musa da Mısır sultanı tarafından gösterilen bu ikramı karşılıksız bırakmayarak Memluk sultanı başta olmak üzere Mısır devletinin ileri gelenlerine bol bol altın ve mücevherler hediye etmiş ve Mısır hazinesine de fazla altın filizi bağışlamıştır. Hac görevlerini yerine getirmek amacı ile Sultan Musa kutsal topraklarda üç ay kaldıktan sonra 725/1325 yılının Rebülevvel ayında dönüş hazırlıklarına başlamıştır (Zehebî, 1985, s. 72; Yâfiî, 1997, s. 206; Doukoure, 2022, s. 124). Hicaz bölgesinin ikliminin Batı Sudan'dan farklı olması hasebiyle Sultan Musa'nın beraberindekilerin büyük kısmı dönüş sırasında aşırı soğuktan etkilenip hayatlarını kaybetmiştir (Doukoure, 2022, s. 125; İbn Haldûn, 2000, s. 495). Mekke'den dönüş sırasında da yine Mısır sultanına Hicaz'dan getirdiği bazı hediyeleri göndermiş, Mısır'ın büyük veziri ve bazı devlet adamlarına da yine çok fazla altın vermiştir (İbnü'd-Devâdârî, 1982, s. 316; İbn Hacer, s. 383; İbn Haldun, 1421, s. 496; İbn İyâs, 1975, s. 457; İbn Kesir, 1988, s. 112; İbnü'l-Verdi, 1996, s. 266; Safedî, 1998, s. 477; Yâfiî, 1997, s. 204; Zehebî, 1985, s. 69).

Sultan Kankan/Mense Musa'nın yaptığı ihsan sadece Mısır'ın bürokrasisi ile sınırlı kalmamıştır. Dolayısıyla yolculuğu boyunca yoksul ve muhtaç olanlara ve âlimlere de ihsanda bulunmayı göz ardı etmemiştir. Kaynaklarda onun Mısır'da muhtaç ve fakirlere çok fazla altın verdiği, hac yolculuğu esnasında geçtiği yerlerde çok fazla para harcadığı geçmektedir (Ömerî, 2020, s. 56). Sultan Musa'nın bu tarihî hac yolculuğuna şahitlik eden ve aynı zamanda ona rehberlik etmiş olan Muhanna b. Abdülkâdir el-Acramî, Kankan Musa'nın hacılara, Mekke ve Medine'nin halkına ihsanda bulunduğunu zikretmiştir (Ömerî, 2020, s. 58).

Batı Sudan tarihinde Sultan Kankan Musa'dan evvel hacca gidenler de olmuştur. Ancak Kankan/Mense Musa'nın haccı eşsiz ve muhteşem olduğu için tarih kaynaklarında efsanevi bir şekilde anlatılmıştır. Öyle ki kaynaklarda Mısır'da Sultan Mense Musa'nın gelmesinden evvel altının fiyatı çok yüksekti ve bir miskal altın (4.25 g ağırlığı) en az yirmi beş dirhemdi. Ancak onun Mısır'a uğramasından sonra altın fiyatı düşmüş ve bu düşüşü uzun zaman sürmüştür. Sultan Musa, o kadar çok altın harcamış olmalıdır ki meşhur tarihçi Ömerî'ye (ö. 749/1349) göre on iki sene boyunca bir miskal altının fiyatı on iki dirhemi aşmamıştır (Ömerî, 2020, s. 58).

İlme çok önem veren biri olarak Sultan Musa, kitaplar başta olmak üzere Mısır'da çok şey satın almış olmalı ki sonunda kendisi Mısır tüccarlarından borç almaya mecbur kalmıştır. Sultan Musa'nın borçlandığı en meşhur tüccarlarından biri Siraceddin b. el-Küveyk'tir. Ancak Mense Musa, memleketine döner dönmez bütün aldığı borçları fazlası ile ödemiştir. Musa'nın bu hac yolculuğu, Mısır ekonomisinin ihyası ve



canlanması açısından oldukça büyük bir rol oynamıştır (İbn Battûta, 1987, s. 707; İbn Hacer, s. 383; İbn Haldûn, 2000, s. 496).


Mense Musa, Kahire’de gördüğü sarayların muhteşemliği ve büyüklüğüne hayran kalarak ülkesinde aynı mimari eserleri inşa etmeye çalışmıştır. Bunu gerçekleştirmek için hacdan gelirken beraberinde mühendis ve mimar getirmiştir. Bu mimarlar arasında Sultan Musa’nın emri üzerine Gao şehrinin Ulu Cami’sini inşa eden Endülüslü meşhur mimar Ebû İshâk et-Tunjak da bulunmaktadır. Bu cami sonraki dönemlerde bölgede ortaya çıkan siyasî istikrarsızlık ve ihmal sonucunda yıkılmaya maruz kalmış. Ancak son yıllarda arkeoloji çalışmalarının neticesinden bu camiden elde edilen kalıntılar o muazzam esere şahitlik etmektedir. Ebu İshak, yine Mali başkentinde bir kubbe, Timbuktu şehrinde de Songay dilinde Cingarey Bero adı ile bilinen bir Ulu Cami ve bir saray inşa ettirmiştir (İbn Haldûn, 2000, s. 496; Nâsîrî, s. 152; Niyâni, 1988, s. 161; Sa’dî, 1981, s. 7).

Sultan Musa Mekke’den ve geçtiği başka Müslüman ülkelerden sadece zanaatkâr ve mimar değil, aynı zamanda çeşitli ilim dallarından âlimler getirmiştir. Onun getirdiği âlimler, Timbuktu ve başka büyük şehirlerde camilerin yapılmasına ve Sankora Üniversitesi gibi eğitim merkezlerinin inşa edilmesine katkı sağlamıştır. Bunun yanı sıra kendi memleketine “bereket olsun” diye yanında Mekke’den bazı Şerifleri (Hz. Peygamber’in torunu Hz. Hasan’ın soyundan gelen Ehl-i Beyt’e mensupları) de getirmiştir (Ka’t, 2014, s. 125; Niyâni, 1988, s. 183).

Sultan Musa’nın hac yolculuğunun en önemli sonuçlarından biri; Allah’ın farz kıldığı hac ibadetini ifa ettikten sonra farklı coğrafyalardan gelen Müslümanların birbirleri ile iletişime geçip ilişkilerini sağlamlaştırma ve geliştirme faaliyetleridir. Bütün bunlar Bilâdü’s-Sudan ile İslam âleminin diğer bölgeleri arasındaki bağların güçlendirilmesini sağlamıştır (Kâsim, 1990, s. 20). Böylece 8./14.yüzyıldan sonra Kankan Musa’nın yaptığı meşhur haccını müteakip Mali ve o zamandaki Müslüman ülkeler özellikle Mağrib ve Mısır arasındaki kültürel, siyasî ve ticari ilişkilerin yüksek seviyede ilerlediği görülmektedir. Bu ziyaret, Mali Devleti’nin itibarını, sınırlarının çok ötesine taşımıştır (İbn Haldûn, 2000, s. 496; Nâsîrî, s. 152; Niyâni, 1988, s. 184).

Mense Musa’nın bu meşhur hac yolculuğunun en önemli neticelerinden biri de Avrupa’nın dikkatini Bilâdü’s-Sudan’a yani Sahraaltı bölgesine çekmesidir. Avrupalılar’ın Bilâdü’s-Sudan ile alakalı bilgileri Orta Çağ’ın sonuna dek çok az idi. Ancak Sultan Musa’nın 724/1324 senesindeki hac yolculuğu sırasında Kahire’de cömertçe harcadığı altınlar hakkındaki haberler Avrupa’ya mübalağalı bir şekilde ulaşmış olmalıdır ki, Avrupalılar, Sultan Musa’dan bahsederken onu Batı Sudan’daki Sahraaltı bölgesinin tamamının sultanı olarak tasavvur etmişlerdir (Riyâd, 1965, s. 16). Abraham Cresques (ö. 789/1387) adlı Avrupalı bir ressam, daha fazla ileri giderek, dünya haritasını çizdiği zaman Batı Sudan’ın harita bölümünde Afrika Büyük Sahra Çölü’nün ortasına altın tahtın üzerinde oturan, altın kıyafet giyen bir sultanın resmini koyarak altına (Mali Devleti’nin Sultanı) şeklinde yazmışlardır. Avrupalılar’ın Bilâdü’s-Sudan hakkındaki bunun gibi düşünceleri gayet normaldir. Çünkü Afrika’nın iç kısımları hakkındaki bilgileri o dönemde oldukça azdır. Dolayısıyla Afrika kıtasının zengin olduğu düşüncesi onlarda Afrika’yı inceleyip keşfetme merakının ve tutkusunun uyanmasına yol açmıştır (Riyâd, 1965, s. 16). Avrupalılar’ın bu düşünceleri ve girişimleri önce köleleştirmeye daha sonra da sömürgecilige neden olan coğrafi keşif hareketlerine zemin hazırlamış olup bunun sonucunda da Afrika’nın yer altı zenginliklerinin çıkarılmasına milat olmuştur (Riyâd, 1965, s. 17).

Mense Musa’nın kervanı, Mali’den Walata’ya ve ardından Tuat/Gadamis üzerinden Kahire’ye doğru yola çıktı. Dönüş sırasında ise aynı yol kullandığı kaydedilmektedir (el-Nagar, 1969, ss. 73, 79).



Harita 3: Mense Musa'nın hac yolculuğu haritası. Kaynak: (Oliver, 2013, s. 51; Abbou, 2020, s. 6).



A. Cresques tarafından 1375 yılında çizilen Mense Mûsâ'nın tasviri (Kavas, 2004, s. 147; Galica, t.y).

## I. Songay İmparatorluğu Döneminde (868-999/1464-1591) Meşhur Hac Yolculukları

Miladi 15. yüzyılın ortalarında Batı Sudan'da hüküm süren Mali Devleti zayıflayarak ortadan kalkmış söz konusu devletin yerini Songay Devleti almıştır. Bu devlet, hâkimiyet dönemi olan 868-999/1464-1591 yılları arasında Mali Devleti'nin hükmü altındaki bölgeleri kendi topraklarına katarak Batı Sudan tarihindeki en büyük ve en geniş devlet haline gelmiştir. Söz konusu devletin sultanlarının gösterdikleri çabalar sonucu 15.-16. yüzyıllarda Batı Sudan'da İslam medeniyetinin ve kültürünün en parlak dönemi yaşanmıştır (Maikâ, 1997, s. 13). Yine Songay Devleti döneminde iz bırakan bazı meşhur hac yolculukları ise şöyledir:

### a. Sultan el-Hâc Askiyâ Muhammed'in (ö.1537) Hac Yolculuğu

Songay Devleti tarihinde Sultan Askiyâ Muhammed'in (1493-1528) ayrıcalıklı bir yeri vardır. O, Songay İmparatorluğu'nun kurucusu olan Sultan Sonni (Sunni) Ali Bero'nun (ö. 897/1492) oğlu Sonni (Sunni) Baru'yu tahttan indirerek başa geçmiş ve sonra Songay Devleti'nin en büyük sultanı olmuştur. Yine Askiyâ Muhammed'in güçlü bir sultan olmasının yanında dindar bir Müslüman olduğu da kaydedilmektedir. Onun döneminde Batı Sudan'da İslam medeniyeti ve İslami ilimler en yüksek seviyeye ulaşmıştır (Maikâ, 1997, s. 13).

Sultan Askiyâ Muhammed, tahta oturduktan sonra halkla ilgilenmeye, onlarla yakınlaşmaya, devlet içinde huzur, istikrar ve güven sağlamaya çalışmıştır. Devleti, istikrarlı ve huzurlu yaptıktan sonra kardeşi Kanfâr Ömer'i yerine vekil olarak bırakıp hac ibadetini gerçekleştirmek amacıyla Mekke'ye gitmeye karar vermiştir (Panikkar, 1998, s. 134; Nagar, 1969, s. 84). Böylece 903/1497 yılının Safer ayında Sultan Askiyâ Muhammed hac yoluna düşmüştür (Sa'dî, 1981, s. 72). O zamanın imkânlarına göre Mekke'ye gidış-dönüş uzun ve meşakkatli bir yolculuk olduğu için Sultan, hac mevsiminden on ay kadar evvel memleketinden yola çıkmıştır (Magribî, s. 56). Askiyâ kervanının Gao'dan Takeda'ya, Air'e ve Fizan'a seyahat ettiği düşünülmektedir (Nagar, 1969, s. 87).

Sultan Askiyâ'nın, Hicaz bölgesine gitmesinin en mühim nedeni hac farızasını yerine getirmektir. Ana nedenin bu olmasının yanı sıra, o zamandaki Müslüman devletlerle ilişki kurma hedefi olduğunu da söylemek mümkündür. Tarih kaynaklarına göre Askiyâ Muhammed'in hac kervanı 1000 piyade, 800 atlı ve çok sayıda âlimi de içermektedir. Bu hac yolculuğunun masraflarını karşılamak amacıyla beraberinde 300.000 altın dinar taşıdığı da kaynaklarda yer almaktadır (Buffill, 1988, s. 236; Niyâni, 1988, s. 206).

Burada zikredilmesi gereken bir husus daha vardır ki; o da bazı tarih kaynaklarında, Sultan Muhammed Askiyâ'nın hacca gitmesinin nedeninin tamamen siyasi amaçlı olduğudur. Bu tür rivayetlere göre Askiyâ Muhammed'in amacı; Sonni (Sunni) hanedanından gasp ettiği iktidarı meşrulaştırmaktır. Bu amacı gerçekleştirmek için uzun bir düşünme ve istişareler sonunda Sultan Muhammed Askiyâ'nın, hacca gidip Mısır Memluk Devleti himayesi altında bulunan Abbasi halifesinin kendisini tanıması için bu kararı aldığı öne sürülmüştür. Ancak, Sultan Askiyâ'nın hayatına ve iktidarı boyunca gerçekleştirilen işlere bakıldığında bu iddianın herhangi bir delile dayanmadığı açıkça görülmektedir. Ayrıca, o zamanlarda Bilâdü's-Sudan'daki sultanların ve hükümdarların hacca gitmeleri, Mali Devleti'nin sultanlarının da daha önce yaptıkları gibi Batı Sudan'da kurulan tüm Müslüman devletlerde uygulanan bir gelenektir (Panikkar, 1998, s. 134).

Sultan Askiyâ Muhammed, bu hac yolculuğunun finanse etmek üzere taşıdığı 300.000 altın dinarın üçte birini Mekke ve Medine'deki hayır kurumları, yoksullar ve fakir fukara arasında dağıtmıştır. Yine bu malın üçte biri ile de Mekke'ye Batı Sudan'dan gelen âlimler, yoksul hacılar için vakıf olarak Mekke'de bağlar ve evler satın almıştır (Buffill, 1988, s. 236; Ka't, 2014, s. 101; Niyâni, 1988, s. 206; Panikkar, 1998, s. 135).

## 1. Sultan Askiyâ Muhammed'in Hac Yolculuğu Sırasında Yaptığı Bazı Önemli Görüşmeleri

### 1.1. İmâm Süyûtî ile Görüşmesi

Sultan Askiyâ Muhammed 903/1497 senesinde hacca giderken Kahire'den geçerek dönemin birçok ünlü âlimiyle bir araya gelip onlarla güzel vakit geçirmiştir. Tarih kaynaklarının öne çıkardıkları Askiyâ Muhammed'in görüştüğü âlimlerden biri o dönemde İslam dünyasının dört bir yanında meşhur olan İmâm Celâleddin Abdurrahmân b. Ebî Bekr es-Süyûtî'dir (ö. 911/1505). Söz konusu görüşmenin ana konusu ise *siyaset-i şer'iyye* üzerine olmuştur. İmâm Süyûtî, Sultan Askiyâ Muhammed'e bir Müslüman hükümdarın veya sultanın toplumu yönetirken yerine getirmesi gereken şeyler hususunda tavsiyede bulunmuştur. Ayrıca Askiyâ Muhammed, İmâm Süyûtî'den helal, haram, İslam ahlakı ve Müslüman bir yöneticinin ahlakı hakkında çok şey öğrenmiş, onun vaazları ve tesviyelerinden çokça yararlanmış. Yine İslam'daki birçok mesele hakkında da Süyûtî'ye sorular yönelmiştir. Sultan Askiyâ Muhammed İmâm Süyûtî'den aldığı görüşlerden ve yanıtlardan oldukça etkilenmiş olmalı ki, ülkesine döner dönmez Batı Sudan'da adaleti, düzeni, İslam'ı yayma hareketini canlandırmak için büyük çaba göstermiştir (Merrâküşî, 1888, s. 89; Niyânî, 1988, s. 206).

### 1.2. Mekke Emîri ve Abbâsî Halifesi ile Görüşmesi

Sultan Askiyâ Muhammed, Mekke'ye vardığında Katâde ailesine mensup Emir Muhammed b. Berekât (859-902/1455-1497) veya oğlu II. Berekât b. Muhammed (902-931/1497-1525) ile görüşmüştür. Sultan Askiyâ Muhammed'den oldukça memnun kalan Mekke Emiri (Şerif-i Mekke) Askiyâ'ya bir kılıç verip onun başına yeşil bir takke (başlık) ve beyaz bir sarık sarmıştır. Orada bulunan onurlu bir topluluğun huzurunda Mekke Emiri Askiyâ'nın Batı Sudan halifesi olduğunu söylemiş ve ona muhalefet edenlerin Allah ve Resul'üne muhalefet ettiklerini, dolayısıyla onlarla cihat etmenin meşru olduğunu ilan etmiştir (Ka't, 2014, s. 93).

Böylece, Sultan Askiyâ Muhammed'in, Şerif-i Mekke'den aldığı kılıç, pelerin ve sarık Batı Sudan'da onun hükmünü pekiştirip İslam'ın yayılma mücadelesi açısından önemli bir meşruiyet ve güç kaynağı olmuştur. Ayrıca Askiyâ Muhammed, Mekke Emirinden Songay Devleti'ne bazı şeriflerin gönderilmesi talebinde bulunmuştur. Böylece Sultan Askiyâ'nın söz konusu hac seyahatinin ve bu sıradaki yapmış olduğu görüşmelerin sonuçlarından biri, kendi saltanatının evrensel bir boyuta taşınmasıdır (Niyânî, 1988, s. 206).

Sultan Askiyâ'nın talebi üzere Şerif-i Mekke tarafından ona verildiği bazı şerifler ile Mekke'den ayrılmıştır. Dönüş sırasında Kahire'den geçerken Mısır Memluk Devleti himayesi altında bulunan Abbâsî halifesi el-Mutevekkil (ö. 903/1497) ile bir araya gelip halifeye değerli hediyeler vererek uygun görürse onunla beraber Batı Sudan'a (Batı Afrika) gitmesini teklif etmiştir. Ancak halife, Askiyâ'ya teşekkür ederek ona Sudan'ın *Emîrî'l-Mûminîni* unvanını vermiştir. Böylece el-Hâc Askiyâ Muhammed'in bu unvanı almasıyla Batı Sudan'da Abbâsî halifesinin desteğini ve iltifatını kazanarak meşru ve güçlü bir sultan haline gelmiştir. Böylece Bilâdü's-Sudan tarihinde *Halife* veya *Emîrî'l-Mû'minîn* unvanını taşıyan ilk sultan olmuştur (Hemşerî vd., 1997, s. 66; Kaddâh, s. 71; Panikkar, 1998, s. 135). Askiyâ Muhammed, bu hac yolculuğundan çok etkilenmiş olmalıdır ki, siyasî açıdan, o zamanlarda Songay Devleti ve diğer Müslüman devletler arasındaki ilişkiler daha güçlü hâle gelmiştir (Merrâküşî, 1888, s. 89; Niyânî, 1988, s. 206).

### b. Sultan Kankan/Mense Musa ve Sultan Askiyâ Muhammed'in Hac Yolculukları Arasında Bir Karşılaştırma

Tarih kaynaklarında Askiyâ Muhammed'in yaptığı hac seyahati, ondan önce de Mali'nin sultanı Kankan Musa'nın yaptığı hac yolculuğu her tarafa duyulmuş, muhteşem ve azametli bir yolculuk olarak

geçmektedir (İlori, 2013, s. 43; Maikâ, 1997, s. 87).

Tarihte cereyan eden olayları birbirleriyle karşılaştırmak insanoğlunun tabiatında vardır. Özellikle söz konusu durum, önemli ve tarihte iz bırakan meşhur şahsiyetler olduğunda insanoğlunun içindeki merak daha fazla uyanmış hâle gelmektedir. Dolayısıyla Batı Sudan tarihinde en önemli şahsiyetlerden sayılan Mali İmparatoru Sultan Kankan Musa ve Songay İmparatoru Sultan el-Hâc Askîyâ Muhammed'in yaptıkları hac yolculukları tarihçilerin mukayeselerinden paylarını almıştır. Bu iki sultanın hac yolculukları arasında mukayese yapan ilk kişi, Batı Sudan'ın en büyük tarihçisi olan Abdurrahman Sa'dî'dir (ö.1655). Sa'dî bu konuyu şöyle değerlendirmektedir:

*"Mali Sultanı (Kankan Musa), onun zamanında benzeri olmayan salih ve adil bir hükümdardır. O, hicretin 8. yüzyılına başlarında güçlü bir ordu ve kalabalık bir topluluk ile hacca çıkmıştır. Onun yanında her birinin elinde altın asa taşıyan beş yüz hizmetçisi vardır. Tarihçiler, Kankan Musa'nın devletinin genişliği ve zenginliği hususunda fazlaca konuşup yazdılar. Ancak o, cömertlik konusunda Songay sultanı el-Hâc Askîyâ Muhammed kadar cömert olmamıştır. Çünkü onun hac yolculuğu esnasında Haremeyn'de (Mekke ve Medine) Allah rızası için infak ettiği altın sadece yirmi bin altın iken Askîyâ Muhammed'in infak ettiği altın yüz bine ulaşmıştır."* (Sa'dî, 1981, s. 7).

Bu mukayese konusu, bugüne kadar Batı Sudan tarihi ile ilgilenen araştırmacılar arasında görüş farklılığına sebep olmuştur. Bir kısım araştırmacılar, Sa'dî'nin değerlendirmesini ileri sürerek, Batı Sudan sultanları tarafından yapılan en görkemli hac yolculuğunun Askîyâ Muhammed'in haccı olduğunu söylerken diğer tarafta bir kısım araştırmacılar, Kankan Musa'nın haccının meşhur olması ve Nüveyrî (ö. 733/1333), İbnü'd-Devâdârî (ö. 736/1336), Zehebî (ö. 748/1348), Kalkaşendî (ö. 821/1418) gibi meşhur tarihçilerin eserlerinde<sup>5</sup> onun haccından bahsedilmesi sebebiyle Batı Sudan tarihinde en azametli hac yolculuğunun Kankan Musa'nınki olduğu kanaatindedirler (Doukoure, 2022, s. 124).

