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# Florya Chronicles of Political Economy

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## From the Editor

In his article “*A Comparative Analysis on the Role of Culture and Language in the Early Phases of Nation-Building in the Middle East*”, Selim Sezer elaborates, three important currents that influenced the formation of the 20<sup>th</sup> century’s Middle East region and its nation-states. He argues that these currents have many characteristics that are similar to the cultural awakening patterns of several European nations. In this framework, he studies *Al-Nahda*, Phoenicianism, and early modern Zionism, which played significant roles in shaping modern Syria, Lebanon, and Israel respectively. He chooses these currents for the following reasons: first, they brought political effects in regions which are geographically close to each other, which can be even considered as one and same region: *Bilad al-Sham*, or Levant. Second, despite significant differences, they have many common points as well, and these points are parallel to what he defines as the “universal pattern” of nation building in this article. Third, these currents are also rival to each other, if not mutually exclusive. He mainly argues that all of these currents, which are developed by pioneers and then reached to relatively larger masses, have played significant roles in the shaping of new nation-states, regardless of whether those pioneers had that goal or not. The originality of Sezer’s article comes from its effort to *compare* them and to elaborate each of them primarily (but not solely) through the perspective of centrality of national language. After a short analysis of the role of culture and language in the nation-building processes as the theoretical framework, he analyzes mentioned three currents, and in the final part, he compares these currents. In conclusion, he argues that all the aforementioned currents belong to the same periods, and they emerged as part of the general modernization process in the region and in the world. This is why they share some basic characteristics of modern national(ist) currents and ideologies. Moreover, language plays a crucial role in creation of a national identity, and this role is clearly seen especially in cases of *Nahda* and cultural Zionism.

In their article, “*The Other Face of Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Soft Power Policy in Somalia*” Sümer Esin Şenyurt and Murat Özay Taşkın focus on Turkey’s becoming an important soft power actor in Sub-Saharan Africa by investing heavily in Somalia in the last 20 years. They argue that by capitalizing on its cultural, religious and historical ties, Turkey has improved its relations with this region and has been seen as

part of its efforts to assume an active role on the world stage. In addition, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's historical visit to Somalia in 2011 is highlighted as a turning point that strengthened Turkish-Somali relations and Turkey's Sub-Saharan Africa policy in general. Turkey has played an active role in Sub-Saharan Africa in areas such as health, education, cultural cooperation and humanitarian aid projects, effectively utilizing its soft power elements through commercial and political channels. Sub-Saharan Africa's perception of Turkey as being in a more advantageous position compared to traditional great powers without a colonial past has positively reinforced Turkey's influence in the continent. Turkey's relations with Sub-Saharan Africa have not only contributed significantly to the countries of the continent, but also enhanced Turkey's international image and influence. In return, as Şenyurt and Taşkın argue, with its economic growth potential and resource richness, Sub-Saharan Africa offers new opportunities for cooperation and development for Turkey. Methodologically, they use qualitative approach and utilize existing literature and document analysis methods. In conclusion, as authors argue, Turkey's Sub-Saharan Africa policy has the potential to be a strategic partnership that serves the mutual interests of the continent and Turkey. This policy strengthens Turkey's position as a global actor while playing an important role in helping Sub-Saharan Africa achieve its development goals. The future of these relations will be closely linked to how both sides shape and deepen this partnership.

In her article, "*A Critical Study on the Use of War News as a Means of Propaganda: The 2003 Iraq War Case*" Ceren Balel argues that conflict conditions such as war or crises facilitate the use of propaganda. Although widely known as consisting of facts, the news is a narrative of reality. Therefore, news texts are ideal for managing perception for the intended purpose. The Iraq War, the first US war to involve pre-emptive war against a potential threat, also witnessed in the global media via both embedded journalism and citizen journalism. The legitimacy of the 2003 Iraq War, waged by the US-led Coalition Force based on United Nations Resolution 1441, is still a matter of debate in international law. Balel emphasizes that in the literature review, it was observed that the structure of the propaganda applied by the US in the war was examined within the framing theory in most studies in terms of the news production and broadcasting process. However, it was seen that the process of the US war program was not assessed within the constructionist framework. Balel's article examines the use of propaganda in the Iraq war news content. The aim of her article is

to examine the use of propaganda in Iraq War news' content in the context of the propaganda model. Methodologically, she uses descriptive field research methodology, case study and relational research models through the content analysis technique. She concludes that after the collapse of the USSR, the fifth filter of the model was found to be functioning as ideological agenda instead of anticommunism, as it had been for the original model.

In his article, "*Geopolitical Problems of NATO Members in the Arctic*" Ferdi Güçyetmez analyzes the increasing geopolitical risks in the Arctic region from the perspective of NATO expansion. Güçyetmez tries to answer the question of preventing a war between NATO members and Russia due to cooperation by examining the geopolitical problems in the Arctic. He aims to provide a different perspective by exploring not only the geopolitical problems with Russia, but also the geopolitical problems of NATO member countries with each other. In the article, Güçyetmez makes an analysis of NATO expansion to the North and geopolitical problems between NATO members such as the USA, Canada, Norway and Denmark in the Arctic Circle. He concludes that cooperation and dialogue among NATO members are vital to resolve future geopolitical challenges. Especially after the tense relations with Russia, the dominance of NATO-centered thinking in the Arctic has overridden the individual policies of the countries. Due to geopolitical tensions in the region, Arctic countries are far from cooperating independently of NATO, taking into account their mutual interests. For this reason, NATO member Arctic countries endeavor to resolve border disputes and island issues on a legal basis. These problems will continue in this manner until the state of war with Russia disappears and tensions between the countries are suspended.

In her article, "*Russian-Turkish Relations in the New Age of Uncertainty*" Veronika Tsibenko provides an analysis of the current state of Russian-Turkish Relations within the framework of the 'Age of Uncertainty' concept coined by Harvard economist Ken Galbraith. In her study, she examines how Turkey is evolving its self-image as it seeks to achieve strategic autonomy through various foreign policy initiatives. Her paper also analyzes Turkey's perceptions of Russia, highlighting both positive and negative views that shape their bilateral relations. By exploring the intricate dynamics of Russian-Turkish relations while taking into account historical context and geopolitical factors, the author provides a comprehensive understanding of the complex nature of interactions of the two

states. In conclusion, Tsibenko emphasizes the necessity of cultivating a positive image and promoting cooperation between Russia and Turkey to effectively navigate the uncertainty of the contemporary world, and ensure a more stable and peaceful coexistence in a constantly changing international landscape.

We thank all authors for their contribution to this issue with their analytical and valuable pieces. We are also very grateful to our colleagues, particularly our assistant Ecem COŞAR CANLIER, the Rector of IAU, Professor İbrahim Hakkı AYDIN, and the President of IAU, Associate Professor Mustafa AYDIN, for their continued support for the FCPE.

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# A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON THE ROLE OF CULTURE AND LANGUAGE IN THE EARLY PHASES OF NATION BUILDING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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## ABSTRACT

As most of the nationalism studies indicate, language and culture are among the crucial elements of the nation-building process. The revival or construction of the national language and culture played a significant role in the formation of national identities of 20<sup>th</sup> century's Syria, Lebanon and Israel as well, and these processes find their origins in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Syrian intellectuals developed a multi-faced cultural awakening pattern called as *Nahda*, in which the Arabic language had a pivotal place. Lebanese Maronite elites planted the first seeds of Phoenicianism, which saw the ancient Phoenicia as the genuine origin of Lebanon. This meant that the Lebanese had their unique identity, which is separate from the Arabs, and this brought the efforts to have a new historiography. At the same period, the pioneers of cultural Zionism – Jewish intellectuals who did not live in the region at the beginning – made huge efforts for the revival of Hebrew language, and this paved the way for the efforts of the political Zionism. Despite significant differences and unique aspects, these three currents had also many points that were similar to each other and to other nation-building efforts in the world, and they all played significant roles in the shaping of new nation-states.

**Keywords:** Nation-building, National language, Nahda, Phoenicianism, Zionism

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## **ORTADOĞU’DA ULUS İNŞASININ ERKEN SAFHALARINDA DİL VE KÜLTÜRÜN ROLÜ ÜZERİNE KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZ**

### **ÖZ**

Pek çok milliyetçilik çalışmasının işaret ettiği üzere, dil ve kültür, ulus inşası sürecinin hayati unsurları arasında yer alır. Ulusal dilin ve kültürün canlandırılması veya inşası, 20. Yüzyıl Suriye, Lübnan ve İsrail’inin ulusal kimliklerinin oluşumunda da belirgin bir rol oynamış olup, bu süreçlerin kökenleri 19. Yüzyıl sonunda yatmaktadır. Suriyeli aydınlar, *Nahda* adı verilen, Arapçanın merkezi bir yere sahip olduğu, çok yönlü bir kültürel uyanış modeli geliştirmiştir. Lübnanlı Maruni elitler, Antik Fenike’yi Lübnan’ın gerçek kökeni olarak gören Fenikecilik’in ilk tohumlarını ekmişlerdir. Bu görüş, Lübnanlıların Araplardan ayrı kendi özgün kimliklerinin olduğu anlamına gelir ve bu da yeni bir tarihyazımı çabalarını beraberinde getirmiştir. Aynı dönemde kültürel Siyonizm’in öncüleri, yani başlangıçta bu bölgede yaşamayan Yahudi aydınlar, İbranicenin canlandırılması için devasa çabalar sarf etmiş, bu ise siyasi Siyonizm’in çabaları için zemin oluşturmuştur. Aralarındaki belirgin farklılıklara ve özgün boyutlarına rağmen bu üç akımın birbirine ve dünyadaki öteki ulus inşası çabalarına benzeyen pek çok yanı da olmuştur ve her üç akım da yeni ulus-devletlerin şekillenmesinde kayda değer roller oynamıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Ulus inşası, Ulusal dil, Nahda, Fenikecilik, Siyonizm



## INTRODUCTION

In a significant part of the academic and non-academic narratives about the region, the First World War is considered as the starting point of configuration of the New Middle East, and the shaping of the region's political map is frequently related to external events, such as the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 which divided the region and paved the way for British and French influence zones for the post-World War period, as well as the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which signifies the promising of a "Jewish homeland" in Palestine by the British government. While these processes certainly played a significant role in the formation of today's Middle East, a reductionist approach that relates this formation only to external political interferences should be avoided. Indeed, modern Middle East is also formed through the ideas of the intellectuals of the diverse communities.

In this article, three important currents that have a fair weight in the formation of the 20<sup>th</sup> century's Middle East region and its nation-states will be elaborated. These currents have many characteristics that are similar to the cultural awakening patterns of several European nations. In this framework, we will study *Al-Nahda*, Phoenicianism, and early modern Zionism, which played significant roles in shaping modern Syria, Lebanon, and Israel respectively. These three currents are chosen for several reasons. First, they brought political effects in regions which are geographically close to each other, which can be even considered as one and same region: *Bilad al-Sham*, or Levant. Second, despite significant differences, they have many common points as well, and these points are parallel to what we define as the "universal pattern" of nation building in this article. Third, these currents are also rival to each other, if not mutually exclusive. Following the investigations throughout the work, we claim that all of these currents, which are developed by pioneers and then reached out to relatively larger masses, have played significant roles in the shaping of new nation-states, regardless of whether those pioneers had that goal or not.

It is true that all these currents require detailed elaboration, and already the related literatures are large and ever enlarging. The originality claim of this article comes from its effort to *compare* them and to elaborate each of them primarily (but not solely) through the perspective of centrality of national language. This is why it would be beneficial to briefly talk about the role of culture and language in the nation-building processes and

to place the issue in a larger theoretical framework. Following this first part, the mentioned three currents will be analyzed in turn, and finally the comparison will be made in the conclusion part.

## **NATIONALISM, NATION BUILDING AND CULTURE**

Nationalism is essentially a modern concept. Although it had some older origins, the nationalist phenomenon basically emerged with the French Revolution of 1789 and then spread to other parts of Europe and the world. It would become a sort of dominant ideology in the 19<sup>th</sup> century's Europe, and it would be largely adopted by the non-European world in the 20<sup>th</sup> century as part of "late modernization". Basically, nationalism is a political phenomenon, and its aim is to create a national power over a territory. This may take shape in various ways: a nationalist movement might struggle to get independence from a multi-ethnic empire or replace the monarchy with the "national will". In both cases, the country is to be ruled by the nation itself. But a crucial requirement of this process is to define the nation and to make all the segments of the society feel that they are a part of it. Especially for the communities who did not have a state or a state-like entity in a previous period, that nation must be sometimes "built" by the political elites and intellectuals. This nation-building process includes many elements, ranging from a new historiography to the revival of the language, discovering or inventing national myths, creating national ideals, educating the people, indoctrinating them with national values, and so on. A crucial part of all these efforts is reviving or building a national culture.

Culture and organization are seen as two "raw materials" of social life by Ernest Gellner, who sees nationalism as a principle that considers the similarity of culture as the main social bond (Gellner, 1997: 3). Similarly, Stephen J. Lee thinks that one of the characteristic features of nationalism is an awareness about a natural homogeneity among the members of the society in terms of language, culture, and social customs (Lee, 1988: 306).

Indeed, a common language is an indispensable part of nation-building processes. According to Sue Wright, national language plays a series of roles in these processes, and they can be classified under three main categories. First of all, the national language plays a useful role, and it functions as a tool of communication that makes participation in political and economic processes possible. Secondly, a common language paves the way for the construction of a common culture for the nation. This also has

a symbolical dimension: knowing and using the national language is a part of the definition of belonging to the nation. Using the language indicates that the individual is a part of the society, whereas refusing it is schismatic and goes against patriotism. Thirdly, the claim of being a separate nation can be supported by putting in evidence that the language of the nation is different from the languages of neighbor communities (Wright, 2004: 42).

Making a detailed theoretical discussion about national language and culture is not among the aims of this article. But it should be underlined that these two elements are crucial and indispensable for a national identity, which is a major focus point of all modern nationalist movements. Obviously, those movements are born in quite different contexts and their aims are not always identical. A nationalist movement may search for independence; it may struggle to form a new state or restructure the existing one, or it may simply look for changing the status of a national community inside the current political framework. As it will be seen in the following parts, the makers of Syrian *Nahda*, the Christian Maronite elites of Lebanon who developed Phoenicianism, and the avant-garde figures of Jewish Zionism had quite different agendas. Nevertheless, the cultural awakening patterns developed by these three groups had many common points. All of them followed a more or less universal model and looked for an identity that would be common for the members of the society and that would differentiate the society from the others. This would be accompanied by some secondary elements of nation building, like a reference to real or supposed ancestors. Evidently, schools would play a crucial role in this making of national culture as well.

### **THE ARAB RENAISSANCE: NAHDA**

The second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century witnessed the rise of an Arab cultural awakening, or an “Arab Renaissance”, in Ottoman Syria (and at a secondary level, in Egypt). A leading scholar of the field, Bassam Tibi, asserts that the Arab nationalism emerged in that period because of the “globalization of the international system”, underlining that the European paradigms had reached almost all parts of the world, and that the new nationalisms were the result of the interactions at international level (Tibi, 1991: 12). Although Tibi points in later parts of his work that Arab nationalism was not identical with Western nationalisms, it is still possible to draw parallels between the European pattern and the Arab Renaissance. This process, called *Al-Nahda* (Awakening), had four subsequent major steps, all of which played significant roles in the construction of a modern

Arab identity: opening new schools, emergence of publishing activities, translation of foreign books into Arabic, and finally a revival of the Arabic language.

In effect, the first steps of schooling in Arab provinces of Ottoman Empire are seen in the second quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Especially 1830s, which correspond to the autonomous rule of Mohammad Ali Pasha in Egypt and the subsequent occupation of Ottoman Syria by his son, Ibrahim Pasha, brought important developments in this sense. This coincided with missionary activities in the region as well. In effect, the Lazarist Fathers opened a college for boys in Aintoura, a predominantly Christian town to the north of Beirut (which was then a part of greater Ottoman Syria) in 1834. The same year, American missionaries transferred their publishing machines from Malta to Beirut. This was followed by the opening of an all-girls school in the same city by Eli Smith and his wife, and the creation of a new and modern school program in Syria by Ibrahim Pasha for primary schools (Antonius, 1938: 35).

Following the Mohammad Ali & Ibrahim Pasha occupation that lasted for almost one decade, the Ottoman state took back the control of Syria and Egypt in 1840, but missionary activities continued after that date as well. By 1860, various missionary groups had opened thirty-three schools throughout Ottoman Syria; they had almost one thousand students in total, and one-fifth of them were girls (Antonius, 1938: 42). Also, local Ottoman Christians had opened many new schools in the second half of the twentieth century, and a significant part of them was with the support of France. Searching for a balance, the Ottoman administration opened its own schools instead of closing the ones opened by foreigners. The first step was the opening of the primary schools, but it gradually evolved into a chain of schools that included higher levels. The peak point of this process was the opening of Damascus Medical School in 1903 and Damascus Military School in 1904. Thus, this period witnessed a leap in the level of education of Syrians as a result of various factors.

The second important source of *Nahda* was the emergence of new publishing activities. The first significant local journal was *Hadiqat al-Akhhbar*, published in Beirut from 1857 on, by Khalil al-Khouri, who was a member of the Christian middle class of the city. This journal would play a significant role in spreading the ideas about a regional patriotism and identity among the Syrians (Zachs, 2005: 88). Three years later, Syrians

met with *Nafir Suriyya*, published by Boutros al-Bustani, which also played an important role in the intellectual life of Syria. These two journals would be followed by a series of new ones. Although they did not have a clear political stance, they did have an important function for the construction of the Arab identity since they produced written texts in Arabic language and put them in circulation.

This rise in daily and weekly newspapers coincided with another sort of publishing activity, which was the translation of foreign books into Arabic. This included the works of famous French writers such as Balzac, Stendhal, Flaubert, and Hugo. Although the first wave of translations was mostly limited with the field of literature, it also paved the way for importation of concepts from Western languages, first and foremost French, to Arabic, and for a quest of Arabic equivalents of modern concepts. In later phases of *Nahda*, political texts were translated into Arabic as well, and they added a new dimension to this cultural awakening. *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadance* of Montesquieu was one of them: Riffa al-Tahtawi, an Egyptian Muslim who translated the text and wrote a foreword for it, would be the one who imported the concept of “fatherland” to Arabic language and Arab intellectual life (Tibi, 1997: 87). A significant point worth being underlined is that the Arabic book production in this period also allowed many female Arab scholars to access “knowledge previously restricted to men”. (Hanssen & Weiss, 2016: 15) This process even witnessed the emergence of preliminary Arab “feminism” when figures like May Ziadah and Zainab Fawwaz joined *Nahda* with their writings that elaborated not only literature and philosophy issues but also gender equality and reform problems (Farah, 2002: 48-49).

*Al-Nahda* process saw its full blossoming with the scholarly works made in the fields of Arabic language and history. In the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, figures like Taher al-Jazairi, Abd al-Qader al-Maghribi, and Khalil Mardam managed several works, including preparation of Arabic grammar books, examination of Arabic proverbs, analysis of roots of Arabic words, and compilation of older products of Arabic literature. Also, modern Arab historians wrote many books about Syrian cities, Syrian architecture, and social life in Arab provinces. On the other hand, during the 1860s and 1870s, literary clubs and scientific societies became active in Beirut – which was the main cultural center of greater Ottoman Syria – and they served as centers for discussion for both literary and political issues. The emphasis on the Arabic language throughout these activities

led, as William Cleveland points out, “naturally to a heightened awareness of the cultural identity of the Arab community” (Cleveland, 2004: 130).

Another important figure in this process was Gurgi Zaidan, a Beirut-born Christian writer, who elaborated the subject of the Arabic language very frequently in the magazine *Al-Khilal* that he published from 1892 on. One of the most striking articles about this subject, entitled “History of the Arabic Language” was published on May 9, 1893. According to Zaidan, language was a growing body like all the other living bodies, and the place of the words in this “body” was similar to the place of burgeons on a tree. Words were coming into existence, living and dying naturally. The Arabic language had developed its existence throughout all the periods before and after Islam, by leaving aside the worn and useless words and by assimilating new terms. Zaidan also developed these ideas in a book, which took its final form in 1904 under the title “Arabic Expressions and Philosophy of Language.” (*Al-Alfâz al-Arabiyya wa'l-falsafa al-lughawiyya*) (Dupont, 2006: 264). Gradually, the emphasis made to the Arabic language gained a direct political implication. Especially Boutros al-Bustani saw the education in the Arabic language as a centerpiece for the unity of Syrians and the civilization. According to him, Ottoman Syria was already the “Tower of Babel” of the religions, and it should not become a Babel of languages as well. The Arabic language, and education which is given by that language, would be a unifying force for various communities living in the region (Hourani, 1983: 102). This is why Albert Hourani considers Al-Bustani as the person who lays the foundations for the modern Arabic language. But all these efforts also led the Arab intellectuals to confront the social reality of their community. In the Introduction part of a recent work on *Nahda* which brings new perspectives following the way opened by Hourani and other classical scholars, Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss indicates that “Nahda’s philological modernization also bore within it the sense of cultural loss and sacrifice occasioned by generalized ignorance and malfeasance” (Hanssen & Weiss, 2016: 18)

In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, *Nahda* would become an even more politicized phenomenon, and it would fuel the decentralist Syrian-Arab political movements of Second Constitutional Monarchy period of the Ottoman Empire (1908-1918). The political debates between the Unionist government and the Arab reformers who fought for local autonomy go beyond the scope of this study. But it is possible to say at least that this political Arabism finds its origins in the cultural Arabism which had



developed throughout the decades that precede it. Another point worth being underlined is that, although the first seeds of the Arab cultural awakening were sown by foreign forces, it would be essentially developed by local Syrians themselves (together with some Egyptians, as we remarked), and this included different segments of cultural elites, such as Christians, Muslims, journalists, historians, and even women.

### **PHOENICIANISM AS THE CULTURAL BACKGROUND OF LEBANESE EXCEPTIONALISM**

Modern Lebanon is generally seen as an “exception” in the Middle East. Although vast majority of its population is made up of Arabs, this tiny country has a unique political culture and a relatively isolated position, by which it is partially separated from the rest of the Arab world. This can be explained by various factors. Firstly, it is the first entity that went out of the *Pax Ottomana* in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the region of Mount Lebanon (*Jabal Lubnan*) got autonomous status in 1861 with an agreement between European major powers and the Ottoman state, and from this time on, Lebanon started to have its own (and by some ways isolated) political life (Hakim, 2013). Secondly, with the creation of Greater Lebanon by Henri Gouraud in 1920, the country had a Christian-centered political life, under the “protection” and hegemony of France, and this also played a significant role in the creation of Lebanese exceptionalism. Finally, this exceptionalism had deeper ideological roots, which had emerged *before* the French mandate regime. In the following parts, we will elaborate on this ideology, which is known as “Phoenicianism”.

In essence, the ideology of Phoenicianism claims that the original roots of Lebanon are found in ancient Phoenicia, and thus the Lebanese have their own identity, separate from the Arab world that surrounds them. This concept, which was developed by Christian Maronite elites of the region had a double function: surpassing or neutralizing the Arab-Islamic influence in the country on one hand and integrating with the world by underlining the cosmopolitanism of Phoenicians on the other hand (Moeller, 2010).

The current, which was in one sense a way of protecting the Lebanese identity against the rising Arab nationalism in the same periods, coincided also with a new historiography. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, some Lebanese intellectuals and historians such as Tannous al-Shidyaq claimed that the Lebanese Christian Maronites were not Arab in fact: they had their

origins in another community called “Mardaites”, which were settled in the region by Byzantine Empire against the Arab-Islamic invasions in the 7<sup>th</sup> century. The underlying meaning was that the Maronites, who were the largest group in Lebanon, were not even Middle Eastern. Although there was a certain difference in terms of implication, both the narratives about Mardaite and Phoenician origins had a similar function: they created a myth about Lebanese people, giving reference to non-Arab origins, and underlining heroism and a golden age (Atlioğlu, 2014: 187-197).

Phoenician reference was also related with the emergence of archeological and scientific findings concerning this civilization in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. An important figure who played a role in conceptualizing Phoenicianism was the famous French orientalist Ernest Renan, who had participated to the expeditionary force sent in 1860 by France to Syria. Renan later wrote a long volume entitled *Mission de Phénicie*, in which the archeological findings were described in detail. The conclusion part of his book had also a politico-cultural dimension: he claimed that the conflict between urban (Phoenician) and the nomad (Arab) was the key of whole history of the region; that barbarism won with the victory of Islam; that the backward Badawi was still dominant in the region; and that Lebanon could nevertheless protect its essence thanks to its natural defense conditions (Renan, 1864: 837).

