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Negotiation, Speed, Politics: Use of Digital Technologies in International Mediation

Müzakere, Hız, Politika: Uluslararası Arabuluculukta Digital Teknolojilerin Kullanımı

Safiye Ateş Burç¹ 

Abstract

The super-accelerated (high-speed) life experiences and coercive practices of the new world order (Covid and post-Covid periods) have affected and changed the negotiation and conflict resolution skills of international actors. Today, with the pandemic and technological developments, acceleration has become a necessity in many fields. Many international mediators, especially the United Nations (UN), have also benefited greatly from digital technologies that pierce space and time during the most severe times of the Covid-19 pandemic. So, in today's world, where economic, social and technological development continues at high speed, should negotiations and policies keep pace? If so, how should accelerated and virtualised political practices be discussed over conflict resolution? What is the impact of digitalisation on international mediation? This article critically discusses the relationship between digitalisation, speed, politics and conflict resolution through content and discourse analysis of political reports on peacemaking practices of different UN missions, especially during the most traumatic period of the pandemic (March 2020-March 2021). The study concludes that politics and negotiations need speed barriers because they need time, but they cannot be isolated from the developments and space of the high-speed society, so they need to follow the virtual space at all times and get involved when needed. As the analyses of the missions' reports show, the effective use of digital technologies, especially during the pandemic, has led to a rapid transformation in mediation (from traditional to cyber-mediation) and conflict resolution activities have been able to continue uninterrupted, but the dangers of digitalisation have not disappeared

Keywords: Speed, International Mediation, Politics, Digitalization, Cyber-mediation

Öz

Yeni dünya düzeninin (covid ve post-covid dönemler) süper hızlandırılmış (yüksek hızlı) yaşam deneyimleri ve zorlayıcı uygulamaları, uluslararası aktörlerin müzakere ve çatışma çözme becerilerini de etkilemiş ve değiştirmiştir. Günümüzde pandemi ve teknolojik gelişmelerle birlikte hızlanma birçok alanda zorunluluk haline gelmiştir. Başta Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) olmak üzere birçok uluslararası arabulucu da Covid-19 pandemisinde mekanı ve zamanı delen dijital teknolojilerden büyük ölçüde yararlandı. Peki ekonomik, sosyal ve teknolojik gelişimin yüksek hızda devam ettiği günümüz dünyasında müzakereler ve politikalar da bu hıza eşlik etmeli mi? Eğer öyleyse, hızlandırılmış ve sanallaştırılmış siyasi pratikler çatışma çözümünde nasıl ele alınmalıdır? Dijitalleşmenin uluslararası arabuluculuk üzerindeki etkisi nedir? Bu sorular etrafında şekillenecek olan bu makalede, dijitalleşme, hızlanma, siyaset ve çatışma çözümü arasındaki ilişki, özellikle pandeminin en travmatik döneminde (Mart 2020-Mart 2021) farklı BM misyonlarının barış yapım pratiklerine ilişkin siyasi raporlarının içerik ve söylem analizi yardımıyla eleştirel bir şekilde tartışılmaktadır. Bu çalışmada siyaset ve müzakere, zamana ihtiyaç duyduğu için hız bariyerlerine sahip olması gerektiği ama yüksek hızlı toplumun gelişmelerinden ve alanından da soyutlanamayacağı için sanal alanı her an takip edip ihtiyaç duyulduğu anda dahil olması gerektiği sonucuna varılmıştır. Misyonların rapor analizlerinin de gösterdiği üzere özellikle pandemide dijital teknolojilerin etkin kullanımı arabuluculukta hızlı bir dönüşüme (gelenekselden siber-arbuluculuğa) yol açmış ve çatışma çözümü faaliyetleri kesintisiz bir şekilde sürdürülebilmişse de dijitalleşmenin tehlikeleri ortadan kalkmış değildir.

Anahtar Kavramlar: Hızlanma, Uluslararası Arabuluculuk, Siyaset, Dijitalleşme, Siber Arabuluculuk

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Introduction

International conflicts¹ as significant disputes determining, obscuring or changing the world politics do not only refer to the conflicts between two independent states but also include intrastate conflicts, the resolution of which entails international actors (Zartman, 2008b, p. 155; Özçelik, 2006; Yılmaz, 2012). With political developments like the demise of the bipolar world beginning from the early 1990s, the number of intrastate disputes increased and the willingness of the disputing parties to reconcile increased in parallel to it. Especially, the second half of the 1990s witnessed the initiation of a large number of peace processes. Many political institutions and figures including the United Nations (UN) began to actively get involved in the transformation of ethnic and sectarian conflicts threatening international security and peace. The mediation mechanism (the intervention of a third party), conducted by international mediators, has been used in most of these processes. Until the 2000s, the UN mostly acted as a peacekeeper force in the conflict areas. However, later on, international mediation evolved into a conflict resolution method becoming significant on different axes (e.g., civil peace delegations) as a result of the efforts by the *Mediation Support Unit* and *The Group of Friends of Mediation*, which are organizations within the UN, and numerous mediating institutions and individuals operating outside the UN.

Mediation, with different aspects before, during and after a conflict, is of great importance for an effective peace-making process. This is so that the parties can come closer to each other, flaming armed conflicts can be cooled down (peace force practice), potential disputes can be prevented (preventive diplomacy) and the security of the society can be ensured when the mediation process in which primary relations, trust and communication are highly important (Bramsen & Hagemann, 2021, p. 544). Therefore, bringing together the disputing parties and making them come to an agreement at the same table is an important practice for international security and world peace, and should be sustained constantly. However, contingencies such as quickly-spreading contagious diseases or wars may impair peace processes, just as in the case of Covid-19. This pandemic, which began to have an impact around the world at the beginning of 2020, created a political and social arena filled with panic. With many countries restricting travel by closing their borders, the sustainability of mediation efforts and peace talks was threatened. At that point in time, the existence of advanced digital technologies, information and communication technologies, was of great importance because these technologies enabled presidents, representatives, diplomats and peacemakers to hold important meetings via video conferences and make their political statements on their social media accounts (especially in the period between March 2020–March 2021). Likewise, politicians and diplomats were able to maintain communication with the public and political arena almost entirely by means of digital technologies, which put digital diplomacy at the centre of international relationships at a faster pace. Similarly, the debate

1 The 1990s, when the Cold War ended, is a period in which major changes were experienced with regard to the nature of conflicts and conflict resolution because, in those years, long and destructive wars between big powers and states were replaced by intrastate conflicts. Following the Cold War, of course, the conflicts between states continued, and are still ongoing today. However, similar intrastate conflicts, in particular the unrest in the Balkans in the early 1990s, began to become widespread around the world. That is why the concept of international conflict today refers to intrastate conflicts in which international actors are involved (Collins, 2017; Özçelik, 2006).

about digitalisation in mediation quickly became a hot topic during the pandemic. The UN 75th General Assembly Meetings were held on 22-29 September 2020 via video conference. Libyan and Myanmar delegations met online with all parties from April to July 2018, and the Yemenis' views on the peace process were gathered through an artificial intelligence-assisted process (Cans & Clarke, 2020; Kaplan, 2020). In other words, mediation activities in the pandemic period continued uninterrupted thanks to digital technologies. Therefore, this phenomenon, accelerated by necessity, should be treated as a transformation experienced in conflict resolution skills. It is a transformation from mediation, where face-to-face communication is central, to cyber-mediation, where virtual communication prevails.

Digital tools are used in mediation because they are accessible, less costly and facilitate the inclusion of marginalised groups in the process. However, digitalisation can also make the mediation process more difficult, where emotions, body language and face-to-face communication are very important. The success of mediation and the prospects for peace may be jeopardised in situations where the parties to the conflict have easy access to social media and do not pay attention to the posts they share during the peace negotiation process, or where all parties do not have equal access to the internet, or in the case of misinformation and disclosure (Hirblinger, 2020; Westcott, 2008; Kavanagh, 2021; Centre for Humanitarian, 2019). In other words, digitalisation poses some risks and threats, just as it offers some opportunities for conflict resolution (Centre for Humanitarian, 2019, p. 7). Perhaps because of these risks, it was foreseeable that conflict resolution methods such as mediation would make a comeback in the aftermath of the pandemic. But this return could not be a return to the past. Before the end of 2021, UN meetings and other peace processes began to be held face-to-face again, albeit while using masks, but in the halls where the meetings were held, screens were also left on for those who could not attend the meeting at that time.

This paper examines whether policy and negotiation can keep up with the pace of technological, economic or social change in today's high-speed societies in the context of theoretical debates and the UN's peacemaking activities during the most traumatic period (March 2020-March 2021: social lockdowns, curfews, travel restrictions, more than a million deaths worldwide). As qualitative data collection methods such as observation and in-depth interviews were not possible during this period, the data was analysed through content and discourse analysis of the reports of UN missions or other international mediators. By analysing the content and discourse of these policy reports in terms of the debates on speed and politics in political philosophy, this article also attempts to discuss the new form of international conflict resolution (cyber-mediation) that was being reshaped by high-speed digitalisation during the pandemic. Although the study draws attention to the UN's mediation practices during the Covid-19 pandemic, it theorises long-standing situations regarding the use of digital technologies in conflict resolution. The strength of the article is that the relationship between international mediation and digital technology is discussed through the discipline and concepts of political philosophy, rather than through the discipline and theories of international relations. This study also excludes the digital devices used by mediation actors in their personal lives, their social media accounts and their engagement with digitalisation in their private lives. Although

it is accepted that the use of digital technology in the personal lives of mediators affects their tasks, only mediation practices were taken into account, as ethnography could not be carried out during the period covered by this article. This is an important limitation of the study. The theoretical debates on speed, politics, time-space compression and the epistemology of the mediation process are taken as the main axes. Through these axes, we read how the experience of peacebuilding and peacemaking in March 2020 - March 2021, when the social lockdown due to the pandemic was very harsh, was continued by the relevant UN missions in digital environments and the information made possible by this process. In today's world, where economic, social and technological development continues at high speed, should or could negotiation and politics accompany this speed? If so, how should accelerated and virtualised political practices be discussed in terms of conflict resolution, negotiation and reconciliation? Structured around these questions, the article will critically discuss digitalisation, acceleration and conflict resolution, in particular through examples from the world mediated by the UN during the pandemic. It attempts to examine the projections of speed in politics on the axis of conflict resolution by revealing the link between conflict resolution and digitalisation. To this end, it first discusses digital transformation in conflict resolution and then analyses the phenomena of acceleration, deceleration and de-spatialisation in terms of policy and negotiation. Then, it considers the opportunities and challenges of cyber-mediation in conflict resolution. Finally, as the impact of the pandemic wanes, it discusses the return to traditional mediation methods in resolving international conflicts through the possibility of hybrid mediation and opens the door to new research on the subject.

High-Speed Social Change, and Transformation in International Mediation: What has had an impact and how?

If the Covid-19 pandemic period is thought of in the context of a tense and anxious social and political arena accompanied by increased security policies, it will be seen how valuable it is to be able to talk about the possibility of sustaining peacemaking in this process. Indeed, world history is full of major, meso and minor conflicts and efforts to resolve them. Although the disputing parties mostly resort to negotiations conducted by themselves as the first method of resolution, the mediation method is one of the important third-party interventions used to resolve both social and international conflicts. The third-party forms in conflict resolution can be divided into two different categories. Forms (such as arbitration or adjudication) subject to legal-normative procedures are in the first category. The other ones (such as mediation or conciliation) based on voluntary procedures "involve various forms of assistance and facilitation, short of judicial or coercive steps, designed to help the parties reach an acceptable outcome" (Bercovitch, 1991, p.3). Recognised as one of the traditional paradigms of conflict resolution and as a mode of negotiation, mediation is voluntary, less costly, non-use of force, flexible and does not jeopardise or threaten the rights of the parties (Zartman, 2008b, p. 155; Bercovitch, 1991, p.4). Mediators who reconcile the mutual demands of the parties at the most appropriate time and contribute to the formation of a peaceful state also ensure peace in the social environment in which they live. Moreover, this motivation, which allows mediators to be more flexible, is more evident in the resolution of international conflicts. For example, the primary purpose of the UN is to ensure international peace

and security. Therefore, it constructs all its activities, legislation and actions on the axis of this purpose.

International mediation, which has been one of the most effective methods of macro-conflict resolution since the 1990s, is strongly influenced by changes and developments in technology and social life. As social and political life has become virtual and digital technologies have diversified, so have the practices and tools used in international mediation. In fact, diplomacy as a whole has been transformed. With the impact of both external (such as the pandemic) and internal political dynamics, digital diplomacy has ceased to be a form of traditional public diplomacy for almost all state actors and is now accepted as a new type of diplomacy (Nicholas, 2008; Yağmurlu, 2019; Köse, 2017; Bjola & Holmes, 2015; Cooper, Heine, & Thakur, 2013; Snow & Cull, 2020). In parallel with the increased use of the internet in the 1990s and the spread of social media after the 2000s, websites, applications and official social media accounts of states, ministries, embassies and other political actors began to emerge. Today, political parties, institutions, states, etc. compete with the number of followers on their official accounts, political statements are made on social media sites such as X (Twitter), and propaganda is also carried out using digital technologies. Moreover, as the use of these technologies has become more widespread, the actors and demands of diplomacy have changed. For example, an ordinary citizen herding sheep in his village can comment on the ideas of a minister tweeting from parliament, and all he needs is a smartphone and an internet connection. In addition to states and citizens, organisations that are part of the conflict also use digital technologies to propagandise, create political tensions by using disinformation, and thereby politicise and even increase their supporter numbers. Most organisations have websites and social media accounts that are used by their political actors (Esen, 2022, pp. 74-78). Adler-Nissen and Eggeling (2022), based on data from their ethnographic study conducted in the European Union offices in Brussels, argue that digitalisation blurs the boundaries between the personal, private and public spheres, and that the digitalisation in which diplomats are involved in their daily lives cannot be considered free of their duties. Similarly, the boundaries between traditional methods of diplomacy and digitalisation have blurred, and this entanglement has been conceptualised as *blended diplomacy*. What is meant here is the existence of a single mixed and intertwined diplomacy, rather than a hybrid diplomacy, which is a mixture of two types of diplomacy that complement each other (pp. 650-653).

Social and political life, which has been digitised to some extent since the 2000s, has become almost completely virtualised with the Covid-19 pandemic (Eggeling & Adler-Nissen, 2021, p. 2). Out of necessity, all political meetings, diplomatic negotiations and political declarations have been conducted in digital form. In addition, celebrations, family gatherings and personal disputes are largely enabled by digital technologies. This means that the social and political sphere has necessarily been super-accelerated by the pandemic. In particular, the main instrument of communication or non-communication between macro-political actors has been, and to a large extent continues to be, digital technologies throughout the pandemic. Not only in routine diplomatic relations between political representatives but also in negotiations for the resolution of armed conflicts, digitalisation has become mandatory in the pandemic. It allowed the process

to continue, to communicate quickly and to know in advance where to intervene. The extraordinary speed of smartphone technology (e.g., the ability of people living on two different continents to have live video conversations), advances in computing and other communication technologies, increased internet access, widespread use of social media, etc., have made it possible to use digitalisation effectively in mediation. However, the idea that the speed of technology and social life has caught up with the political sphere, including the resolution of international conflicts, is controversial. Indeed, it must be said that some peace negotiations, or steps that should have taken place as a result of negotiations, were delayed or could not take place because of the pandemic. For example, the next step in the peace agreement signed between the Taliban and the United States in Doha in February 2020 was to hold talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban in March of that year. However, the talks could not take place due to the increase in cases of the disease in Afghanistan (Huseyni, 2020). Although the parties were unable to meet for some time, they were able to make their views on the process known through social media. Other digital technologies allowed remote meetings to take place and the parties were able to keep each other informed until September. Again, the Covid-19 pandemic had not yet started when the *UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)*, the *UN Special Envoy for Yemen* and their technology partners sought to create a virtual platform where the public could openly express their views through a technology-based system to develop an approach to the Yemen peace process. But soon after, the Covid-19 virus spread worldwide and the Mission's work, both in Yemen and in New York, was almost completely disrupted. Many activities were cancelled or postponed. Despite the pandemic, however, the technology-based work enabled people from almost all walks of life in Yemen to participate in the peace process. On 8-9 June 2020, during this "three-hour live, interactive online discussion, participants expressed their thoughts on the prospects for a nationwide ceasefire, the future of the political peace process, and what is needed to alleviate the humanitarian suffering in Yemen" (Cans and Clarke, 2020, para. 3). Furthermore, through the efforts of the *UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)*, the *Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF)*² was established in late 2020 to find a political solution to the on-going conflict in Libya, and its first meeting was held virtually on 7-8 November 2020 (Kenny, 2020; Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, 2021). In short, the sustainability of mediation in the pandemic could be ensured through digital transformation. However, it should be noted that the use of digital technologies in the negotiation processes and discussions on this issue had started earlier. This is because an advanced information system was in place long before the pandemic, and mediators or parties involved in peace-making had begun to benefit from the power of technology. After 2000, a video, tweet or comment produced by any person or organisation could be transmitted around the world in a very short time. In this situation, it became necessary

2 Recognised as part of a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned process and constructed as a mini-version of the intra-Libyan peace talks, the overall objective of the LPDF was announced as follows "to build consensus on a unified governance framework and arrangements that will enable national elections to be held as soon as possible to restore Libya's sovereignty and the democratic legitimacy of Libyan institutions" (UNSMIL Statement, 2020, para. 3). Importantly, this forum has 75 members, equally elected from all regions of the country. In announcing the forum, the head of UNSMIL, Stephanie Williams, stated that participants in the LPDF would include representatives from all ethnic, social, political, geographical and tribal regions of the Libyan people (including women and youth), with an inclusive, fair and rights-based approach (Kenny, 2020).

for politicians to react immediately to certain situations, or more precisely, to speed up its ability to react.

To facilitate reconciliation or peace processes, parties to conflicts have used various digital technologies, sometimes with the support of UN missions and sometimes on their own. In Colombia, for example, during the 2012-2016 negotiations between the FARC and the state, a website was created to provide an easy-to-use platform for the public to submit ideas and proposals. As part of the framework agreement between the parties, anyone could submit a proposal on any topic to the website. In fact, more than 60,000 proposals were received in a short period of time. Due to the volume of submissions and proposals, both the government and the *Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia/FARC)* had to devote time and resources to reading, analysing and incorporating them into the system. A joint project has been developed to maintain all the submissions, although there have been difficulties in updating the website (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2019, p. 26). Also in 2012, Fiji's Constitutional Commission launched a website to draft a constitution with fair and inclusive participation and used mass media and text messaging to engage women in the process. Alongside the efforts of the Constitutional Commission, women's organisations in Fiji actively used digital tools such as Facebook and email to inform women about the process. At the end of the process, a number of provisions were included in the draft constitution as a result of suggestions received through social media and email, particularly those that addressed specific issues advocated by women. In the political dialogue process that began in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2016, WhatsApp was actively used to share information (such as meeting dates and times or meeting schedules) among negotiators. Similarly, in Nicaragua, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, social media and email were used as ancillary elements of negotiations (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2019, pp. 25-30). However, it should be noted that in these global cases, parties or mediators tended to make more limited use of technology to facilitate the process. Since 2018, the impact of technology on conflict resolution has begun to take place on serious platforms and in protracted debates. During the pandemic period, a greater and more holistic use of technology has become imperative.

The first of the UN-led forums and meetings examining the impact of technology on conflict resolution was the 2018 *Cyber-mediation Conference*, organised by Swisspeace in collaboration with DPPA and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD). The main theme of this conference was the shift, or potential shift, in the axis of mediation due to digitalisation. This is because the mediation process, which in its traditional form required real space and time, has now begun to relate to virtual space. In this case, the axis tended to shift from real space to virtual space. Indeed, in the final declaration of the conference, the concept of cyber-mediation was discussed from different angles, linking technology and conflict resolution methods (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2019). Another event related to digitalisation was the Fifth Istanbul Mediation Conference in 2018, organised by the *Group of Friends of Mediation*, chaired by Turkey and Finland and established to promote the use of mediation in international conflict prevention. The third part of the conference, which began with video messages from Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, focused on digital

transformation and mediation. The session, which discussed the positive and negative impacts of digitalisation on mediation, noted that technological developments have drastically changed the practice and environment of mediation, even though its foundations remain the same (Executive Summary, 2018). The emphasis on technology, reflected in the final text of the meeting, was carried over to the 2019 meeting, where discussions continued. The annual ministerial-level meeting of the Friends of Mediation Group was also dedicated to technology in 2019. In particular, the new tools offered to mediators by new technologies (such as artificial intelligence, communication applications and databases) and the benefits and risks of digitalisation for mediation and peace were discussed (10th UN Group of Friends of Mediation, 2019). *The Digital Technologies and Mediation Toolkit 1.0* report prepared by the UN Secretariat was also presented at an expert meeting of the Group of Friends of Mediation (Akçakar, 2021, pp. 39-40; Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2019, p. 2).

Despite all these activities and discussions, the discipline of conflict resolution had not established a strong link with digitalisation. Since the pandemic requires inclusion in the super-fast social change imposed by necessity, it is possible to say that the link between peacemakers and technology began to strengthen after 2020. In fact, it should be noted that the high speed in technology, economy and social life that occurred in parallel with the 2000s has also spread to the political sphere, and digital diplomacy has begun to be accepted as a method that goes beyond public diplomacy. However, even though digitalisation has become a phenomenon that affects all areas of life, it is difficult to say that politics and negotiations accompany or should accompany the high speed in areas such as technology and the economy.

Politics, Speed and Negotiation

When considering the arguments about politics, speed, time and space, it is necessary to mention two different theoretical divisions. The first, based on the ideas of Paul Virilio and Sheldon Wolin, argues that deceleration, not acceleration, is necessary in politics. Virilio admits that there is acceleration in the political system, but he considers it to be evil and argues that there should be deceleration. According to him, with the development of communication and transport technologies, the immediacy of earthly time is becoming more important, but the reality of geographical distances is no longer there. In particular, the widespread use of the Internet has caused the disappearance of temporal distances along with the disappearance of geographical distances (Virilio, 2003, pp. 13-14). In this case, political borders, national, economic and political policies and culture, which require space and the slowness of time, have inevitably disappeared. Now the authorities established by humans are being replaced by machines, and the Internet by the virtual world. Virilio (1998), who praises the Internet as unlimited communication, also demonises it (p.104). It is such a disaster that it casts doubt on reality and manipulates public opinion uncontrollably. Likewise, as a radical democrat, Wolin argues that speed and abrupt change pose significant dangers in practice. Wolin believes that accelerated societies are largely disharmonised, as rapid change in particular both dulls the collective conscience and obscures memories. Furthermore, according to him, politics needs time, so it is necessary to slow down (Wolin, 2016, p. 578). The second theoretical split regarding

the interpretation of politics in terms of time and space is shaped in line with William Connolly's arguments, that acceleration can have a transformative effect on politics. Accordingly, one must keep up with the accelerating world. We should essentially focus on the pluralist potential of social pace (Connolly, 2009). In this way of thinking, if the political field cannot keep up with the new state, it is thrown out of time, that is, it remains perpetually anachronistic. Hartmut Rosa, who interpreted modernity as a process of social acceleration (the pace of technological development, the pace of social change and the pace of the flow of life), developed an analysis that brought together the ideas of both Paul Virilio and William Connolly. According to him, acceleration is driven by the logic of capitalism (time is money and money is a scarce resource). The increasing pace of technological acceleration with the transition to industrial capitalism is a factor leading to social change. There is a cycle here: Technological acceleration necessarily changes the information, practice and communication styles of society, and people necessarily accelerate to keep up with this change. The need to keep up with the times exerts considerable pressure on social life (Rosa, 2005, p. 448; 2009, pp. 82-87; 2022, pp. 19-20). This pressure is quite hard and effective on politics because the production of policies and the control of social development by political actors need to be slowed down.

Hartmut Rosa suggests that democratic politics is only possible if there are "speed barriers" to social change. In other words, on the one hand, societies should keep up with political and social change and therefore be fast and dynamic. On the other hand, "the speed of change and the dynamics of society should be slow enough so that they can effectively influence the formation of deliberative political will and decision-making processes, or politics can effectively control (or direct) social developments" (p.450). Moreover, today there is a significant lack of synchronisation between politics and other social systems (such as the economy and technology). That is, while developments in social systems such as technology are constantly accelerating, democratic and deliberative political developments are slowing down because they take time (Rosa, 2005, p.450) or they preserve time, as Wolin puts it. Political affairs such as the construction of a political argument, legislative processes, and administrative and judicial control all take time. Consequently, Rosa's basic argument is that the formation of deliberative will and decision-making processes of the high-speed and dynamic societies of the global age in which we live are, for many reasons, decelerating rather than accelerating (Rosa, 2005, p. 451). Wolin (1997) also argues that political time cannot be synchronised with the temporalities and rhythms that drive culture and the economy because

Political time entails an element of idle time. This is because the political action precedes the negotiation and negotiations intrinsically take time. Negotiations develop in environments where disputing, competing but legitimate thoughts are present. Political time is conditioned by the existence of differences and the attempt to negotiate them. The outcomes of negotiations, whether be successful or not, preserves the time [...] Thus, time is 'taken' or moreover preserved for negotiation (Wolin, 1997, p.2).

In short, the logic of negotiation is that it takes time. That is, certain attempts at action should be made and maintained. William Zartman analysed the importance of time in conflict resolution in the context of ripeness. If the parties or mediators do not correctly perceive the timing of resolution efforts, which is called ripeness, the resolution of the dispute becomes significantly more difficult (Zartman, 2008a, 1-2; 1985, p. 237).

The time Zartman refers to is not an easily identifiable and actionable moment, hour or day. It is the point at which the parties can no longer afford the costs of the dispute and understand or feel that the conflict should somehow be transformed, i.e., it can be perceived with a subjective perception. The essential point for the present study, however, is that Zartman, like Wolin, believes that conflict resolution takes, or should take, time. What Zartman means by ripeness is the time in which the dispute lasts. It generally refers to a real-time span of many years. Zartman (1985) says: “Only time can resolve conflicts, but it also needs a little help” (p.237). Conflict resolution is a long-term process that takes place in a tense political arena (in a real geographical space). There are steps in this process that need to be followed and carefully arranged. Therefore, conflict resolution (including mediation) as a whole needs “time”, not only in the context of ripeness. The resolution of international conflicts, however, requires a real space as well as time. The main emphasis in political philosophy’s discussion of speed and politics is that with the development of transport and information technologies, information spreads faster and affects a wider space. In other words, it is crucial to interpret politics and speed in terms of time and space. Moreover, in today’s high-speed societies, time-space compression blurs the truth, trivialises real space and de-spatialises politics and negotiations. However, political issues such as mediation can be more effectively conducted in a real place where face-to-face communication can take place. But what does time-space compression and de-spatialisation mean for politics and negotiation?