Ancak konuyu toparlayacak olursak bu konu ile ilgili şunları söylemek mümkündür: Kankan Musa'nın haccı meşhur olması ve ünlü tarihçiler tarafından zikredilmesi o zamanın şartlarına göre normaldir. Çünkü Sultan Kankan Musa'dan önce Batı Sudan'dan hacca gidenler olmuş, fakat onun zamanına kadar beraberinde bu kadar kalabalık bir topluluğu (20 bin) ve büyük bir miktar altını hiçbir kimse yanında götürmemiştir. Bunun için Mısır halkı başta olmak üzere Kankan Musa'nın haberini duyanlar veya kendisini görenler şaşkınlığa düşerken tarihçiler için de bu seyahat ilginç bir konu olmuştur. Diğer taraftan Kankan Musa'nın haccı ibadet vasfı olmakla birlikte bu ibadet esnasında yaptığı infaklar daha çok siyasî maksada ve itibar kazanmaya matuftur. Zira harcadığı altının çoğu Mısır sultanı Muhammed b. Kalavûn ve sarayındaki adamlara yöneliktir (Buffill, 1988, s. 236; Maikâ, 1997, s. 88).

Askîyâ Muhammed'in haccı Kankan Musa'nın haccı kadar meşhur olmayıp ünlü tarihçilerin eserlerinde fazla yer almamasının sebebi ise insanın tabiatı ve zaman dilimi ile yakından alakalıdır. Bir hadiseyi ilk gördüğünde şaşkınlığa düşerek ondan her yerde bahsetmek, daha sonra o hadiseye alışınca defalarca cereyan etse bile onu normal görmek insanoğlunun tabiatındandır. Dolayısıyla Askîyâ Muhammed'in hacca çıktığı dönemde Mısır halkı, Batı Sudanlı sultanların kendi topraklarından geçip hacca gitmelerine alışmıştır. Zaman dilimi olarak da Sultan Askîyâ Muhammed'in hacca gittiğinde Mısır'daki Memluk Devleti, zaafa düşüp iktisadi ve siyasî krizler içinde boğulmakta, ömrünün sonunu yaşamaktaydı. Dolayısıyla Mısır'da Sultan Muhammed b. Kalavûn gibi güçlü sultanların ve Nüveyrî, Zehebî, Kalkaşendî gibi meşhur tarihçilerin çağı geçmişte kalmıştır. Dolayısıyla Askîyâ'nın haccının onların eserlerinde yer almaması gayet normal bir şey olarak değerlendirilebilir. Diğer taraftan Askîyâ

<sup>5</sup> Bu eserlerde Mense Musa'nın haccı hakkında fazla bilgi için bk. İbnü'd-Devâdârî, E. A. (1982). *Kenzü'd-Dürer ve Cami'u'l-Gurer*, s. 316; Kalkaşendî, E. A., *Subhu'l-A'sâ*, H.1333/M.1915, s. 294; Nüveyrî, *Nihâyetü'l-Ereb fi Fünûni'l-Edeb*, s. 54; Zehebî, *Ziyûlü'l-'iber fi Haberi Men Gaber*, s. 69

Muhammed, Mısır Memluk Devleti adamlarına yaklaşmak yerine İmam Süyûti gibi meşhur âlimler ile irtibata geçip onlarla görüşmeyi tercih etmiştir (Buffill, 1988, s. 236; Maikâ, 1997, s. 88; Nagar, 1969, s. 88). Mekke ve Medine’de olduğu gibi onun yüz bin altın miktarında yaptığı infaklar, Batı Sudan hacıları ve yoksulları için vakıflar kurup bağlar satın almayı tercih etmesi onun bu hac yolculuğunun dini tarafını siyasi tarafının önüne geçirmeye çalıştığını göstermektedir (Buffill, 1988, s. 236; Maikâ, 1997, s. 88).

## II. el-Hâc Ömer b. Saîd el-Fûtî’nin (ö. 1280/1864) Hac Yolculuğu

El-Hâc Ömer el-Fûtî, Batı Sudan’da Fütüyye Ömeriyye Devleti’nin kurucusudur. Faslılar tarafından 999/1591’de Batı Sudan’da en büyük devlet olan Songay İmparatorluğu yıkıldıktan sonra bu bölgede küçük devletçiklerin ortaya çıkması sonucu İslam’ın yayılma hareketi gerileme yaşamıştır. Dolayısıyla bölgede İslam’a uymayan hurafelerin ve bidatların yayılmasının yanı sıra putperestler de baş göstermeye başlamıştır. Bu durum yaklaşık 16. yüzyılın sonundan 19. yüzyılın birinci çeyreğine kadar yaşanırken diğer tarafta Batı Sudan; İngiliz ve Fransız sömürgeciliği ve bölgenin Hıristiyanlaştırılması tehlikesine maruz kalmıştır. Ancak bölge hem siyasi hem de dini olarak bir kargaşa döneminden geçerken Müslümanları yeniden birleştirip güçlü bir ümmet haline getirmek için İslam’ın önünde duran bütün tehlikeleri ortadan kaldırmak amacıyla İslami islah ve yenilenme hareketi ve çabaları hiçbir zaman eksik olmamıştır. En önemli islah hareketlerinden biri, Fûtîler’in devletini kurmayı başaran el-Hâc Ömer el-Fûtî’nin hareketidir.

Bu devlet 1851-1890 yılları arasında hüküm sürerek Batı Sudan’da gerek Müslümanları bir devletin çatısı altında birleştirmiş gerekse Fransız sömürgecilik hareketine karşı önemli başarılarla imza atmıştır. Bu çalışmada konumuz hac yolculuğu olduğu için bundan sonraki satırları siyasi olaylara boğmadan bu devletin kurucusu olan el-Hâc Ömer el-Fûtî’nin yaptığı hac yolculuğuna ışık tutmaya çalışacağız.

Ömer el-Fûtî hac yolculuğu sırasında Mâsina’dan<sup>6</sup> başlayarak Sokoto,<sup>7</sup> Fizan,<sup>8</sup> Mısır-Sudan’dan geçerek 1828’de Mekke’ye ulaşmıştır (Abdalmâjid, 1985, s. 143; Cisse, 2018, s. 378; Ubeydullah, 2014, s. 126). el-Hâc Ömer, hac farızasını ifa ettikten sonra Mağrib’ten hacca gelen Ticânîyye tarikatına mensup âlimler ile görüşme fırsatını bulmuştur. Bu fırsatı iyi değerlendiren el-Hâc Ömer, Mekke’de ilim tahsili için tam iki yıl kalmıştır (Abdalmâjid, 1985, s. 144; Tall, 2006, s. 75). El-Hâc Ömer iki yıl içinde iki kere hac yaptıktan sonra Kudüs’ü ziyaret etmek için Mısır yoluyla Filistin’e gitmiştir. Kudüs ziyaretini bitirince de Şam yoluyla Mekke’ye dönmüştür. Bir süre oradaki hocalardan ilim tahsil ettikten sonra kendisine icazetname verilmiştir (Abdalmâjid, 1985, s. 144). Hocalarının gördüğü İslam’a hizmet etmek gayreti ve Müslümanların durumu ile ilgilenmesi sonucu el-Hâc Ömer’e Ticânî tarikatının *Halife* lakabı verilmiştir. Hocaları tarafından kendisine Batı Sudan’da İslam’ın yayılması hareketine devam etmesi ve sömürgecilik faaliyetlerine engel olması için tavsiyeler verilmiştir. Böylelikle sadece hac ibadetini yerine getirmek amacı ile Mekke’ye giden Ömer el-Fûtî, omuzlarında İslam’a ve Müslümanlara hizmet etme şeklindeki büyük bir sorumluluğu yüklenerek geri dönmüştür (Abdalmâjid, 1985, s. 145; Tall, 2006, s. 75).

El-Hâc Ömer’in hac dönüşünde, başarılı bir lider olabilmek için Mısır’da el-Ezher âlimleri ile irtibata geçip onlardan dini ve siyasi eğitim gördüğü zikredilmektedir. Ayrıca Mısır’da Müslümanların siyasi durumunu yakından takip etme fırsatı da olmuştur.

19. yüzyıl bütün İslam dünyası için çalkantılı ve çetin bir dönem olmuştur. El-Hâc Ömer’in haccı bu döneme denk gelmiş olup Mısır başta olmak üzere hac yolculuğu boyunca Müslümanların durumuyla alakalı olarak, geçtiği yerlerdeki ümmet-i Muhammed’in probleminin farklı olmadığını görmüştür. Dolayısıyla el-Hâc Ömer, dinî farızalarını yerine getirmek ile yetinmeyip bu durumu ortadan kaldırmak

<sup>6</sup> Bugünkü Mali Cumhuriyeti topraklarında yer almaktadır.

<sup>7</sup> Günümüzde Kuzey Nijerya’ya tekabül devlet (1805-1903)

<sup>8</sup> Libya’da bir bölge.

için siyasi, içtimai ve ekonomik alanlar başta olmak üzere Müslümanların her alanda bir ıslah ve yenilenme hareketine muhtaç olduklarının kanaatine varmıştır (Silla, H. 1406, ss. 77-78).

#### a. Ömer el-Fûtî'nin Bornu-Kânem Devleti'ni Ziyareti

Ömer el-Fûtî, hac dönüşünde Mısır'da bir müddet kaldıktan sonra Fizan (Fezzân) yoluyla Bornu-Kânem Devleti'ne gitmiştir (Abdumâjid, 1985, s. 145). Bornu sultanı Şeyh Muhammed el-Emîn el-Kânemî (ö. 1252/1837), el-Hâc Ömer'i iyi bir şekilde karşılayıp onu kendi kızı Meryâto ile evlendirmiştir. el-Hâc Ömer, Bornu'dan ayrılıp memleketine gittiği zaman Bornu sultanı ve Sokoto sultanı arasında bir anlaşmazlık çıktığını duymuştur. Bilâdü's-Sudan'da bu iki büyük devlet arasındaki gerginlik, daha kötü noktaya ulaştığı takdirde Müslümanların başlarına ne kadar büyük felaketler açılacağına farkında olan el-Hâc Ömer, kendisinin iki devlete yakınlığını kullanarak sulh yapmak için arabuluculuk yapmıştır (Abdumâjid, 1985, s. 145). O zamanlarda Batı Sudan'da çoğu sultanlar bilgi sahibi oldukları için Ömer'in onlara yazdığı mektup, Batı Sudan İslam kültürü ve medeniyeti tarihinin en değerli hazinelerinden biridir. Ömer'in hac yolculuğunun günümüze kadar ağızda dolaşmasının en önemli nedenlerden biri söz konusu mektubu olmuştur. O, bu mektubunu bir şiir formunda kaleme almıştır.<sup>9</sup> Kaynaklar onun mektubuna, sultanların yazdığı cevaplardan ve verdikleri tepkiden bahsetmemiştir. Ancak öyle görünüyör ki; el-Hâc Ömer'in arabuluculuğu olumlu sonuca ulaşmıştır. Çünkü ortaya çıkan fitnenin büyüyüp savaşa dönmesinin engellemeyi başarmıştır (Ubeydullah, 2014, s. 129).

#### b. Ömer el-Fûtî'nin Sokoto Devleti'ni Ziyareti

Öyle anlaşılıyor ki, el-Hâc Ömer, hac dönüşü yolunda Bornu Devleti'ni ziyaret ettikten sonra yoldayken ortaya çıkan anlaşmazlık haberini almasını müteakiben Sokoto Devleti'ni ziyaret edip ortaya çıkan anlaşmazlığı giderme konusunda faydalı olacağı kanaatine varmış olmalı ki, Sokoto'ya gitmeye karar vermiştir.

E-Hâc Ömer, Sokoto'da da sultan tarafından güzel karşılanmıştır. Sokoto sultanı Muhammed Bello, el-Hâc Ömer'i, kendisine en yakın müşavirleri arasına alıp ona büyük ihşanda bulunmuş ve onu kendi kızı Hafsa ile evlendirmiştir (Ubeydullah, 2014, s. 130). el-Hâc Ömer, Sokoto Devleti'nde kaldığı 12 yıl boyunca ileride kuracağı Devlet-i 'Ömeriyye Fütüyye'nin kuruluşu için ilmi, askerî ve siyasi birikim başta olmak üzere devlet yönetme sanatında büyük tecrübe kazanmıştır (Ubeydullah, 2014, s. 131; Tall, 2006, s. 75). El-Hâc Ömer, 12 yıl Sokoto Devleti'ne hizmet ettikten sonra yürüttüğü ıslah hareketini devam ettirmek için kendi memleketine dönme zamanı geldiğini hissetmiştir. Böylece 1838'de davasına bağlı talebeler, müritler ve takipçilerinden oluşan büyük bir topluluk ile Sokoto'dan ayrılıp memleketi Mâsina'nın başşehri el-Hamdülillah'a gelmiştir (Abdumâjid, 1985, s. 146).

El-Hâc Ömer'in, 1840-1857 yılları arasında Batı Sudan'ın pek çok bölgesine yaptığı seyahatler onun ıslah, yenilenme ve tebliğ hareketinin seyrinde dönüm noktası sayılmaktadır (Ubeydullah, 2014, s. 132). Bu dönemde yaptığı seyahatlerinde hem putperestler arasında İslam'ın yayılması hem takipçilerinin artması hem de 1862-1898 yılları arasında Batı Sudan'ın büyük kısmında hüküm sürecektir Ömeriyye Devleti'ni kurup esaslarını sağlamlaştırmasında önemli bir mesafe kat etmiştir (Ubeydullah, 2014, ss. 132-133). Böylece Bilâdü's-Sudan tarihinde iz bırakan bu önemli şahsiyetin hayatındaki büyük değişimin başlangıcı onun hac yolculuğu ile başlamıştır. Dolayısıyla bu da bize Batı Sudan tarihi üzerinde hac yolculuklarının bıraktığı etkilerin ne kadar büyük olduğunu göstermektedir.

<sup>9</sup> Manzum olarak yazdığı bir mektup hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak için bk. Ömer b. Saîd el-Fûtî, *Tezkiretü'l-Gâfilin 'An Kubhi İhtilâfi'l-Müminin*, Tahkik: Âdem Bambâ, Câmiatü Malaya, Malaysia.

**Sonuç**

İslam kültür ve medeniyetinin zenginliği ve Müslümanların birbirleri arasındaki etkileşimi açısından hac yolculuklarının rolü oldukça büyüktür. Hac farızasını eda etmek; özellikle Orta Çağ'da son derece meşakkatli yolculuklar neticesinde mümkün olabilmektedir. Çünkü söz konusu yolculuklar hem yol tehlikesi hem de fiziksel yorgunluk taşımaktadır. Bu durum ister sultan ister zengin isterse de sıradan tebaa veya fakirler için değişmemektedir. Ancak sultan veya melikler için daha zor ve tehlikelidir. Çünkü hac yolculuğu sırasında sultanların yolda saldırıya uğrayarak hayatlarını kaybetme veya yoklukları fırsat bilinerek ülkelerinde iktidarın ele geçirilme tehlikesi vardır. Bunun için tarih kaynaklarına baktığımızda hac ibadetini yerine getiremeyen nice melik, sultan ve halifeler önümüze çıkmaktadır. Lakin diğer taraftan tüm bu tehlike ve zorlukları göze alarak, canları ve iktidarları pahasına hac ibadetini ifa edip Kâbe'yi ve Hz. Peygamber'in kabrini ziyaret etmeyi tercih eden nice sultanlar da tarih kaynaklarında yer almaktadır.

Batı Sudan bölgesi birçok sultanın ve melikin tarihi hac yolculuklarına tanık olan coğrafyalardan biri sayılmaktadır. Sultanlar tarafından gerçekleştirilen hac yolculukları sonucu, Batı Sudan'daki Müslüman devletler ile diğer Müslüman devletler arasında dini, siyasi ve kültürel bağları güçlendirecek oldukça önemli görüşmeler yapıldığı ve ilişkiler kurulduğu görülmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra Arapçanın Batı Sudan'da yaygın olmasında ve Songay ile Mali Devletleri'nde idari ve ticari işlerde resmî dil haline gelmesinde haccın rolü çok büyüktür; çünkü Batı Sudan'dan hac için Mekke'ye gidenlerin çoğu ilim tahsili için orada kalmışlardır. Ayrıca ülkelerine yanlarında Arapça kitaplar getirmişler ve bazen de bazı âlimlerle beraber dönmüşlerdir. Hac yolculukları sayesinde ortaya çıkan bu ilim hareketinden dolayı Batı Sudan'da özellikle 15.-16. yüzyıllarda İslami ilim merkezleri çok yaygınlaşmış ve meşhur olmuştur.



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## AFRICA CLIMATE SUMMIT 2023: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE SOCIAL DIMENSION

## 2023 AFRİKA İKLİM ZİRVESİ: İKLİM DEĞİŞİKLİĞİ VE SOSYAL BOYUT

Yıl 4, Sayı 1, ss.41-61.

Year 4, Issue 1, pp.41-61.

Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi

Article Type: Research Article

Geliş Tarihi: 11.10.2023

Submitted: 11.10.2023

Kabul Tarihi: 15.01.2024

Accepted: 15.01.2024

DOI: 10.58851/africana.1374553

## Atf Bilgisi / Reference Information

Dal, S. (2024). Africa Climate Summit 2023: Climate Change and The Social Dimension, *Africana Dergisi*, 4 (1), 41-61. <https://doi.org/10.58851/africana.1374553>

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## Abstract

Climate change, driven by its effects of increasing greenhouse gas emissions, refers to systematic and long-term changes in the planet's climate system. These changes manifest themselves with various effects, such as the increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events, rising sea levels, and higher surface temperatures. Beyond being an environmental issue, climate change has political, economic, and social dimensions. The African continent, where poverty rates are high, is the region that feels the impacts of climate change most intensely in social and societal contexts. The purpose of addressing the social dimension of climate change is to minimize its adverse effects through a comprehensive approach. In this context, this study focuses on the social dimension of climate change and examines the Africa Climate Summit 2023 (ACS'23). The goal of this study is to shed light on the social dimension of climate change in Africa. This study argues that summits play a crucial role in setting agendas, addressing issues, and generating solutions within the framework of climate change. In this context, it seeks to answer questions such as: what the effects of climate change are in general, how it impacts societies on a social level, and what the positioning of this issue is in the ACS'23. To address these questions, a descriptive analysis method is employed, centering on the work of the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), with a literature review. The results indicate that climate change has gained prominence in discourse at the global/regional level, but there have been delays in taking action. They also highlight the critical importance of sustainable policies and financial resources in addressing the (social) problems caused by climate change in the African continent. This study is expected to contribute to the academic literature -in Türkiye- by drawing more attention to the social issues in Africa as a result of climate change.

**Keywords:** Africa, summit, climate change, social dimension, sustainability.

## Öz

Sera gazı emisyonlarını artırıcı etkileri nedeniyle hızlanan iklim değişikliği; sistematik ve uzun süreli olarak, gezegenin iklim sisteminde meydana gelen değişiklikleri ifade etmektedir. Bu değişiklikler; şiddetli ve sık hava olaylarının artması, deniz seviyelerinin yükselmesi ile yüzey sıcaklıklarında artış gibi farklı etkilerle kendini göstermektedir. Çevresel bir sorunun ötesinde iklim değişikliğinin; siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal boyutu bulunmaktadır. Yoksulluğun yüksek seyrettiği Afrika, toplumsal ve sosyal bağlamda iklim değişikliğinin etkilerini en yoğun hisseden bölge/ktadır. Sosyal boyutta iklim değişikliğinin ele alınma amacı, bütüncül bir yaklaşımla olumsuz etkileri en aza indirmektir. Bu anlamda iklim değişikliğinin sosyal yönüne odaklanan çalışma, 2023 Afrika İklim Zirvesi'ni incelemektedir. Çalışmanın amacı, sosyal boyutuyla iklim değişikliğini Afrika özelinde ele almaktır. Çalışmada; gündem oluşturma, sorunların ele alınması ve çözüm üretilmesi çerçevesinde zirvelerin önemli olduğu savunulmaktadır. Bu minvalde; genel olarak iklim değişikliğinin etkileri nelerdir, sosyal olarak toplumları nasıl etkilemektedir, 2023 Afrika İklim Zirvesi'nde bu hususun konumlanışı ne durumdadır, sorunlarına cevap aranmaktadır. Bu bağlamda betimsel analiz yöntemi kullanılarak Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) ile Afrika Birliği'nin çalışmaları merkeze alınıp literatür taraması yapılmıştır. Sonuçlar; global/bölgesel düzeyde iklim değişikliğinin söylem bazında öne çıktığını, aksiyon almada gecikmeler yaşandığını, Afrika kıtasında iklim değişikliğinin sebep olduğu (sosyal) problemlere çözüm üretmede sürdürülebilir politikaların ve mali kaynak oluşturmamın kritik öneme sahip olduğunu göstermektedir. Çalışmanın; iklim değişikliğinin bir neticesi olarak, Afrika'daki sosyal sorunlara daha çok dikkat çekme noktasında -Türkiye'deki- akademik literatüre katkı sağlaması beklenmektedir.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Afrika, zirve, iklim değişikliği, sosyal boyut, sürdürülebilirlik.

## STRUCTURED ABSTRACT

In this study, the social effects of climate change in Africa are discussed. First, after evaluating the effects of climate change in general, the social dimension of climate change was analyzed specifically for Africa within the framework of ACS'23. The two main bearers of the summit are the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU). The basis of the study is created by considering the actions and texts/reports of these two organizations. The declaration published at the end of the summit is a conclusion.

Despite presenting an environmental facade, climate change has multifaceted societal and social ramifications. Africa is the most exposed to these impacts due to higher levels of poverty, deprivation, and economic inadequacy compared to other regions. The African continent relies largely on an agriculture-based economy, making it particularly susceptible to the effects of climate change. Consequently, food production diminishes, and the local populace's struggle against hunger becomes more challenging. Decreased water resources due to drought exacerbate inequalities in access to water. The extreme temperatures brought about by climate change proliferate health issues and the incidence of infectious diseases. The UN and the AU are engaged in significant efforts to combat climate change. These two entities take the lead in shaping crucial policy-making processes in the fight against climate change. They have played roles, especially in the creation of international agreements like the Paris Agreement. These organizations implement various programs and projects to provide financing and technical assistance to African countries for combating climate change. The UN and the AU encourage scientific research related to climate change and support evidence-based policy formulation.

