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Afro Eurasian Review is differentiated by the fact that it includes articles by experts in the field who have conducted research on a wide geographical area related to the countries in Afro-Eurasian continents and aims to make a high contribution to the academic literature, especially by benefiting the general readership as well as those who conduct scientific studies and practitioners. In this issue of the journal, different topics are included and their attracting attention in other geographies as well as the geographies they are related to are evaluated at national and international level.

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As a culmination of the research experience accumulated over the years, the Economic and Social Research Centre within MÜSİAD has embarked upon the challenge of publishing an international journal. Thus the Afro Eurasian Studies has been born in Türkiye, at the epicentre of Afro Eurasia, out of a desire to contribute to the international discourse on the new dynamics of the region.

Editor

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A PROBLEM AS COLONIAL LEGACY: NORTHERN MALI AND AZAWAD

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Bir Sömürge Mirası Olarak Bir Sorun: Kuzey Mali ve Azawad

Öz

Mali, bölgedeki terör faaliyetleri, iç savaşlar ve darbeler nedeniyle güvenlik bağlamında uzun bir istikrarsızlık dönemi yaşamaktadır. Libya krizinin ardından yaşanan karışıklık, Mali'deki askeri darbe ve ardından Batı Afrika'daki diğer darbeler, farklı amaçlar için silahlanmış grupların çoğalması ve saldırılar için uygun koşulların oluşmasına neden olmuştur. Bu durum, 2012'de Tuareg liderliğinde başkaldıran ve ülkenin kuzey bölgelerinde bağımsızlığını ilan eden Azawad Ulusal Kurtuluş Hareketi'nin (MNLA) mevcut konumunu akıllara getirmektedir. Yaygın inanışın aksine, kuzey bölgelerindeki Tuareg liderliğindeki silahlı isyan, sömürge sonrası Mali devletinin varlığından bu yana devam eden bir olgudur. Sahel bölgesindeki son kriz, Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinden bu yana bölgenin güvenliği açısından en ciddi tehditlerden biri olarak değerlendirilmektedir ve uzun vadeli sonuçlarıyla ilgili ciddi endişelere yol açmaktadır. Bu makale, Bamako'ya karşı Tuareglerin süregelen isyanını dikkate alan tarihsel bir düzlemde çeşitli parametreleri inceleyerek krizin geçmişi ve bugünü daha net bir şekilde anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu nedenle, öncelikle sömürge sonrası ve bağımsız Mali'deki siyasi konjonktürü inceleyecek ve ardından Azawad çatışmasının köklerini ve bugünün politik ortamında ortaya çıkan potansiyel tehditleri tartışacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Azawad, Mali, Tuareg, MNLA.

A Problem as Colonial Legacy: Northern Mali and Azawad

Abstract

Mali has been experiencing a long period of instability in the security context due to terrorist activities, civil wars, and coups in the region. The turmoil following the Libyan crisis, the military coup in Mali, and the subsequent coups in West Africa have created favorable conditions for the proliferation and attacks of groups armed for different purposes. This brings to mind the current position of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which rebelled in 2012 under the leadership of the Tuaregs, emerged as an armed movement in the northern regions of the country and declared its independence from Mali. Contrary to popular belief, the Tuareg-led armed insurgency in the northern regions is as old as the post-colonial Malian state. The recent crisis in the Sahel region is one of the most serious since the end of the Cold War, with dire long-term implications for the region's security. This article aims to provide a clearer understanding of the past and present of the crisis by examining various parameters on a historical plane that considers the Tuareg's persistent rebellion against Bamako. For this reason, it will first examine the political conjuncture in post-colonial and independent Mali, and then discuss the roots of the Azawad conflict and the potential threats it poses in today's political environment.

Keywords: Azawad, Mali, Tuareg, MNLA.

Growing Security Crisis

Mali has been independent since 1960 and a multiparty democracy since 1991. From 1991 to 2012, it was a stable country with a democratic and peaceful transfer of power between parties. In early 2012, it faced a multifaceted crisis with severe consequences. These included a conflict in the north of the country that threatened its territorial integrity; political and institutional instability in the south that resulted in the March 22 coup d'état; and severe food insecurity as a result of droughts in the previous year. Following these events, the Government regained control of key areas in the north. The first peace agreement was signed in June 2013, although it lasted only a few months. The European Union and African Union troops supported the Government of Mali to stabilize the situation. After a short transitional period, democracy was restored, and parliamentary and presidential elections were successfully held in 2013 (Climate Investment Funds, 2015). However, one of the unresolved problems in all these processes is the north-south conflict that dates back to independence and even before. Indeed, the Tuareg uprising in 2012 once again exposed the insurmountable tension between the north and south of Mali. One reason for this tension can be found in the state-building methods that, immediately after decolonization, encouraged aggressive unity and the continued economic and political marginalization of the North. Despite past political unity, relations between northern and southern populations have always been distrustful. The French occupation exacerbated this mistrust. This was due to the attitude of the French during the colonial period when they decided to cultivate a ruling class composed almost exclusively of black Southerners. When these new ruling elites decided to free themselves from colonial rule, they had to find a way to establish political authority over the entire territory of Mali, using strategies ranging from favoritism and patronage to marginalization, divide-and-rule economic strategies, and military control. This was far from strengthening the unity of the country and the people's commitment to nation-building. In fact, by creating an independent centralized state based on the political and economic subordination of the North, post-colonial elites laid the foundations for rebellions in the North and future state failure.

While northern Mali is now seen by Malian authorities as a problem rather than a valuable part of the country, this has not always been the case. In times of trans-Saharan trade and royal pilgrimages to Mecca, the northern regions were seen as key to Mali's economic prosperity and political power. Northern Mali was an area of exploitation and trade, and a meeting point between the Arab, Saharan, and African worlds. Timbuktu, for example, was a powerful commercial metropolis where gold was exchanged, negotiated, and sold to the Maghreb, Mashreq, Europe, and the countries of the Mediterranean Gulf. Northern Mali also had a monopoly on the extraction of salt, a commodity then considered a princely possession. The end of the great Malian empires and French

colonialism preceded the exclusion of the northern regions from the center of power. In 1963, just five years after its creation, the Malian government faced strong political resistance to the growing influence of the south when it decided to abandon the Joint Organization of the Saharan Regions (OCSR) project so that it would not become an obstacle to its nation-building goals. Until then, OCSR membership had served as a counterweight to the growing political and territorial dominance of southern-dominated Mali. State over the traditional nomadic territories that the Tuaregs consider their own. Mali's exit from the OCSR fed a strong belief among Tuaregs in northern Mali that they had been abandoned by the south.

The decision to marginalize the North after independence, which was manifested in the will of the central state to affirm territorial integrity throughout the country, added to the historical prejudice between Northerners and Southerners. Indeed, the southern population has an extremely negative perception of the north. The Tuaregs are historically associated with distrust due to their long and mythologized experience of 're-zed', or raiding, against the settled population. Other northerners, especially the Fulani or Songhay people, have been regular victims of these attacks. This partly explains their support for Mali's independence and Bamako's authority. explain the historical and long-standing mistrust between North and South. Since 1960, the Tuareg and Arab population has never managed to adapt to the new Malian state model and has been regularly excluded from positions of power and the central 'national cake'.

The northern population has not directly benefited from development programs, nor (unlike the south) has it been successful in accessing state rent (due to very limited representation in parliament and government). This unequal access to state resources can be seen as a consequence of the divide-and-rule strategy implemented by the Malian government, which reached its peak under the regime of Amadou Toumani Touré.

Tuaregs in Mali History and Claims

To understand the Azawad factor, which has long been a thorny issue for Mali, it is essential to look at the history of the Tuareg. Traditionally known as a nomadic people, the Tuaregs have been romanticized in Western literature as the "blue men of the Sahara" due to the blue veils of the men and the bluish tint of their faces from the paint. Their territory is spread over large areas of the Sahel region (Lecocq and Klute, 2013: 425). There are various theories about the meaning of Tuareg. The most widely accepted is that it comes from the word 'Targa dweller', the Tuareg name for the Fezzan region of Libya (Prasse 2012). The more common name they give themselves is Kel Tamasheq/Tamajaq, or 'Tamasheq/Tamajaq speakers', which is the general name for the Tuareg dialects (there are eight main languages), which belong to the Tamazight

family. Another common self-description is Kel Tagelmust or 'veiled people'. It is possible to say that Tuaregs are spread across West and North African countries such as Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria and Libya. Tuareg's history is old and important for the region. There are many sources written on the history of these people. However, since the scope of this study is to examine the Tuaregs within the framework of Mali and Azawad, it would be more useful to focus on the colonial period and its aftermath. The north of Mali, with its present-day borders, has always been valued by local kingdoms. Through their historical influence and economic prosperity, the northern regions played a major role in what is today considered Mali. During the great empires of the 11th to 16th centuries, the northern cities of Timbuktu (100,000 inhabitants in the 15th century) and Gao (70,000 in the 14th century) were the most influential places in Mali, wielding political power and economic dominance. After the Moroccan occupation (16th and 17th centuries), the regional fragmentation of Mali (local kingdoms) shifted the political center of gravity towards the southern regions. With French colonial rule (1880/1890-1960), the center of gravity shifted to the south, relegating the north of Mali to a position of secondary importance (Baines, 2017: 51).

By becoming a political periphery, the northern regions lost their influence and were directly subjected to the domination of a 'foreign' south. Excluded from power, they were also often excluded from economic programs and nascent development, before being seen as a hotspot of insecurity and a danger to regional stability. Due to the lack of regional official figures or local northern statistics (especially over long periods), this section focuses mainly on the economic trends and global inequalities that fueled frustration and motivated some of the most violent uprisings. Where statistics are available, they are noted and interpreted to help explain the 2012 crisis and highlight Mali's internal differences. It is well known that the society that fought for its independence after the French occupation tried to develop various methods of struggle, even after the colonial forces took control of the entire region. The French occupation also ushered in a century of profound change that shaped this society in all aspects: social, economic, political, and conceptual. The Tuareg resistance to the French conquerors and the subsequent rebellions against the colonizers and then against the post-colonial states established according to the French-designed territorialization of the region were fundamentally similar. This struggle, the idea of the Tuareg liberating their identity from outsiders, was transformed in the post-colonial period into the idea of Azawad's independence (Claudot-Hawad, 2017). Mali's state-building efforts between 1960 and 2012, and the Azawad Tuareg's responses to them, are analyzed according to three distinct phases: The first was independence and modernization (1960-1968), during which Tuareg dissidents launched their first rebellion (between 1962 and 1964) against the centralizing policies of President Modibo Keita's government. The second was the rise of authoritarianism under the military regime during periods of severe drought

(1968-1992), which led to social, economic, and demographic upheavals in Tuareg lands; the third was the transition towards a neoliberal state (1992-2012), which led to large-scale rebellions in the first half of the 1990s, unresolved agreements and smaller rebellions that led to secession in 2012 (Maddy-Weitzman, 2022: 91). There have been four major rebellions since the 1960s. The first Tuareg revolt took place in 1962-64. During this period, the Tuaregs came under great pressure from the government of 'Modibo Keita', who came to power after the French left the country. At that time, the Tuaregs were heavily discriminated against and lagged behind others in terms of the distribution of state benefits. To exacerbate the situation, the Keita government enacted some land reform policies that threatened Tuareg's access to agricultural products on their land (Mohanty, 2018). Despite various programs aimed at strengthening national unity and the legitimacy of the Bamako government within the northern region, north-south relations have always remained openly distrustful. The military coup by General Moussa Traoré in 1968 and the establishment of a centralized regime in Bamako that lasted 30 years (until the revolution of March 26, 1991) did nothing to remedy this situation.