The De-spatialization/ Placelessness of Mediation in the Accelerated Political Arena

David Harvey (1993/2003) argues that each new mode of production and social formation employs its own time-space practice. Technological progress, which is gaining momentum with globalisation, eliminates space in the context of time and space. In capitalism, which is characterised by the speed of life, “overcoming spatial barriers as if the earth were collapsing on us” and limiting time to the moment we are in can be expressed as a compression of our temporal and spatial worlds (time-space compression) (Harvey, 2003, p. 270). De-spatialisation, which refers to the elimination of space through time, has been made possible by acceleration, especially in transport and information technologies. Harvey (2003) states that with the developments in transport and telecommunications, space has shrunk to a global village (p.270), what is meant by de-spatialisation here is the constant shrinking of the real space (locality) to go to, or even the elimination of it. Paul Virilio (1998) also points out that “geographical shrinkage” occurs in parallel with the acceleration of movement and vehicles, and that geographical location has definitively lost its strategic value (pp.127-128). This loss corresponds to the situation in which the instantaneity of earthly time virtually eliminates geographical space, which is global placelessness.

We now live in a much faster (high-speed) world (in terms of communication, transport and as a society) than in 1977 when Virilio wrote “Speed and Politics” and in 1995 when Harvey published “The Condition of Postmodernity”. Indeed, as a result of such widespread digitisation, the Internet and social media mean a global space, but this global space is itself a de-spatialisation when used in relation to space. Hartmut Rosa (2022) argues that spaces in modern life are narrowing and shrinking in parallel with

time. According to him, space has lost its vastness, resistance and meaning. As a result, social or emotional intimacy now depends not on the distance of spaces, but on the use of modern media communication channels (p.48-49). John Urry, looking at space from a more abstract perspective, argues that changes in the perception of time and space enable new spatialities rather than a de-spatialisation or trivialisation of space (p.40). Similarly, Giddens emphasises that space is no longer confined to 'locality', opening up space for new spaces to become global (p.24). It is striking that both Urry and Giddens refer to the abstraction of space. From this point of view, the internet and social media can be said to be the areas where statements and various virtual practices are spatialised. In conflict resolution, however, real space is crucial, both because it relates to the area of conflict and because it enables face-to-face communication. Therefore, it should be noted that the de-spatialisation in conflict resolution, in parallel with the link that Harvey, Virilio and Rosa make between space and time, amounts to the elimination of real (geographical) space or locality. In this context, the present study expresses placelessness, the elimination of geographical space, when it refers to de-spatialisation.

International disputes take place either in a directly real space (e.g., battlefields) or at a level that can affect a real space or its operations. Therefore, locality or region (even in cyber-mediation based on digitalisation) occupies a critical place in the literature on conflict resolution. At the same time, peacemaking cannot do without (real) space. Even if globalisation and modernisation theoretically allow for the creation of new spaces, the pacification and reconciliation of two groups in armed conflicts requires space. More precisely, it is necessary to get the parties talking, to bring them together and to harmonise their demands. Doing this at a distance, i.e., preferring a spaceless or abstract space to a local one, will undermine the success of reconciliation. This is because the conflicting parties choose a real space in which they feel safe and mediators whose impartiality they are sure of in the reconciliation process. In line with this, Virilio (1998) suggests that the war without space will spread and that this damaging spread will extend over a wide area of time, thus becoming a time war (p.57).

Cyber-Mediation: Reachability, Accessibility, Inclusivity

It is certain that the time-space compression has different effects on the transformation of world politics. Because of the spread of digitalisation, the form of diplomacy has changed, thinking about politics has become different, and political actors have developed new political actions as a result of diversified theoretical arguments. For example, the UN and similar organisations have conducted peace processes between conflicting macro-actors, using digital technologies where necessary, which is referred to in the mediation literature as cyber-mediation. Especially during the Covid-19 pandemic, much of the policy-making, propaganda and perception-building was done through digital technologies, specifically, the Internet. However, during this process, the governed, diplomats and policymakers encountered not only the soft and constructive sides of digital diplomacy but also its dark sides (Bjola & Pamment, 2019). When we discuss conflict resolution, politics and digitalisation over acceleration, looking at the opportunities created by virtualisation together with its dark sides makes it clear what challenges (such as information pollution on social media, misinformation, leakage of

private information, virtual attacks and lack of access) conflict resolution can face. It also makes it easy to see the threats that the speed of technology can create in these areas. For this reason, the opportunities offered by cyber-mediation are discussed below, along with the threats they pose.

Those involved in conflict resolution were largely present in the digital environment, especially during the pandemic, and were similar to practitioners of different disciplines (Camino, 2021; Lanz & Aleiba, 2018). In this way, the second stage of the mediation process (the stage of the acquisition of information) becomes easier and its flow accelerates with the development of information and communication technologies. In the process of information gathering, there is a situation with two facets. On the one hand, the parties can easily and actively contact the mediators through social media, websites and other communication channels (e-mail, etc.). On the other hand, the mediators can easily contact the parties' representatives and obtain various information about the issue and the parties. Faster information gathering facilitates the mediators' understanding of conflictual parties and their troubles and speeds up the mediation process.

Reachability, accessibility and inclusivity: Three of the qualities that enable digitisation to transform many areas are reachability, accessibility and inclusivity. These three qualities are largely interrelated and sometimes intertwined. Therefore, all three are discussed together in this study.

The issue of reachability should be discussed in terms of reaching risky regions and meeting the demands of the people living there (10th UN Group of Friends of Mediation, 2019). Communicating with the regions where conflicts are intense and geographical barriers make it difficult to reach them and involve the people living there in the peace and mediation process can be relatively easier when digital technologies are used. This is because it is much easier to communicate with people via telephone, the Internet or social media, and to convince them or obtain their opinions without the need for physical contact (what makes it easier - the absence of violence?). In short, through the use of digital technologies, it is possible to come together independently of time and space. Digital technologies, by enabling wider and more diverse participation and increasing the means of communication, enhance inclusivity in the peace process. However, inclusivity is not limited to broad participation. In the *Digital Technologies and Mediation Tool Set* published by the UN, inclusivity is defined as the extent to which the views and needs of parties and stakeholders are represented and integrated into the mediation process (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2019, s.23). Thus, inclusivity is a quality that simultaneously includes representation and pluralistic participation. However, an inclusive process does not mean that all stakeholders are directly involved in formal negotiations, but rather that communication between the parties to the dispute and other stakeholders is facilitated by including multiple perspectives in the process. Mediators tend to use online tools to bring these different views into the process. Websites (to collect, share, store information or load documents), social media platforms, instant messaging applications, online surveys, video conferencing or other artificial applications are some of these tools (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2019, p. 24). For example, the UN Special Envoy for Yemen organised a two-day online meeting for Yemeni women stakeholders in the context of the peace process. The purpose of these meetings was to discuss the meaningful participation of women from different regions and age groups, and indeed the inclusion of.

In a project conducted by the UN Special Envoy for Yemen in July 2020, one person was able to hold real-time, one-on-one meetings with a group of up to 1,000 people using artificial intelligence-assisted technology. Daanish Masood of DPPA emphasised that this method is a new way of doing business that increases inclusivity in the peace process: “Until now, there has been no way to systematically engage in dialogue with peace supporters and get their opinions with a relatively low-cost and real-time opinion analysis. This new artificial intelligence-based approach has changed all that. This approach represents a new way of doing business that can make the ongoing political and peace process much more inclusive” (Cans & Clarke, 2020, para. 4). The then UN Special Representative for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, made a similar point when he said: “While I am aware of the limitations in terms of access to digital negotiations and representation, it has become an important step in reaching out to Yemenis outside our usual circles” (Cans & Clarke, 2020, p. 59). The co-founder of the Women Solidarity Network in Yemen, Muna Lugman, drew attention to the diversity of Yemenis reached and emphasised the importance of the project in terms of both inclusivity and representation, saying: “I also think that the participants in the meetings were multi-representative. There were participants from the south, the north, young people and women, different political parties and independent individuals. For me, the representation was good” (Cans & Clarke, 2020, para. 8). Again, the inclusion of groups considered marginal (such as women, minorities, disabled people) through the use of digital technologies makes peace talks more inclusive. For example, the LPDF, which held online meetings in Libya in 2020, invited participants from different social segments (different geographical regions, ethnic groups, sectarian groups, socially representative groups) based on the principle of inclusivity (Kenny, 2020, para. 8). In addition to this, one of the goals of the UN Libya Action Plan, declared in September 2017, was to hold a national conference and prepare online activities between April and July 2018 to facilitate the participation of the Libyan people. As a result, politically and socially marginalised groups were also able to present their opinions and have them heard without personal participation through the survey on these online platforms (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2019, p. 25).

One notable innovation was for Libyans to be able to contribute to the process online between April and July 2018. To achieve this, a website in Arabic was specifically designed by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) with parameters set to facilitate user access and navigation. This measure helped make the preparatory process more inclusive and transparent. The website included information about the national conference process as well as the dates and locations of the meetings, visual content from past events, meeting reports, and information about how Libyans could organize their own events. Most importantly, the website included an online questionnaire on the agenda for the consultations through which Libyans could provide their insights and feedback. The online platform offered an opportunity for various groups, including those politically and socially marginalised, to express their opinions and be heard without having to attend meetings in person. In addition, an outreach campaign was organized to ensure the broadest online participation (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2019, p. 24-25).

At this point, the issue of access to the Internet should be elaborated. Accessibility is an integral part of the inclusion and effective use of the digital environment. When individuals, institutions or other entities have access to any information they want, wherever there is an Internet connection, the enabling role of digital technologies comes

into play. However, there are significant inequalities in internet access between continents and countries. According to the 2023 data, approximately 5.3 billion people out of a global population of approximately 7.9 billion, or 67.9% of the world's population, have access to the internet. While 43.2% of Africa's population can access the internet, the figure is 67% in Asia, 89.2% in Europe, 80.5% in Latin America, 93.4% in North America, 77.1% in the Middle East and 70.1% in Australia. Again, within the African continent, while 6.8% of Eritrea's 3.6 million people have access to the internet, 73% of Nigeria's 211 million people have access to the internet (Internet World Statistics, 2023). This inequality, the so-called 'digital divide' (Yağmurlu, 2019, p. 1273), also creates inequality in terms of inclusion in political debates. That is, those who have access to the Internet are in an advantageous position compared to those who do not have access to the Internet and therefore are not aware of political events and decisions, or only become aware of them at a later stage, or cannot respond to them through the necessary channels. David McIvor (2011) interprets this as the potential (and indeed the danger) of speed-increasing inequalities. This inequality, which develops between those who can keep up with the pace of the new world and those who cannot, causes those living in the same space at the same time to occupy different temporalities (p.60). The concern that arises from associating this desynchronisation with politics is the fact that only certain groups and individuals with access to the Internet can benefit from the advantages of speed. The biggest challenge faced by the artificial intelligence project in Yemen was access to the internet. As the internet was slow in Yemen, those who could access the system had to constantly refresh the page to see and answer the questions (Cans & Clarke, 2020, para 11). Apart from equality of access, the problem of having certain technological tools is another important issue. In other words, it becomes impossible for poor neighbourhoods that do not have technological tools such as computers, tablets or smartphones to be included in the digital environment, even if there is internet access in these neighbourhoods.

Disinformation and leaks: An important issue that cuts across the three main attributes listed above and the issues of reachability, accessibility and inclusivity, and that embodies both the benefits and the dangers of digitalisation, is disinformation and leaks. In fact, they both illustrate why policy cannot keep up with the speed of technology and risk sabotaging peace processes. In times when traditional methods were used and conflict resolution was confined to one place, this sabotage could range from armed attacks to manipulating the information of the masses. Today, however, this can be done much more easily and cheaply through social media. Incorrect or incomplete information posted on social media is quickly disseminated to a wide audience, which can lead to a process that is difficult to correct. Moreover, leaks not only affect negotiations and political processes, but can also undermine trust among diplomats (Adler-Nissen and Eggeling, 2022, 656). Transforming false or incomplete information into truth in public perception is a major challenge for the mediator. However, leaks (disclosure of confidential information) act as powerful agents that sabotage reconciliation efforts, especially in mediation processes. With the digital dissemination of leaks, information travels quickly and becomes widely known. Virilio's (2003) concepts of generalised virtualisation and the *information bomb* are very valuable in this sense. Virilio (2003) states that in the new millennium we are facing a new bomb with a high impact. He states that "it is the information bomb that has the ability to shatter international peace through the interactivity of information" (p.62).

Information disseminated more easily and quickly through the use of technology also plays an important role in the creation or consolidation of hate speech, i.e., polarisation (10th UN Friendship Group, 2019).

In Lieu of a Conclusion: On the Trail of Hybrid Mediation

The acceleration of transport from horse-drawn carts to jet planes and the development of communication technologies that allow people living on opposite sides of the world, experiencing different time zones and different spaces, to simultaneously video chat or comment on a tweet, bring time-space compression into play. What should be emphasised here is that the changing experience of time and space leads to the establishment of new social and political relations, norms and values (Avcı, 2021, p. 3791). More specifically, “the experience of time-space compression provokes, excites, stresses, and sometimes leads to severe anxiety in people, thereby mobilising a wide range of social, cultural and political responses” (Harvey, 2003, p. 270). As a result, the new normalisation or new order that is being discussed today in various aspects is not only related to the conditions created by the pandemics, but also to the new socialities and politicalities created by increasing digitalisation. Since the phenomenon of digitalisation and acceleration of social life predates the pandemic, there will inevitably be criticism that the new “normal” being discussed today is not so new (Karakas, 2020, p.546). Leaving aside such criticisms, it can also be said that the dramatic increase in the pace of social change along with the pandemic has dictated new norms and relations for politics and conflict resolution, and organisations such as the UN have adopted new policies to keep up with these changing conditions. In this sense, interpreting politics, disputes and conflict resolution in the context of time and space allows for a reinterpretation of the forms of social co-creation accelerated by the new order and an examination of how these norms and relations are contained within political institutions.

With the technological development of information systems in the 21st century, temporality became a focus of social science. However, the passage of time in technology, politics and economics and the effects of temporality vary dramatically (Bear, 2014, p. 8). Time, which is no longer accepted as a moment advancing on a definite and linear axis, is endowed with a social content. In particular, with the widespread use of digital technologies, time corresponds to a compressing, super-accelerating and obscuring phenomenon. The acceleration of today’s technologies has brought the world to a different point in terms of social control. It is as if we are all voluntarily and intimately observed and monitored by a universal panoptic control (Virilio, 2003, p. 20; Han, 2020, p. 18). Along with the multitude of eyes spread across the world, time compresses and accelerates, geography shrinks and areas including dispute resolution and negotiation become placeless.

When discussing speed in the context of politics and conflict resolution, two basic practices should be taken into account: a) being active in the digital sphere to accompany high speed and b) following the innovations and actions that speed brings in the fields of technology, etc., and getting involved in the virtual space as needed. In conflict resolution and politics, it is neither preferable (and therefore necessary to slow down) nor necessary to act more quickly than in other fields. However, following and constantly

monitoring fields that have already taken action (technology, social media, business, etc.) allows for timely and on-the-spot action, which sometimes means moving fast. In essence, discussing digitalisation, which differentiates the way we experience time and space, on the axis of reconciliation means talking about two parallel levels that are not in contact with each other. On the first level, we encounter a narrower and more closed space that encompasses the mediation process and in which mediators are present. Here, if the parties and mediators use digital technologies well and effectively, and if they are digitally literate, this will shorten and facilitate the mediation process. Therefore, speed at this level will contribute positively, not negatively, to the negotiation. Indeed, it was observed that the use of various digital platforms and tools in Yemen and Libya during the pandemic made a significant contribution to the mediation process, particularly in the information-gathering phase. On the second level, there are the parties to the conflict, those trying to resolve it and the troublemakers, who are in fact all media users with access to the Internet. Movement on this level (frequently and pejoratively) has the potential to create destructive effects during the negotiation process. Actions such as leaks of information related to the reconciliation process, sharing by parties with negative emotions that can negatively affect the process, and disinformation by mischief makers in an easy way can block the process. As the theoretical arguments on the speed-up society indicate, the speed of social change cannot be ignored and disregarded. In other words, once the process is heard by the public, from then on, maintaining the process skilfully, face to face and in one place will allow for an effective solution. At this point, it can be suggested that hybrid mediation, where digital technologies are used effectively (including improving the technological/digital literacy of mediators) and which is faithful to conventional norms, should be adopted for a sustainable resolution in the 21st century. Kakoma and Marques (2020), writing about their predictions for the future of mediation in the post-pandemic period, also argue that the ground rules for consolidating global peace and security are constantly changing and therefore mediation practices should be adapted to the changing conditions (p.3). As noted above, negotiations are political processes that take time, and cyber-mediation has challenges as well as benefits. In particular, detailed legal statutes should be enacted to mitigate the risks and threats of new technologies.

Looking at mediation activities after the pandemic, one observes an inevitable return to conventional mediation, but it is not, and cannot be, a return to the past. The reference objects of the new world order have changed. Information is now one of the main tools of the new mediation systems. For this reason, mediators have to learn how to use, distribute and control information, as well as how to take an appropriate position between the parties.

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Nuclear Powerplay: Traditional and Emerging State Dynamics in the United Nations General Assembly (1990-2017)

Nükleer Güç Oyunu: Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulunda Geleneksel ve Yükselen Devlet Dinamikleri (1990-2017)

Aylin Ece Çiçek¹

Abstract

This article deals with the specific topic of nuclear non-proliferation under the umbrella of global governance- namely the United Nations' General Assembly. First, this work will present an account of the evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and, secondly, examine the contemporary situation through a realist lens. More specifically, it is aimed to test powerful states' probability to shape the global agenda, through alignment. By establishing the theoretical bases and proposition on which the study is grounded, the following part will focus on methodology and hypotheses. By utilizing ANOVA analysis and Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression, this paper aims to uncover the relationship -if any- between the factors affecting state behavior on global platforms under the issue area of nuclear weapons and non-proliferation efforts.

Keywords: Global governance, United Nations, quantitative analysis

Öz

Bu makale, küresel yönetim şemsiyesi, yani Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulu kapsamında, nükleer silahların yayılmasının önlenmesine ilişkin spesifik konuyu ele almaktadır. Birincisi, bu çalışma nükleer silahların yayılmasının önlenmesi rejiminin evrimini sunacak ve ikinci olarak güncel durumu gerçekçi bir mercekten inceleyecektir. Spesifik olarak, güçlü devletlerin uyum yoluyla küresel gündemi şekillendirme olasılıklarının test edilmesi amaçlanıyor. Bir sonraki bölümde çalışmanın dayandığı kuramsal temeller ve önermeler belirlenerek yöntem ve hipotezler üzerinde durulacaktır. Bu makale, ANOVA analizi ve Olağan En Küçük Kareler (OLS) regresyonunu kullanarak, nükleer silahlar ve nükleer silahların yayılmasını önleme çabaları kapsamında, küresel platformlarda devlet davranışını etkileyen faktörler arasındaki ilişkiyi -varsa- ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Küresel yönetim, Birleşmiş Milletler, nicel yöntemler

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Introduction

The quantitative methodological leniencies in the discipline of International Relations- both in theory and practice stem from the success and acceptance of behavioralist practices over conservative historical and interpretive approaches.¹ One of the consequences of this shift is seen in the terminology used within the discipline. Normative terms and definitions with charged connotations are of direct impact on the theory produced, compromising scientific principles by creating subjective foundations. However, there are a few are exempt to this unwritten rule. A prime example is the concept of weapons of mass destruction, where the use of these devastating instruments is considered ethically wrong. Consequently, the logical outcome is to accept non-proliferation as the norm (Gavin 2010).² Biological, chemical and nuclear weapons- when used for destructive purposes, are almost certain to result in mass extinction. This study deals focuses on one such issue- weapons of mass destruction/nuclear weapons- and how nuclear policy has evolved within the realm of global governance, more specifically within the United Nations General Assembly.³ By examining the voting patterns of states, it is possible to uncover specific patterns, convergences, and divergences of alignment regarding nuclear proliferation. In simple terms, the aim is to understand how state behavior influenced by relative power positions and narrow national interests- is manifested within the GA. More specifically, how do states behave when their national interests are in a divergent path with the global agenda? This paper argues that a states' narrow national interests are defined in terms of their relative power maximization and trumps their liberal support of the global agenda.

This paper will first provide a brief account of the evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Secondly, it will examine the contemporary situation through a realist lens. More specifically, it is aimed to test powerful states' probability to shape the global agenda, through alignment. By establishing the theoretical bases and proposition on which the study is grounded, the following section will focus on methodology and hypotheses. This will include ANOVA analysis and OLS regression. We will begin with a discussion on the relationship if any between the factors that affect state behavior on global platforms within the issue area of nuclear weapons and non-proliferation efforts.

The Traditional Nuclear Regime

In 1945 the United States demonstrated the catastrophic power of nuclear weapons in the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Temples 1980).⁴ “The usage of nuclear technology in military applications and security concerns changed the arsenal of power munitions making this newly found weapon an indispensable part of prestige, status and, international power (Udum 2017; Çiçek 2020).”

1 Often called the Behavioral Revolution. Of course, this is not to argue that there is a clear winning camp within this debate. All methodological approaches contribute to the richness of the discipline.

2 There are very few critiques to this view; see Waltz 1981 and 2012. This holds true politically, as well, with only Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi and Kim Jong-Un as outliers.

3 It can be said that the fact that the Americans and the British bringing certain issues to the Security Council and General Assembly is proof of the importance of global governance institutions. However, not all constellations global governance have proven to be of the strong position of the UN Security Council on international topics.

4 It is estimated that over 190.000 people perished.

In the aftermath of this tragedy, power politics became evident once again. Nuclear non-proliferation and prohibition were not topics of interest for the powers.⁵ While there were some indications of a potential nuclear regime in the 1940s and 50s, a comprehensive discussion did not take place. The Cold War's onset and the subsequent events of the Cuban Missile Crisis heightened tensions between the USA and USSR: almost resulting in a nuclear catastrophe. Despite the gravity of this situation, both countries continued with their acquisition of nuclear materials, but an effort was made with the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968.⁶ Almost immediately, problems regarding the export of nuclear materials to non-member states arose, further developments like the SALT and ABM resulted in a short period of détente. However, these efforts were undermined by the USSR-China confrontation on the Amur River (in 1969) and the Yom-Kippur War (in 1973). Following complex developments in the Middle Eastern region, SALT II was ultimately withdrawn (Grau 2004).⁷

In 1982 START became a potential part of the nuclear regime as a result of Reagan's foreign policy approach. However, no tangible results were achieved during this time.⁸ This trend changed with the signing of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, signaling a relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev. Shortly after this progress the Cold War ended and nuclear issues came back to the forefront. Below are the milestones pertaining to nuclear non-proliferation since the 1990s.

Chart 1
Historical Treaties

Year	Agreement	Notes
1991	START	
1993	START II	Not implemented
	IAEA Model Protocol	In force with 140 States and Euratom. 13 States have signed but have yet to bring it into force.
1995	NPT rediscussed	Prolonged, additional rules. North Korea withdrawal in 2003
1996	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)	Not implemented
1997	ABM Treaty of 1972 rediscussed	US withdrawal in 2002
2017	Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons	First binding treaty. Not signed by nuclear countries

The Contemporary Nuclear Regime

The tragic events of 9/11 caused numerous changes in the international system with non-state actors gaining significance on the global arena. Conceptions of power swayed from a balance of hard and soft power to manifestations of military capabilities. Amidst this chaos, nuclear issues also received attention as a crucial aspect of power capacity.

5 The decade was one of marked by threat perception and, nuclear power became a critical part of state strategy.

6 Goes into effect 1970, members: USSR US CHINA UK FRANCE

7 Between the Soviet Union and Afghani insurgent groups, the Soviet Afghan War resulted in stalemate. The impetus driving Soviet forces was to increase influence in the region.

8 The USSR struggled to keep up with the USA nuclear efforts technologically, and with Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika, the USSR took a different approach to nuclear weapons non-proliferation- marked by the 1986 Reykjavik Summit. The failed summit was put together with the aims to deliberate on human rights and the USSR invasion of Afghanistan

Critics of the existing nuclear policy argued that the current status quo was one sided. However, these critiques did not halt the bilateral relationship between the US and Russia leading to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.⁹

In 2007, Iran emerged as a key player in the nuclear arena. In response to this threat, the US proposed taction. Russia, who was allegedly a supporter of the Iranian nuclear programme, did not react positively to this request. During this complex multilateral interaction, the transfer of power from Bush Jr. to Obama also influenced the tone as Obama’s approach was of liberal orientation. This led to the development of a joint framework intended to reduce nuclear warheads and capabilities. Obama stated, “Together, we’ve stopped that drift, and proven the benefits of cooperation. Today is an important milestone for nuclear security and non-proliferation, and for U.S.-Russia relations. It fulfills our common objective to negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty”. In 2010, START I, the successor, was approved by the Senate with Russia signing on in 2011. Such an upward path is also demonstrated by the data which shows US supports of successful resolutions: they have increased significantly in 2011 following the signing of the Treaty. This is visualized below:




Figure 1. Ratio of successful resolutions

After the increase in 2011, there has been a significant decrease in American support of UN resolutions. This decline can be attributed to the Trump administration’s opposition to existing Cold War agreements. As a result of this firm stance, the United States has rejected its obligations under the INF Treaty. From a neo-realist standpoint of view, one of the reasons behind this aggressive action is the perception of decision makers that the international system is hostile, with power being the defining characteristic.