Africa and many African nations are actively engaged in combating climate change and reducing the associated social impacts. Several African countries have formulated national climate action plans and taken steps towards their implementation. These plans aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, enhance adaptation efforts, and support sustainable development goals. Some African nations are reducing fossil fuel usage by investing in renewable energy sources, with a particular emphasis on solar and wind energy projects. The preservation and restoration of forests and natural habitats are crucial for biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration. Sustainable management of water resources and water efficiency initiatives play a pivotal role in building resilience against drought and water scarcity challenges.

At ACS'23, climate change was discussed in all its aspects and its effects were on the agenda in the social context. In the declaration published within the framework of the final text of the summit, climate change and the social dimension; (on a global scale) and especially in Africa, as follows: (i) Emphasizing the validation by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that Africa experiences accelerated warming compared to the global average, and if unchecked, climate change will persistently affect African economies and societies, impeding progress and well-being; (ii) Expressing alarm over the disproportionate burdens and hazards that numerous African nations confront due to climate change-induced erratic weather phenomena and patterns, including protracted droughts, catastrophic floods, and wildfires, leading to extensive humanitarian crises with adverse consequences for economies, health, education, peace, and security, among other threats. In order to overcome social and other problems, it was stated at the summit that collective action was needed on the following issues: (i) urging the international community to promptly take action to reduce emissions, honor its commitments, uphold previous pledges, and aid the continent in tackling climate change; (ii) encouraging investments that promote climate positivity and trigger a developmental path centered on industries set to revolutionize our world, enabling African nations to attain a consistent middle-income status by 2050. At the summit, commitments were made, by African leaders, on the following issues: (i) formulate and execute policies, regulations, and incentives aimed at attracting domestic, regional, and worldwide investment in sustainable growth and all-encompassing economies; (ii) orient our economic development strategies toward growth that benefits the

climate, including the expansion of equitable energy transitions and the generation of renewable energy for industrial operations, climate-resilient and regenerative agricultural practices, and essential safeguarding.

In conclusion; general and specifically in Africa, combating climate change necessitates a comprehensive effort at both the global and local levels. Vital measures to address the social (and other) issues caused by climate change and mitigate their impacts include reducing greenhouse gas emissions, preserving ecosystems, enhancing energy efficiency, promoting sustainable agriculture, establishing social justice, and implementing education and policy regulations. National and international collaborations are of utmost importance in the African context. While the efforts of the UN and other international organizations in combating climate change are significant, they also have shortcomings and challenges. Climate change demands more international cooperation, swift action, and comprehensive policy and financing solutions, necessitating the enhancement and improvement of existing efforts. This is because Africa faces resource constraints, high social and economic challenges, as well as political issues and instability. The AU commitment to social justice in African countries is crucial. The AU should allocate more funding to awareness and education projects and programs regarding climate change, with its support and coordination. Many African countries are also working on efforts to combat climate change and reduce its social impacts. However, African countries must strengthen appropriate policy and legal frameworks for climate change mitigation. Efforts to combat climate change should align with sustainable development goals.

### **Introduction**

Climate change refers to the long-term and systematic alterations in the Earth's climate system. These alterations encompass variations in average weather conditions, temperature, precipitation, winds, and other climate attributes. Climate change has occurred over centuries and is a result of both natural factors and human activities. Climate change is commonly associated with the following factors: global warming, greenhouse gas emissions, impacts on biodiversity, rising sea levels, and shifts in weather patterns. The increase in greenhouse gases leads to the warming of the Earth's surface and rising average temperatures. This phenomenon can result in the melting of polar ice caps, elevating sea levels, and more frequent and severe weather events. Human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural gas), deforestation, and industrial processes are responsible for the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. These gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxides, etc.) trap heat from the sun in the atmosphere, thereby causing an increase in the Earth's surface temperature. Climate change affects natural habitats, impacting plant and animal species, and may lead to the endangerment of certain species and disruptions in ecosystems. The melting of polar ice caps and the expansion of seawater contribute to the rise in sea levels, resulting in coastal erosion, salinity issues, and flooding in coastal regions. Climate change influences weather patterns and precipitation regimes, leading to an increase in droughts, floods, storms, and other extreme weather events.

Climate change leads to extensive impacts on the world in various dimensions. These impacts can affect natural, economic, and social systems, in addition to changes in the climate system. Elevated temperatures promote the spread of diseases like heatstroke and malaria, complicate access to clean drinking water, and create issues with access to water resources. Decreasing water resources and triggering waves of migration due to extreme weather events increase the number of displaced individuals. Extreme weather events and agricultural losses result in economic setbacks. Climate change adversely affects energy supply and causes damage to infrastructure through heavy rains, flooding, and hurricanes. These effects demonstrate that climate change is a multifaceted and intricate issue.

Climate change is often accelerated due to human activities, particularly the increase in greenhouse

gas emissions such as the use of fossil fuels, deforestation, and industrial processes. Climate change destabilizes food production by adversely affecting agriculture. Irregular precipitation, droughts, and extreme heat result in crop losses and higher food prices, thereby increasing food insecurity. Elevated temperatures and humidity levels facilitate the spread of infectious diseases. The expansion of habitats for mosquitoes and other vectors contributes to the proliferation of diseases like malaria. Climate change deepens injustices among and within societies. Low-income and vulnerable communities are more susceptible to the effects of climate change and have limited access to resources. Climate change amplifies pressure on natural resources, leading to social conflicts. Disputes over access to water resources or land use, in particular, escalate into conflicts at local and national levels. Climate change encourages migration from uninhabitable regions. Events such as droughts, floods, and rising sea levels force people to abandon their homes, triggering waves of migration and exacerbating immigration issues.

Africa's relationship with climate change is multifaceted and intricate, encompassing a range of social impacts. Much of Africa still relies on agriculture-based economies. Climate change adversely affects agricultural productivity due to issues like drought, diminishing water resources, and extreme weather events, consequently reducing food production and increasing the risk of food insecurity. Africa is heavily dependent on water resources, and many regions already experience water scarcity. Climate change exacerbates problems related to decreasing water resources, drought, and water shortages. Diseases like malaria are on the rise, and heatwaves and limited access to water sources lead to health problems. Africa's economies are predominantly based on natural resources such as agriculture, mining, and forestry, which are negatively affected by climate change. Events like heavy rainfall, floods, and droughts result in economic losses. Climate change disproportionately impacts already impoverished and vulnerable communities, intensifying issues related to social justice. Aligning efforts in social justice and economic development with climate change appears to be an inevitable necessity.

Africa is recognized as a continent where climate change has a greater social impact compared to other regions. The fundamental reasons for this can be listed as follows: Much of the African continent is characterized by poverty and economic vulnerability. Low income levels, deficiencies in essential infrastructure, and fragile economies make it difficult for them to resist the effects of climate change. A significant portion of Africa still relies on agriculture-based economies, which are highly sensitive to climate change. Drought, dwindling water resources, and extreme weather events negatively affect agricultural production. Access to water resources is already problematic in many African countries, and climate change further exacerbates the pressure on water resources. Drought and water scarcity pose serious challenges for drinking water and irrigation. Climate change intensifies displacement and migration due to issues related to access to water resources, agricultural losses, and extreme weather events, leading to social and economic problems. Particularly in Africa, social injustices related to the distribution of resources and the protection of affected communities are becoming more widespread due to climate change. Lastly, some African countries have inadequate capacity for policy development and implementation to address climate change. Political instability and poor governance further complicate efforts to combat climate change.

In this study, which focuses on the social dimension of climate change, the Africa Climate Summit 2023 (ACS'23) is discussed. The inaugural ACS'23 has the objective of tackling the growing exposure to climate change and its associated expenses, both on a global scale and specifically in Africa. Given the anticipation of increasing climate-related crises in terms of frequency and severity, there is an urgent need for action to alleviate these challenges. The summit, which took place in Kenya, offers a platform for policymakers, practitioners, businesses, and civil society to discuss climate solutions, the obstacles to overcome, and opportunities realized in various regions. The summit had a primary focus on four key areas: i) Energy systems and industry ii) Cities, urban and rural settlements, infrastructure and transport iii) Land, ocean, food and water iv) Societies, health, livelihoods, and economies (ACS'23 official website, 2023). The focus of this study is the UN and the AU and the work of these two institutions. In the study, climate

change and its effects in general will be discussed first. After evaluating climate change in the social context, within the framework of ACS'23, the focus will be on the social impacts of climate change, specifically in Africa.

### Climate Change and Its Effects

Climate can be assessed across various geographical levels, such as municipalities, nations, or the entire planet, through metrics like mean temperatures, the typical count of rainy days, and the occurrence of droughts. Climate change pertains to alterations in these metrics spanning years, decades, or even centuries (National Research Council, 2013, p. 1). Climate represents the extended-term average atmospheric conditions in a particular area spanning 30 to 50 years or more. Climate change denotes a methodical shift in the prolonged state of the atmosphere across numerous decades or beyond (Public Health Institute, 2016, p. 1). Climate change is identified by assessing the extensive extended-term temperature and rainfall patterns, alongside additional factors like atmospheric pressure and moisture levels in the nearby surroundings. Furthermore, the erratic weather variations, the shrinking of worldwide ice sheets, and the resulting increase in sea levels are some of the most widely recognized global and local outcomes of climate change (Abbass et al., 2022, p. 42540). The phenomenon of climate change can be linked to two major shifts in energy utilization. Initially, coal substituted waterpower, driving the industrialization of the 19th century and triggering an unparalleled surge in efficiency (Müller-Kuckelberg, 2012, p. 2). It's evident that alterations in greenhouse gases (GHGs) concentrations in the atmosphere have the potential to modify global climates (Dietz et al., 2020, p. 136). The scientific consensus is strong that climate change is already a fact. Rise in peak temperatures, frequency of hot days, and heat index have been detected across almost all regions in the latter part of the 20th century. Cumulative proof indicates that the recorded warming over the last five decades can be largely ascribed to human actions. The trend of rising global average surface temperature is predicted to persist, with anticipated increases ranging from 1.4 to 5.8 °C by 2100 compared to 1990 (Abeygunawardena et al., 2003, pp. 1-2).

Governments will come under immense pressure to increase public spending due to climate change, including funding for household disaster assistance and infrastructure reconstruction. Climate change can also impact various economic sectors like agriculture and tourism, leading to a reduction in tax revenues and worsening budget deficits. Extreme weather events, rising temperatures, and droughts resulting from climate change can have significant adverse effects on budgets and debts. Officials estimate that the US government needs to allocate between \$9 and \$28 billion annually for expenses related to wildland fire suppression, crop insurance, coastal disaster relief, air quality, and healthcare. While many studies have examined the impact of climate change on GDP, few have focused on its effects on fiscal balances and government budgets. One finding suggests that Austria's government budget will decrease by 1.2 percent in 2050 (Giovanis & Ozdamar, 2022, pp. 1-2). As nations across the globe progress in implementing the Paris Agreement, numerous countries are reassessing their internal governance structures and establishing approaches aimed at facilitating their shift toward eco-friendly, climate-resilient development on the domestic front. Effective domestic governance is equally crucial as we strive to enhance our climate change efforts post-2020 within the framework of the Paris Agreement (Averchenkova et al., 2019, p. 9). Climate change is progressively evolving into a consistent focal point on the agendas of numerous policy-making assemblies. This elevated status reflects the recognized significance of climate change in molding and exerting influence over the course of development and the equilibrium of power within the worldwide political economy (Adano & Daudi, 2012, p. 1).

In the context of the study, the two institutions that constantly put climate change on the agenda are the UN and the AU. Evaluations and analyzes will be made within the framework of the approaches of these two institutions to the subject. The global institution known as the UN was established in 1945 and currently consists of 193 Member States. The UN operates based on the principles and objectives outlined in its founding Charter. Over the years, the UN has adapted to the rapidly changing world. However, its

fundamental purpose remains unchanged: to provide a platform where nations from all corners of the globe can convene, deliberate on shared challenges, and devise solutions that promote the well-being of humanity. The UN is a component of the larger UN system, which includes numerous programs, financial resources, and specialized agencies, each dedicated to specific areas of focus, governance, and budgets. The UN collaborates with these distinct entities within the UN system, all working together to assist the organization in achieving its objectives. The UN itself is just one facet of the broader UN System. The UN's cooperation with other UN system entities is vital for realizing the goals set forth in the UN Charter. Since its founding, the United Nations has assumed new responsibilities that were not envisioned at the time of its inception. The Organization has established objectives for creating a more sustainable world and has committed to collective efforts to combat climate change. As global challenges have expanded, so has the scope of the UN's mission (UN official website).

According to UN; the climate emergency is deteriorating as emissions of greenhouse gases persist in their ascent. The most recent report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reveals that global temperatures have already surged 1.1 °C beyond pre-industrial levels and are poised to approach or surpass the critical 1.5 °C threshold by 2035. Disastrous and escalating occurrences of extreme heatwaves, droughts, deluges, and wildfires have become increasingly commonplace. Escalating sea levels are imperiling the lives of countless individuals residing in coastal communities. Furthermore, the world is presently confronted with the most extensive episode of species extinction since the era of dinosaurs, and the oceans were inundated with more than 17 million metric tons of plastic contamination in 2021, with forecasts suggesting a potential twofold or threefold increase by 2040 (UN SDG Report, 2023, p. 3).

Drawing upon the findings compiled in the Global Sustainable Development Report and the insights gained since 2015, this current report outlines a set of pressing measures for your contemplation across five pivotal domains: “(a) Heads of State and Government should recommit to seven years of accelerated, sustained and transformative action, both nationally and internationally, to deliver on the promise of the SDGs. (b) Governments should advance concrete, integrated and targeted policies and actions to eradicate poverty, reduce inequality and end the war on nature, with a focus on advancing the rights of women and girls and empowering the most vulnerable. (c) Governments should strengthen national and subnational capacity, accountability and public institutions to deliver accelerated progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). (d) The international community should recommit at the SDG Summit to deliver on the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and to mobilize the resources and investment needed for developing countries to achieve the SDGs, particularly those in special situations and experiencing acute vulnerability. (e) Member States should facilitate the continued strengthening of the UN development system and boost the capacity of the multilateral system to tackle emerging challenges and address SDGs-related gaps and weaknesses in the international architecture that have emerged since 2015.” (UN SDG Report, 2023, pp. 4-5).

There are 17 goals in the UN SDG: “(1) End poverty in all its forms everywhere (2) End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture (3) Ensure healthy lives and promote well being for all at all ages (4) Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all (5) Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls (6) Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all (7) Ensure Access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all (8) Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all (9) Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation (10) Reduce inequality within and among countries (11) Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable (12) Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns (13) Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts (14) Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development (15) Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss



(16) Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide Access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels (17) Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development” (UN 2030 Agenda, official website).

The goal focusing on climate change is stated in article 13: ‘Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.’ Recognizing that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) serves as the foremost international, intergovernmental platform for deliberating the worldwide reaction to climate alteration. The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) depicts the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere throughout the 20th century as a consequence of the increasing utilization of energy and the expansion of the global economy. As outlined by the WMO, the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere modifies the radiative equilibrium of the atmosphere. The most recent comprehensive evaluation of the scientific findings was carried out in 2007 by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) regarding the reasons, consequences, and potential approaches to address climate change. The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report on Climate Change in 2007 encompasses inputs from three working groups addressing 1) the physical science, 2) the impacts of climate change, adaptation, and vulnerability, and 3) the mitigation of climate change. In IPCC terminology, climate change pertains to an alteration in the condition of the climate that can be discerned (e.g., via statistical analyses) through modifications in the average and/or the fluctuation of its characteristics and endures for an extended duration, generally spanning decades or more. It alludes to any transformation in climate patterns over time, whether attributed to inherent variations or stemming from human endeavors. This interpretation contrasts with that in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), wherein climate change denotes a transformation in climate that is directly or indirectly ascribed to human activities that modify the composition of the global atmosphere and that is apart from natural climatic fluctuations witnessed over corresponding time intervals (UNFCCC, 2011, pp. 1-2).

According to working group II, climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability; observed impacts: Various natural systems, spanning every continent and the majority of oceans, are encountering the consequences of regional climate alterations, notably elevated temperatures. Projected future impacts: Regarding the anticipated repercussions, there is presently a wealth of more detailed data accessible concerning the characteristics of these consequences, encompassing various systems and industries (food, health, social costs). Regions that will be especially affected: Africa, due to its limited adaptability and the predicted ramifications of climate change (UNFCCC, 2011, pp. 2-5). In 2015, the international community embraced a collective plan for humanity, the planet, peace, prosperity, and collaboration: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. They established an ambitious set of interconnected SDGs. These objectives encompass all corners of the globe and all aspects of life and progress – spanning health, education, the environment, peace, justice, security, and equality. Their purpose is to eradicate poverty and hunger, combat diseases to ensure healthier societies and well-being, empower women and girls, and address the three-fold planetary challenge of climate change, biodiversity decline, and pollution. Attaining the SDGs would signify a monumental stride forward but will necessitate resolve and dedication from individuals in every nation, the shared duty of governments, and global unity (IGS, 2023, p. 1).

Paris Agreement signed under the responsibility of the UN in 2015; in bolstering the execution of the UNFCCC (Convention), encompassing its goal and aspirations, the intention is to fortify the worldwide reaction to the challenge posed by climate change within the framework of sustainable progress and endeavors to eliminate poverty. (UN Paris Agreement, 2015, p. 3) In the Agreement, the following emphases stand out in the context of climate change and its effects -with some actions-: The aim is to restrain the rise in the global mean temperature, keeping it well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, with efforts to restrict the temperature surge to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels; this recognition stems from the understanding that such measures would significantly mitigate the hazards and repercussions of climate change; additionally, there's a focus on enhancing the capacity to adapt to the adverse consequences of

climate change, promoting climate resilience, and fostering low greenhouse gas emissions development without jeopardizing food production; Parties involved should also consider the concerns of economies most affected by the consequences of response measures, especially developing country parties, during the implementation of this agreement; this involves assessing the impacts and vulnerability related to climate change to formulate nationally determined prioritized actions, giving consideration to vulnerable populations, areas, and ecosystems; Parties acknowledge the significance of preventing, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change; this includes extreme weather events and gradual onset events, highlighting the role of sustainable development in diminishing the risk of loss and damage; advanced nations that are Parties to this agreement will furnish clear and uniform details regarding assistance for developing country Parties, which is both offered and mobilized through public initiatives. This reporting will occur every two years and align with the modalities, procedures, and guidelines that will be established; these endeavors should, when suitable, receive support. This support may come from entities such as the Technology Mechanism and, with financial backing from the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, enable collaborative efforts in research and development. Additionally, it will facilitate technology access, especially during the initial phases of the technology cycle, for developing country Parties. (UN Paris Agreement, 2015, pp. 3-15).

According to AU's studies; Africa stands as the planet's most arid continent, with 45% of its landmass comprising drylands and half of its inhabitants residing in arid, semi-arid, dry, sub-humid, and hyper-arid regions. Projections indicate that climate-induced water stress could impact as many as 700 million people dwelling in arid and semi-arid zones. The ramifications of climate change compound the preexisting challenges in managing water resources within these arid and semi-arid areas. Starting from 1797, the frequency of extremely hot days in Africa has surged sevenfold. The continent is anticipated to witness heightened average temperatures and more frequent heatwaves, along with a likelihood of drier conditions, with the exception of the Sahara and East Africa. Some reports show that escalation underscores the growing climate-related risks posed to Africa's ecosystems, biodiversity, human well-being, food and water security, as well as socio-economic progress. These threats encompass rising temperatures, elevated sea levels, prolonged dry periods, shifting precipitation patterns, and an increased occurrence of extreme weather events. Enhancing Africa's climate resilience is paramount to unlocking its developmental potential. Climate change is projected to impose an annual cost of around US\$40 billion on the region until 2030 (AU Climate Change Plan, 2022, pp. 10-12). The AU recognizes the technical and financial assistance provided by the EU, among other organizations, in formulating its climate strategy. This forms part of the EU's broader assistance efforts. The EU's long-term budget, the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), sets a target of allocating 30% of funds to climate adaptation and mitigation, which encompasses programming for countries beyond its borders. Within the framework of its Green Deal and climate change adaptation strategy, the EU has pledged to 'support sub-national, national, and regional adaptation approaches, with a particular emphasis on adaptation efforts in Africa. The agreement additionally features a regional protocol for Africa, highlighting the shared commitment to addressing various challenges. These encompass environmental issues, sustainable management of natural resources, and climate change. Specific initiatives include the phasing out of 'inefficient fossil fuel subsidies,' collaborative efforts to prevent and mitigate climate-induced conflicts, actions to address loss and damage, reinforcement of climate research and monitoring, and the provision of adequate financing for climate-resilient development (Pichon, 2022, p. 9).

The implementation of policies related to climate change adaptation and environmental initiatives is ineffective, often limited to specific sectors, or entirely absent. The AU's dedication to keeping global warming below a 1.5°C increase from preindustrial levels must be upheld. The Climate Action Network urges the phasing out of fossil fuel emissions as early as possible, with a strict deadline of 2030 to ensure the manageability of adaptation and mitigation costs. To achieve this, a resolute political commitment is essential from developed nations and all countries to establish a binding agreement in the forthcoming negotiations. The AU is focusing on climate change adaptation and mitigation policies, alongside the

framework for fostering low-carbon development technology in the region. There should be an effort to generate political momentum for the formulation of climate adaptation policies within individual national states. Furthermore, the establishment of a regional monitoring body is crucial. African nations must undergo a fundamental shift in the management of natural resources, land, water, and the formulation of food security policies (Mburia, 2015, p. 3).

### **Social Context of Climate Change**

Climate change holds significant relevance for the field of social (policy) studies and the welfare state, as it increasingly impacts individuals' personal lives, including their homes and livelihoods. In this regard, climate change has emerged as a crucial and expanding source of social risks in the twenty-first century. The protective aspect of social insurance and related programs aimed at income redistribution and service provision is expected to gain growing importance due to global warming and the ongoing transition toward a zero-emission society. This is particularly relevant due to shifts in the nature and distribution of social risks. For an extended period, social (policy) studies and research on the welfare state have engaged in discussions about distinguishing between traditional social risks (e.g., illness, disability, retirement, and frailty) and emerging social risks associated with factors like increased labor market participation, higher divorce rates, separations or the end of cohabitation, lone caregiving responsibilities, and the expanding elderly population in need of care from others. Risks related to climate change have been on the rise for several years and, in this context, can be considered as not entirely novel. (Hvinden & Schoyen, pp. 236-237).