The current of Phoenicianism had thus firstly emerged in the late Ottoman period, but it would take its final and highest form in the French mandate period (1920-1943). While Université St. Joseph in Beirut – which was added to Greater Lebanon by the French and turned into the capital city of the new country – became the most important cultural center of the country, the history and geography books written by Gabriel Levenq, Rene Moutarde, Ferdinand Toutel, and Jacques Eddé were used as textbooks in Lebanese schools. At the same period, Phoenicianism became a sort of official state ideology, and even a new theology was created, claiming that Adam and Eve had descended from Heaven to Lebanon, that Noah’s ark was made of Lebanese cedar trees, and that Jesus had come from Palestine to Lebanon to spread his creed (Khuri, 1990: 157-158). Finally, the efforts to separate Lebanese identity from Arabism were seen in some debates about alphabet, when famous writer Said ‘Aql proposed leaving the Arabic alphabet and using instead Latin alphabet with Phoenician origins (Atlioğlu, 2014: 223).



In summary, the current of Phoenicianism and other trends that accompany it did their best to build a Lebanese identity which would be separated from the Arab identity, and this coincided with the emergence of new myths that depicted the Lebanese not only as a unique community but even as the center of the world in some instances.

### **MODERN ZIONISM AND ITS CULTURAL COMPONENT**

Modern Zionism is another ideological current that is typical of the period in which it was born. This current, who aimed – and managed – to create a Jewish nation-state in Palestinian territories was not a religious movement at all: indeed, most of its avant-garde figures were secular, even atheist people, although the religious narratives about “Promised Land” played a certain role in publicizing the movement (Chomsky & Papper, 2015: 125). This is also quite in parallel with the nation-building pattern in Europe in the same periods when we keep in mind that elites of many other nations – from the Scottish to the Romanian – used real or fictitious narratives about Great Ancestors and religious or semi-religious myths as part of building their nationalist programs and indoctrinating the large masses (Thiesse, 2001).

In fact, one important point, which made Zionism a “modern” current, is that it separated itself from the traditional Jewish views about returning to Palestine in the distant future. Although the Judaic creed claims that they are the chosen people of God and that they will return to Promised Lands one day, most of the Jewish clergy also believed that the “exile” (meaning spreading of the Jews to different parts of the world after 70 AD) was also a part of the divine fate, and the Jews who would return to *Eretz Yisrael* one day would also be at forefront of the emancipation of all human beings. In other words, God had chosen Jews for this emancipation in His big plan (Tessler, 2009: 16). In addition, it was only God who would decide the timing of return. This would happen after the arrival of Messiah, and if people would try to construct a homeland in Palestine before that time, this would be a violation of the contract between God and people, and evidently going against His plans (Tessler, 2009: 19-20).

When Theodor Herzl published his famous book *Judenstaat* in 1896 and when the First Zionist Congress convened in Basel city in 1897 declared the aim of creating a Jewish state in Palestine, this was a clear disengagement from the traditional religion-based Jewish stance, and religion would play only the aforementioned “publicizing” role for the Zionists. In addition,

modern Zionism was less fed by the legacy of religious Zionism than the legacy of Jewish enlightenment and nation-building efforts of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. At this point, it will be useful to take a glance at this older Jewish cultural awakening that preceded and contributed to the political Zionism at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Indeed, the efforts to define the Jewish community as a national community instead of a religious one, as well as the efforts to construct a cultural identity, emerged in Europe in the same period where the continent met with Enlightenment and nationalist ideas. The Jewish enlightenment, called *Haskalah*, was born in Germany in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century and then spread to other European countries. *Haskalah* gave special attention to language and education issues, and in a larger context, it included a belief in creating a cultural *modus vivendi* between Jews and the surrounding world and bringing about a change by this way (Tessler, 2009: 26). Almost in the same years, figures like Krotzmal and Smolenskin started to declare that Jews make up a nation in the modern sense and that they should get their national rights. In addition, a key element in Jewish nation-building would be put in the forefront by Rabbi Yehuda Alkalai in the 19<sup>th</sup> century: breaking from the Orthodox tradition which saw the Hebrew language as a sacred language that was not fit for daily life, Alkalai insisted that the key of reconstructing the union of Jews was to use Hebrew commonly (Tessler, 2009: 27-38).

The language issue was indeed highly crucial since most of the Jews were speaking the dominant language of the country in which they lived. One alternative for the Ashkenazi (major community of European Jews) was the Yiddish, but it was not a “national” language since it was under the influence of the German language, and it was spoken by only one segment of the global Jewish community. This is why the Jewish intellectuals found themselves in a heated debate about language in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The Association for Jewish Culture and Science (*Verein für Kultur und Wissenschaft der Juden*), which was founded in Germany in 1819, made extensive works on the Yiddish language and they arrived at the conclusion that it was no more than a German dialect, and it could not be a fundament for nation-building. At the beginning, this was the idea of the minority among Jewish intellectuals, but gradually the idea of reviving Hebrew and making it a common language for Jews found more supporters.

Late 19<sup>th</sup> century witnessed the emergence of initial versions of what is called as the cultural Zionism with the efforts and works of Ahad Ha'am and Eliezer Ben Yehuda, among others. Born in 1856 in Russian Ukraine, Ahad Ha'am was in favor of the cultural revival and modernization of the Jewish people through the agency of a little intellectual elite. For Ha'am, a complete national life was involving two things: "First, full play for the creative faculties of the nation in a specific national culture of its own, and second, a system of education whereby the individual members of the nation will be thoroughly imbued with that culture, and so molded by it that its imprint will be recognizable in all their way of life and thought" (Troy, 2018: 107).

As for Ben Yehuda, he was a figure not only preaching the development of the Jewish culture through intellectuals, but also – and more importantly – playing a vital practice role for the construction of the Jewish national identity, which would reach the masses. Born in Russia in 1858, Jewish journalist Ben Yehuda went to Palestine in 1881 and committed his life to the creation of a modern language on the basis of ancient Hebrew, which was the language of Torah, but which had become a dead language throughout centuries. Ben Yehuda saw an explicit political implication in this effort: Yiddish was the language of slavery and exile, whereas Hebrew, which was now in process of being revived in the land of Great Ancestors, was the language of free Jews living in their "own" territories (Thiesse, 2001: 78). At the age of 22, one year before going to Palestine, he had said in a letter the following words: "All our efforts to make them appreciate the importance of the language to us, the Hebrews, will be of no avail. Only a Hebrew with a Hebrew heart will understand this, and such a person will understand even without our urging. Let us therefore make the language really live again! Let us teach our young to speak it, and then they will never betray it!" (Troy, 2018: 105).

Settling in Palestine was a crucial issue for Ben Yehuda, because he believed that the Hebrew language could be revived only by "returning" of the Jewish masses to what was considered as the fatherland: "let us increase the number of Jews in our desolate land; let the remnants of our people return to the land of their fathers; *let us revive the nation and its tongue will be revived, too!*" (Troy, 2018: 105). Ben Yehuda prepared a huge Hebrew dictionary by producing new words with original Hebrew roots, thus he both revived and created that language. And the Modern Hebrew would be obligatory in the Jewish schools opened following the

first Jewish immigration waves to Palestine in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries; it would get its final victory when the British mandate authorities would recognize it in the 1920s as the official language of Palestine, having equal status with Arabic and English (Thiesse 2001: 79).

Before concluding, it should be noted that Ben Yehuda was also active in the publication efforts in Jerusalem, and these activities were among the constituting elements of the Jewish national identity, similar to what we have seen in the case of *Nahda*. The Jewish newspapers in late Ottoman Palestine were elaborating several issues, a great deal of which were about non-political issues, such as daily issues and urban problems. But especially the ones that appeared after the Ottoman Constitutional Revolution of 1908 such as *Ha-Herut* as well as Ben Yehuda's newspaper, *Ha-Tsevi* were engaged in political affairs, too. They even gave space to articles about Palestinian Arabs from a Jewish political perspective, and asserted, for example, that the Christian Arabs were "the worst enemies of the Jewish communities" (Dalachanis & Lemire, 2018: 333-345). In these ways, they significantly contributed to the construction of a modern Jewish national identity.

## **CONCLUSION**

In this article, a general framework for three cultural awakening patterns that had direct or indirect political implications and that affected the emergence of the new Middle East in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century is given. To conclude, the common and differentiating features of these three currents will be underlined.

First, all the aforementioned currents belong to the same periods, and they emerged as part of the general modernization process in the region and in the world. This is why they share some basic characteristics of modern national(ist) currents and ideologies. As we underlined in the first part, language plays a crucial role in the creation of a national identity, and this role is clearly seen especially in the cases of *Nahda* and cultural Zionism. The language issue is more complicated in Phoenicianism, because it is impossible to put another language at the forefront for an isolation from Arabs since the mother language of Maronite Christians is none other than Arabic. This is why the only thing they could do was to propose a new alphabet, although this found few supporters. History is also another critical component in all these processes albeit in different forms and levels. Several figures of *Nahda* made works about the general

Arab history, and precursors of Zionism did not fail to make reference to ancestors' lands. And for the Phoenicianists, the works of history took the form of producing a new historiography and even a new theology.

The main differences that separate these three phenomena from each other can be found in their political implications and in the status of the elites that produced them. Although *Nahda* can be – and must be – seen, in a retrospective approach, as a pillar of the future Syrian national state, its vanguards most probably did not have the aim of having a Syrian state. Indeed, they were within the *Pax Ottomana* and what they developed was in fact a part of general Ottoman modernization. The elites made only a little faction of the larger Ottoman Syrian society, but different segments of this community were represented in the leading figures of *Nahda*. And finally, despite the fact that foreign forces played a certain role in this process, it was mainly the local elites who produced that cultural renaissance.

As for Phoenicianism, the case is quite different. It was produced by only one segment of Lebanese elites, namely Christian Maronites, who made up the majority of Lebanon in which many other religious and sectarian communities lived as well. They had a clear political aim, which was to make Lebanon separate from the Arab world that surrounds it. And while it was launched by local forces at the beginning, the process took its final and highest form under the support and protection of a foreign – mandatory – force.

Finally, modern Zionism and its cultural component were produced not by native people who lived in Palestine, but by European Jews who aimed to settle in that region and to create a totally new political entity (which would be, in final instance, a colonial entity) there. Also, they would reach their aims in later periods with the help of another mandatory force – in this case, Britain. And finally, the movement didn't represent all the Jewish elites, let alone all the Jewish people: it was the product of secular nationalist Jewish elites, who would separate themselves not only from religious leaders but also from the more moderate figures inside the European Jewish intelligentsia.

In sum, the three “awakening” patterns of Middle East region had important differences, but they all fall within one same large category. There's ground to claim that all these movements put the issues of language and culture at the center, and while they were initially supported by only a minority within their communities, they fulfilled a significant function in nation-

building, despite the fact that they were not necessarily in favor of a nation-state. That said, shaping of the 20<sup>th</sup> century's Middle East was certainly not solely the result of the efforts of these pioneers, and the foreign powers who had built mandate regimes in the Levant region had a certain role in these nation-building processes as well.

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# **THE OTHER FACE OF TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: SOFT POWER POLICY IN SOMALIA**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Sub-Saharan Africa, continues to play an important role in the geopolitical landscape due to its abundant natural resources, thriving human capital and growing influence in international politics. This importance has not gone unnoticed by Turkey as it seeks to strengthen its global position and position itself as a regional powerhouse. Recognizing the enormous potential of Africa and more specifically the critical importance of Somalia, Turkey adopted a soft power strategy to increase its influence in the continent, especially after the devastating famine in Somalia in 2011. By providing emergency humanitarian assistance and supporting Somalia's recovery and state-building efforts, Turkey has played a key role in the country's reintegration into the global community. This engagement marks an important milestone in Turkey's engagement with Somalia and underscores a broader commitment under the African Opening Policy, which gained momentum in the late 1990s and escalated after 2005. Over the past years, Turkey has developed a solid and enduring partnership with Africa, supporting its economic and political presence with soft power initiatives in the fields of culture, education, health and religion.

**Keywords: Foreign Policy, Soft Power, Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey, Somalia**

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## **TÜRKİYE’NİN SAHRA-ALTI AFRİKADA’DAKİ DIŞ POLİTİKASININ DİĞER YÜZÜ: SOMALİ’DE YUMUŞAK GÜÇ POLİTİKASI**

### **ÖZ**

Sahra Altı Afrika, bol doğal kaynakları, gelişen insan sermayesi ve uluslararası politikada artan etkisi nedeniyle jeopolitik manzarada önemli bir rol oynamaya devam ediyor. Bu önem, küresel konumunu güçlendirmeye ve kendisini bölgesel bir güç merkezi olarak konumlandırmaya çalışan Türkiye’nin de gözünden kaçmamıştır. Afrika’nın muazzam potansiyelinin ve özellikle de Somali’nin kritik öneminin farkında olan Türkiye, özellikle 2011 yılında Somali’de yaşanan yıkıcı kıtlığın ardından kıtadaki etkisini arttırmak için yumuşak güç stratejisini benimsemiştir. Acil insani yardım sağlayarak ve Somali’nin toparlanma ve devlet kurma çabalarını destekleyerek Türkiye, ülkenin küresel toplumla yeniden bütünleşmesinde kilit bir rol oynamıştır. Bu durum, Türkiye’nin Somali ile angajmanında önemli bir kilometre taşına işaret etmekte ve 1990’ların sonunda ivme kazanan ve 2005’ten sonra tırmanan Afrika Açılım Politikası kapsamındaki daha geniş bir taahhüdün altını çizmektedir. Geçtiğimiz yıllarda Türkiye Afrika ile sağlam ve kalıcı bir ortaklık geliştirmiş, ekonomik ve siyasi varlığını kültür, eğitim, sağlık ve din alanlarındaki yumuşak güç girişimleriyle desteklemiştir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler: Dış Politika, Yumuşak Güç, Sahra Altı Afrika, Türkiye, Somali**

## **INTRODUCTION**

In international relations, soft power refers to the capacity of states to influence other states in favor of their policies through tools such as cultural appeal, ideological influence and diplomacy, without using force or offering material incentives. This concept, introduced by Joseph S. Nye, plays a critical role in understanding the dynamics of global politics. At the core of soft power is how a country's values, policies and culture are perceived internationally. This perception is an important factor in shaping a state's relations with other countries. For example, a successful soft power strategy allows a country to gain credibility on the world stage, have a greater say in international affairs, and achieve its goals at a lower cost. In this context, Turkey's foreign policy in Somalia can be analyzed as an example of a soft power approach that aims to increase its influence in the African continent and strengthen its position as a global actor. Turkey's strategic approach has materialized in various areas such as humanitarian aid, education, health services and development projects, thus establishing a mutually beneficial partnership that has deepened Turkey-Somalia relations.

In terms of humanitarian assistance, Turkey's humanitarian efforts to Somalia have increased significantly in response to the major drought and famine crisis in 2011. The Turkish government and civil society organizations have provided extensive support to meet basic needs such as food aid, water supply and shelter. This assistance has significantly improved Turkey's image among the Somali people and positioned Turkey as a reliable partner in the region. Humanitarian aid plays a critical role in Turkey's exercise of soft power because it reinforces Turkey's image as a responsible actor in the international community, while at the same time improving the living conditions of people in the target country and creating a positive perception of Turkey. Turkey has also made significant contributions to education and health in Somalia. Schools, hospitals and training centers funded by the Turkish government and various Turkish non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have contributed to the social and economic development of Somalia. Such projects reflect Turkey's intention to have a long-term impact and presence in Somalia and strengthen the bonds of friendship between the two countries.

Development aid is another important element of Turkey's soft power strategy in Somalia and has made tangible contributions in areas such as infrastructure projects, agriculture and industrial development. Such

projects help to lay the economic foundations for Somalia to stand on its own feet while enabling Turkey to project a positive image in the international arena. In conclusion, Turkey's use of soft power in Somalia is realized through humanitarian aid, education, health services and development projects. Besides increasing Turkey's influence in the international arena, this strategy has also contributed to Somalia's socio-economic development and strengthened relations between the two countries.

Soft power as a concept first appeared in the book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* written by Joseph Nye in 1990, but its use in interstate relations dates back to much earlier (Demir, 2012). Soft power is based on the attractiveness of a country's culture, political values and foreign policy. In this context, the culture and values of a country seeking to gain power must have universal appeal. Such a state should be able to present its national interests in line with the expectations of target countries and implement these policies to their satisfaction, which will significantly contribute to the increase of its soft power. Alexander L. Vuving, another thinker working on soft power theory, drew attention to Nye's definition of 'getting others to want what we want' and whether the desire of others should be a strong desire or a passive acceptance. In this case, he emphasized that the definition of soft power should be '*getting others to want or accept what we want*' (Vuving, 2009).

Since soft power is the style of relations developed with values, culture, foreign policy practices and other factors that influence the behavior of foreign actors, cultural interaction activities gain importance when examining Turkey's soft power practices. Using peaceful methods in foreign policy and setting the agenda by pursuing an active policy are examples of soft power (Nye, 2005). In this context, dealing with the problems in Turkey's neighborhood and assuming an order-building role can be shown as Turkey's soft power strategy (Oğuzlu, 2011). This strategy has provided Turkey with unique opportunities to assert itself and increase its influence, especially in Africa, a continent that has attracted increasing international attention in recent years and has great potential.

Despite its difficult colonial history, the African continent continues to struggle with serious problems such as hunger, drought, poverty, civil wars and coups. This rapidly growing and developing continent is increasingly becoming an attractive region for both developed and developing countries due to its strategic location, vast natural resources, growing human resource

capacity and significant representation in the United Nations. Therefore, countries aiming to have an impact on the continent strive to increase their influence by establishing commercial, social and cultural relations. Turkey's policies and initiatives towards Africa have an important place in the effort to utilize this vast potential.

Somalia, like many other countries in Africa, has experienced a tragic colonial history and has faced serious problems such as humanitarian crises, terrorism and famine after gaining independence. Despite these challenges, Turkey has been trying to increase its influence as a prominent soft power in the region and has shown a remarkable presence especially in Somalia due to its religious and historical ties. Through the state, autonomous structures and civil society organizations, Turkey has implemented an effective soft power policy that has lasted for nearly 20 years and contributed to the state-building process. The activities carried out in various fields, especially humanitarian aid, have turned into a cooperation model that started in 1998, has lasted until today, and constitutes an important turning point in Turkey-Africa relations (Karaođlan, 2018).

The evolution and application of the concept of soft power has been subject to various criticisms in academic circles. These criticisms usually cover issues such as the measurement of soft power, its impact, its relationship with hard power and its potential association with cultural imperialism (Wilson III, 2008). In particular, the difficulty of measuring the effectiveness of soft power, the necessity of long-term investments, and the importance of synergies with hard power have been frequently emphasized in academic debates (Gallarotti, 2011). There are also criticisms arguing that soft power can be perceived as interference in the internal affairs of target countries, which may conflict with the principle of independence and sovereignty (Hayden, 2012). In this framework, while critics question the role and effectiveness of soft power in international relations, they also reveal the limits of this concept and the difficulties in its use.

Soft power also has its limitations: its effectiveness is difficult to measure, it usually yields long-term results, it may not be sufficient on its own without combining with hard power, it may be subject to criticisms of cultural imperialism, and it may be perceived as interference in the internal affairs of target countries (Nye, 2004; Wilson III, 2008; Gallarotti, 2011). Nevertheless, in a globalizing world, factors such as increased intercultural interaction, complex global threats and challenges, and the proliferation of

information and technology ensure the continued relevance of soft power. Nye (2011) and other scholars emphasize the importance of soft power as a strategic tool in international relations in the 21st century, pointing to its potential to enhance states' international reputation and influence through diplomacy.

As its main arguments, the present article focuses on the fact that Turkey has become an important soft power actor in Sub-Saharan Africa by investing heavily in Somalia in the last 20 years. By capitalizing on its cultural, religious and historical ties, Turkey has improved its relations with this region and has been seen as part of its efforts to assume an active role on the world stage. In particular, the historic visit to Somalia in 2011 is highlighted as a turning point that strengthened Turkish-Somali relations and Turkey's Sub-Saharan Africa policy in general. Turkey has played an active role in Sub-Saharan Africa in areas such as health, education, cultural cooperation, and humanitarian aid projects, effectively utilizing its soft power elements through commercial and political channels. Sub-Saharan Africa's perception of Turkey as being in a more advantageous position compared to traditional great powers without a colonial past has positively reinforced Turkey's influence in the continent. Turkey's relations with Sub-Saharan Africa have not only contributed significantly to the countries of the continent, but also enhanced Turkey's international image and influence. With its economic growth potential and resource richness, Sub-Saharan Africa offers new opportunities for cooperation and development for Turkey. Turkey is expected to further deepen these relations and establish mutually beneficial sustainable development partnerships. In conclusion, Turkey's Sub-Saharan Africa policy has the potential to be a strategic partnership that serves the mutual interests of the continent and Turkey. This policy strengthens Turkey's position as a global actor and plays an important role in helping Sub-Saharan Africa achieve its development goals.

Methodologically, this study aims to analyze Turkey's soft power strategies in Somalia and their impact on bilateral relations with Somalia. The research will adopt a qualitative approach and utilize existing literature and document analysis methods. Firstly, Turkey's various strategic initiatives towards Somalia, such as humanitarian aid, education, healthcare and development projects, will be comprehensively analyzed. These sources will be used to reveal the extent of Turkey's influence and soft power in Somalia. The analysis will assess how these activities have shaped Turkey's

international image and contributed to socio-economic developments in Somalia. This methodology will provide an assessment of Turkey's use of soft power in the region and help us understand the dynamics and interactions in bilateral relations. In the first part of the study, the historical course of Turkey-Somalia relations before 2011 will be analyzed, followed by a discussion of soft power effects in the new era of Turkey-Somalia relations. In the last part of the study, examples of institutions that are active in Somalia in the context of Turkey's soft power will be analyzed.

### **A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TURKISH-SOMALI RELATIONS BEFORE 2011**

The Ottoman Empire established significant political, economic, social, and military connections with North Africa, and similarly fostered robust relationships with East Africa from the 16th century onward. This region was of strategic importance to the Ottomans, especially for safeguarding the sacred Islamic sites and securing sea and trade routes. Countries such as Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia were, to varying extents, under Ottoman influence or control. The Empire particularly maintained positive relations with Muslim sultanates in the area, notably the Sultanate of Harar and Zanzibar. During the 16th century, the Sultanate of Harar emerged as a dominant force in East Africa, exerting control over regions including Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Ethiopia. The Ottoman Empire supported these Muslim sultanates both to fortify them and to counteract Portuguese colonial ambitions in East Africa, providing comprehensive support in political, economic, social, and military spheres. In the 19th century, the Dervish Resistance Movement, led by Somalia's most prominent anti-colonial figure, Sayyid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, signed an agreement with the Ottoman Empire to provide military assistance to its anti-colonial movement (Sıradağ, 2016).

The ties between the Ottoman Empire and Africa extended beyond military alliances, encompassing economic engagements and diplomatic efforts as well. For instance, in what is now South Africa, the Ottoman Empire designated Mehmet Remzi Bey as its ambassador in 1914, aiming to foster and enhance bilateral relations. Additionally, the Empire's connection with the continent was marked by religious and cultural exchanges. A notable example of this is in 1862, when the Ottomans dispatched Imam Abu Bakr Effendi to South Africa with the mission to educate the local population about Islam and promote its teachings. (Ozkan, 2012).



Somalia established its embassy in Ankara in 1976, followed by Turkey inaugurating its embassy in Mogadishu in 1979. This embassy remained operational until the onset of the civil war in Somalia in 1991. This early diplomatic engagement laid the groundwork for enhanced bilateral cooperation across various domains. Notably, Somalia was among the initial recipients of Turkey's official development assistance, starting in 1985. To deepen its ties with Africa, Turkey devised the "Africa Action Plan" in 1998. Despite the establishment of these relations, the bond between Turkey and African nations, including Somalia, remained relatively subdued until the late 1990s. Turkey's commitment to strengthen its diplomatic, political, economic, and cultural ties with African countries gained momentum with the introduction of its Africa initiative in 1998. The initiative gained significant traction under the AK Party government, which came into power in 2002, marking a period of proactive engagement and substantial steps towards realizing the goals outlined in the Africa Action Plan (Ipek, 2014). The initial formal engagement between Turkey and Somalia occurred during the African Union (AU) Summit in Addis Ababa, held on January 29-30, 2007, with the participation of the then Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. During this summit, Erdoğan held a meeting with Somalia's then President, Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed, where he invited the Somali leader to submit a proposal to Ankara detailing Somalia's challenges and requirements (Özkan, 2014).

### **NEW ERA IN TURKEY-SOMALIA RELATIONS: 2011 AND BEYOND**

Erdoğan's landmark visit to Somalia in August 2011 significantly marked the strengthening of political and diplomatic ties with the country. Prior to his trip to Mogadishu, it is reported that Erdoğan convened an urgent meeting in Istanbul with members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to address and aid the famine crisis in Somalia (Ipek, 2014).