⁹ Nuclear activities become transparent during this era

The international system, and in our case, global governance, is closely linked with the concept of power, which has a myriad of various elements. However, for the purposes of this study, a traditional understanding of power is taken into account where abilities to influence and shape the expected behavior of other actors is key (Barnett and Duvall 2004). Concomitantly, global governance embodies many- if not all- of the essential elements of the concept of power. Systemically, global governance without power is unthinkable as power is the gel which grasps all the different actors in one way or another. In the following section, this study will analyse the role of power in shaping the nuclear regime and, demonstrate that power is indeed the primary currency in this context.

Power as the Main Currency in the International Order: Theoretic Framework

The majority of nuclear regimes focus their attention on constraining and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Ruzicka 2018). However, the aim for a complete prohibition of nuclear weapons was not realized, which suggests that the dominant powers of the period have an impact on the widespread adoption of decisions. It should be noted that, the number of nuclear weapons and state capabilities remained the same. As a result, states possessing nuclear capabilities and arsenals were unofficially granted a form of legitimacy, while those who were not part of the club were simply left to their own devices. Interestingly, this inequality was one of the characteristics of the Cold War era nuclear regime.

Here, it is critical to differentiate between the various operationalizations of power other than simply considering the material capabilities of states (Strange 1982; Ruzicka 2018). Taking a broader perspective, there are several theoretical approaches to take when analyzing the nuclear regime. However, two stand out: realism and idealism (Hymans 2006).

The realist view supports that nuclear weapons are compulsory deterrents within the anarchic international system. These weapons are viewed as being the most effective deterrent due to their sheer destructive force; this provides security (Davis 1993).¹⁰ Classical realism posits that such a force supports and signals the abundance and abundance of power, they demonstrate prestige: both nationally and on the international level (Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton 1985; Rosenthal 2002). This understanding contributes to the security-power dilemma where one states' acquisition of weapons leads to another state to compete: resulting in the classic arms race. Countries relentlessly adjust their relative power position within the international system which results in a subsystem of the balance of power (Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton 1985; Walt 1990).

This train of thought forms the basis for theories of alliance formation as states seek to enhance their survival capabilities (Wright 1954). For realism, power is seen as a means to manage anarchy and increase security. Cooperation is feasible but it is only maintained as long as it serves a states' interests. However, not all states have the ability to possess nuclear power: "the predictable reactions of other countries may make nuclear status self-defeating (Davis 1993)." Moreover, even if they have the capability, some states may not find it rational to acquire nuclear weapons. Instead, they chose to maintain the status

¹⁰ According to Davis (1993) not all forms of power is desirable to classical realists and this is explained through the security-power dilemma.

quo and align themselves with powerful nations as seen in the NPT. The failure of the NPT supports realist claims that such agreements are less likely to succeed. Ben Frankel argues that international nuclear stability is a byproduct of superpowers rather than nuclear regimes or treaties (Cohen and Frankel 1990). Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that nuclear proliferation actually increases international stability (Waltz 1995; Mearsheimer 1993). These ideas lead to a false assumption that realism and its various subcategories do not accept the concept of cooperation particularly on matters of hard power and national security. This is certainly not the case in point: international institutions, norms and initiatives are recognized as platforms in which countries have the potential to cooperate. The extent of this collaboration is debated through a collective security perspective, not its existence. (Gavin 2010). The United Nations is one such organization where it is possible for countries to advocate their agendas and national interests.

Realist thoughts posit that institutions such as the United Nations serve as a platform in which powerful states can promote their own agendas and shape the international discourse on specific issues. One such issue is the nuclear regime, which has been a complex phenomenon discussed within the United Nations General Assembly. Nuclear matters hold significant importance within the UN system, but it seems that nuclear non-proliferation norms only truly affect those states that lack sufficient relative power. States with significant nuclear capabilities often act outside of the boundaries set by these norms and regimes. One example of this is the United States' withdrawal from all Cold War era agreements. Another way to measure this is by examining UNGA voting records: do great powers remain silent? How do great powers act when emerging powers support non-proliferation? If history is examined, it is observed that great powers either choose to abstain or vote against such efforts, which supports the proposition that nuclear regimes do not apply to them.

Research Question

For the purposes of this article, the United Nations General Assembly serves as the prime model of a global governance platform. While it may seem counter intuitive since the Security Council specifically handles with nuclear issues, the fact that the topic of nuclear power is also discussed in the General Assembly highlights this significance. Therefore, the research question of this study revolves around the following idea:

How do narrow national interests and relative power considerations affect state behavior in global governance platforms?

To identify the independent variables two steps are required. First, a classification of issues and states' power is necessary. For simplicity countries are divided into two groups under the organizing principle of power: traditional and emerging powers. Secondly, a generalization of the range of issues is required. Due to the complexity of identifying the powerful, the second analysis will utilize an Ordinary Least Square regression. In this regression, power is calculated by combining the following independent variables: GDP, exports, imports, military expenditure, and research and development expenditure. This analysis is strongly inspired, influenced, and is based on the data collected by Eric Voeten.

The initial purpose of this inquiry is to determine how both traditional and emerging powers vote in the UN General Assembly. This descriptive analysis aims to provide various explanandum for the existence of coalitions and alliances in the international arena. The resulting options can be classified into two categories. The first possibility is that a consistent pattern will emerge, indicating that traditional powers and emerging powers vote jointly. In the instance that this is confirmed, theories of coalition building, and block voting would be strengthened. The second possibility is that votes are diverge, suggesting that each country prioritizes different issues based on their definition of national interest. Both outcomes have implications for the realist and liberal camps.

Details, Definitions, Data and Methodology

Uncovering patterns of cooperation between states and attempting to demonstrate similarities and differences within these dynamics will contribute to our understanding of the “who” which governs the global nuclear programme between 1990-2018. Under this umbrella, there are both neo-liberal and realist claims over what constitutes emerging and traditional powers. Although this study reflects the realist outlook, there are aspects of the neo-liberal paradigm as well. Especially through observations of the evolution and current state of global governance. Here it can be argued from the liberal perspective that global governance constellations have indeed evolved to include emerging powers as significant actor, whereas the realist perspective does not argue the importance of such actors as being shifters and shapers of the international regime (Humphrey and Messner 2006, Kirton, Daniels, and Freytag 2019, Westerwinter, Abbott, and Biersteker 2019, Weiss and Wilkinson 2019, Beeson 2019). Additionally, new crises have also changed the manner and frameworks in which issue areas have been decided. However, this shift is realist in nature, as the problematique of terrorism has indeed shifted the foci from economic topics to security-based concerns (Kirton, Daniels, and Freytag 2019, Koenig-Archibugi 2019). This new system is a result of the interactions of the aforementioned multiple explanandum. Concomitantly, the emergent global system, or global governance, is framed significantly differently. The impending imminent threats produced by this system is closer to the realist argument that powerful states are more influential in deciding, framing and shaping the outcomes constituting global governance. This is the theoretic bases of this article in which the methodologies have been selected. Put simply, it will be argued that great powers are the locomotors of this system.

Here, it is necessary to disclose that by no means is this work explanatory of the whole global governance system. Such a lofty aim is beyond the scope and range of this paper. A narrowing of the research is both necessary and essential. The more specific question of inquiry here, is to investigate the specific role of power within global governance and even more so to investigate the cases in which relative power concerns shape state behavior. However, this is also not a specific enough statement to measure. To measure the powerful, this work will concentrate on the hard measures of power. The United Nations General Assembly has been chosen as a proxy for global governance as it is the most inclusive and universal of such constellations. The General Assembly voting records are indicators of state behavior and this, state preferences. The collective decision-making processes and coalition building procedures provide specific cases for analysis.

The results will show us an aspect of who governs, empirically.

The most important, and perhaps the most critical definition here is uncovering what power is. It is a key concept for many disciplines; international relations, philosophy, political science, economy to mention a few. For the intents and purposes this paper will accept the concept of what constitutes the powerful as based on post-war conceptions. Power is the ability to influence independent variables to realize the intended dependent outcome which is shaped by rationalist means. When the concepts and notions of global governance and power are reconciled one statement is imminent: global governance without power is unthinkable.

Moving on to the more pragmatic measurement aspect of power which presents a dichotomy. Are great powers the traditional powers? Should we understand powerful as the victors of the two World Wars? How should the powerful be measured? To tackle these problems and make certain that no leaf remains covered, it will be argued from both sides. In the first part of the analysis the definition of the powerful will indeed be the victors and shapers of the post-war order. These countries are: China, France, Germany, USA, UK, Japan, Italy and Russia (Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann 2004, Fazal and Poast 2019, Han and Paul 2020). Emerging powers on the other hand will be the states which reflect an increasing trend in the areas of militarization, economy, resource management...etc (Mourato Pinto 2013). The two country groups will be the units of analysis for the first part- the ANOVA t-tests.

However, just comparing the two groups in terms of their convergences and divergences in their voting patterns provides descriptive results and in not an original inquiry. Therefore, another type of analysis will be conducted- a more systematic and numbers-based analysis through the use of statistics to illustrate that power indeed is the main currency which shapes and frames the global agenda for nuclear issues (1990-2018).¹¹ The logic here to understand that not all traditional powers hold the attributes of the superpowers. Therefore, the first descriptive analysis is just that- it paints rudimentary picture of the situation. The quantitative part of this paper, which aims to achieve a certain amount of correlation, does not accept the predetermined conditions of what constitutes the powerful on the basis of the post-war order. Here, the powerful is decided on hard variables as parameters: GDP, military expenditure...etc. This will allow for a more comprehensive understanding of what influences voting patterns.

The chosen methodology is a type of regression: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). This study constitutes a large-N study as the number of observations are above 600. The results of the UN General Assembly session assumes that yes votes are considered in support of the issue and no votes reject the actions proposed. Moreover, the successful and rejected outcomes of the UN session is calculated by taking a simple majority (% 50 +1). The analyses of the hypotheses' are considered to illustrate the correlation of likelihood of voting patterns. Here, the analysis provides an explanation of the reasons behind the results of the ANOVA analysis.

The variables are as follows: the dependent variable is taken as the ratio of the yes

¹¹ The temporal frame of this study is based on two factors; data availability and the significant changes in the international system with the end of the Cold War.

votes in the topic of nuclear non-proliferation in a given year. This data is taken from Eric Voeten's UN GA dataset. This is our unit of analysis; it is calculated through the division of yes votes to the total votes in a given year. The dependent variables are gross domestic product, levels of imports and exports, military expenditure data, Polity IV data, population data, the existence of militarized inter-state disputes as well as R&D expenditures. Data sources are as follows:

GDP: World Bank dataset (constant US dollars in thousand), indicator of economic power

Imports and Exports: International Monetary Fund dataset, indicator of economic power

Military Expenditure (1): SIPRI database (constant US dollars in thousands) indicator of hard power, taken as share of GDP

Military Expenditure (2): Composite Index and National Capabilities database (constant US dollars in thousands), alternative measure for hard power as it is more comprehensive integrating populations, resources... etc, taken as share of GDP. Utilized as second alternative due to temporal data unavailability.

Polity V: Composite Index of Levels of Democracy, range from -10 (autocratic) to 10 (democratic). Control variable for regime type.

Population: World Bank dataset (constant US dollars in thousands, share of GDP)

Research and Development: World Bank dataset (constant US dollars in thousands, share of GDP)

Militarized Interstate Disputes: Correlates of War database, dichotomous variable

All variables are transposed logarithmically to achieve unit compatibility. Additionally, to overcome the random effects and endogeneity the variables have been lagged for one year. Decade dummies have been utilized to control for fixed effects. The OLS regression will constitute around the clustering of the countries.

Hypothesis Testing and Results

Steven Cimbala claims that "international politics is a game of oligopoly, where the few rule the many." Should the following hypotheses be confirmed, this statement and the realist line of thought will be supported.

H1: Traditional powers are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining to nuclear non-proliferation.

H2: Emerging powers are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining to nuclear non-proliferation.

Below are the results of the ANOVA independent t-test:

Chart 2: ANOVA results

Group Statistics					
	TRAD EMG OTHERS	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
vote_1_Sum_NU	1 EMG_PWR	232	11.25	5.365	.352
	2 TRAD_PWR	203	6.50	3.696	.259
vote_3_Sum_NU	1 EMG_PWR	232	1.54	2.641	.173
	2 TRAD_PWR	203	5.72	3.906	.274

Both claims hold true: first, it is observed that traditional powers are less likely to support nuclear non-proliferation on the international front because their national interests lie in increasing their relative power. Traditional powers are less likely to support others' increase in nuclear power, playing into the zero-sum game view of the international system. Secondly, it is detected that emerging powers are more likely to support nuclear regimes and non-proliferation efforts to reinforce their stance by reducing the magnitude of threat that such weapons cause. The results of the ANOVA analysis, demonstrate the heterogeneity in the likelihood of traditional powers and emerging powers' voting tendency. Put simply, variance exists in the means of the vote numbers.

Here, it is critical to also include theories of damage limitation as explanations of the real-life dynamics which have been observed between the United States and China. Although China has a strong No First Use (NFU) policy, its efforts to strengthen the nuclear arsenal is regarded as a threat by Washington- not only due to a comparison of numbers. In the unlikely instance that such a catastrophe should occur, the US views its relative capability to withstand attacks as a major aspect of its power. This is a key example in which relative systemic factors shape state perceptions.

The confirmation of the two hypotheses support realist explanations on the nature of international cooperation- especially when the issue is critical to its survival and relative power position. However, a more detailed account of the voting patterns and their directions can be uncovered by looking at the ratio of the means of yes and no votes over time. This will allow an analysis bridging the gap between theory and practice; supporting that realpolitik is applicable to the events which have been summarized in the previous sections.

The second part of the analysis tests the variance between the two groups by automatically clustering emerging and great powers. This provides a much more accurate contemporary analysis through the introduction of success variables which allows an understanding of reasons behind the likelihood of agreeing with the winning camp. A simple majority threshold is adopted: 50% +1. This provides for a detailed understanding of which country groups are invested with the global agenda. Here, the explanandum is calculated through the division of a states being in the success category to total votes. Identical controls have been utilized.

The hypotheses are as followed:

Hypothesis 3: Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining nuclear non-proliferation.

Hypothesis 4: Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining nuclear non-proliferation.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
GDP per capita	-0.0157 (0.0163)	-0.0167 (0.0143)	-0.112*** (0.0244)	
Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP per capita	-0.0748 (1.382)	-0.450 (1.428)	0.00583 (1.481)	
Total Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes	-0.0257** (0.0102)	-0.0346*** (0.0114)	-0.0313*** (0.0115)	-0.0162*** (0.00373)
Population		-0.0180 (0.0113)	-0.0930*** (0.0196)	
Polity V		-0.00674* (0.00395)	-0.00445 (0.00432)	
Export			-0.00563 (0.0310)	
Import			0.0886*** (0.0293)	
CINC				-2.285* (1.251)
Constant	1.081*** (0.254)	1.411*** (0.328)	3.375*** (0.523)	0.833*** (0.0489)
N	2630	2484	2203	2360
R ²	0.398	0.433	0.456	0.390

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure 2. OLS results

The results of the OLS regression testing H3 and H4 are below:

The results of the tests indicate that H3 is not statistically significant, but there is a finding which posits that if militarized interstate disputes are happening in a state, it is more likely for that state to support non-proliferation efforts. Although this indication is present, it would be too far of an assumption to stipulate this hypothesis is supported with a small margin of error, as this claim just points us in the direction for further research under the discipline of conflict studies. The results of H4 provides us with a finding that is indeed statistically significant. The results show clearly that GDP per capita is a variable of explanatory power. In other words, as GDP per capital increases by a one standard deviation, it is more likely for a stat to vote against with the UN agenda- more specifically, the probability decreases from 72 percent to 55 percent. This clearly show that nuclear non-proliferation efforts are not supported by the economically powerful- the rich are less likely to support a world without nuclear weapons. Theoretically speaking, it is possible in the near future to expect another arms race- perhaps with the existence of nuclear weapons. Certainly, this is quite worrying. Below are the results in detail.




Figure 3. Linear predictions for militarized interstate disputes

However, the above hypotheses do not provide us with information to illuminate the voting patterns in detail. Do great powers vote together? Are they in the winning camp? To uncover this inquiry, two other hypotheses are tested:

Hypothesis 5: Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning nuclear non-proliferation issues.

Hypothesis 6: Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning nuclear non-proliferation issues.

The results are below:

	Model 1	Model 2
GDP per capita	-0.00921 (0.0119)	-0.00675 (0.0119)
CINC	-2.556** (1.211)	-2.572* (1.368)
Population		0.0126 (0.00978)
Total Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes		-0.0277*** (0.00808)
Polity V		-0.00370 (0.00232)
Constant	0.948*** (0.166)	0.726*** (0.231)
N	4188	3539
R ²	0.233	0.276

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure 4. OLS results for Convergence

In the new tests, which are much more detailed, the results support that economic power is indeed critical. Predicted ratios decrease even more substantially with each standard deviation: a decrease in two standard deviations show the following: 83 percent to 57 percent. Such finding indicate again the importance of economic power. The last model in Figure 4, which calculates CINC scores as a measure for power also claims that states with higher national capacity decreases support to the suggested resolution. The confidence interval is 90 percent here. Another interesting finding comes to light with the previous tests: as the democratic nature of a state decreases, it is more likely for that state to support resolutions as well as being in the winning group within the results of aforementioned resolution.

Conclusion

Realist theories posit the prevalence of relative power concerns as a major driving force shaping 21st century global governance. In theory, the machinations of the international system align with understandings of the zero-sum geopolitical landscape. Although there are different perspectives from understanding state behavior within the liberal scope to shape inter-state more idealistically, the state as one of the main actors of international relation in theory and practice try to maximize their capabilities. Theoretically, great powers must be the foremost actors of the international system in terms of their decision-making capacities. Additionally, they have the potential to effect and influence emerging powers' decision-making processes. When theory and practice are put together, it is observed that power remains the primary currency in international affairs. For such reasons, this study has aimed to find relevant data that can prove the assumption that states use their power positions to maintain and maximize their national interests.

The findings align with realist assumptions confirming that this game is indeed a zero-sum game, particularly when it comes to nuclear discussions within global governance. At the end of the day, international society expects that global governance- the new liberal world order- would show a new global understanding in contrast to the hard power approaches of states. Thus, the state will get the position only as a philosophically positive state. States do not embrace a position in which they are more likely to lose standing, instead they are more likely to choose a path in which they become a part of the nuclear armed states' club. States desire control over others, especially in nuclear matters, through their decision-making capacity in international organizations. There, they are expected to be a part of the major bargaining and negotiation apparatus of international governance such as United Nation. In such platforms, states which have historically been on opposing camps have the potential to be aligned, creating an interesting case study.

Consequently, states are less inclined to embrace liberal claims of common interest, leading to significant tensions between international actors. As mentioned, even though states can come together on some controversial topic idealistically, they are less likely to adopt approaches which jeopardize their relative positions, especially within the modern state system. This has been evident both historically and quantitatively. Unfortunately, achieving an idyllic and peaceful world seems unattainable under the current system. However unlikely, the most attainable solution would be a comprehensive paradigm shift in the understanding of national interests moving away from a state-centric perspective towards a more global perception.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

Organization of Turkic States: Diverse Motivations For A Common Aim

Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı: Ortak Bir Amaç İçin Çeşitli Motivasyonlar

Merve Erkan Aydın¹ , Yi Liu² 

Abstract

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) was established to strengthen relations and increase cooperation between Turkic-speaking countries. The roots of the organization, which has the capacity to influence the balance of power in its geography, date back to the early 1990s, when the Turkic republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus declared their independence. The process, which started with the Presidential Summits held for the first time in 1992, has undergone transformations over time and has taken its current form. As in every organization, the motivations of member states have been effective in the mentioned transformations. This study aims to reveal the political, economic, and cultural motivations of the member states towards the OTS. In this context, firstly, information will be given about the emergence, transformations, structure, goals, and cooperation areas of the organization. Afterward, the motivations of the organization's leading actors (Türkiye and Kazakhstan) and other members (Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan) will be examined in two subsections. In this study, in which a comparative analysis method was adopted, scientific data, books, articles, internet resources, official documents, and reports were used. The main argument of the study is that economic and political expectations come to the fore in the interest of member states to the organization, and cultural motivations play an encouraging role in the realization of these expectations.

Keywords: Organization of Turkic States, Turkic Republics, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Türkiye

Öz

Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı (TDT) Türkçe konuşan ülkeler arasındaki ilişkilerin güçlendirilmesi ve işbirliğinin artırılması amacıyla kurulmuştur. Bulunduğu coğrafyada güç dengesini etkileme kapasitesi olan bu teşkilatın kökenleri Orta Asya ve Kafkasya'daki Türk cumhuriyetlerinin bağımsızlıklarını ilan ettikleri 1990lı yılların başına kadar uzanmaktadır. İlk kez 1992 yılında düzenlenen Başkanlık Zirveleriyle başlayan süreç, zamanla dönüşümler geçirerek günümüzdeki halini almıştır. Her örgütte olduğu gibi, söz konusu dönüşümlerde üye devletlerin motivasyonları etkili olmuştur. Bu çalışma, üye devletlerin TDT'ye yönelik politik, ekonomik ve kültürel motivasyonlarını ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu kapsamda ilk olarak, teşkilatın ortaya çıkışı, dönüşümleri, yapısı, amaçları ve işbirliği alanları hakkında bilgi verilecektir. Ardından, teşkilatın önde gelen aktörlerinin (Türkiye ve Kazakistan) ve diğer üyelerinin (Kırgızistan, Azerbaycan ve Özbekistan) motivasyonları iki alt başlıkta incelenecektir. Karşılaştırmalı bir analiz yönteminin benimsendiği bu çalışmada, bilimsel veriler, kitaplar, makaleler, internet kaynakları, resmî belge ve raporlardan yararlanılmıştır. Çalışmanın ana argümanı üye devletlerin örgüte olan ilgisinde ekonomik ve siyasi beklentilerin ön plana çıktığı, kültürel motivasyonların ise bu beklentilerin gerçekleştirilmesinde teşvik edici bir rol oynadığıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı, Türk Cumhuriyetleri, Orta Asya, Kazakistan, Türkiye

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Introduction

States become members of international organizations in line with several common interests (economic, political, cultural, etc.) or values. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) emerged with member states coming together around common elements such as language, culture, and history. Declaring their independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkic states in Central Asia and the Caucasus made certain diplomatic initiatives to improve their relations with each other and with Türkiye. The most important of these was the Summits of Heads of States of Turkic Speaking States (Presidential Summits), which had been held since 1992. As a result of these institutionalized summits over time, The Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States (Turkic Council or Turkic Kenesh) was officially established in 2009. By 2021, the Turkic Council changed its name to the Organization of Turkic States and took its final form.

Political and economic meanings are attributed to this organization, shaped around the common values of the Turkic world. Considering the perceptions, expectations, and motivations of the member states towards OTS, it can be understood better. In this respect, the political, economic, and cultural motivations of the founding members (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Türkiye) and Uzbekistan (becoming a member in 2019) are significant. Bearing in mind the experienced transformation and gained momentum since its establishment, OTS membership offers significant potential to member states in various aspects. Although common cultural values were emphasized more at the beginning, the political and economic expectations appear as the main provider of the continuity and effectiveness of this organization today.

As the center of gravity of international relations started to shift towards Asia, the importance of Central Asia and the Caucasus began to increase. After decades of Soviet domination, Moscow continues to exist as an influential actor in the region. Similarly, the United States of America (USA), the dominant power of the international system after the Cold War, is one of the determinants of the developments in Central Asia and the Caucasus. On the other hand, China is one of the significant actors that has recently increased its economic and political influence in this region. In this direction, it is discussed in the literature whether OTS will be a balancing power in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the future of this organization's position in regional and global politics is questioned. This organization derives its structure, which has been developing and transforming for more than thirty years, and its sustainability from the approaches of the member states. Accordingly, to better understand the discussions and to make a consistent assumption about the future of the organization, it is important to examine and evaluate the main motivations of the OTS members.

When the relevant literature is examined, there are various studies on the OTS. However, a lack of studies stands out in the literature that address the motivations of member states towards the organization separately. Therefore, in this study, OTS members' expectations, goals, and motivations will be examined in a multidimensional way. In the first part, the emergence, transformations, structure, objectives, and cooperation areas of the organization will be briefly revealed. In the second part, the political, economic, and cultural motivations of member states will be analyzed in two subheadings. Firstly, the motivations of Türkiye and Kazakhstan, the leading actors, will be discussed in detail.

Secondly, the motivations of Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan, which have a limited capacity compared to Ankara and Astana, and Uzbekistan, which joined the organization later, will be included. Thus, the goals and expectations of the member states for membership and continuity of the OTS will be emphasized. In this framework, the article mainly argues that political and economic motivations take precedence in members' interest to the organization, while cultural motivations play a promotive role to these.

Organization of Turkic States: Emergence, Structure and Goals

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 was one of the most important developments of the 20th century. Following its disintegration, 15 new independent nation-states emerged in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe (Sapmaz, 2008, p. 11). Accordingly, the impacts of the national and international conjuncture have brought new opportunities and risks at local, regional, and global levels. One of the opportunities offered by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, especially for the Turkic world, is the existence of an independent Turkic belt stretching from the borders of China to Europe. In other words, the declarations of independence of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have created a natural opportunity for further cooperation between Türkiye and the Turkic republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus in many areas (Yıldırım, Tuğluoğlu, Gökçe & Okumuş, 2021, p. IV). Considering the bilateral and multilateral relations between the parties, it is seen that multidimensional cooperation initiatives in political, economic, social, and cultural fields began immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

After the independence of the Turkic republics, the foundations of the OTS were laid (Nazarbayev, 1997, p. 201-202). In this context, Presidential Summits started to be organized since 1992 with the participation of the heads of state of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Türkiye, and Turkmenistan (Erol & Çelik, 2017, p. 20). At these summits, in addition to emphasizing common language and culture, the parties discussed cooperation opportunities in various fields (such as economy, customs, transportation, etc.) and took some steps for institutionalization. In this direction, ten summits were held in different cities of the Turkic world between 1992 and 2010. The mentioned summits were institutionalized as the "Turkic Council" with the Nakhchivan Agreement signed by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Türkiye at the ninth summit in 2009 (Ulutaş & Tanrısever, 2019, p. 114). Consequently, the Turkic Council was officially launched at the 10th summit in 2010 (Tosun, 2020, p. 21).