Bamako's 'military' approach to the northern issue is seen as one of the most important components of the 2012 crisis. The misappropriation of funds allocated to the Special Program for Peace, Security, and Development in Northern Mali to build military barracks in the northern regions is a good example of this military model. The Malian government decided to rebuild and re-equip its military infrastructure in the north using money that should have been spent on local economic and social development. The local population, expecting social and developmental improvements, was deeply disappointed and saw this as another failure of state policy in the north. By deliberately sidelining the economic and social dimensions of the recurrent conflicts in the north and prioritizing mainly repressive actions, the Malian authorities have paved the way for other non-national loyalties and external interventions. The first rebellion in 1963, just three years after independence, demonstrated the difficulties of addressing post-colonial challenges and bringing all Malian communities under one political entity. The post-colonial Malian authorities' preference to suppress the rebellion and their refusal to address the root causes of the crisis (i.e. political recognition of northern features and a special status for the region) helped perpetuate the conflict for years. The authorities' decision to ban tourism and establish martial law and military rule in the northern regions illustrated the approach adopted to address northern issues.

The overthrow of President Modibo Keita in 1968 and the establishment of the military regime of General Moussa Traoré helped to quell popular discontent, at least for a few years and superficially. However, severe droughts in 1972-1973 and 1984-1985 fed new discontent, forcing thousands of members of the northern tribes to leave the

region and seek refuge in neighboring countries, especially Niger and, to some extent, Libya. While these exoduses did not directly destabilize the Malian regime, the exodus has led to frustration, insecurity, and discontent among the northern population. It also encouraged new links with other groups, especially in Niger, where Tuareg rebel movements have been active since independence. The Libyan regime welcomed these climate-oriented refugees 'warmly', which Muammar Gaddafi, leader of the Libyan Socialist People's Jamahiriya, saw as a way to increase his political influence in the Sahara. Integrated into the Libyan Legion of Islam (founded in 1972), the Tuaregs were militarily trained and equipped and took part in the Libyan regime's proxy wars in other African countries (Chad, Sudan, Lebanon), especially Chad (Morgan 2011). With this move, the Tuareg problem became regionalized.

Tuareg and Arab exiles were the main participants in the second rebellion of 1990-1991. Like their elders before them, the fighters fought for better living conditions and recognition of a northern political identity, but at the same time demanded that the Tuaregs be allowed to become fighters in the Malian national army. By ignoring the political motivation of the rebels and preferring to call them 'highway bandits', General Moussa Traoré repeated the mistakes of Modibo Keita and once again contributed to the radicalization of the movement. Abuses by the Malian army, especially in Gao, Kidal, and Menaka, exacerbated grievances in the north. In 1990, an attempt by the Mouvement National de l'Azawad to free imprisoned Tuaregs by storming a police station in Menaka put the central government on high alert. After this attack, the insurgency continued and made relatively successful progress (Kristensen, 2012). Algeria was chosen by the Malian regime to mediate the crisis because of its knowledge of the region and suspected links between the rebels and the Libyan regime. However, the Tamanrasset peace accords, signed on January 6, 1991, were called into question when General Moussa Traoré was overthrown on March 26 following a coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Toure. The new regime did not recognize the Tamanrasset Agreement as legitimate and took few steps to implement it (Lode, 20021: 59). Between January 22 and March 25, 1992, Algeria mediated three rounds of negotiations between government representatives and the United Fronts and Movements of Azawad (Mouvements et Fronts Unifids de l'Azaouad- MFUA), culminating in the signing of the National Pact on April 11, 1992, in Bamako, Mali (Keita, 2018: 15). The FPLA initially refused to recognize the National Pact. Government troops killed twelve Tuaregs in Gossi on May 14, 1992, and 48 Tuaregs near Foita on May 17, 1992. Tuareg militants killed four bus passengers in the city of Gao on June 27, 1992. The Algerian government brokered an agreement between government representatives and MFUA representatives on February 11, 1993. The agreement provided for the integration of Tuareg militants into the Malian national army, but mutual attacks continued until the end of 1994. The Front Islamique Arabe de l'Azawad (FIAA), which

was involved in the war, continued its attacks on government forces until mid-1995. FIAA militants killed two people in Timbuktu on January 25, 1995. On the same day, government troops captured FIAA headquarters in the town of Tin-Adema. The FIAA agreed to a cessation of military hostilities in June 1995. The end of the Tuareg rebellion was marked by the ceremonial destruction of some 3,000 weapons in Timbuktu on March 26, 1996. Around 2,500 civilians were killed during the conflict and around 150,000 Tuaregs were forced to flee to neighboring countries as refugees during the unrest (UCA, 2023). The decade after 1996 can be characterized as a period of peaceful assistance to bring back Tuaregs who had fled to neighboring countries. The peaceful period lasted for about 10 years, but it must be said that this period did not bring about any solution that would radically solve the problem.

Indeed, a third rebellion broke out in May 2006. Fighters led by Iyad Ag Ghali took advantage of the withdrawal of the Malian army in the north after the last peace agreement to take control of the cities of Kidal and Menaka. This move by Iyad ag Ghali prompted Algeria to once again bring its mediation offer to the negotiating table. At this point, it should be noted that there was a difference of opinion among the Touaregs. Indeed, while some Tuaregs saw Iyad's Ifoghas community as the sole beneficiaries of the deal, opposition parties in Bamako rejected Amadou Toumani Touré's concessions to the rebellion and argued that the problem should be dealt with militarily. According to them, by negotiating with armed groups without even trying to stop the insurgency, the ATT ignored what they saw as the main source of the problems (Baines, 2017: 76). When the current process in the region entered the political climate characterized as the Arab Spring and the power of the anti-government demonstrations that spread across North African countries reached Libya (2010), the possibility that northern Mali might be affected might not have been one of the first scenarios that came to mind. However, Gaddafi's fall would also usher in heated times for this region. The return of Malian Tuareg diaspora members to Mali in the summer of 2011, fleeing the civil war in Libya, seemed to offer the perfect opportunity to renew a Tuareg-led separatist project. In mid-October 2011, a major conference was held in the mountains of Kel Adagh, and a visible effort was made to move the audience of the meeting beyond identification with the ethnic Tuareg cause. Participants reportedly agreed that the time had come for northerners to break away from Bamako and establish an independent Azawad state, which led to the creation of the Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA, *Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad*). The MNLA accused the Bamako government of deliberately obstructing Azawad by encouraging mismanagement, informality, and nepotism. More importantly, the MNLA contributed significantly to the "liberation" effort by further emphasizing the secessionist tendency. It immediately adopted the classic "liberation front" rhetoric and declared its "intention to use 'all necessary means' to end Mali's 'illegal occupation' of 'Azawad'"

(McGregor, 2011). Developments in 2012 exacerbated the turmoil in the north. The declaration of independence published on the website of the Movement for National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) also stated that "the borders of other countries will be respected". The movement is one of two rebel groups that have increased their control in the region following the overthrow of the Malian government. The organizers of the coup in Mali cited the failure to stop the uprisings in the country as the reason. Meanwhile, Amnesty International noted that Mali was facing a major humanitarian crisis at the start of the uprising (Amnesty International, 2012). Amnesty called for immediate access for aid agencies to the northern cities of Gao, Kidal, and the historic city of Timbuktu, where looting, kidnapping and unrest have been taking place for days. After the UN Security Council called for an end to fighting in Mali, MNLA rebels announced yesterday that they had taken control of territory in the region and declared a "unilateral ceasefire". MNLA said it would adhere to the UN charter, in addition to declaring independence and respect for the borders of neighboring states. The MNLA also called on the international community to recognize the declared independent administration (BBC, 2012). The declaration of independence in 2012 was also one of the factors that exposed the conflict within the Tuareg community. While many Tuaregs were forced to flee the region, Azawad, which wanted a secular and independent state, was far from united among other regional powers, especially Islamist groups (Spiegel, 2012). In this process, the emergence of Ansar Dine (or Ansaraddin, an "Islamist" organization with ties to al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, amid the instability caused by the clashes between the MNLA and the government, and the capture of northern cities, especially Timbuktu, and the threat to the capital Bamako, created an opportunity for France to intervene directly. In 2013, the parties once again came to the table under the mediation of Algeria, which once again brought a temporary solution to the problems in the region. The Malian government and the Coordination of Azawad Movements, also known as the CMA, signed a peace agreement mediated by Algeria. The group includes the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, the Arab Movement of Azawad, and the High Council for the Unity of Azawad. According to the agreement, the CMA will respect "the unity and territorial integrity of Mali". The Malian government agreed to implement a more decentralized system of government with regional assemblies elected by universal suffrage (Mohanty, 2018).

Coups and the North as Instruments of Instability

Military coups are one of the biggest obstacles to the political stability of countries. Mali has experienced this process of instability with five coups after independence. After the 1968 coup against Modibo Keita and the 1991 coup against Moussa Traoré, the military ended the government of Amadou Toumani Touré in 2012 after the Tuareg rebels advanced to the capital Bamako. The 2012 coup is important for the country's

political climate, because the northern problem, which had been going on since the early sixties and had been dealt with temporary solutions, was now one of the main reasons for a coup d'état. In addition, the fact that foreign troops were seen as an opportunity to solve the problem in the north would pave the way for bigger problems in the following years.

The removal of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta by the military in 2020, who had been the head of state since 2013, led to similar processes happening again. Keita and the country's prime minister announced their resignations on state television after being held at gunpoint. In his statement, Keita said he did not want bloodshed for the sake of staying in power and said he was dissolving the government and parliament. After international statements condemning the military coup in Mali, Keita, and Prime Minister Boubou Cissé were taken to a military camp near the capital Bamako. Keïta had won the general elections in 2018 and started his second term in office. But he has not escaped criticism over allegations of corruption, mismanagement of the economy, and controversy over parliamentary elections. The country has been the scene of several major protests in recent months, with clashes with 'jihadists' and disagreements among soldiers over salaries (BBC, 2020).

Transitional president Bah Ndaw stepped down the following year, again following a military intervention, and Assimi Goïta became the country's new leader. In the post-2021 period, the steps taken to remove the French military from the region had a significant meaning in terms of weakening the neocolonial ties. On the other hand, these neocolonial ties are being replaced by some other actors that can create dependencies, and the solution to the problem in northern Mali is only changing actors but not finding a solution. The fact that the Wagner mercenary company is heavily employed in the region and participates in operations with the Malian army, raises concerns about the region's future. The renewed escalation of tensions came to a head in August 2023. Fighting intensified in the town of Ber, only 50 km from Timbuktu. Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) fought with Malian Army forces to control this area. Since then, tensions in the northern region have continued to rise. The CMA claimed to have shot down a Malian army plane in Gao in the northeast. This claim was denied by the Malian army, which acknowledged that the plane had crashed but said it was due to a technical problem. This latest incident marks an unprecedented escalation at a time when dialogue between Bamako and the northern fighters has completely broken down. The situation is more volatile than ever, leading to fears of a conflagration in the north, where pro-independence groups are calling on the population to contribute to the war effort (Laplace, 2023). On the other hand, the recent intervention by the Malian army in Kidal, which has been controlled by the CMA since 2013, has caused great repercussions. Known as a haven for the separatists, Kidal is strategically important.