After the meeting, members pledged US\$350 million and pledged to establish a team to coordinate aid to Somalia, comprising Senegal, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Kazakhstan and the OIC General Secretariat. Another indication of Erdoğan's extensive lobbying for support for Somalia was his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2011, where he devoted half of his speech to Somalia, urging the global community to help Somalia get back on its feet (Özkan, 2014).



Erdogan chose to visit Somalia especially during Ramadan in order to draw attention to the world's major droughts, not only from the Muslim world but also from other countries. According to the International Crisis Group (2012), during his visit to Mogadishu, the Turkish leader led a large delegation of more than 200 business, political and cultural figures, including his family. Erdoğan ignored the perception of Mogadishu's pervasive phenomenon of a "no-go zone" and subsequently became "the first non-African leader" to visit the famine-hit capital in two decades. Following this historic visit, Turkey reopened its embassy in Mogadishu on November 1, 2011 (ICG, 2012).

It is important to note that Turkey appointed Cemalettin Kani Torun, a medical doctor and former president of the World Doctors Association, as the Turkish Ambassador to Somalia on September 13, 2011. In addition, a friendship group was first established between the Turkish Parliament and the Somali Parliament in 2011. Following Erdogan's historic visit to Somalia, relations between the two countries reached a peak as Ankara continuously campaigned for Somalia's support among the international community (Sıradağ, 2016).

In its engagement with Africa, Turkey has transitioned from primarily a political role to a more proactive stance in addressing the continent's challenges. A notable example of this shift is Turkey's collaboration with the United Nations to host the "Preparing Somalia's Future: Aiming for 2015" conference in Istanbul on May 21, 2012. This event, which drew participation from 57 countries and 11 regional and international organizations, focused on critical issues such as water, energy, transportation, and racism, aiming to craft a strategic vision for Somalia's rehabilitation. The conference culminated in the formulation of a detailed five-point plan for the reconstruction of the Somali state, emphasizing national unity, the establishment of a new political framework, economic overhaul, the organization of national defense forces, and overall national development. This initiative underscores Turkey's deepening engagement with Somalia, further evidenced by the continued high-level visits by Turkish deputy prime ministers and various cabinet members to monitor and advance ongoing projects, illustrating the evolving and multifaceted nature of Turkey-Somalia relations (Özkan, 2014).

On January 25, 2015, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a significant visit to Somalia, during which he officially opened the newly constructed

terminal at Mogadishu airport and inaugurated one of the region's largest and most advanced hospitals, both of which were funded and completed by Turkey. This visit underscored Turkey's distinctive role in Somalia, positioning it as an unconventional political entity in the region. Unlike traditional actors who have often prioritized security concerns and the tangible aspects of their diplomatic engagements, Turkey has adopted a humanitarian-centric approach in its dealings with Somalia. This strategy has not only differentiated Turkey from other international players but also challenged and prompted a reconsideration of the prevailing, predominantly security-focused and static foreign policy approaches towards Somalia by these traditional actors (Bingöl, 2013).

Gullo highlights that Turkey's approach to Somalia has significantly boosted its soft power on the global stage. Under the governance of the AK Party, Turkey has reoriented its foreign policy priorities, adopting the principle of "strategic depth" which has facilitated a more proactive stance in its international relations, especially towards Somalia and Africa at large. This shift signifies Turkey's transition from a predominantly military-focused foreign policy to one that is more independent and multifaceted. Historically, Turkey's political engagement with African nations was minimal until the early 2000s. However, the modern Turkish foreign policy agenda seeks to alter this narrative by enhancing bilateral relationships with African countries, thereby strengthening Turkey's global stature and recognition (Gullo, 2012).

Soft power strategies play a central role in Turkey's efforts to increase its visibility and influence on the international stage as a developing country. Soft power refers to a country's capacity to influence international relations by utilizing its cultural, historical and social appeal. Turkey has consolidated its position as a global actor by expanding its overseas trade relations and diplomatic representations, as well as having an important place among the world economies. In this process, Turkey's soft power is based on its historical, cultural and religious ties as well as the advantages of its strategic location, peace-oriented foreign policies, economic visibility and the achievements of state and non-governmental organizations.

Especially in recent years, humanitarian diplomacy has come to the fore in Turkey's use of soft power. This strategy has become an effective tool in Turkey's relations with countries with which Turkey has historical, cultural, political, economic and religious ties. In this context, Somalia

constitutes one of the most remarkable examples of Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy activities. Following the famine crisis in Somalia, Turkey decided to deepen its relations with Africa and accelerated its efforts for the development of the country and increasing its visibility in the international arena. Turkey's policies in Somalia have not only been a vital support for a fragile state, but have also made Turkey a center of attraction.

Along with its humanitarian diplomacy activities in Somalia, Turkey has conducted a multidimensional and multi-actor foreign policy by mobilizing all the means of its soft power. Through state institutions and civil society organizations, Turkey has made efforts to help Somalia become a self-sufficient country and has provided extensive civil society support in addition to international and public support.

The main foci of Turkey's foreign policy towards Somalia are philanthropy and humanitarian diplomacy. According to Turkey, humanitarian diplomacy involves not only emergency aid but also a broad vision of development partnership. In this respect, the Turkish government has a multidimensional foreign policy plan to ensure peace and stability in the country, which includes emergency aid especially in 2011 and 2012, long-term development assistance, mediation for peace, technical and personnel capacity building, scholarships for Somali students and the development of Turkish-Somali trade relations (Özkan & Orakçı, 2015). Turkey's policies towards Somalia have been shaped primarily to provide humanitarian aid to alleviate hunger and famine in the country and to draw the attention of the international community to the tragedy in the region and to save Somalia, which is in need of urgent assistance, from the effects of famine and hunger (Özkan, 2014).

One of the most important elements of Turkey's soft power policies towards Somalia is development aid. As of today, Turkey is the largest bilateral aid donor to Somalia. After the 2011 famine crisis and the official visit of the Turkish Prime Minister to Somalia, Turkey's humanitarian and development aid to Somalia through state institutions and non-governmental organizations has exceeded 500 million dollars (Karaođlan, 2018). Within the scope of emergency humanitarian aid efforts, from 2011 to 2017, in addition to the 370 million dollars of aid provided by the state to Somalia, 130 million dollars of aid was provided by civil society. Private sector investments in Somalia amounted to 100 million dollars (Orakçı, 2018).

## **TURKISH ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVE IN SOMALIA**

Turkey's foreign policy towards Somalia is both multidimensional and multi-actor. Despite the adverse conditions of the civil war in Somalia, Turkey, through the efforts of state institutions, civil society and private sector organizations, has played an important role in meeting the basic needs of the country and then in the state-building process by providing emergency humanitarian aid and implementing many important projects such as education, health, water and food security in the longer term. With assistance from both public and private organizations, many projects ranging from street cleaning to the construction of complexes such as roads, mosques, schools, hospitals and airport and port operations have been carried out, especially in the Mogadishu region, and assistance for the development of the country has been prioritized. The Turkish government has mobilized state and autonomous institutions such as TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), Turkish Red Crescent, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, Public Diplomacy Coordinatorship, Presidency of Religious Affairs and Religious Foundation, Turkish Airlines and AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency) for Somalia, and many non-governmental organizations such as IHH (Humanitarian Relief Foundation), Yardım Eli, Yeryüzü Doktorları, Deniz Feneri, Cansuyu Association and many other large and small non-governmental organizations have supported this movement and continue their activities in Somalia. The first institution that comes to mind when one thinks of Turkey in Somalia is TIKA, Turkey's official aid agency, which implements development aid and coordinates infrastructure projects carried out by all kinds of institutions and organizations participating in the aid movement in Somalia. Rather than working as an aid agency in Somalia, TIKA is an umbrella organization that regulates the provision of aid in an effective and organized manner. (Alegöz, 2013).

It is well known that Turkey has a significant impact on the health sector in Somalia and has been working to overcome the deficiencies with significant projects in a country that has experienced serious health infrastructure problems following the civil war. In cooperation with the Ministry of Health and the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), four field hospitals have been established in and around Somalia, enabling hundreds of thousands of patients to be treated to date. The 200-bed Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Turkey-Somalia Training and Research Hospital, one of the most modern and fully equipped hospitals in East Africa, built in cooperation with TIKA and TOKI, has enabled the treatment of 6,000

patients and surgery of 100 patients per month. This hospital, jointly operated by the Turkish and Somali Ministries of Health and staffed by Turkish and Somali personnel, has been an important step in improving the health infrastructure and contributing to the employment of local people. The Vocational School of Health Services opened within the hospital aims to train auxiliary health personnel. The Vocational School of Nursing and Public Health, established by the Red Crescent in Somalia in 2016, contributes to the country's manpower progress and development goals. Non-governmental organizations have also made significant investments in the field of health, and efforts have been made to train health personnel through projects such as IHH's cataract surgery for 1000 patients, Ibni Sina Vocational School of Health opened in cooperation with Yeryüzü Doktorları and TİKA, and medical residency programs. By establishing medical nutrition centers in Somalia and creating nutrition programs for mothers and newborn babies in cooperation with UNICEF, Yeryüzü Doktorları also provides medicine and equipment support for these centers (Murphy & Woods, 2014).

Also, Turkey, which has also taken steps to develop social and cultural relations with Somalia, provides training programs to members of the Somali National Youth Council through TİKA on topics such as broadcasting, NGO establishment, project management, practical Turkish and promotion of Turkey (Özkan, 2014). Yunus Emre Institute, one of the most important institutions of Turkey's cultural soft power, continues its activities in Mogadishu such as teaching Turkish to Somali citizens and promoting Turkish culture. Many private foundations and non-governmental organizations from Turkey also provide a large number of scholarships for Somali students. Turkey attaches great importance to these scholarships for Somali students in the name of its soft power. It is aimed that Somali students who will return to their countries after studying in Turkey will not only make important contributions to their countries in the reconstruction process of Somalia, but also provide important opportunities and positive returns to the parties in terms of future Turkish-Somali relations. As of today, there are more than 1000 Somali students receiving undergraduate, graduate and doctoral education in Turkey through official and non-governmental organizations. In addition, there are about 10 Turkish schools in and around Somalia and the Turkish Maarif Foundation provides education to tens of thousands of students through its 6 schools in Somalia (Karaođlan, 2018).

In 2013, the most advanced applied agriculture school in East Africa was established in Mogadishu in cooperation with TIKA and IHH. This school was established to teach modern agricultural techniques and ensure food security, thus enabling the Somali people to produce their own vegetables and fruits. Through these trainings, Somalia aims to become an independent country that can meet its own food needs. In addition, in Somalia, the longest country in Africa with the longest ocean coastline, TIKA is making efforts to develop the fisheries sector and aims to make the best use of the country's natural resources by providing trainings for fishermen. TIKA has also drilled 26 water wells across Somalia as part of the "Access to Clean Water Campaign" carried out in cooperation with the State Hydraulic Works (DSI), providing access to clean drinking water for approximately 200,000 people (Karaođlan, 2018).

Apart from Mogadishu, TIKA also carries out projects in Somaliland and Puntland regions, building hospitals, Quran courses, education centers, orphanages and providing equipment support. In 2014, TIKA started to open offices in Garowe and Hergeysa, and its goal is to open offices in Baidoa and Kismayo, depending on the security situation, in order to extend Turkish aid from Mogadishu to the whole of Somalia (Archilles & Sazak, 2015).

AFAD is one of the most effective organizations working together with TIKA after the emergence of the need for emergency aid in Somalia. In cooperation with the Ministry of Health, Aselsan, the General Directorate of Security, the Turkish Red Crescent, TIKA and various NGOs, AFAD sent emergency aid materials such as medicines, medical supplies, food and clothing to the country, and later financed investments in many areas such as drinking water projects, hospital constructions and communication systems.

Turkish Red Crescent, one of the most important distributors of Turkish official development assistance in Somalia, has been the most effective aid organization in the country since 2011. In 2011, the Red Crescent established the Somalia Delegation Presidency in the region and continues its activities from three centers in Somalia, namely Al Jazeera Camp, Hot Food Center and Warehouse, serving approximately 25,000 people (Alegöz, 2013).

One of the cornerstones of Turkey's influence in Somalia is based on its Islamic identity. The Somali people, the majority of whom are Sunni



Muslims, attribute great legitimacy to Turkey's projects as a Muslim country. In this context, a significant portion of Turkey's aid to Somalia is provided by active institutions such as the Presidency of Religious Affairs. In 2014, the establishment of the Religious Services Counsellor's Office in Mogadishu and the appointment of a religious services attaché to the country stand out as part of Turkey's religious diplomacy efforts. The Presidency of Religious Affairs and the Turkish Religious Foundation, as well as a number of religiously based NGOs are also engaged in various aid activities in Somalia. While these organizations initially focused on meeting food and emergency needs, over time they have started to provide support in areas such as education and religious services.

Today, IHH is one of the oldest and most important non-governmental organizations in Somalia, supporting a wide range of projects from agriculture to health. IHH has been working in the country since 1997, establishing contact with local tribes through Zemzem Foundation, one of the local civil society organizations in Somalia, and striving to reach even the remotest corners of Somalia (Archilles & Sazak, 2015). IHH established the Anadolu Education Center, the largest orphanage in Somalia, and also provides financial support to many orphaned children and their families suffering from the civil war.

In addition to all these organizations operating in Somalia, Turkish companies from the private sector are also making significant investments in the reconstruction process of Somalia. Favori LLC, which operates the Somali airport, and Albayrak Group, which purchased the operating rights of the Somali port for 20 years and made significant contributions to the Turkish embassy complex in Mogadishu, are the most prominent ones. In addition to companies such as En-Ez Concrete Factory, which received a tender from TIKA and made significant contributions to the reconstruction of roads in the country, Yankı Construction, which undertook the construction of a nursing school, PGM, which conducts quality control of manufacturing and import goods in Somalia, as well as many other important Turkish companies operating in the construction and furniture sectors with their local partners in Somalia are also making investments in Somalia. These companies, whose investments in the country amount to approximately 100 million dollars, have a direct contribution to the Turkish soft power and these investments show the importance that Turkey and Turkish entrepreneurs attach to Somalia and its future (Karaođlan, 2018).

## **CONCLUSION**

Turkey's policies towards the African continent in the last 20 years have attracted attention, especially with heavy investments in Somalia. Turkey has become an important soft power actor in Sub-Saharan Africa by utilizing its cultural, religious and historical ties. The relations developed with Sub-Saharan Africa are seen as part of Turkey's efforts to assume an active role on the world stage. In particular, the historic visit to Somalia in 2011 was a turning point that strengthened Turkish-Somali relations and Turkey's Sub-Saharan Africa policy in general.

Turkey has played an active role in Sub-Saharan Africa in areas such as health, education, cultural cooperation and humanitarian aid projects, effectively utilizing soft power elements as well as commercial and political channels. The fact that Sub-Saharan Africa sees Turkey, which does not have a colonial past, in a more advantageous position compared to traditional great powers has positively reinforced Turkey's influence on the continent.

Turkey's relations with Sub-Saharan Africa have made significant contributions not only for the countries in the continent, but also for Turkey's own international image and influence. The potential for economic growth and the wealth of resources in Sub-Saharan Africa offer new cooperation and development opportunities for Turkey. Turkey is expected to further deepen these relations and establish mutually beneficial sustainable development partnerships.

However, the success of Turkey's Sub-Saharan Africa policy is closely linked to the continent as well as Turkey's domestic politics and economic situation. Turkey should not ignore its domestic problems while developing its relations with Sub-Saharan Africa and the strategies pursued in foreign policy should be understandable and supportable by the public. This is important for Turkey to increase its influence and soft power capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa while at the same time maintaining domestic balances.

In conclusion, Turkey's Sub-Saharan Africa policy has the potential to be a strategic partnership that serves the mutual interests of the continent and Turkey. This policy strengthens Turkey's position as a global actor while playing an important role in helping Sub-Saharan Africa achieve its development goals. The future of these relations will be closely linked to how both sides shape and deepen this partnership.



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# SAVAŞ HABERLERİNİN BİR PROPAGANDA ARACI OLARAK KULLANIMINA İLİŞKİN ELEŞTİREL BİR ÇALIŞMA\*

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## ÖZ

Savaş, kriz ve çatışma ortamları propagandanın daha yoğun biçimde kullanılmasına zemin sunmaktadır. Gerçeğin aktarımı olarak sunulan haber, özünde bir gerçeklik anlatısı olduğundan, hedeflenen amaca yönelik algının oluşturulması için ideal ortamı sağlamaktadır. ABD'nin, olası bir tehlikeye karşı önleyici müdahale amaçlı ilk savaşı olan Irak Savaşı, uygulanan iliştilirilmiş gazeteciliğin ve yurttaş gazeteciliğinin küresel medyada geniş kitlelere ulaştığı da ilk savaştır. Birleşmiş Milletlerin (BM) 1441 sayılı kararına dayandırılarak ABD öncülüğündeki Koalisyon Gücü tarafından gerçekleştirilen 2003 Irak Savaşı'nın meşruluğu uluslararası hukuk bakımından halen tartışılmaktadır. Yapılan literatür taramasında, ABD'nin yaptığı savaşlarda uyguladığı propagandanın yapısının, haber üretim ve yayım süreci üzerinden genel hatları ile çeşitli çalışmalarda ortaya konulduğu; ancak ABD'nin savaş programı kapsamında bu sürecin işleyişinin Propaganda Modeli çerçevesinde ele alınmadığı görülmüştür. Bu çalışmada Irak Savaşı haberlerinin propaganda amacıyla nasıl kullanıldığı Chomsky ile Herman'ın propaganda modeli üzerinden sorgulanmıştır. "Haberin içerdiği enformasyon ve sunulmasındaki sıklık (frekans) propagandaya yöneliktir." hipotezinden yola çıkılarak, haber metinlerinin, Irak Savaşı sırasında; gündem belirleme amaçlı kullanımı ve haber sıklığı (frekans) üzerinden, alt amaç sorularına cevap aranmıştır. Betimsel alan araştırması yöntemi kullanılarak gerçekleştirilen bu çalışmada örnek olay incelemesi, ilişkiyel araştırma modeli üzerinden, içerik analizi tekniği ile uygulanmıştır. SSCB'nin çökmesinden sonra modelin beşinci filtresinin, antikomünizm yerine ideolojik gündem olarak işlerliği bulunmuştur.

**Keywords: Gazetecilik, Propaganda Modeli, Haber, Gündem Belirleme, Kamuoyu, Yumuşak Güç**

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## **A CRITICAL STUDY ON THE USE OF WAR NEWS AS A MEANS OF PROPAGANDA: THE 2003 IRAQ WAR CASE**

### **ABSTRACT**

Conflict conditions such as war or crises facilitate the use of propaganda. Although widely known as consisting of facts, the news is a narrative of reality. Therefore, news texts are ideal for managing perception for the intended purpose. The Iraq War the first US war to involve pre-emptive war against a potential threat, was also witnessed in the global media via both embedded journalism and citizen journalism. The legitimacy of the 2003 Iraq War, waged by the US-led Coalition Force on the basis of United Nations Resolution 1441, is still a matter of debate in international law. In the literature review, it was observed that the structure of the propaganda applied by the US in the war was examined within the framing theory in most studies in terms of the news production and broadcasting process; however, it was seen that process of the US war program was not assessed within the constructionist framework. This article examines the use of propaganda in the Iraq war news content. The aim of this article is to examine the use of propaganda in Iraq War news' content in the context of the propaganda model. Within the scope of this study, which was conducted using descriptive field research methodology, the case study and relational research models were applied through the content analysis technique. After the collapse of the USSR, the fifth filter of the model was found to be functioning as ideological agenda instead of anticommunism, as it had been for the original model.

**Keywords: Journalism, Propaganda Model, News, Agenda Setting, Public Opinion, Soft Power**

## GİRİŞ

Savaş; özünde ülkeleri ve toplumları, nesiller boyu etkileyecek biçimde iz bırakan, iki veya daha fazla aktör arasında yaşanan, yüksek düzeyde şiddet içeren silahlı mücadeledir. Savaş ve kriz gibi çatışma ortamları propagandanın daha yoğun biçimde kullanılmasına zemin sunmaktadır. Gerçeğin aktarımı olarak sunulan haber ise, özünde bir anlatıdır. Belirli bir bakış açısı ve belirli bir zaman kesitinde, anlatıcı durumunda olan gazetecinin belirlediği bir dizgede aktarılan bir olay örgüsünü de içeren haberin, anlatının özelliklerini taşımakla birlikte; kurgusal niteliğinin de olduğu genelde açık biçimde görünmemektedir. Tanımları arasında sıklıkla yer alan güvenilirlik ve doğruluk nitelemeleri, haber metinlerinin hedeflenen amaca yönelik algının oluşturulması için uygunluğunu sağlarken; savaş ortamlarında haber tüketicisinin içinde bulunduğu ruh hali, savaşa dair metinlerin propaganda amaçlı kullanımına ideal ortam sunmaktadır. Bu nedenle iletişim teknolojilerinin gelişmesiyle birlikte her savaşta söz konusu dönemin en belirgin iletişim araçları kullanılmış, ortaya çıkan her yeni iletişim teknolojisi, savaşın kitlelere aktarımını ve bir ölçüde niteliğini belirlemiştir.

Irak Savaşı sürecinde gerçekleştirilen enformasyon yönetimi, buradaki kuramsal çerçeve kapsamında ele alınmıştır. Irak Savaşı, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin (ABD) olası bir tehlikeye karşı, söz konusu tehlike henüz gerçekleşmeden önleyici müdahaleyi içeren Bush Doktrini doğrultusunda gerçekleştirdiği ilk savaştır. Ayrıca, kitle iletişim araçlarının küresel boyutta yaygınlaştığı ve geniş kitlelerin olan bitenden kısa zaman içinde haberdar olduğu bugünün iletişim ortamında savaşın meşruluğuna yönelik kamuoyu oluşmasının gerekmesi, bu savaşın medya boyutunun önemini arttırmaktadır. Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) Güvenlik Konseyi'nin 1441 sayılı kararına dayandırılarak ABD öncülüğündeki Koalisyon Gücü tarafından gerçekleştirilen 2003 Irak Savaşı'nın meşruluğu uluslararası hukuk bakımından halen tartışılmaktadır.

Irak Savaşı'nı önceki savaşlardan ayıran en belirgin nokta, iliştilmiş gazetecilerin savaşın gerçekliğini ana akım gazetecilikte tek yanlı ve taraflı aktarmasına karşılık; yurttaş gazetecilerin kendi gerçekliklerini internet üzerinden dünyaya aktarabilmiş olmasıdır. Irak Savaşı, yalnızca askerî ve uluslararası politika açılarından değil, medya kullanımı, enformasyon yönetimi bağlamında da model olabilecek, bu açıdan güncelliği süren bir savaştır.

Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği'nin (SSCB) çökmesinin ardından iki kutuplu dünya düzeni değişmiş, oluşan yeni konjonktürde güç kavramının kapsamı, kaynakları ve etkisi yeniden değerlendirilmiştir. Uluslararası ilişkilerde askeri ve ekonomik güç öğeleri ile diplomasideki etkinliğin yanı sıra; ikna, gündem belirleme, kendi değerlerini ötekilerce cazip kılma konuları da önem kazanmıştır. Yumuşak gücün uygulanabileceği en yaygın ortamlardan biri medya içerikleri, özellikle de haberlerdir.

Çevrimiçi yayıncılık, etkileşimli (interaktif) bir iletişim ortamının oluşmasına zemin yaratmıştır. Irak Savaşı ile geleneksel medya ortamlarının yerine, internet görece önemli bir duruma gelmiştir. Kitle iletişim araçlarının yaygınlaşması, teknolojilerinin geniş kitlelerce ulaşılabilir olmasına; dolayısıyla ülkenin alt yapısının yanı sıra, kullanıcıların alım gücüne bağlıdır. Bu bağlamda, internet teknolojisinin dünya çapında yaygınlaşması ve kişilerin evlerinde veya işyerlerindeki bilgisayarlardan internet hizmetine ulaşabilmesi sonucu alımlayıcı bir kitle ortaya çıkmıştır. Irak Savaşı bu bağlamda internette takip edilebilen ilk savaştır. Irak Savaşı haberleri, daha çok içerikleri açısından çerçeveleme kuramı üzerinden irdelenmiştir. Bununla birlikte, Chomsky ile Herman'ın Soğuk Savaş döneminin iki kutuplu dünyasındaki enformasyon akışını incelemek üzere geliştirilen propaganda modeli, haber akışı ve savaş stratejileri açısından yeni bir dönemin başladığı Irak Savaşı ve sonraki savaşlarda da işlerlik gösterebilecek niteliktedir.