Following the launch of Turkic Council, eight more summits were organized, between 2011 and 2021, including different themes such as education, science, culture, transportation, tourism, sports, digitalization and smart cities. At the seventh summit in Baku, Azerbaijan in 2019, Uzbekistan became a full member of the council and Hungary was accepted as an observer member (OTS, 2023A). At the eighth and last summit in Istanbul, Türkiye in 2021, heads of state decided to change the name of the organization to the Organization of Turkic States (Çiçekli, 2022). Moreover, Turkmenistan, which stands out as neutral state, became an observer member since this summit (Kaya, 2022). Starting from the ninth summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan in 2022, these summits began to be referred to as OTS summits instead of Turkic Council summits. During this summit,

the idea of integration and the Turkic World 2040 Vision were especially emphasized (OTS, 2023B). The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is not recognized by any state other than Türkiye, was also accepted as an observer member at the ninth summit (Başaran, 2022).

It can be mentioned some factors, often intertwined with each other, that were influential in the establishment of OTS and its predecessors. The first of these is the need and quest to emphasize a common identity among member states and their societies (OTS, 2021A, p. 3). As it is known, the members of the organization have rooted historical ties and similar socio-cultural backgrounds. This situation, which provides the basis for the OTS, creates a supportive effect in two aspects: Promoting economic and political collaborations through cultural affinity and placing a new shared identity as an alternative to long-standing Russian influence in the region. The mentioned dimension of the organization is interpreted in some studies as a social construction effort through similar identities like “Turkicness”, “Turkic world” and “Turkic cooperation”. In other words, it is argued that a collective cultural identity can influence member states’ motivations toward the organization and their foreign policy decisions (Yesevi, 2022, p. 12-13; Demir, 2022, p. 44; Akçapa, 2023, p. 475). Moreover, as emphasized by Türkiye’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, this is compatible with the approach of İsmail Gaspıralı, one of the founding ideologists of Turkic nationalism, to “unity in language, thought, and work” (Directorate of Communications, 2023). On the other hand, the transformations of the organization over time have brought the “axis shift” and “Turkic nationalism/Turanism” discussions into the agenda. In this respect, it has been discussed whether Türkiye’s leading role in OTS means an axis shift of this state from the West to Eurasia (Devonshire-Ellis, 2021). Similarly, the possibility of encouraging Turkic nationalism/Turanism in Central Asia by OTS has caused some concerns in countries such as Russia and China, which have minorities of Turkic origin (Akçay, 2022.; Chan, 2021).

At this point, another factor is the reflections of the power vacuum caused by the post-Soviet era and rising international competition in the region. As previously stated, the region’s abundant natural resources and strategic significance have resulted in a power struggle among actors such as the USA, Russia, and China since the emergence of independent states (Erdoğan, 2020, p. 990-1012; Sarı, 2022). On the other hand, no individual actor, whether from within or outside the region, has been able to effectively stabilize Central Asia and resolve its complex issues on their own (Gök, 2022, p. 118). In terms of the Turkic republics, this situation was particularly challenging during the initial years of their independence. For this reason, some integration initiatives and/or multilateral regional organizations have emerged both among these states and under the leadership of international actors. However, the weak institutional capacities of the mechanisms established among Turkic states and the secondary or less important roles of these states in the organizations led by international actors have rendered these initiatives and organizations relatively inadequate (Sarıkaya, 2021, p. 4). Therefore, the OTS has emerged because of nearly thirty years of experience as an organization with Turkic states at its center and which has established its institutional structure over time.

Moreover, some studies in the literature address the emergence and transformations of the OTS from a neofunctionalist perspective (Tekir, 2023, p. 1084-1094.; Emeklier, Taş

& Yılmaz, 2022, p. 73-99). Accordingly, it is assumed that cooperation and integration efforts in one area will encourage similar efforts in other areas and therefore create a spillover effect. From this point of view, it is accepted that the cultural cooperation efforts of the Turkic states also constitute a basis for further economic and political cooperation efforts. Indeed, another important factor influencing the emergence of the OTS was the needs and expectations of the member states for economic and political cooperation. In the economic dimension, these included issues such as enhanced trade relations, adaptation to a market economy, efficient use of natural resources, and better utilization of strategic locations for energy and freight transportation (Özsoy, 2023, p. 45-47.; Topsakal & Zengin, 2021). Politically, the member states' aims to increase their prestige in international relations and their quests for support or solutions in problematic areas like ethnic issues, border disputes, sharing of transboundary waters, and the fight against terrorism played a dominant role (Sarı, 2022). Despite these similarities with the neofunctionalist perspective, the OTS has emerged in line with an understanding that does not aim to transfer the sovereignties of member states to a higher authority, but to establish multifaceted partnerships among member states in various fields (Yüce, 2022).

To understand OTS better, it is necessary to touch upon its organizational structure and purposes, as well as its historical background and emergence factors. In the Nakhchivan Agreement, which is accepted as the founding document of the Turkic Council (predecessor of OTS), the structure, functions, purposes, and duties of the organization are mentioned (Turkic Council, 2009, p. 1-7). According to this agreement, OTS consists of five administrative bodies: The Council of Heads of State (CHS), the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), the Senior Officials Committee (SOC), the Council of Elders (*Aksakals*), and the Secretariat. CHS, which is formed by the heads of member states coming together during summits, is the main decision-making and management body of the organization. The duties of this council include evaluating the activities of the organization, determining the primary areas of cooperation, and addressing current problems. Similarly, CFM, consisting of the foreign ministers of the member states, gathers before the meetings of CHS. The duties of this council involve discussing the activities on the agenda of OTS, determining the agenda of CFM meetings, and approving the personnel structure and financial report of the Secretariat (Erkiner & Eray, 2022, p. 230-234).

SOC consists of experts appointed by member states, and each state is represented by at least one representative. The main task is to evaluate and approve the draft documents prepared by the Secretariat before the meetings of CFM and CHS. *Aksakals*, on the other hand, was formed as a part of the tradition of consultation in Turkic culture. This council consists of the elders of each member state and operates as an advisory body in related fields (Turkic Council, 2009). Finally, the Secretariat, which was established as the permanent executive body and is headquartered in Istanbul, has particular importance for the organizational structure (OTS, 2021D). At the head of the Secretariat, there is a Secretary General appointed for a three-year term according to the alphabetical order of the English names of the countries, and deputies consisting of representatives of each member. According to the Nakhchivan Agreement, the duties of the Secretariat include organizing official meetings, preparing draft documents, establishing and ensuring

archiving of documents, providing interaction with other international organizations/forums, and submitting financial activities reports (Turkic Council, 2009).

As well as the main administrative bodies, there are also some associated and integrated organizations/institutions with the OTS. Among these, the International Organization of Turkic Culture-TURKSOY, which is called UNESCO of Turkic world (Yüce, 2021, p. 22), aims to strengthen the interaction between Turkic peoples, to transfer Turkic culture to future generations, and to introduce it to the world (Kaseinov, 2015, p. 19-25.; TURKSOY, 2023). International Turkic Academy, established in 2012 by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Türkiye, is responsible for organizing research on Turkic culture and scientific activities related to it (OTS, 2023C.; Kydyralı, 2019, p. 49-58.; International Turkic Academy, 2023). The Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States (TURKPA), consisting of parliamentarians of member states, targets inter-parliamentary cooperation and organization of the national legislative dimension of the decisions of associated organizations regarding the Turkic world (TURKPA, 2023). Finally, the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation conducts multifaceted activities with the basic mission of protecting and promoting the common cultural heritage of Turkic-speaking peoples (Afandiyeva, 2015, p. 35-39).

OTS aims to develop mutual ties between members in line with common language, culture, tradition, and historical ties. According to the Nakhchivan Agreement, some of the main aims and duties of the organization are: Strengthening mutual trust/friendship; contributing to regional/global peace and security; acting on international platforms/forums jointly; fighting against terrorism, separatism, and human and drug trafficking together. In addition, improving the economic, social, and cultural conditions of the societies is among the primary objectives (Turkic Council, 2009). When the official documents are examined, the steps taken to fulfill these goals and tasks can be seen (OTS, 2023D). In this direction, conferences, forums, symposiums, and exhibitions are organized; research funds are established; meetings between the relevant units of the members are held; academies and committees are established; protocols are signed; sports competitions are organized, and various other projects are implemented. Moreover, sectoral meetings are held covering all segments of societies/states such as various ministries, professional chambers, writers and cinema professionals, lawyers, official news agencies, and national TV channels. On the other hand, it is envisaged that basic principles such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, and non-interference in internal affairs will be respected while fulfilling the mentioned objectives and duties (Turkic Council, 2009).

Strong cooperation between member states is needed to obtain the objectives, tasks, and projects of the OTS. When the official website is examined, it is seen that many cooperation areas are mentioned. Some of these can be listed as international issues, trade, investments, customs, transportation, education, culture, media, youth, sports, diaspora, technology, energy, health, agriculture, justice, human capacity, and religious institutions (OTS, 2023E). Considering the official documents, it is clear that many more examples can be given for the fields of cooperation. However, no matter how diverse they are, it is possible to collect these cooperation areas between members under three pillars: Political cooperation, economic cooperation, and cultural cooperation. Moreover, these pillars point to the main framework of member states' motivations towards the

organization. Therefore, in the next part, the main motivations of the member states will be examined in line with political, economic, and cultural expectations.

Motivations of Member States: Political, Economic and Cultural Expectations

Although OTS currently has five members and three observers, member states' influences within the organization and their expectations from it differ. In this regard, Türkiye and Kazakhstan stand out as the leading actors of the Turkic world's integration efforts. Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan, which have a limited capacity compared to these states, and Uzbekistan, which joined the organization later, play a complementary role in Ankara's and Astana's efforts. Therefore, in this part, the basic motivations and expectations of the organization's member states will be discussed in two subheadings. In the first, the political, economic, and cultural motivations of Türkiye and Kazakhstan, which are considered as the driving forces of the organization, will be discussed comparatively. In the second, the meaning of OTS for the other three members will be examined from the aspects. Thus, the motivations of all member states will be evaluated comparatively.

Intentions of Leading Actors: OTS for Türkiye and Kazakhstan

After the independence of Turkic states, Türkiye and Kazakhstan have stand out as leading countries of Turkic world's integration efforts. This situation is mainly because the political and economic capacities of these two countries are more developed compared to others. With its institutionalized state structure that has existed for centuries, Türkiye is seen as the natural leader of the Turkic Belt in Eurasia. This state is one of the first countries to recognize the independence of Turkic republics and to support them the most (Aras, 2000, p. 45). For example, Türkiye, which signed almost 150 agreements with these states during their early independence (Alaranta & Silvan, 2022, p. 3), provided more than 90% of the aid to Central Asian countries between 1992 and 1996 (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2013, p. 75-76). Similarly, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) was established in 1992 to organize Türkiye's development assistance to the Turkic states and thus to expand Ankara's sphere of influence in Central Asia and Caucasus. In this context, improving relations with the Turkic world has been among the priorities of Turkish foreign policy for more than thirty years (TİKA, 2023).

On the other hand, Kazakhstan's effort to play a leading role in integration efforts in the Turkic world since the 1990s was influenced by the expectation that it would become the rising-leading country of the region and its quest to become more engaged in the international system (Zengin, 2021, p. 75-80). Accordingly, Astana's adoption of a multi-vector foreign policy approach has been effective in its tendency to develop good relations with the Turkic world (Diyarbakırlıoğlu & Yiğit, 2014, 70-82). In this context, it is possible to attribute special importance to founding president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. Defining as the Elder (Aksakal) of the Turkic world, Nazarbayev was a key figure in the process ranging from the Presidential Summits to the establishment of the OTS (Doğantekin, 2019). The statement on the organization's website that the "OTS is the brainchild of President Nazarbayev" also confirms the above argument (OTS, 2019). However, it would be not appropriate to only associate Kazakhstan's relations with the

Turkic world and OTS with the personality of Nazarbayev. On the contrary, this state has made the goal of improving relations a comprehensive state policy and has continued its activities in this direction after Nursultan Nazarbayev's rule (Sanchez, 2020, p. 4-5).

Türkiye's and Kazakhstan's main political motivations for OTS are the search for regional and global influence. For Ankara, this organization points to a new and strong orientation in its foreign policy perspective. Türkiye, which was a loyal member of the NATO alliance during the Cold War, has started to face serious problems in its relations with Western countries, especially since the 1990s (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2013, p. 75-80). For example, the differences in perspectives on the fight against terrorism and the deadlock in the European Union integration processes are some of the problematic areas (Hale, 2013: 158-194). As a result of this situation, Ankara needed to diversify Western-centered foreign policy understanding since the mid-1990s, especially after the change of government in 2002 (Alaranta & Silvan, 2022, p. 4-5). In this context, Türkiye has begun to adopt a multidimensional and proactive foreign policy approach in geographies such as Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. In today's world, OTS appears as one of Ankara's leading foreign policy instruments towards Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Despite Türkiye's increasing interest in Central Asia, Russia and recently China are among the most influential actors in the region. Considering its current economic and political potential, it does not seem possible for Ankara to enter a struggle for influence alone with Moscow and Beijing. For this reason, it is possible to describe the OTS as both a complementary alternative to Western influence and a balancing actor against Russia and China, in terms of Turkish foreign policy (Gökçelik, 2022.; Samar & Ademoğlu, 2022). A relatively analogous situation applies to Kazakhstan's foreign policy goals. OTS, which is on its way to becoming an important economic and political power in the region, stands out as a third way against Russian and Chinese influence in Central Asia (Demir, 2022, p. 65). Unlike the asymmetric relations established with Russia, which sees the region as its backyard, and China, which increases its influence in the region, Astana has the chance to establish more equal and balanced relations with OTS members (OTS, 2021A, p. 2). Although Türkiye is the most influential state in the organization, Ankara's limited economic and political capacity compared to Russia and China provides a significant opportunity for Kazakhstan in this respect.

Kazakhstan is the world's ninth-largest country by surface (Pavlovic & Gritzner, 2003, p. 9) and the largest landlocked country (Kassen, 2018, p. 319-320). If the OTS project is successful, Astana has the potential to make its strategic position in Central Asia more important, as in the Soviet era. In this direction, a strategic alliance that can be established with Azerbaijan over the Caspian Sea and the improvement of relations with neighboring countries (Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) within the organization will create a strategic advantage for Astana government. Moreover, the fact that Kazakhstan, which tries to play an active role in regional/international organizations (McDermott, 2006), has undertaken a leading mission in the establishment of the OTS supports Astana's claim and efforts to regional leadership. Lastly, the Astana government approaches this organization as a window opening to the West. In other words, Türkiye's active position within the OTS constitutes one of Kazakhstan's main motivations towards this organization at the point of developing relations with Western countries (Ormanova, 2016, p. 630). In addition,

Türkiye has enabled the Turkic republics, especially Kazakhstan, to participate in other organizations such as the Economic Cooperation Organization (Yalçinkaya, 2019, p. 93). The fact that Türkiye is a part of the Western alliance, that the OTS connects China and European countries, and that Hungary is an observer member strengthens this motivation of Astana.

Türkiye's and Kazakhstan's main economic motivations for OTS mostly focus on mutual trade and energy. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Ankara has been trying to increase its commercial share in the Central Asian market, especially in areas such as construction, textiles, and telecommunications (Alaranta & Silvan). Following the success of Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, on the other hand, there was a visible increase in demand for Turkish defense industry products by the Turkic republics (Yüce, 2022). Also, as seen in Table 1, the increase in Türkiye's commercial relations with the Turkic republics in the period from 2009 to 2020 is promising for the future of economic relations. Similarly, by effectively using the Middle Corridor project, Türkiye aims to create a Turkic transit route extending from east to west, with OTS at its center. The scope of this project is planned to facilitate freight transportation between members and to create an uninterrupted commercial line between European markets and Asian countries. Considering Türkiye's geostrategic position within the project, the possible success of the Middle Corridor may also mean more economic and political benefits for Ankara (Toprak, 2020, p. 24-26). Alike, Türkiye's geopolitical position is also significant for another transport network whose establishment process began in 1992 and whose founding document was signed in 1998. Transit Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA), an international organization based in Baku, stretches from the European Union to Kyrgyzstan and includes all Turkic republics. This organization has a transportation network that includes land, rail, and Caspian sea routes connecting the Turkic republics to Europe (Yalçinkaya, 2012: p. 34-39; Yalçinkaya & Güzel, 2021: p. 106-107).

Table 1

Türkiye's exports to Turkic States: 2009 and 2020 (Thousands of US Dollars)

Country	2009		2020	
	Export	Import	Export	Import
Azerbaijan	1,400,446	140,599	2,085,574	410,710
Kazakhstan	633,417	959,454	985,684	1,180,549
Kyrgyzstan	140,002	31,446	417,546	91,158
Turkmenistan	945,655	327,559	786,965	319,386
Uzbekistan	279,963	413,078	1,154,334	969,983

(World Bank, 2023A)

In terms of energy, it is possible to emphasize two main motivations of Türkiye. Firstly, Türkiye, 92.8% foreign-dependent in energy (Yalçın & Doğan, 2023, p. 207), desires to diversify its energy suppliers through some member countries with rich natural resources such as oil, natural gas, and uranium. Secondly, as in the examples of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan-BTC (Yiğitgüden, 2023) and Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline-

TANAP (Aras, Suleymanov & Hasanov, 2013, p. 1-9), Ankara aims to be a transit base for the transportation of member states' resources to European markets. In this way, the Turkish government expects to increase its strategic importance and expand economic opportunities (Akçapa, 2023, p. 487-488). From this point, the economic motivations of Astana towards OTS basically consist of three factors: Firstly, Kazakhstan targets to export its oil and natural gas safely owing to the projects and agreements of this organization. In this context, almost all the energy resources that the Astana government exports to Europe are transferred via Russia. For Kazakhstan, the introduction of the OTS for alternative energy transportation can eliminate the possibility of interruption of energy trade with Europe in case of a possible crisis with Moscow. On the other hand, this situation may increase the amount of energy resources that Astana exports to European countries in case of emerging new sanctions against Russia by Western countries (Nakhle, 2023.; Abdrahmanov & Zhumagulova, 2023).

Secondly, Kazakhstan sees OTS as a convenient platform to make its market economy more functional and diversify the sectoral distribution of its economy. This country, which has rich natural gas, oil, coal, and uranium reserves (Karatayev & Clarke, 2014, p. 97-104), plans to avoid dangerous situations such as a resource curse that will be created by its economy being heavily dependent on natural resource income (Aliiev, 2015, p. 1-28). The fact that 50% of Kazakhstan's exports and 30% of government tax revenues consist of oil and natural gas revenues makes understandable Astana's economic motivation towards OTS (Bjerde & Proskuryakova, 2022). Finally, Kazakhstan aims to increase its economic and strategic importance for China and European countries, by actively participating in OTS initiatives such as the Silk Road, Caravanserai and Middle Corridor projects. On the one hand, as in the TRACECA example, Astana hopes to further integrate into Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) too and benefit from it. Beyond that, Kazakhstan targets to be the locomotive of its region by reaching European countries through Azerbaijan and Türkiye and by diversifying its commercial and political cooperation with them. Thus, by benefiting from the increasing influence of OTS, Kazakhstan strives to become one of the central countries of a wide route extending from east to west (Szumski, 2022.; Jafarova, 2023).

Table 2

Kazakhstan's exports to Turkic States: 2009 and 2020 (Thousand US Dollars)

Country	2009		2020	
	Export	Import	Export	Import
Azerbaijan	91,513	145,442	84,124	25,012
Kyrgyzstan	390,495	116,477	580,520	267,582
Turkmenistan	108,949	61,387	76,623	51,356
Türkiye	959,454	633,417	1,180,549	985,684
Uzbekistan	891,845	304,414	2,136,391	793,026

(World Bank, 2023B)

Another motivation of both countries is to improve cultural relations with other members. The development of cultural relations is accepted as the driving force in

accelerating the economic and political relations between OTS countries. It is possible to see the traces of cultural identity, especially in Türkiye's foreign policy approaches. For example, Ankara, which emphasizes values such as modernization, secularism, and democracy in its relations with Western countries, puts special emphasis on the Muslim identity when establishing relations with Middle Eastern countries (Göl, 2009, p. 795-811). Similarly, it is observed that common features in language, culture, and history are mostly pointed in Türkiye's policies towards other members (Fida, 2018, p. 114, 120). In this context, OTS membership creates a suitable ground for this country to accelerate its integration efforts in fields such as education, culture, history, geography, language, religion, sports, and literature. The fact that institutions such as TİKA and TURKSOY operate within the borders of member countries and with the collaboration of OTS can be shown as an example to this (Akıllı & Çelen, 2019, p. 135-152.; Purtaş, 2017, s. 98). However, Türkiye's activities in this direction should not just be evaluated regarding nationalism/Turanism. The expectations of economic and political mutual benefit are effective in these activities more than ideological motives. The statement by Binali Yıldırım, *Aksakal* of Türkiye and OTS, that "China and Russia are natural members of the organization" strengthens this argument (Sputnik Türkiye, 2021).

For Astana, as well as increasing cultural interactions with other members, consolidating the Kazakh identity within the country and strengthening national integrity is also a cultural motivation. This situation, which is not desirable for a modern nation-state, stems from the fact that the percentage of ethnic Kazakhs in Kazakhstan is relatively low and the country hosts more than 100 different ethnicities (Daminov, 2020, p.1). For this reason, the Kazakh government aims to ensure that the Kazakh language is spoken more in Kazakhstan, the survival of Turkic culture in the country, and increased communication with relative societies by being more integrated into the cultural projects and institutions of OTS. In this context, Astana actively participates in many projects conducted within the framework of this organization. International Turkic Academy and Orkhun Student Exchange Project are some of the cultural projects supported by Kazakhstan (Akıllı, 2019, p. 14-15). On an individual basis, initiatives such as planning to gradually change the Cyrillic alphabet between 2023 and 2031 and including the languages of the Turkic states as elective foreign languages in some schools are among the examples of this (Şimşek, 2023, p. 242).

Expectations of Other Members: OTS for Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan

Although their capacities are limited compared to Ankara and Astana, it would not be wrong to state that the motivations of the other three members are relatively similar to these two leading countries. Politically, the main motivations of these three countries are centered around factors such as multidimensional regional cooperation efforts, increasing their prestige in Central Asia, finding regional/international support in solving their problems with neighbors, and some security concerns. In this context, OTS means for Kyrgyzstan the opportunity to resolve its problems with neighbors through peaceful ways and to find strong regional/international support in times of crisis. The Bishkek's resolution of the border/water problem with Uzbekistan through diplomacy in 2022 (RFE, 2022) and the OTS members' support for Bishkek during the border conflicts between

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in January 2022 are examples of this (OTS, 2022A). Also, the dominant positions of Kazakhstan and Türkiye in the organization are among the factors that increase the interest of Kyrgyzstan, which places security concerns at the center of its foreign policy. Astana's active role in the solution of many regional problems since its independence and Ankara's decades of experience/capacity sharing with Kyrgyzstan in economic, political, and military aspects has been influential in the emergence of this situation.

Azerbaijan also seeks the support of OTS members in disputes/conflicts with neighboring countries such as in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The fact that OTS members stood by Baku in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and that Azerbaijan's victory in the war was congratulated at the Unofficial Turkestan Summit held on March 31, 2021, clearly shows this (OTS, 2021B). In this context, this victory revealed an uninterrupted transportation line between the Turkic republics in Central Asia and Türkiye and had an encouraging effect on cooperation efforts (Bayramova, 2021, p. 8-9). On the other hand, the expectation of developing relations with the Turkic world, especially with Türkiye, plays a leading role among Azerbaijan's political motivations towards OTS. In other words, Baku sees OTS as a suitable platform for the collective development of bilateral relations in various fields. As stated, the victory of Azerbaijan in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War brought the cooperation efforts between the member states to a different point. It is known that Türkiye, which played a vital role in this victory with its defense industry products such as Bayraktar TB2 and TRG-300, has also given intensive support to the modernization and training of the Azerbaijani army for decades. In this respect, this support and victory strengthens not only Azerbaijan's motivation, but also other countries such as Kyrgyzstan, which have made an agreement with Türkiye to modernize its army (Gök, 2022, p. 131).

On the other hand, Uzbekistan, which is not a founding member of OTS, has become a full member of the organization since 2019 because of its changing foreign policy preferences (Sobirov, 2020, p. 726-729). Shevket Mirziyoyev, who came to power after Islam Karimov passed away in 2016, followed a policy that Tashkent should strengthen its cooperation with Central Asian countries in various fields (Toktogulov, 2022, p. 53-55). The fact that Mirziyoyev organized official visits to Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and other Central Asian OTS members after he took office is also evaluated from this perspective. Therefore, the thought that political and economic stability in the region can be achieved by deepening cooperation with neighboring countries is the main political factor in Uzbekistan's rising interest in OTS (Tulyakov, 2022). Uzbekistan, which tried to follow a balanced and changeable foreign policy between the USA, Russia, and China in line with its interests during the Karimov era, perceives OTS as a rising actor in the region for the new period. For this reason, Tashkent desires to diversify its foreign policy alternatives and to balance the activities of the great powers in Central Asia, by increasing political and economic integration with the OTS countries. Mirziyoyev's words "Uzbekistan and the Turkic Council are connected not only by common culture, language, and spirituality, but also by traditional friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation" at the Cholpan Ata Summit reveals Tashkent's will to develop multidimensional cooperation with members (Otaxonov, 2022).

From the economic perspective, energy-related issues, mutual trade, and the importance of the Middle Corridor are among the leading motivations of Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan. For example, for Kyrgyzstan, which has poor natural resources and the weakest economy in the region, economic interests regarding OTS are as crucial as political interests (Kayani, 2021, p. 550). In this context, Bishkek's main economic expectations are access to energy resources in Central Asia and the acceleration of mutual trade between members. Moreover, the Middle Corridor project has also a noteworthy potential for the economic and political interests of Kyrgyzstan. Efforts to integrate the Middle Corridor into other international projects such as BRI, New Silkroad Project and TRACECA may mean new investments, possible commercial gains, and increased strategic importance for this country, which may be on the route of these projects (Kaya, 2022). In this direction, Kyrgyzstan attaches special importance to its relations with other OTS members on the project route. It is also possible to mention similar motivations for Azerbaijan. This country is in an extremely critical location in the Middle Corridor and other international transportation route projects. Especially after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the emergence of the possibility of opening the Zangezur Corridor increased the strategic importance of Baku. In this respect, Azerbaijan, providing the connection between Türkiye and other Turkic states, may be the commercial bridge of the Middle Corridor and other projects (Gawliczek & Iskandarov, 2023, p. 37-44).