Conclusion

The security crisis in northern Mali, like many others, is a legacy of the colonial era. The abandonment of all sociological and cultural criteria when establishing borders has triggered security crises in many African countries that emerged as sovereign states in the process of independence. The Mali crisis is similarly intertwined with security threats both within Mali's borders and in neighboring countries.

In addition, the perpetuation of political instability through coups makes the resolution of crises even more difficult. Steps taken to resolve the conflict through reconciliation have also failed to provide a solution. At this point, a 60-year-old problem affects regional security and is a tool of intervention for Western powers. In particular, France's military operations in the region together with its allies have caused a great deal of anger.

On the other hand, the ideological divergence of the Azawad groups fighting for secession further complicates the equation in the region. Structures such as MNLA, CMA, Ansar Dine, IMA (Islamic Movement of Azawad) fight for similar goals with different ideologies, which hinders stability in the region. The withdrawal of French troops from the region after the last coup in Mali and the Malian army's concentration on the northern region with the Wagner forces have increased the intensity of military operations. The information that Kidal has been taken and the announcement of the continuation of the operations brings with it the possibility of the separatist movements in the region to relocate. The fact that countries such as Burkina Faso and Niger are close to the conflicts in Mali and, like Mali, are ruled by military juntas after the coup d'état makes it necessary to consider the possibility that conflicts may find new areas.

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MASLAHAH OF ISLAMIC BANKING MERGER DISCOURSES (INDONESIA CASE)

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İslami Bankacılık Birleşme Söylemlerinin Maslahati (Endonezya Örneği)
Öz

Endonezya hükümeti, İslami bankaların rekabet gücünü güçlendirmek için Endonezya'daki İslami bankaları, yani Bank Syariah Mandiri (BSM), Bank Rakyat Indonesia Syariah (BRIS) ve Bank Negara Indonesia Syariah'ı (BNIS) Bank Syariah Indonesia (BSI) ile birleştirdi. Bu nedenle, bu çalışmanın amacı, Endonezya'da bu kadar kısa sürede gerçekleştirilen İslami banka birleşmelerinin etkisini çalışan yaşı, çalışan deneyimi ve çalışan verimliliği faktörlerine göre analiz etmektir. Bu çalışmada kullanılan yöntem, faaliyet raporu adı verilen ikincil verilerden elde edilen nicel bir yöntemdir. Ayrıca, bu çalışmadaki problemlerin formülasyonu şunları içermektedir: (i) Her bir eski bankanın çalışanlarının yaş ve deneyimlerinde bir boşluk var mı?; (ii) Eski bankaların her birinin birleşmeden önceki performans ve üretkenlik koşulları nelerdi?; (iii) Eski bankanın üretkenliği ile karşılaştırıldığında birleştirilmiş bankanın üretkenliği nasıldır? Bu çalışmanın sonuçları, personel yönüyle ilgili bir iç çatışma potansiyeli olduğunu ve hem kâr hem de muazzam kâr ve varlıklara sahip eski bankalardan gelen varlıklar açısından verimlilikte azalma olduğunu belirtmektedir. Bu nedenle, bu çalışmanın anlamı, ihtilafları azaltmak ve hem dış hem de iç taraflara fayda veya maslahat sağlamak için birleşik İslami bankaya karşı takip eylemleri almaları için hükümet paydaşlarına bilgi sağlamaktır. Bu çalışmanın orijinalliği, personel faktörleri ve çalışan verimliliği ile ilişkili İslami bankaların birleşmelerini tartışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Birleşme, İslam Bankası, Verimlilik, Maslahat

Maslahah Of Islamic Banking Merger Discourses (Indonesia Case)
Abstract

The Indonesian government has merged Islamic banks in Indonesia, namely Bank Syariah Mandiri (BSM), Bank Rakyat Indonesia Syariah (BRIS), and Bank Negara Indonesia Syariah (BNIS) into Bank Syariah Indonesia (BSI) to strengthen the competitiveness of Islamic banks. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of mergers of Islamic banks in Indonesia which were carried out in such a short period based on factors of employee age, employee experience, and employee productivity. The method used in this study is a quantitative method sourced from secondary data, namely the annual report. Furthermore, the formulation of the problems in this study includes: (i) Is there a gap in the age and experience of employees of each ex-legacy bank?; (ii) What were each ex-legacy bank's performance and productivity conditions before the merger?; (iii) How is the productivity of the merged bank when compared to the productivity of the ex-legacy bank?. The results of this study state that there is a potential for internal conflicts related to the staffing aspect and a decrease in productivity both in terms of profit and assets from ex-legacy banks with enormous profits and assets. Therefore, the implication of this study is to provide information to government stakeholders to take follow-up actions against the merged Islamic bank to mitigate conflicts and provide benefits or maslahah for both external and internal parties. The originality of this study is to discuss mergers of Islamic banks that are associated with staffing factors and employee productivity.

Keywords: Merger, Islamic Bank, Productivity, Maslahah.

Introduction

Banking is one of the significant institutions in a country's economy. Indonesia has two types of banking operations: conventional and Islamic banks. According to Law Number 21 of 2008 concerning Islamic Banking, Islamic Banks are banks that carry out business activities based on sharia principles, or Islamic law principles that are regulated in fatwas of the Indonesian Ulema Council, such as the principles of justice and balance ('adl wa tawazun), beneficiaries to communities (maslahah), universalism (alamiyah), and does not contain transaction that contains gharar (uncertainty), maysir (gambling), riba (interest rate), zalim (unfairness) and illegitimate objects (haram) (Nugroho, 2022b, 2022c; Nugroho et al., 2022). The growth of Islamic banking in Indonesia is very rapid. This is evidenced by the end of 2020, where Islamic banks in Indonesia registered with the Financial Services Authority (OJK) as many as 14 sharia commercial banks, 20 sharia business units, and 164 Sharia People's Financing Banks (Nugroho et al., 2020, 2021). The rapid development of Islamic banking must be accompanied by good performance in terms of financial and non-financial aspects. Therefore, the performance of Islamic banking is an achievement that has been achieved during its operational activities. Furthermore, the development of the Islamic banking industry has experienced significant asset growth. According to Alfi (2021), asset growth from Islamic banks as of January 2021 was 13.51% year on year (YoY), with total assets as of January of Rp600.99 trillion sourced from Islamic Commercial Banks (BUS), Islamic Business Units (UUS), and Islamic rural Banks (BPRS).

When viewed from a historical aspect, the existence of Islamic banks in Indonesia began in 1992, namely with the establishment of Bank Muamalat Indonesia (Diantanti et al., 2021; Karyanto et al., 2021; Nasfi et al., 2022). However, in general, the journey of the Islamic banking industry in Indonesia can be explained as follows:

- Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI), the first Islamic bank in Indonesia, started its business and operated on May 1, 1992;
- PT Bank Syariah Mandiri (BSM) officially started its activities and operations on November 1, 1999;
- PT Bank BNI Syariah (BNIS), which has effectively carried out operations since June 19, 2010;
- PT Bank BRI Syariah (BRIS) officially operated under a license from Bank Indonesia on October 16, 2008;
- The signing of the conditional merger agreement on October 12, 2020, namely a merger agreement between Islamic banks signed by the Directors of BSM, BNIS, and BRIS;

- The legal merger occurred on February 1, namely the legal inauguration of the merger between BSM, BNIS, and BRIS into Bank Syariah Indonesia (BSI). However, operations still use their respective core banking;
- October 1, 2021, the merger of core banking operations from merger banks, namely BSM, BNIS, and BRIS, into one BSI core banking;
- On May 27, 2022, The Annual General Meeting of Shareholders, the fiscal year 2021, approved the entry of series A shares of the Government (Dwi Warna), which will make BSI a state-owned bank;

July 22, 2022, BSI officially became a state-owned enterprise marked by the placement of government shares in BSI through series A government shares (Dwi Warna). Based on the journey of Islamic banking in Indonesia above, until now, the banking industry in Indonesia continues to metamorphose in search of the perfect form to provide services and contribute significantly to the Indonesian nation, especially in improving public welfare. To realize this, the Indonesian government has merged from a Islamic bank that is a subsidiary of a state-owned enterprise because it is following the architecture and study made by the KNKS (National Committee for Sharia Economy and Finance) that there must be a state-owned Islamic bank (KNKS, 2019). However, the phenomenon related to the market share of the Islamic banking industry to the market share of national banks is still a challenge and needs to be improved. This is in line with the statement from the Deputy Director of Islamic Banking of the Financial Services Authority, Farid Falatehan that the market share of Islamic banking still low. However, it was established in 1992 and is still below 10%, or to be precise, it has only reached 6.74% (Nisaputra, 2022).

Furthermore, referring to the metamorphosis of the Islamic banking industry, that is, the event of a merger of Islamic banks carried out in a short period (in just four months), risks a non-comprehensive analysis of the feasibility study or merger evaluation could be happen. Some of the risks that may arise in the future include:

- Preparation of an inefficient organizational structure due to the allocation of positions to accommodate previous positions in merger banks (BSM, BNIS, BRIS);
- There is an inequality in the merger bank, and this is because the merger is not due to liquidity difficulties such as mergers during the monetary crisis. Still, due to the government's mission, the banks with the most capital and operating longer, namely BSM, will be the same as Islamic banks that have operated more recently, namely BNIS and BRIS. Therefore, employee experience, product portfolio, and employee competence from BSM have the potential to be harmed due to this merger process;

- The merger of BSM, BNIS, and BRIS does not increase the industrial market share of Islamic banks;
- The internal impact of the merger on corporate culture and conflicts of interest between inter-bank mergers (ex-legacy) requires relatively long-standing consolidation;
- BSM is an ex-legacy bank that had the most assets before the merger into BSI and tended to become aggrieved;
- BSI's operations as a bank that controls the market above 40%, there is a potential for BSI to be a monopoly player in the Islamic banking industry.

Referring to these phenomena, the formulation of the problems in this study is as follows: (i) Is there a gap in the age and experience of employees of each ex-legacy bank?; (ii) What were each ex-legacy bank's performance and productivity conditions before the merger? ; (iii) How is the productivity of the merged bank when compared with the productivity of the ex-legacy bank?. Therefore, based on the phenomenon and problem formulation, the purpose of this conceptual paper is to analyze the impact of the merger of Islamic banks in Indonesia from the internal aspects of the organization, namely related to staffing and productivity. In addition, the implication of this conceptual paper is to provide scientific characteristics related to the merger of Islamic banks so that it can be used as a reference for the following researchers. Furthermore, the novelty of this conceptual paper is to discuss related issues that may occur due to the merger of Islamic banks, which is the first time it has occurred in Indonesia.

Methodology

The method used in this conceptual paper is qualitative descriptive, which discusses the formulation of questions based on scientific studies that researchers have done before, both sourced from journals and books that have been published. Therefore, to limit the discussion on the conceptual paper, the research question of this research includes:

- Is there a gap in the age and experience of employees of each ex-legacy bank?
- What are each ex-legacy bank's performance and productivity conditions before the merger?
- How is the productivity of the merged bank when compared to the productivity of an ex-legacy bank?