Chomsky ile Herman haberlerin medya üzerinden kitlelere aktarılması sürecini propaganda modeli kapsamında 5 temel filtre üzerinden açıklamaktadır: medya sahipliği, reklam ilişkileri, haber kaynağı, tepki üretimi (muhalefet), antikomünizm. Bu modele göre, bir enformasyonun yayımı için bu filtrelerden geçmesi gerekmektedir. Soğuk Savaş sonrası SSCB'nin çökmesi sonucu, bir açıdan plüralist, bir açıdan tek kutuplu dünya düzeninin ortaya çıkmasıyla, modelin artık işlevsiz olduğu görüşlerine karşı çıkan Herman, beşinci filtre olan antikomünizmi yeniden değerlendirerek; pazarın koşullarının filtre olarak kullanılabileceğini; sonraki çalışmalarda bu filtrenin başka bir öğe ile işlerliğinin çalışılabileceğini savunmuştur. Irak Savaşı sürecinde gerçekleştirilen enformasyon yönetimi, bu çalışmadaki kuramsal çerçeve kapsamında ele alınmıştır.

Yapısökücü (dekonstrüktif) bir yaklaşımla ele alınan konunun, kuramsal ve işlevsel olarak literatüre bir katkısı da, örnek olay analizinin yapıldığı Irak Savaşı'nda uygulanan iliştilenmiş gazetecilik ile savaş anlatısı üzerin-

den duygudaşlık yaratımını irdelemesidir. Savaş haberlerinin bir tür anlatı olduğundan hareket eden bu çalışma, haber metninde savaşın kurgulanmasının algı yönetiminde oynadığı rolün değerlendirilmesi açısından önem taşımaktadır. Bu önem doğrultusunda çevrimiçi yayıncılıkta Irak Savaşı haberlerinin propaganda amacıyla nasıl kullanıldığı sorusu çalışmanın ana amacını oluşturmaktadır. Bu soru, Chomsky ile Herman'ın propaganda modeli üzerinden sorgulanmıştır. "Haberin içerdiği enformasyon ve sunulmasındaki sıklık (frekans) propagandaya yöneliktir." hipotezinden yola çıkılarak, haber metinlerinin, Irak Savaşı sırasında; gündem belirleme amaçlı kullanımı ve haber sıklığı (frekans) üzerinden, alt amaç sorularına cevap aranmıştır. Betimsel, alan araştırması yöntemi kullanılarak gerçekleştirilen bu çalışma kapsamında örnek olay incelemesi, ilişkisel araştırma modeli üzerinden, içerik analizi tekniği ile uygulanmıştır.

### **KURAMSAL ÇERÇEVE**

Konuya ilişkin kavramsal çerçevenin biçimlenmesi ve savaş haberlerinin propaganda aracı olarak kullanımın anlaşılması için haber ile propaganda bağlantısı, propaganda ve medya ilişkisi, Irak Savaşı'nın medya boyutu, propaganda modelinin işleyişi ve haber üzerinden yumuşak güç kullanımı bu bölümde alt başlıklarla yer almaktadır.

### **PROPAGANDA, GÜNDEM, KAMUOYU İLİŞKİSİ**

Medyanın gücü değerlendirilirken sıklıkla söz edilen kamuoyu oluşturma, gündem belirleme ve propaganda, algı yönetimi sürecinin birbiri ile bağlantılı bileşenleridir. Gerçeğin aktarımı olarak tanımlanan haber, belgesel film, haber filmi gibi enformatik anlatıların içeriklerinde, gerçekliği yeniden kurgulayan meslek profesyonelleri, bu tür anlatıların gerçek olduğuna ilişkin genel kanı sayesinde medya gündeminin belirlenmesi ve kamuoyunun oluşması için hedeflenen yönde enformasyon aktarma olanağına sahiptir.

Gündem; bir konunun medyada yer alma sıklığı, haberin ele alınma ve sunulma biçimiyle doğrudan ilişkilidir. Medyanın gündemi, haber tüketicilerinin de gündemine dönüşmektedir. McCombs ile Shaw tarafından geliştirilen gündem belirleme, Cohen'in, basın, çoğu zaman insanlara ne düşüneceğini söylemekte başarılı olmasa da; ne hakkında düşüneceklerinin ortamını oluşturur önermesinden kaynağını almaktadır. Medya; özellikle de haber medyası kişilerin bir konu hakkında ne düşüneceği üzerine olmasa da, gündeme bağlı olarak hangi konular üzerine düşüneceği üzerin-



de etkiye sahiptir. Gündem belirleme, özünde bir öncelikler hiyerarşisidir (Maigret, 2011: 255). Gündem belirleme, McCombs ve Shaw'a göre dört aşamalı kamuoyu oluşumunun ilk düzeyi olan "farkına varma/vardırma" aşamasıdır. Kamuoyu oluşturmada ikinci düzey bilgi edinme; üçüncüsü tutum geliştirme; dördüncüsü davranış değişikliğidir. Medya içerikleri ve özellikle haberler, içerdikleri enformasyonla ve oluşturdukları duyguyla kamuoyu oluşumunda önemli bir yer tutmaktadır (Yüksel, 2001: 35, Yüksel, 1997; 577). Halkın gündemi medya ürünlerinin içeriklerinde sunulan konulardan; politik gündem ise iktidarın önemli basın açıklamaları ile brifinglerinde yer verdiği konulardan oluşmaktadır (Christie, 2006: 520). Böylece kendisine sunulan sınırlı seçenek arasından seçim yapan kişilerin süreç içinde kanıları oluşmakta, kanılar yaygınlaştıkça süreç içinde kamuoyu oluşmaktadır.

Kamuoyu, yaygın düşünce; bir olay, durum, kişi veya kuruluş ile ilgili oluşan genel zihniyettir. Sartori'ye göre kamuoyu, halkın veya halkların kanaatlerinin toplamıdır ve genellikle kabaca alınmış bir veridir (2004: 52). Neumann'a göre her türlü rejimde toplumsal denetim, yani bireylerin farkında olmadan diğer bireylere ve hükümetlere uyguladıkları uzlaşma baskısını oluşturabilen kamuoyu kavramının herkesin kabul ettiği, standart bir tanımı yoktur. (1996: 82-83). Milburn, demokratik toplumlarda kamuoyu desteğini almayan yöneticilerin iktidarlarını uzun süre koruyamayacakları (1998: 39) görüşünde iken; Bourdieu de, kamuoyunu iktidarın bir güç ögesi olarak ele alarak, önceki dönemlerde siyaset adamının "Tanrı bizimledir" söylemi üzerinden iktidarını meşrulaştırdığı, kitle iletişim araçlarının geliştiği bugün ise "kamuoyu bizimledir." diyerek meşruluk kazandığı savındadır (1998: 17). McCombs ve Shaw'a göre böylesi bir ortamda bazen geniş bir kitlenin üstünkörü bir biçimde benimsediği bir kanı yerine, çok daha küçük bir kitlenin kararlı biçimde benimsediği bir kanı ağır basabilmekte ve kamuoyu azınlığın etkisiyle oluşabilmektedir (1972: 176).

Öte yandan propaganda, önceden hedeflenmiş bir amaca ulaşmak için tasarlanarak gerçekleştirilen bir iletişim eylemidir. Bektaş'a göre propaganda, düşüncüyü yönlendirmeye, ikna etmeye yönelik bir kapsamdadır (2002: 46). Qualter'e göre propaganda, propagandacıya yakıştırılacak eylem ve edimlerin hepsini kapsayan ve bunun dışındaki her şeyi dışarıda tutan bir tanımlamayla "... bireylerin veya grupların belirli bir durum veya konumundaki tepkilerin kendi amaçlarına uygun tepkiler şeklinde olacağını umarak giriştikleri bir faaliyet"tir (1980: 279). Özerkan ile Inceoğlu'na göre ise propaganda, belli bir amaç doğrultusunda, hedef kitlede istenilen



davranış ve tutumu sağlamak için sistematik bir biçimde gerçekleştirilen, görünürde herhangi bir zorlama barındırmayan tek bir yanlı iletişim; daha doğrusu bir iletim sürecidir (1997: 42-46).

Öz olarak gündem belirlenerek kamuoyu oluşturulmakta, oluşturulan kamuoyu ile propagandaya uygun ortam sağlanabilmektedir. Bununla birlikte propaganda amacıyla oluşturulan içerik gündemde sıklıkla yer almakta; böylece kamuoyu oluşturmak için uygun ortam sağlamak üzere gündem oluşturulmaktadır.

### **SAVAŞ HABERİ VE PROPAGANDA İLİŞKİSİ**

İnsanın doğasında dış dünyayı tanıma, olaylardan haberdar olma ve şeyler hakkında fikir sahibi olma eğilimi vardır. Bu gereksinimi karşılamaya yönelik enformasyon aktarım ortamı olan haber, literatürde genel olarak gazeteciler ve haber söylemi bağlamlarında tanımlanmaktadır. Cohen ve Young'a göre, haberler, gazeteciler tarafından üretilmektedir. Gieber'a göre haber gazetecilerin yaptıklarıdır. Fisherman ise haberi, çalışanların uyguladıkları yöntemlerin sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan şey olarak tanımlamaktadır. Haberi bir tür olarak değil de, söylem olarak ele alan Van Dijk'a göre haber, toplumda var olan egemen söylemin bir ürünü iken; Hall'a göre ise, egemen söylemin haber metni içinde yeniden kurgulanmasıdır (Tokgöz, 2008: 19). Schlapp, haberi güncel ve ilginç bir olayın olduğunca nesnel biçimde, her türlü taraflı değerlendirmelerden ve söz oyunlarından uzak biçimde sunulması olarak tanımlamaktadır (2000: 17). Aslan'a göre, gazetecilerin eylemleri üzerinden yapılan tanımlamalar haber kavramının içeriğini belirsizleştirmektedir ve haber olaylar ve durumlarla ilgili içerikleri ile ele alınmalıdır (2003: 15-16). Haberin tanımının çok keskin sınırları yoktur.

Haber, enformasyonun işlenerek üretildiği bir anlatıdır. Bir olay veya durum anlatıya dönüştüğü an, artık gerçeğin bir yönden görünümü; yani gerçeklik oluşmaktadır. Hayata ilişkin görüntü, fotoğraf, enformasyon, değerlendirmeleri içeren haberler sayesinde dünyada olanları öğrenen haber tüketicisinin algısı bu çerçevede oluşmakta; haber tüketicisi olaylar, olgular, yerler ve hatta duygular hakkında dolaylı deneyim; sentetik deneyim kazanmaktadır (Türkoğlu, 2010: 9). Yaygın biçimde gerçeğin aktarımı olarak tanımlanan haber, bu bağlamda propaganda için uygun bir ortama dönüştürmektedir.

Kitle iletişim araçlarının geliştirilmesiyle propaganda eğlence ve haber biçiminde sunulmaya başlanmıştır. Çatışmalarla geçen 20. yüzyılın başında kitle iletişim araçlarına ulaşan belirli bir kitlenin oluşması ve savaş ortamı, askeri propaganda için uygun koşulları sunmuştur. 1. Dünya Savaşı sırasında İngiltere, ABD ve Almanya’da kurulan komisyonlarla propaganda faaliyetleri başlamıştır. 2. Dünya Savaşı sırasında ABD’de propaganda açısından daha yaygın ancak daha az manipülatif Savaş Enformasyon Bürosu (OWI) kurulmuş ve bu kurumun belli başlı film stüdyolarıyla işbirliği için Pentagon Hollywood İrtibat Bürosu faaliyete geçirilmiştir. OWI’nin başlıca planlayıcılarından Arcibald Mc Leish’in savaş filmleriyle ilgili “Bu savaşın esas cephesi Güney Pasifik değildir. Ortadoğu değildir. İngiltere ya da Norveç ya da Rus bozkırları değildir. Esas cephe Amerikan kamuoyudur” sözü propaganda ve medya ilişkisini özetler niteliktedir (Stahl, 2010: 27-28). Savaş anlatıları, savaş ve barış olgularına yönelik toplumsal algıyı oluşturmaktadır. Çünkü savaş, açılan ilk ateşle başlamaz. Savaşın fiilî olarak başlamasının ötesinde askeri eylemler ile dil arasında bir ilişki vardır. Sözcükler, görüntüler ve düşünceler, askeri çatışmaların söylem temelindeki desteğidir (Pick, 1993: 14). Savaş ortamı, askeri eylemlerden önce, kullanılan söylemde ve oluşturulan anlatılarda yaratılmaktadır (Monegal, 2002: 32).

Haberin bazı noktalarını örtüp bazı noktalarını öne çıkartması, bunlara uygulanan sansür, manipülasyon, dezenformasyon ve alımlayıcının içinde bulunduğu ruh hali, savaş metinlerinin propaganda amaçlı kullanımına olanak tanımaktadır (Stocchetti, 2003: 646). Savaş, yüksek düzeyde şiddet içeren siyasal bir eylem olduğundan, iktidarların iç ve dış politika alanlarında destek edinmesi açısından savaş haberleri yaşamsal önem taşımaktadır. Üstelik savaş haberlerinin çarpıcılığı, içerdiği şiddetin dozu çok yüksek; etkilediği kitle ise çok geniştir.

Savaşta ani şiddetlenmeler ve şiddetteki azalmalar, savaşla ilgili haber yapan gazetecilerin sayısına etki etmektedir. Savaşın şiddetlendiği dönemlerde bölgede görev yapan muhabirlerin ve söz konusu savaşı içeren haberlerin sayısında artış görülmekte, çatışma ve şiddetin azalmasından ve savaşın taraflarından birinin geri çekilmesinden sonra haber medyasının olaya ilgisi azalmaktadır. Öte yandan savaşlar, gazeteciler açısından da yaşamsal tehlike taşıyan ortamlardır. (Kim, 2012: 325). Dolayısıyla, gazetecinin can güvenliği ve haber aktarımı için göze alınması gereken maliyet yüksektir. Haber kaynağının denetim altında bulunmasına dayalı

iliştirilmiş gazetecilik ise, Irak Savaşı koşullarında gazetecilerin emniyetinin sağlanması savıyla ortaya atılmıştır.

Gerçek anlamıyla ilk defa 2003 Irak Savaşı'nda gerçekleştirilmiş iliştirilmiş gazetecilik uygulaması ile gazeteciler, olayların taraflarından biri ve aynı zamanda haber kaynağı da olan ABD ordusu ile savaş alanında bulunmuştur. Kuşkusuz bu durum kaynak bağımlılığına yönelik eleştirilere yol açmıştır. Barınma, yemek, ulaşım gibi en temel ihtiyaçları için askeri güç unsurları ile bir arada bulunan gazetecilerin, bir çeşit Stockholm Sendromu yaşayarak objektifliklerini yitirdikleri ve kendilerini askerî birlikler ile özdeşleştirdikleri öne sürülmüştür (Fahmy ve Johnson, 2012: 24-25).

Gazetecilerin kişisel emniyetini sağlamak ve haber kaynağına daha yakın olarak haber üretmek amacıyla iliştirilmiş gazeteciliği kabul etmesi, meslek ilkeleri gereği korunması gereken gazeteci-kaynak mesafesinin ortadan kalkması habercilik ile propaganda ilişkisini dolaylı olsa da güçlendirmiştir. Irak Savaşı, gerek gazetecilik uygulamaları, gerekse propaganda ve enformasyon yönetimi bakımından ilklerin görüldüğü bir savaştır.

## **PROPAGANDA MODELİ**

Propaganda modeli medyanın ve siyasi iktidarın ekonomik güç üzerindeki güçlü denetimini ve medyanın hükümet politikaları için destek sağlama-daki etkisini açıklamaktadır (Chomsky ve Herman, 2012: 70). Chomsky ile Herman'ın Sovyetler Birliği'nin çöküşünden önce geliştirdikleri propaganda modeline göre, haberin medyadan aktarımı için beş temel filtreden geçmesi gerekir. Bunlar medya sahipliği, reklam ilişkileri, haber kaynağı, üretilmiş tepki (flak), ideoloji/antikomünizm filtreleridir. Propaganda modeli, ürün olarak haberi incelememekte; haberin aktarılmasında birbiri ile bütünleşik filtrelerin olduğunu; bir haberin anaakım medyada aktarılması için bu filtrelerden geçmesi gerektiğini varsayan, sistem bağlamında haber aktarımını incelemektedir.

Propaganda modeline göre filtreler sistemin özünde ve çok güçlü olduklarından kısıtlayıcıdır. Gazeteciler ile medya kuruluşları haber üretim sürecinde bu filtreleri fark etmeksizin, haberi sistemin kısıtlayıcılığında tüketicisine aktarmaktadır. Bu açıdan Chomsky gazetecilerin iktidar ilişkilerine yönelik haber ürettiğini varsaymanın komplo teorisine gireceğini savunurken (Klaehn, 2002: 149, 165). Herman ise habercilik faaliyetleri ile ilgili gazetecilerin niyetinin kesin olarak anlaşılamayacağı ve propaganda modeline haber üretim sürecinde sisteme kasıt gütmekten uydukları görüşündedir (2000: 105).

Propaganda modeli haberin tüketicisine aktarımına kadar geçirdiği enformasyon toplama ve haberleştirme süreçlerinde bu beş filtrenin etkin olduğu üzerine kuruludur. Modelde haber, bu filtrelerin herbirinden ayrı ayrı geçerek tüketicisine ulaşmaktadır (Chomsky ve Herman, 2012: Bölüm 1). SSCB'nin çökmesi ve komünist kutbun ortadan kalkmasıyla beşinci filtre yeniden değerlendirilmiş ve Chomsky bu filtrenin ötekiliği (Klaehn, 2002: 161), Herman ise bunun pazar koşullarını destekleyici çerçeveyi içerebileceğine (2000: 109) ilişkin görüşlerini ortaya koymuşlardır. Wintonik ile Akhbar Rıza Üretimi'ni irdeleyen çalışmalarında, Chomsky ve Herman'ın beşinci filtreyi ilk başta baskın ideoloji olarak adlandırmayı düşündüklerini, bu filtrenin özel girişimleri desteklediğini ve bir ülkenin kendi yardımseverliğini (benevolence) içerdiğini savunmaktadır (aktaran Klaehn, 2002: 161).

Kuram, çevresel koşullara bağlı olmasından dolayı özellikle Soğuk Savaş sırasındaki çatışmaların Amerikan medyası tarafından yorumlanmasını açıklamak için uygun olarak değerlendirilse de, Kosova Krizi haberleri üzerine olan çalışmalarda da propaganda modeli kullanılmıştır. (Gilboa, 2005: 32).

Modeli Soğuk Savaş sonrası yeniden değerlendiren Herman'a göre komünizmin zayıflamasından sonra beşinci filtre piyasa koşulları olarak işlevliğini sürdürmektedir. Propaganda modelinin işlevliğini sürdürdüğünü ve medya sahipliği var olduğu sürece bu modelin geçerli olacağını savunan Herman (Klaehn, Carañana, Alford, & Godler, 2018), aynı zamanda beşinci filtre ile ilgili eleştirilere açık olduklarını belirterek, beşinci filtrenin hangi değer ile çalıştığını bulmak için bilim insanların çalışmaya davet etmektedir (Herman, 2000: 109, 111). Modelin son filtresinin yeniden tasarlanabileceği, özellikle de kapitalizm bağlamında ele alınabileceği görüşleri de vardır (Sparks, 2007: 69-71, 82). Propaganda modeli, özünde, kutuplaşmanın olduğu ve kamuoyu desteğinin enformasyon üzerinden sağlandığı o medya ortamı sürdükçe güncellenerek kullanılacak bir modeldir. Propaganda modeli, eşikbekçiliği veya çerçeveleme kuramlarındaki aksine haberin üretim sürecine odaklanmamakta; bir ürüne dönüşen haberin oluşmasına neden olan sistem üzerinde durmaktadır. Haber, bu sistem içinden süzülerek tüketicisine ulaşması üzerine kurulu olan propaganda modelinin işlevliğinin anlaşılması için, haberin bir ürün olarak değerlendirilip filtreler bağlamında yapısökücü bir yaklaşımla ele alınması gerekir.

## YUMUŞAK GÜÇ UYGULAMALARI BAĞLAMINDA HABER

En genel haliyle hedeflerine ulaşmak için gerekli olanaklara, ortama ve yeteneklere sahip olma ve diğerlerini bu yönde davranmaya yönlendirme olarak tanımlanabilen güç, Soğuk Savaş sonrası yeniden tanımlanarak konvansiyonel/sert ve yumuşak güç olarak sınıflandırılmıştır. Sert güç hedeflenen yönde davranmaya teşvikler (havauçlar) ve tehditler (sopalar) ile yönlendirmekte; askeri, politik öğeleri, bu yöndeki yaptırımları içermekte; yumuşak güç ise dolaylı yollardan istenen sonuçları almayı kapsamaktadır. Uluslararası politikanın ve küresel medyanın gündemi belirlemek, dikkati istediği yöne çekerek, diğerlerinin kendi istediklerini isteme noktasına gelmesini sağlamak için kültür, ideoloji, kurumlar gibi değerleri kullanmaktadır. Yumuşak gücü hafifsememek gerekir. Nye'ye göre, 11 Eylül saldırılarının ardındaki Usame bin Ladin'in kendine inananlar üzerinde yumuşak güce sahip olduğundan hareketle; akıl çelmek zor kullanmaktan daha az zararlı bir yöntem olarak görülmemelidir (2004: 5-6).

Yumuşak güç ile sert güç birbirlerine bir denge ile bağlıdır. Bir ülke ekonomik ve askeri gücündeki bir gerilemeye bağlı olarak, yalnızca sahip olduğu sert gücünü yitirmemekte; aynı zamanda uluslararası gündemi belirleme kabiliyetini ve cazibesini de bir ölçüde yitirecek duruma gelmektedir. Yumuşak güç, enformasyon ortamları üzerinden uygulanabilmektedir. Ülkelerin en uygun yumuşak güç kullanım biçiminin enformasyon ile uygulanacağı savındaki Nye'ye göre, en iyi propaganda ise propaganda yapmaktır. Bir ülkenin yumuşak güç öğeleri kültürü, politik değerleri, ve öteki devletler tarafından meşru görülen dış politikaları üzerinde kuruludur ve bunlar bağlamında diğerlerinin gözünden meşru olarak görülmesi gerekmektedir. Üstelik başarılı bir askeri operasyon, neyi yok ettiği ile değil; ne yarattığı ile ilgilidir (2014; 2004: 9, 99). Enformasyonun güç olarak değerlendirilmesine bağlı olarak gücün kapsamının ve araçlarının artık farklı çizilmesi; güvenlik ve savaş kavramlarının önceki dönemlere göre algılanmasında da farklılıklar yaratmıştır. Bu nedenle ülkelerin ve orduların yumuşak güç öğesi olarak iletişim uygulamalarına verdikleri önem de artmıştır. Ülke yöneticilerinin ve askerî sözcülerin medya üzerinden kitleler ile kurdukları iletişimde, konvansiyonel gücün yanı sıra insani değerler, medyanın gündemi, haber içerikleri de birer güç öğesine dönüşmüşlerdir ve bugün gelinen noktada gündem belirleme de yumuşak güç öğesidir (Nye ve Welch, 2010: 58). Irak Savaşı bu açıdan incelenmeye değer bir örnektir. ABD ordusunda kara, deniz ve hava kuvvetleri bünyesinde kamera ve silah taşıyan 150 fotoğrafçı Savaş Kamerası (Combat Camera)

Programı kapsamında ilk defa Irak Savaşı'nda düzenli olarak görüntü ve fotoğraf çekerek, haber ajanslarına, medya kuruluşlarına bu fotoğrafları dağıtmışlardır. Savaş Kamerası Birliği'nin böylelikle bir haber kaynağına dönüşmesi (Hiebert, 2003: 250-252) yumuşak güç ve propaganda modeli kapsamındaki uygulamalara örnektir.

Dış politika alanında özellikle medya içerikleri aracılığıyla kullanılabilen yumuşak güç, daha çok sivil toplum, tanınmış kişiler ve medya şirketleri tarafından oluşturulmaktadır (Nye, 2023: 19). İdeolojileri, düşünceleri, kültürel, toplumsal ve politik düşünceleri, olası tehdit öğelerini ve hatta gerçekleşen olayları kitlelere aktaran filmler, kitaplar, dergiler ve gazetelerde sunulan her türlü medya içeriğinde olduğu gibi haber metinleri de yumuşak gücün kullanıldığı ortamlardır. Yumuşak güç, hedefin kabul etmesi sayesinde uygulanabilmektedir.

## **YÖNTEM**

Betimsel, alan araştırması yöntemi kullanılarak gerçekleştirilen bu çalışma kapsamında örnek olay incelemesi ve ilişkisel araştırma modeli üzerinden, içerik analizi tekniği uygulanmıştır. Araştırmanın önemi, amacı, alt soruları, örnekleme, evreni ve kullanılan yöntem ile teknik bu başlıkta yer almaktadır.