If evaluated in the context of social (construct), climate change -and its impacts- stands out in the following areas: human health, food security, water resources management, vital infrastructure, culture, environment, territorial integrity, local–regional conflicts resources over common pool resources, migration, drought, poverty in local communities (Karimi et al., 2022, pp. 51-58). To give an example in the context of human health; climate change-induced natural disasters, like floods and periods of extreme drought, frequently coincide with emotions of anxiety, shock, depression, grief, hopelessness, desensitization, hostility, disruptions in sleep patterns, challenges in interpersonal relationships, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, and self-harm. Additionally, heatwaves associated with climate change elevate tendencies towards aggression, acts of violence, self-inflicted harm, domestic abuse, and hospital admissions, particularly among individuals with pre-existing mental health issues (Gifford & Gifford, 2016, p. 292). Climate change has a profound influence on the agricultural industry in (West) Africa, jeopardizing food security and nutritional well-being, especially for communities with limited adaptability. It affects various sectors, including energy, farming, water management, healthcare, forestry, infrastructure, education, community resilience, disaster risk mitigation, institutional growth, industrial advancement, research and innovation, policy formulation, economic investment, and cooperative efforts (Sorgho et al., 2020, p. 1).

The research determined that the majority of fluctuations in chemical and energy consumption could be attributed to variations in water quality and climatic conditions, with the exception of soda ash usage. Additionally, the study indicated that forthcoming climate changes, whether at the highest or lowest emission scenarios outlined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), might marginally decrease energy and chemical consumption. Another significant discovery from this investigation is that the impact of climate change on the overall energy usage throughout the lifecycle of water supply (a reduction of 3-6%) may offset the increased water demand resulting from a warmer climate by the end of the century in the case of the studied system (Kaddo, 2016, p. 7). Combinations of climate strategies encompassing socioeconomic changes, such as accessible housing, a minimum wage of \$15, or a job assurance, boost public backing for climate control efforts in the United States. Moreover, clean energy requirements, regardless of the specific technologies encompassed, enhance the appeal of climate policies. Connecting climate initiatives with economic and social matters proves particularly effective in broadening

support for climate policies among individuals of diverse racial backgrounds (Bergquist et al., 2020, p. 1).

Current expenditure on Climate Change Mitigation Policies (CCMPs) in the UK is minuscule, standing at 0.3% of GDP, with half of this amount being obligatory spending by energy corporations. Environmental levies, which used to account for approximately 2.5% of GDP, are on the decline. Ultimately, households bear the brunt of CCMPs, particularly through mechanisms like the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), posing questions regarding fair distribution and conflicting with other objectives of public policy. The pursuit of both climate change and social justice objectives necessitates the adoption of alternative policies (Gough, 2011, p. 14). Regarding the impacts, the consensus remains that tropical regions of the world, which are primarily developing nations, will suffer more adverse consequences than temperate regions. Overall, these responsibilities and impacts combine to create a 'dual injustice,' a point that is consistently emphasized on a global scale by the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) and G77 groups of countries. Here's one example of the contemporary imbalance: if all 40 million SUV drivers in the US were to switch to fuel-efficient cars, the resulting savings alone would offset the emissions generated from providing electricity to 1.6 billion people in the Southern hemisphere. China now contributes to 29% of global CO2 emissions, nearly double that of the US, and its emissions per capita have risen significantly to be within the range of the EU. It's a notable aspect of climate change governance that both emissions per person and a nation's total emissions, influenced as they are by population size, matter. Therefore, the North-South divide in global social policy is fundamentally nuanced in the realm of global climate politics. A third-world coalition of rapidly growing capitalist economies is emerging, positioned between the North and South. In the absence of a suitable acronym, it'll refer to these nations as the East (Gough, 2013, p. 5-6).

Promising approaches are also emerging from different parts of the world that can provide insights for policy initiatives. Sierra Leone, a country frequently impacted by floods and landslides, has been taking measures to establish a responsive social protection system in times of crisis. This effort is supported by the World Bank's Global Risk Financing Facility (GRiF). The Sierra Leonean government, in collaboration with the Climate Centre and Tetra Tech, has recently crafted the forthcoming national social protection legislation. This legislation identifies groups deemed climate vulnerable and affected by disasters as potential future recipients of social protection. Additionally, the bill outlines the roles, functions, and coordination mechanisms among the Ministry of Social Welfare, the National Commission for Social Action, and the National Disaster Management Authority. It is anticipated that the bill will be ratified by parliament by the close of 2023, enabling social protection to be a legally mandated tool for responding to climate-related disasters (Sengupta & Dahlet, 2023, p. 5).

Complexity theory and the perspective of complex systems offer both a figurative context and terminology with dimensions and intersections that can aid us in comprehending and strategizing action. They also provide a structure for charting and scrutinizing how the Earth, climate, and the pursuit of social justice might converge. Neo-liberalism contradicts and weakens the fundamental perspectives of First Nations, the appreciation of complexity, and the establishment of climate justice by positioning the individual within the market as the bedrock of society. An investigation that concentrated on assessing sustainability tactics among the world's largest 500 corporate firms revealed that top sustainability performers consistently embraced a proactive approach centered on capabilities and opportunities, without engaging in a risk management framework whatsoever. This research underscores the constraining elements of risk management frameworks and directs the focus toward more creative modes of addressing climate change and sustainability (Howard et al., 2023, pp. 6-9, p. 24). Linking with it, for instance; In April 2021, the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development in Colombia introduced the Carbon Neutrality Colombia initiative. This initiative aims to encourage the endeavors of both the public and private sectors, as well as civil society, in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Its ultimate goal is to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Additionally, the effects of climate change can serve as a chance for economic expansion, social progress, and the responsible and sustainable supervision of ecosystems. This approach

promotes the development of low-carbon and climate-resilient practices (Belchior- Rocha and Anile, 2023, 124). Another example; Africa's carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) emissions stemming from commercial and industrial operations have been negligible. In 2018, South Africa, the largest CO<sub>2</sub> emitter on the continent, released only 6.6% of the greenhouse gas emitted by the United States and merely 3.5% of China's emissions. During that same year, Africa as a whole generated 1.45 gigatonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> in total, an amount even less than Russia's emissions alone. In fact, 75% of this total comes from just five industrializing African countries heavily reliant on fossil fuels: South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt, and Morocco. When compared to India's annual per capita CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of 1.9 tonnes, Africa's 1.1 tonnes per person per year remains relatively low (for comparison, India's population is similar in size to the African continent's population). In essence, Africa's historical fossil fuel consumption carries no responsibility for the rapid climate change occurring worldwide (Noyoo, 2023, p. 157).

One of the most important studies that emphasize the social dimension of climate change specifically in Africa is Agenda 2063. The text of the AU Agenda 2063 is introduced as follows:

‘We, the people of Africa and her Diaspora, united in diversity, young and old, men and women, girls and boys from all walks of life, deeply conscious of history, express our deep appreciation to all generations of Pan-Africanists. In particular, to the founders of the Organisation of African Unity for having bequeathed us an Africa with exemplary successes in the fight against slavery, colonialism and apartheid. Agenda 2063, rooted in Pan Africanism and African Renaissance, provides a robust framework for addressing past injustices and the realisation of the 21st Century as the African Century.’

Africa's exceptional natural resources, its environment, and ecosystems, including its wildlife and untamed territories, are thriving, cherished, and safeguarded, with economies and communities that are resilient to climate change. Africa is determined to confront the worldwide challenge of climate change by giving priority to adaptation in all our endeavors, leveraging expertise from various fields with sufficient support (affordable technology development and transfer, capacity building, financial and technical resources) to ensure the implementation of measures for the survival of the most vulnerable populations, including island nations, as well as for sustainable development and shared prosperity. Africa is committed to achieving equitable and sustainable utilization and stewardship of water resources for socio-economic development, regional collaboration, and environmental preservation. The remarkable progress made by countries in the Global South to uplift substantial segments of their populations from poverty, enhance incomes, and drive economic and social transformation is noteworthy. Africa is an integral part of the global effort, through the UN and other international organizations, to explore multilateral approaches to humanity's most pressing issues, which encompass human security, peace, poverty, hunger, disease eradication, gender equality, and climate change. Take prompt action regarding climate change and the natural surroundings, putting into effect the Climate Action Program in Africa, which includes initiatives addressing climate change specifically aimed at women and youth (AU Commission, 2015, pp. 1-16).

Although there are other areas within the field of social (policy) studies research that are undoubtedly worthy of exploration in future studies, the research conducted so far has encompassed both conventional and climate-adjusted perspectives on issues such as risks, citizenship, social welfare systems, and overall well-being. Given the imperative for economies and societies, including welfare states, to rapidly transition towards decarbonization, it would be prudent for researchers in the field of social studies (policy) to concentrate on examining both the environmentally problematic aspects of their fundamental concepts and the potentially influential roles that welfare systems could play in facilitating sustainable transformation. The escalating climate-related risks underscore the potential increased significance of redistributive social security and public services, particularly during such a transformative period. As a result, one specialized area within climate-adjusted social (policy) study research should focus on the necessary reforms of welfare institutions and policies to ensure that they are capable of fostering and advancing sustainable well-being on a global scale and across generations. This climate emergency represents a novel structural condition

for all societies, and there is no doubt that it presents substantial challenges in terms of organizing welfare states and shaping social policies (Hirvilammi et al., 2023, p. 2, pp. 15-16)

### **Climate Change in Terms of Social Impacts in Africa: Africa Climate Summit 2023**

Africa witnesses an escalating pattern of weather and climate fluctuations, resulting in disasters and the disruption of economic, ecological, and social systems. It is projected that by 2030, as many as 118 million individuals living in extreme poverty (defined as those with daily incomes of less than US\$ 1.90) will face the risks of drought, floods, and extreme heat in Africa if adequate response measures are not implemented. Such circumstances will impose additional burdens on poverty alleviation endeavors and significantly impede progress in prosperity. In sub-Saharan Africa, climate change has the potential to further reduce the gross domestic product (GDP) by up to 3% by 2050. This presents a formidable challenge for climate adaptation and resilience initiatives since not only are the environmental conditions deteriorating, but the number of affected individuals is also on the rise (World Meteorological Organization, 2020, p. 4). If it needs to give an example to overcome such problems; in 2017, the African Development Bank (AfDB) raised more than USD 5 billion for upcoming climate finance initiatives (Safonov, 2019, p. 16).

Although climate change impacts everyone, those with the least ability to adapt, local people, primarily the impoverished, are the most susceptible. Africa's development achievements, both past and future, are jeopardized by climate change's consequences unless adaptation efforts are enhanced. As an example, during the 2005-2006 famine in Niger, there was an early and accurate warning of the impending catastrophe, but many months passed before aid reached the affected regions. During this time, households faced a difficult choice: selling productive assets at a loss or reducing investments in human capital (e.g., malnutrition, withdrawing children from school). Either choice could have long-term implications for poverty. Despite the evident shortcomings in donor-funded disaster relief, its frequent utilization may have, nevertheless, discouraged nations from establishing robust national social safety nets integrated with their budgets and obtaining weather-based insurance. Access to financial products and services is also of some significance (Rasmus et al., 2008, pp. 1-4).

Habitats and ecosystems in Africa face a range of pressures, including but not limited to deforestation, land degradation, and a heavy reliance on biomass for energy. In sub-Saharan Africa, over 80 percent of the population relies on traditional biomass for cooking. Climate change is anticipated to introduce an additional layer of stress. Africa's susceptibility to climate change is compounded by various non-climatic factors, encompassing persistent poverty, food insecurity, a high prevalence of diseases, ongoing conflicts, limited development, and insufficient adaptive capacity. The climate crisis is also one of the triggers for conflicts. The average per capita income in most African nations is currently lower than it was three decades ago. Sub-Saharan Africa is the sole region that witnessed negative annual per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth, with a -1 percent rate between 1975 and 1999. One-third of the population in sub-Saharan Africa grapples with chronic hunger, and like Malawi some African countries contend with high HIV/AIDS prevalence, affecting four out of ten individuals (UNDP, 2007, p. 93). The associated costs related to healthcare expenditures and productivity losses are most pronounced in some of the poorest nations, amounting to roughly 5 percent of GDP or approximately US\$28.4 billion annually in sub-Saharan Africa. Out of the 25 African countries that faced food crises in 2003, ten are currently mired in internal conflicts, while four are in the process of recovering from past conflicts. These conflicts frequently divert scarce resources towards military budgets at the expense of developmental needs and lead to a significant number of internally displaced persons and refugees. (Osman-Elasha, 2009, pp. 13-15).

When analyzing the adaptation of livelihoods to climate change disruptions in rural Mozambique, beginning with an institutional examination of the scalar dimensions of livelihood practices that

interconnect with climate change adaptation. The research takes into account various factors, including a comprehensive assessment of the vulnerability context and the acknowledgment of how different values and considerations impact the outcomes of adaptation efforts. However, in some respects, the study doesn't directly delve into sustainability aspects concerning livelihood adaptation and institutions. This omission leaves certain analytical aspects concerning environmental integrity, social justice, and equity somewhat unaddressed. This gap can be attributed to the failure to connect the discussed issues with a specific sustainability framework. The study provides a comprehensive discussion on the multifaceted aspects of adaptation in small-scale African agriculture. Still, it overlooks the examination of equity and social justice concerns, which are crucial in the context of climate change, adaptation, and mitigation, as they raise issues of fairness and justice. On the other hand, other research projects opt to focus exclusively on the infrastructure and technical alternatives when analyzing climate change adaptation in various African communities. However, they do not explore the potential implications of these strategies for sustainability, leaving this aspect largely unexplored (Bhatasara & Nyamwanza, 2018, p. 89).

Due to climate change; the most susceptible area is Africa, particularly the sub-Saharan region, due to its limited adaptive capacity and anticipated shifts in rainfall patterns. Small islands are also highly vulnerable because of the substantial exposure of their populations and infrastructure to the threats of rising sea levels and increased storm surges. Adverse security consequences arising from future climate-related alterations are expected to be predominantly evident in countries and regions that currently experience armed conflicts, primarily in the east-central parts of Africa. A connection between environmental conditions and migration has been observed in various rural African settings. Migration patterns resulting from prolonged drought conditions initially align with established labor migration patterns and may not significantly differ in intensity from areas with well-established high rates of temporary, cyclical migration (Mearns & Norton, 2010, p. 5, 88, 112).

The motto of ACS'23, held in Kenya on 4-6 September 2023, is 'Driving Green Growth & Climate Finance Solutions For Africa And The World.' Institutions and organizations supporting and partnering with the summit; AU, EU, Kenya government, German Cooperation, Government of Denmark, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, UN, The Rockefeller Foundation and others. Background emphasis of the summit was; climate change presents substantial risks to the international community, resulting in significant economic damages from its physical impacts. In the last ten years, storms, wildfires, and floods have led to considerable reductions in GDP. Africa, specifically, confronts severe climate-related difficulties, including droughts, desertification, and a rising number of cyclones, which in turn cause displacement, migration, and food shortages. The continent is also disproportionately affected by the global temperature increase and is expected to encounter growing physical climate hazards. Moreover, African governments' limited capacity to address the climate emergency, due to their high debt burden and economic setbacks, underscores the urgent need for debt relief and increased financial resources. Africa's contribution to the process is expressed as follows; Shifting the narrative from a dichotomy between the Global North and Global South is of utmost importance in dealing with the climate emergency. Collaboration and unified efforts are essential for all countries to effectively address climate change. Africa is prepared to play a role in worldwide decarbonization endeavors by utilizing its plentiful resources, such as renewable energy, vital minerals, agricultural capacity, and natural assets. By capitalizing on these advantages, Africa can lead its sustainable growth while also assisting in fulfilling global renewable energy requirements. Additionally, the continent presents various investment prospects for international capital to advance decarbonization efforts and bolster local economic progress (ACS'23 official website, 2023).

The following call was made by African leaders at the summit; in order to attain the necessary reductions in emissions and ensure sufficient funding for climate initiatives, a comprehensive worldwide funding system is imperative. This entails imposing specific taxes on sectors such as aviation and maritime, discontinuing fossil fuel subsidies on a global scale, and instituting a universal tax on fossil fuels. Additionally, Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms (CBAM) can serve as a tax designated for targeted

mitigation and adaptation endeavors. Exploring the implementation of a Global Financial Transactions Tax represents another potential avenue for generating substantial revenue. These global levies should be collected and consolidated into a single global fund, with allocation based on maximizing climate impact and bolstering technological advancements. Moreover, the equitable distribution of funds should be overseen by a global governance body, independent of national interests. The following commitment was made; during the ACS'23, leaders will be encouraged to put forth ambitious promises and engagements. A comprehensive framework for making pledges and commitments will be formulated to steer these initiatives. By embracing ambitious concepts and undertaking courageous commitments, we have the chance to reverse the course of climate change, impacting not only Africa but the entire world (ACS'23 official website, 2023).

Summit focused on delivering climate-positive growth and finance solutions for Africa and the world. Focus themes were determined as follows; Climate Action Financing: three climate finance goals, more financing, targeted financing, and cheaper higher risk appetite financing. Green Growth Agenda for Africa: 'We as LMIC (Low and middle income countries) have a lot to contribute to the global climate agenda and we need to commit to playing our part. We cannot keep growing in a high-carbon intensive manner.' Climate Action and Economic Development: both are not in conflict but interdependent; they need to happen together or neither will happen. Global Capital optimization: as opposed to local optimization— many of the lowest cost sources of reducing global emissions are typically found in the Global South compared with industrialized countries (ACS'23 official website, 2023).

Many topics were touched upon during the summit by specialists, and it can highlight some of the topics in order to connect them with the study; The Power of the Potential: To set the stage for ACS and ACW (Africa Climate Week), showcasing Africa's potential in addressing climate challenges, emphasizing the need for a fairer financial system, and highlighting the road to COP28 (Conference of the Parties). The youth and Indigenous People and Local Communities presented their statements to the Summit. Investment Opportunities for Food Systems Transformation in Africa: The session focuses on a unified African vision to transform sustainable food systems urgently, given the challenges posed by climate change. It aims to showcase existing initiatives, announce new investments, and promote strategies for doubling agricultural production and productivity by 2030. Additionally, the session aims to boost intra-African trade, encourage private sector investments in value addition, and prioritize climate-smart and regenerative agriculture to achieve green growth. The acceleration of investments in climate-resilient water projects is crucial: This session delves into water's pivotal role in Africa's socio-economic development and its significance in building climate resilience amidst challenges like prolonged droughts. The dialogue focused on the 2023 UN Water Summit's Fresh Water Challenge, the pressing investment gap, with currently only \$10-\$19 billion being invested against a required \$30 billion, and the initiatives from the African Union and the High-Level Panel on Water Investments to bridge this shortfall. Adaptation across the Continent: This session discussed the significant needs and opportunities for accelerating adaptation action across the continent. It shined light on knowledge, capacity, and finance needs for adaptation, discussing how action is already being mobilized, opportunities for further investments to improve the resilience of people and economies, and getting resources where its needed the most (ACS'23 official website, 2023).

In connection with the summit, the 2023 regional climate week provided a chance to advocate for significant transformation and to promptly address the necessity for expediting advancements by jointly initiating a worldwide overhaul of our economic and social structures. It is discussed in this context; social, economic, and environmental instrument: challenges and opportunities in Africa (ACW, 2023, pp. 1-6). The following topics have also been on the agenda; Digitalisation and African climate solutions, research and innovation: a game changing for food and agricultural systems under a changing climate, food systems under a changing climate, climate resilient and low-carbon energy and infrastructural systems, low carbon, resilient urban areas, resilient water systems (ACS'23, Innovation Hub, pp. 1-3).



At ACS'23, climate change was discussed in all its aspects and its effects were on the agenda in the social (impacts) context. In the declaration (ACS'23 Declaration, 2023, pp. 1-8) published within the framework of the final text of the summit, climate change and the social dimension; (on a global scale) and especially in Africa, as follows: (i) Emphasizing the validation by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that Africa experiences accelerated warming compared to the global average, and if unchecked, climate change will persistently affect African economies and societies, impeding progress and well-being; (ii) Expressing alarm over the disproportionate burdens and hazards that numerous African nations confront due to climate change-induced erratic weather phenomena and patterns, including protracted droughts, catastrophic floods, and wildfires, leading to extensive humanitarian crises with adverse consequences for economies, health, education, peace, and security, among other threats; (iii) Recognizing that climate change stands as the paramount global challenge and the most significant peril to all life on Earth, demanding immediate and collaborative efforts from all countries to curtail emissions and diminish the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere; (iv) Acknowledging that Africa, although not historically accountable for worldwide warming, endures the repercussions disproportionately, affecting lives, means of subsistence, and economies; (v) Additionally acknowledging that African metropolises and urban areas are undergoing swift expansion, and by 2050, they will accommodate more than 1.0 billion inhabitants. Aware of the reality that swift urbanization, poverty, and inequality constrain planning capabilities and other urban factors that heighten people's exposure and susceptibility to threats, thereby transforming cities into disaster-prone zones throughout the continent.

In order to overcome social and other problems, it was stated at the summit that collective action was needed on the following issues: (i) urging the international community to promptly take action to reduce emissions, honor its commitments, uphold previous pledges, and aid the continent in tackling climate change; (ii) encouraging investments that promote climate positivity and trigger a developmental path centered on industries set to revolutionize our world, enabling African nations to attain a consistent middle-income status by 2050; (iii) inviting world leaders to join us in seizing this exceptional chance to expedite global decarbonization while pursuing equity and collective prosperity.

At the summit, commitments were made, by African leaders, on the following issues: (i) formulate and execute policies, regulations, and incentives aimed at attracting domestic, regional, and worldwide investment in sustainable growth and all-encompassing economies; (ii) orient our economic development strategies toward growth that benefits the climate, including the expansion of equitable energy transitions and the generation of renewable energy for industrial operations, climate-resilient and regenerative agricultural practices, and essential safeguarding; (iii) intensify our endeavors to enhance agricultural productivity through sustainable farming practices, ensuring food security while minimizing adverse environmental consequences and promoting nature and biodiversity; (iv) take the lead in establishing global benchmarks, measurements, and market mechanisms to accurately assess and remunerate the preservation of nature, biodiversity, socio-economic advantages, and the provision of climate-related services.

The summit also called for action as follows: encourage world leaders to recognize that the global economy's decarbonization presents an opportunity to foster equity and collective prosperity; extend invitations to Development Partners from both the global south and north to align and coordinate their technical and financial resources aimed at Africa, promoting the sustainable utilization of Africa's natural resources for the continent's transition to a low-carbon development model and contributing to worldwide decarbonization; devise industry policies that incentivize international investments in regions offering the most significant climate advantages while ensuring benefits for local communities; petition the African Union Commission to formulate an implementation framework and roadmap for this declaration and designate Climate Change as an AU focal point for the year 2025 or 2026.