Findings

Age Differences and Employee Experience Differences from Ex-Legacy Banks
 The merger of Islamic banks must benefit all stakeholders, including internal parties (Utami et al., 2021)). In addition, merger action was carried out at the government's initiation, where the three banks were not in a condition of liquidity difficulties (Akram et al., 2021; Nugroho, 2022a). Therefore, management must address differences in organizational age, portfolio, employee experience, intellectual capital, and IT capital fairly and transparently in preparing organizational structure and compensation. This should be a concern because there is a potential conflict of interest in the merger process that benefits a group of parties who know the merger information in advance to create unethical actions or actions. For example, when viewed from the age of employees of ex-legacy banks (merger participants), it can be known as follows:

Table 1. Number of Employees Based on Age Range from 2017 to 2020 (Bank Syariah Mandiri-BSM)

Number of Employees by Age Range	2020	Portion	2019	Portion	2018	Portion	2017	Portion
> 30 Years Old	6533	76.14%	6159	72.02%	5793	66.51%	5254	59.21%
≤ 30 Years Old	2047	23.86%	2393	27.98%	2917	33.49%	3620	40.79%
Total	8580	100%	8552	100%	8710	100%	8874	100%

Source: BSM (2020)

Based on data on the age range of BSM employees (table 1), the portion of BSM employees over 30 years old in 2020 was 76.14%, or 6533 people.

Table 2. Number of Employees Based on Age Range from 2017 to 2020 (Bank Negara Indonesia Syariah-BNIS)

Number of Employees by Age Range	2020	Portion	2019	Portion	2018	Portion	2017	Portion
> 30 Years Old	2824	49.22%	2630	47.44%	1845	38.77%	1581	35.17%
≤ 30 Years Old	2914	50.78%	2914	52.56%	2914	61.23%	2914	64.83%
Total	5738	100%	5544	100%	4759	100%	4495	100%

Based on data on the age range of BNIS employees (table 2), the portion of BNIS employees over 30 years old in 2020 was 49.22%, or 2824 people.

Table 3. Number of Employees Based on Age Range from 2017 to 2020 (Bank Rakyat Indonesia Syariah-BRIS)

Number of Employees by Age Range	2020	Portion	2019	Portion	2018	Portion	2017	Portion
> 30 Years Old	2,522	56.3%	2,606	56.5%	2,815	60.4%	2,950	59.3%
≤ 30 Years Old	1,955	43.7%	2,005	43.5%	1,846	39.6%	2,021	40.7%
Sub Total	4,477	100.0%	4,611	100.0%	4,661	100.0%	4,971	100.0%
Employee BRI in Aceh	1,680	27%	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	6,157	127%	4,611	100%	4,661	100%	4,971	100%

Source: BRISyariah (2020)

Based on data on the age range of BRIS employees (table 3), the portion of BRIS employees over the age of 30 in 2020 was 56.3%, or 2522 people.

Therefore, based on table 1, table 2, and table 3, it is known that there is a large gap, namely the age range of employees between BSM, which has an age range of employees > 30 years of 6533 people or 76.14% of the number of BSM employees. This shows that BSM, as a bank that was first established, has employees whose age is above the average of BNIS and BRIS employees. In addition, what if an analysis is carried out based on the employee's length of service? It can be known as follows:

- BSM, which was inaugurated on November 1, 1999, has an average employee working period of 9 years and 3 months;
- BRIS, which was inaugurated on November 17, 2008, has an average employee working period of 5 years and three months;
- BNIS which was inaugurated on June 19, 2010, has an average employee working period of 5 years and three months for BNIS employees. Referring to the condition of the age difference of the employees and the average working period of the employees who carry out the merger, if an adequate and fair merger feasibility study is not carried out, there are potential conflicts such as:

- There is injustice in compensation. Potential conflicts over the provision of compensation can occur because each ex-legacy bank (BSM, BRIS, and BNIS) previously had different policies in providing salaries, incentive benefits, bonuses, etc. These differences can cause conflicts if they are not studied thoroughly related to the experiential aspects of the educational aspect and aspects of the work portfolio of each employee in determining the amount of equitable compensation. In addition, there is a need for transparent socialization related to the determination of compensation.
- There is injustice in the determination of positions. The potential conflict with the merger is that not all positions in ex-legacy banks can be attributed to the organizational structure of Islamic banks resulting from the merger. Thus, there is a potential for a contest for positions that are carried out unfairly and transparently.
- There is an injustice in the giving of appreciation
- The potential for jealousy related to the appreciation given can be a conflict. This is because there are differences in performance between ex-legacy banks which causes differences in the types and forms of appreciation or incentives. Therefore, it is necessary to have a comprehensive study related to the provision of appreciation so that there are no harmed parties.
- There are gaps in competence and work experience
- The difference in average age and work experience impacts each ex-legacy employee's causes different ways of thinking and working. Therefore, there is a potential for conflict where subjective assumptions assume what the ex-legacy is doing is the most correct.
- There is a clash of work cultures
- Each ex-legacy bank has a different work culture before. This can cause conflicts against different values adopted and differences in business processes and business models of each legacy bank.
- There is unfair competition

The merger has an impact on the merging of the organizational structures of the three ex-legacy banks into one organizational structure of the merged Islamic bank, namely Bank Syariah Indonesia, which has the potential to make it challenging to develop a career at the merged bank. Therefore, there is the possibility of intense competition, which has the opportunity for unethical and immoral actions.

Performance and Productivity before the Merger Bank Syariah Mandiri (BSM)

Bank Syariah Mandiri is an ex-legacy bank with the most prominent assets and long-

est-established. Below is a table of BSM performance by profit and asset aspects:

Table 4. BSM Performance for the 2017-2020 Period (Million Rupiah)

Performance	2017	2018	2019	2020
Profit before tax and zakat	499,600	836,600	1,809,264	1,977,597
Assets	87,939,800	98,341,100	112,291,867	126,907,940

Following table 4 above, the profit and BSM assets over the past four years have continued to increase. The profit position before tax and zakat in December 2020 was Rp1.9 trillion, with assets of Rp126.9 trillion. Furthermore, the growth of the performance of BSM is as follows:

Table 5. BSM Performance Growth for the 2017-2020 Period

The increase in profit during the 2017-2020 period was 296% or a total of Rp1.47 trillion. Meanwhile, profit growth for 2019-2020 increased by 9%, or Rp168.33 billion. Furthermore, if analyzed based on the number of BSM employees owned during the 2017-2020 period, it is as follows:

Table 6. Number of BSM Employees for the 2017-2020 Period

Growth 2017-2020	Growth 2019-2020
296%	9%
1,477,997	168,333

Referring to table 6 above, BSM employees from 2017-2020 decreased by -3.31%, and from 2019-2020 increased by 0.33%. Therefore, when analyzed, the productivity of the number of employees versus the profit and assets of BSM is as follows:

Table 7. Productivity Per BSM Employee for The Period 2017-2020

Employee Productivity Ratio	2017	2018	2019	2020
Profit Productivity Ratio	56	96	212	230
Asset Productivity Ratio	9,910	11,291	13,130	14,791

According to table 7 above, the productivity of BSM employees to profit continues to increase, namely by Rp230 million per employee in 2020 against Rp14.79 billion per employee assets. Moreover, profit productivity employee ratio formulation as follow:

$$\frac{\text{Profit before tax and zakat (n)}}{\text{Number of Employees (n)}}$$

$$\frac{\text{Assets (N)}}{\text{Number of Employees (n)}}$$

So as, asset productivity employee ratio formulation as follow:

$$\frac{\text{Assets (N)}}{\text{Number of Employees (n)}}$$

Bank Rakyat Indonesia Syariah (BRIS)

Bank Rakyat Indonesia Syariah is an ex-legacy bank with the second largest assets. Below is a table of BRIS performance based on profit and asset aspects:

Table 8. BRIS Performance for the 2017-2020 Period (Million Rupiah)

Performance	2017	2018	2019	2020
Profit before tax and zakat	139,494	157,473	118,378	433,258
Assets	31,543,384	37,915,084	43,123,488	57,715,586

Following table 8 above, the profit and BRIS assets over the past four years decreased in 2019. The profit before tax and zakat position in December 2020 was Rp433.2 billion, with assets of Rp57.7 billion. Furthermore, the growth of the performance of BRIS is as follows:

Table 9. BRIS Performance Growth for the 2017-2020 Period

Growth 2017-2020	Growth 2019-2020
211%	266%
293,764	314,880

Based on table 9, the increase in profit during the 2017-2020 period was 211%, or a total of Rp293.7 billion, while the profit growth for the 2019-2020 period increased by 266%, or 314.8 billion. Furthermore, if analyzed based on the number of BRIS employees owned during the 2017-2020 period, it is as follows:

Table 10. Number of BRIS Employees for the 2017-2020 Period

Year	2020	2019	2018	2017
BRIS employees	6157	4611	4661	4971

Referring to table 10 above, the number of employees from 2017-2020 increased by 23.86%, and from 2019-2020 increased by 33.53%. Therefore, when analyzed, the productivity of the number of employees versus the profit and assets of BRIS is as follows:

Table 11. Productivity Per Employee BRIS Period 2017-2020

Employee Productivity Ratio	2017	2018	2019	2020
Profit Productivity Ratio	28.06	33.79	26	70
Asset Productivity Ratio	6,345.48	8,134.54	9,352	9,374

Based on table 11 above, employee productivity to BRIS profit in 2019 has decreased. However, in 2019 it became Rp70 million per employee. However, in terms of assets, it increased from 2019 to Rp9.3 billion per employee.

Bank Negara Indonesia Syariah (BNIS)

Bank Negara Indonesia Syariah is an ex-legacy bank that has the lowest assets among other ex-legacy. Below is a table of BNIS performance based on profit and asset aspects:

Table 12. BNIS Performance for the 2017-2020 Period (Million Rupiah)

Productivity	2017	2018	2019	2020
Profit before tax and zakat	422,910	567,780	799,949	688,990
Assets	34,822,442	41,048,545	49,980,240	55,009,340

Table 12 above shows that BNIS assets have continued to increase over the past four years. The profit position before tax and zakat in December 2020 was Rp688.9 billion, with assets of Rp55 trillion. In addition, the performance growth from the aspect of profit and assets from BNIS is as follows:

Table 13. BNIS Performance Growth for the 2017-2020 Period

Growth 2017-2020	Growth 2019-2020
63%	-14%
266,080	(110,959)

Based on table 13, BNIS's profit increase during the 2017-2020 period was 63%, or a total of Rp266 billion, while BNI's profit growth for 2019-2020 contracted by 14% or minus Rp110 billion. In addition, the number of BNIS employees in the 2017-2020 period is contained in the table as follows:

Table 14. Number of BNIS Employees for the 2017-2020 Period

Year	2020	2019	2018	2017
BNIS Employee	5738	5723	4942	4737

Based on table 14 above, BNIS employees from 2017-2020 increased by 21.13%, and from 2019-2020 increased by 0.26%. Therefore, BNIS productivity based on profit and asset aspects is as follows:

Table 15. Productivity Per Employee BNIS Period 2017-2020

Employee Productivity Ratio	2017	2018	2019	2020
Profit Productivity Ratio	89	115	140	120
Asset Productivity Ratio	7,351	8,306	8,733	9,587

According to table 15 above, the productivity of employees to BNIS's profit in 2020 is lower than in 2019, which is Rp120 million per employee. However, in terms of assets, it increased from 2019, which was Rp9.6 billion per employee.