On the other side, the development of commercial relations with member states is among Baku's main motivations for the organization. This is because OTS provides a suitable platform for this country to advance its economic relations with Türkiye and other Turkic states in the region. In this context, Azerbaijan desires to benefit from the collaborative environment created by OTS's emphasis on common language, culture, and history in its relations with member states. For Azerbaijan, which aims to increase trade volume and market opportunities with the Turkic world, OTS is an important organization that tries to facilitate and develop economic relations through customs agreements and projects (Baghirov, 2022, p. 61-66). The economic potential of the organization is of particular importance for Uzbekistan also. The reason for this is that some of the main trade partners of Tashkent are other members of the organization like Türkiye and Kazakhstan (World Bank, 2023B). In this respect, Uzbekistan is of the opinion that the deepening of cooperation and integration efforts within the organization will also contribute to the economic growth of the countries (Rakhimov, 2023, 403-404).

Therefore, the Uzbek government has put forward and/or supported moves that will improve economic cooperation between member countries in every meeting. For example, during the eighth summit, President Mirziyoyev proposed the establishment of a research center within the OTS, which would help by increasing trade and cooperation between members (Behruz, 2022, p. 266). As another example, the Turkic Investment Fund, which is the first joint financial institution of the Turkic world and every member state contributes equal capital, was established at the Samarkand summit hosted by Uzbekistan (TURKPA, 2022). Uzbekistan also participated in OTS's Sister Ports Project through logistic centers such as Universal Logistics Service (Tashkent), Akhtachi (Andijan), and Termez Cargo Center (Surkhondarya). In addition, Tashkent is trying to advance bilateral and multilateral economic relations with member countries by actively participating in

projects like “YePermit”, “Green Corridor” and “DigitalTIR” in areas such as customs, mutual trade, and digitalization in transportation. Based on all these, economic factors relatively come to the fore among the main motivations of Uzbekistan (Kun.uz, 2022).

The goal of strengthening cultural ties, which is accepted is also manifested in the main motivations of these three states. In this regard, cultural activities constitute the most active area of Kyrgyzstan in the organization. For example, the second and sixth Turkic Council summits hosted by Bishkek government were organized with cultural themes such as education, science, and sports. Similarly, Kyrgyz Kazakh, Kyrgyz-Turkish, and Kyrgyz Uzbek universities located in Kyrgyzstan also demonstrate the will of this country to develop scientific-cultural cooperation between the members. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan, which hosts sports organizations such as Ethnosport and World Nomad Games, believes that the development of cultural relations with member states will increase the number of tourists coming to the country and its reputation (Anarkulov et al., 2021, p. 387-394). Likewise, Azerbaijan actively participates in sports competitions, events related to literature, festivals, and meetings organized by OTS. The most attractive cultural activity of Baku in OTS is hosting the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation, which was officially established at the Astana Summit in 2015 (Idrissov, 2015, p. 11-14). The objective of this foundation, whose secretariat is in Baku, is “to protect, study and promote the Turkic culture and heritage through support and funding activities, projects and programs” (OTS, 2023F).

Finally, it can be stated that Uzbekistan acts with similar motivations as Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan in the cultural field. In this context, the Tashkent government carries out some activities to increase cultural cooperation within the OTS and to better use the existing potential. Hosting the First Turkic Agricultural Forum, giving an international award in the name of Alisher Navoi, trying to establish a research center for Turkic cultural heritage, carrying out studies on climate change and environment for the OTS geography, and declaring the city of Bukhara as the first youth capital of the Turkic world are some of these activities (OTS, 2022B.; Uza, 2021.; Kun.uz, 2022). Uzbekistan is also trying to increase its effectiveness in the field of tourism within the OTS, with moves such as proposing the *Tabarruk Ziyarat* (Holy Ziyarat) project (Bukhari.uz, 2023) and declaring Kokand the tourism capital of the Turkic world (OTS, 2021C). As a result, when considered from the perspective of all three states, the idea of developing cultural relations, which forms the philosophical background of OTS, in Turkic world is a catalyst for the search for improving political and economic relations between member states.

Conclusion

The multidimensional cooperation efforts developed by Turkic republics since 1992 were institutionalized over time and the Turkic Council was established in 2009. The organization took its final form with a name change in 2021. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, common points such as language, history, and culture came to the fore as a significant source of motivation in the members’ cooperation efforts in the beginning. In the following years, however, the economic and political motivations of member states have become dominant in the sustainability of the organization. Accordingly, in today’s world, the economic and political expectations of the member states stand out and cultural

elements play a supportive role in realizing these expectations.

From political perspective, the organization offers member states the opportunity to diversify foreign policy alternatives based on equality. Although Türkiye and Kazakhstan are the leading actors, the limited economic and political capacities of these states compared to other regional/global powers make it easier for the other three countries to approach the organization within the framework of the equal partnership principle. Moreover, OTS promises its members a noteworthy potential in international politics for the future. When considered in this context, on the one hand, it is discussed in the literature whether this organization can be an effective actor in the balance of power in the region against the USA, Russia and China. On the other hand, OTS allows its member states to become an uninterrupted Turkic line between Europe and Asia.

Similarly, the OTS attracts the attention of the member states with various economic opportunities. First, the most basic expectation of OTS members is to increase mutual trade and investments through various agreements and projects. Secondly, reducing the dependence on other actors by providing diversity in energy transportation and distribution is among the primary economic goals of member states. Thirdly, the idea of being at the key point of a continuous Turkic line extending from Asia to Europe, which will emerge because of the possibility of the Middle Corridor and its merger with other international projects, attracts member countries economically, due to their strategic locations.

The expectation of cultural integration between the Turkic republics is still an important source of motivation for the member states. In other words, member states aim to strengthen cultural ties and interaction with each other through OTS. Affiliated organizations, cooperation projects, and other initiatives are significant in this manner. Similarly, OTS organizes joint events between the members in sports, tourism, literature, and many other fields. At this point, it would not be wrong to claim that all these activities were carried out within the framework of the “unity in language, thought and work” approach of İsmail Gaspirali.

Overall, it is possible to put forward that Türkiye and Kazakhstan are the leading actors of OTS. However, although their capacities are relatively limited, other three countries (Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan) also embrace this organization and actively participate in its activities. When the motivations of member states are examined, it is seen that their political and economic expectations are in a dominant position. On the other hand, cultural motivations, which played a key role in the establishment process, are still a driving force. In other words, the development of cultural relations is highly crucial for member states in terms of the realization of their economic and political interests. Therefore, it can be stated that economic, political, and cultural elements are mostly interconnected in the motivations of member states towards OTS.

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Türkiye's Policy towards Syrian Asylum Seekers in Light of the Normative Power of the European Union and Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberal Democracy

Avrupa Birliği'nin Normatif Gücü ve Carl Schmitt'in Liberal Demokrasi Eleştirisi Işığında Türkiye'nin Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Yönelik Politikası

Özgür Üzelakçıl¹

Abstract

This study analyses Türkiye's policy towards Syrian asylum seekers in light of the normative power of the European Union (EU) and Carl Schmitt's critique of liberal democracy. The article hypothesises that Türkiye, under the influence of the EU's normative power, prioritised the collectivist discourse in its Syrian asylum seeker policy, pushing universal principles to the background, and finally politicising and bringing them to the bargaining process. This hypothesis was tested, using a qualitative research design, with semi-structured interviews conducted with officials from the Türkiye Red Crescent (TRCO), the Presidency of Migration Management Officer (PMMO), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye (MFAO). Furthermore, data was collected through a quantitative survey with non-random sampling from 390 Turkish citizens who were affected by these policies, residing in the Istanbul/Fatih, Mersin/Mezitli, and Kilis city centres, to determine their perceptions. The data shows that Schmitt's concerns about liberal democracy are reflected in EU-oriented Türkiye's asylum seeker policies. The conflict between the legal texts covering universal human rights and the national interests of EU Members and Türkiye should only be resolved by harmonized universal principles and collectivist consent.

Keywords: Liberal democracy, Asylum seeker policy, Normative power, National interests, Legitimacy

Öz

Bu çalışma, Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) normatif gücü ve Carl Schmitt'in liberal demokrasi eleştirisi ışığında Türkiye'nin Suriyeli sığınmacılara yönelik politikasını analiz etmektedir. Makalenin hipotezi, AB'nin normatif gücünün etkisiyle Türkiye'nin Suriyeli sığınmacı politikasında kolektivist söylemi ön planda tutarak evrensel ilkeleri geri plana ittiği ve son olarak bunları siyasallaştırıp pazarlık sürecine soktuğu yönündedir. Bu iddiayı test etmek amacıyla Türk Kızılayı, Göç İdaresi Müdürlüğü ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı yetkilileriyle nitel bir araştırma yöntemi olan yarı yapılandırılmış görüşmeler yapılmıştır. Ayrıca İstanbul/Fatih, Mersin/Mezitli ve Kilis il merkezlerinde ikamet eden ve bu politikalardan etkilenen, tesadüfi olmayan örnekleme yoluyla seçilen 390 Türk vatandaşından algılarını belirlemek amacıyla nicel bir anket yoluyla veriler toplanmıştır. Veriler, Schmitt'in liberal demokrasiye ilişkin kaygılarının AB odaklı Türkiye'nin sığınmacı politikalarına da yansıtıldığını gösteriyor. Evrensel insan haklarını kapsayan hukuki metinler ile AB üyelerinin ve Türkiye'nin ulusal çıkarları arasındaki çelişki ancak uyumlaştırılmış evrensel ilkeler ve kolektivist rıza ile çözülebilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Liberal demokrasi, Sığınmacı politikası, Normatif güç, Ulusal çıkarlar, Meşruiyet

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Introduction

The EU has normative power due to its capacity to impose its perception of security on others. Yet, this feature has left the EU in a dilemma between freedom and security, justifying Carl Schmitt's perception. Largely based on communitarian interests rather than cosmopolitan, the EU's policies including Türkiye about asylum seekers¹ have been exemplary in this regard.

As Carl Schmitt asserted in his theoretical framework, major decisions made by the West regarding liberal democracy are highly likely to undermine minority rights. Despite this being the case, since the EU has normative power with regard to border security concerns, it converts not only the structures of its member states, but also the social order of the third countries.² As a consequence, humanity continues to suffer from them. For this reason, this study aims to handle migration management of the EU and Türkiye with reference to Schmitt's perspectives.

The study begins by explaining Schmitt's theoretical approach. It highlights the differences between liberal equality and the equality observed in parliamentary democracies. He argues that a pluralistic approach may not be successful in democracies that are not ideal homogeneous societies (Schmitt, 2008; Mouffe, 1997). For instance, the utilitarian understanding of nation-state citizens regarding immigration renders pluralism ineffective (Walzer, 1990; Mann, Hall, 2011; Pierson, 2015). The issue at hand is that legal texts originate from a political context where decisions are often based on group identity (Kymlicka, 1998; Abbey and Taylor, 1996). This makes it challenging to have faith in and comply with legal texts that are influenced by the political process. Doubts about the legitimacy of legal texts can lead to crises (Schmitt, 1998; Schmitt, 2005; Schmitt, 2007). The next section explains the research methods used in the study and the background of the data obtained to test Schmitt's arguments.

The next part of the study focuses on the notion fact that the EU is considered a normative power for the sake of the perception of Europeanization (Börzel and Risse, 2009, p. 7; Olsen, 2002, p. 924). Its normative power, therefore, stems from its administrative structure and legal texts that impose such power on other countries (Smith, 2012, p. 278-279; Sjursen, 2006, p. 237-238; Manners, 2006, p.194; Koca, 2016, p. 56-57). Member states have also included a security dimension for social, economic and political issues by relying on normative power for their own benefit, initiating an unethical process (Buzan, 1991, p. 439; Wæver, 2011, p. 446). For that reason, migration policies would be politicized and minorities would face exclusion (İçduygu, 2017, p. 35; Hutter and Kriesi, 2021, p. 2), as suggested by Schmitt. Also, in this part is about the EU's agreements that politicize migration policies including the security issue (Innes, 2021, p. 972; Shutes and Ishkanian, 2021, p. 3-4). After the 9/11, Paris and Madrid attacks triggered a policy, revealing the concept of the 'Fortress Europe' (Katharine and Matt, 2006, p. 270; Thomas, 2021, p. 1). And then, the concept turned into 'Friends Circle'

1 In this study, Syrians under temporary protection in Türkiye are referred to as asylum seekers. The term asylum seeker is used for those who seek international protection but whose status is not yet determined.

2 Türkiye can be considered a first country of asylum for Syrians pursuant to article 35(b) asylum procedures directive. Applications for international protection by Non-Syrians may be declared inadmissible by Greece articles 33(1) and (2) (c) APD because Türkiye can be regarded as a safe third country pursuant to article 38 APD (UNHCR, 2017, 498-508).

within the framework of the 2003 European Security Strategy (Bilgin, 2022, 51; Biscop, 2004, p. 25; Fontana, 2022, p. 92).

In the last part, the democratic gap of the EU is explored in respect to Schmitt's concerns (Schmitt, 2007, p. 100; Schmitt, 2005, p. 13-14; Vinx, Schmitt, 2019; Grey, 2017, p. 346; Schmitt, 1988, p.16-17). The asylum seeker negotiations between the EU and Türkiye are then examined in accordance of this discourse. This process clearly shows that how interest-based decisions were made in a functional way (Abdelaaty, 2019, p. 2831; Fouskas, Gökay & Vankovska, 2020, p. 299). The study's conclusion is that Türkiye's asylum seeker policy in the EU axis is politicised and caught between national interests and universal principles. This condition of being stuck in the middle was revealed in light of data obtained from field studies.

Theoretical Framework: Asylum Seeker's Policies in the Liberal Democracies in Terms of Critique of Carl Schmitt's

Schmitt argued that liberal rules and democratic principles are incompatible, leading to conflicts between concepts such as freedom, pluralism, legality, and legitimacy. He provided examples to demonstrate that true pluralism does not function effectively within nation-states.

For democracy to function effectively, equality should be understood as substantial rather than material, legal, or moral. Members of a democratic society experience their freedom as being shaped and supported by common habits and identities (Schmitt, 2008, p. 43). Therefore, he thinks that democracy is based not only on equality between equals but also on equality between unequals, making homogeneity a main factor of democracy (Mouffe, 1997, p. 22). While equality for a person evaluated in the liberal ground is inherently equal, in the democratic systems, a person belongs to the demos, and is therefore excluded politically. So, citizenship is the way to gain rights in all forms of equality (Mouffe, 1997, p. 23). Schmitt argues that democracies, which attach common affiliations as a condition for demanding democratic rights, have moved away from the humanity (Mouffe, 1997, p. 25). Because today's societies have a heterogeneous structure, it is very difficult to achieve religious, moral, and cultural unity in these societies (Mouffe, 1997, p. 32). Therefore, democracy cannot assume formal equality, nor can it guarantee specific or multiple freedoms (Schmitt, 2008, p. 43).

In other words, emphasizing their belonging to different groups (Kymlicka, 1988, p. 181) communitarians are sceptical of situations that could disrupt their own order (Abbey and Taylor, 1996, p. 1). According to them, there is a free rider problem between producers and non-producers in the society (Walzer, 1990, p. 16); therefore, some could be excluded from the public. As Michael Mann stated, the issue of migration is about crime, housing and welfare problems in Europe, and reflected by racist backlash (Mann, Hall, 2011, p. 69-70). In addition, some EU members have applied a societal sense of citizenship for social closing against migrants (Pierson, 2015, p. 181). According to Schmitt, the reason is that if a state has internal conflicts, they will be weak in foreign policies and dominant ones impose their own security perception (Ejdus, 2009, p. 13). Schmitt further stated that while there are different political discourses in the society (Schmitt, 2007, p. 100) the decision of the dominant one at times of crisis (Schmitt, 2005, p.13-14)

determines who the enemy is and who the friend is (Vinx, Schmitt, 2019). For Schmitt, political power can reject or accept something foreign through democracy. Therefore, he viewed the immigration management prepared with a liberal approach with suspicion and emphasized that it was wrong to look for reliability and morality in refugee law (Grey, 2017, p. 346). States have the power to make decisions in times of emergency (Schmitt, 2005, p. 17). Sovereigns independently evaluate norms, laws and their interpretations and make decisions (Schmitt, 2005, p. 72).

In this respect, Schmitt argues that liberalism and democracy cannot coexist successfully, but democracy can function in homogeneous societies (Mouffe, 1997, p. 21-22). He also says that while equality is considered the natural state of people in liberal thought, the concept of ‘demos’ in democracy includes exclusion (Mouffe, 1997, p. 23-24). Indeed, in societies that lack diversity and disregard human rights, conflicts between the majority and minority groups will arise (Schmitt, 1988, p. 16-17). Therefore, when discussing matters of public interest in such environments, a parliamentary crisis will be unavoidable (Schmitt, 1988, p.73-74). The argument is based on the dilemma between politics and law, according to his opinion.

For Schmitt, politics is prior to law, and law, in short, cannot constitute legitimacy by itself. Law that is not informed by a particular political will is likely to undermine the legitimacy of a political order (Schmitt, 2008, p. 9). According to Schmitt’s anti-normative position, legal order is always contingent on the state (Schmitt, 2008, p. 14). In his argument, the legitimacy of law derives from the satisfaction of social expectations. Otherwise, crisis is inevitable (Schmitt, 2008, p. 14).

Research Methodology

This study evaluates the impact of the EU’s normative power on Türkiye’s asylum seekers policies with the following issues:

- How EU’s Normative Power Affects Its Periphery
- Türkiye’s Asylum Seeker Policy
- De jure and De facto Background

The starting point of the study was the legitimacy of the refugee policy, based on Schmitt’s views on the legitimacy crisis. The concept of legitimacy has been discussed in terms of consent, necessity and legality. In this context, semi-structured interviews were conducted by employing a qualitative research approach with the authorities of the Türkiye Red Crescent (TRCO), the Presidency of Migration Management Officer (PMMO) and the Department of Asylum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye (MFAO).³ Additionally a quantitative research method was used through data collected through a survey, to understand the thoughts of Turkish citizens living in the Istanbul/Fatih, Mersin/Mezitli and Kilis city centres. Of the participants, 58.5% are from Istanbul/Fatih (228 people), 26.2% are from Mersin/Mezitli (102 people), and 15.4% are from Kilis (60 people).⁴ The regions were selected based on a method prepared jointly by the State

3 Semi-structured interviews were held with PMMO on 13 December, 2018, and with TRCO and MFAO on 22 January, 2019 in Ankara.

4 For this study, a group of individuals selected through non-random sampling, was used referred to as the

Planning Organization and the Türkiye Statistical Institute during the EU harmonization process. The method was summarized at three levels, known as the Türkiye Statistical Regional Units Classification (NUTS), in accordance with law no. 4720 in 2020. The Istanbul/Fatih region differs from others due to its high immigration rate and diverse demographics. The Mersin/Mezitli region is known for its port trade and tourism, while the Kilis provincial centre is a border region with a social structure based on agriculture and animal husbandry. The Istanbul/Fatih region was classified as 1st Degree developed, the Mersin/Mezitli region as 2nd Degree developed, and the Kilis city centre as 6th Degree developed due to these variations. When the data collected from the interviews, and the survey were evaluated together, democracy deficit occurred in the negotiations on asylum policies between the EU and Türkiye, drawing parallels to Schmitt's thought.

How EU Normative Power Affects Its Periphery: The Case of Türkiye

With the Article 3(5) 21 TEU, the EU penetrated international rules and established its own legal spaces such as Euro zone and Schengen area (Ott, 2021, p. 206). For instance, in the Schengen area, the EU leads the world in terms of the abolition of the death penalty, the expansion of children's rights, and management of the market (Campbell and Nolting, 2022, p. 4-5). In addition, the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ)'s texts to protect the union's internal market, shared values, and security, made the EU as a Regional Rule Maker (Ott, 2021, p. 207).

The EU's normative power not only covers military dimension, but also entails economic and social problems (Sjursen, 2006, p. 237-238). Manners stated: "The more militarization of the EU, the less normative power of the EU" (Manners, 2006, p.194). This explanation highlighted the outcome of externalizing actions. While Buzan was arguing about securitization in the 90s through centre and periphery (Buzan, 1991, p. 439) he looked at securitization from either side of political and military dimensions of society. The gap emerging from these dimensions would create the clash of civilizations (Buzan, 1991, p. 449-450). Weaver carried securitization to political area (Wæver, 2011, p. 446) in conformity with Schmitt's perspective that reads: "Dominant one is a pioneer to determine securitization on behalf of a nation" (Wæver, 2011, p. 478). As a result, the EU will have made decisions without participation, transparency and accountability. Although Article 21(1) TEU mentions about "democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, and the principles of equality and solidarity" (TEU 21(1) Article, "Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union") the Visegrad Group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and Framework Participation Agreement (EU-Türkiye) could be exemplary for the dilemma between human rights and securitization (Wessel, 2021, p. 196).

As the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) stated in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union have been damaged, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) need more regulations accordingly (Wessel, 2021, p. 178). After the EU migration crisis, some member states including Italy, Greece, and Hungary in particular

¹'Research Group'. It is recommended to use specific comments instead of generalizations within the group (Neuman, 2014, p. 250).

objected to the EU's decisions about asylum seekers. In other words, as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) and EU Secondary Legislation and the Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) have not worked properly, the EU's normative power has weakened.

With the EU making decisions to satisfy its members (Schmidt, 2013, p.12) it could be necessary to discuss the policies concerning asylum seekers through Schmitt's critical approach. Processes determining migration, border management and readmission agreements with third countries such as the "EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility" and the "Partnership Framework" and the "Migration Pact" emerged (Lavenex and Nicola, 2022, p. 2848-2849) as liberal democracy-specific texts that Schmitt objected to. After September 11, 2001, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) changed to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and since then, the partnership agreements for Mediterranean countries have been seen only in the status of "partner in the Mediterranean" (Bilgin, 2022, p. 54). This understanding reflects Schmitt's claim of a homogeneous structure for democracy (Mouffe, 1997, p. 22). The European Security Strategy (ESS) could be seen as an example of a controversial liberal policy, as outlined by Schmitt.

The European Council adopted the ESS in December 2003 to design principles and set clear objectives so as to please the EU members' security interests. On the contrary, this period interrupted relations with the Mediterranean countries (Biscop, 2004, p. 25). When the terrorist incidents affected the European Migration and Refugee Pact of 2008, the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 reorganized the temporary protection system, common procedures for admission and withdrawal or secondary asylum (Official Journal of the European Communities, "Treaty of Lisbon, (2007/OJ/C, 306/1). Thus, the EU handled the "Integrated Border Management" and the "Twinning Projects" for the question of sovereignty of states (Katharine and Matt, 2006, p. 270). In brief, a novel approach has commenced between EU members and non-members, such as the Global Approach for Migration and Mobility (GAMM). With the GAMM, dated 18 November 2011, the EU explained migration and mobility with a focus on security, linking them with development. In this connection, a 'Contribution-Based' process was initiated after the "EU's Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern Mediterranean Countries", dated 24 May 2011, which was shaped with the idea of solving the problem from its source. Frontex, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), and the European Return Office strengthened non-member countries financially and cooperated with them.

Despite the security measures taken due to the perceived threat, mass migration from the Middle East never stopped. As a result, the European Security Agenda of 2015 saw debates on securitization and human rights (Fontana, 2022, p. 92). During these negotiations, Italy and Greece proposed Türkiye as a stop station for asylum seekers, under the 'safe third country' and 'first country of asylum' policies. In 1999, when Türkiye started an adjustment process with the EU, as a candidate country, migration policies began to develop. However, through some policies such as the Readmission Agreement in 2013 and the Protocol on the Initiation of the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue, Türkiye conducted negotiations conditionally (Okuy, Lavenex, Križić and Düzgüt, 2020, p. 8). For instance, the EU developed ways to keep away refugees from Europe with

third countries (Fontana, 2022, p. 97-98) as though they worked in search and rescue activities. Actions through Frontex created a victim-saviour dichotomy (Innes, 2021, p. 971). Subsequently, radical parties which addressed the problem of belonging increased in effectiveness in countries such as Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Greece (Swen and Kriesi, 2021, p. 10). This dilemma is based on declining public well-being (Shutes and Ishkanian, 2021, p. 3-4). Moreover, the EU-Türkiye Statement of March 2016 was signed for 6 billion Euros to keep away refugees (Spijkerboer, 2021, p. 1).

However, just like the case in the cooperation between Italy and Libya, strategies with third countries have unfortunately failed (Vara and Matellán, 2021, p. 317-318). Not only Libya, but also Italy was held responsible for that unsuccessful outcome. As a result, The Parliamentary Assembly of Europe highlighted: "Libya violated the right to asylum, freedom of navigation, humanitarian discrimination and non-refoulement principles" (Vara and Matellán, 2021, p. 321). According to Article 16 of the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts), however, Italy was held mainly responsible (Vara and Matellán, 2021, p. 327). In the trial 'HIRSI'(ECtHR - Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy [GC] Application No. 27765/09), Italy was also held responsible for the violation of the common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection provided by directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and Council (Directive 2013/32/EU, 26 June 2013 Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International Protection). In another incident, Greece has been found to have violated the right to life of Syrian refugees by firing on their vessel; resulting in the European Court of Human Rights ordering Athens to pay €80,000 to the family of Belal Tello, who died after the 2014 incident (Kassam, 2024, 17 January).

The EU-Türkiye negotiations, on the other hand, pointed to strong structured deals like the Association Agreement in 1963 and its subsequent protocol and association council decisions, after which deals were made like the Readmission Agreement in 2013. The deals were applied in line with the 'third country principle' such as the EU- Türkiye Statement of 2016 (Carrera, Vara and Strik, 2019, p.16-17). In brief, no more traditional border security policies were used like the 'Sophia Operation' (AB'den Akdeniz'de insan kaçakçılarına karşı yeni operasyon [New operation from the EU against human traffickers in the Mediterranean], *BBC News Türkçe*). The important point is that these initiatives were defined by the Court of Justice of the EU as 'not attributable' (Carrera, Vara and Strik, 2019, p. 9). For example, agreements like "the March 2016, Facility for Refugees in Türkiye" were made in return for development assistance. Türkiye gave asylum seekers temporary protected status, called them guesst rather than refugees, and they were provided with necessary public services (Abdelaaty, 2019, p. 2831).