## **ÖNEM**

Yapılan literatür taramasında ABD'nin Irak Savaşı'nda uyguladığı propagandanın yapısının haber üretim ve yayım süreci üzerinden genel hatları ile çeşitli çalışmalarda özellikle çerçeveleme kuramı açısından ortaya konulduğu; ancak ABD'nin savaş programı kapsamında bu sürecin propaganda modeli çerçevesinde ele alınmadığı gözlemlenmiştir.

Birinci Körfez Savaşı canlı yayınla küresel televizyon izleyicisine aktarıldığında, savaş alanı, günlük hayat, vurulan hedefler ve buralardaki insanların durumu ile ilgili görüntülere yer verilmemiş; savaş bir "havai fişek gösterisi" gibi aktarılmıştır. Dolayısıyla alımlayıcı tarafından savaşın boyutu ve oradaki tarafların içinde buldukları durumlar yansıtılmamıştır. 2003 yılında Irak'ın işgali sırasında uygulanan iliştilenmiş gazetecilikte, ABD Ordusu tarafından algının oluşturulması için bir tür filtre uygulanmıştır.

Çalışma, savaş haberlerinin de bir tür anlatı olduğunun ortaya konulması ve bu haberlerdeki kurgunun algı yönetimi bağlamındaki rolünün değer-

lendirilmesi açılarından önem taşımaktadır. Yapısökücü (dekonstrüktif) bir yaklaşımla ele alınan konunun, teorik ve işlevsel olarak literatüre bir katkısı da örnek olay analizinin yapıldığı Irak Savaşı'nda uygulanan iliş-tirilmiş gazetecilik ile savaş anlatısı üzerinden nasıl duygudaşlık yaratıl-dığının ortaya konulmasıdır. Irak Savaşı üzerine yapılan çalışmalar daha kısa süreyi ele aldığından, çalışma kapsadığı sürecin uzunluğu açısından da benzerlerinden ayrılmaktadır.

## AMAÇ

Uluslararası hukuk bağlamında Irak'a yönelik yaptırımların uygulanabi-lirliği BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nin 1441 sayılı kararına dayanmakta ve bu karara göre

1) İşbirliği, 2) Silahlanma ve 3) Güvenlik olarak üç ana başlıkta toplan-maktadır.

İncelenen haberlerde bu üç ana başlığa ait anahtar sözcükler saptanarak, "Çevrimiçi yayıncılıkta 2003 Irak Savaşı haberleri propaganda amacıyla nasıl kullanılmıştır?" sorusunun yanıtı, Chomsky ile Herman'ın propa-ganda modeli üzerinden sorgulanmıştır. "Haberin içerdiği enformasyon ve sunulmasındaki sıklık (frekans) propagandaya yöneliktir." hipotezinden yola çıkılarak, haber metinlerinin, Irak Savaşı sırasında; gündem belirle-me amaçlı kullanımı ve haber sıklığı üzerinden, aşağıdaki sorulara yanıt aranmıştır:

1. Çalışma kapsamında toplanan haber içerikleri gerçekliğin aktarıldığı propaganda amaçlı bir araç olarak kullanılmış mıdır?
2. Savaşa dair her türlü enformasyon propaganda için kullanılabilenekte midir?
3. Irak Savaşı sırasında; bir yumuşak güç aracı olarak haberde gündem belirleme nasıl kullanılmıştır?
4. Propaganda modelinde SSCB'nin yıkılışı sonrası işlerliğini yitiren be-şinci filtre, bugünkü konjonktürde, ideolojik gündem olarak kullanılıyor olabilir mi?

## YÖNTEM VE TEKNİK

Çalışmada çevrimiçi yayıncılıkta yayımlanan savaş anlatısının propagan-da amaçlı olarak nasıl kullanıldığı irdelenerek, enformasyon yönetimi açı-sından oynadığı rol değerlendirilmeye alınmıştır.



Betimsel alan araştırması yöntemi kullanılan çalışma kapsamında örnek olay incelemesi, ilişkisel araştırma modeli üzerinden, içerik analizi tekniği ile uygulanmıştır. Nitel ve nicel yöntemlerin birlikte kullanıldığı araştırmada, sorunsal kapsamında 2003 Irak Savaşı örnek olayı birbirine eşdeğer iki ayrı gazetecilik kuruluşunun haberleri; haber türleri, haberlerin günlük yayım sayısı ve içerikleri bağlamlarında karşılaştırılarak araştırma sorularının yanıtı aranmıştır.

Örnekleme alınan haberlerde, Irak Savaşı BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nin 1441 sayılı kararına dayandırıldığından, ilk olarak bu kararda 3 ana başlıkta yer alan kavramlar, haber metinlerinde taranmış ve sözcüklerin bu metinlerde yer alma sıklığı saptanmıştır. İkinci aşamada bu metinler, haber türlerine göre sınıflandırılarak haberlerin yayınlandığı günlere göre ayrılmışlardır. Üçüncü aşamada savaşa yönelik olumlu/olumsuz/nötr değerler de söylem çözümlemesine tabi tutulmuştur. Dördüncü aşamada toplanan veriler doğrultusunda her iki yayım kuruluşu karşılaştırılmıştır. Beşinci aşamada her iki yayım kuruluşunda yayınlanıp örneklem dışına çıkarılan içeriklerin de çalışma açısından anlamlılığı olup olmadığı irdelenmiştir.

BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nin 1441 sayılı kararı; 1) İş birliği 2) Silahlanma ve 3) Güvenlik olarak üç ana başlıkta toplanmaktadır. Her ana başlığın altında birkaç kavram yer almaktadır. Her ana başlığın altındaki bu kavramlar, içerik çözümlemesinde kullanılacak anahtar sözcükler olarak saptanmıştır. Buna göre, haberlerde aranacak İngilizce sözcüklerin yanında, parantez içinde Türkçe karşılıkları şöyle yer almaktadır:

Compliance (iş birliği) başlığı için 1) comply (uymak) – compliance (uyum), 2) collaboration–collabarate, (iş birliği), 3) cooperate –cooperation (birlikte çalışmak), 4) resolve (çözmek)- resolution (çözüm), 5) accept (kabul);

Poliferation (silahlanma) başlığı için 1) WMD (KİS) – weapon (silah) – arm (silah), 2) biological (biyolojik), 3) nuclear (nükleer), 4) chemical (kimyasal/kimyevi), 5) uranium, (uranyum), 6) missile (füze);

Security (güvenlik) başlığı için 1) peace (barış)- ceasefire (ateşkes), 2) operation (operasyon)- invasion (işgal) – war (savaş), 3) UNSCOM-IA-EA- (atom + ajans), 4) sovereignty (egemenlik), 5) threat (tehdit) – hostile (saldırgan/ düşmanca tutum) – terror (terör), 6) inspection (denetim/denetleme).



Çalışma kapsamında bu üç ana başlığa ait anahtar sözcüklerden yola çıkarak araştırma sorularına yanıt aranmıştır. Bu yanıtlar, Chomsky ile Herman'ın propaganda modeli üzerinden sorgulanmıştır.

## EVREN VE ÖRNEKLEM

Çalışmanın evreni internette yayın yapan anaakım gazeteler; alt evreni ise ABD'de ve Türkiye'de internette yayın yapan anaakım gazetelerdir. Her iki yayın kuruluşunun içerikleri internet kullanıcılarının serbest erişimine olanak sunmaktadır.

Örneklem grubuna çevrimiçi ABD haber sitesi olarak Washington Post ve Türkiye'den Hürriyet internet siteleri dahil edilmiştir. Washington Post'un seçilme nedeni önceki çalışmalarda kullanılan araştırma modellerine alınmış olması ve sitenin örneklem toplamaya olanak sağlamasıdır. Türk haber sitelerinden Hürriyet'in çalışmaya seçilme nedeni ise, yine örneklem toplamaya elverişliliği ile bu sitenin Türkiye'de en fazla takip edilen haber sitelerinden biri olmasıdır.

## VERİLERİN TOPLANMASI VE İŞLEM

Haber metninde içeriğin öz olarak sunulduğu, haberin türünün ve konusunun anlaşıldığı, haberin özeti niteliğindeki bir veya iki cümleden oluşan bölüm flaş olarak adlandırılmaktadır. Haberlerin en çok okunan bölümleri başlık ve flaş bölümleridir. Haber tüketicileri flaş bölümünden sonra haber metninin uzunluğuna bağlı olarak veya flaş bölümünden haberin içeriğine dair genel fikir edininip devamındaki metni okumayabilmektedir. Gazetecilik uygulamaları açısından gazete ve internet haberlerinde, haberin okunurluğunu artırmak adına üzerinde en çok durulan bölümler de başlık ve flaş bölümleridir. Çalışmada incelenen haber sayısının çokluğundan ve haber tüketicisinin haber okumaya yönelik genel tutumundan dolayı haberlerin başlıkları ile flaş bölümleri incelenmiştir.

Çalışmanın kapsadığı 17 Kasım 2002- 12 Mayıs 2003 döneminde Washington Post Gazetesi'nin internet sitesi arşivinden "Irak" ve Hürriyet Gazetesi'nin internet sitesi arşivinden "Irak" anahtar sözcükleri ile ilgili haberler, Kasım 2012-Mart 2013 tarihleri arasında, sitelerin detaylı arama sistemleri üzerinden toplanmıştır. Washington Post sitesinden, 5199, Hürriyet'ten 6418; toplamda 11617 haberin toplanmasının ardından; köşe yazıları, söyleşiler, röportajlar, okur mektupları, kitap tanıtımları ve editoriyal yazılar, çalışmada haberlerin başlık ve flaş bölümleri inceleneceğinden örneklem dışına çıkartılmıştır.

Örneklemedeki metinler olumluluk değerine göre olumlu-olumsuz-nötr; Irak Savaşı ile ilgisi bakımından doğrudan- dolaylı ve haber türlerine göre politika, dış politika, dış haberler, ekonomi, yaşam, diğer (magazin, teknoloji, sağlık, turizm,spor) olarak türlere ayrılmıştır.

Araştırmada olumluluk ile ilgili değişkenler savaşın meşruluğu yönündeki veya savaşın sonucunda ortaya çıkacak demokrasi, barış ortamı, yeniden yapılanma gibi savaşa yönelik olumlu değerlere gönderme yapan metinler için kullanılmıştır. Savaşın koşullarının oluşmadığı, savaşın yapılmaması gerektiği, savaş karşıtı protestolar, barış çağrıları, kitle imha silahlarının (KİS) bulunamaması gibi değerler ise, savaşa yönelik olumsuz değerlere gönderme yapan metinler için kullanılmıştır. Örnekleme Irak ile ilgili haberlerin başlıkları ve flaş bölümleri alınmıştır ve bu bölümlerde savaş ile ilgili bir değer taşımayan haberler ile, bu bölümlerde olumlu ve olumsuz değişkenleri aynı anda içeren haberler ise nötr olarak değerlendirilmiştir.

## **SINIRLILIKLAR**

Örneklem grubuna alınan çevrimiçi yayın organlarının yayınlandığı günden araştırmanın yapıldığı güne kadar içeriğinde bir değişiklik yapılmadığı varsayılmaktadır.

İncelemeye konu olan dönem 18 Kasım 2002 ile 11 Mayıs 2003 tarihleri arasındadır. 18 Kasım 2002 BM silah denetçilerinin kitle imha silahları konusunda incelemelerde bulunmak üzere Irak'a gittiği 11 Mayıs 2003 ise Irak'ta Baas Partisi'nin yanı sıra Saddam Hüseyin döneminin tüm kurumlarının lağvedildiğinin duyurulduğu tarihtir.İncelemeye konu olan dönem gazetecilik uygulamaları göz önünde bulundurularak 17 Kasım 2002 ile 12 Mayıs 2003 arasında sınırlandırılmıştır.

Araştırma yapılan dönemde yayın yapan yurttaşların ve koalisyon gücünde görevli askerlerin blogları (milblog) ise, bloglar olayın gerçekleştiği tarih ile çalışmanın yapıldığı tarih arasında geçen süre içinde yayından kalkmış olmaları, özellikle de milbloglar üzerinden yayımı yapılan enforsasyonun sakıncalı bulunarak yayımdan kaldırılması nedeniyle metodolojik olarak sağlıklı veri toplamaya neden olacaklarından dolayı bloglar araştırma kapsamına alınmamıştır.

Çalışma ABD ile Türk medyası üzerinden karşılaştırılarak gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Çalışmada haber başlıkları ve haberlerin flaş bölümleri incelenmektedir. Bu nedenle röportaj, söyleşi, köşe yazısı, okur mektupları gibi teknik olarak flaş bölümü içermeyen gazete içerikleri örneklemeden çıkarılmıştır.

## VERİ VE BULGULAR


Çevrimiçi sitelerden örneklem kapsamında yer alan haber metinleri toplanıp içerik çözümlemesi uygulanarak ortaya çıkan veriler başlıklar altında sıralanmaktadır. Örneklem dışına çıkarılan içerikle de ilgili duygudaşlık üzerinden anlamlılık saptanmış ve bu anlamlılığa genel değerlendirme başlığı altında yer verilmiştir.

## HABER İÇERİKLERİNİN PROPAGANDA BAĞLAMINDA İRDELENMESİ

Çalışmanın kapsadığı 17 Kasım 2002- 12 Mayıs 2003 döneminde Washington Post sitesinden, 5199, Hürriyet'ten 6418; toplamda 11617 haber toplanmıştır. Köşe yazıları, söyleşiler, röportajlar, okur mektupları, kitap tanıtımları ve editoryal yazılar, çalışmada haberlerin başlık ve flaş bölümleri inceleneceğinden örneklem dışına çıkartılmıştır. Washington Post'tan 3396, Hürriyet'ten 5328 haber geriye kalmış; toplamda 8714 haber değerlendirmeye alınmıştır. Yüzde olarak bakıldığında, ayıklanan içeriklerden sonra Washington Post'tan ilk aşamada toplanan haberlerden %65'i, Hürriyet'ten toplananların ise %83'ü örnekleme dahil edilmiştir.

Toplam haber sayısı arasındaki farkın gazetelerin konuya verdikleri önem ile ilgili olduğu çıkarımının yapılması olası değildir. Burada yayın kuruluşlarının yayın politikaları, günlük haber aktarım kotaları, son dakika haberciliği uygulamaları, ABD'deki ve Türkiye'deki gazetecilik uygulamalarındaki genel farklılıklar, haber tüketicisinin yayın kuruluşlarından beklentileri gibi etkenlerin, toplam haber sayılarındaki farka yol açma olasılığı göz önünde tutulmalıdır.

**Grafik 1.** 17 Kasım 2002-12 Mayıs 2003 Arasında Washington Post Ve Hürriyet Gazetelerinden Örnekleme Alınan Haber Sayıları



Irak ile ilgili haberler en yüksek sayıya Washington Post'ta 21 Mart 2003'te, Hürriyet'te ise 20 Mart 2003'te ulaşmıştır. Her iki gazetede de çatışmaların en yoğun olduğu dönemde kuramsal çerçevede yer aldığı üzere (Kim, 2012: 325) haberlerin sıklığının arttığı saptanmıştır. Şubat sonunda her iki gazete için de sıklık değerlerinin artmaya başladığı, Nisan ortalarında ise azalmaya başladığı; yine her iki gazete için de savaşın ilk haftasında haber sayısının en yüksek değerde olduğu görülmektedir.

Bu haberler, Irak'a müdahale yapılmasının dayandırıldığı BM'nin 1441 sayılı kararı bağlamında; Irak'a yönelik yaptırımların gerekçesi olarak iş birliği, silahsızlanma ve güvenlik olmak üzere üç ana başlıkta incelendiğinde; Washington Post haberleri %61 güvenlik, %31 silahlanma, %8 iş birliği; Hürriyet haberleri ise, %68 güvenlik, %21 silahsızlanma ve %11 iş birliği başlıkları altında dağılmıştır. Her iki gazetenin haberlerinin en çok güvenlik, en az iş birliği ana başlıklarında üretildiği saptanmıştır.

Haber aktarımı sıklığı bağlamında savaştan birkaç gün önce özellikle 16 Mart'ta iki gazetenin de haber sayısında bir azalma olduğu saptanmıştır. 16 Mart 2003 Pazar gününe denk gelmektedir. Özel durumlar dışında gazetecilerin bir bölümünün haftalık tatil kullanabildikleri günler olduğundan bugünlerde haber toplanması ve üretilmesindeki azalmada bunun da göz önünde bulundurulması yararlıdır. Her iki gazetede de Cumartesi, Pazar ve Pazartesi günlerinde örnekleme alınan haber sayılarında azalma saptanmıştır.

Güvenlik ana başlığı, her iki gazetenin haber içeriklerinde öne çıkmaktadır. Savaş, bu ana başlığın anahtar sözcüklerindedir. İşbirliği ana başlığını her iki gazete de daha az gündeme getirmektedir. Silahlanma ana başlığına dair veriler bakımından ise Washington Post bu başlıktaki anahtar sözcüklere Hürriyet'e oranla daha çok yer vermektedir.

### **SAVAŞ ANLATILARINDAKİ ENFORMASYONUN PROPAGANDA BAĞLAMINDA KULLANILMASININ İRDELENMESİ**


Çalışma kapsamında savaş haberleri ile ilgili olumlu ve olumsuz değerler Irak veya Koalisyon Gücü ülkeler temelinde ele alınmamış; savaşla ilgili eylemler ve söylemler üzerinden değerlendirme yapılmıştır. Haberlerin başlık ve flaş bölümleri incelenip sonraki bölümler değerlendirmeye alınmadığından; bazı haberlerin incelenen bölümlerinde olumlu veya olumsuz değerleri içermediği görülmüş; bu tür haberler nötr olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Olumlu değerler savaş koşullarının oluştuğunu, savaşın kaçınılmazlığını, savaşın Irak'a ve bölgeye demokrasi getireceğini, Irak'ın yeniden yapılanmasını, bölgeye sevk edilen askeri gücü içeren enformasyonun yanı sıra; Irak tarafının gerekirse savaşılacağı ile ilgili açıklamalarını, savaş hazırlıklarını, savaşı kazanacakları açıklamalarını kapsamaktadır. Bu doğrultuda savaşın nedenlerinden biri olan KİS'lerin bulunamaması, gerek Irak, gerekse ABD ve diğer ülkelerdeki savaş karşıtı gösteriler, dini ve politik liderlerin barış çağrıları diğer ülkelerin BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nde savaşın koşullarının oluşmadığı yönündeki açıklamaları Irak Savaşı'na dair olumsuz değer olarak ele alınmıştır. Bununla birlikte savaş başladıktan sonra her iki tarafın askerlerinin ölümleri, sivil halkın uğradığı kayıplar ve işkenceler, savaş koşullarında ortaya çıkan sağlık sorunları ve toplumsal sorunlar da olumsuz olarak değerlendirilmiştir.

Örnekleme yer alan Washington Post haberlerinin %30'u olumlu, %15'i olumsuz; Hürriyet haberlerinin ise %28'i olumlu, %17'si olumsuz içerik taşımaktadır. Bu açıdan her iki gazetenin haberlerinin olumluluk düzeyinin birbirine yakın olduğu saptanmıştır.

Haberler, içeriklerinin doğrudan Irak Savaşı ile ilgili olup olmamaları açısından incelendiğinde, Washington Post internet sitesinde yer alan Irak'a yönelik haberlerin %54'ünün, Hürriyet internet sitesinde yer alan Irak'a yönelik haberlerin %69'unun doğrudan Irak savaşı ile ilgili olduğu görülmüştür. Washington Post'taki Irak haberlerinin daha büyük bir oranda dolaylı olduğu anlaşıldığından, Irak ile ilgili içeriğin, Irak Savaşı'ndan en azından başlık ve flaş bölümleri kapsamında bağımsız olarak gündeme getirildiği sonucu ile yorumlanması olasıdır.

Her iki gazetede aktarılan haberlerin türlerine göre dağılımları Grafik 2’de yer almaktadır. Washington Post’tan toplanan Irak haberlerinin %32’si dış politika, %23’ü dış haberler, %14’ü ekonomi, %13’ü politika, %13’ü yaşam haberlerinden ve %5’i diğer (magazin, teknoloji, spor, sağlık) haberlerden oluşmaktadır. Hürriyet’ten toplanan Irak haberlerinin ise %53’ü dış haberler, %19’u dış politika, %13’ü ekonomi, %9’u politika, %3’ü yaşam haberlerinden ve %3’ü diğer (magazin, teknoloji, spor, sağlık) haberlerden oluşmaktadır.

**Grafik 2.17** Kasım 2002-12 Mayıs 2003 Arasında Washington Post ve Hürriyet Gazetelerinin İnternet Sitelerinde Yayınlanan Haberlerin Türlerine Göre Dağılımı



Haber türleri açısından özellikle dış politika ve yaşam haberlerinde dikkat çekici sonuçlar elde edilmiştir. ABD’nin savaşın taraflarından biri olması önemlidir. Türk ve ABD gazeteleri açısından bakıldığında, ABD gazetesi için dış politika haberi türündeki bir olay, Türk gazetesi açısından, haberin kaynağına bağlı olarak dış haberler türünde yer alabilmektedir. Dolayısıyla bu noktada savaşın aktörleri ve kaynak öğeleri önem kazanmaktadır.

Yaşam haberleri açısından bakıldığında, bu tür haberlerin Washington Post’ta %13, Hürriyet’te ise %3 oranında olduğu görülmektedir. İnsan öykülerini de içeren yaşam haberleri, Washington Post ile Hürriyet’te yer alma açısından karşılaştırıldığında genel ortalamada belirgin bir yer kapsamaktadır.

Yaşam haberleri, genel olarak bakıldığında içinde duyguyu en çok barındıran haber türüdür. Bu açıdan yaşam haberlerinin savaş anlatılarına dönüşmesi önemlidir. Yaşam haberleri, günlük hayattan kesitler ve insan öyküleri içeren haber türüdür. En sık kullanılan propaganda tekniklerinden biri duygulara seslenmek olduğundan, insan öyküleri önem taşımaktadır.

Haber türleri açısından elde edilen veriler, haberde aktarılan enformasyonun propaganda bağlamındaki kullanımının ortaya çıkması açısından önem taşımakla birlikte propaganda modelinin beşinci filtresinin işlerliği açısından da gereken verileri oluşturmaktadır.

## **IRAK SAVAŞI SIRASINDA GÜNDEM BELİRLEME ARACI OLARAK HABERİN YUMUŞAK GÜÇ BAĞLAMINDA İRDELENMESİ**

Yumuşak güç, ikna ederek, değerlerin benimsenmesi gibi zorlayıcı olmayan yöntemler kullanarak, ekonomik, politik veya askerî yaptırımlar olmaksızın, karşı tarafın hedeflenen yönde düşünmesi ve davranması için gereken koşulların sağlanmasını kapsamaktadır. Bir düşünce ortamı oluşturmak ve bunun için gerçekliği oluşturmak da yumuşak güç uygulamalarının kapsamındadır (Nye, 2004: 5-6, Nye, 2010: 2, Nye ve Welch, 2010: 58). Uluslararası haber ajanslarının veya medya kuruluşlarının aktardığı haberlerde, bazı kavramların ve olayların öne çıkarılması, bazılarının ise göz ardı edilerek yok sayılması, propagandif söylemin yumuşak güç olarak değerlendirilmesi olasıdır. Haberde hedeflenen doğrultuda bir düşünce ortamı oluşturulması için kullanılacak en uygun yöntemlerden biri bazı sözcüklerin frekansı; başka bir deyişle sözcüklerin yinelenme sıklığıdır. Haber tüketicisinin sıklıkla yinelenen sözcüğü, kavramı, olguyu, durumu veya söylemi ayırmsayarak, kişisel gündeminde buna yer verme olasılığı güçlenecektir. Bu, aynı zamanda gündem belirleme ve ardından kamuoyu oluşumu sürecinin medya içerikleri üzerinden biçimlenebileceği bir aşamadır. Öne çıkarılan içeriğin ötekilerden ayırt edilip görece önemli olarak nitelendirilmesi, ileride kitlelerin tutumları ile davranışları üzerinde etkili olacak kamuoyu oluşum sürecinin başlangıcıdır (Yüksel, 1997: 576-578). Medyada, özellikle haberlerde öne çıkarılan içeriklerin kamuoyu oluşumu ile ilgili önemi bundan kaynaklanmaktadır.