Performance and Productivity after Islamic Bank Merger

The merged bank of the three ex-legacy, namely BSM, BRIS, and BNIS, is Bank Syariah Indonesia (BSI); when compared with productivity based on profit aspects and asset aspects, it can be seen in the table below:

Table 16. Ratio Productivity Comparison Islamic Bank before and after Merger

Employee Productivity	2020			2021	Difference		
	BSM	BNIS	BRIS	BSI	BSM	BNIS	BRIS
Profit Productivity Ratio	230	120	70	203	-28	83	133
Asset Productivity Ratio	14,791	9,587	9,374	13,598	- 1,194	4,011	4,224

Moreover, according table 15 above, it can be explained as follows:

- The impact of the merger is an increase in the number of bank employees resulting from the merger, in this case, BSI in 2021 to 19,510 people;
- The impact of the merger in 2021 on the employee productivity ratio based on the BSM profit aspect was a decrease of Rp28 million per employee, which previously the profit productivity per BSM employee in 2020 was Rp230 million per employee. This is because BSI's profit productivity ratio in 2021 is Rp203 million per employee;
- On the other hand, employee productivity based on the profit aspect of BNIS and BRIS has increased by Rp83 million per employee and Rp133 million per employee, respectively;
- The employee productivity ratio based on the asset aspect of BSM decreased by Rp.2 billion per employee. This is due to employee productivity based on the aspect of BSM assets before the merger (in 2020) of Rp14.8 billion per employee, while employee productivity based on the aspect of BSI assets after the merger (in 2021) became Rp13.6 billion;
- On the other hand, employee productivity based on the asset aspects of BNIS and BRIS increased by Rp9.6 billion per employee and Rp9.4 billion per employee, respectively.

Conclusion and recommendations:

The merger of Islamic Banks in Indonesia is the first merger of Islamic banks in In-

onesia and also the fastest merger in the world. Therefore, there is a potential conflict that needs to be mitigated early. Some things that need to be considered so that the merger of Islamic banks can provide benefits for all stakeholders are as follows:

- Differences in the average age and experience of employees from each ex-legacy bank have the potential to cause obstacles in communication;
- There is a potential for a study of the merger that is not comprehensive, so there is a possibility that there are parties who are harmed by this Islamic bank merger action;
- The potential decrease in employee motivation is due to decreased career expectations, a lack of transparency in determining positions, and the amount of remuneration received.

In addition, there is a possibility that the determination of leaders in the work unit at the middle level is not based on a fit and proper test so that there is the potential for disharmony at work and a decrease in the quality of work results. Furthermore, the merger of Islamic banks in Indonesia should provide benefits to the community if the number of outlets or coverage increases and also the products and products created are in accordance with the needs and desires of the community, and not just because of the political will of the government.

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SOCIO-ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKIYE AND SOUTH AFRICA

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Türkiye ve Güney Afrika Arasındaki Sosyo-Ekonomik İlişkiler Öz

Hem Güney Afrika hem de Türkiye, kıtada küresel ekonominin önemli oyuncularındandır. Güney Afrika'nın maden ve yeraltı kaynakları açısından zengin olması, ülkede madencilik önemli bir sektör haline getirmiş, Türkiye ise güçlü imalat ve hizmet sektörleriyle çeşitliliğe sahip bir ekonomiye sahip olmasıyla dikkat çekmiştir. Her iki ülke de uluslararası ticaretle uğraşiyor ve çeşitli ülkelerle diplomatik bağları vardır. Türkiye ve Güney Afrika siyasi, ekonomik ve kültürel boyutları kapsayan diplomatik ilişkiler sürdürmektedir. Her iki ülkenin de birbirlerinin başkentlerinde iletişim ve işbirliğini kolaylaştıran büyükelçilikleri bulunmaktadır. Türkiye ile Güney Afrika arasındaki ekonomik ilişkiler ticaret ve yatırımda önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Türkiye ile Güney Afrika arasındaki ikili ticaret yıllar geçtikçe istikrarlı bir şekilde artmaktadır. İki ülke arasında makine, taşıt, tekstil ve tarım ürünleri dahil olmak üzere çeşitli malların alışverişi yapılmaktadır. Her iki ülke de ticaret anlaşmaları ve iş heyetleri aracılığıyla ekonomik işbirliğini geliştirmeye çalışmıştır. Son yıllarda ekonomik bağların daha da derinleştirilmesi yönünde tartışmalar yaşanıyor. Ticareti ve yatırımı artırma-ya yönelik çabalar arasında enerji, altyapı ve teknoloji gibi sektörlerdeki fırsatların araştırılması da yer alıyor. Daha yakın ekonomik işbirliğini teşvik etmek için ortak iş forumları ve ekonomik zirveler düzenlenmektedir. Kültürel alışverişler aynı zamanda Türkiye ile Güney Afrika arasındaki ilişkilerin güçlenmesine de katkıda bulunuyor. Turizmin yanı sıra eğitim ve kültür programları da insanlar arası etkileşimi ve karşılıklı anlayışı kolaylaştırıyor. Ancak tüm bunların yanında bütün diplomatik ilişkilerde olduğu gibi her iki ülkenin de üzerinde aşmaya çalıştığı zorluklar ve farklılıklar mevcuttur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Güney Afrika, Ekonomik İlişkiler, Ticari ilişkiler, Afrika

Socio-Economic Relations Between Turkey And South Africa Abstract

Both South Africa and Turkey are important players in the global economy. South Africa is rich in minerals and resources, making mining a significant sector, while Turkey has a diverse economy with strong manufacturing and services industries. Both countries engage in international trade and have diplomatic ties with various nations. Turkey and South Africa maintain diplomatic relations that encompass political, economic, and cultural aspects. Both countries have embassies in each other's capitals, facilitating communication and cooperation. Economic relations between Turkey and South Africa are notable, with trade and investment playing a significant role. Bilateral trade between Turkey and South Africa has been growing steadily over the years. The two countries engage in the exchange of various goods, including machinery, vehicles, textiles, and agricultural products. Both nations have sought to enhance economic cooperation through trade agreements and business delegations. In recent years, there have been discussions about further deepening economic ties. Efforts to boost trade and investment include exploring opportunities in sectors such as energy, infrastructure, and technology. Joint business forums and economic summits have been organized to foster closer economic collaboration. However, like any diplomatic relationships, there may also be challenges and differences that both countries work through.

Keywords: Turkey, South Africa, Economic Relations, Mercantile ties, Africa

Turkish Economic Ties with South Africa

Mercantile relations between nations are a driving force behind globalization, facilitating trade, investment, and collaboration. A compelling example of such economic partnership can be found in the growing relationship between Turkey and South Africa. These two nations, located in different corners of the world, have managed to forge robust economic ties that contribute to their mutual growth and prosperity. At the heart of the Turkish-South African economic relationship is trade and tourism. Both countries have recognized the potential for increased bilateral trade and have taken steps to foster this exchange. Over the years, trade agreements and initiatives have been established to create an enabling environment for economic cooperation. These agreements aim to reduce tariffs, simplify customs procedures, and provide preferential treatment for certain goods, promoting a conducive framework for cross-border commerce.¹

The economic ties between Turkey and South Africa span a wide range of sectors. Machinery, textiles, chemicals, and agricultural products are among the goods that form the backbone of their trade relations. This diversified trade portfolio reflects the complementary nature of their economies and the ability to meet each other's demands and preferences. Beyond trade, investment opportunities have also been a driving force behind Turkish-South African economic ties. Both countries have recognized the potential for collaborative ventures that can contribute to economic growth and job creation. South Africa's rich mineral resources, well-developed infrastructure, and strategic location have attracted Turkish investors interested in sectors such as mining, energy, and construction.² Turkey and South Africa have engaged in joint economic initiatives aimed at deepening their economic bonds. Business delegations, trade missions, and investment forums have facilitated direct interactions between companies from both countries. These initiatives provide a platform for business leaders to explore opportunities, establish partnerships, and forge lasting economic relationships.³ While the Turkish-South African economic ties have shown positive trends, challenges such as trade imbalances and regulatory issues have also emerged. Addressing these challenges requires ongoing dialogue, collaboration, and the willingness to find mutually beneficial solutions. Such challenges, however, also present opportunities for both nations to work together and enhance their economic cooperation.

Economic ties are often strengthened by cultural, and people-to-people exchanges.

¹ Kahf M. & Sinno N. (2021). *Constructions of masculinity in the middle east and north Africa: literature film and national discourse*. p.98, American University in Cairo Press.

² Kahf M. & Sinno N. (2021). *Constructions of masculinity in the middle east and north Africa: literature film and national discourse*. p.98, American University in Cairo Press.

³ Bloom J. & Warner N. (2020). *Architecture of the Islamic west: north Africa and the Iberian Peninsula*

The interactions between Turkish and South African citizens, whether through tourism, education, or cultural events, contribute to fostering a deeper understanding and appreciation of each other's cultures. These interactions create a solid foundation of goodwill that further supports economic collaboration. The economic ties between Turkey and South Africa exemplify the potential for nations to forge meaningful partnerships that extend beyond geographical boundaries. Through trade, investment, and joint initiatives, these two countries have managed to leverage their respective strengths for mutual benefit. As they continue to navigate the complexities of the global economy, their economic relationship serves as a testament to the power of collaboration and cooperation in fostering growth and prosperity.⁴

Ottoman Relations with Africa

The Ottoman Empire, one of the most significant and influential empires in history, left a historical legacy in Africa. From the 16th to the early 20th century, the Ottomans expanded their reach across the continent, leaving behind a rich cultural, architectural, and historical heritage that continues to shape various African countries today. The Ottoman Empire's presence in Africa was primarily concentrated in North Africa, particularly in regions such as Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. These territories were under Ottoman rule for several centuries, and their influence can still be seen in the architecture, cuisine, language, and cultural practices of these countries. One of the most notable legacies of the Ottomans in Africa is their architectural contributions. Ottoman architecture, characterized by its grandeur, intricate designs, and use of domes and minarets, can be seen in numerous mosques, palaces, and public buildings across North Africa. The iconic mosques of Cairo, such as the Sultan Hassan Mosque and the Al-Rifa'i Mosque, showcase the Ottoman architectural style and serve as reminders of the empire's influence. Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire played a significant role in shaping the political landscape of North Africa. Ottoman governors, known as pashas, governed these territories, implementing administrative systems and policies that influenced local governance structures. The Ottoman legal system⁵, known as the Sharia, also had a profound impact on the legal frameworks of these regions⁶, with many aspects of Ottoman law still prevalent in contemporary legal systems. Trade and commerce were also vital aspects of the Ottoman legacy in Africa. The empire established trade routes and networks that connected Africa with the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. These trade routes facilitated the exchange of goods, ideas, and cultural practices, contributing to the economic development and cultural diversity of the region. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire's

⁴ Donelli F. (2021). *Turkey in Africa: turkey's strategic involvement in sub-Saharan Africa*. p. 83, I.B. Tauris

⁵ Isom-Verhaaren C. & Schull K. F. (2016). *Living in the ottoman realm: empire and identity 13th to 20th centuries*.p. 241, Indiana University Press.