Also, as an important note, the AU has joined the G20 as a permanent member. The inclusion of the

AU into the G20 as a permanent member is welcomed, and it is strongly believed that this inclusion will significantly contribute to the addressing of global challenges. The G20 reaffirms its firm commitment to Africa, extending its support through initiatives like the G20 Compact with Africa and the G20 Program to aid industrialization in Africa and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The G20 is in favor of additional dialogues about enhancing collaboration between the G20 and other regional allies. The efforts of all G20 members, which facilitated the accession of the AU as a permanent member during India's Presidency of the G20, are commended. A significant role is played by Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa and South Africa, in the global economy. G20's commitment is to strengthen the ties with the AU and support the realization of the aspirations outlined in Agenda 2063. Strong support for Africa is also reiterated (G20 Leaders' Declaration, 2023, pp. 28-29). This result increases the hope that it will bring faster and stronger solutions to the social problems caused by climate change in Africa.

## Conclusion

This study examines the societal impacts of climate change in Africa. Initially, it assesses the broader implications of climate change and subsequently delves into the specific social aspect of climate change within the context of ACS'23. The United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) serve as the principal organizers of the summit. The study is grounded in an analysis of the initiatives and documents/reports released by these two entities. The summit's concluding statement represents the culmination of this research.

Despite presenting an ecological veneer, climate change carries multifaceted societal and communal implications. Africa bears the brunt of these consequences due to elevated poverty levels, destitution, and economic insufficiency when compared to other regions. The African continent predominantly hinges on an agriculture-centered economy, rendering it particularly vulnerable to climate change's repercussions. As a result, food production dwindles, rendering the local population's battle against hunger more arduous. Dwindling water resources due to drought compound disparities in water access. Climatic changes in the form of extreme temperatures propagate health challenges and the prevalence of communicable diseases. Rising sea levels displace coastal communities, deepening societal issues through waves of migration. Industries such as fishing and tourism endure adverse effects due to climate change. Climate-related incidents disrupt schools, hindering children's education and fostering educational discrepancies. Climate change escalates societal conflicts by heightening pressure on natural resources. It exacerbates social injustices by disproportionately impacting underprivileged and susceptible communities.

The United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) are engaged in significant efforts to combat climate change. These two entities take the lead in shaping crucial policy-making processes in the fight against climate change. They have played roles, especially in the creation of international agreements like the Paris Agreement. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) - a vital component of the groundbreaking Paris Agreement - stands as the world's most significant climate fund. Its mission is to assist developing nations in enhancing and achieving their objectives for Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) focused on low-emission and climate-resilient trajectories. The GCF is required to allocate 50% of its funds to activities aimed at reducing emissions (mitigation) and 50% to those addressing the impact of climate change (adaptation), in terms of grants. Additionally, a minimum of 50% of the resources dedicated to adaptation should be directed to the nations that are most vulnerable to climate change, particularly African states. The GCF's programming strategy acknowledges the need to expand both mitigation and adaptation endeavors. The GCF seeks to harness cooperative advantages while reducing potential conflicts between adaptation and mitigation. Africa, despite contributing the lowest greenhouse gas emissions globally, continues to face the most significant vulnerability and disproportionate impact from climate change. As the world's largest multilateral climate fund, the GCF is actively assisting African nations in achieving their climate-related objectives by investing in projects aimed at promoting low-emission and climate-resilient development. Up to this point, the GCF has supported 78 projects, providing a total of USD 3.7 billion in

GCF funding and attracting an additional USD 9 billion in co-financing from various public and private partners. The GCF engages in climate change mitigation and adaptation through four primary approaches; first, creating a conducive environment for climate action by advocating for comprehensive strategies, planning, and policy development. This is especially crucial in sub-Saharan Africa, where debt levels have significantly increased since the beginning of the pandemic. In partnership with the FAO, the GCF is assisting Botswana in developing a National Strategy for Green Resilient Recovery, focusing on agriculture and tourism. Second; accelerating climate innovation. For instance, in collaboration with Acumen, the GCF is investing equity in the KawiSafi Fund, which offers risk capital to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) developing innovative off-grid solar and climate-resilient agriculture solutions for vulnerable communities in East Africa. Third, de-risking projects that might not be considered financially viable, thus establishing a commercial track record for new climate solutions. One such example is the support provided to the Great Green Wall initiative. To date, the GCF has approved 29 projects involving both the public and private sectors in Sahelian countries, with a total GCF financing of over USD 1 billion. Finally, aligning finance with sustainable development by enhancing domestic financial institutions' capacity to incorporate climate risks into all financial decision-making processes. For instance, the GCF has assisted the Development Bank of Southern Africa in establishing a dedicated climate investment facility and will aid in issuing the first municipal bonds for wastewater recycling in South Africa. (Green Climate Fund, 2023).

The organizations (UN and AU) implement various programs and projects to provide financing and technical assistance to African countries for combating climate change. The UN and the AU encourage scientific research related to climate change and support evidence-based policy formulation. Moreover, Africa has developed numerous initiatives to combat climate change at both continental and regional levels. For instance, the African Union's climate change programs have played a pivotal role in fostering regional cooperation. Various adaptation and resilience projects are implemented in Africa to combat climate change. These projects can be beneficial in areas such as sustainable water resource management, teaching climate-friendly farming practices to farmers, erosion control, among others. To put Africa's NDCs into action, an investment of approximately US\$ 2.8 trillion will be necessary from 2020 to 2030. The African Development Bank (AfDB) has increased its climate financing to reach US\$ 25 billion by 2025, with 67% of this funding dedicated to adaptation. Additionally, the bank is striving to secure up to US\$ 13 billion for its Africa Development Fund (UN Ghana, 2023). Africa receives support from the international community in terms of climate finance and technical assistance, contributing to environmental sustainability and increased adaptive capacity. Africa presently obtains approximately 30 billion dollars annually in climate funding, with one-third of this sum originating from the World Bank. However, the climate financing requirements are estimated at 280 billion dollars annually. To bridge this climate financing deficit, the public and private sectors, multilateral organizations, and development partners must intensify their efforts. The World Bank is firmly dedicated to sustaining its assistance to Africa, which encompasses activities like the preparation of Country Climate and Development Reports, as well as the provision of technical aid and financial backing (UNFCCC, 2023). According to another prevalent and significant perspective, the support of the international community in the context of climate change in Africa is insufficient. Calculating the requirements and potential returns on specific investments could represent progress in building a stronger argument for increased financial support from the international community (ACET, 2023).

Africa, along with numerous African countries, is deeply involved in the battle against climate change and the mitigation of its social consequences. By November 2019, 49 out of the 54 African countries had approved their NDCs. With the signing and ratification of the Paris Agreement, almost all African nations have pledged to strengthen climate action by decreasing their greenhouse gas emissions and bolstering their ability to withstand adverse impacts. The need for adaptation to climate change's adverse effects is pressing for the continent (AFDB, 2023). Numerous African states have devised national strategies for addressing climate-related issues and have initiated measures to put these strategies into

action. These blueprints are designed to minimize carbon emissions, strengthen adaptive measures, and contribute to the attainment of sustainable development objectives. Certain African countries are diminishing their reliance on fossil fuels by channeling resources into sustainable energy alternatives, with a specific focus on solar and wind energy endeavors. The protection and revival of woodlands and native ecosystems are of utmost importance for safeguarding biodiversity and sequestering carbon. The sustainable governance of water resources and initiatives to enhance water efficiency are central to bolstering resilience against drought and the challenges of water scarcity.

In summary, addressing climate change, both globally and specifically in Africa, requires a comprehensive approach. Essential actions to tackle the social (and other) consequences of climate change and reduce their effects consist of decreasing greenhouse gas emissions, conserving ecosystems, improving energy efficiency, promoting sustainable agriculture, establishing social equity, and enforcing education and policy regulations. National and international collaborations are of utmost significance in the African context. While the efforts of the UN and other international organizations in addressing climate change are substantial, they also come with limitations and challenges. Climate change calls for increased international cooperation, prompt action, and all-encompassing policy and financing solutions, necessitating the enhancement and refinement of ongoing initiatives. This is because Africa faces limitations in resources, substantial social and economic hurdles, along with political issues and instability. The African Union's dedication to achieving social justice in African nations is critical. The AU should allocate more resources to awareness and educational projects and climate change programs while offering support and coordination. Many African countries are also engaged in combating climate change and lessening its social repercussions. Nonetheless, African nations must fortify appropriate policy and legal frameworks for climate change mitigation. The endeavors to combat climate change should be in harmony with sustainable development objectives.

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## EXAMINING THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF ISLAM AND HERITAGE IN WEST AFRICA

### BATI AFRIKA'DA İSLAM TARİHİ VE MİRASININ İNCELENMESİ

Yıl 4, Sayı 1, ss.62-73.

Year 4, Issue 1, pp.62-73.

Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi

Article Type: Research Article

Geliş Tarihi: 30.06.2023

Submitted: 30.06.2023

Kabul Tarihi: 27.01.2024

Accepted: 27.01.2024

DOI: 10.58851/africana.1320932

#### Atf Bilgisi / Reference Information

Halidu, Y. (2024). Examining the Historiography of Islam and Heritage in West Africa, *Africana Dergisi*, 4 (1), 62-73. <https://doi.org/10.58851/africana.1320932>

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#### Abstract

Heritage is broadly viewed as a cultural construction of the present that is deeply ingrained in the past. Since the 1990s, Africanist scholars, mostly historians, have engaged with the concept of heritage in Africa, focusing on how post-colonial African countries conceptualized heritage after many of them achieved independence in the 1960s. Presently, there are many works on how local and national as well as international movements, have complicated the concept of heritage in Africa. However, most of these works have concentrated on the national and cultural constructs of heritage with very few on religion, especially Islam. This paper explores how scholars have presented the subject of Islam and Heritage in West Africa. It is a historiographical essay that argues that Islam and Muslims in West Africa are not aliens to the conceptualization and the development of heritage in Africa. They have played several roles in safeguarding their intangible and tangible heritages and in some ways, assisted in conserving cultural heritage of their respective regions. Thus, this work does not only allow us to appreciate the contribution of religion (Islam) to the construct of heritage, but it also contributes to the literature on the history of Islam and Muslim societies especially in West Africa.

**Keywords:** Heritage, West Africa, Islam, Shariah, Conceptualization, World Heritage, UNESCO.

#### Öz

Miras, geniş anlamda, geçmişe derinlemesine kök salmış, günümüzün kültürel bir inşası olarak görülmektedir. 1990'lardan bu yana, çoğunlukla tarihçiler olmak üzere Afrikalı akademisyenler, Afrika'daki miras kavramıyla ilgilendiler ve sömürge sonrası Afrika ülkelerinin birçoğunun 1960'larda bağımsızlığını kazanmasının ardından mirası nasıl kavramsallaştırdığına odaklandılar. Günümüzde yerel ve ulusal olduğu kadar uluslararası akımların da Afrika'da miras kavramını ne kadar karmaşık hale getirdiğine dair pek çok çalışma mevcut. Ancak bu eserlerin çoğu mirasın milli ve kültürel yapısına yoğunlaşmış, çok azı ise din, özellikle de İslam üzerinedir. Bu makale, Afrika'daki tarihçilerin, araştırmacıların ve aynı zamanda bilim insanı Batı Afrika'da İslam ve miras konusunu nasıl sunduklarını incelemektedir. Bu yönüyle çalışma, Batı Afrika'daki İslam'ın ve Müslümanların Afrika'daki mirasın kavramsallaştırılmasına ve gelişimine yabancı olmadığını savunan tarihyazımsal bir makaledir. Din Tarihi araştırmacıları sıklıkla maddi kültürleri ihmal ederek dinin maddi olmayan kültürü üzerinde yoğunlaşırlar. Ne var ki, çalışmada tarih, yerli dini toplulukların, tarihlerinin maddiliği ve dini deneyimleriyle güçlü bağları olduğunu gösterdi. Dolayısıyla çalışmada unutulmuş, var olmayan, susturulan ve sıklıkla ihmal edilen bazı materyallere aracılık yaparak, sadece maddi kültürün İslami dini uygulamalar için önemini göstermekle kalmıyor, aynı zamanda İslami bilginin nasıl edinildiğindeki nesnelere de gösteriyor. Böylece sayede makale dinin (İslam'ın) somut ve soyut mirasının inşasına katkısını takdir etmemize olanak sağlamanın yanında İslam tarihi ve Batı Afrika'daki Müslüman toplumlara ilişkin literatüre de katkıda bulunuyor.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Miras, Batı Afrika, İslam, Şeriat, Kavramsallaştırma, Dünya Mirası, UNESCO.



**STRUCTURED ABSTRACT**

Scholars of religion very often concentrate on the non-material culture of religion at the neglect of its material cultures. Meanwhile, history has shown that religious communities have had strong connections with the materiality of their religious experiences. In this work, the overall objective is aimed at showing how material culture has shaped Islamic education and heritage in Africa. The paper adopts strategies of collecting practices to assemble objects that have historical value in the *longue durée* (long duration/long period of time often used to depict how social processes develop or how social structures evolved) history of the transformation of Islamic education in Africa. It argues that material culture has been very much involved in the history of Islamic education in Africa not only as an epistemological basis for showing the shifts in pedagogy, but also indicating the extent to which knowledge is applied to the daily religious and secular lives of teachers and their students. By giving agency to the materials, the paper does not only show the importance of material culture and heritage to Islamic religious practices, but also shows the centrality of the objects in how Islamic knowledge was acquired.

Indeed, academic study of religion has often treated material culture as anti-religious. Scholars of Religion in Africa mostly specialize in non-material elements of religion. It is common to read scholarly works on religious experiences, doctrines, textual history, and ethics as well as mythology and religious philosophies, without touching on heritage in West Africa especially. Meanwhile, a careful examination of the two fields, religion, and material culture, reveals that material culture plays very important roles in religious beliefs and practices. Most crucially, just as Julian Droogan argues, these two are inseparable. Various religious denominations continue to connect to past religious sites, relics of the past, shrines, and historical places of worship not only to establish their identity as members of that faith, but also to use them, when possible, to enhance their socio-economic status. In Islam, for instance, the Ka'ba, as a religious sanctuary, receives pilgrims annually. The pilgrims undertake the religious obligation known as Hajj where they circumambulate the Ka'ba as well as other religious practices at Safa and Marwa and the Jamarat. Thus, material culture is not antithesis to religion in general and Islam in particular.

Muslims have had a constant connection with their material culture in their daily lives but, how far these materials have impacted Islamic religious practices is yet to be explored extensively. This paper seeks to explore an aspect of these connections in the area of the history of Islamic education in Africa. It argues that material culture has been very much involved in the history of Islamic education and heritage in Africa not only as an epistemological basis for showing the shifts in pedagogy, but also as indicating the extent to which knowledge is applied to the daily religious and secular lives of both teachers and their students. The agency of material culture to knowledge acquisition and transmission as well as its application, shares some perspectives with other fields including collecting. Not only does the field of collecting collect objects, but also it sometimes explores the agency of objects to show how objects shape human experiences and actions.

Collectors and curators collect artifacts and materials for various reasons. Sharon Macdonald, a British anthropologist and a museologist, defines collecting as “a self-aware process of creating a set of objects conceived to be meaningful as a group.” This definition shows not only that collecting is a deliberate attempt to collect objects, but also an underlying reason for collecting such objects. The definition also shows that objects are not collected in isolation but are grouped based on defined characteristics either for aesthetic purposes or for purposes of research or to help in historical narrations. Macdonald adds that although museums play important roles in the ‘conception of collection’ it is not the same as collecting. Museums rather contextualize objects and give them new meaning and interpretations. From the 1990s, historians began to explore the history of collecting and why people collected. As Macdonald shows, although historians, especially of collecting practices, acknowledge that collecting started many centuries ago in various periods and places including Ancient Greece, and Rome as well as medieval Europe, collecting in Renaissance and early modern Europe was unique. This period is not only

widely accepted as the foundation of modern museum collecting, but also that it is distinct from earlier efforts of collecting in many ways. Collecting in this period involved a new set of educated elites who extended collecting from specific royal or religious recognition to the act of displaying the objects in specialized cabinets or rooms. Moreover, there were new collecting technologies and revised administrative mechanisms in inventory and cataloging.

In arguing the case for more agency, Paula Findlen, who is among the earliest historians to write on the subject of collecting showed how collecting overlapped with the evolution of scientific culture in early modern Europe (Italy). She argues that Naturalist collectors such as Ulisse Aldrovandi (1522-1605) and Athanasius Kircher (1602- 1680) turned nature into collectibles to facilitate the development of natural history. James Delbourgo also contributed towards showing objects of scientific value in his examination of Sloane's biography. Delbourgo's account includes a new set of objects such as specimens of cocoa that Sloane collected from Jamaica and the Caribbean. Susan Crane, another historian of collecting, focused on nineteenth-century Germany to explore the phenomenon of historical consciousness. She also provided a new way to think about collecting. She primarily gave agency to the ruins that were left after the Napoleonic wars to show how the objects literally awakened historical consciousness. These works and many others have shown how collecting has engaged with material culture and heritage.

The material culture in the history of Islamic education in Africa, I explore, involves objects with a set of culture as objects in mainstream collecting, albeit the objects do not necessarily end up in museums, but are used daily in the practical acquisition of knowledge. Like Crane, I explore the agency of the objects in shaping the development of Islamic education in Africa. Robert Launay argues that the materiality of Islamic education helps us to understand two major transformations of Islamic education in Africa. He asserts that while heritage shows a classical paradigm of knowledge delivery up to the nineteenth century, other Islamic materials signify a modern trend of education introduced by colonial educational institutions. This paper gives agency to the materials while applying Launay's epistemological transformation of Islamic education. It explores how materials complicated Islamic education in Africa and argues for an integration of materials from both classical and modern paradigms of Islamic education in Africa.

There is also a strong case for the material significance to classical Islamic education in Africa. As Launay argues, classical Islamic education dominated the scene before the exposure of Muslim communities to colonial rule and missionary education in the nineteenth-century. This timeline resonates with Wadad Kadi's identification of shifts in a *longue duree* history of Islamic education in its broader sense. Kadi identifies three stages and asserts that the first stage took the form of institution and compilation from the seventh century to the nineteenth century. The second stage followed from the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century when new world colonial systems emerged. This period saw the introduction of secular systems into Islamic education. The third stage followed from the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to the present. Muslims in the third stage had to deal with colonial legacies and challenges of modern nations that wholly or partly relegated Arabic education to the background.

## Introduction

Material culture has been very much involved in the history of Islamic education in Africa not only as an epistemological basis for showing the shifts in pedagogy but also indicating the extent to which knowledge is applied to daily religious and secular lives of both teachers and their students. By giving agency to these forgotten, some non-existent, silenced and often neglected materials, this paper does not only show the importance of material culture to Islamic religious practices, but also shows centrality of the objects in how Islamic knowledge was acquired. In attesting to the crucial nature such objects play in the larger context of enriching Islamic heritage in Africa, many scholars have explored the centrality of these objects. For example, in Hossam Mahdy's view (Mahdy, 2007), three main factors have influenced heritage

preservation in Islam. The first is the challenge of the Eurocentric construct of heritage located in the concept of value and views about intrinsic value as well as issues of integrity and authenticity. The second is the *shariah* provision of what to preserve and what to neglect, located in scriptural texts and thirdly, challenges of modern-nation-state on the institution of *waqf*. The concept of value, he argues, is used to refer to the positive qualities and characteristics, both actual and potential, as the foundation for conserving objects. In defining “value-based” approach to conservation, Randall Mason for example excluded ethical and philosophical values as well as normative codes of behavior from the assessment of values in objects. Mason further contends that “Islamic values should be considered under social and spiritual values.” For Mahdy, this monolithic construction of heritage is problematic because “value” means different things to different people. Moreover, the Islamic worldview defines values by exactly what Mason and other heritage world conventions exclude from their definition. He insists that “*Islamic values are not limited to religious, spiritual, or cultural aspects, as they stem from a worldview formed by Islam.*” Muslims are therefore, called upon by the Qur’an in chapter 7: 199, to respect local traditions that do not conflict with Islamic principles.

Besides the Islamic worldview of heritage and conservation, the centralization of *waqf* which served as a means to preserve heritage, set the tone for bureaucrats, politicians, and decision makers to prioritize what *waqf* revenues were to be used for without any regard to what the founders of or individual *waqf* proponents stipulated in their *waqf* documents. The effects of this were readily seen in the management and maintenance of historic mosques and heritage sites. Examples of these management problems are easily noticeable at historic mosques such as the Sinan Pasha Mosque in the historic city of Cairo. Not only are they left empty without being used by local communities, but are also sometimes isolated from their urban surroundings for purposes of tourism. Another example is the way historic *sablīs* (drinking fountains) are kept in Egypt. For Mahdy, although the *sablīs* were part of non-religious historic structures in the context of Islam, they carried the notion of ‘serving water as a form of charity.’ Thus, they were to be maintained and kept well, but they were either robbed of their architecture or left as places for collecting cabbages.

Consequently, scholars like Mahdy have provided several arguments to show that Islam is a worldview and must be understood in its own right. In this worldview, heritage values and ethics are inseparable. Moreover, heritage values should neither be stated as intrinsic values nor should be prioritized over other socially constructed values. Although Islam recognizes scientific values, archaeological (see De Jong and Rowlands, 2007) values could be accepted when identified as scientific. Concluding his discussion, Mahdy calls for the recognition of Islamic approaches to heritage and studies in the intellectual history of conservation of cultural heritage, especially on pre-Islamic heritage. He is optimistic that this will correct misconceptions that Muslims are adamant about the cultural remains of pre-Islamic civilizations.

Although Mahdy’s discussion focuses on some Muslim-majority countries in the Arab- world including Egypt, his theoretical foundations of Islam and Muslims with regard to heritage are relevant to the discussion of Islamic heritage in Sub-Saharan Africa. It must be noted that heritage and what it means to conserve a particular set of tangible and intangible objects is so much contested in Africa, especially during the post-colonial period. *Reclaiming Heritage: Alternative Imaginaries of memory in West Africa* (2007), edited by Ferdinand De Jong and Michael Rowlands (2007) and *The Politics of Heritage in Africa ...* (2015), edited by Derek Peterson, Kodzo Gavua and Ciraj Rassool (2015) as well as *African Homecoming ...* by Katharina Schramm (2016) have provided myriad ways heritage is viewed and applied in Africa. *Reclaiming Heritage...* as a case in point, for instance, emphasized non-tangible heritage preservations to divert attention from the over-stressed tangible ones since the post-colonial period. *The Politics of Heritage in Africa ...* explored both national and local manifestations of heritage construction and preservation, highlighting the various controversies in the application of heritage, sometimes within the same geographical areas. *African Homecoming* focused on an international construct of heritage

located in the phenomenon of “homecoming” mainly by Africans in the Diaspora. The perspectives provided in both Mahdy’s work and those of the Africanist historians help to explore Islamic heritage conservation in West Africa in both specific and broad terms. In extending the discourse further, I will try to group the heritage conservation efforts of Muslims into two namely, *The Intangible and The Tangible*.