Irak'a müdahalenin uluslararası hukuk açısından meşruiyetinin dayandırıldığı BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nin 1441 sayılı kararı çerçevesinde yapılan değerlendirme sonucu Hürriyet'in işbirliği ana başlığında yer alan haberlerin tek başına anahtar sözcük ve bu sözcüğün yer aldığı haber sayısının farklılık gösterdiği saptanmıştır. Yani Hürriyet'te işbirliği ana başlığında 167 kere kabul sözcüğü yinelenirken, çözüm-çözmek sözcüğü 160 kere yinelenmiştir; ancak her iki anahtar sözcük de toplam 139'ar haberde yer almıştır. İçinde geçtikleri haber sayısı aynı olmasına karşın, sıklığı daha çok olan kabul sözcüğü bu nedenle Tablo 1'de Hürriyet'te işbirliği ana başlığında en sık yer verilen anahtar sözcük olarak yer almaktadır. Her



iki gazetede de, diğer tüm anahtar sözcükler için haber sayısı ile sözcük yinelenmesi birbirinin aynıdır.

Haberler incelendiğinde her iki gazetede de silah ve savaş sözcükleri en yüksek değeri verdiği için, haber tüketicisinin olumlu, olumsuz veya nötr ayırt etmeksizin haberleri okuduğunda en çok savaş ve silah sözcüklerini içeren anlatılarla karşılaşır ve bu kavramlar üzerine düşünmesi olasıdır. İşbirliği ana başlığı kapsamında ise ABD gazetesinin okurları daha çok çözüm içeren haber içerikleriyle karşılaşırken, Türk gazetesi okurları kabul sözcüklerini içeren haber içerikleriyle karşılaşmışlardır.

**Tablo 1.** 17 Kasım 2002-12 Mayıs 2003 Arasında Washington Post ve Hürriyet Sitemlerinden Toplanan Haberlerin Ana Başlıklar Altında En Yüksek Sıklık Değerleri

Ana başlıklara göre en çok sözcük	WP		Hürriyet
silahlanma	weapon		silah
güvenlik	war		savaş
işbirliği	resolve-resolution		kabul

Diğerlerinin tercihlerini belirleme yeteneği üzerine kurulu yumuşak güç, akıl çelme, ikna, cezbetme gibi ılıman yöntemlerle hedeflenen doğrultuda düşünce, tutum, duygu ve algı oluşturulması süreçlerini içermektedir (Nye, 2004: 5; Nye ve Welch, 2010: 58). Dolayısıyla haberlerde söylenenler kadar, söylenmeyenlerin de büyük önemi vardır ve yumuşak güç uygulaması bağlamında bir şeyi söylememek de, söylemek kadar etkin bir yöntem olarak kullanılabilir. Haberlerde ana başlıklara göre en az yer verilen sözcükler Tablo 2’de görülmektedir. Bu noktada her iki gazetede de silahlanma başlığında uranyum, en az yinelenen sözcüktür. Oysa, savaşın dayandırıldığı temel nedenlerden biri, Irak’ın Nijer’den uranyum aldığı ve bununla KİS’leri geliştirdiği iddiasıdır. ABD ve Türk gazetesinde haber akışının çok az olması bu açıdan dikkat çekicidir. Çünkü gazetecilikte, önemli olgular, tarihler veya olaylar, gazeteciler tarafından aralıklarla araştırılıp haberleştirilmektedir. Fikri takip denilen bu uygulama, gazetecilerin bazı konuları sıklıkla gündeme getirmesinin de açıklamasıdır. Savaşın ardından Irak’ta uranyum bulunmadığı ortaya çıkmış (BBC, 2004), böylelikle savaşın temel dayanaklarından birinin çürük olduğu anlaşılmıştır.



**Tablo 2.** 17 Kasım 2002-12 Mayıs 2003 Arasında Washington Post ve Hürriyet Sitelerinden Toplanan Haberlerin Ana Başlıklar Altında En Düşük Sıklık Değerleri

Ana başlıklara göre en az sözcük	WP	Hürriyet
silahlanma	uranium	uranyum
güvenlik	sovereign	saldırgan, düşmanca
işbirliği	collaborate-collaboration	uyum-uyma

Bu veriler kuramsal çerçeve ile ve özellikle Stahl'ın medyanın oluşturduğu içerikleri tüketmekte olan bir kişinin, maruz kaldığı propaganda nedeniyle "neden savaşıyoruz" sorusunu aklına getirmeden; yalnızca "savaşıyoruz" kabulü ile anlatıyı alımladığı savıyla örtüşür niteliktedir (Stahl, 2010: 56). Irak Savaşı'nın çıkmasını ve iktidardaki Baas Partisi'nin lağvedilmesini kapsayan süreçte haber tüketicilerinin Irak'ta uranyum bulunup bulunmadığı üzerine düşünme koşullarının medyada oluşturulmadığı saptanmıştır. Savaşın temel nedenlerinden birinin dayandığı uranyumun gündeme getirilmemesi, kuramsal çerçeve bağlamında bir yumuşak güç uygulaması olarak görülmektedir. Bunun dışında Washington Post'ta en az yinelenen sözcükler güvenlik ana başlığında sovereign (egemen) ve işbirliği başlığında collaborate-collaboration (işbirliği) iken; Hürriyet'teki haberlerde güvenlik ana başlığında saldırgan-düşmanca ve işbirliği başlığında ise uyum-uyma olarak saptanmıştır. Bu başlıklarda anlamlı bir ilişki görülmemiştir.

## PROPAGANDA MODELİNİN BEŞİNCİ FİLTRESİNİN İDEOLOJİK GÜNDEM OLARAK İŞLERLİĞİ

Belli bir konunun, durumun, olayın veya söylemin medyada sunulmasıyla kişilerin üzerinde düşüneceği konuların da büyük ölçüde belirlenmesi gündem belirlemenin özüdür ve kamuoyu oluşması sürecinin başlangıcıdır. Kamuoyunun oluşumunda medya dışındaki etkenlerin de rolü olmakla birlikte; medyanın kamuoyuna etkisinin bir konunun ayırt edilmesi, diğerlerinden önemli olarak nitelendirilmesi yönünde genel bir uzlaşısı vardır. Medya, kamuoyu oluşum sürecinin gündem belirleme aşamasında etkindir (Yüksel, 1997, 576-578). Nye'nin yumuşak güç kavramını geliştirmesinden önce, güç kavramını ele alan Bachrach ve Baratz'a göre gücün dışarıdan bakıldığında görünmeyen ve üzerinde düşünülmeyen dolaylı bir yüzü vardır. Gücün bu gizli yüzü toplumsal ve politik değerler üzerinden


kurulmakta (Bacrach & Baratz, 1962: 948), Lukes'a göre de bu koşullarda ortaya çıkan düşünce ortamı üzerinden kanılar ve inançlar oluşmaktadır (Nye, 2010). Dolayısıyla gazetelerde yer alan içerikler, bir yandan baskın ideolojinin gündemini yansıtırken, bir yandan da oluşan konjonktürün süreçliliği ve meşruluğunun da temelini oluşturmaktadır.

Çalışma kapsamında toplanan haberler Herman ile Chomsky'nin propaganda modeli kapsamında incelemeye alınmıştır. Bu modelin özelliği, haberin üretiminde, gazete içindeki örgütsel ilişkilerdeki amacın sorgulanamayacağı ön kabulünü barındırması ve medya içerikleri ile medya etkilerini değil; haber aktarım sürecinde medya sisteminin işleyişini irdelemesidir. Başka bir deyişle; propaganda modeli eşikbekçiliği, çerçeveleme, haber değeri gibi kavramları haber üretim ve aktarım sürecine dahil etmeden, haberi medyadan okura yansıtılanın üzerine kuran bir modeldir. Modelde, anaakım medyada yayınlanan bir haberin zaten modeli oluşturan filtrelerden geçtiği varsayılmaktadır. Propaganda modelini SSCB ile ABD arasında Soğuk Savaş döneminde, haber içerikleri üzerinden, genel konjonktürün kutuplaşmayı yansıtmasını açıklamak için bir sistem eleştirisi olarak ele almak olasıdır.

Medya kuruluşlarında haber aktarımını, sistem boyutu ile ele alan Herman ve Chomsky'nin propaganda modelinin Soğuk Savaş sonrası işlerliğini yitiren antikomünizm filtresi yerine Herman (2000) piyasa koşulları filtresini önermiş veya başka bir ögenin de bu filtre için işler olabileceğini savunmuştur.


SSCB'nin çöküşünden sonra orijinalinde antikomünizm olan beşinci filtrenin bugünün koşullarında ideolojik gündem olarak işlerliğinin değerlendirilebilmesi için, çalışmada önceki başlıklarda yer alan verilerin bu soruya yanıt olmak üzere yeniden ele alınması gerekmektedir. Dolayısıyla gazetelerde en çok ve en az yinelenen sözcükler, haber içeriklerinin savaşla dolaylı veya doğrudan ilgili olması, haberlerin türlere göre dağılımı üzerinde bu başlık altında yeniden durulmaktadır. Bunlarla birlikte, Tablo 1 ve 2'de yer alan gazetelerde en çok ve en az yer verilen anahtar sözcükler, günlük dağılımları ile Grafik 3'te Washington Post ve Grafik 4'te Hürriyet için ayrı ayrı görülmektedir.

**Grafik 3.** 17 Kasım 2002-12 Mayıs 2003 Arasında Washington Post İnternet Sitesinde BM 1441 Sayılı Karardaki Ana Başlıklara Göre Anahtar Sözcüklerin Günlere Göre En Yüksek Frekans Değerleri



Örneklem kapsamında haber toplanan 177 günlük süreçte, savaş sözcüğü Washington Post'ta 170 gün; Hürriyet'te ise 162 gün yer almıştır. Bu sonuçlardan niyete yönelik inceleme yapılması olası değildir. Yine de bu haberlerin, haber kaynaklarınca yayılan enformasyon, savaş ile ilgili yapılan açıklamalar, ünlülerin savaşa yönelik protestoları, ekonomi çevrelerinin savaşa yönelik önemleri gibi gündem belirleme kuramı açısından ikinci aşamada bulunan içeriği medya üzerinden kitlelere aktardığı göz önünde bulundurulmalıdır.

**Grafik 4.** 17 Kasım 2002-12 Mayıs 2003 Arasında Hürriyet İnternet Sitesinde BM 1441 Sayılı Karardaki Ana Başlıklara Göre Anahtar Sözcüklerin Günlere En Yüksek Frekans Değerleri



Haber türleri açısından yapılan değerlendirmede, her iki gazetede yer alan içeriklerde yalnızca ekonomi haberleri ve diğer haberler için yakın değerlerde sonuçlar ortaya çıkmıştır.

Gazetecilik uygulamaları açısından haberin iç veya dış kaynaklı olarak değerlendirilmesi, hangi ülkenin medya kuruluşunca aktarıldığına bağlı olarak değişmektedir. Dış haberler, haberin içerdiği bilgi veya enformasyonun yabancı kaynaklardan geldiğini göstermektedir. Dış haber oranının Washington Post için %23, Hürriyet için ise %53 olması, Hürriyet açısından Irak Savaşı'na yönelik bir kaynak bağımlığı olduğunu gösterir niteliktedir. ABD savaşın taraflarından biri olduğundan Washington Post için politika veya yaşam haberi olarak değerlendirilen bir haberin Hürriyet tarafından dış haber olarak işlenmesi doğaldır. Hürriyet'te yer alan haberlerin kaynağına bakıldığında, dış kaynakların ağırlıkta olması, aynı zamanda bu gazetenin internet sayfasında yer alan haberlerin dış kaynakların filtrelerinden geçip Hürriyet'e daha sonra ulaştığını göstermektedir. İki gazetenin karşılaştırması yapıldığında yine ABD'nin savaşın taraflarından biri olmasının; Washington Post'ta yayınlanan içeriklerde iç politika ve savaşın kişilerin hayatındaki izdüşümünün veya savaş ile ilgili kişilerin düşündüklerinin, hissettiklerinin daha çok yer almasının bir nedeni olarak değerlendirilmesi olasıdır.

Haberler, türlere göre gazetelerde yer alma oranlarına bağlı olarak değerlendirildiğinde gündem kavramı kapsamında açıklanabilmektedir. Gündem, medyada yer verilen konuların öncelik sırasına göre sıralanmasını da içerir ve kamuoyu oluşumunun başlangıcıdır (Yüksel, 1997: 577). Gramsci'ye göre devlet, ikna yoluyla kitlelerin ve toplumun rızasını yaratarak, siyasal iktidar sahibi olmanın yanı sıra, kültürel iktidarı sayesinde de kendi ideolojik hegemonyasını oluşturmaktadır. Bu sistemde medya sahipleri ile çalışanları egemen sınıfın hegemonyasını gerçekleştirmekte ve pekiştirmektedir (Vergin, 2008: 88, 92). Bu bağlamda haber de bir hegemonya aracıdır. Gerek anaakım gazete, televizyon kanalı gibi haber aktarım ortamları, gerekse uluslararası haber ajansları hegemonyayı pekiştirmekte, dolayısıyla bu doğrultudaki ideolojik gündemi aktarmaktadır.

Beşinci filtrenin ideolojik gündem olarak işlerliğinin olup olmadığı araştırıldığında, Tablo 1'de Washington Post ve Hürriyet gazetelerinde silahlanma ve güvenlik ana başlıklarında en çok yinelenen sözcüğün aynı olması; yine silahlanma ana başlığında savaşın başlama nedenleri arasında olmasıyla büyük önem taşıyan uranyum sözcüğünün bu başlık altında en

az yinelenen sözcük olması, Irak haberleri özelinde BM 1441'nci madde bağlamında bu iki gazetenin gündemlerinin benzerlik gösterdiğini ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Ana başlıklar çerçevesinde bakıldığında her iki gazete de güvenliğin üzerinde en çok haber üretilen; işbirliğinin ise en az haber üretilen ana başlık olması dikkat çekicidir. Chomsky ve Herman'a göre propaganda modelinde gazetecilerin niyetinin kesin olarak anlaşılması olması değildir ve modelde niyet soyutlanmıştır. Propaganda modeli, üretilen haberlerin bu filtrelerden geçerek üretildiği üzerine kuruludur. Kuramsal çerçevede bulgular değerlendirildiğinde ve Irak Savaşı'nda iliştilirilmiş gazeteciliğin kaynak filtresini oluşturduğu göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, haber içeriklerinden beşinci filtrenin ideolojik gündem olarak işlerliği bulunduğundan söz etmek olasıdır.

## GENEL DEĞERLENDİRME

Çalışma kapsamında Washington Post ile Hürriyet'in gündemleri karşılaştırıldığında, büyük bir benzerliğin olduğu görülmektedir. Bu veriler, her iki gazetede de en çok savaş ve silah sözcüklerinin yinlendiğini; buna karşın en az uranyum sözcüğünün geçtiğini göstermektedir. Savaş sonrasında Irak'ta KİS'lerin bulunamadığı açıklanmıştır. Savaşın temel dayanaklarından KİS'lerin varlığı ile uranyum doğrudan bağlantılı olduğundan, uranyuma çok az yer verilirken, silahlara geniş oranda yer verilmesi, söylenen kadar söylenmeyen şeylerin de propaganda kapsamında değerlendirilmesi gerektiğinin kanıtıdır.

Bununla birlikte her iki gazetenin de başlıkları bağlamında yapılan değerlendirmede güvenliğin birinci, silahlanmanın ikinci ve işbirliğinin üçüncü sırada yer aldığı görülmektedir. Bu sonuçlar da, propaganda modelinin beşinci filtresinin ideolojik gündem olarak işlerliği yönündedir.

Çalışma kapsamında son olarak örneklem dışına çıkarılan haberler bağlamında anlamlılık değerlendirmeye alınmış ve burada bir anlamlılık olabileceği saptanmıştır. Çalışma konusu süreçte Washington Post'un söyleşi, röportaj, köşe yazısı, okur mektubu vb. içeriğe daha çok yer verdiği görülmektedir. Söyleşi türü içeriklerde önemli bir kişi, bir konu veya bir durum öne çıkarılmaktadır. Röportajda yine benzer öğeler öne çıkarılabileceği gibi, röportaj özünde yazınsal bir tür olduğundan, söz oyunları ve okurun ilgisini çeken yazınsal söylem de kullanılabilir. Köşe yazıları ise söyleşi ve röportajdaki tüm teknikleri kullanabilmekle birlikte, öteki tür haberlere göre daha derin analizler ve öngörüler içeren içeriklerdir. Okur mektupları olumlu, olumsuz duygular ile görüşleri barındıran,

kişilerin yalnızca bir durum karşısındaki tepkilerini göstermek için yazılmış, enformasyon içermeyen yazılardır. Bu verilerden Washington Post'un Hürriyet'e oranla Irak ile ilgili olarak duygu, analiz, bilgi içeren haber türlerini aktarmaya daha yatkın olduğu görülmektedir. Duygular, özellikle 20. Yüzyılın ikinci yarısında ideolojilerin, liderlerin ve her türlü ürünün tercih edilmesinde kullanılan yöntemlerden birine dönüşmüştür. İki karşıt kutbun olduğu ortamlarda, özellikle internet üzerinden yayılan içeriklerde anlatısı güçlü olan ve kamuoyunun desteğini almak için duygulara seslenen anlatılar sıklıkla kullanılmaktadır (Yavuz Görkem, 2019: 98). Bu bağlamda örneklem dışına çıkarılan içeriklerin, özellikle savaşın tarafı olan ABD gazetesinde, Türk gazetesine oranla duygu yoğun içeriğin daha fazla bulunduğu saptanmıştır. Oysa, Türkiye'nin Irak ile sınır komşusu olması, özellikle sınır bölgesindeki insanların birbirleriyle bağının bulunması Irak ile ilgili Türk halkının da hassasiyetini oluşturan etkenlerdir. Dolayısıyla Türk haber medyasının da özünde Irak'ta olanlarla ilgili duygusal içerikler yayınlaması şaşırtıcı bir durum oluşturmamaktadır. Bununla birlikte genel gazetecilik uygulamaları arasındaki farklılığın iki ülke haber içerikleri arasında farklılığın nedeni olarak açıklanması da olasıdır. Gündem belirleme ve kamuoyu oluşumu süreçleri bağlamında değerlendirildiğinde ise, haber tüketicisinin duygularına seslenen içerikler, okuru/izleyiciyi hedeflenen yönde tutum ve davranışa yönlendirmektedir.

## **SONUÇ**

Bugünkü enformasyon çağında bilginin üretimi, dağıtımı ve iletişim teknolojilerin geliştirilip kullanılabilmesi bir güç ögesidir. Enformasyonu yönetmenin her aşamasıyla ayrı bir güç aracına dönüşmesi, algının, olgu kadar önem kazanmasının da zeminini oluşturmuştur. Özellikle uluslararası politika ve savaş alanlarında yeni iletişim teknolojilerinden ve enformasyon yönetiminden yoğun oranda faydalanılmaktadır. Bu açıdan siyaset bilimi ile iletişim bilimlerinin ortak kümesinde olan bu çalışmanın konusu gibi alanların önemi giderek artmaktadır.

İletişim teknolojilerine ve haber dağıtım ağları olan haber ajanslarına, güvenilir ve itibarlı yayıncılık kuruluşlarına sahip ülkeler, bu doğrultuda büyük kaynaklar sağlayan ülkeler, yumuşak gücünü uygulamak için ortam bulabilmektedir. Araştırma sonuçlarının çalışmada oluşturulan kuramsal çerçeve kapsamında çözümlenmesi de bunu desteklemektedir.

Çalışmanın temel sorusu çevrimiçi yayıncılıkta 2003 Irak Savaşı haberlerinin propaganda amacıyla nasıl kullanıldığıdır. Bu bağlamda haberde

propagandanın nasıl yapılabileceğinin anlaşılması ve açıklanması için oluşturulan kuramsal çerçevede, toplanan enformasyonun haber anlatısına dönüştürülüp aktarımına kadar geçen sürecin aşamaları değerlendirilerek, ortaya çıkan veriler üzerinden alt araştırma sorularının yanıtı aranmıştır. Bu veriler haber aktarımını sistem boyutuyla ele alan Herman ile Chomsky'nin geliştirdiği propaganda modeli kapsamında incelenmiştir. Çalışma kapsamında gerek Washington Post'ta gerekse Hürriyet'te yayınlanan haberlerin içeriklerinin benzerliği ve içeriklerin ideolojik gündemi yansıttığı saptanmıştır. Savaşın dayanaklarından olan Irak'ın Nijer'den uranyum olarak silah geliştirdiğine ilişkin içeriklerin ise, savaş sürecinde üzerinde durulmayan konulardan olması dikkat çekicidir. İki ülke gazetesi karşılaştırıldığında Washington Post'ta duygulara seslenen ve böylelikle okur kitlede duygudaşlık yaratabilecek içeriklere daha ağırlıkla yer verildiği sonucuna varılmıştır.

SSCB'nin çökmesinden sonra beş filtreden oluşan propaganda modelinin atıl olan beşinci filtresinin bugün 'ideolojik gündem' olarak işlerliği sonucuna varılmıştır.

İletişim alanında kullanılan modeller ve kuramlar baskın araca (medium), bu araçları kullananların davranışlarına, genel konjonktüre, toplumsal ve ekonomik koşullara göre dönemsel olarak değişiklik gösterebilmektedir. Dolayısıyla, iletişim çalışmalarında bir dönem geçerli bir kuramın, bir değişkenin devreye girmesine bağlı olarak rafa kaldırılması, başka bir koşul oluştuğunda yeniliğe uyum sağlamak üzere yeniden yorumlanarak işlerlik kazanması olasıdır. Bu açıdan değerlendirildiğinde, Soğuk Savaş döneminde ABD'nin SSCB karşısında uyguladığı haber dağıtım sistemini açıklayan propaganda modeli, 21. Yüzyılın ilk başlarındaki konjonktürde ideolojik gündem olarak kabul edilerek, çözümlemelerde kullanılmaya uygundur.

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# **GEOPOLITICAL PROBLEMS OF NATO MEMBERS IN THE ARCTIC**

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## **ABSTRACT**

With the acceptance of climate change as a security threat, more than one security risk may emerge in the same region. The Arctic is one of the geographical areas where the effects of climate change are most tangible and the security environment is gradually decreasing. Security concerns in the Arctic have resulted in NATO expanding its territory to the Russian border. While Russia perceives this situation as insecurity, it also means the end of NATO's Northern expansion. With the Northern enlargement, four of the five Arctic countries became NATO members. However, the increase in the number of members in the Arctic does not mean that there will be no problems in this region. The disputed borders in the Arctic are very important for fisheries and important energy routes. In this study, both the problems among NATO members in the Arctic region and the disputes with Russia will be analysed from a geopolitical perspective. An answer will be sought to the question of how NATO enlargement in the Arctic will affect the geopolitical problems in the Arctic.

**Keywords: Arctic, Arctic Circle, NATO, Security, NATO Enlargement**

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In this article, Ethical Committee Approval is not needed.

## **ARKTİK BÖLGESİNDE NATO ÜYELERİNİN JEOPOLİTİK SORUNLARI**

### **ÖZ**

İklim deęişiklięinin de bir güvenlik tehdidi olarak kabul edilmesi ile aynı bölgede birden fazla güvenlik riski ortaya çıkabilmektedir. İklim deęişiklięinin en fazla hissedildięi ve güvenlik ortamının giderek azaldıęı coęrafyalardan birisi Arktik'tir. Arktik'teki güvenlik endişeleri, NATO'nun Rusya sınırına kadar ulaşması ile sonuçlanmıştır. Bu durum Rusya tarafından güvensizlik olarak algılanırken, NATO'nun da Kuzey genişlemesinin sonu anlamına gelmektedir. Kuzey genişlemesi ile Arktik'teki beş ülkeden dördü NATO'ya üye oldu. Ancak Arktik'teki üye sayısının artması bu bölgede hiç sorun yaşanmayacağı anlamına gelmiyor. Arktik'teki tartışmalı sınırlar, balıkçılık ve önemli enerji yolları açısından oldukça önemlidir. Bu çalışmada, Arktik bölgesindeki NATO üyelerinin hem kendi aralarındaki sorunlar hem de Rusya ile tartışmalı olduęu sorunlar jeopolitik perspektiften incelenecektir. Arktik'teki NATO genişlemesi, Arktik'teki jeopolitik sorunları nasıl etkileyecek sorusuna cevap aranacaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler: Arktik, Arktik Çemberi, NATO, Güvenlik, NATO Genişlemesi**


## **INTRODUCTION**

Geopolitics is a fundamental theory used in many academic disciplines, including International Relations. It traditionally examines the importance of physical space over the role of nation-states. Geopolitics focuses on strategic control over territorial spaces and the authority held by states. In the context of this concept, the Arctic has all the features of geography, economy, technology, power and science, and geopolitics.

Geopolitics is primarily concerned with the spatialisation of international politics as perceived and influenced by sovereign powers and hegemonic states. In this way, the complex above- and below-ground physical structure of the region can be explained in terms of international relations. Thanks to geopolitics, new global problems such as environmental degradation and climate change have become more understandable. Furthermore, geopolitics has provided valuable insights into the spatial dimensions of international relations, while the traditional emphasis on power politics has helped to unravel the complexities inherent in contemporary global issues.