⁶ Isom-Verhaaren C. (2021). *The sultan's fleet: seafarers of the ottoman empire*. P. 54, I.B. Tauris.

influence extended beyond North Africa. Ottoman traders and explorers ventured further into sub-Saharan Africa, establishing commercial ties and diplomatic relations with various African kingdoms and empires. These interactions led to cultural exchanges, the introduction of new goods and technologies, and the spread of Islam in some regions.

The Ottoman legacy in Africa is not without its complexities and challenges. The empire's rule was not always welcomed by local populations, and resistance movements against Ottoman control emerged in some areas. Additionally, the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century and the subsequent colonization of Africa by European powers marked the end of Ottoman influence in the continent. However, the Ottoman legacy in Africa remains an important part of the continent's history and cultural heritage. It serves as a reminder of the interconnectedness of different regions and civilizations throughout history. The architectural marvels, cultural practices, and historical narratives left behind by the Ottomans continue to be cherished and preserved, contributing to the diverse tapestry of African identity. In conclusion, the Ottoman Empire's legacy in Africa is a testament to its historical significance and influence. The empire's architectural contributions, political systems, trade networks, and cultural exchanges have left an indelible mark on the continent. Recognizing and appreciating this legacy helps us understand the complex history of Africa and its connections to the wider world.

Turkish relations with South Africa

The history of Turkish migration to South Africa can be traced back to the late 19th century. Many Turkish immigrants arrived in South Africa during the Ottoman Empire era, seeking better economic opportunities, and escaping political unrest. These early settlers primarily engaged in trade, establishing businesses, and contributing to the growth of the local economy. One notable figure in Turkish-South African history is Haim Galanti, who arrived in South Africa in the late 1800s. Galanti, originally from the Ottoman Empire, established himself as a successful businessman. He played a crucial role in the development of the textile and mine industry in South Africa and contributed significantly to the community in the country.⁷

The Ottoman Islamic impact in South Africa is a testament to the far-reaching influence of the Ottoman Empire and its cultural, religious, and economic ties with regions across the world. While geographically distant, the connection between the Ottoman Empire and South Africa left a lasting mark on the social, religious, and cultural fabric of the country. The Ottoman Empire's legacy is deeply rooted in Is-

⁷ Sadouni S. (2019). Muslims in southern Africa: Johannesburg's Somali diaspora. P. 43, Palgrave Macmillan.

lam, and this influence extended to South Africa through the spread of Islamic teachings and practices. Ottoman scholars like Abubakr Effendi and Mahmud Fakih Emin Effendi but also some Muslim traders played a role in introducing and promoting Islam, contributing to the growth of Muslim communities in South Africa. Ottoman architectural styles and design principles influenced the construction of mosques and religious buildings in South Africa. These structures often feature elements such as domes, minarets, and intricate tilework, reflecting the artistic and architectural heritage of the Ottoman Empire.⁸

The Ottoman Empire's engagement with South Africa facilitated cultural exchange and interaction. This led to the infusion of Ottoman cultural elements into local traditions, including music, clothing, and cuisine. The Ottoman impact contributed to the rich diversity of South African culture. Ottoman influence contributed to the establishment of Islamic educational and religious institutions in South Africa. These institutions played a crucial role in preserving and disseminating Islamic knowledge and practices among the Muslim community. Ottoman economic activities and trade networks indirectly influenced the economic landscape of South Africa. Trade relations facilitated the exchange of goods and ideas, contributing to economic growth and cultural cross-pollination.⁹

The Ottoman Empire's role as a protector of Islam resonated with Muslims in South Africa, fostering a sense of religious solidarity. News and developments from Ottoman lands often reached South Africa, influencing the community's perception of global events. The Ottoman Islamic impact contributed to the identity and awareness of Muslims in South Africa. The shared cultural and religious heritage fostered a sense of belonging to a broader global community. Awareness of the Ottoman Empire's political status and its eventual dissolution influenced political consciousness among Muslims in South Africa. The decline of the Ottoman Empire resonated with concerns about global political dynamics. The Ottoman Islamic impact in South Africa is a testament to the interconnectedness of history and the far-reaching influence of the Ottoman Empire. While the direct interactions between the Ottoman Empire and South Africa were limited, the cultural, religious, and economic ties left an indelible mark on the country's heritage. The Ottoman legacy is a reminder of the complex interplay of cultures and civilizations that have shaped South Africa's diverse and vibrant society.

⁸ Kallander A. A. (2013). Women gender and the palace households in ottoman Tunisia p. 93, (1st ed.). University of Texas Press. For a controversial study see; Minawi M. (2016). The ottoman scramble for Africa: empire and diplomacy

⁹ Gençoğlu Halim. (2018). Ottoman traces in southern Africa: the impact of Turkish emissaries and Muslim theologians p. 172 ,(1. ed.). Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık.

The Story of Angora Goats in South Africa

Angora goats have a significant presence in South Africa, where they are primarily raised for their luxurious mohair fiber. Mohair, known for its softness, sheen, and durability, is highly valued in the textile industry for producing a range of products, including clothing, accessories, and upholstery. The history and impact of Angora goats in South Africa are noteworthy. The Angora goat breed originated in ancient Asia Minor (modern-day Turkey) and was initially brought to South Africa in the early 1800s. They were later imported in larger numbers, with breeding programs established to improve the quality of mohair produced by the goats. South Africa's semi-arid and arid regions provide a suitable environment for raising Angora goats. The climate supports the goats' adaptability to thrive in areas with limited grazing and water resources. The primary economic value of Angora goats in South Africa lies in their mohair production. Mohair is sheared from the goats' fleece and is known for its luster, strength, and dye-absorption properties. The fiber is used in high-end fashion, textiles, and crafts. Angora goat farming contributes to rural employment and livelihoods, especially in regions where other agricultural activities may be limited. The industry provides jobs in shearing, sorting, processing, and trading of mohair. South Africa has invested in research and breeding programs to improve the quality of Angora goats and their mohair. Selective breeding aims to enhance desirable traits, such as fiber quality, growth rates, and reproductive performance. The Angora goat breed has faced challenges, including disease outbreaks and genetic issues. Conservation initiatives in South Africa work to preserve the genetic diversity of the breed and address health concerns. South Africa is a major global producer of mohair, with a significant portion of the country's production exported to international markets. The country's mohair is known for its high quality and is sought after by textile manufacturers worldwide.

The sustainable nature of Angora goat farming aligns with South Africa's focus on environmentally friendly and ethical practices. The goats' ability to graze on marginal lands and their low water requirements contribute to their sustainable farming. Angora goat farming has played a role in community development and empowerment, particularly in rural areas. It provides an avenue for income generation and skills development for local communities. Angora goat farming is intertwined with the cultural fabric of some South African communities. Traditional practices, knowledge, and skills associated with goat farming contribute to cultural preservation.

Indeed, Angora goats have become an integral part of South Africa's agricultural and textile industries. The country's expertise in breeding, producing, and trading mohair has positioned it as a global leader in the Angora goat industry, making a significant economic and cultural contribution to the nation.

Turkish Tobacco in South Africa

Turkish tobacco, also known as Oriental tobacco, has a notable history and presence in various parts of Africa. It is a unique type of tobacco known for its distinct flavour, aroma, and texture, and it has been cultivated and traded in different African countries. Turkish tobacco originated in the Ottoman Empire and is characterized by its small leaves, intense aroma, and rich flavour. In the 19th and 20th centuries, Turkish tobacco seeds were introduced to various regions, including Africa, as part of trade and colonial activities. Turkish tobacco cultivation spread to several African countries, particularly those with suitable climate and soil conditions. Egypt, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Tanzania are among the African nations where Turkish tobacco is grown. The tobacco is typically cultivated on small farms by local communities. Turkish tobacco is known for its unique flavour profile, which is often described as sweet, spicy, and aromatic. The distinctive taste of Turkish tobacco has contributed to its popularity and demand in the tobacco industry. Turkish tobacco is used in various tobacco products, including cigarettes, pipe tobacco, and hookah (shisha) tobacco. It is often blended with other types of tobacco to create a balanced and flavourful smoking experience. The cultivation and trade of Turkish tobacco have had economic implications for the African countries involved. The tobacco industry can provide income and livelihoods for local farmers and communities involved in its production. Like other forms of tobacco cultivation, Turkish tobacco farming has been associated with various challenges and controversies. These include concerns about environmental impact, health effects, and labour practices in the tobacco industry. The cultivation of Turkish tobacco in Africa reflects the interconnectedness of global trade and cultural exchange. It underscores the role of agriculture in shaping local economies and traditions. The global tobacco industry is subject to regulations and market dynamics that influence the production, trade, and consumption of tobacco products. Turkish tobacco's role in this industry is influenced by both local and international factors.

In some African countries, Turkish tobacco cultivation has contributed to the diversification of agricultural activities. Farmers may choose to grow Turkish tobacco alongside other crops as part of their livelihood strategy. It's important to note that the tobacco industry, including Turkish tobacco cultivation, has faced criticism due to health concerns related to tobacco use. Efforts to reduce tobacco-related health risks have led to increased awareness campaigns, regulatory measures, and initiatives aimed at supporting tobacco farmers in transitioning to alternative crops. Turkish tobacco's presence in Africa illustrates the complex interactions between trade, culture, agriculture, and global industries, with implications for local economies and communities.

Political Relations Between Turkey and South Africa

Political relations between countries play a crucial role in shaping their interactions on the global stage. One such dynamic and evolving relationship is that between Turkey and South Africa. These two nations, geographically distant but connected by shared interests and values, have cultivated a strategic partnership characterized by diplomatic engagement, economic cooperation, and collaboration on international issues. Diplomatic relations between Turkey and South Africa were established on May 10, 1994, a pivotal time for South Africa as it transitioned to democracy. This marked the beginning of a new era of engagement between the two countries. Since then, both nations have sought to build and strengthen their political ties through high-level visits, diplomatic consultations, and joint initiatives. High-level visits have played a significant role in solidifying the political relationship between Turkey and South Africa. These visits provide opportunities for leaders to engage in discussions on a wide range of issues, from bilateral cooperation to regional and global challenges. Such interactions contribute to a deeper understanding of each other's perspectives and priorities.

Bilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation

Political relations often intersect with economic interests, and Turkey and South Africa are no exception. Both countries have recognized the potential for increased trade and economic collaboration. Bilateral trade agreements and joint economic initiatives have paved the way for enhanced economic relations, with sectors such as machinery, textiles, agriculture, and technology offering opportunities for growth. Collaboration on international and regional issues forms an integral part of the political relationship between Turkey and South Africa. Both nations are active participants in multilateral forums, including the United Nations, where they work together on matters such as climate change, peacekeeping, and human rights. Their alignment on various global challenges reflects a shared commitment to addressing pressing issues of our time. Political relations are often strengthened by cultural, and people-to-people exchanges. Cultural diplomacy initiatives, educational programs, and tourism exchanges contribute to fostering mutual understanding and friendship between Turkish and South African citizens. These interactions create a foundation of goodwill that supports broader political cooperation. The political relations between Turkey and South Africa have evolved into a strategic partnership that encompasses multiple dimensions. Both nations recognize the strategic importance of collaborating in areas such as energy, defence, technology, and infrastructure development. These partnerships are aimed at achieving mutual benefits and advancing the economic growth and development agendas of both countries. Like any politi-

cal relationship, the partnership between Turkey and South Africa is not without its challenges. Differing perspectives on certain issues may arise, requiring diplomatic negotiations and dialogue. However, these challenges are seen as opportunities for both countries to engage in constructive discussions and find common ground. The political relations between Turkey and South Africa exemplify the potential for collaboration and cooperation between nations that may be geographically distant but share common values and interests. Through diplomatic engagement, economic ties, and joint efforts on global challenges, Turkey and South Africa have laid the foundation for a lasting and dynamic partnership that holds promise for the future. As they navigate the complexities of an ever-changing world, their political relationship remains an important pillar of their international engagements. Diplomatic relations between Turkey and South Africa have evolved over the years, encompassing political, economic, cultural, and strategic cooperation. These two nations have engaged in diplomatic efforts to strengthen their bilateral ties and collaborate on various regional and international issues. Diplomatic relations between Turkey and South Africa continue to evolve, reflecting shared interests, regional dynamics, and global issues. As these two nations collaborate on various fronts, their diplomatic efforts contribute to mutual benefits, peace, stability, and the advancement of common goals on the international stage.

Economic Relations between Turkey and South Africa

Economic and political relations between South Africa and Turkey have been steadily growing over the years, with both countries recognizing the potential for mutually beneficial cooperation. These relations have been built on a foundation of shared values, economic interests, and diplomatic ties. Economically, South Africa and Turkey have been exploring various avenues to enhance trade and investment between the two nations. Bilateral trade has been on the rise, with both countries experiencing an increase in exports and imports. In 2020, the total trade volume between South Africa and Turkey reached approximately \$1.2 billion, a significant increase from previous years. This growth can be attributed to the diversification of trade products, including machinery, vehicles, textiles, and agricultural products. Furthermore, both countries have recognized the importance of fostering investment opportunities. Turkey has shown interest in investing in South Africa's mining, energy, and infrastructure sectors, while South Africa has sought to attract Turkish investments in various industries, including manufacturing, tourism, and agriculture. To facilitate these investments, both countries have established bilateral agreements and joint economic commissions, providing a framework for cooperation and collaboration. In addition to economic ties, South Africa and Turkey have also developed strong political relations. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established

in 1994, following the end of apartheid in South Africa. Since then, both nations have engaged in regular high-level visits, exchanging delegations and strengthening diplomatic ties. These visits have served as a platform for discussing various political and economic issues of mutual interest. Furthermore, South Africa and Turkey have collaborated on various international platforms, such as the United Nations and the G20. Both countries have shared interests in promoting peace, stability, and development in their respective regions and globally. They have often aligned their positions on key international issues, including human rights, climate change, and global security. Moreover, cultural, and educational exchanges have played a significant role in strengthening the ties between South Africa and Turkey. The two countries have encouraged people-to-people interactions, fostering cultural understanding and promoting tourism. Educational scholarships and exchange programs have been established to facilitate academic cooperation and knowledge sharing. Despite the positive trajectory of economic and political relations, challenges remain. Both countries face domestic economic and political issues that can impact their bilateral cooperation. South Africa's economic inequality and high unemployment rates, as well as Turkey's political tensions and regional conflicts, can pose challenges to the growth of their relations. However, the commitment of both countries to overcome these challenges and build a stronger partnership remains evident. Indeed, the economic and political relations between South Africa and Turkey have witnessed significant growth in recent years. Both countries have recognized the potential for cooperation and have taken steps to enhance trade, investment, and diplomatic ties. While challenges persist, the commitment to strengthening the relationship remains strong. As both nations continue to explore new avenues for collaboration, the future looks promising for the economic and political partnership between South Africa and Turkey.

The Turkish community in South Africa has also made significant contributions to education. Turkish schools, known as "Maarif schools," have been established in various cities across the country. These schools provide quality education to both Turkish and South African students, promoting cultural exchange and fostering understanding between the two communities. The schools have gained recognition for their academic excellence and have become an integral part of the South African education system. Culturally, Turkish heritage is celebrated and cherished in South Africa. Turkish festivals, such as the Turkish Food Festival and Turkish Film Festival, are organized to showcase Turkish cuisine, art, music, and cinema. These events provide an opportunity for South Africans to experience Turkish culture firsthand and foster cultural exchange between the two communities. The Turkish community in South Africa has also played a vital role in promoting interfaith dialogue

and understanding. Turkish mosques, such as the Hamidia Mosque in Johannesburg, Masjid al-Aziz in Port Elizabeth and Masjid al-Osman in Cape Town have become iconic landmarks and centres for community engagement. These mosques not only serve as places of worship but also host cultural events, seminars, and educational programs that promote dialogue and tolerance among different religious and cultural groups. Furthermore, Turkish-South African business relations have flourished over the years. Turkish companies have invested in various sectors in South Africa, including construction, manufacturing, and tourism. These investments have contributed to job creation and economic growth in both countries, further strengthening the bilateral ties.

Despite the positive contributions of the Turkish community, challenges remain. Like any immigrant community, Turkish-South Africans face the task of preserving their cultural heritage while assimilating into the broader South African society. Language barriers, cultural differences, and the need to balance tradition with modernity can pose challenges for future generations. Turkish heritage in South Africa is a fascinating aspect of the country's multicultural tapestry. Over the years, Turkish immigrants have made significant contributions to South African society, leaving a lasting impact on various fields, including business, education, and culture. The Turkish community in South Africa has managed to preserve its rich heritage while integrating into the diverse fabric of the nation.

After 1994, both countries have sought to encourage investment and business collaborations. Turkish companies have shown an interest in various sectors in South Africa, including construction, infrastructure development, and textiles. On the other hand, South African companies have explored opportunities in Turkey, particularly in sectors like mining and tourism. The South African government has also aimed to attract foreign investment, including Turkish investment, to stimulate economic growth. Diplomatic efforts have played a role in strengthening economic relations. Turkey and South Africa have engaged in high-level diplomatic talks and visits to discuss economic cooperation.

These discussions often result in bilateral agreements aimed at promoting trade and investment. Furthermore, both countries have participated in international forums and organizations, such as the G20, where they collaborate on economic and financial matters. Tourism and cultural exchange have also contributed to economic relations. South Africa's rich cultural heritage and natural beauty have attracted Turkish tourists, leading to increased flights and tourism-related investments. Similarly, Turkish culture, cuisine, and historical sites have become increasingly popular among South African tourists.

In conclusion, the economic relations between Turkey and South Africa have evolved significantly since 1994. Both countries have recognized the importance of collaboration and have taken steps to strengthen their economic ties in various sectors. Continued diplomatic efforts, trade promotion, and investment encouragement can further deepen and diversify these economic relations in the years to come.

Conclusion

Mercantile relations between Turkey and South Africa have evolved over the years, encompassing trade, investment, and economic cooperation. Both countries have recognized the potential for collaboration and have taken steps to strengthen their economic ties. Trade between Turkey and South Africa has grown steadily, with both countries seeking to diversify their trade portfolios. They have engaged in bilateral trade agreements and initiatives to promote economic cooperation. The trade relationship includes various sectors, such as machinery, automotive, textiles, chemicals, and agriculture. Turkey and South Africa have signed bilateral agreements to enhance their economic relations. These agreements aim to create a favourable environment for trade and investment by addressing issues such as customs procedures, tariffs, and market access. The Turkey-South Africa Joint Economic Commission (JEC) serves as a platform for discussions and cooperation on economic matters. It facilitates dialogue between the two countries to explore opportunities for collaboration, address challenges, and promote trade and investment.


Both Turkey and South Africa have organized business delegations and trade missions to explore potential opportunities, forge partnerships, and expand their economic networks. These delegations often include representatives from various sectors looking to establish business ties. Turkey and South Africa have taken steps to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) from each other. They provide information and support to businesses interested in investing in sectors with growth potential. Agricultural products have been a significant component of the trade relationship between Turkey and South Africa. Both countries export and import various agricultural goods, contributing to food security and supply. Tourism exchanges between Turkey and South Africa have increased, with citizens of both countries showing interest in exploring each other's culture, history, and natural beauty. Tourism contributes to people-to-people ties and economic growth. While mercantile relations between Turkey and South Africa have shown positive trends, there are challenges to address, including trade imbalances and regulatory issues. Both countries continue to work on creating an enabling environment for trade and investment. Turkey and South Africa often cooperate in multilateral forums and organizations, such as the G20, where they collaborate on global economic issues and advocate for their mutual interests.

IMPERIAL OTTOMAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY

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i. The first Ottoman Consul-General Ohannes Majakyan in South Africa, 1911



ii. Donations collected by Hilal-i Ahmer for the supply of aircraft to the Ottoman Army in South Africa were sent to Istanbul by the Ottoman consul Ohannes Majakyan in Johannesburg. In the same year, Goolam Mahomed Isaac, one of the prominent Muslims of Mauritius, in the letter he sent to consul general Ohannes Majakyan Effendi, regarding the donations collected for the children of the Turkish soldiers who became martyred in the Tripoli War, 1912.

iii. Summary of Main Trade Agreements between South Africa and Türkiye, See more, Southern African Development Community (SADC): Protocol on Trade in Services, <http://www.thedtic.gov.za/sectors-and-services-2/1-4-2-trade-and-export/market-access/trade-agreements/>, accessed 20.09.2023.

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TRAGEDY OF KHARTOUM: CAPITAL CITY OF 200 YEARS

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Tragedy of Khartoum: Capital City of 200 Years

History repeats itself. The civil war induced on April 15th, 2023, centered around Khartoum, capital of Sudan and three states of Darfur, has gone into 9th month today. No capital city in the world has experienced such a war scene or the destruction and looting suffered by Khartoum. Sudan has not recently experienced similar events. However, this is reminiscent of the Mongol army entering Baghdad, the capital of the Abbasids, on February 14, 1258. When the Mongol army under the command of Hulagu entered the Abbasid capital, one of the most terrible massacres in human history took place. Roads to the city were occupied and most of its people were killed. At the same time, the destruction of the landmarks of Islamic civilization and the massacre of its people were a tragedy on its own. This occupation maintains as one of the greatest disasters in Islamic history, despite the passing of a thousand years.

In 2013, the central government in Sudan established a temporary militia called the Rapid Support Forces (RFS) against the resistance movements in the country, which is witnessing the destruction, looting, occupation and mass displacement that Khartoum is currently witnessing. However, while 10 years have just passed, it would not be an exaggeration to describe them as the Mongols of the 21st century, due to all their destructive activities in the western and central parts of the country, taking advantage of the gap created by the military intervention in 2019. Because every brutal method was used to kill, torture and humiliate the people of Baghdad in the greatest looting known to humanity. The Rapid Support Forces forced and continue to force violence on their own country. The capital city of Khartoum, located where the Blue Nile and the White Nile meet, has turned into a “ghost town”, a metropole that is dissipating on the face of the earth.