### The Intangible Heritage

As seen from the afore-mentioned discussion above, Mahdy argues that the intangible heritage mainly consists of social and ethical values, not defined by Eurocentric models, but defined by Islamic principles. But before Mahdy, *Reclaiming Heritage: Alternative Imaginaries of Memory in West Africa* (2007) gave us an extensive account on intangible cultural heritage, outlining how UNESCO’s 1972 convention framed and contextualized the discourse on heritage and memory in West Africa. Contrary to the Eurocentric framing of heritage conservation perpetuated by UNESCO and imposed on Africa, the editors in the introduction argued that alternative imageries of heritage existed in Africa to counter Western imaginations. The anthology places memory (memory herein implies politics of remembering and forgetting that stresses repetition and continuity) at the center of the heritage discourse. It forces us to accept that “Memory is located in material sensory practices such as songs, performances, and photographs, *as well as* in sites where the past is conserved, mediated, and authorized.” (De Jong & Rowlands, 2007). Both Mahdy and Ferdinand De Jong & Michael Rowlands help us to contextualize aspects of intangible cultural heritage in West Africa (2007, P.19). From their works, it becomes apparent that the intangible Islamic heritage include Muslim’s efforts to maintain Islamic spirituality, education, the socio-economic and political models of life as well as the individual and collective memories. The earliest works by Africanist scholars focused on these intangibles, yet the very necessary aspects of Islamic heritage in West Africa.

In “The historiography of Islam in West Africa: An anthropologist’s view”, Benjamin Soares noted that during the colonial rule, *jihad* became a major theme in the history of Islam in West Africa, produced by colonial imperialists. Colonial powers were preoccupied with the history of the *jihad* movements, carefully framing it as the only way Muslims are destined to reform their societies, to curtail any threat to colonial dominance (2014, p.30). To address colonial misrepresentation of Muslim’s reform movements, Africanist historians in the early years of the development of African History as a discipline in the 1960s, picked up themes of *jihad*. Their works reflected availability of sources in the reconstruction of a detailed history of the *jihads*. They treated the 18<sup>th</sup> and the 19<sup>th</sup> century *jihad* movements among other things, as ‘revolutions,’ forms of anti-colonial movements and social movements aimed at creating an Islamic space as well as seeking better lives for Muslims. These works began with Muray Last’s PhD thesis published as *The Sokoto Caliphate* in 1967 and Mervin Hiskett’s *Sword of Truth* in 1973. Both works concentrated on Shehu Usman Dan Fodio (d.1817) and his reform movement that led to the founding of the Sokoto caliphate in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century. Later, in 1985, David Robinson also published *The Holy War of Umar Tal*, tracing Al-Hajj Umar Tal’s holy war (jihad) in the Western Sudan between 1852 and 1864.

Soares noticed further that, in the Francophone regions, key actors of the 19th-century *jihads* were associated with specific Sufi orders. Usman Dan Fodio, for instance, was of the Qadiriyya Sufi order while Al-Hajj Umar Tal was a Tijaniyya. The Mouridiyya, founded by Cheikh Amadou Bamba Mbacke (d. 1927) in Senegal, followed later after the earlier two were established. Therefore, these works not only highlight histories of the *Jihads*, but also include histories of the mystical tradition of Islam in West Africa. From the 1970s, new studies delved into second wave reform movements which were largely anti-Sufi. Among the earliest was Lansine Kaba’s PhD, published in 1974 as *The Wahhabiyyah: Islamic Reform and Politics in French West Africa*. Although these studies continued into the 1990s, the narratives after the bombing of the World Trade Center in 2001 which targeted Salafi/Wahhabi reform movements, intensified studies into the activities of these new reform movements as wells as their engagements with “Sufi Islam” in West Africa. Ousman Kane, Ousman Kobo, and Roman Loimeier, among others, have done extensive studies,

aiming at portraying how the reform movements, framed within the context of modernity, negotiated change in their communities (Kane, 2003; Kobo, 2012; Loimeier, 2000).

Another area of Islamic heritage conservation in West Africa has been the transformations in Islamic education. From the late 1970s, many Africanist scholars started researching into the transformation of Muslim education in Africa. Pioneering works (Kaba, 1974; Skinner, 1976, pp. 499-520; Sameh, 1997) analyzed the transition from Qur'anic schooling characterized by rote learning to a madrasa system that included the study of Arabic grammar and other aspects of the Islamic sciences which were organized in an improved curriculum. In his *"Paths to Progress ..."*, Kobo identifies four factors from the historiography that led to the transformation from Qur'an schooling to madrasa education that began during the colonial period. Firstly, colonial administrators were interested in training Muslim cadets for colonial administration during Muslims' resistance to Christian mission schools. Secondly, with the introduction of Western styled schools, operated by the missionaries, Muslims from the 1950s began to regard the Qur'an school system as outmoded. Thirdly, West African Muslims' exposure to new models of madrasa education in Northern Africa, especially in Egypt, shaped their thoughts about new pedagogical foundations. The fourth is the early 20th-century modernizing discourse by the Salafi leaders (Kobo, 2016, p.162).

From the late 20<sup>th</sup> century onwards, attention shifted from purely focusing on the madrasa education to studying the history and processes of the inclusion of secular curriculum into madrasa schooling, especially the Franco-Arab schools in the French-speaking West Africa that began as early as the 1950s (Alidou, 2005). Several scholars (Kobo, 2022, pp. 334-350; Umar, 2001, pp. 223-229; Owusu, 2019, pp. 50-72) have also done similar studies in the English-speaking countries as well. The principal reason that led to the inclusion of secular education into the madrasas is that Muslims realized the inadequacies of the madrasa system to the realization of their socio-economic needs, especially during the late 1980s and 1990s. Kobo argues further that, the effects of the Economic Recovery Programs, coupled with the lack of language skills in English to aid employment opportunities especially for the graduates of Arab universities, necessitated a campaign to include a secular curriculum into the madrasa schooling. Consequently, the inclusion of secular education "resulted in a new system of madrasa often described as Franco-Arabic and Anglo-Arabic schools, a system the colonialists' had attempted to establish but failed." (p.168).

In point of fact, serious efforts to preserve Muslim heritage in West Africa have not been limited to men without Muslim women playing significant roles. Earlier works though are critiqued by some scholars as elitist focused, provide significant information of Muslim women who worked hard to preserve either Islamic knowledge or Islamic mystical orientation in West Africa. Among the earliest works is "The Role of Women as 'Agents Religieux' in Sokoto," (1985) by Jean Boyd and Murray Last. It focused primarily on Nana Asma'u, the daughter of Ousman Dan Fodio and her contribution towards Islamic knowledge. From the 1990s, scholars started engaging with studies that focused on Muslim women and the ways in which they organized, mostly collectively, to address the challenges they faced in their communities. Ousseina Alidou and Adeline Masquelier are among the few scholars who have done extensive studies on Muslim women's contribution to the development of their communities in West Africa to be specific, and Africa in general. In showing how some Muslim women in Kenya transformed the existing Islamic educational system, Alidou provides that Bi Swafiya Muhashamy-Said, a trained professional teacher worked tirelessly in pioneering the incorporation of an Islamic religious epistemology into a secular educational framework. Similarly, Mwalim Azara Mudira established an Islamic institution she named, the *ma'had*. This institution did not only engender Islamic education in favor of Muslim women in Kenya but also challenged the often-emphasized narrative by Kenyan male spiritual leaders that Muslim women are passive recipients of ritualist knowledge (pp.327-329).

Besides conserving spirituality and education, Muslims have also conserved their societal norms through praised songs. In "Islam and popular music in Senegal..." (McLaughlin, 1997, pp. 560-581) and

“The name of God I will sing again” (McLaughlin, 2000, pp. 191-207), Fiona McLaughlin, a professor of African Languages and Linguistics, explores the transformations in Islamic praised-singing tradition in Senegal. While these papers do not specifically focus on heritage, they are useful to the discussion on heritage conservation in West Africa. The papers stress the role of griots (verbal artists) and ‘popular song’ musicians in conserving the ideals of marabouts’ historical value and their behavior. While the griots have a long history in most African societies, popular songs emerged in Senegal in recent years as a new genre, ranging between the sacred and the secular. It inculcated aspects of American popular songs into the traditional praised singing which was either used to praise Prophet Muhammad or the marabouts.

On memory, two papers (Entangled Memories and Parallel Heritages in Mali by Micheal Rowlands and ‘Enchanting Town of Mud’: Djenne, A World Heritage Site in Mali by Charlotte Joy) in *Reclaiming Heritage: Alternative Imaginaries of Memory in West Africa* (2007), include arguments of different notions of heritage among Muslims in Djenne. Micheal Rowlands specifies that UNESCO’s World Heritage program in Mali created conserving impulses of nostalgic memory as well as posing socio-economic challenges to both the post-colonial state and its inhabitants. As the program led to a division between tangible and intangible heritage, Muslims’ response to the nostalgia yielded two main views. While Muslim conservatives as well as the Minister of Culture refused major transformation of the Djenne mosques as well as other buildings, some Muslims including the Imam of the mosque argued for an adoption of a *Wahhabi*-inspired architecture that included glazed tiles and minaret (2007, pp.127-145). Similar to Mahdy’s arguments about intrinsic value, the Imam of the mosque argued that Islam did not designate a fixed architecture for mosques. Thus, for Micheal Rowlands, although the mosque was a tangible heritage, the imagery of its transformation remained a matter deeply rooted in the Islamic reformists’ discourse of modernity (2007, p. 127).

The foregoing discussion is a glimpse of Muslim’s efforts to preserve intangible forms of heritage. Muslims facilitated the maintenance of both spiritual and ethical values, such as establishing the Islamic faith and practices in West Africa and helping to transmit them to the younger generations. Ousman Dan Fodio, for example, is one of the major contributors towards the establishment of the Islamic faith in West Africa, especially in today’s Northern Nigeria. Thus, as Mahdy argues, Islamic knowledge is one of the major aspects of heritage that needs to be maintained. After taking time to highlight some of the intangible aspects of heritage, I will now turn my attention to the tangible ones.

### **The Tangible Heritage**

Muslims in West Africa have not only engaged with the preservation of intangible heritage. They have also made several efforts to maintain the material culture as well. Although this aspect of Muslims’ effort is under-represented in literature, there are some works that have mentioned some of these efforts. However, most of the available literature take a general study of West African communities and mention some aspects of Muslim’s heritage conservation cultures. A significant way of conserving heritage among Muslims is the daily and ceremonial use of historical artifacts. For example, in “Islam and popular music in Senegal...” (1997), and “The name of God I will sing again” (2000), Fiona McLaughlin does not only discuss about songs, but shows how names of marabouts are either written, tired or embossed on vehicles and other socially used objects. McLaughlin’s observation is further emphasized in Nicole Crowder’s online article where she provides photographs to show details of how Mourides in Senegal dressed and maintained objects and sites to show the essence of their history and their religious beliefs (2000, pp.191-207).

More so, *Museums and History in West Africa* (Ardoiu & Arinze, 2000) is an anthology containing papers that emanated from a workshop organized by the West African Museums Program (MAMP) on “Museum and History’ in 1995 at Ouida (Republic of Benin). The papers addressed intellectual,

methodological, and institutional challenges that affect “research and communication in museums” in West Africa and in some parts of Africa, including South Africa and Zanzibar. Mamadou Camara’s paper, “Common Histories and Heritage” in Guinea and in Mali, and Boubakar Diaby’s paper, “Fixed and Moveable Cultural Heritage in Jenne (spelled also as Djenne) include discussions on Islamic heritage preservation.” Camara identifies two types of museums; traditional museums in animist (it is not clear why Camara uses a contested term “animist” instead of African traditional settlements) areas and traditional museums in Islamized areas. While those of the animist areas emphasized sacred sites and ritual objects, those of the Islamized areas contained heritage associated with the wars of Islamization during the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Items contained include flags of *jihad*, weapons, dresses, sacred turbans, and manuscript writings and documents. Others include the mosque of Al- Hajj Umar Tal at Dinguiraye and a sword used in the *jihad* movements. These objects, as argued by Camara, are part of the heritage of Muslims, and they possess useful knowledge transmitted through various generations.

Jenne’s (Djenne) experience of heritage conservation, as Diaby describes, overlaps in some ways with Trevor Marchand’s *The Masons of Djenne*, (2009) but diverts from each other in significant ways. Among the ways they overlap is the cultural heritage located in public and private buildings and craftsmanship. A classic example is the Jenne mosque. The mosque in both accounts is one of the most important public architectures in Jenne. Marchand describes it in detail and stresses that the people of the city had an annual community plastering of the mosque. This activity symbolized their unity and showed their reverence to the house of God and their aim of seeking the blessings of God. While Diaby highlights the history of specific fixed and movable objects such as the mosque (fixed) and written documents known as *tarikis* (movable objects), Marchand provides an extensive history of Jenne and its inhabitants with special reference to the masons of Djenne. He provides an extensive description of masonry, focusing on the masons’ identities, and building procedures including their tools and how they connect with other crafts such as potting and blacksmithing as well as the *marabouts* (Islamic religious scholars, normally of the ‘Suffi’ origins) and their *maraboutage* (the various magical- religious practices such as performing divinations and making amulets).

Besides the grand central mosque of Djenne, heritage is located in many other areas including, craftsmanship, collecting, spiritual power and praise singing. Marchand clarifies that before beginning any building in the city, the construction sites were blessed. This involved a collection of mixed- grains, melon-sized stones, and a composed mix of Qur’anic verses as well as potent incantations in *Djenne-Chiini*. The grains and the stones were blessed with the Qur’anic verses and the incantations and were then put in the foundations before constructions were made. By doing so, Islamic knowledge and traditional knowledge used to seek for spiritual protections for these buildings and for the overall sustenance for their inhabitants. In addition to facilitating the blessing of sites, Marabouts played significant roles in the production of amulets imbued with the protection of individuals, properties, and houses. Although Marabouts acknowledged the spiritual powers of masons and others, they identified their spiritual power to be Islamic, while others were not. This contestation is important as it shows that the Djenne community is not a monolithic community. While its people are of different religious backgrounds though, a Muslim majority, others also belong to different crafts. The three most important crafts that contribute to heritage conservation in Djenne are potting, blacksmithing, and masonry.

## Conclusion

Muslims have been very central to the discourse of heritage conservation in West Africa, not only as contributors at the national and international levels, but also in the development of Islam in Africa. Albeit their direct efforts to the overall heritage preservation in their respective regions in Africa have yet to receive major scholarly attention since academic study of religion has often treated material culture as anti-religious. Scholars of religion primarily specialize in non-material elements of religion. It is common to read scholarly works on religious experiences, doctrines, textual history, and ethics as well as mythology

and religious philosophies. Meanwhile a careful examination of the two fields, religion, and material culture, reveals that material culture plays very important roles in religious beliefs and practices. I argue that the two are actually inseparable. Various religious denominations continue to connect to past religious sites, relics of the past, shrines, and historical places of worship not only to establish their identity as members of that faith, but also to use them, when possible, to enhance their socio-economic status. The paper asserts that, in Islam, for instance, the Ka'ba, as a religious sanctuary receives pilgrims annually. The pilgrims undertake the religious obligation known as Hajj where they circumambulate the Ka'ba as well as other religious practices at Safa and Marwa and the Jamarat. Thus, material culture is not antithesis to religion in general and Islam in particular.

Muslims have had constant connection with their material culture in their daily lives but how far these materials have impacted Islamic religious practices is yet to be explored extensively. This paper tried, explored, and pointed out an aspect of these connections in the history of Islamic education in Africa. It argued that material culture has been very much involved in the history of Islamic education in Africa not only as an epistemological basis for showing the shifts in pedagogy, but also indicating the extent to which knowledge is applied to the daily religious and secular lives of both teachers and their students. The agency of material culture to knowledge acquisition and transmission as well as its application shares some perspectives with other fields including collecting. Not only does the field of collecting collect objects, but also it sometimes explores the agency of objects to show how objects shape human experiences, historical writings, and actions. These sample handwritten historical documents in the archives showcase West African ingenuity towards faith and knowledge. As a personal learning tool, it does not only portray a writing ability, but also emphasizes the quest for knowledge. As suggested in the history of the Islamic exhibits, the Quran and “the case appear to be a hybrid of northern and West African influence” while the case typifies a northern influence, especially Chad. Besides the knowledge that these objects provide, also emphasizes other materials including pen and ink as well as a paper without which its production wouldn't have been possible at a time when machine printing was not widespread or non-existent in many parts of Africa. The description of some of these exhibits in showing Islamic heritage emphasizes the importation of the paper, showing that by the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, paper was either not produced in many parts of Africa or was hard to come by. The scarcity of paper will be relevant in discussing other materials, such as the writing boards which were used to acquire knowledge before the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Thus, besides memorization of the Qur'an, the materials enabled the recording of the knowledge as well. African Muslim scholars and their students provided manuscripts on Islamic law, Arabic poetry, and commentaries of the Koran as well as Islamic ethics.

In summation, this paper asserted that, the materiality of Islamic education facilitated the connection between education and other crafts including leather work and sewing. It also enhanced economic activities and craftsmanship by those involved in the heritage and objectification of these materials. The Quran case might be a typical example of this connection. The aim of protecting the Qur'an and other manuscripts of knowledge necessitated the production of other materials including leather. As already known, Quranic cases are made from three materials, namely, leather, cloth, and cardboard. Whereas all these materials are not directly involved in the acquisition of knowledge, their connection to the preservation and protection of a product of knowledge was highly significant too. In enriching the scholarly tradition of the discourses of Islamic heritage in West Africa, and overall Islamic Education in Africa, this paper argued and showed that some objects in educational paradigms that have been silenced, forgotten, neglected, and hidden in the sands of time, are understood in their own rights without casting doubt on any of them with respect to the other. The forgoing discussion, with its centrality on the materiality of Islamic education, argues for a kind of integration between the two paradigms. Writing materials in Islam, such as boards still play both physical and spiritual roles in the acquisition of Islamic knowledge that are unique and important to the core of the Islamic message. Many Muslim students today hardly know how to write Arabic or are particular about the memorization of the Qur'an. Meanwhile, both Arabic and memorization of the Qur'an are integral aspects of Islamic knowledge and its message. All these are enhanced through material culture. This paper



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has provided various trends in the historiography on how both intangible and tangible Islamic heritage conservation efforts have been implicated by socio-cultural as well as international discourses. It will be interesting to have studies that will focus primarily on Muslims' contribution towards national archives or museums in Sub-Saharan African countries to be specific or within the various regions in Africa in general.

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## THE GAMBIA-TAIWAN RELATIONS, 1995-2013: YAHYA JAMMEH'S FOREIGN POLICY RATIONALITY

### GAMBIYA-TAYVAN İLİŞKİLERİ, 1995-2013: YAHYA JAMMEH'İN DIŞ POLİTİKA RASYONALİTESİ

Yıl 4, Sayı 1, ss.74-96.

Year 4, Issue 1, pp.74-96.

Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi

Article Type: Research Article

Geliş Tarihi: 03.07.2023

Submitted: 03.07.2023

Kabul Tarihi: 16.01.2024

Accepted: 16.01.2024

DOI: 10.58851/africana.1322305

#### Atf Bilgisi / Reference Information

Lenn, M. (2024). The Gambia-Taiwan Relations, 1995-2013: Yahya Jammeh's Foreign Policy Rationality, *Africana Dergisi*, 4 (1), 74-96. <https://doi.org/10.58851/africana.1322305>

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#### Abstract

One of Yahya Jammeh's most consequential diplomatic relations was with the Republic of China on Taiwan. Although Jammeh's decision to have diplomatic relations with Taiwan immediately brought US \$35 million to the junta in 1995, it has been criticised by politicians and policy makers for being irrational. However, there has been neither an attempt to document the benefits derived from the relationship nor an analysis of the rationality that justified the relationship. Therefore, this paper attempts to explain the rationality of Jammeh's foreign policy on Taiwan and to document the benefits derived. The paper adopts rationality as a theoretical framework. It argues that to understand Jammeh's foreign policy rationale of choosing Taiwan over China, his promise to deliver development, and outperform Dawda Jawara's regime must be considered. However, this is only possible by accounting for his funding needs and the prospects from China and Taiwan. Accordingly, the paper reviews 150 reports as the main source of data to establish the amount of loans and aid in cash from China between 1974-1994 and Taiwan's total cash and cheque donations between 1995-2012. The paper thus concluded that Jammeh's foreign policy on Taiwan was procedurally and economically rational considering Taiwan's numerous contributions to education, health and agriculture amongst others. The study is of relevance to scholars and researchers interested in Yahya Jammeh's foreign policy, small state studies, Taiwan's diplomatic engagement with one of its most former valued allies in Africa.

**Keywords:** Foreign Policy, Foreign Relations, Rationality, Aid, Grants, Gambia, Taiwan.

#### Öz

Yahya Jammeh'in en önemli diplomatik ilişkilerinden biri Tayvan'daki Çin Cumhuriyeti ile oldu. Jammeh'in Tayvan'la diplomatik ilişki kurma kararı 1995'te Cunta'ya anında 35 milyon ABD doları kazandırmış olsa da bu karar politikacılar ve politika yapımcılar tarafından mantıksız olduğu için eleştirildi. Ancak ne ilişkiden elde edilen faydaları belgelemeye yönelik bir girişim ne de ilişkiyi haklı çıkaran rasyonelliğin analizi yapılmıştır. Bu nedenle, bu makale Jammeh'in Tayvan'a yönelik dış politikasının rasyonelliğini açıklamaya ve elde edilen faydaları belgelemeye çalışmaktadır. Makale rasyonelliği teorik bir çerçevede benimseyiyor. Jammeh'in Çin yerine Tayvan'ı seçme konusundaki dış politika mantığını anlamak için kalkınma sağlama ve Dawda Jawara rejiminden daha iyi performans gösterme vaadinin dikkate alınması gerektiğini savunuyor. Ancak bu finansman ihtiyaçlarının ve Çin ile Tayvan'dan gelecek beklentilerin dikkate alınmasıyla mümkün olabilir. Buna göre makale, 1974-1994 yılları arasında Çin'den gelen kredi ve nakdi yardım miktarını ve 1995-2012 yılları arasında Tayvan'ın toplam nakit ve çek bağışlarını belirlemek için ana veri kaynağı olarak 150'den fazla raporu inceliyor. Dolayısıyla makale, Tayvan'ın diğerlerinin yanı sıra eğitim, sağlık ve tarıma yaptığı sayısız katkı dikkate alındığında Jammeh'in Tayvan'a yönelik dış politikasının usul ve ekonomik açıdan rasyonel olduğu sonucuna vardı. Çalışma, Yahya Jammeh'in dış politikası, küçük devlet çalışmaları ve Tayvan'ın Afrika'daki en eski değerli müttefiklerinden biriyle diplomatik ilişkileriyle ilgilenen akademisyenler ve araştırmacılar için geçerlidir.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Dış Politika, Dış İlişkiler, Rasyonelite, Yardım, Bağış, Gambiya, Tayvan.