A new geopolitical era is beginning in the world geography: Arctic ice blanket. We are talking about a geographical area where countries rich in economy and technology are closest to each other. While some researchers call this closeness a “new area of conflict”, others call it “cooperation and opportunity”. Although it is incorrect to call it a new area of conflict, the tension in the region is noticeably increasing. Glaciers, seen as an obstacle to transportation and underwater exploration before technological developments, are not a problem today.

Map 1. Arctic Sea Ice Thickness Maps



Source: Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling Data Portal, 2024

The thick ice layer of the Arctic region caused this region to be seen as uninhabitable. However, the region became more valuable as access to the glaciers became easier thanks to developing technology. We cannot explain this only with technology. Climate change is also important in the effectiveness of technology. As a result of glacial melting in the region, thick ice sheets can be easily overcome with new icebreakers. As seen in map 1, even the ice thickness in the most inaccessible parts of the Arctic region has decreased to 3.5 metres. A study by Blidberg, Corell and Westneat (1980) revealed that the highest ice depth in the Arctic Ocean is 50-55 ft (15-17 metres).

As a result of changing geopolitics, disputes in the Arctic region have diversified. These include border disputes, fishing boundaries, oil, gas and mineral resources in the region. As the Arctic ice melts, new shipping routes open up, facilitating the extraction of natural resources (Ekaterina, 2019). Moreover, this change reduces the need for the Suez and Panama canals as transport and trade routes and creates a safe alternative route. In particular, regional conflicts in the Red Sea have brought the Arctic to the

forefront as an important alternative. Another important issue is the impact of climate change on indigenous peoples in the Arctic (Weber, 2020). Rising sea levels as a result of melting glaciers threaten the livelihoods and habitats of the people living in the region.

When considered geographically, the Arctic region can be grouped in different forms: wider or narrower. Firstly, there are the main countries that form the basis of the Arctic region, known as the Arctic Five. These are; Canada, the United States of America, Norway, Denmark and Russia. Secondly, there are the eight Arctic states located on the North Pole line (with three states added to this group by the 1996 Ottawa Declaration). In addition to the Arctic Five, these are Iceland, Finland and Sweden. Thirdly, there are countries that do not have borders with Arctic states and have observer status (Weber, 2020). These countries are France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the People's Republic of China, Poland, India, South Korea, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Among these countries, China is the country that makes its presence felt and invests the most in the region (Schönfeldt, 2017).

The reasons mentioned above lead to various consequences. Among these consequences, security has a multifaceted perspective. Increasing geopolitical activity in the region causes countries to change and develop their security policies. Russia's annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine have increased geopolitical unrest in the region. The confrontation of Russia, which has the longest border to the Arctic region, with the West has increased the risks in the region. As a precaution against these risks, both the military deployments to the Polish border and the NATO membership of Finland and Sweden are the two most important outcomes in the Arctic. NATO enlargement is also a critical process for the Arctic region (Schönfeldt, 2017).

The global value of the Arctic region is increasing and relations between countries are becoming different. Yes, there is also a security movement against Russia in the region, but on the other hand, the increasing geopolitical value of the Arctic region is increasing competition among all countries. We can give several examples of this issue. The first example can be Disputes over Exhaustion Areas: Disputes over rights and boundaries over extraction areas of submarine resources (e.g., oil, natural gas) may increase among coastal states in the Arctic region. This could include countries such as Norway, Russia, Canada, the US (United States) and

Denmark (via Greenland). Another example of the safety of Sea Routes is the melting of glaciers in the Arctic Ocean, which has led northern sea routes to become more accessible. This could lead to an increase in ship traffic and disagreements among NATO members over the security and management of these passages. Another example is the increase in Military Presence and Regional Balances: The increase in military presence in the Arctic region may affect regional security balances. The fact that some NATO members become regional bases and increase their military presence may cause concern for other countries in the long term. Such problems could disrupt cooperation and balance among member states in NATO's Arctic region. Examining the problems these countries experience among themselves may shed light on potential problems that may arise in the future.

Arctic geopolitics is characterised by close relations between the environment and security. The globalisation of the Arctic and the balance of power are important in an environment where common interests support stability. As long as the common interests and cooperation of the countries continue, it is unlikely that minor disputes will escalate into war. However, we cannot ignore some problems. The globalisation of the Arctic points to a period in which the Arctic region plays an important role in world politics and international relations and changes in geopolitical paradigms are taking place. In order to better understand this period, we need to better analyse the relations between countries.

This article will analyse the increasing geopolitical risks in the Arctic region from the perspective of NATO expansion. Can cooperation between NATO countries and Russia prevent a possible war? The question will be answered by examining the geopolitical problems in the Arctic. This research aims to provide a different perspective by exploring not only the geopolitical problems with Russia but also the geopolitical problems of NATO member countries with each other.


## **NATO EXPANDING NORTHWARDS**

Climate change is causing the Arctic ice to melt and the glaciers to retreat, triggering the emergence of new shipping and trade routes. This situation increases the economic and strategic importance of the region. However, these developments also bring about environmental sensitivity and geopolitical tensions. These complex dynamics pose new and unforeseen risks, threatening collaboration.



European countries, trying to balance themselves against the hegemony of Germany and the Soviets, had also been trying to solve security-centred problems. Security integration was both difficult and an alternative. Therefore, it was more rational for many European states to establish a union instead of being at the mercy of the Soviets to ensure security. NATO and the European Union immediately filled the gap left by the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the membership of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in NATO in 2004, the new Russia felt NATO at its borders for the first time. If we look at it from the Kaliningrad perspective, we can also say that Poland's NATO membership dates back even earlier (1999).

**Map 2.** Arming the Arctic



**Source:** Bloomberg, 2023.

The process of expansion from an Arctic perspective dates back to the founding of NATO. In 1949, the US, Canada, Norway and Denmark, which were among the founding countries, connected security in the Arctic to NATO. As can be seen, all A5 countries, except Russia, are members of a security board in the region with NATO. Iceland is also in this process. In the context of the A8 countries, Finland and Sweden have taken part in the

Arctic as NATO members after a long time. Thus, NATO expansion has also reached Russia's northern borders (Güçyetmez, 2023).

When the policies of Arctic states are analysed, issues such as environmental protection and sustainability, economic interests, protection of border rights and entitlements, and recognition of sovereignty come to the fore in the Arctic. In terms of security, the emphasis is generally on environmental threats, climate change and the sustainability of natural resources. Common problems in the Arctic region are defined as border rights, economic security and military security. In this issue, Arctic countries tend to protect their borders with NATO cooperation. However, on the other hand, they want to maintain a policy without isolating Russia. Mutual relations with Russia are intense, especially in international trade transport and cooperation. Although they are seen as a threat to Russia in terms of security with NATO membership, Russia continues to cooperate both as a member of the Arctic Council and as a trade partner.

NATO's expansion in Northern Europe is an issue that needs to be evaluated from strategic, military and diplomatic perspectives. NATO expansion in Northern Europe could strengthen or weaken unity and coordination within the alliance. Some members support NATO in recruiting more members to provide a stronger deterrent against Russia's growing military threats. But others worry that this expansion could lead to divisions within the alliance. NATO expansion in Northern Europe could also lead to debates about how it will interact with the defence policies and security strategies of the European Union (EU). While some argue that the EU should develop a stronger defence identity and increase coordination with NATO, others worry that NATO could weaken the EU's role in defence. It is an important factor in the expansion process in Northern Europe. While enlargement can enable greater integration and cooperation within the alliance, it can also highlight differences and cause tension in relationships. Therefore, a balanced and comprehensive strategy, as well as diplomatic efforts, is required to achieve and maintain the unity of NATO.

## **GEOPOLITICAL ISSUES AMONG NATO MEMBERS IN THE ARCTIC CIRCLE**

International relations are based on the actors in the international system and the balances between them. These relations are based on concepts such as state sovereignty, international interests, balance of power, security and ideology. The reason for highlighting these basic concepts is to keep in

mind that each state will act in line with its own interests. The sovereignty of states within national borders is a principle that underlies international relations. In international relations, it is accepted that states endeavour to increase their power and protect their national interests. In this context, NATO can be recognized as an actor of power and security, but military imbalances between countries can make this situation untenable. When we look at the states in the Arctic region, the most powerful NATO country is the US. Therefore, we cannot talk about a balance in this region. This imbalance can cause insecurity among other countries. For this reason, it will be more solution-oriented to determine the problems between the countries in the Arctic region independently of each other.

Canada, Norway, Denmark and the United States, both NATO and Arctic countries, are in strategic competition over the Arctic's energy resources, sea routes and fishing potential.

Strategically located regions such as Greenland, which is connected to Denmark, have important resources in terms of both climate change impacts and geopolitics. In addition to its environmental resources, Greenland's strategic location could increase interactions and strategic competition between NATO members over Greenland. In addition, the border disputes between the United States and Canada, Norway's border problems in Svalbard, and Denmark's border problems with Canada are seen as geopolitical problems for the future. Therefore, it is useful to examine the problems in these regions in more detail.

## **THE UNITED STATES AND GEOPOLITICAL DISPUTES IN THE ARCTIC**

The United States of America is active in the Arctic region to protect its strategic interests and maintain its power in the region. The United States assesses the commercial and military advantages to be gained from the opening of sea routes and energy resources in the Arctic region.

Even though the United States has been in the spotlight for the last thirty years with its Middle East policies, it has also been active in the Arctic regions. Both as a country and through international institutions (UN, NATO, Arctic Council, etc.), it is in an active struggle in the North as well as in the South. The US was a founding member of the Arctic Council in 1996.

There are three main factors shaping America's Arctic policy: Firstly, climate change and environmental factors; secondly, transit routes and energy resources in the region; and thirdly, geopolitical factors and the power struggle with Russia. On the other hand, there are four main "Strategic Pillars and Guiding Principles". These are; Security, Climate Change and Environmental Protection, Sustainable Economic Development, International Cooperation and Governance (Güçyetmez, 2021).

It is known that the US has defined an updated vision for new operations in the Arctic region. In this context, it plans to respond to regional geopolitical competition, economic drivers and changes in the regional environment by using its military power. America has updated its current missions in the Arctic under the name of "Activities and Strategic Objectives Studies" (The White House, 2023) and decided to increase activities in the region because a significant part of the world's energy reserves are in this region according to Pentagon reports. The Arctic covers an area of about 21 million square kilometres, including the northernmost parts of three continents, the Arctic Ocean and parts of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. By comparison, the surface of the Arctic ice shelf during winter is almost the size of America. At such a strategic point, we can say that America took a strategic step exactly 140 years ago.

With the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867, the United States made its presence felt in the region as a coastal Arctic neighbour. The United States purchased the colony for \$7.2 million, or 2 cents per acre (National Archives, 1867). The Russian Tsar sold Alaska for 11 million 520 thousand rubles. The motivator for this sale was Britain, the architect of America, which was created with its 13 colonies (Schönfeldt, 2017).

In 1867, a new problem emerged with this agreement. With the drawing of two geographical lines in the Arctic Ocean and the Bering Sea, which determined the sovereignty areas of Russia and America, the problems that have lasted until today began. In 1926, with the decree issued by the USSR, the western borders of the Soviets were regulated as the line dividing Ratmanova and Krusenstern islands in the Bering Sea (passing through 168° 49' 30" west longitude) (Fedorova, 2011: 381-392).

In 1976, both the US and the USSR found it appropriate to use the 1867 convention in the process of determining their economic zones. However, later on, a 15 thousand square mile dispute area arising from the methods used in the mapping while the countries were determining their territories

was formed. To resolve the dispute, an agreement was signed between the USSR and the US on 1 June 1990, accepting the "Baker-Shevardnadze Line" as the maritime boundary line between the two countries. The agreement was approved by the US on 16 September 1991, but Russia did not ratify the agreement despite signing it (Kříž and Chrást'anský, 2011: 117).

Competition over access to the Arctic region's energy resources affects US strategic interests in the region. The potential of oil, natural gas and other energy resources in the Arctic is critical to the United States' energy security strategy. However, it competes with other Arctic states for access to these resources. In particular, Russia's claims over control of Arctic energy resources could create a potential point of conflict with the United States.

The Arctic policy of the United States focuses on the competition with Russia. In 2007, the US Navy's modern strategy announced the internationalisation of Arctic maritime areas and the opening of new sea routes. The 2014-2030 US Navy Arctic Map report envisaged the creation of a special ice force in the Arctic. In 2018, the re-establishment of the Second Fleet was made as a move against Russia's Northern Fleet. The Blue Arctic strategy, published in 2021, emphasised the modernisation and increase of US power in the Arctic region. The US Arctic policy emphasises competition with Russia and takes steps towards building strong alliances against Russia (Raikov, 2022: 150).

The opening of sea-lanes in the Arctic has the potential to transform trade routes and strategic shipping lanes. The United States insists that Arctic Sea lanes remain in international waters and free passage is maintained. However, this may also affect relations with other states in the region. In particular, Russia's claims to control of the Northern Sea Route may limit the US's strategic influence in the region and lead to disputes over the security of sea-lanes.




Map 3. Bering Strait



Source: Freeworldmapnet, 2023.

The Bering Sea is between Russia and Alaska in the north of the Pacific Ocean. It is the third largest sea in the world with approximately 2.3 million km<sup>2</sup>, with the Bering Strait in the north and the Aleutian Islands in the south. In addition, the Bering Sea constitutes the exit of the maritime transport routes passing through the Arctic to the Pacific, which makes the region a strategic location. On the other hand, Alaska and the North Slope, the Beaufort Sea and the Chukchi Sea are known to contain valuable resources that have yet to be discovered. It is estimated that the US has found approximately 23.6 billion barrels of oil and 104.4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas on the outer continental shelf of the Beaufort and Chukchi seas (Green, 2016). More broadly, future offshore energy development in the Arctic area is critically important to sustain and extend America's energy revolution, one that has made the U.S. the world's No. 1 oil and natural gas producer (Green, 2016). Prudhoe Bay is the area where the greatest amount of oil is extracted in the region.


**Map 4.** Petroleum Reserve-Alaska and in the Offshore of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas

Source: American Petroleum Institute, 2016.

Although Canada is in the North of the United States, there is a controversy in the Dixon region. You can see this disputed geographical location in map 5. Located at the southernmost point of Alaska's panhandle, this area is part of the United States. South of Dixon is the Canadian archipelago of Haida Gwaii (Jacobs, 2021). The 1825 Treaty of St Petersburg established the current border between Alaska and Canada. This treaty, signed between Russia and Britain, created the first problems for their interests in the north-west of North America (Mazour, 1945: 303-310).

Russia determined  $54^{\circ} 40'$  north as the southern boundary of the American panhandle. (The treaty later gave rise to former President James K. Polk's campaign slogan: "Fifty-four forty or war!") (Jacobs, 2021). However, because the panhandle's terrain was inaccessible, the actual routing of this boundary could not be determined. Thus, when the Americans bought Alaska from the Russians in 1867, they inherited a conflict (Selkirk, 2019). The subject of this conflict has survived to the present day. This region is 80 km wide and 50 km long, with a total area of 806 square metres. 1.5 million people pass through this region every year and it is a productive fishing area. It is both a commercial and strategic transit point. This issue has been going on for more than a century for both Canada and America, as this route extending to the Arctic region has a global strategic importance by combining with the Northern Passage Route passing through the Arctic.

**Map 5.** Dixon Entry Border Claims Between the United States and Canada



Source: Frank, 2021

As a result, it is Russia that the United States sees as a potential rival in the Arctic. Having resolved its border disputes with Canada on paper, the United States is directly targeting Russia in both its regional doctrines and foreign policy. The dialogue between the United States and Russia ended in 2014. The United States has repeatedly said that it aims to remove Russia from the Arctic.

The United States and Russia share a maritime border along the Bering Strait and around the Arctic Ocean. Both sides benefited from continued cooperation and mutual cooperation in Arctic waters. Greater cooperation in the Arctic could protect the region by reducing the risk of potential



conflict between NATO countries and Russia, but mutual security problems in the region have created a security dilemma. This dilemma caused NATO to rely on Russia's borders.

Current tensions escalating into a military conflict and resulting in a global war can take place at any time. On the other hand, the economic and military-political dimensions of relations in the Arctic are likely to take precedence and international cooperation can play an important role. However, the war between Russia and Ukraine will directly affect Arctic policies. Therefore, both NATO enlargement and tensions in the war environment may turn into a hot conflict environment in the Arctic.

### **CANADA AND GEOPOLITICAL DISPUTES IN THE ARCTIC**

Canada's main foreign policy on the Arctic is Canada's Northern Strategy, adopted in 2009: "Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future", adopted in 2009. Canada is closely allied with its NATO partners to protect its security and economic interests in the Arctic. The United States and Denmark stand out among these allies because they border the Arctic. Canada recognises that it cannot ensure its security in such a vast area as the Arctic on its own due to financial and military difficulties, and therefore aims to leverage the military power of the United States. To modernise its military forces, Canada is building a military training centre at Resolute Bay and a deep-sea port at Nanisivik to strengthen its marine and coastal protected areas management units (CBC News, 2013).


Canada is located in the northern part of the North American continent and ranks as the second-largest country in the world. Geographically, Canada's coastline along the Arctic Ocean adds to its increasing strategic importance in the region. Global warming and the melting of Arctic ice have opened up Arctic routes and facilitated easier access to natural resources. As a result, Canada and other Arctic nations are compelled to play a more active role in controlling the region and safeguarding their interests. Moreover, Canada's border sharing with the United States makes it strategically significant. Given that the U.S. possesses the world's most powerful economy and military strength, maintaining a strong relationship with Canada becomes crucial. The two countries share the longest international border in the world and collaborate closely in terms of trade and security.

A direct challenge to Canada's sovereignty in Arctic waters occurred in 1985. The United States sent an icebreaker into the Northwest Passage without notifying Canada or asking for permission. This political dispute

led to the signing of the 1988 Arctic Co-operation Agreement between the two countries. According to the agreement, the United States would not send any more icebreakers into the passage without Canada's authorisation, but in return, Canada would always grant access.

To shape its policies in the area, Canada has developed various documents and strategies, such as the "Northern Strategy," "Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy," and "Arctic and Northern Policy Framework," (Wilfrid, 2011: 219-240) aiming to legitimise its national identity and interests in the region. Canada focuses on supporting the social and economic development of the Arctic, enhancing gains for Northern indigenous peoples, and emphasizing sustainable use of the region (McDorman, 2009: 9-24).

**Map 6.** Where is the Beaufort Sea Boundary between the U.S. and Canada



Source: Kinah, 2010.

However, Canada faces challenges concerning border disputes and sovereignty rights in the Arctic region. Notably, significant actors like the US and the EU do not recognize Canada's sovereignty rights in the Arctic, particularly in the case of the Arctic Ocean and Beaufort Sea. The unauthorized use of the Arctic by American ships has caused unease for the Ottawa government. The Canadians think their Beaufort Sea boundary with the U.S. is a linear extension of the national boundaries on the adjacent

mainland - the U.S. thinks the boundary starts at a 90-degree angle to the shoreline. The map above shows the disputed area.

Additionally, disagreements persist between Canada and the US over the division of the Yukon-Alaska maritime boundary. Both countries are unwilling to relinquish territorial claims in the region due to their oil and gas reserves. Similarly, disputes continued between Canada and Denmark concerning the sovereignty of Hans Island and the division of the Lincoln Sea but on June 14, 2022, peace was brokered between two longstanding NATO allies, Canada and Denmark (Tsiouvalas, Endalew and Enyew, 2022).

Conflicts also exist over the Arctic continental shelf. Canada claims that its continental shelf extends beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by 1.7 million square kilometers, which may clash with the continental shelves claimed by other countries.

These situations illustrate that Canada's policies in the Arctic region are complex and sensitive. The country strives to manage border disputes and sovereignty rights to safeguard its national interests and sovereignty. However, such disputes with other countries and the international community impact the geopolitical relations in the region.

Canada's economy heavily relies on its natural resources. Utilizing the rich underground resources in the Arctic could be a significant contribution to the country's economy. The Canadian government aims to unlock the economic potential of the North and foster dynamic economic growth and trade. This will benefit Northern communities and the overall Canadian economy. To achieve this goal, Canada is investing in infrastructure, such as roads, ports, and airports, to improve transportation and connectivity in the North.

Canada has a long history of petroleum and gas development in the Arctic region. The first oil production in Canada's Arctic took place in 1920 in Norman Wells, Northwest Territories, and since then, over 226 million barrels of oil have been produced (Ieda, 2015: 2-5). However, onshore petroleum and gas activities in the Canadian Arctic did not intensify until the discovery of oil in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, in 1968. In parallel with the exploration of the Prudhoe Bay oil field in the late 1960s, Canada opened its first Arctic exploration well on Melville Island (Drake Point), Northwest Territories.

During the 1970s and early 1980s, Canada made significant investments and licensing for petroleum and gas research. Notable among these are the exploration efforts in the Mackenzie Delta, Beaufort Sea, and Arctic islands. In the period between 1972 and 1989, a total of 86 wells were drilled in the Beaufort Sea. However, due to the challenging and harsh Arctic climate conditions, the exploration activities faced operational difficulties and were abandoned in the mid-1980s, especially with declining oil prices.

Despite the decline in interest in the 1980s, Canada continued to make petroleum and gas discoveries in the Arctic. The discovery of the Bent Horn oil field in the Sverdrup Basin in the mid-1980s became Canada's first offshore oil production source. However, due to significant commercial and operational challenges, the production from Bent Horn ceased in 1997.

In the 2000s, with increasing oil and gas prices, Canada expanded private and public incentives to access Arctic resources. Several companies received licenses for exploration in the Beaufort Sea and Mackenzie Delta regions. However, only a limited number of wells were drilled actively, and exploration faced challenges due to disputes over maritime boundaries between Canada, Denmark, and the United States (Ilhan, 2013: 309).

Canada's interest in Arctic energy resources has fluctuated over the years, influenced by market conditions and geopolitical factors. Nonetheless, Canada has continued to explore potential oil and gas reserves in the region, driven by the prospects of economic benefits and advancements in exploration technologies.

As a result, the strategic partnership between Canada and the Arctic countries is based on interests. Canada feels obliged to establish closer relations with both Denmark and the United States because of their positions. In addition, Canada and the United States, which have some border problems, do not carry this problem forward and prefer military and economic alliance. Especially Canada's need for military support is a major factor in this regard. For this reason, Canada is loyal to the NATO alliance, and tends to comply with the general decisions and emphasises with its foreign policy and commitment that it will do whatever the alliance requires in the future.

## **NORWAY AND GEOPOLITICAL DISPUTES IN THE ARCTIC**

Located in the west of the Scandinavian Peninsula, Norway borders the Skagerrak in the south of the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea in the west

and the Barents Sea in the north. Norway has land borders with Sweden to the east and with Russia and Finland to the northeast. Norway also has territories far from the mainland. These are Bear Island (Bouvetoy), Svalbat (Spitsbergen), Jan Mayen, as well as Bouvet Island and Peter I Island in Antarctica and Queen Maud's Land. The coastline of the mainland with its fjords is half the length of all the coastlines in the world. Glaciers in Norway have been forming since 500 BC. One-third of the Norwegian national territory lies north of the Arctic Circle. The Arctic region of Norway consists of the mainland counties of Finnmark, Nordland and Troms, with a population of about 464,000. At sea, it consists of the Lofoten Islands, Svalbard and Jan Mayen, which are close to the mainland.

Norway's comprehensive definition of its Arctic strategy and policies was first articulated in the "Norwegian Government High North Strategy," which was initially published in December 2006. This strategy document places a particular emphasis on Norway's presence in the Arctic, acquiring knowledge related to Arctic activities, strengthening cooperation with Russia, and increasing Russia's participation. It is framed within a long-term, predictable perspective, highlighting a focus on the Arctic. The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy was issued in 2007 by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the follow-up strategy *New Building Blocks in the North* was issued in 2009 (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007: 7). In the 2009 strategy document, Norway's Arctic position has been defined in a broader sense, encompassing both geographical and political aspects. The aim is to ensure that the Arctic remains a peaceful and stable region in accordance with international cooperation and the principles of international law.