Türkiye, on the other hand, was left alone in the global problems, due to the agreements based on mutual interests, and on May 3, 2022, President Erdoğan stated: "...Now, we are in the preparation of a project that will ensure the return of 1 million of our Syrian brothers" (Asylum Seeker Statement by Erdogan, We are in the Preparation of a Project for the Return of 1 Million Syrians). However, turning to domestic policy, he said in a speech on May 9, 2022: "...They can return to their homeland whenever they wish, but we have never expelled them from these lands..." (President Erdoğan: We will never

expel Syrians who take refuge in our country). Moreover, Greece and Italy asserted that Muslim refugees on their islands were manipulated by President Erdoğan to change the demographic structure (Fouskas, Gökay & Vankovska, 2020, p. 299). In contrast, Türkiye likened the island of Lesbos to the ‘Guantanamo of Europe’ (Alexandra, 2020, p.432).

As a result, this conditional process began with an open door policy based on humanitarian assistance, followed by wants about financial and social burden sharing due to capacity issues. For this reason, it could be meaningful to consider the legal and actual consequences in Türkiye.

De Facto and De Jure Results of the Türkiye’s Asylum-Seeker Policies

Turkish citizens were dissatisfied owing to free education, health care, and social benefits provided for asylum seekers (Üzelakçıl, 2021, p. 404). Moreover, in 2013, the breakdown of Türkiye-EU relations created an “implementation gap” between domestic politics and foreign policy (Düvell, 2018, p. 183). This gap can be summarized as in the table below.

Table 1
Background of EU and Türkiye negotiations in terms of Policy Headings

De jure Background	De facto Background
a) Open Door Policy from a Humane Perspective	→ Hospitality By pass Geneva convention
b) The burden-sharing request and benefit-based agreements process	→ Communitarian understanding Due to complaints from citizens
c) Exclusion (EU) and Visa Free Europe (Türkiye)	→ Conflicts of interest Violation of non-refoulment Principle
d) Mutual waiting strategy on the basis of distrust and a politicized refugee policy	→ Instrumentalized refugees Failure to Prevent Illegal Immigration and Human Trafficking

Source: Corresponding author

Open Door Policy from a Humane Perspective

Türkiye welcomed nearly 3,5 million Syrian refugees in April 2018 through open door policy, and defined them with temporary protection status so as to avoid human rights criticism (Akçapar, 2017, p. 3). Refugees have been assessed over religious and moral values and managed with harmonization instead of integration (Düvell, 2018: 190). Article 96 of Law on Foreigners and International Protection No. 6458 of 2013 (LFIP) used the concept of harmony instead of integration (Akçapar, 2017, p. 10). Since non-European arrivals were treated as guests on the “Temporary Asylum Seeker Status” of 1994, the “Temporary Protected Status” was issued in April 2012 and the legal and humanitarian deficit was closed, asylum seekers were not forced to return.

However, MFAO outlined what the limits of the rights granted may be: “*The rights given to asylum seekers cannot go beyond the rights afforded to citizens. This is out of the question for any state. But help can be done*”. When we look at the de facto situation, Syrians under temporary protection have fewer rights than refugees, but more rights than

conditional refugees (Heinrich Böll Stiftung/Türkiye, 2019, p.16). A different view on service delivery was given by then Prime Minister Erdoğan, who said: “...helping our religious brothers and sisters is the priority task...” (Lazarev and Sharma, 2015, p. 202). To this emphasis, the reaction of the Alevi section as a minority group emerged (Lazarev and Sharma, 2015, p. 207). In parallel with these explanations, a survey was conducted among Turkish citizens to gauge their views on the necessity of the refugee policy. The survey revealed that a significant number of respondents disagreed with the statements ‘Accepting Syrians is a requirement of religious brotherhood’ and ‘Türkiye’s Syria policy serves the Middle East Peace’⁵ (Üzelakçil, 2020, p. 202). PMMO, on the other hand, drew general pictures about that: “*The issue of harmonization in 6458, the mutual harmony of local society and foreigners, is also reflected in migration policies. One society is not driven to assimilate into another... It is more about making a policy with a mutual effort...*”. Overall, political decisions and actions about asylum seekers have opened up criticisms against foreign and domestic policy. Schmitt (2008) argued that a pluralistic understanding cannot be achieved if laws are based solely on general politics rather than universal principles. As mentioned above, there are differences between the perceptions of the citizens and the authorities.

The Burden-Sharing Request and Benefit-Based Agreements Process

Although the UN New York Declaration of 19 September 2016 envisages burden sharing and further contributions to the UNHCR in aid to refugees and the states that accept them, (Lambert, 2017, p. 732) de facto, there has been a capacity gap in education, health care and working life for asylum seekers.

Firstly, looking at working life, the 10% rate of work for asylum seekers in a workplace has led them to insecure, low-paid and long-hours jobs (İçduygu and Şimşek, 2016, p. 64). It has also entailed forced labour, child labour, and human trafficking. In addition to this process, we can see citizens’ consent about working life with survey results. The results show that a high number of respondents answered negatively to the following questions: ‘Syrians had no impact on the increase in unemployment’, ‘Syrians enjoy working with citizens’, ‘Syrians should be given work permits’, and ‘Syrians have enabled the revival of commercial life’ (Üzelakçil, 2020, p. 194-198). Contrary to these results, when we look at the point reached in working life, we should emphasise that different results are encountered. First of all, Syrians contribute to the economy by closing the gap in unqualified jobs (Üzelakçil, 2021, p. 395), yet, unregistered asylum seekers, compared to citizens, have been alleged to create unfair competition from the direction of tax-free work and cheap labour supply (Toğral, 2016, p. 69). While the cheap and flexible labour power of Syrians contributed to employers, native workers have been negatively affected due to low pay. Therefore, the difference between legal and actual situation increased (Düvell, 2018, p. 182). As of 2021, 91,500 Syrian asylum seekers have received work permits (Yabancıların Çalışma İzinleri, [Work Permits for Foreigners] 2021). Schmitt (1998) argues that minorities whose places in society are questioned may face conflicts. That is why the responses above indicate that citizens do not want refugees in their work life.

5 The survey data and results were obtained from the author’s doctoral study.

On the other hand, approximately 684,728 children started school in 2019/20 academic year, but attendance rates tend to fall with age (Erdoğan, 2020, p. 35-36). In an effort to solve problems, 1.6 million asylum seekers have been assisted by the Emergency Social Safety Net and about 494 thousand children have been transferred to schools through the EU (Conditional Cash Transfer for Education) programme. At university level, public schools accepted refugees without tuition (European Commission, 29 May 2019). The point is that Türkiye has spent about 873m euros, compared to the 300m the EU projected to support education (Erdoğan, 2020, p. 37). Although education expenditures are generally welcomed, our survey results show negative responses to the statement 'Ensuring equal opportunities in education increases positive contribution to the economy' at a high rate (Üzelakçil, 2020, p. 194).

In the field of health, as of 2019, due to nearly 4 million health care services and 500,000 vaccinations (European Commission, 29 May 2019), a financial and human burden is clearly observed. As a consequence, the Turkish public's criticisms concerning the cost of effective and rapid access to healthcare has increased. Addressing these criticisms, the PMMO said: "*Economically, there is a negative perception within the society... We are already making videos themed around false facts. For instance, videos are being released saying that the view that Syrians receive government salaries is not true...*". Despite negative perceptions in society, our survey results show positive responses to the question 'I want to participate in aid activities for Syrians' at a high rate (Üzelakçil, 2020, p. 182). Actually, negative opinions not only exist in domestic policy, but also in foreign policy. For instance, the EU has requested the need to prepare the *acquis* to ensure compliance with legal regulations and ECHR decisions (European Commission, 29 May 2019) to shift humanitarian aid to development assistance, as well as to improve working environments for NGOs (European Court of Auditors, 2018, p.6).

To sum up, TRCO summarized the situation of Türkiye, which stands alone in sharing global responsibility and financial burden, as follows: "*Immigration policy is used as a tool to share the financial burden.*" An asylum seeker policy that has become instrumental in foreign policy will be inevitable, given that the state capacity is not unlimited. The citizens largely did not support refugee policies related to education, health, and working life, apart from humanitarian aid. Consequently, the government was forced to change its policy. This conclusion is supported by our survey results. 390 people expressed highly negative opinions on the statements at a high rate 'I am against the idea of sending', and 'Aid is more important than economic growth' (Üzelakçil, 2020, p. 182-202). Although governments may choose to exclude refugees to please their citizens, a mutual concession in the interests of citizens can remove the exclusion. For example, detaining asylum seekers in exchange for visa liberalization.

Exclusion basis on the Securitization and Visa Free Europe

The principles involved in the Dublin agreements of 2003 and 2013 turned out place a heavy burden on Greece. Then the Common Asylum System collapsed, triggering Hungary and Slovakia's criticisms. The solution was found through Türkiye, Lebanon and Jordan (Lavenex, 2020, p. 357-358). On 3 September 2015, with the death of a Syrian child, 'Alan Kurdi', in the Aegean, the Council of Europe agreed to establish hotspots

in Greece and Italy in cooperation with Angela Merkel and François Hollande, to stop human trafficking and ensure international protection (Lavenex, 2020, p. 364; Vara and Matellán, 2019, p. 317).

Despite all the above efforts, the US withdrew from the Global Compact for Migration (Pauline, 2021, p. 296-297). Hungary followed it in March 2018. Then Bulgaria, Poland, Latvia and Slovakia withdrew, and also Italy violated the rules (Pauline, 2021, p. 301). However, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) had confirmed that (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) the member states are to respect the decisions taken and are to be compatible in cooperation with international organizations. In the 2015 migration crisis, the EU-Türkiye Statement in 2016 was planned to halt mass migration to Türkiye within the framework of 6 billion euros in total support and visa restrictions. After all, migration flows through Türkiye and Greece stalled. In that time, Türkiye spent 30 billion Euros and no promise of removal of visa restrictions had been kept by the end of June 2016 (Akçapar, 2017, p. 12). There were still prejudices on security among the member states. In connection to this, Slovakia's Prime Minister Robert Fiko stated: 'Migrants are all terrorists' and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban said: 'Migrants are poison' (Lang, 2018, p. 512). Such parsing rhetoric violated principle 2 of the EU deal, emphasizing "human dignity, freedom, equality and human rights". On the other hand, the PMMO stated Türkiye's stance in this process as follows: "*Human rights are fundamental for refugees... But mass movements pose a security challenge. This is the breaking of a policy. But in general, the refugee issue is a human rights issue...*". However, the results of our survey indicate that a high percentage of 390 people responded negatively to the question 'I support our soldiers fighting in Syria', 'Türkiye's Syria policy serves peace in the Middle East' (Üzelakçil, 2020, p. 201-202).

While the EU sees readmission agreements as a tool that can be used outside membership, Türkiye has taken a service-based, not rights-based approach to asylum seekers (Yıldız and Uzgören, 2016, 199). When it comes to conditionality, Türkiye demanded visa-free entry into the Schengen area many times until October 2017, but the EU often stated that Türkiye had not met the terms of the agreement.

In conclusion, Türkiye has evidently been impacted in the economic and social dimensions to avoid vulnerability in the international arena. Regarding this concern, TRCO said: "*...for opposition parties, the question of immigration is generating the mainstream with populist rhetoric... If we manage it well, it will not be an economic and social burden anymore...*". In contrast to TRCO's comment, the survey responses revealed the citizens' sensitivities towards this issue. The survey results indicate that a high percentage of 390 people answered negatively to the question 'Our increasing population with Syrians will strengthen our state' (Üzelakçil, 2020, p. 195). This supports Schmitt's (2008) argument that social equality should be understood as a fundamental concept, rather than just a material, legal, or moral one.

A politicized refugee policy

Türkiye has organised social power with the AKP government over the past decade, established good relations with the EU, and expanded political networks. However; "from 2007 onwards, the government has been dealing mostly with the fight against terrorism,

the state of war in the surrounding countries, and work on a civilian constitution, while the lack of negotiations with the society has increased” Mann said (Mann and Hall, 2011, p.12).

As mentioned above, states do not only control their infrastructural power in their migration policies, but also show it with an exclusion policy based on the identity dimension (Soifer and Vom Hau, 2008, p. 226). For example; firstly, President Erdoğan said in 2016 that “*nearly 2 million 733 thousand Syrian asylum seekers could be granted citizenship gradually*” (Akçapar, 2017, p. 9). This view has, however, harmed social consent. Then, he changed his opinion and stated that “*citizenship would be granted to those with higher education and talented people*” (Akçapar, Şimşek, 2018, p. 177). Then, the President said at the Global Refugee Forum on December 17, 2019: “*...There is a need for formulas to keep refugees on their own homeland and return them there*.” (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı [Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye], 17 December 2019). When the two conversations were compared, the discourse on citizenship and repatriation was not overarching. We can also see this result in our survey study. For example; a high percentage of 390 people answered negatively to the questions: ‘Citizenship is given to Syrians who are in a good financial situation’, ‘Citizenship of babies is a good practice for future generations’, and ‘Citizenship should be granted to Syrians’ (Üzelakçıl, 2020, p. 191-197).

There has been a domestic policy that has failed to satisfy citizens, while a condition-based foreign policy process has also been in place. The decisions of both the EU and Türkiye have been influenced by their mutual distrust, which has eased domestic political tensions, resulting in a ‘Strategy of Insecurity’. Therefore, the lack of sound policies both for asylum seekers and citizens is apparent. When we look at these criticisms from a different dimension, MFAO said: “*... Parameters changed widely from 2011 to 2018. We saw tightening of open-door policy... there is no confusion in terms of permanence or transience. The borders are closing due to security, which is why there is not a clarity problem*”. For example, in 2018, Türkiye constructed a 764-kilometer-long wall along its border with Syria to prevent irregular crossings. As a result, Syrians who fled from Idlib through the Türkiye-Syria border gates, which were closed in May 2019, were unable to enter Türkiye (Heinrich Böll Stiftung Derneği / Türkiye, 2019, p.14). Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a statement in September 2019 that Türkiye intends to create a safe zone in Syria and repatriate approximately one million Syrians. If this plan is in place, the problem of international law and especially the principle of repatriation will be discussed (Heinrich Böll Stiftung Derneği / Türkiye, 2019, p.20).

To sum up, as MFAO outlined: “*The Turkish Republic is not a country that was founded yesterday, but these factors have had their effect....We do not make this policy based on the EU, but on international agreements and conventions...*”. Even though MFAO’s comments are justified, since the 2015 EU migration crisis, all conditions have changed. The EU has drawn Türkiye into negotiations of conditionality and has used migration policy as a tool (İçduygu, 2011, 4). Although refugee problems are considered a human rights issue in some documents, such as the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to migration, the EU’s goal of protecting its borders has had a negative impact on Türkiye’s asylum seeker policy and EU accession process.

Conclusion

This study analysed Türkiye's asylum seeker policy in relation to Carl Schmitt's critique of liberal democracy and the normative power of the EU through a combination of semi-structured interviews with officials and a survey of Turkish citizens. The analysis revealed that PMMO dealt with asylum seeker policies in the context of human rights and security issues. In contrast, TRCO emphasized opposition to the discussion based on economic and social burden, while MFAO stated that the focus should be on asylum seeker policy with a cosmopolitan philosophy. On the other hand, asylum seeker policies related to work, education, and health were presented as reasonable by officials while citizens were critical of them.

In line with Schmitt's thoughts that states may face a legitimacy crisis due to the lack of political consensus, we examined society's consent to the asylum policy, the belief in the necessity of the policy, and the legality of the policy as elements of legitimacy. In this context, the lack of public participation in legal decisions has undermined their legality. However, authorities have argued that the lack of participation on the issue of asylum seekers is as a matter of sovereignty. Citizens, on the other hand, while recognising the humanitarian necessity of the decisions taken, expressed reservations about the necessity of decisions taken beyond the rights of citizens. Finally, society's desire not to engage with asylum seekers in family and the work force was seen as an obstacle to integration. Authorities however argued that the opposition exaggerated criticism by using populist rhetoric.

As a result of all these developments, while the EU tried to use Türkiye as a buffer country in foreign policy, Türkiye, attached the issue of visa liberalisation as a condition to the refugee problem. In terms of domestic policy, it has tried to gain social consent by producing a discourse of naturalising only qualified asylum seekers and settling others in safe areas. In summary, despite implementing an open-door policy with a humanitarian discourse in its refugee policy, Türkiye faced a crisis due to its financial capacity and lack of social consent. To manage this process, it emphasized burden-sharing and compelled the EU and its members to make some bilateral agreements. These agreements demonstrate how the refugee crisis, which is a humanitarian issue, has transformed into a political negotiation. This situation had a significant impact on asylum seekers who could not identify with the country they lived in. This study's implications suggest that Schmitt's idea that 'true pluralism cannot ensure equality in heterogeneous societies and that liberal laws will prioritize national interests over universal rights' could hold true.

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An Ontological Security Analysis of Americanism in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1945-1960

Türk Dış Politikasında Amerikancılığın Ontolojik Güvenlik Analizi, 1945-1960

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Abstract

This article aims to draw attention to an aspect of Turkish foreign policy that has not been sufficiently theorized, especially within the framework of Ontological Security Theory. It attempts to show that one of the motives of Turkish foreign policy for its increasing orientation towards the West in the early Cold War period was to complete the three-century-long project of Westernization and to find a relevant place in the international system. As an alternative version to the European model of Westernism or modernization, Americanism in Turkish foreign policy appeared as an illustration of the ontological security concerns of the country alongside its political, economic, and security interests. Under the Western security umbrella, the Turkish state sought not only to protect its territory from the Soviet threat but also to secure its state identity as an important part of Western civilization. Accordingly, Türkiye adopted an anti-Soviet stance and tried to secure its place in the Western bloc, but often acted in favor of the United States and against its own national interests. This attitude has implications for the Ontological Security approach, which interprets the irrational and identity-oriented behavior of the nation-states as an effort to maintain the security of their 'being.' Consequently, this study argues that the pursuit of ontological security was an important element of Turkish foreign policy during this period.

Keywords: Turkish Foreign Policy, Ontological Security Theory, Americanism, Western Bloc

Öz

Bu makale, Türk dış politikasının, özellikle Ontolojik Güvenlik kavramı çerçevesinde, yeterince kuramsallaştırılmamış bir yönüne dikkat çekmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Türk dış politikasının Soğuk Savaş döneminin başlarında Batı'ya doğru artan yöneliminin nedenlerinden birinin üç yüzyıldır devam eden Batılılaşma veya modernleşme projesini tamamlamak ve uluslararası sistemde kendine uygun bir yer bulmak olduğunu göstermeye çalışmaktadır. Türk dış politikasında Amerikancılık, Batıcılığın Avrupa modeline alternatif bir versiyon olarak ülkenin siyasi, ekonomik ve güvenlik çıkarlarının yanı sıra ontolojik güvenlik kaygılarının da bir göstergesi olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Zira Batı güvenlik şemsiyesi altında Türk devleti sadece topraklarını Sovyet tehdidinden korumayı değil, aynı zamanda Batı medeniyetinin önemli bir parçası olarak devlet kimliğini de güvence altına almayı amaçlamıştır. Bu doğrultuda Türkiye, Sovyet karşıtı bir tutum benimseyerek Batı bloğundaki yerini sağlamlaştırmaya çalışmış, ancak çoğu zaman ABD'nin lehine ve kendi ulusal çıkarlarının aleyhine hareket etmiştir. Bu tutum, devletlerin irrasyonel ve kimlik odaklı davranışlarını onların 'varoluş' güvenliğini sürdürme çabası olarak yorumlayan Ontolojik Güvenlik yaklaşımı için çıkarımlar sunuyor. Sonuç olarak, bu çalışma ontolojik güvenlik arayışının bu dönemde Türk dış politikasının önemli bir unsuru olduğunu savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Dış Politikası, Ontolojik Güvenlik Kuramı, Amerikancılık, Batı Bloku

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Introduction

The position of nation-states in the international system is one of the most important factors determining their domestic and foreign policies. In an international order based on competition, nation-states — especially those whose interests exceed their capabilities in terms of hard and soft powers — seek to develop different foreign policy visions and instruments to ensure their survival and maximize their national interests. The Turkish Republic and its foreign policy are, of course, no exception. In addition to the basic policies of nation-states, such as sovereignty, recognition, and territorial integrity, the status quo and Westernization (or modernization) have been accepted and treated as fundamental principles of Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP), despite constant changes and transformations in decision-making (Oran, 1996). While the former has been adopted primarily to protect national security and stability in its region, the latter is about building and maintaining a modern national identity for the Turkish society and state. TFP has also adopted ‘pragmatism’ as an overarching guiding principle for understanding events and shaping behavior. Each of these principles has had a significant impact on the Turkish perspective on regional and international developments, and thus on the self-image and narrative of the Turkish state to date.

Existing studies on TFP primarily address issues of security, diplomacy, alliances, and more recently, identity. Specifically, the concept of identity and the influence of ideological factors on the Turkish foreign policymaking process have been approached from different perspectives — largely through realist (Yalvaç, 2014; Oğuzlu & Han, 2023) and constructivist frameworks (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003; Demirtaş-Coşkun, 2011) — yet have not been extensively studied through the lens of Ontological Security Theory (OST). Within the limited yet noteworthy literature on this topic, Adisönmez and Onursal (2020) investigate the subject in the recent post-July 15 coup attempt period in Türkiye, focusing on the (in)security discourse of the government. Tutan (2020) directs attention to the relationship between political psychology and ontological security, as reflected in Türkiye’s bilateral relations with Syria, Greece, and Azerbaijan over the last few decades. Similarly, Küçük (2021) analyzes bilateral conflicts between Greece and Türkiye based on their ontological security concerns. Another example of a focus on bilateral relations is provided by Pusane and Ilgit (2022), for whom Türkiye’s search for ontological security has impeded the development of positive bilateral relations with the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). In a more recent exploration, Gülseveren (2023) attempts to discern how the deterioration of bilateral relations between Türkiye and Israel in the 2010s was instrumentalized to satisfy their ontological security needs through identity-based narratives.

In seeking to contribute to the aforementioned literature, this paper aims to analyze how Turkish policymakers, in the early stages of the Cold War, formulated TFP under the influence of the United States of America (USA or simply the US) and delineated the national identity of the Turkish state within the international system. This analysis employs the lens of ontological security theory, which is primarily concerned with understanding and representing a political agency’s constant sense of being in its relations with others within a given social structure (Giddens, 1991; Mitzen, 2006a; Steele, 2008; Browning & Joenniemi, 2017). The core argument of this study is that Americanism in

TFP evolved not solely based on Türkiye's security and political interests in the context of the Cold War but also due to ontological security concerns. The country sought to establish a concrete modern state identity through stable and routinized relations with the Western world. Within the three fundamental levels of analysis — international system (structure and characteristics), nation-state (identities and interests), and individual (personal characteristics, perceptions, ideologies, and policy preferences of decision-makers) — referred to in the discipline of International Relations (IR), the focus of this research is the nation-state, the Turkish state (Mingst, McKibben, & Toft, 2019, pp. 107-109).

This research employs a qualitative, descriptive, and analytical research design developed based on the collection of primary and secondary sources. Data is gathered from academic sources focusing on Turkish foreign policymakers and their foreign policy orientation influenced by domestic and international developments. However, it should be noted that the research may encounter potential obstacles, limitations, and practical problems due to the abundance of data and constraints on the research's ability to fully address them. Moreover, this work can be considered introductory since it aims to provide insight into understanding and reinforcing the assumptions of the ontological security approach applied to the analysis of a long period in TFP. In terms of structure, the paper is divided into five sections. The first section presents the theoretical framework of the paper, namely, the Ontological Security approach. The following two sections briefly explain the basic principles and evolution of TFP over the past century and the conceptual framework of the paper, i.e., Americanism, in a concise manner. The next section focuses on the selected period of TFP during the early decades of the Cold War era. Finally, the concluding section highlights the main findings of the study.

Theoretical Framework: Ontological Security

The traditional understanding of security in IR theory prioritizes the physical security of the state above all its other needs. According to Mearsheimer (2013), the neorealist conception of national security/survival is considered the primary and ultimate goal of every nation-state in the conflict-ridden and self-help international system, where each nation-state must ensure its security. In this state-centric view, the basis of the state action on the international stage is the pursuit of feeling secure from any physical threat to its existence. In recent decades, however, this narrow meaning of security and the agenda of contemporary security studies have faced scrutiny and broadened in analysis. The Copenhagen School, a pioneer in the new and critical analysis of security, has expanded the concept's scope to include non-military aspects. In this multidimensional view, threats and security concerns occur in interrelated sectors, encompassing not only the military and political but also the social, environmental, and economic realms (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998). Since the 1990s, the debate has increasingly included the role of non-state actors and non-material factors such as identity, which has been ignored by mainstream IR theory for years. Developed in such an evolving intellectual environment, OST, with its perspective and contributions to the concept of security, has carved out a new space and gradually gained a broader place in IR theory and literature since the early 2000s. Drawing on the disciplines of Sociology and Psychology, its assumptions specifically align with those of the Social Constructivist approach in IR theory.

The concept of ontological security, coined by psychiatrist R.D. Laing in 1965, implies a psychological situation in which individuals, in this case, nation-states, seek continuity and stability in their existence. Laing posits that individuals respond to threats to their existential position with anxious defensiveness, viewing ontological security as a relational and instinctive tendency of the self “to preserve its autonomy and identity” (1990, p. 52). Sociologist Giddens, a central figure in studies on the topic, also defines ontological security as “a sense of continuity and order in events” (1991, p. 244). However, these scholars do not necessarily perceive identity as something constant for ontological security; instead of being given and fixed, identities are alive, socially constructed, shaped by context, and evolving. According to Giddens, “self-identity is not something that is just given...but something that has to be routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual” (1991, p. 52). The key point is that “ontological security refers to the feeling of stability: when we feel our identity is stable, we are ontologically secure” (Mitzen & Larson, 2017, p. 3). Browning and Joenniemi (2017) further contribute to the topic by stating that identity is not only about “preservation” but also about “adaptation,” making OST valuable for understanding identity-related issues that nation-states face in domestic and world politics.