**STRUCTURED ABSTRACT**

When Yahya Jammeh seized power in a military coup d'état in 1994, his primary aim was to change the domestic politics of the Gambia. However, with sanctions and suspension of aid programmes from the Gambia's traditional partners such as the United Kingdom, USA, Germany, European Community, Jammeh had to intensify his diplomatic efforts, leading to changes in the Gambia's foreign policy. One of those changes had been the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, which angered China and thus led to the severing of ties between the Gambia and China. From 1995 to 2013, the Gambia maintained very close ties with Taiwan. For nearly two decades the Gambia served as one of the most vocal advocates of Taiwan's independence. Taiwan on the other hand, made substantial cash and material donations to the government of the Gambia. While many within the Jammeh government as may be expected praised the ties, others outside of the government criticised Jammeh for abandoning China. In fact, Adama Barrow, the president of the Gambia who defeated Jammeh in the December 2016 Presidential Elections criticised Jammeh for recognising Taiwan, referring to it as a 'strategic mistake' that should not have happened. President Barrow went on to promise that the Gambia would adhere to the One-China policy. Jammeh's foreign policy on Taiwan was very intriguing; abandoning a great power for a small power. What must have motivated the decision? Was the decision rational or a strategic mistake?

This paper examines the foreign relations of the Gambia with Taiwan during the chairpersonship and presidency of Yahya Jammeh (1995-2013). The paper adopts the Rational Actor Model as its theoretical framework to examine Jammeh's decision making process and the justification of his foreign policy on Taiwan. The Rational Actor Model focuses on actor's decisions as interest-driven (Karl & Mintz, 2010). Graham (1971, p. 30) defined rationality as a "consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints". Thus, in varied circumstances, individuals pursue objectives that would maximize their benefits and reduce the costs incurred. According to Macdonald (2003, p. 552), rationality has three parts. First, people act for a purpose, thus behaviour is goal-oriented. Second, actors have a consistent preference. The ranking of preferences in transitive order means that in the absence or inability to attain the first ranked preference, actors would pursue the second ranked preference. Finally, actors always want to maximise their gains. Rationality follows certain decision and implementation steps.

Following Cashman's (1993) rationality logical steps, the paper takes a comprehensive approach towards rationality; thus, it attempts to understand Jammeh's foreign policy problem at the time of recognising Taiwan. Thereafter, the paper analyses the possible course of action and associated reactions available to Jammeh. The paper also explains the cost related to those actions. It analyses the probable successes and costs of his decision. These steps were analysed under one section. The last step focuses on evaluating the implementation of the decision. Here, the paper examines the cash and in-kind contributions of Taiwan to the Gambia to understand Taiwan's contribution. I used newspapers and a number of reports as the main source of data to analyse the benefits derived from the relationship.

The paper found that Jammeh's foreign policy decision was procedurally rational as Taiwan was willing to offer a bigger loan compared to China at the onset. Considering that Jammeh and the junta were struggling to attract funding to improve the economic and development situation of the Gambia, it was rational to recognise Taiwan and sever ties with China. Furthermore, Jammeh's diplomatic relations with Taiwan was economically rational. By this, it is meant that the sanctions imposed on the Junta by traditional donors of the Gambia; Jammeh's promise to transform the Gambia; and the need to build local legitimacy all influenced his decision to enter into this diplomatic relation. In the relationship, he found a donor that filled the gap created by Western donors' sanction on the junta. Furthermore, he found a reliable, non-confrontational, non-scrutinising ally who allowed him to build and support his 'development agenda' thereby making him gain legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the Gambians. Furthermore, Taiwan's annual contribution to the different sectors of the Gambia justified Jammeh's foreign policy decision. This is the rationality of Jammeh's diplomatic relationship with Taiwan. The review of 150 reports as the main

source of data revealed that while loans and aid in cash from China between 1974-1994 was approximately \$50,000,000 Taiwan's cash and cheque donations was estimated at \$398,658,655 between 1995-2012. Thus, economically, the relationship was more beneficial compared to the previous engagement with China.

This paper is the first academic attempt to examine and explain the rationality of Yahya Jammeh's foreign policy on Taiwan. It is also the first attempt to comprehensively compile Taiwan's numerous contributions to the Gambia. It will thus provide the first peer reviewed journal article on the subject serving as reference for students and researchers. It will also help better inform policy makers and practitioners interested in Jammeh's and the Gambia's foreign policy.

## **Introduction**

The Gambia is the smallest state in mainland Africa, with a population of just over two million people and territorial size of approximately 11,000 km<sup>2</sup>. It is also a least developed country and has continuously seek relations that brings development aid. Thus, since its independence from Great Britain, the Gambia has pursued an independent foreign policy, establishing relations with diverse countries around the world. Even at the height of the Cold War, the Gambia maintained relations with both the US and the former Soviet Union. Its first prime minister and president, Dawda Jawara, who ruled the country for three decades, has been described as pragmatic in his foreign policy. However, his successor, Yahya Jammeh, who took over power from Jawara in 1994, has been criticised by critics for being irrational in his foreign policy decisions resulting in reduction of funding for the country's development programmes. However, his supporters have praised him for his radical shifts in the country's foreign policy orientations and the benefits it brought. Nonetheless, none of these claims are substantiated with research on any of the Gambia's bilateral relations. Therefore, this paper is a case study of the Gambia-Taiwan relations, from 1995-2013. The diplomatic recognition of Taiwan by the Gambia is an interesting case, as China, a great power, frowns upon the diplomatic recognition of the Island State it considers part of its territory. Moreover, China was one of the main donors of the Gambia at the time of severing ties. However, with the recognition of Taiwan, Taiwan became a leading ally to the Jammeh government.

Using the Rational Actor Model (RAM) as its theoretical framework, the paper examines whether Jammeh's diplomatic recognition of Taiwan was rational or not, and if rational to what extent can it be defined as rational. With over 150 reports and a contextual analysis of the circumstances and considerations under which Jammeh recognised Taiwan, the paper found that Jammeh's foreign policy was both economically and procedurally rational. According to the findings, Taiwan's contribution to the Gambia within 17 years is about 800% of China's contribution to the Gambia in the 20 years preceding Jammeh's chairmanship and presidency. Accordingly, the main contribution of the paper is threefold. To our knowledge, it is the first comprehensive compilation and analysis of Taiwan's contribution to the development of the Gambia. This is important in understanding the relevance of Taiwan to the Gambia and Jammeh for the period under study. Thus, it will be of interest to policy makers and researchers interested in the subject. Secondly, it belies the assumption often held that Jammeh's foreign policy on Taiwan was irrational. In using the rational actor model, it contributes to the literature on use of the model and small states, revealing that a small state can pursue independent rational policies despite opposition from great powers. Finally, it is important for policymakers especially in the Gambia who are currently promoting the One-China policy to explore the possibilities of at least gaining nothing less than that gained from Taiwan.

When the Gambia gained independence in 1965 with Dawda Jawara as prime minister (who became the first president in 1970), the Nationalist Party led by Chiang Kai-Shek, based in Taipei was the internationally recognised government of China. The party had retreated to Taipei as Chairman Mao's forces took over mainland China in 1949. While Mao's government enjoyed little or no recognition in the

West because of its ideological disposition, the nationalist government based in Taipei was widely seen as an alternative to communism, hence its recognition within international cycles although it managed the Taiwanese Strait only (Cooper, 2009, pp. 46-48). Thus, the Gambia too, followed the norm of the international community in recognising the government in Taipei in 1965. In fact, the Gambia signed an agreement on technical cooperation with the Republic of China in 1967 to boost rice production, which is the staple food of the Gambia (Touray, 2000, pp. 51-52).

However, when the United Nations shifted its recognition to the government of Mao in mainland China in 1971 (Taylor, 2002, p. 40), the Gambia also followed suit to recognise the Peoples Republic of China on 17 December 1974 despite Taiwan's renewal of the five-year cooperation. Following this, Taiwan severed ties and its ambassador left immediately (Touray, 2000, p. 52). For the remaining presidency of Jawara, the Gambia maintained diplomatic ties with China until in 1995 following a military takeover led by Yahya Jammeh in July 1994. Yahya Jammeh served as the Chairperson of the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council, the junta that ruled the Gambia from 1994-1996. Jammeh was the President of the Gambia from 1997 to 2016. In 1995, Jammeh established diplomatic relations with Taiwan thus leading to the withdrawal of the Chinese ambassador and technical advisors (Saine, 2009, pp. 95-107). The Gambia continued to have diplomatic relations with Taiwan until 14<sup>th</sup> November 2013 when the Gambia announced that it has severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan. On 17<sup>th</sup> March 2016, the Gambia and China formally signed diplomatic agreements, thus effectively ending any speculation about a sudden return to Taiwan-Gambia ties (Janneh, 2017, pp. 25-26).

### Literature Review

In a description of Taiwan's foreign aid policy, Lee (1993, pp. 52-53) argued that "foreign aid seems to be an indispensable and effective tool to achieve one of its top foreign policy objectives: to win more international support, preferably official recognition... thus warding off diplomatic isolation and deterring the PRC". While Lee's (1993) work focused on Taiwan's aid policy from the 1960s to early 1990s, Atkinson's (2014) can be seen as a continuum as it looks at three constraining factors affecting Taiwan's foreign policy. Atkinson (2014) explained that President Ma Ying-jeou's administration had to offer aid while attempting to ensure that aid is accountable, reduce aid in line with domestic expectations while galvanising support for Taiwan's course.

Atkinson (2014, p. 409) concluded that "Ma Ying-jeou administration has reduced aid funding, improved management of aid programs, and demands a higher level of accountability from recipient governments". In fact, Ma's government has been characterised by dwindling foreign aid. For instance, in 2011, Taiwan's aid budget was 12.94% lower than in 2010. Nonetheless, Taylor (2002) has argued as early as 2002 that there were limits to Taiwan's diplomacy. Taylor (2002) presented cases where Taiwan's donation led to scandals and reaction from opposition parties in the recipient countries. Also, Taiwan allowed many recipient governments to claim ownership of projects, such as in the Gambia where Jammeh claimed to be the provider of tractors donated by Taiwan. Several other studies on Taiwan have focused on its relationship with the US (Cheng, 2013; Coffin, 2017; Liao and Lin, 2015; Tadahi, 2021; Hsieh, 2020), the European Union (Cho, 2018; Neszmélyi, 2019; Winkler, 2008; Biedermann, 2018; Hsieh, 2020), its attempt for membership or participation in international bodies (Tubilewicz, 2012; Scanlon, 2017; Lindemann, 2014; Rollet, 2021), its relations with China as well as its relations with other Southeast Asian states (Ikegami, 2012; Liew and Tang, 2019).

While Taiwan's foreign policy has received much scholarly attention, generally, the Gambia's foreign policy has not been widely researched. An exception to this is Senegal-Gambia relations especially in the early years of independence (1960s to 1970s) and the confederal period (1980s). Such studies have focused on the viability of the two countries in a union, issues, and challenges to a union between Senegal

and the Gambia (M'bai, 1992; Proctor, 1967; Jallow, 2012; Senghore, 2008; Edmund, 1993). A few other studies have looked at the general orientation of the Gambia's foreign policy. For example, while Janneh (2017) has focused on the role of personalities in the country's foreign policy, Hughes and Perfect (2006, pp. 251-279) in a chapter described Jawara's major diplomatic engagements from the 1960s to 1994.

Moreover, the *Historical Dictionary of The Gambia* has two paragraphs on its foreign policy, which argued that the personalities of the country's leaders dictated their foreign policies (Hughes & Perfect, 2008, pp. 65-66). So far, only two articles on Gambia-Taiwan relations are available on the Web of Science. A Google Scholar search also yields similar results. One of the papers focused on Taiwan's funded vegetable gardening projects in Sukuta, Lamin and Banjulding 1 and 2 in the Gambia, in which the authors asked whether the ideas and techniques being supported by the Taiwanese techniques can work in the Gambia. The paper concluded that the gardens were functioning well, and the ideas and technology seemed working. However, its sustainability would rest on Gambians, it concluded (Baker & Edmonds, 2004). The other paper focused on the role of ideas in Chinese foreign aid to the Gambia in the First Republic (Bautigam, 1994).

Although there has not been an attempt to document Taiwan's contribution to the Gambia during Jammeh's rule, Touray (2000) has compiled Taiwan's contribution to the Gambia in the First Republic (1970-1994). According to Touray (2000, p. 52), in 1967 the Gambia and Taiwan concluded an agreement on technical cooperation which led to the deployment of 16 rice growing experts, which was increased to 40 experts to the Gambia. The Cooperation eventually included the World Bank who provided a concessional loan of £500,000. By 1974/1975 when Jawara shifted diplomatic relations to China, yields in rice cultivation had rose from 744 tonnes in 1967/1968 to 14000 tonnes. Although the Gambia had a two-China Policy (recognising that they should both exist), it had diplomatic relations with Taiwan only until 1974 when it shifted to a One-China-Policy. By this time, the Taiwanese rice experts were 45. Following the One-China foreign policy of Jawara in December 1974, China sent 32 rice growing experts which was less than the total number of Taiwanese rice experts (Touray, 2000, p. 70).

Notwithstanding, following the Gambia's Minister of External Affairs' visit to China, an agreement of Economic and Technical Cooperation was signed in February 1975; subsequently a 30 million Yuan loan payable over a period of 50 years was given to the Gambia. China further sent 22 people and a 11 member agriculture mission to study rice growing in the Gambia after Jawara visited China in June 1975 (Touray, 2000, pp. 69-70). Moreover, China promised to build a 100 bed capacity hospital in the Gambia, a stadium and a hostel (Touray, 2000). In fact, Chinese exports to the Gambia would increase from 6,000,000 to 18,000,000 in 1975. In the 1980s China provided a loan of GMD 15,000,000 to build hospitals and provide resources for the personnel to run them. In the mid-1980s, a £1,200,000 loan was signed with China for the difference of cost of projects (Touray, 2000, p. 140). Three cooperation agreements were signed in 1987; one provided an equivalent of GMD 6,000,000 for health and agriculture. Two other agreements for fertilisers, animal production, horticulture, brickmaking were also signed. In 1989 an interest free loan of US \$8,000,000 was signed for rehabilitating health centres. Moreover, in 1990, US \$12,100,000 million for economic development was effected according to Touray (2000, p. 140).

Saine, on the other hand, provided a general description of the Junta's foreign policy (1994-1996). Saine (2000, p. 78) narrates that following the 1994 coup in the Gambia, China provided US \$23,000,000 to the Junta but severed ties with the Gambia on 25<sup>th</sup> July 1995 when the Junta restored diplomatic relations with Taiwan on 13<sup>th</sup> July 1995. In 1995, Taiwan provided a much-needed loan of US \$35,000,000 to the Junta. Saine (2000, p. 78) further provided a summation of Jammeh's foreign policy from 1997 to 2009 where he estimated that by 2000, Taiwan's aid to Jammeh was equivalent to US \$80,000,000. On the rationale for Taiwan's contribution to the Gambia, Saine argued that the main explanation had been to win support in the international system (2009). This is consistent with the literature on Taiwan's foreign policy with small states and its engagements to ensure diplomatic recognition. Saine (2009) rightly argued that



Jammeh's diplomatic engagement was influenced by his need for resources to fund his development projects. With the main donors turning their back, Jammeh sought support from others such as Taiwan. In 2009, Saine estimated total aid to have reached US \$200 million (Saine, 2009, p. 107).

Although Saine's article (2000) and chapter (2009) on the AFPRC and APRC foreign policy under Jammeh provide a summative statement on Taiwan, it was not a study of Jammeh-Taiwan relations, rather a general description of the Junta's foreign policy. In addition, the chapter on foreign policy (Saine, 2009) is within a book that studied Jammeh's regime focusing on his anti-democratic record and personal autocracy. Moreover, the summative statement covers the period until 2009. These limitations are a necessary condition for a study that attempts to understand Taiwan's contribution to the different sectors of the economy. Furthermore, this study extends to offer a theoretical explanation of Jammeh's rationality of engaging in diplomatic relations with Taiwan which is largely lacking. The following section sets the theoretical framework of the paper.

### **Theoretical Framework and Methodology**

The rational actor model (RAM) provides an analytical frame that focuses on unitary actors' decisions as interest-driven (Karl & Mintz, 2010). It helps analysts to understand and better predict the behaviour of actors (Alden & Aron, 2017; MacDonald, 2003). Graham (1971) defined rationality as a "consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints" (p. 30). In varied circumstances, individuals pursue objectives that would maximize their benefits and reduce the costs incurred. According to Macdonald (2003, p. 552), rationality has three parts. First, people act for a purpose, thus behaviour is goal-oriented. Second, actors have a consistent preference. The ranking of preferences in transitive order means that in the absence or inability to attain the first ranked preference, actors would pursue the second ranked preference. Finally, actors always want to maximise their gains. A comprehensive view of rationality is that it follows through logical steps meaning decision making is done following certain steps. Therefore, foreign policy makers identify their foreign policy problem first, then they analyse the possible course of action and associated reactions, followed by estimation of the cost of their actions. That is followed by an analysis of the chances of success and estimation of the costs of their actions. Once these are done, implementation of the most rational course of action, that which maximises benefits is pursued (Cashman, 1993). Therefore, analysts can use the same steps to understand the foreign policies of states. This paper utilises Cashman's (1993) rational actor's analytical steps to explain Gambia-Taiwan relations under the presidency of Yahya Jammeh. I asked what Jammeh's foreign policy problem was and his goals; the foreign policy alternatives and the costs and benefits. This is followed by a presentation of the benefits derived from the action.

The paper relies on two major newspapers, *The Point Newspaper* and *The Daily Observer*, the former independent and the latter pro-government. The two were purposely selected because of their extensive coverage of relations with Taiwan and the availability of a digital archive of both, although *The Daily Observer* is now available through a third-party online source namely *allafrica.com*. A simple web search of keywords such as "Taiwan, grant, aid, scholarship, donation, presentation, cheque, inaugurated, farewell" was done. My knowledge of the coverage of Taiwanese assistance led us to prioritise these words in the search. In total, we analysed over 150 news publications and about 120 of these served as the main source for the section on benefits realised from the relationship.

### **Analysis of Jammeh's Procedural Rationality in Recognising Taiwan**

When Jammeh took power in 1994 he had one fundamental problem, legitimacy. The international and traditional donors of the Gambia did not recognise the military government he led after overthrowing Jawara. Accordingly, sanctions were imposed on him. The effect had been that the Jammeh government

lost aid from donors and income from tourism to fund activities. For instance, Britain issued travel warning to UK citizens planning to travel to the Gambia for tourism. Jammeh also faced a legitimacy problem at the domestic level. The opposition parties had wanted him to go back to barracks as well. However, a ban on political parties and publications restricted the possibility of outright opposition. Nonetheless, since Jammeh had argued that the Jawara government was overthrown because of its poor records in developing the Gambia's health, education, and infrastructure, he needed funds if he was going to be seen as different from the regime he overthrew.

Therefore, Jammeh's ultimate goal could be summed into establishing legitimacy and funding. He needed funding to implement his activities in and for the Gambia, but he also needed to be accepted as a legitimate head of state. Nonetheless, the emphasis of the donors was that Jammeh must hand over power and go back to the barracks. In the Gambia, there were some who were receptive to the Jammeh, but many were also opposed. Jammeh needed to see how to attain his goals of getting legitimacy and funds.

Jammeh had alternatives available to him following the coup. Primarily, to solve the legitimacy crises he faced and the funding shortage to prove his worth and difference with Jawara to Gambians, he could just return to the barracks immediately as most of the traditional donors including US, UK, the IMF wanted. On the other hand, he could continue trying to convince the international donors that they needed to recognise him and see how that goes. However, in that process he may search for more non-traditional donors who are not so much concerned about democratic credentials. If he could get that, then he would fund local development projects and invest in education, health, etc.

If Jammeh were to give up as a military leader, hand over power and return to the barracks; what would be the cost? Considering that he had committed a treasonous crime, he would likely face charges sooner or later; a lesser consequence might have been early retirement because none would want a putschist in the army. However, he could engage non-traditional donors and see whether they can offer an acceptable sum for the time being. This would less likely cause him substantial problems. In fact, it would help him to gain legitimacy at local level as people would accept him. Once this is gained, he can turn into a civilian president and be accepted by the traditional donors.

It appears that the best alternative available to Jammeh was to seek non-traditional donors. This would allow him to stay in power, fund his development programmes for a while and then transform into an elected head of state. However, in doing so, he must also select the best non-traditional donor that provides sufficient funds and allows him to direct the funds without questioning him. Taiwan appeared to be a perfect candidate for this. While China as a traditional donor had not questioned Jammeh's credibility, they provided less funds than Taiwan would do. Moreover, Taiwan was known for being more generous and providing cash and cheque donations, China would not do that. Therefore, Jammeh decided to select Taiwan to fund his programmes and subsequently get legitimacy.

It is therefore rational that Jammeh dispatched a team to Taiwan for negotiations and the initial engagement yielded results with a 35 million grant which was more than the 23 million provided by China. A year later Jammeh retired from the army, contested the presidential elections, and won thereby becoming a legitimate president in the eyes of the other donors like the IMF, UK, US etc. and Gambians as well. The elections were held after aid from Taiwan and elsewhere helped Jammeh initiate development programmes. Year after year, Taiwan regularly contributed to Gambia's development agenda, thus contributing to building a legitimacy for Jammeh. It must be taken that as a military government facing sanctions, not having cash, and as an elected government, always quarrelling with the West, it was very much rational to have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Jammeh had followed procedural rationality. Secondly, the economic benefits to be detailed later is a proof of the maximum benefits derived by Jammeh in the relationship. The section below details the various contributions made by Taiwan to argue that the

relationship had yielded benefits to Jammeh.

## **Benefits Derived From the Relationship with Taiwan**

### **Contributions to education and training**

Taiwan's greatest contribution to the Gambia between 1995 and 2013 might be on the latter's education. Although little or no coverage was found for the period 1995 to 2001 during our data collection, from 2002 to 2013, Taiwan annually contributed to the Gambia's education sector. Below is an attempt to map this contribution as found in two major newspapers in the Gambia, namely *The Point* and *Daily Observer* newspapers.