The standout element in Norway's Northern policies is the prioritization of relations with Russia over other issues and disputes. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union posed a military security dilemma and concern for Norway, but in the 1990s, Russia received humanitarian aid from Norway. In the 2000s, the growth of Russia in military and economic terms led to internal debates in Norway about its Arctic policies and strategies. At a time when Russia was advancing militarily, economically, and politically, it became inevitable for Norway to continue providing financial support to Russia. However, it should not be overlooked that in the Arctic, Russia has become a potential market and collaboration opportunity for Norway, particularly in the development of the Shtokman oil and gas field. Russia has become a decisive driving force behind Norway's new Northern

policies. In Norway's relations with Russia, efforts to establish cooperation in the Barents Sea and initiatives aimed at accelerating economic growth in northern Norway are evident. Norway's declining oil and gas production in the North Sea has increased its interest in the continental shelf and EEZ areas in the Arctic Ocean. Nevertheless, environmental concerns may impose certain limitations on development efforts. Regarding the territorial dispute over the continental shelf in the Barents Sea between Norway and Russia, while hydrocarbon exploration activities were seen as the main driving force behind the agreement signed between the parties in 2010, the primary goal was more about Russia gaining support from Norway in extending its continental shelf beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit in the Arctic Ocean (Moe, 2013: 139). When we look at Norway's Arctic strategy documents, regional security and sustainable dialogue come to the fore.

The growing threat to Norway in the Arctic continues with Russia increasing its military deployment in the region and organising military exercises against Norway and NATO. Russia's measures against NATO expansion also seriously threaten Norway's security in the Arctic (Østhagen, 2022). This threat is related to both Norway's geographical location and its strategic allies. Norway occupies a strategic position in the Arctic and is central to NATO's defence strategy in Northern Europe. Russia's growing military presence in this region is a geopolitical threat to Norway's territorial integrity, as well as to other countries in the region.

How Norway responds to this threat is important for international relations and security policy. As a member of NATO, Norway, working with other members of the alliance, should address this threat and take the necessary steps to ensure security in the region. In the Arctic region, tensions between Norway and Russia continue over geography. In particular, there is a dispute over Spitsbergen Island in the Svalbard archipelago. The surveillance activities of China and Russia continue on this island, and the inclusion of Sweden and Finland in this region becomes a problem for Russia.

Spitsbergen is an important but often forgotten territory in international politics and is currently under Norwegian sovereignty. However, Russia's claims to this region are increasing tensions. The ambiguities of the Treaty governing the Svalbard archipelago and NATO's position raise concerns that Norway's sovereignty could be violated. The treaty signed in 1920 recognised Norway's sovereignty over Svalbard (Vázquez, 2022).



However, Russia criticises this treaty. The treaty recognises the right to carry out commercial activities on the island, and this includes activities such as mining.

**Map 7.** Svalbard Archipelago and Fishing Area



*Source:* CSIS, 2020.

As a result, NATO is aware of the strategic importance of Spitsbergen and believes that Russia could use the area to make moves against the alliance. However, while the risk of a direct conflict is low, there is potential for conflict due to the strategic importance of the area. In the future, uncertainties over the status of the region are likely to persist and this will increase the interest of countries in the Arctic region and further afield. The Svalbard archipelago may also be at the centre of conflicts in the future.

### **DENMARK AND GEOPOLITICAL DISPUTES IN THE ARCTIC**

Denmark, while not geographically located in the Arctic region, has a direct stake in Arctic matters due to its sovereignty over Greenland and the Faroe Islands. In 2011, Denmark introduced the "Kingdom of Denmark Strategy 2011-2020," which outlines its policies on Arctic issues. This strategy has been endorsed by the governments of the Faroe Islands and Greenland and emphasizes four key priorities: Preserving a secure and peaceful Arctic environment and promoting self-sustainable development and growth;

showing respect for the climate, environment, and nature of the Arctic and maintaining close cooperation with international partners (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2011-2020). Denmark also asserts claims to the extended continental shelf in the Arctic, particularly areas that could potentially stretch from Greenland to the North Pole, including the potential oil rich Lomonosov Ridge. Additionally, Denmark has interests in the "Banana Hole" region in the Norwegian Sea, which is also claimed by Norway and Iceland. In 2006, Denmark, on behalf of the Faroe Islands, reached a preliminary agreement with Iceland and Norway on determining the continental shelf boundaries in the region. Furthermore, border disputes persist between Canada and Denmark in areas such as Hans Island and the Lincoln Sea, as previously mentioned (Government.no).

Denmark's strategy is centered on collaboration. It highlights the crucial role of international cooperation in harnessing the new opportunities presented by the changing Arctic region. By emphasizing the development of new binding rules and standards, such as a "Polar Code," for Arctic navigation and underscoring the significance of international law, the document underscores the importance of international cooperation. This document summarizes the country's key objectives in the region. The core strategy advocates for the management of the region based on international legal principles to ensure a peaceful, secure, and collaborative Arctic. Simultaneously, it places an emphasis on the importance of close cooperation with organizations like the Arctic Council and the Arctic Five for the development of the region while addressing climate and environmental issues. The ultimate goals of the strategy are quite diverse and two-fold. On one hand, it aims to strengthen Greenland's autonomous status, thereby positioning the Kingdom of Denmark as a prominent player in the international arena within the Arctic region. Simultaneously, the strategy serves as a roadmap for effectively responding to the evolving environmental conditions, geo-economic dynamics, and the growing global interest in the Arctic, presenting both challenges and opportunities. This strategy provides a framework for approaching both current and future Arctic issues and seeks to bolster the Kingdom of Denmark's role in this critical geography.


The last territorial dispute over sovereignty over the Arctic Circle was resolved at a diplomatic meeting in Ottawa on 14 June 2022 (Government of Canada, 2022). In particular, this agreement took place against a background in which both sides considered the integrity of traditional



territories important to Inuit communities (Government of Canada, 2022). In particular, the agreement aims to establish maritime boundaries in the Labrador Sea, the main focus of sovereignty claims between Canada and Denmark, and in the Lincoln Sea beyond the continental shelf.

In addition, as part of the agreement, the long-standing dispute over Hans Island (Tartupaluk) in northern Greenland is being resolved. The division of Tartupaluk into territorial waters and Greenland's maritime jurisdiction will clarify sovereignty, and use rights over the island and enable its inhabitants to continue their traditional activities (Tsiouvalas & Enyew). An important aspect of the agreement is the endeavour to provide a fair and acceptable solution regarding the demarcation of the boundary. The agreement between the parties was realized by considering the natural geographical features and establishing a fair demarcation line (Østhagen, 2023). The agreement also includes the establishment of a practical and workable border management regime to regulate tourism, trade and visitor traffic in the border areas. This is a step towards the resolution of potential disputes in the border areas and the effective management of borders.

**Map 8.** Canada-Denmark Boundary Agreement



*Source:* Global Affairs Canada, 2022

In conclusion, the 2022 Agreement brings an end to long-standing border disputes, strengthens diplomatic relations between Canada and Denmark, and increases stability in the region. The disputes between the two NATO member states have been resolved. Thus, they preserved both border security and stability in the region.

## **CONCLUSION**

This study analyses the emerging geopolitical issues in the Arctic Circle, examining the strategic importance of the region and the origins of conflicts of interest. The Arctic Circle plays an important role in the international arena due to its energy resources, sea routes and strategic location. However, this leads to various problems among NATO members.

Focusing on the country-centred problems described above, we have seen that the security of energy resources, valuable minerals and sea routes in the Arctic Circle is also an important issue. The security and control of sea routes poses a geopolitical challenge for NATO members. The borders of the routes and the transit routes between countries are still disputed. There are different views on whether these routes should be defined in international waters or should be under the sovereignty of specific countries. Therefore, rivalries between countries continue.

Cooperation and dialogue among NATO members are vital to resolve future geopolitical challenges. Especially after the tense relations with Russia, the dominance of NATO-centred thinking in the Arctic has overridden the individual policies of the countries. Due to geopolitical tensions in the region, Arctic countries are far from cooperating independently of NATO, taking into account their mutual interests. For this reason, NATO member Arctic countries endeavour to resolve border disputes and island issues on a legal basis. These problems will continue in this manner until the state of war with Russia disappears and tensions between the countries are suspended.

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## **RUSSIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE NEW AGE OF UNCERTAINTY**

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### **ABSTRACT**

The present paper provides an analysis of the current state of Russian-Turkish Relations within the framework of the ‘Age of Uncertainty’ concept coined by Harvard economist Ken Galbraith. It examines how Turkey is evolving its self-image as it seeks to achieve strategic autonomy through various foreign policy initiatives. The paper also delves into Turkey’s perceptions of Russia, highlighting both positive and negative views that shape their bilateral relations. By exploring the intricate dynamics of Russian-Turkish relations while taking into account historical context and geopolitical factors, the author provides a comprehensive understanding of the complex nature of interactions of the two states. In conclusion, this paper argues for the necessity of cultivating a positive image and promoting cooperation between Russia and Turkey to effectively navigate the uncertainty of the contemporary world and ensure a more stable and peaceful coexistence in a constantly changing international landscape.

**Keywords: Turkey, Russia, Russian-Turkish Relations, Image of State, Constructivism**

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## **YENİ BELİRSİZLİK ÇAĞINDA RUSYA-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ**

### **ÖZ**

Bu makale, Harvardlı ekonomist Ken Galbraith'in ortaya koyduğu 'Belirsizlik Çağı' kavramı çerçevesinde Rus-Türk ilişkilerinin mevcut durumunun bir analizini sunmaktadır. Türkiye'nin çeşitli dış politika girişimleriyle stratejik özerkliğe ulaşmaya çalışırken kendi imajını nasıl geliştirdiğini inceliyor. Makale ayrıca Türkiye'nin Rusya imajlarını da inceleyerek ikili ilişkilerini şekillendiren hem olumlu hem de olumsuz görüşlerin altını çiziyor. Yazar, tarihsel bağlamı ve jeopolitik faktörleri göz önünde bulundurarak Rus-Türk ilişkilerinin karmaşık dinamiklerini inceleyip, iki devletin etkileşimlerinin karmaşık doğası hakkında kapsamlı bir anlayış sağlar. Sonuç olarak, bu makale, çağdaş dünyanın belirsizliğini etkin bir şekilde yönlendirmek ve sürekli değişen bir uluslararası ortamda daha istikrarlı ve barış içinde bir arada yaşamayı sağlamak için olumlu bir imaj geliştirmenin ve Rusya ile Türkiye arasındaki işbirliğini teşvik etmenin gerekliliğini savunmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Rusya, Rus-Türk ilişkileri, Devlet İmajı, Yapılandırıcılık**



## **INTRODUCTION**

In 1977, renowned Harvard economist Ken Galbraith released his influential book ‘The Age of Uncertainty’ and popularized his ideas through an eponymous television series broadcast on the BBC. In this work, Galbraith contrasted the Golden Age of the 19th Century, when things were quite certain in economic matters, with the great uncertainty and instability of the 20th Century, brought by market system and individualism. We can productively apply this concept to the current system of international relations that is to claim the New Age of Uncertainty for states in their foreign affairs.

Looking back at the twentieth century, we can see that after the turmoil of the two World Wars, there was a period of long-lasting global peace. The Yalta and Potsdam Conferences in 1945 established a stable bipolar system of international relations. The new international order was based on the rule of law, with the United Nations serving as the primary platform for international cooperation.

However, the withdrawal from the global stage of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked not the new stability, but the ongoing collapse of this system, leading to a gradual disintegration of both the Yalta-Potsdam framework and the traditional Westphalian system that emphasized national sovereignty. As a result, we are now witnessing a shift towards increased turbulence, global competition and instability, with a rise in regional conflicts around the world.

Strategic uncertainty on a global scale is evident in various dimensions such as political, institutional, economic, and ideological ones. We can observe the emergence of rising powers and new regional hegemons, the formation of new groups of influence worldwide, the confrontation of values and visions of the future. The U.S.-led order built on the military and financial superiority of one state with economic sanctions as instrument of coercion and punishment provokes the rising voices of protest all over the world. As a result, the unipolar structure of the international system is visibly breaking.

Turkey, in particular, shows dissatisfaction with the current international order, exacerbated by the endless EU membership process, domination of ‘Big Five’ in U.N.’s Security Council and growing economic and political pressure from the United States. The discord between Turkey and this

unipolar world order began with the 2003 Iraq War. The invasion of Iraq marked a turning point, sparking discussions about challenges to the UN-centered world order (Thakur & Sidhu, 2006; Cockayne & Samii, 2004), the crisis of a disintegrating Global Order, where the rule of law is replaced by the rule of might (Comar, 2018), emergence of the post-American world (Zakaria 2008), non-polar world (Haass, 2008) and the post-Iraq War global world order, where one can see the decline of US hegemonic power (Koçak, 2022). But the real influence of the United States is now facing such challenges as the rise of new powers, the distrust from partners, the unification of many states on an anti-Western basis on the principle ‘the West and the Rest’, and economic challenges from global powers such as China.

This strategic environment of uncertainty and multivariability brings new challenges and opportunities, as it is not clear what future holds for the upcoming international order. With the unwillingness of the great powers to provide an understandable and predictable global security architecture, regional actors are increasingly seeking ways to ensure their national security and pursue their interests, forming tactical alliances that may shift over time. Multipolarity in action does not seem yet as a *fait accompli*, and multipolar world order or polycentrism is still more potential than real.

Examining Russian-Turkish relations in this context offers new perspective. Today we are witnessing a significant rapprochement between Russia and Turkey cooperating in the economic, political, military spheres and even in the nuclear energy industry. While a strategic partnership between the two countries is on the agenda, the future of this relationship remains unpredictable. Navigating through this uncertain environment requires an understanding of both the broader strategic landscape and each state’s desired future, and the states’ self-images become a compass guiding their great journey.

This desired future is closely linked to a state’s self-image, which can be considered from the perspective of the constructivist theory of International Relations. In the following sections, we will see how Turkey constructs its image, and how this is complemented by Turkish images of Russia. By analysing these constructs, we can then use strategic thinking modelling for the potential development of Russian-Turkish relations.

## **TURKEY'S SELF-IMAGE IN TRANSITION**

Experts point out that Turkey is actively pursuing the status of a global superpower by embracing the concept of 'Strategic Autonomy' and implementing it through various foreign policy strategies. These strategies include initiatives like advocating for UN Security Council reform with the slogan 'the world is bigger than five', as well as long-term visions such as 'Vision 2023', 'Vision 2053', and 'Vision 2071' (Gafarlı & Rognifard, 2023). The ambitious 'Century of Turkey' plan is also a part of this grand strategy.

The first step of Turkey on this way is to elevate its international standing by becoming an influential or decisive actor, regional leader, or even a multipower, leveraging its economic, political, and cultural influence. As a result, Turkey actively engages in foreign relations and strategic activities in its neighbourhood, positioning itself as a significant player state on the world stage (Ekinçi, 2010).

At the same time, geopolitical representations and the boundaries of this neighbourhood may change, expanding to include significant territories, such as the Balkans, Black Sea, and Caspian regions, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. This neighbourhood encompasses the Eurasian continent, or the Afro-Eurasian space, forming, according to Kardaş (2019), Turkey's own geopolitical vision, in which it is the one and only center power.

Turkey emphasizes its Ottoman heritage, rich history, linguistic and religious connections in order to enhance its role in the strategic neighbourhood, creating its own image as a legitimate regional hub of attraction. One of the key concepts is the 'civilization center' causing the leadership role of Turkey in the Islamic world as the defender of faith globally. Additionally, Turkey presents a special image as a stabilising power, defender of the underprivileged, prioritising moralist approach as an impartial and just force, or even an anti-imperialist state.

These idealistic, geopolitical, and civilizational approaches to defining its own identity as the central state is complemented in Turkey by a more pragmatic view of itself as a middle state. This pragmatic viewpoint, influenced by the so called Sèvres syndrome, allows Turkey to acknowledge not just its strengths and successes but also its limitations, guiding its choice of a cautious and balanced strategy.

Turkey's self-awareness has been deeply affected by the events of the First World War and the subsequent disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. This awareness of being economically, culturally, and politically on the periphery of 'Civilized World' has led Turkey to align itself towards the West and the great powers, recognising its dependence on them.

Despite setbacks and disappointments, Turkey remains a candidate for EU membership, a long-standing member of the Western bloc, and part of the Transatlantic Alliance (Erşen & Köstem, 2020; Öniş & Yılmaz, 2015). However, there is a growing dissatisfaction within Turkey regarding its current position, leading to a shift in self-image towards increasing its own importance on the global stage. This shift can be seen in terms such as 'promising power', 'emerging power', and 'rising power' (Dal & Gşk, 2014; Öniş & Yılmaz, 2015) being used to describe Turkey in a changing global order.

The simultaneous focus on Turkey's growth can lead to considerations of balancing between a small power and a middle power status (Baba & Önsoy, 2016), or the effectiveness of a 'restrained middle power' concept (Oğuzlu, 2023). These two strategic lines of self-identification are united by a hybrid option – the perception of Turkey as a re-emerging power, seeking to restore its importance on the world stage.

This view, rooted in imperial legacy and post-imperial nostalgia, can lead to expectations that surpass Turkey's actual capabilities, resulting in a mismatch between expectations and capacity (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2015). Additionally, Turkey's geopolitical aspirations are met with a critical self-perception, with some viewing Turkey as a revisionist state or even a 'kingmaker' (Özpek & Demirağ, 2014). On the other hand, due to this revisionism Turkey has been successful in activating its foreign policy and taking on the role of a peacemaker and a mediator in regional crises and conflicts.

## **TURKISH IMAGES OF RUSSIA AND ITS INFLUENCE ON RUSSIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS**

The perception of Russia in Turkey is as varied as Turkey's own self-image. While Russia is often viewed as a powerful force in the region and on the global stage, it is not classified as a great power. In the regional context, both Russia and Turkey are seen as significant powerhouses in Eurasia (Koçak, 2022), leading to a sense of competition for influence and the need to negotiate and divide spheres of interest.

Another common perception of Russia is that of a ‘defeated hegemon’, a great power that has lost some of its dominance (Sümer, 2021). These views are shaped by the historical context of the region, including events like the Cold War and the rise of China as a global power.

The conflict subject for Russia and Turkey is the challenge of defining their extensive shared neighborhood (Dilmaç, 2018). Turkey sees Russia as the most important and powerful state in its immediate vicinity (Aktürk, 2014), but does not recognize the ‘Near Abroad Doctrine’ of Russia. The latter asserts Russia’s natural interest in or privileged position on the post-Soviet space due to political, economic, and cultural ties, as well as the large number of compatriots still residing in the territories of newly formed post-Soviet states (Koçak, 2022; Aktürk, 2013). This discrepancy is further complicated by the Turkish idea of ‘yakın çevre’ (Özkan, 2010), that includes many, if not all post-Soviet states in imagined geography of Turkey’s near space.

Despite these tensions, there is also a positive and friendly image of Russia in Turkey, driven by pragmatic considerations of economic and political benefits. This rapport is bolstered by a shared desire for a multipolar world, similar traditional values, and a conservative orientation among political elites in both countries, which leads to both ideological and political-economic conflicts with the collective West.

An alliance between Russia and Turkey, based on anti-Western sentiments and the counter-hegemonic discourse of the “Club of Unrepresented”, serves to overcome the ongoing isolation of both countries (Balta, 2019; Gafarlı & Roknifard, 2023). The ideological aspect of relationship between the two states plays a significant role, enabling Turkey to maintain friendly ties with Russia while still remaining part of NATO. However, this provokes concerns about the potential damage to Turkey’s relations with Western countries due to its closeness with Russia.

The alliance between Russia and Turkey is seen by Turkish experts as a tactical move to counterbalance US influence (Kardaş, 2022; Ersen & Köstem 2020). Yet, the cost of this friendship has become a point of contention, with fears that Turkey could be pulled away from its Western partners by Russian influence, particularly in military-technical cooperation (Yılmaz, 2021; Kirişçi & Köstem, 2018).

Russia is also seen in Turkey as a dominant force, which poses a source of concern. There is a popular image of Russia as an energy superpower and energy giant (Ersen & Köstem, 2020; Tiftikçigil & Yesevi, 2014) leveraging its economic strength in political negotiations. Additionally, as a nuclear power with a military presence, Russia is perceived as a dangerous entity. Furthermore, Russia's active involvement in the United Nations Security Council, which Turkish leadership has suggested should be disbanded as a 'Club of Privileged', adds to the complexities of its image in Turkey. Turkey views the economic cooperation as asymmetric in Russia's favour (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2015; Kardaş, 2019; Köstem, 2018), leading to a growing energy dependence and a trade deficit for Turkey, highlighting Russia's strategic advantages (Örmeci, 2019).

The main concern in Turkey is the perceived political influence of Russia in its strategic neighbourhood, which is seen as revisionist, aggressive, and expansionist (Kardaş, 2022; Koçak, 2023). This perception is shaped by the experience of the Cold War rather than historical context, leading to Russia being viewed as a primary enemy threatening national security and even territorial integrity of Turkey (Çelikpala, 2015).

There is a belief that Russia seeks to surround and eliminate Turkey, creating a sense of a besieged fortress and an enhanced security threat. In this view, the Black Sea, Caucasus region, Balkans, and Eastern Europe become a stage for conflicts due to Russia's expansive ambitions. It has been stated that Russia employs hybrid warfare techniques in Ukraine and South Ossetia, and also waged a proxy war against Turkey and its strategic allies during armed conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria (Teifukova & Erol, 2017; Aktürk, 2014; Öniş & Yılmaz, 2015).

However, Russian-Turkish joint diplomatic initiatives and a commitment to peaceful resolutions suggest otherwise. Russia does not view its presence in the Middle East as a threat to Turkey's interests and has worked with Turkey on various regional issues (Mamedov&Lukyanov, 2018). Russia remains committed to the principles of a peaceful resolution of the conflicts in the Caucasus. Since 2020, Russia has been working with Turkey in this regard. The joint Russian-Turkish center for monitoring the ceasefire regime and all military operations in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone is worthy of mention in this context.

As for the Black Sea, it has always been of strategic significance to Russia, as it is the only Russian year-round shipping route to the world markets. The

Black Sea's strategic significance to Russia and its dependence on Turkey for access through the narrow straits further highlight the complexities and interdependence of the Russian-Turkish relationship.

Russia's foreign policy strategy follows a defensive approach, notably in response to NATO's expansion towards its border. The so-called eastern enlargements of 1999 and 2004 turned the Black Sea region into a zone of conflict between Russia and NATO, and with the ongoing accession of Finland and Sweden to the Trans-Atlantic Partnership, the situation has further deteriorated in the Baltic Sea also.

The more harmful aspect in terms of consequences is the persistent perception in Turkey since the Cold War regarding Turkey as a NATO shield and the frontline of Western struggle against Russia. In this framework, Turkey gets the role as a state that can slow down, hinder, and stop the expansion of Russian influence (Aktürk, 2014). This situation deprives Turkey of desired strategic autonomy and relegates it to the position of a US satellite and the periphery of the West, where political decisions are made. Such a position also hinders Turkey's ability to implement its plans for achieving strategic autonomy, as well as its tactics of 'multi-vector balancing' (Gafarlı & Roknifard, 2023).

## **CONCLUSION**

The inconsistencies in the Turkish self-images and its perceptions of Russia contribute to the unpredictable and sometimes unstable nature of Russian-Turkish relations. Although sometimes in our minds and hearts we can look better than in our deeds, the shared image we present and our partner's perception of us determine the nature of our relationship.

The role Turkey plays in shaping the future of bilateral relations with Russia, given Russia's traditionally reactive, not proactive foreign policy, is crucial. This role can potentially influence Russia's foreign policy positively, paving the way for a strategic partnership or multidimensional partnership to overcome uncertainties. The shared neighborhood between the two states necessitates finding optimal ways to interact, considering the historical ups and downs in bilateral relations and the calculation of potential risks and future effects.

Whether it will be a global Eurasian partnership, cooperation of Turkey with Russia and China in structures like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Turkey's participation in the BRICS, or perhaps a special



joint Russian-Turkish structure for managing the regional agenda, is determined by the constructed images of our states. The establishment of the Russian-Turkish high-level cooperation council in 2010 and common diplomatic negotiation platforms in recent years can serve as far-reaching examples of successful cooperation and signs of an emerging strategic shift.

Turkey and Russia can maintain strategic or multidimensional partnership and cooperation to overcome the New Age of Uncertainty, or an alliance for solutions to regional and security challenges. In both cases it is essential to create an accurate but positive image of the neighbour with whom we can be friends during times of strength and weakness. Otherwise, as the international system changes, Russia and Turkey could find themselves once again on opposite sides in a conflict caused by values and interests that are foreign to both parties.

To prevent potential geopolitical rivalries and conflicts between the two states in the future, it is necessary to conduct further analysis of Russia's and Turkey's self-images and their role-models. We also need to answer the question of whether a geopolitical rivalry between these two strong neighbour countries is unavoidable, and if so, to what extent.

We can state that it is essential for both Russia and Turkey to cultivate a positive image of each other to build a more stable and peaceful future. By promoting conflict resolution, and respect for sovereignty, both countries can work towards a more harmonious and secure world for all, as the Great Uncertainty can be overcome just by Great Cooperation.

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