A key feature of OST (“security as being”) is that the individual or the state establishes and articulates its self-identity through a set of instruments and practices. When challenges to routinized relationships and one’s own identity create anxiety and make the agent feel insecure, biographical narratives (telling stories or events) help the political agency construct and consolidate its self-image. As nation-states confront external threats to their “physical, social, and ontological security,” they turn to autobiographical stories to overcome these challenges (Subotic, 2016, p. 611). Widening the scope of the debate, Mitzen argues that states need not only physical security but also ontological security (“a sense of continuity”), making a subtle distinction between the two: “ontological security is security not of the body but of the self” (2006a, p. 344). To support this perspective, she analyzes the literature on the role of ontological security-seeking in the foreign policy decision-making process, emphasizing the potential for conflicting policy preferences between the ontological and material security concerns of the state (Mitzen & Larson, 2017). Moreover, Mitzen posits that uncertainty in the system arising from the security-seeking behaviors of states, the possibility of conflict, and the threat of physical harm can also provide ontological security for the state. This is because the state authority, feeling insecure in the face of a threat, tends to dedicate its energy to developing deliberate policies and building stable and routinized social relations with others to reduce anxiety and maintain its selfhood (Mitzen, 2006a). Similar to Mitzen, Subotic (2016) discusses the issue, highlighting the central role of narratives in foreign policy behavior through the case of Kosovo’s secession from Serbia in 2008. In her view, the Serbian political leadership activated the historical narrative of “victimhood, injustice, and national revival” to justify the unwanted shift in its foreign policy from rejection to recognition of Kosovo, defined as a key element of Serbian identity, to ensure ontological security of the Serbian nation (2016, p. 621).

The irrational or morality-based behavior of states can also be interpreted through the lens of OST. Steele (2005) illustrates this with the example of the British pursuit of

ontological security (“a sense of continuity”) during the American Civil War (1861-1865). Based on a cost-benefit analysis, British policymakers did not see much moral benefit in intervening in the war, which would challenge their slavery policy and established selfhood. As a result, despite the potential strategic and economic benefits of war, they opted for neutrality to preserve Britain’s international image (Steele, 2005, p. 519). From the OST perspective, such irrationality is because, like human beings, the state has various physical and non-physical needs, such as a sense of self-pride, honor, prestige, and freedom from fear and anxiety. Shame, in this context, serves as both something that ontological security-seeking actors attempt to escape and a drive to restore the former situation (Steele, 2008). Nation-states also have identities, ideological worldviews, routines, and a set of beliefs, rules, and values, and thus strive for both physical and ontological security. Wendt (2004) explains that the nation-state can be considered to have real properties attributed to personality, so they should be treated as real “persons” in world politics in International Relations (IR) theory and studies. According to Wendt, the personhood of states, despite their non-physical existence, lies in the fact that they possess three particular psychological properties: “Intentionality” (collective intentions) as they pursue common goals among their peoples; “consciousness” (groupthink) as they implement the meanings shared by society; and the property of being a “(super) organism” that comes into being and dies (at least the identity and legal personality they must have to exist) (Wendt, 2004). In line with this, Wendt defines ontological security (“predictability in relationships to the world”) as one of the four fundamental interests of the state arising from its corporate identity, alongside international recognition, physical security, and socio-economic development (1994, p. 385). Given this, the focus of OST consists of psychological and ideational elements other than material ones, which is relevant to the case of TFP analyzed below.

Basic Principles and the Course of Turkish Foreign Policy

The two basic and overarching principles of TFP are Westernization and the status quo. They are often the subject of debates that argue the opposite, as the country has, from time to time, pursued revisionist tendencies and disengagement from the West, balancing East and West, or realigning the axis of TFP. However, the two maxims of the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, have generally been upheld by decision-makers. His first maxim, “peace at home, peace in the world,” expresses the policy of maintaining the existing order without resorting to aggression through irredentist or revisionist claims. The maxim of “reaching the contemporary level of civilization” aims at incorporating the political, economic, and social structure of Western civilization into the reconstruction process of modern Turkish society (Oran, 1996). For Atatürk, modernization meant a complete process of Westernization, involving the adoption of Western values and practices in a top-down nation-building project. Accordingly, the political identity of the Turkish state would be reshaped by the elements of modernity, such as progress, standardization of education, adoption of European law and the Latin alphabet, change of dress, separation of religion and the state, and republicanism institutionalized in the Constitution of 1937 — while rejecting traditions based on Islamic identity embraced by the previous Ottoman rule (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003, pp. 46-50).

Following Atatürk’s balanced foreign policy, Türkiye tried to remain outside the warring camps during World War II (1939-1945), influenced by the aftermath of World

War I, socio-economic problems, poor military conditions, and the potential burdens of another war. The policy of “active neutrality and balance” between the belligerent powers was the guiding principle of TFP determined by İsmet İnönü (1938-1950) (Deringil, 2014). Similar to the late period of İnönü, the priority of TFP under Adnan Menderes (1950-1960), who initiated the democratization of the Turkish political system and furthered the institutionalization of relations with the West, was Westernism, or more precisely, Americanism. Without deviating from the Western orientation, TFP and political leadership in the 1960s and 1970s were largely dominated by the military bureaucracy. In contrast, the tenure of Turgut Özal (1987-1993) is discussed within the framework of political and economic liberalization and the idea of neo-Ottomanism, aiming to improve bilateral relations with neighboring countries in a wide range of areas from the Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia to the Caucasus. During this period, the inclination toward the West was reflected in the country’s efforts to become part of the European Economic Community (EEC), today’s European Union (EU) (Balcı, 2013). In the post-Cold War period, Türkiye pursued a revised and proactive foreign policy with a multilateral approach in its region and beyond, but not entirely independent of Western-oriented foreign policy or domestic influences (Oran, 1996). Since the beginning of the 21st century, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2002-present), TFP has expanded its scope, strategy, and tools through a multifaceted vision that encompasses both physical and ontological security needs.

Conceptual Framework: Americanism in Turkish Foreign Policy

Americanism has been a fact of life in international relations since the 19th century, associated with the global influence of the United States, making it a hegemon in the international system with capabilities in various fields. The concept can be explained as a sense of admiration for and a tendency to use American style and practices as a model for the social and cultural life, and economic and political development of a country outside the US. Over time, however, the term has acquired negative connotations due to growing US influence and uneven development in developing countries (Elteren, 2006). In the context of Turkish Americanism, the term can be understood within the framework of the Westernization project, a complex and non-linear process of modernization in various sectors of Ottoman society dating back to the late 18th century. Beginning with the military, following the Western development path to strengthen central authority and internal stability and regain waning power internationally, the state-led reform efforts gradually spread to legal, administrative, political, economic, social, and cultural spheres. Another reason was the goal of the Ottoman leadership to ally with the European powers against Russia after repeated wars and territorial losses. Although the Ottoman leadership did not succeed in restoring its former status and preventing the disintegration of the empire, the modernization movement remained a source of debate and one of the main policies of the new regime after the First World War in the country (Arı, 2021, pp. 16-17).

Türkiye’s War of Independence (1919-1922), largely directed against European powers, led to the emergence of the American modernization model as an alternative to the European one, and the American mandate debate in the country. Despite a positive image, the understanding of Westernization with Europe persisted until the mid-1940s due

to domestic and foreign policy situations, particularly the isolationist foreign policy of the US. Immediately after World War II, when European powers ceded their former role to the US, which became the superpower of the new world order, the Western orientation of TFP was redefined (Bora, 2002). After World War II, Türkiye's Western orientation shifted toward Americanism, driven by the fear of communist expansion and the Soviet Union's interests in the Turkish Straits by demanding joint control of the geostrategically important Straits in a 1946 note. Rumors of Soviet territorial claims to Kars and Ardahan (an unproven idea) led Türkiye to view the US as a counterweight to the Soviets and to pursue a policy aimed at improving Turkish-American relations and strengthening its position in the anti-Soviet camp (Gökay, 2006, pp. 59-62). The country's anti-communist ideology and Western-oriented foreign policy reached its peak with a clear expression of Americanism during the time of İnönü and Menderes. The trigger for the increasing influence of the US in the political, economic, military, and even cultural spheres of Turkish society was the economic and political liberalization process that began under Menderes. The Cold War not only enabled the Turkish state to receive American support in various areas, from military training to foreign aid but also to use the case of the US as a model for the modernization of the country (Örnek, 2015). This ideal was embodied in the proclaimed words attributed to President Celal Bayar: "We/Türkiye will become a little America in 30 years" (Vatan, 27.10.1957).

The construction and articulation of modern state identity in TFP were directly influenced by the reinterpretation of traditional Western orientation and the new context, under which the country needed American assistance (Bora, 2017). During this period, Turkish politicians considered the US as the true representative of the "free and civilized" world and a great opportunity to complete the country's ongoing modernization process and protect its interests. This approach is reflected in the words of the Turkish writer Rifki Atay, who stated, "For us, American Westernism, not European Westernism, should be the essential one" (Bora, 2017, p. 78). Accordingly, the sympathy toward the American model and the idea of "Turkish-American friendship" were publicly idealized through political and intellectual discourses and modes of mass communication (Bora, 2002). In other words, until the late 1950s, Turkish Americanism developed based on both ideological affinity and the pragmatic goals of Turkish leaders. While the period from 1945 to 1960 witnessed a generally positive course in Turkish-US bilateral relations, criticisms centered on the main argument of an asymmetrical relationship and the subordination of Türkiye's national interests to American global strategy and policies, which became more prominent in the 1960s (Bilgiç, 2015). Since then, discussions of the dynamics of Turkish-American relations and Americanism have been an important aspect of TFP studies.

Findings and Discussion: Turkish Foreign Policy, 1945-1960

Türkiye, which managed to stay out of World War II by not taking sides, could not maintain its stance in the ideological war between the communist Eastern bloc and the capitalist Western bloc after the war. In the context of the Cold War, the Turkish leadership pursued a foreign policy that aligned its interests with the Western camp against the Eastern camp because "interests are a product of identity constructions" (Browning & Joenniemi,

2017, p. 6). The periods of İnönü and Menderes witnessed the rapid development of Turkish-American relations and the integration of the country into Western institutions. In contrast to the relatively balanced and neutral foreign policy of the early years of his rule, İnönü's last years were marked by a clear turn towards Britain and the US. For him, establishing good relations with them would benefit Türkiye's development in the civilized world (İlyas & Turan, 2012, p.337). This was because İnönü openly pursued a policy of continuing the principles of the founding leader, Atatürk, in both its domestic and foreign policy (Aydemir, 2011). Likewise, TFP under Menderes was mostly Western-oriented, according to Tuncer (2013, p. 22), since "Atatürk's principle of modernization was perceived by the Menderes government as the implementation of a policy in line with Western foreign policy." In this respect, Türkiye's membership in the pacts and organizations in the Middle East served the regional policies of the West, especially the US and Britain, and not only its own interests (Tuncer, 2013).

Giddens states that "the maintenance of habits and routines is a crucial bulwark against threatening anxieties" (1991, p. 39). In its search for a Western status, feeling secure against the Soviet threat, and consolidation of the modern state identity in the Cold War environment, Türkiye sought to play an active role in Western-led international organizations. This policy was evident in Türkiye's voting behavior on resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council and in the draft resolutions it submitted, which were in line with its Western allies rather than being independent and serving its national interests. Based on the discourse of "reaching the contemporary level of civilization," Ankara's main motivation was to be recognized by the Western world as "an equal and respected member of the Western camp" (Kumek, 2022, p. 561). Türkiye's inclusion in the Western collective security system due to its geopolitical and strategic position was important for the US strategy in the region. Receiving military and economic aid under the Truman Doctrine (1947), designed as a project to protect countries under ideological and military pressure from the Soviets, Türkiye institutionalized its relations with the Western camp. Within this framework, the Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Türkiye (JAMMAT) was established to facilitate modernization, improve military capabilities, and integrate the Turkish army into the collective security mechanism through military support and training. However, it has been criticized on the grounds of harming the organization and development of the Turkish army and defense industry (Celep, 2018). In the same year, Türkiye was also included in the Marshall Plan, which aimed to rebuild war-ravaged Europe with economic aid. Despite mixed results, its integration process helped the Turkish state to feel physically and ontologically secure. For Turkish Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak, for instance, the Truman Doctrine "... made the Turkish people feel that they were no longer isolated" (Hale, 2013, p. 83).

With the desire to be part of the "civilized" world, the Turkish government sought to join the Western bloc through the application of international institutions because "individuals are motivated to create cognitive and behavioral certainty, which they do by establishing routines" (Mitzen, 2006a, p. 342). In addition to its membership in the Council of Europe, the IMF, and the World Bank, the event that turned Türkiye into an ally of the Western community was its admission to NATO in 1952, the political and security umbrella for the peace and security of the Western world (Hale, 2013, pp. 84-87). As OST indicates, the search for a stable identity that depends on routine relations with

others through recognition and constant interaction encourages the agency to construct a self-identity and organize its actions (Mitzen, 2006b). Türkiye's dependence on the West for its security and political goals stemmed from both anxieties about its national security and the intention to be a strategic partner in multilateral cooperation, through which Türkiye would stabilize its relations with the West and consolidate its 'Western' identity. As Mitzen argues, "because routines sustain identity, actors become attached to them...and routinized social relations stabilize our identities" (2006a, p. 347).

During this period, the country also entered the democratization process under the Democrat Party government of Menderes through the first multi-party elections of the country in 1946 to complete the westernization or modernization process. The first truly free elections of 1950 ended the long authoritarian and single-party regimes of Atatürk and İnönü and initiated an American-style liberalization process in both political and economic life, which also paved the way for the Americanization of TFP. It is often argued that one reason for the liberal reorientation of Turkish politics was the external pressure exerted on the İnönü government by the US, which emerged victorious from the war and would determine the new world order with liberal principles. In this sense, for the Turkish authorities, "resistance to the democratic transition could result in exclusion from the Western world" (Yetkin, 2014, pp. 150-157). In essence, the establishment of stable relations and cooperation with the Western alliance would secure the international recognition of the Turkish state (Kosebalaban, 2011, pp. 69-74). The fear of being behind or outside the West (i.e., a sense of ontological insecurity), as well as the uncertainty stemming from the ideological clash with the Soviets, often led Türkiye to make concessions to the US-led alliance. Thus, engaging with the West could prove to be both beneficial and detrimental to the country.

The cost-benefit analysis of foreign policy decisions and actions on ontological security may contradict the realist assumption that states make decisions to maximize their outcomes (Steele, 2005). For some, like Bozdağlıoğlu (2003), Türkiye's alliance with the West in the early years of the Cold War negatively affected its image in the Middle East region, which at that time was fighting for its independence against Western imperialism and colonialism. Türkiye, the first Muslim country to recognize Israel in 1949, was labeled as a tool of the West by the Middle Eastern countries. The anti-imperialist ideology led the Arab world to form pro-Soviet and anti-Western alliances in which Türkiye was considered an extension of the imperialist camp due to its membership in the capitalist bloc and its pro-Western stance. Türkiye's participation in regional diplomatic initiatives against the Socialist bloc — perceived by these countries as a staunch supporter of Arab nationalism and independence — in line with Western interests, renewed the criticism and distrust of Türkiye. For example, the Baghdad Pact, through which Türkiye sought to win over countries of the region, was established in 1955 as a defense and cooperation organization but failed to win the confidence of the regional countries and instead accelerated their rapprochement with the Soviet Union (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003, pp. 115-120).

Türkiye's Participation in the Korean War

Although Turkish Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu claimed during World War II that "We (Türkiye/Turkish people) are selfish; we fight only for ourselves"

(Deringil, 2014, p. 5), Türkiye sent its troops to a country even though it had no interests or reasons to fight there. The reason for Türkiye's sacrifice was the effort to reaffirm its commitment to the Western security system by sending a 4,500-strong force to the Korean War without consulting parliament, resulting in more than 721 dead and 2,147 veterans in the Turkish force (Turan, 1991, pp. 160-164). "As states must create meanings for their actions, no matter what the potential outcome of such actions will be," the 'rationalization' of actions in various ways is likely (Steele, 2008, p. 109). In the same way, Prime Minister Menderes described joining NATO as a national victory, saying "We lost a handful of blood in Korea, but we joined the great states" (Turan, 1991, p. 165). According to Kumek, the decision to send troops to the Korean War was motivated by Türkiye's concerns about its "status insecurity" and its fear of being excluded from the Western alliance. This perception stemmed from the rejection of Ankara's applications for non-permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council in 1946, which was seen as a means of status consolidation, and for membership in NATO, defined as the guarantor of the peace and security of the Western Alliance, in 1950 (2022, p. 573).

The Crises of Jupiter Missiles and the U-2 Incident

Türkiye's position in the Western alliance and policy orientation later led to the rise of anti-Americanism among the Turkish public. This pressure on the government increased when Türkiye made unilateral concessions, such as the use of the Incirlik base in Adana for purposes not listed on the NATO map, the removal of Jupiter missiles (considered a means of national security against the Eastern bloc), and misconduct by American soldiers at home (Güney, 2008). Several bilateral agreements between Türkiye and the US resulted in the delivery of large amounts of foreign aid and debt. Among them, the Aid Agreement under the Truman Doctrine (1947) was compared by some Turkish nationalist figures and intellectuals to "capitulations"¹ on the grounds that the US was granted excessive rights over Türkiye's military and economic domains, violating its "sovereignty" and increasing its dependence on the economic and military aid provided by the US. Similarly, the Economic Cooperation Agreement (1948) under the Marshall Plan faced strong criticism for being conditional and prioritizing the interests of the US over those of Türkiye and its development needs (Bilgiç, 2015, pp. 256-259).

Although survival or national security is considered the primary concern of nation-states, their pursuit of ontological security can also lead them to engage in risky and not necessarily rational behaviors that threaten their physical security and national interests (Steele, 2008). Similarly, for Mitzen, under certain conditions "ontological security can conflict with physical security" (2006a, p. 342). Türkiye's commitment to the Western security structure caused it to make what some consider irrational decisions, such as accepting the installation of the US missiles and military bases under the North Atlantic Treaty (1949). Concrete examples of this situation can be achieved by shedding light on the plane crash and the Jupiter missile crisis faced by Türkiye, a neighbor of the Soviet

1 Special amenities and concessions granted to foreign countries and their nationals in various areas for political, social, and economic reasons by different means during the rule of the Ottoman Empire. As they were seen as a means of exploitation that weakened or deteriorated the Turkish economy, independence, and political authority, the capitulations were abolished with the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 (Pamir, 2002, p. 90).

Union at the time because it was an ally of the US. At the time of the Cuban crisis, the US government decided to install the Jupiter missiles (intermediate-range ballistic missiles) in Izmir, Türkiye, to deter Soviet aggression but withdrew them in exchange for the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba without the consent of Turkish authorities (Seydi, 2010).

Besides increasing its importance in the Western security structure, the geopolitical location of Türkiye made the country vulnerable to physical threats in the race between the two poles. Another incident contributing to this situation was the U-2 incident, which also violated the sovereignty of the Turkish state and endangered its national security. At the time, the multifaceted rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union escalated into an arms race, particularly in the areas of nuclear missiles and space. The installation of military bases on the territory of allies raised serious security concerns for the host countries on both sides. Despite serious Soviet warnings, Türkiye was one of the few allies in the Western bloc to agree to the installation of nuclear missiles on its lands. The U-2 spy plane of the US, launched from the Incirlik base in Türkiye, entered Soviet airspace over Pakistan's territory and was shot down over Soviet territory in May 1960, escalating the Cold War tensions between the two blocs. Following the incident, the Soviet Union targeted the Western Bloc, threatening the US and its allies by stating, "...next time, we will destroy such planes and the bases from which they take off..." (Gülmez & Tahancı, 2014, p. 235).

The Rise of the Cyprus Question

While Türkiye was consolidating its position in the Western bloc, it began to address the issue of the island of Cyprus, considering it a "baby homeland" (*yavru vatan*) that was being internationalized in those years. However, Türkiye approached the matter with caution and hesitation due to its preoccupation with its status in the international arena. In the late stages of British colonial administration, the Island's two ethnically and religiously divided communities began to clash over the sovereignty of the island. In addition to British tactics of divide and rule, the irredentist and proactive policies of the Greeks, and the lack of a significant counterattack from the Turkish side due to its reactive policies and hesitant attitude, fear of Soviet claims to the straits, and reliance on British promises for the security of the Island, the Greek position was increasingly strengthened vis-à-vis the Turkish Cypriots (Holland, 2020, pp. 760-762). Türkiye's avoidance of the problem in the early years of the conflict can be seen in the words of Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü, "At the moment, an issue like the Cyprus problem is not our concern" (Dağcı & Diyarbakırlıoğlu, 2013, p. 26). Köprülü also revealed that the government had no clear policy on Cyprus in the early 1950s, stating that "there is no Cyprus problem" at the time (Tuncer, 2013, p. 163). Türkiye's priority of strengthening relations with the West deeply determined its foreign policy actions regarding the long-standing problem.

A Search for Ontological Security in the Ideological Conflict?

After World War II, which ended with the victory of the liberal doctrine, the world entered into a prolonged ideological struggle between the capitalist liberal world and the communist world. The emergence of the bipolar international order gave sovereign

members of the world community clear options: choose a side between the two blocs, creating a distinction between ‘us/allies’ and ‘them/rivals,’ and determine their position among the members, or join neither bloc. This situation aligns with Wendt’s (1994) idea that sovereign states in the international system are involved in collective identification, a sense of belonging to a larger group of individuals/states with common concerns and goals, along with national identities and self-interests constructed based on domestic and international factors. The collective interests of the two blocs, largely defined by the US and the Soviet Union, were constructed based on shared systems of values and beliefs that interacted through social relations among the states of the international community in the context of the Cold War (Wendt, 1994, p. 386).

Exposed to Soviet and German threats during World War II, Türkiye ruled out the possibility of a military attack and, thanks to its “active neutrality,” avoided further losses to the state. After the war, the emergence of the Western world and its liberal ideology as the victor ignited in Turkish leaders the desire to secure an important place for Türkiye in the new order. The polarization of the world through collective identification brought both benefits and risks to Türkiye, given its geostrategic location important to both the East and the West. Steele notes that “An agent is ontologically secure when they choose a course of action comfortable with their sense of self-identity” (2005, p. 526). In a similar logic, Türkiye viewed the ideological Cold War as an opportunity to realize the old dream of Westernization. The question, however, is whether the Soviet threat was the real trigger or rather a pretext for consolidating Western-Turkish relations. According to Deringil, the Soviet threat seemed to be used as a means of fear that pushed the country in this direction (2014, pp. 252-253). Leffler (1985) suggests that the US and even Turkish officials while acknowledging Soviet demands over the Turkish Straits, considered military action from the country unlikely. The perception of a Soviet threat was based on congruence between US strategic interests, including the Soviet advance toward the region, and Türkiye’s geostrategic importance in the Mediterranean and Middle East regions. Although Türkiye’s security was not guaranteed in the event of an attack, it had been admitted to NATO and was militarily equipped by the alliance to prevent potential neutrality and counter the Soviet advance toward the south (Leffler, 1985).

Alongside the US factor, the historical background of repeated wars, as well as ideological and cultural differences, also played a role in Turkish-Soviet relations. Distrust of communism and fear of the Soviet military threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Turkish state among nationalist and religious segments of society contributed to the perception of the Soviets as the ‘other’ in Turkish political life (Örnek, 2015). In 1953, following Türkiye’s accession to NATO, the Soviet Union announced in a note to the country its intention to relinquish claims to Kars, Ardahan, and the Straits, and to restore and normalize bilateral relations (Aktas, 2006). Despite Soviet calls for rapprochement and offers of economic assistance, the Menderes government did not easily deviate from its pro-American stance (Tellal, 2000). During this period, anti-communist sentiment was mostly used as an ideological tool to consolidate Türkiye’s position in Western civilization, seen by Turkish policymakers as the ultimate winner of the ideological clash. This aligns with the argument that “Faced with such anxieties, actors may actually find solace in perpetuating the conflict and the securitized identities

on which it rests” (Browning & Joenniemi, 2017, p. 7). According to Özkan, the government-induced “myth of the Soviet threat” served as a catalyst for the creation of a collective anti-communist identity in the Turkish public and as a tool to strengthen its position in domestic politics (2020, p. 161). Under İnönü, for example, pro-Western and anti-Soviet propaganda was disseminated in the country’s press with the help of nationalist and anti-communist intellectuals under the control of the government, guided by its official ideology, Kemalism, a Western-oriented secular ideology (Deringil, 2014). In short, Turkish foreign policymakers sought stability through routine relations with the West and the consolidation of Western identity, a quest pursued for more than two centuries. This tendency was, therefore, reactive and reflexive, “to adapt routines and identities to new situations” (Browning & Joenniemi, 2017, p. 14). Besides top officials, the predominantly Muslim public and Islamist groups developed a sense of hatred for communism and launched an ideological war against its attitude toward religion. As an alternative to a secular, in many ways depressed Europe, the US was accepted as an antidote to the Soviets in the discourse of the “infidel” and the “red menace” (Örnek, 2015).

Although Turkish-Soviet relations showed signs of softening with Stalin’s death and the abandonment of territorial claims on Türkiye, it was not easy due to the nature of Turkish-American relations at the time, rather than solely Türkiye’s security concerns. Furthermore, Türkiye’s attempt to reach out to the Soviets with economic concerns was not welcomed by the US (Aktaş, 2006). For Hale, countering the Soviet threat, while acknowledging its utilization, rather than embracing liberal values, was the driving force behind Türkiye’s increasing political and security ties with the West (2013, p. 79). Others, such as Özkan (2020) and Bozdağlıoğlu (2003), claim that the magnitude of the Soviet threat is exaggerated because it is used as an excuse to come under the Western umbrella, a behavior in line with Mitzen’s statement that “states become attached to their conflict because its routines sustain identity” (2006a, p. 354). In other words, aligning with the US and taking an anti-Soviet stance was not only a response to security threats but also a way for Türkiye to position itself as part of Western civilization and contribute to its sense of identity. Türkiye’s self-identification with the Western world shaped its narrative accordingly since “ontological security is intricately related to the processes of memory, narrative, and action” (Steele, 2008, p. 17). As Bozdağlıoğlu (2008, p. 55) explains, “Throughout its modern history, Türkiye has fully identified itself with Europe and established close relations with the United States.” For example, by stating that “America and Türkiye are friends with the same ideals,” President Bayar positioned his country among the Western powers (Bora, 2002, p. 154).