First time in the history of modern Sudan, the capital city was moved to another location, namely Port Sudan by the Red Sea. When the civil war broke out in Khartoum on April 15, 2023 and by militias affiliated with the Rapid Support Forces, all foreign embassies, representatives of international organizations and executives of companies left the country. Also, as of April 30th, 2023, many public institutions and banks were forced to move outside the capital for the first time to Port Sudan, the country’s largest port city, because they were pointed as a target. Naturally, the city of Port Sudan has temporarily served as the administrative capital of the country. Many foreign representatives, including the Turkish Embassy, also chose this city as their residence address. Also governmental bodies, some of the universities, and Central Bank of Sudan, as well as headquarters of other banks moved to Port Sudan to resume their operations.

Moving the capital city under challenging conditions was a major decision. And this one was made on August 27th, 2023 by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of state Transitional Sovereignty Council, and Commander in Chief of Sudanese Armed Forces. He led a successful military operation to move the capital city from Khartoum to Port Sudan while the country had been dealing with the civil war broken out by the Rapid Support Forces over 4 months ago. This seaside city has become the administrative capital of the state ever since.

Likewise, since the International Khartoum Airport was rendered unusable by the Rapid Support Forces, and the historical capital turned into a battlefield, all flights were called off. As a result, the Port Sudan Airport has become the only airport to connect Sudan to the rest of the world.

As of December 19, 2023, the Rapid Support Forces militia entered Wad Madani, the central city of Al-Jazeera state, 180 kilometers away from Khartoum, and the second largest city in Sudan followed by the capital. Until that date, this was the city where civilians displaced from Khartoum mostly settled. This time, the Rapid Support Forces captured Wad Madani and in a dramatic manner, this city was plundered, as was the case in Khartoum, when the army unit there laid down their weapons and left. There was great outrage and shock over the looting, theft, kidnapping for ransom, rape, and arson of public buildings and factories. Desperate civilians were forced to relocate for the second time, this time migrating to other states.

Wad Madani being an easy target for the Rapid Support Forces militia to capture created another great outrage among Sudanese people. Militia forces tried to capture Sinnar and Nile states, just like they did with Wad Madani. Thus, on December 23, civilians throughout Sudan, including the Nile River, Red Sea, Kessela, El-Shamali, Kordufan, El-Gadarif states, declared “general mobilization” and started the fight against the militias.

The Sudanese National Army and Abdulaziz al-Hilu’s SPLM-N forces decided to wipe off the cities of Sudan against the Rapid Support Forces, which no longer had an official position, destroying and looting the cities of Sudan. The first city to be reclaimed was Dilling, the second largest city of South Kordofan state.

On December 28, 2023, it was announced that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa would attempt to mediation. It was planned that Hemedti, head of the Rapid Support Forces, to meet different formations across the country for this mediation attempt, in line with finding African solution to African issues. However, although the information regarding his death has not yet been

clarified, it is claimed that his images prepared by artificial intelligence were used throughout the civil war. There is no concrete evidence that he’s still alive. Since the news that indicated Mohammed Hamdan Daglo, nicknamed Hemedti, who led the Rapid Support Forces, went to Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, remained unannounced by the official websites of these countries, people raised suspicion around that question. It is said that Hemedti died in an attack in this civil war between Sudanese, but his death or murder was concealed in order to keep the motivation of his militia together. In fact, the general opinion is focused on the “wait and see” approach. On the other hand, there are those who have high expectations from a possible dialogue. It is even stated that permanent peace may be established.

It is known that in the clashes between the Sudanese National Army to prevent the Rapid Support Forces, which they also had to fight against, great destruction was caused to residential and public buildings in the capital Khartoum, signs of life in the city were lost, public and private facilities were closed and looted.



Except for abandoned civilian and military cars on the streets of the city, the signs of life here have been completely erased. Rapid Support Forces have looted richness of the entire region. Looting, destruction and massacre continue even after 250 days. All this time, a life is lived without electricity, water, food, basic food and health services. Similar to the Mongols who started fires in every city they occupied, there are no mosques, churches, houses, schools, hospitals, banks, bazaars, workplaces or

government institutions left in any residential area. Even the National Museum and Zoo were destroyed.

The Rapid Support Forces did even worse, using every brutal means to occupy the homes of the people of Khartoum, rape and humiliate their inhabitants. They carried out mass looting by stealing people's jewelry, cars and household items. By implementing a policy of unfair settlement in the homes of civilians, the method of the RSF is almost no different from Israel's method of Jewish settlement in Palestine. They also broadcast live on social media via their mobile phones to brag about what they have done.




Today, the unchanging view in Khartoum is that it is a ghost metropolis full of abandoned houses, militia snipers and corpses lying in the streets, and most of it is occupied by these militias. They turned civilians into human shields against the aerial attacks of the Sudanese National Army.

Khartoum-based buildings and towers that are symbols of modernization, as well as dozens of historical buildings such as the Sudanese Presidential Palace and the Sudan National Museum, as well as thousands of private houses and apartments, many factories, schools, universities, hospitals, public buildings, etc., were targeted because the Rapid State Forces were hiding there. . In this way, buildings belonging to the Sudanese people and state could not avoid being further destroyed.



The current state of the **International University of Africa**, one of the most prestigious universities in Sudan and Africa



When vitally important sovereign headquarters, including Khartoum International Airport, which is the country's largest airport providing air transportation from the capital Khartoum, became completely unusable because of the attacks of the Rapid Support Forces in the first days of the war, domestic and international flights from here were completely stopped. Due to the military or civilian importance of airports in the war, Khartoum Airport was completely destroyed. The building and airfield were made unusable. Most of the aircraft were destroyed and were completely out of service.



The destruction of the airport was not limited to the demolition of buildings. The war has destroyed the livelihoods of people in the regions surrounding the capital, educational opportunities for their children, and the wealth that families have accumulated over decades.

Pressure of the war had major impact on the Sudanese healthcare industry, which had already been failing due to lack of infrastructure. Major hospitals in the capital were either looted by the militias to treat their own wounded members or occupied as military headquarters. In short, as the entire city turned into a huge battlefield, all public and private hospitals were destroyed and became unserviceable. More than 90% of over 200 public and private hospitals and healthcare institutions were completely destroyed. Facing this sad situation in which Sudan has found itself in, the need for Türkiye's experience in the healthcare industry and its infrastructure, including city hospitals, is greater than ever.

According to estimated statistics based on observations obtained from video footage and photographs widely published on social media; it appears that 29 ministry buildings in Khartoum, as well as archaeological and historical buildings built during the

Turkish and British rule in Sudan in the 19th century, the presidential palace and the museum attached to it were also significantly damaged.

The streets of Khartoum are in ruins and have become motionless. Cars are ruined, destroyed, abandoned or set on fire, and they are scattered everywhere. As the fighting continued and escalated, approximately 93% of power stations and offices were destroyed in different districts of Khartoum. Most of the database of the Electricity Distribution Company were lost or looted.

Images and videos of looting and setting of fire of 28 commercial bank branches and 19 bank offices, along with part of the Central Bank of Sudan building in Khartoum alone were shared. Live broadcasts and video footage on social media by members of the Rapid Support Forces were also boasting about the money they stole, as if they had were national heroes.

A total of over 158 major markets and bazaars of Khartoum, including Al-Suq Al-Arabi- Saad Qişra, Suq Odurman faced with air bombardment. Or most of them were first looted by the Rapid Support Forces and their thieving gangs, then they were set on fire, and now they are unusable and destroyed.



Civil war destroys Khartoum to the ground and wipes off all buildings.

The capital, Khartoum, had a population of more than 7 million, and all of them had to leave their homes and either move to other states or, for those who had the means, to neighboring countries. Today, Sudan ranks first as the country with the most displaced people in the world, beating Syria and Ukraine on this.

As a result, observations show that many public and private institutions are being destroyed in a widespread, organized and systematic way. They also forced every Sudanese to flee as the most basic needs of daily life were deliberately targeted.

Experts estimate the amount of direct and indirect damage to the industrial and banking sectors in the capital Khartoum and other regions at approximately 4 billion dollars. There is also an expectation that these losses will increase significantly if the current war is not stopped.

Having been sabotaged and looted by the RSF, industrial plants, public buildings, and especially banks will not be able to conduct their activities and perform their duties for a long time. Perhaps Sudan will need the close attention and cooperation of Türkiye and Turkish companies to stand alone after the war.

Emerging of Rapid Support Forces

- Rapid Support Forces (RSF) were consented by the parliament of the period in August 2013 and their powers and duties were defined by the Presidential decree. Its origins lie in the infamous militia called “Janjaweed”, which was established by the central government in the civil war against the armed resistance organizations in Darfur.
- Although they were armed by former president Omar al-Bashir against armed groups in Darfur, from a historical perspective, they were not the first to arm the tribes in Kordofan, but were helped by Imam Sadiq al-Mahdi in the war against the insurgency in South Sudan during the third democratic period.
- Until 2019, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) were created on a controlled basis by the Omar Al-Bashir government as a disciplined military unit that worked according to directives and had no political role. The purpose of its establishment was to assist Sudan’s armed forces in the fight against the armed movements of the region during the Darfur crisis, which was the hottest political region in the world between 2003 and 2015. It was by no means

a force operating parallel to the regular army. Until one morning in 2019 when the change of power occurred, they had been in full agreement and high coordination with the military leaders to whom the country’s affairs were handed over.

- After 2019, with the transitional period in Sudan, the peace process and political peace issues began to take place when the Deputy Prime Minister Hamdok intruded his realms of authority and duty, including economic issues, during his time in the economic mechanism. Thus, by presenting himself as a separate institution and a structure that does not comply with the orders of the armed unit, it began to assume political roles outside its duties and job description.
- Over the years, RSF has earned hundreds of millions of dollars for sending mercenaries to fight for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Moreover, it grew stronger by consolidating its control over the gold mines. Hemedti Dagalo, head of the Rapid Support Forces, also deepened ties with the United Arab Emirates and cooperated with Wagner, a notorious Russian private military company that – like the military – has been implicated in serious human rights abuses in places such as Syria, Ukraine, and Mali.
- Since then, General Dagalo has created a powerful paramilitary force that has intervened in conflicts in Yemen and Libya and controls some of Sudan’s gold mines.
- Such strong entity, apart from the army, is considered a source of instability in Sudan, as it would be in any other country. Flush with wealth and support from foreign patrons, the RSF quickly became a formidable rival to the army, setting the stage for today’s conflict.
- Ation in parallel to the Sudanese army. They have modern weapons and their leader, Hemedti, had extensive international relations with global military institutions. In addition to their control over gold mines and domestic and foreign investments over the years, the RSF and the army control lucrative sectors such as gold, sesame and gum arabic exports.
- Unlike Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of the Sudanese Transitional Administrative Council and the Sudanese National Army, Hemedti did not have the legitimacy of being the head of the Sudanese army. So he hired consultants to lobby on his behalf in the capitals of Western countries while he built hospitals and clinics in Sudan.
- It has become clear to the public that the armed forces took opposing sides, did not obey their orders, openly opposed them, and did not organize what they wanted to say and do.
- The RFS and its leader Hemedti began to escape their responsibilities. He

accused the Sudanese army of “obstructing the political process”, sometimes with reports to the civilian wing that it was obstructing the “transition of the political process”. Recently. The differences of opinion between Hemedti and Al-Burhan increased and this was echoed in the media.