Taiwan launched a scholarship for Gambians to study in Taiwan in 2004 (*The Gambia Daily News*, 2005), and 25 Gambian students, the first batch selected to study petrochemical engineering in Taiwan graduated in 2008 (Jawneh, 2008a). Taiwan annually granted more scholarships from 2006 to 2013, as 288 Gambians received ICDF scholarships to study in Taiwan (Manneh, 2006a; Jawneh, 2007; Jawneh, 2008e; Jallow, 2009; Jawneh, 2011f; Jawneh, 2011g; *The Point Newspaper*, 2012a; Y. Ceesay, 2012; *The Point Newspaper*, 2013c; Jawneh, 2013b). This does not include those who benefitted from the Taiwan Defence Scholarship and other packages. Nonetheless, Taiwan had another package for those studying within the Gambia yet faced by financial challenges. Accordingly, Taiwan awarded an annual scholarship of \$6000 to University of The Gambia students (*Gambia Daily News*, 2005; Manneh, 2007b; Nfamara, 2008h; Jawneh Nfamara, 2009f; *The Daily Observer*, 2010; Jawneh, 2011k). The first record of this was found in a 2006 publication, and it appears to have continued until the relations were severed although we could not find news reports of these for the years 2006, 2012 and 2013.

Furthermore, Taiwan contributed to the school infrastructure of the Gambia. For instance, the Mingdaw Cultural Center constructed Mingdaw Junior and Senior Secondary School in 1997 in a peri-urban settlement in the Gambia, thus serving many rural and urban students (Mingdaw Upper and Senior Secondary School n.d.). The school's laboratory was also funded by Taiwan's ambassador (*The Daily Observer*, 2002). Additionally, Mayork Senior Secondary was constructed by Taiwan at a cost of US \$740,160 within two years (A.B. Ceesay, 2002; Manneh, 2007a). In fact, the construction of Mayork and Siffoe schools cost Taiwan US \$2.8 million (Jawneh, 2008c; Jawneh, 2008f). Still, when the Gambia announced the creation of the country's first Science academy in May 2007, Taiwan contributed US \$344,718 (Ngandwe, 2007). Taiwan funded two computer labs at the Science, Technology and Innovation Park in Faraba (Jallow, 2012d). Taiwan provided two 60-seater buses bought at the cost of US \$175,410 for the UTG to facilitate transportation of students to the Faraba Science Park (Jallow, 2012c).

The Gambia's President's Empowerment of Girls Education Project (PEGEP) received US \$700,000 equivalent to GMD 21,000,000 in May 2005 to promote gender parity in education (Trawally, 2005). The review shows that Taiwan had continuously contributed to PEGEP annually (Faye, 2008; Jawneh, 2008b; *The Daily Observer*, 2010). Furthermore, Taiwan provided an annual grant of US \$1,000,000 to the Gambia's education sector (Fadera, 2009; Janko, 2012b; *The Daily Observer*, 2013a). Also, Taiwan provided learning materials such as when a 40-foot container of learning materials was donated to MoBSE 2013 (Bobb, 2013). In 2013 too, Taiwan disbursed US \$31,290 to purchase air tickets for Gambian graduate students to conduct research in the Gambia (*The Daily Observer*, 2013a).

At the time of the severing of ties, there were 276 Gambian students in Taiwan, 175 of them on scholarships from Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs or National Science Council. Notwithstanding, the Taiwanese Ministry of Education allowed them to complete their current semester (*The Point Newspaper* 2013f). These contributions were very important to the Jammeh regime. It could be recalled that during the

military takeover in 1994, Jammeh had blamed the Jawara regime for its failure to develop the education sector. He specifically blamed the government for not making higher education available to everyone. Therefore, Taiwan's construction of schools, donation of educational items, provision of scholarships and grant to PEGEP helped Jammeh to attain his goals. In the next subsection, Taiwan's contribution to the Gambia's health sector for the period analysed is discussed.

### **Contributions to the health sector**

Another sector pivotal for Jammeh where Taiwan has made numerous contributions is the health sector. Jammeh had on several occasions differentiated his regime from Jawara's by arguing that the latter's government had left two hospitals only while the British constructed one only. Therefore, he needed to do more than Jawara had done in the health sector to build local legitimacy. In his relationship with Taiwan, he found a magnanimous aid. In fact the first haemodialysis machine available in the Gambia was donated by Taiwan in 2006 (Sanyang & Sambou, 2019). The latter paid US \$95,974 to upkeep the six machines in 2011 (Ndow, 2011). Moreover, Taiwan donated over 500,000 for the renovation of Phase I of the RVTH (The Point Newspaper, 2011b). In fact, Taiwan was annually in the news for its in-kind donations to the Gambia's health sector. For instance, in September 2006 and November 2008, Taiwan's Ambassador to the Gambia donated 946 walking sticks to the Jammeh Foundation for Peace (JFP) (Manneh, 2006b; Sallah, 2008). And, between 2006 to 2012, it donated 1,146 wheelchairs to JFP (Manneh, 2006b; Sallah, 2008; Jawneh, 2010c; Jawneh, 2011b; Janko, 2012a). Other in-kind donations included 11 mobile x-ray machines (Fall, 2011), 16 computers of clinical system, a server, sets of fingerprint identification and diabetes care equipment (Jallow, 2012e); infant incubators, obstetric diagnostic table, sphygmomanometers, nebulizers, ultraviolet ray sterilizers, an MRI machine (The Point Newspaper, 2013e); and medical items worth US \$167,000 (International Cooperation and Development Fund, 2013b).

Furthermore, Taiwan was providing an annual grant of US \$600,000 paid in two instalments to the Gambia's health sector for capacity building, recruitment of Cuban doctors etc. by 2008 (Jawneh, 2008d; Jawneh, 2009e; Janko, 2010; Jawneh, 2011i; The Point Newspaper, 2012c). Also, medical teams from Taiwan regularly visited the Gambia to offer free medical services, technical support and training (The Point Newspaper, 2011a). For example, from August 2010 to October 2012, three Mackay Memorial Hospital (MMH) teams arrived in the Gambia (The Daily Observer, 2012a). Taiwan awarded scholarships to Gambian doctors to pursue postgraduate programmes in Taiwan (Jawneh, 2008g), and in other states such as Ghana and Liberia (Njie, 2011b; The Daily Observer, 2013b).

On 27<sup>th</sup> August 2012, the Gambia and Taiwan signed an agreement on maternal health program earmarked for 2012 to 2015 to build capacity of health practitioners in the Upper River Region (URR) of the Gambia and provide equipment and supplies for 11 minor health centres in URR (The Point Newspaper, 2012b). The program which assisted 11 minor health centres in URR to provide antenatal and postnatal care and health checks (The Point Newspaper, 2012b), started with capacity building of health personnel in URR in November 2012 (International Cooperation and Development Fund, 2013a) and by end of August 2013, two community nursing and midwifery courses were held which benefitted 40 participants. Also, 85 traditional birth attendants and 68 other health personnel in Upper River Region were trained. 959 Pregnant and 174 postnatal mothers (1,133 women) benefitted from medical services (International Cooperation and Development Fund, 2013d). In September 2010, Taiwan presented a cheque of US \$50,000 to the National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) as its contribution to the Gambia's disaster relief and rehabilitation (Janko, 2010).

Taiwan's contribution to the Gambia's health sector during the period under review was fundamental for Jammeh's image as a transformer and a moderniser of the country's health sector. The MRI machines and other health equipment were regularly shown on state TV as part of Jammeh's transformative

achievements. Arguably, this must have provided a sort of legitimacy for Jammeh within the Gambia. Government officers regularly praised Taiwan in this role. Therefore, it is conclusive that Jammeh's diplomatic engagements brought much needed help to health sector. This is the case with the annual health grant provided by Taiwan for capacity building and payment of Cuban doctors. Between 2008-2013, Taiwan made at least a cash or cheque presentation of US \$8,355,347 for the health sector of the Gambia according to the newspapers reviewed. This excludes in-kind contributions such as medical equipment, health projects implemented, scholarships to nurses and doctors as well as deployment of Taiwanese medical teams to the Gambia just to mention a few. Taiwan stood as the leading bilateral contributor to the Gambia's health sector during the period under review. Therefore, Jammeh's diplomatic relations with Taiwan was rational.

### **Contributions to agriculture**

Jammeh had presented himself as a firm believer in agriculture. As an advocate of the 'peasant' class, he had to present himself as an agriculturalist and a potential transformer of the obstacles in the agriculture sector. In Taiwan, he found a supporter of his desire for technical improvements and project implementations for the realisation of his goals. In 1995, an agreement between the government of the Gambia and Taiwan's Technical Mission was signed for an all-year round productive vegetable gardens in three communities in the Gambia – Banjul, Sukuta and Lamin. Lamin and Banjulnding I project started in 1996 while the Sukuta project started in 1998. In 2001 Banjulnding II was established to expand the gains in Banjulnding I. Baker and Edmonds (2004) revealed that technologies, marketing and management schemes tested and used on the farms proved effective in Taiwan and worthy in the Gambia. In the Banjulnding project, women earned GMD 559.00 as income and were able to save GMD 85,639.75 (Baker & Edmonds, 2004). Furthermore, Taiwan also donated vehicles, four in 2007 alone (wow.gm, 2007); over 4000 metric tonnes of fertilisers from 2009 and 2012 (Jawneh, 2009a; Y. Ceesay, 2010b; Jawneh, 2012a; Jallow, 2012a); a cheque of US \$2,921,317 for farm implements (Darboe, 2012); 2,723 bags of seeds to Gambian farmers (Sawo, 2012); US \$156,986 for the procurement of pumps and GPS system for tractors (The Point Newspaper, 2013d); and 3000 pineapple seedlings to Jammeh in 2013 (Jallow, 2013a).

Additionally, in April 2013 Taiwan's Technical Mission in the Gambia started the implementation of an Upland Rice Cultivation Project to enhance sustainable cropping and to consolidate 22% of 32,000 hectares (International Cooperation and Development Fund, 2013e). However, 54,176.56 hectares had already been developed for upland rice cultivation by the Mission from 2009 to 2012 (Sawo, 2012). By September 2013, farmers in Sapu, Jahally and Kuareh benefitted from training, rice varieties, water control gates; a road pavement of about a kilometer; and improvement of 136 hectares of tidal irrigation fields (International Cooperation and Development Fund, 2013e). Moreover in 2011, a Tilapia Cultivation and Technological Transfer Project was launched by Taiwan to train fisheries staff and local farmers in the Gambia. By March 2013, in addition to several trainings and production of manual on tilapia in local languages and English, 4,800 tilapia fingerlings were distributed to cultivation households (International Cooperation Development Fund, 2013c).

### **Contributions to the security sector**

In a major boost to the security sector in April 2011, Ambassador Richard Shih presented a cheque of US \$528,645 for the rehabilitation of the Yundum Army Barracks (Jawneh, 2011c). The donation came after a surprise visit made by Jammeh to the army barracks in 2009 where he expressed dismay at the shocking state of the barracks and publicly apologised to the soldiers for coping with such a deplorable state (Jawneh, 2009d). Therefore, the donation was a major boost for Jammeh to fulfil his promise to the soldiers. Similarly, Taiwan also funded the rehabilitation of the old police quarters in Banjul at a cost of US \$1,500,000 (The Daily Observer, 2012b, Faal, 2013; Jallow, 2013d); and the rehabilitation of the

Armed Forces Training Center at the Fajara Barracks, at a sum of US \$113,787.88 (The Daily Observer, 2013). Also, Taiwan funded the construction of a perimeter fence around Gambia's only airport with US \$970,442 (Jawneh, 2012d).

Furthermore, Taiwan donated 10 naval boats to the Gambia's navy between 2009 to 2013 (Jawneh, 2009b; Taiwan Today Newspaper, 2012; Jawneh, 2013d). Also 27 naval officers were trained during the period (Jawneh, 2009b; Jawneh, 2013e). However, Taiwan's aid was not limited to the navy only. For example, 63 officers from the other forces were awarded training programmes in Taiwan (Jawneh, 2012c; (4 received Taiwan Defence Scholarship 2013; Jawneh, 2010a; Cole, 2011; Jawneh, 2013a). Moreover, Taiwan provided US \$465,892 to the Gambia government as tuition and stipend for five officers and a civilian to pursue aeronautical engineering and maintenance skills at Spartan College of Aeronautics in USA (Jallow, 2013d). It also provided US \$52,000 to the Gambia Police Force Human Rights Unit's procurement of equipment (Jallow, 2013c).

Accordingly, cheques worth US \$3,482,548 were presented by Taiwan to the government of the Gambia between 2009 to 2013. In addition to this, seven patrol boats were donated to the Gambia navy by Taiwan. During the same period, 48 officers of Gambia's Armed Forces benefited from trainings funded by Taiwan. Taiwan's support to the security sector was very much important especially in renovating and rehabilitating the barracks. The Gambia has not received fundings for that purpose for a long time. Accordingly, it contributed to serving Jammeh to build legitimacy as the man of the soldiers.

### **Contributions to culture, youth, sports and business**

From 2010-2013 Taiwanese students visited the Gambia annually for a cultural exchange. About 40 Taiwanese students took part in the event held in the Gambia (Jawneh, 2009c; Ceesay, Y., 2010a; Jawneh, 2011e; Ceesay, Y., 2011; Jawneh, 2012b; Jawneh 2013c). A group of Gambians also participated in the first Taiwan Youth Culture and Study organised by the China Youth Corps (Jawneh, 2009c), while the Gambia's Cultural Group too participated in Taiwan's indigenous festival in 2011 (Jawneh, 2011d).

Between April 2010 to 2013, Taiwan presented cheques worth US \$1,467,200 to the Gambia for the enhancement of sports and youth development (Jawneh, 2010b; The Point Newspaper, 2013a; Jallow, 2013a; The Point Newspaper, 2013b). It is important to state that US \$1,000,000 of the amount was meant to develop youth enterprises and businesses (Jallow, 2013a). In October 2011 and July 2012, Taiwan and a Taiwanese Company donated footballs to the Ministry of Youths and Sports and the Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education (Jawneh, 2011h). The Company further donated US \$10,000 to orphanages in The Gambia (Jallow, 2012b).

Despite long established diplomatic relations, the first Taiwan-Gambia business Council meeting only took place on 16<sup>th</sup> November 2009. Taiwan's Ambassador Shih acknowledged that "relationship between our two countries is close but there is a room for more relationship in the area of trade". As a result of the meeting, the Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GCCCI) and Taiwan Africa Industry Development Association (CIECA) signed a business, trade and investment agreement (Jawneh & Marenah, 2009). Although not much was registered in this domain, three Taiwanese companies participated in the 2011 Gambia trade fare. One similar remark was the need for Taiwan to engage in economic diplomacy as the Gambia Investment and Export Promotion Agency (GIEPA) CEO, Fatou Jallow, called for more 'private sector engagement' (Jawneh, 2011j). Although officials recognised that business had been neglected, no explanation was given for this. It is not clear if Jammeh had rationalised a potentiality for this area from the relationship.

### Contribution to other sectors

In May 2006, Taiwan donated 33 personal computers and monitors, 16 tables and 10 chairs, and other electronic gadgets to the then newly created Department of State for Information, Communication and Technology of the Gambia (Ceesay, A.B., 2006). Furthermore, in August 2006, Taiwan's Embassy to the Gambia, on behalf of Yu-Yuan company in Taiwan donated 26 containers of clothing and household materials valued at US \$3.5 million to the Gambia (Jobe, 2006). Furthermore, in January 2010, Taiwan's Embassy presented a cheque for 1,000,000 Gambian Dalasi to the National Federation of Gambian Women (NFGW) (Jawneh, 2011a). In April 2011 too, the Taiwan's Embassy disclosed that its government has budgeted US \$8.4 million to support the Gambia government (Njie, Taiwan Donates U.S.\$300, 000 Medical Grant 2011a).

Also, in March 2012, Taiwan presented a cheque of US \$3,840,000,963 to the Gambia for the procurement of vehicles to enhance government's mobility (Njie, 2012a). Further to this, in December 2012, Taiwan presented a cheque of US \$747,692 to the Gambia to procure ferry engines as a part payment of US \$1.5 million meant for the purchase of 12 new engines (Njie, 2012b).

In total, in the review above, newspapers had reported a contribution of \$398,658,655 by Taiwan between August 2006 to July 2012. However, 3.5 million dollars of these was clothing materials. In any case, the remaining amount is a significant contribution by Taiwan to the Jammeh regime. In addition to the above, the Janneh Commission which was established to unveil Jammeh's financial transactions had unveiled that Taiwan gave the following aid and/or grants to the Jammeh led government between 1995 to 2004. Taiwan provided US \$18,700,000 for agriculture and light industries to the Gambia in 1995; in 1996 it funded the construction of Essau-Kerewan road at a tune of US \$7,262,77; in 2000, it provided US \$3,289,999 to Gambia's National Water and Electricity Company; in 2002 it provided US \$2,469,060; and in 2004 it granted US \$617,504 to the Gambia for microfinance and capacity development. This amounts to US \$25,802,840. However, the Janneh Commission has estimated that loans and grants between 1995-2004 totalled US \$44,508,842.

### Conclusion

This paper attempted to explain the rationality of Jammeh's foreign policy on Taiwan, using the rational actor model following Cashman's (1993) logical steps as a guide for analysis. Accordingly, I argued that every foreign policy decision starts with a foreign policy problem. Therefore, the paper analysed the circumstances and considerations under which Jammeh diplomatically recognised Taiwan, leading to China's withdrawal of aid and technical assistance from the Gambia, a vacuum to be filled by Taiwan. The paper argued that the sanctions imposed on the Junta and the freezing of aid by traditional Western donors of the Gambia, Jammeh's promise to transform the Gambia and the need to build local legitimacy all influenced his decision to enter into diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The sanctions and suspension of aid to the Gambia, created a huge financial challenge for Jammeh, thus requiring vigorous fundraising to fill the gap. Furthermore, Jammeh's condemnation of Jawara's development record, and the expectations the former created, meant that he was required to effect development programmes. Therefore, Jammeh's goal was to raise funds for his development programmes and to fulfil his promise. Jammeh took a number of actions to appease the West, such as engaging China for a loan, reducing the transition period to democracy from four to two years, but all did not yield Jammeh's needs for more funding. Since Taiwan was willing to provide a bigger loan to the government of the Gambia compared to China, it was rational to therefore, recognise Taiwan and get the loan. Accordingly, it is argued that Jammeh's means to attracting more aid for his interest was rational. This fits the core assumption of rationality, that foreign policy action was purposive and interest driven.

Furthermore, comparatively, the total amount of aid disbursed by Taiwan in 17 years is far greater than the amount donated by China in the 20 years immediately preceding the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. We found that while loans and aid in cash from China between 1974-1994 was approximately \$50,000,000, Taiwan's cash and cheque donations amounted to \$398,658,655 between 1995-2012. Therefore, economically, the engagement with Taiwan was more beneficial than the engagement with China. Taiwan's support to the Jammeh government was diverse and substantial, targeting several sectors deemed priority areas by the Jammeh government. Taiwan supported the education, health, agricultural sectors and many more. For more than a decade, it remained the main bilateral donor to the education sector, supplementing the budget, providing scholarships at home and abroad, providing infrastructure and materials etc. It also provided similar support to the health sector. Therefore, Jammeh's engagement with Taiwan is consistent with another core assumption of rationality – that choices are meant for the maximisation of benefits. And evidently, the relationship between the Gambia and Taiwan was beneficial. It helped Jammeh boast of ultramodern medical equipment often paraded on TV, which offered medical services and helped to contribute to the legitimisation of Jammeh. Through Taiwan's support, Jammeh told Gambians that he brought more developments, in health care and education in less than two decades than Jawara had done in three decades. Therefore, Taiwan's donation also helped attain Jammeh's need for acceptance by the population.

The paper concludes that Jammeh's diplomatic relations with Taiwan was procedurally and economically rational. In the relationship, he found a donor that filled the gap created by Western donor's sanction and freezing or reduction of aid. Furthermore, he found a reliable, non-confrontational, non-scrutinising ally who allowed him to build and support his 'development agenda' thereby making him gain legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the Gambians. This is the rationality of Jammeh's diplomatic relationship with Taiwan.

Nonetheless, the main limitation of this paper is that it has not been possible to ascertain whether the documents analysed forms the entirety of relevant materials that could provide details of aid and loans. Therefore, the paper might have missed a number of reports relating to the subject under study. However, this does not affect or change the conclusion – that Jammeh's decision on Taiwan was rational. Accordingly, this paper lays a foundation for more research on the subject, such as exploring the rationale behind Taiwan's massive support to the Gambia and to what extent the Gambia under Jammeh supported Taiwan and the benefits derived from such support by Taiwan. However, if the conclusion that the relationship was beneficial is true, why did Jammeh terminate diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 2013? This is a very difficult question to answer simply because Jammeh did not say anything at the time or after the termination except that it was done for the strategic national interests of the Gambia. In essence, as everywhere else, what national interest is, is contested and constructed by the power that be. Since Jammeh did not attempt any construction of that, it is therefore difficult to tell. In fact, the Taiwanese did not know either. A request for a meeting by the Taiwanese authorities was rejected by the government of the Gambia. Nonetheless, one noticeable feature of the event was that neither Jammeh nor any member of his government had criticised the Taiwanese government. Typically, Jammeh hurled insults on allies or perceived enemy states whenever there was a problem. This was not the case with Taiwan. This could suggest that he was still appreciative of Taiwan's role. However, it is important to reiterate that the severing of ties happened after President Ma had taken a step to reduce misuse of funds and engaging in donations that lead to scandals. In fact, he is reported to have asked 23 embassies to desist from checkbook diplomacy.

Therefore, it is discernible that Jammeh may have severed the ties to either gain more, probably from the Chinese or to lure Taiwan to provide more. It could also be that Jammeh no longer saw a viable role for the Gambia in Taiwan's claim for independence considering the domestic political changes in Taiwan. Moreover, as Jammeh continued to face heavy criticism, the period saw an attempt to intensify relations with Russia. Was the diplomatic pause intended to enable China to defend its regime at the UN? Was it meant for infrastructural projects China is currently doing? Since 2017, China has expanded its operation



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in the Gambia under Adama Barrow's presidency. Although it is not the focus of this paper to detail Gambia-China relations here, China is also on a path to leave a footprint on the Gambia as it is currently popular for its white elephant projects such as the construction of roads and bridges. Whatever the motivations of Jammeh were in terminating the relations with Taiwan in 2013 and shifting to China, it is clear that his 1995 decision regarding Taiwan was procedurally and economically rational.

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