Conclusion

The concept of ontological security in IR theory is used to understand how nation-states strive to maintain a stable and consistent self-identity. It also provides insights into the seemingly irrational actions of nation-states that expose themselves to physical threats to ensure the security of their identity. This study benefited from the ontological security approach to analyze the Western orientation of Turkish foreign policy in the early years of the Cold War, using Americanism as an example. In line with its

traditional pursuit of building and maintaining a Western identity and securing a place among Western countries, Türkiye adapted its foreign policy to align itself with the US-led Western world, even when this conflicted with its physical security interests. By forming an alliance with the Western world against the Soviet-led Eastern world in the face of external challenges, Türkiye sought to institutionalize its relations with the West to demonstrate its commitment to the international community and Western values. However, this alignment was driven not only by the desire to protect its national security and political and economic interests but also to consolidate its modern state identity and status within the international system. Consistently, the anti-communist stance and the policy of distancing itself from the Soviets were sometimes used as tools to define ideological boundaries. Consequently, Turkish foreign policymakers not only sought to avoid the physical threats to its national security but also tended to develop a sense of ontological security in the Cold War context.

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The Relationship Between Transnational Networks and Its Member Cities: Turkey*

Ulus-ötesi Ağlar ve Üye Kentler Arasındaki İlişki: Türkiye

Suna Ersavaş Kavanoz¹ , Nisa Erdem² 

Abstract

Transnational Municipal Networks have taken their place in international relations as policy actors that facilitate cooperation. The fact that cities increase their effectiveness in the field of global politics with the developments accompanying globalization and localization policies has increased the importance of these networks as a structure describing inter-city cooperation. This study aims to evaluate transnational networks from the cities' perspective and provide an explanation of the relationship between the characteristics of member cities and their participation in these networks. To achieve this, we create a new data set by content coding the transnational networks involving Turkish municipalities in terms of their purposes, functions, and memberships, as well as the member municipalities in terms of their population size, level of development, and institutional unit condition. This data set reveals that the institutional structure of municipalities, the level of urban development, and population are significant determinants of transnational network membership. Additionally, the study describes the link between membership structures and the functions of transnational networks. Our findings have significant implications for urban politics research.

Keywords: Transnational networks, Turkish Municipalities, Cities, Diplomacy, Turkey

Öz

Ulus ötesi belediye ağları, iş birliğini kolaylaştıran politika aktörleri olarak uluslararası ilişkilerde yerini almıştır. Küreselleşme ve yerelleşme politikalarına eşlik eden gelişmeler ile birlikte kentlerin küresel siyaset alanında etkinliklerini artırması, bu ağların kentler arası iş birliğini tanımlayan bir yapı olarak önemini artırmıştır. Bu çalışma, ulus ötesi ağları kentlerin bakış açısıyla değerlendirmeyi ve üye kentlerin özellikleri ile bu ağlara katılımları arasındaki ilişkiyi açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bunu başarmak için, Türkiye'de kentlerin (belediyelerin/ kent yönetimlerinin) üye olduğu ulus ötesi ağların amaçları, işlevleri ve üyelikleri; söz konusu üye kentlerin nüfus yönünden büyüklükleri, gelişmişlik düzeyleri ve kurumsal yapıları içerik analizi yoluyla kodlanmış ve kodlama sonucunda yeni bir veri seti oluşturulmuştur. Bu veri seti, belediyelerin kurumsal yapılarının, kentsel gelişme düzeylerinin ve nüfus büyüklüklerinin ulus ötesi ağ üyeliği için önemli belirleyiciler olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Ek olarak, çalışma üyelik yapıları ile ulus ötesi ağların işlevleri arasındaki bağlantıyı açıklamaktadır. Bu çalışmanın bulguları, kentsel politika araştırmaları için önemli çıkarımlar sunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ulus ötesi ağlar, Türk Belediyeleri, Kentler, Diplomasi, Türkiye

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Introduction

As the number of city dwellers and urban economies grows, large city governments have begun to exert more influence in domestic and international diplomacy and join transnational networks (Dietrichsen and Niekerk, n.d. 4). In accordance with the increasing activity of city governments, the international collaboration domain is also evolving. The multilevel governance approach, which focuses on facilitating relationships between different levels, comes to the fore when addressing many complex problems, which are cross-border problems such as climate change, food scarcity, water shortage, and environmental pollution. The search for solutions to these problems has required the participation of international political actors. Many of the European Union's (EU) programs in the field of sustainability and climate change target cities and regions more than state governments. EU funding is compounded by the need for cities to build management capacity to deliver sustainable programs and encourages cities to build international networks in the urban sustainability policy sector as a means of developing technical knowledge (Pierre, 2019).

Beyond intergovernmental cooperation in the global domain, networks and collaborations involving city governments and the civil sector are gaining importance as a result of the need for local knowledge to solve problems. Counting the number of existing transnational networks is becoming increasingly difficult in the present day. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the number of transnational networks, regional networks, and networks involving different actors and municipalities has been steadily increasing.

Between 1990 and 2000, Twenty-nine percent of active transnational networks involving municipalities were created, while 30 percent were created after 2001. This represents an increase of 43 networks between 2004 and 2014, or more than four per year. This also indicates a growing interest and demand for networking among local authorities (Acuto et al., 2017, p.16). In addition, the increase in the number of these transnational networks has resulted in networks that focus on more specialized topics. The increase in the number of such networks raises concerns that, as duplications and overlaps increase, the ability of networks to shape global policies and represent local interests may be weakened and fragmented, and that complexity and miscommunication issues may arise (Grandi, 2020, p. 13, 14; Acuto et al., 2017, p. 19; Abdullah and Garcia-Chueca, 2020). To concretize these concerns, it is also necessary to identify networks operating in similar thematic areas and to determine the size of the municipalities participating in the networks. However, the development index of network-member cities is intended to support the contention that cities with developed economies are more likely to participate in collaborative networks (Mocca, 2017). In this context, it is crucial that a municipality's number of transnational networks can be evaluated.

What factors influence municipal membership in transnational networks? Does a significant relationship exist between the structure and functions of a transnational municipal network? Even though there are studies on transnational municipal networks in the literature, these studies emphasize the role of these networks as a reflection of multilevel governance in the EU integration process. In international relations literature, emphasis is also placed on the role of transnational networks as "soft power" in shaping global policies. Transnational networks have been studied from the cities' perspective,

particularly in relation to global urban literature, and a small number of studies have also revealed the relationship between networks and the size of their member cities. Municipal network membership determinants have received scant attention in the literature. According to Mocca (2019), there is a need for research on the causal explanation of local unit membership in transnational networks.

This study aims to clarify the connection between the characteristics of networks and the factors that determine membership in these networks. In this regard, the research is supported by the following arguments: Firstly, as the level of institutionalization of municipal management of international relations rises, the number of network memberships will increase. Secondly, the number of network memberships will increase as the level of urban development rises. The development index of member cities is also intended to support the contention that cities with developed economies are more likely to participate in collaborative networks (Mocca, 2017). In this context, it is crucial that the number of transnational networks involving a municipality can also be evaluated. Thirdly, cities with larger populations will have more network memberships than smaller cities. Fourthly, memberships in transnational networks by municipalities are related to national and international policies. Lastly, networks with a predominantly hybrid membership structure focus on thematic issues, whereas networks with an exclusive municipal membership structure focus on political issues.

It is extremely challenging to classify transnational networks involving municipalities that are interconnected in certain areas and to generalize the results. This constraint compelled us to restrict our study to the 98 transnational networks in which Turkey participates and, consequently, to the characteristics of Turkish municipalities. This study has contributed to knowledge in two significant areas. Firstly, it provides an original data set on the membership of municipalities in transnational networks and bridges the literature on transnational networks and urban policy. Secondly, it contributes to the measurement of the relationship between the characteristics of the municipality and the transnational network of which it is a member by revealing the factors that influence the network membership activity of municipalities.

The research is conducted as follows: The first section examines the literature on transnational municipal networks, as well as their role in global governance and the formation of global policies. Following is a description of the data set's creation, data, and methodology. The study continues with the findings section, which includes the results of the relationship between transnational networks and the characteristics of member municipalities and ends with the conclusion and evaluation section, which provides the results of these findings.

Literature Review

City diplomacy refers to the international activities that are carried out by autonomous regions, states and local governments. In a narrower sense, it refers to local governments, mostly municipalities. However, based on the concept of “trans-governmental”, city diplomacy can be defined as “trans/municipal”: the international relations of cities that attempt to establish mutual relations between municipal governments to address particular challenges (Chan, 2016: 141). Transnational municipal networks are efforts to

bring together local government units/cities located across national borders at a global or regional level to achieve common goals. In a broad sense, municipal networks are used as the general name for all interactions that encompass all city diplomatic actions. In this sense, bilateral dialogues between cities and sister cities are also considered municipal network activities. In a narrower sense, municipal networks are a system of relationships through which cities can cooperate to face the challenges of economic development, social protection and environmental sustainability (Fontona, 2017: 17). In studies, transnational networks involving cities are examined from a variety of perspectives. These focal points are highlighted by the following: the activity of networks in question as actors of global governance in the context of multi-level governance, providing space for lobbying and politics, mediating the advocacy of the local agenda in the international domain, and guiding global policies as soft power (Kern and Bulkeley, 2009, p. Bulkeley, 2005; Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004; Acuto, 2013; Niederhafner, 2013; Grandi, 2020; Wang and Amiri, 2019; Feldman, 2012). The highlights also include what it means for a city to be included in these networks, an evaluation of the cities in the context of their publicity strategies, and how being a member of a network impacts the local policies and service areas of member cities in order to determine how the networks address specific thematic issues such as migration, climate change, and the fight against drugs, which stand out for their uncertainty, complexity, and transboundary nature (Acuto and et al., 2017, p. 18; Grandi, 2020: 48; Dougless, 2002; Muraoka and Avellaneda 2021; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Niederhafner, 2013). In a small number of studies, transnational networks involving municipalities (Bouteligier, 2013; Wu, 2020; Fünfgeld, 2015) have also been discussed in the context of discussions on democracy and participation. The prevalence of studies on transnational networks, particularly those involving municipalities in relation to climate change (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004; Kern and Bulkeley, 2009; Toly, 2008; Smeds and Acuto, 2018; Andonova et al., 2009; Gordon, 2013) is attributable to the efforts made to find a solution to the issue at hand. In his study on the city of Gothenburg, Sweden, Pierre (2019) assesses that cities are increasingly using internationalization as a means of capacity building on a range of urban issues, particularly climate change and sustainability.

Global problems require innovative solutions and a diversity of actors, especially when their transnational nature is taken into account. To solve these issues, it is necessary to contribute multiple perspectives in a coordinated way. Transnational networks support the need to regulate the learning process and behavioural differences through the cooperation of various actors. Innovative hybrid organizations that encourage participation and are flexible and effective make collective success on issues that cannot be achieved individually possible; therefore, networks enable the potential to create value and amass vital resources (Weber and Khademan, 2008, p. 334; Gordon, 2013, p. 290; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). In this context, municipal transnational networks stand out as polycentric, loosely connected, non-hierarchical, or horizontally functioning cooperation. Kern and Bulkeley (2009) identify three defining characteristics of transnational networks involving local governments in relation to the expansion of the multilevel character of European governance in the context of European integration: the autonomy of member cities and their freedom to enter and exit the network; its non-hierarchical, polycentric, horizontal character; and the direct implementation of decisions made within the network by its

members. In addition to sharing joint projects and best practices, today's transnational municipal networks also participate in and seek to influence international policymaking; that is, they devote additional resources and energy to international lobbying or city diplomacy on a global scale (Swiney, 2020, p. 245).

Gordon (2013, p. 292) explains the conditions that facilitate the establishment of transnational networks involving municipalities as follows: (a) the exposure of cities to the competitive forces of globalization, (b) a strong obligation to seek means to improve local governance capacity and increase the collective voice of local governments in the face of other levels of government, and (c) the declining cost of travel and long-distance communication. Political, economic, and technological forces traditionally associated with contemporary globalization are transforming the international policies of cities as well as their size, significance, and capabilities. In this context, cities are becoming a central driver of economic development expansion and transforming their status and governance capabilities into political objectives (Curtis and Acuto, 2018). The concentration of global challenges in cities has resulted in the formation of international alliances that have significantly expanded with regard to city-specific issues (Abdullah and Garcia-Chuera, 2020, p. 42). Cities offer the possibility of an emerging political community/assemblage that can provide forms of governance that can keep up with the scale and complexity of global challenges by forming transnational networks (Curtis and Acuto, 2018, p. 11, 12; Acuto and Leffel, 2021).

The number of actors participating in transnational networks is growing, and the policies formulated by these networks are becoming increasingly international. In addition, as the variety of actors in municipal networks increases, the influence of city budget constraints and municipal authority declines. Simultaneously, municipalities not adhering to a strategy for the membership process accompany memberships in networks that prioritize recognition, branding, and economic opportunities (Acuto, 2016). As an alternative to state-centric international regimes, multi-actor, multi-level, and non-hierarchical networks are rising to the forefront of the democracy debate (Lemos and Agraval, 2006; Bulkeley, 2005), and the role of the private sector in these networks is discussed. Multi-actor hybrid networks can make decision-making processes more democratic, particularly those involving the civilian population and the scientific community, and increase the sustainability and activity of city diplomacy on a global scale. Particularly, the scientific community will be able to contribute significantly to networks by providing data to local governments and conducting research and policy analyses to achieve sustainable development objectives (Abdullah and Garcia-Chueca, 2020, p. 51-53).

Mocca (2019), who argues that multilevel governance does not appear suited to provide a causal explanation for the membership of local units in transnational municipal networks, suggests examining the causes at the urban level. While international phenomena such as Europeanization and globalization support the establishment of transnational networks involving municipalities by providing more opportunities to build relationships and a forum for the exchange of knowledge and best practices, they cannot explain why municipalities/cities join these networks on their own (Mocca 2019, p. 278). Municipalities are also emerging as a new, increasingly potent actor in the global

distribution of power (Acuto, 2013). Through transnational cooperation networks and economic projects linking regional, national, and international borders, municipalities have emerged as new political actors in cross-border public action (Milani and Riberio, 2011, p. 23; Acuto, et al., 2017, p. 15). Understanding the rationale for cities' participation in transnational municipal networks requires looking at the opportunities that transnational municipal networks provide to their members. Dissemination and sharing of information, especially technical support, the creation of training opportunities, access to finance, and advocacy through networks are the main reasons for cities to join transnational municipal networks. The capacity and resource support it provides to achieve common goals is important (Haupt and Coppola, 2019). Municipalities provide access to new ideas and knowledge, as well as civil, public, and private capital through their networks (Bouteligier, 2013; Niederhafner, 2013; Wang and Amiri, 2019; Abdullah and Garcia-Chueca, 2020). Networks are complementary in terms of resources, experience, and practice (Weber and Khademan, 2008, p. 335-336), and they also demonstrate how municipalities adapt their diplomatic practices to the shifting international order (Klaus, 2020). Butun Bayındır (2021) in his study on three cases from Turkey reveals that the first reason behind participation in transnational municipal networks is the intention to benefit from experiences, knowledge, expertise, innovation, and best practices and the second reason is the intention to benefit from funds and grants. In addition to sharing information and disseminating policy information, ensuring local development as a requirement of inter-city competition also emerges as an important reason for joining a network (Taylor, 2011, p. 68), putting promotion at the forefront of networks. According to the concept of competitive cooperation of networks (Van der Pluij and Melissen, 2007, p. 13), networks involve both competition and cooperation between cities. In their field study on the reasons for membership in transnational municipal networks in six cities from a new institutionalist perspective, Gronnestad and Nielsen (2021) demonstrate that both the rational choice institutional theory and the discursive institutional theory can explain the aforementioned reasons. In the study, it is stated that the rational choice institutional theory is the best explanatory framework, and that membership is viewed as a means of cities to develop and legitimize certain identities.

In terms of shaping global politics, transnational networks, particularly those involving global cities, stand out when viewed in terms of the size of the cities that comprise them. Of C40 member cities, 90% are also members of the Metropolis network, and 99.9% of Metropolis network members are also International Union of Local Governments (UCLG) members (Abdullah and Garcia-Chueca, 2020, p. 49). In this context, it can be stated that while global city governments engage in city diplomacy activities to influence the international policy agenda via the networks in which they participate, smaller and medium-sized city municipalities participate in networks on specific thematic issues to defend their interests, facilitate the provision of local services, and share technical, financial, and informational support in this facilitation. The explanations for the cities of Milan and Turono reveal that transnational municipal networks are appreciated primarily for the symbolic functions they serve, allowing the two municipalities to strengthen their prestige and position in local and/or national policy spaces. In his study assessing Milan and Torino's membership on transnational municipal networks in the context of migration policies, Caponio (2018) assessed that in the case of Torino, participation in transnational

municipal networks represents a resource to be used locally to strengthen relations with local stakeholders, especially banking foundations, while in Milan, membership in transnational municipal networks is used to lobby for national financial resources.

In transnational networks involving municipalities, climate change and sustainable issues stand out as matters of strategic cooperation, particularly in the context of the exchange of best practices in local government public policies (Manfredi-Sanchez, 2021, p. 4-7; Surmacz, 2018: 12; James and Verrest, 2015; Rashidi and Patt, 2018). In the governance of these networks, supporting the performance of the network and shaping global policies by working strategically rather than collaboratively (Wukich, 2014) are top priorities. While discussing the influence of transnational municipal networks on global governance and diplomacy in the context of network secretariats, which are the administrative arms of municipal networks, Lecavalier and Gordon (2020) present the influence of networks on global political decisions, particularly in the field of climate change. Moreover, they argue that issue/theme-specific networks can facilitate interactions between municipalities, as well as distill and reformulate policy actions and best practices pertaining to the themes they prioritize (Lecavalier and Gordon, 2020, p. 17). The fact that cities/municipalities stand out, particularly in the climate change agenda, is closely related to the urbanization rate of the global population, the fact that cities are centers of economic productivity and power, and the fact that they are disaster-prone centers. The relationship between urban actions and global emissions is also significant. To find solutions, a local-scale approach to climate change necessitates local scale and innovation to communicate and collaborate (Gordon, 2013, p. 289). In his field study of 7 German cities¹, Oppowa evaluated that cities prefer ICLEI membership for lobbying activities including mayoral support at the international level, membership in the Energy Cities and EUROCITIES network for lobbying and project cooperation at the technical level, and membership in the Climate Alliance for information exchange, awareness raising and project cooperation (Oppowa, 2015). Bush et al. (2018), in their study on 7 German cities that are members of transnational municipal climate networks, state that the reasons why cities become members of transnational municipal networks are not the services that a network and its infrastructure can provide to cities; the act of joining and becoming a member of a network is more important, and membership is used for domestic policy purposes such as emission reduction targets and institutionalization of climate trajectories.

Transnational network cities/municipalities unite local actors, such as businesses, NGOs, associations, and industry chambers, with national and international actors. Networks between cities/municipalities can also be used to raise awareness about complex and widespread issues, such as the environment, transportation, and health, and provide opportunities to address contemporary urban issues (Dougless, 2002, p. 64).

Methodology

Classifying transnational networks involving municipalities as interconnected in some locations and generalizing the results is extremely difficult. Rather than classifying transnational networks in relation to one another, the purpose of this study is to classify networks in which Turkish municipalities participate based on their purposes, functions,

1 Berlin, Bonn, Freiburg, Hamburg, Heidelberg, Munich, Stuttgart.

and memberships in order to reveal the relationship between the municipalities and the networks. This research answers three main questions:

Question 1: Municipal foreign relations are a learning process that continues over time (Buis, 2009, p. 191). Is there a correlation between the institutionalization of external relations in municipalities and membership in transnational networks?

Question 2: Is there a relationship between the membership structures of transnational networks involving municipalities and the functions of these networks?

The data related to Question 2 are presented in Table 1.

Question 3: a. As the level of development of cities increases, does the number of their memberships in transnational networks also increase?

b. Is there a relationship between the population size of municipalities and memberships in transnational networks?

c. Is the membership of municipalities in transnational networks related to national and international policies?

The data for Question 3/c are presented in Table 1.

Within the scope of the research, these questions were tested through the transnational networks involving Turkish municipalities and the member municipalities of the network. The transnational networks involving Turkish municipalities were identified using documents published by the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change. According to the list published by the Ministry, 359 memberships have been established by many municipalities in Turkey in various years. In the list of 139 different transnational networks in total, the number of transnational networks was actually less than 139 due to some networks being rewritten under different names and mergers occurring between networks, and a total of 108 different networks were identified as having been established. Moreover, in the conducted research, it was not possible to access the structures of 10 transnational networks due to their closure, temporary nature and similar reasons. In this context, this study includes 98 transnational networks of municipalities in Turkey (Annex 1).

For the research, data on the structure of transnational networks in terms of how they are distributed according to the applicable classification were gathered by scanning and coding the purpose, memberships, and activities sections of the networks' own websites. Data on international networks is usually taken from the website of the relevant network. In rare cases where websites could not be accessed, access to the relevant data was provided by conducting a general search on the internet about the network. Data were coded through content analysis. The coding was done separately by two authors and compared. The process of content analysis and comparison of the data by the authors was repeated until at least 80 percent agreement was achieved in the coding.

Table 1
Classification of Transnational Networks Involving Turkish Municipalities According to Their Structure

Member Structures	Inter-City Structures
	Hybrid Structures
Functional Types	Structures with Technical Functions
	Structures with Economic Functions
	Structures with Political Functions
	Structures with Hybrid Functions
Purpose(s)	Hybrid purposes
	Local advocacy
	Political dialogue
	Sustainability
	Business associations Based on disadvantaged groups' rights
	Economic development
	Culture-identity-protection
	Security
	Digitalization, technology, innovation and science

Table 1 details the study's coding method and justifications. Membership structures, functional types, and purpose(s) are the three classifications for transnational networks.

Networks of municipalities are "inter-city structures" if they consist only of cities. Networks whose member structures consist exclusively of cities and urban communities are classified as inter-city networks, whereas networks that also include NGOs, the private sector, public institutions and organizations, and other sectoral stakeholders are classified as "hybrid structures". There are four distinct coding schemes for functional structures: "technical", "economic", "political", and "hybrid". Transnational networks with technical objectives are transnational networks whose principal activity is the collection of specialized knowledge. The primary purpose of transnational networks with economic functions is economic and commercial cooperation. Political transnational networks are transnational networks whose primary purpose is political (Dedeoglu, 1998). Transnational networks with hybrid functions are networks with multiple functions. The classification of member municipalities of transnational networks is based on the purposes/types of purposes of these networks, which are categorized under nine titles. This included "hybrid objectives," "local advocacy," "political debate," "sustainability," and "commercial associations", "disadvantaged groups/rights-based cooperation," "economic growth," "culture-identity protection," "security," and "digitization, technology, innovation, and science."

Findings

According to the study's methodology, the research findings are presented in three dimensions. First, the relationship between institutionalization and network memberships in the context of Turkish city diplomacy; second, the classification of the structures of transnational networks involving Turkish municipalities; and third, the classification's results in terms of the purpose/purposes and activities of these networks.

The Relationship between Institutionalization and Membership in Transnational Networks in the Context of Turkish City Diplomacy

Institutionalization of city diplomacy refers to the establishment of a distinct structure or unit for city diplomacy activities within local governments' institutional organization schemes. These structures are directly responsible for the international relations of local governments, and their purpose is to ensure that sufficient qualified personnel execute and coordinate the relevant services of local governments in the international domain (Erdem and Ersavas Kavanoz, 2021, p. 29). According to Milani and Riberio, participation in transnational networks is one of the three most important diplomatic activities conducted by local governments with a formal structure (2011, p. 30). The data on the institutionalization of city diplomacy in cities is essential for associating institutionalization with network membership.

In order to examine the impact of institutionalizing city diplomacy on memberships in transnational networks in Turkey, the effect of establishing a separate "foreign relations unit" within the municipal organizational structure was examined. According to Erdem and Ersavas Kavanoz's study (Kavanoz, 2021, p. 3), 45 municipalities in Turkey have institutionalized city diplomacy; that is, they have a separate foreign relations unit².

Table 2

The Influence of "Institutionalization" on Transnational Network Memberships in Turkish City Diplomacy

Explanation	Nr.	Explanation	Nr.	Explanation	Rate
Municipalities with a Foreign Relations Unit	31	Memberships to Transnational Networks in Municipalities with a Foreign Relations Units	156	Ratio of Membership to Transnational Networks in Municipalities with a Foreign Relations Unit	5.032
Municipalities without a Foreign Relations Unit	110	Memberships to Transnational Networks in Municipalities without a Foreign Relations Unit	181	Rate of Membership to Transnational Networks in Municipalities without a Foreign Relations Unit	1.645

Table 2 compares the transnational memberships of Turkish municipalities with and without a foreign relations unit. Turkey has 141 municipalities with 338 transnational network memberships. Thirty-one of 141 municipalities have a foreign relations unit as part of their organizational structure, making them institutionalized. The remaining 110 towns lack a foreign relations unit. While 31 municipalities with foreign relations units have 156 memberships in transnational networks, 110 municipalities without foreign relations units have 181 memberships. Municipalities with a foreign relations unit are likely to belong to more networks than those without.

In the scope of the research conducted on the institutional structures of all municipalities in Turkey, except for municipalities below the urban level, 45 municipalities established

2 For more detailed information on which municipalities in Turkey have a separate foreign relations unit, see: Erdem, N and Ersavas Kavanoz, S. (2021), "A Research on 'City Diplomacy Management' in Turkey", *Journal of Urban and Environmental Research*, 3(1), 28-49.

foreign relations units in their organizational structures between 1989 and 2020, with a significant number of these units being established in the last decade. Establishing institutional structures within the municipality for city diplomacy efforts is, on the one hand, a necessity due to the volume and complexity of these operations, and, on the other, an indication of the value placed on these endeavors.

Among Turkish cities with an institutionalized structure in the field of city diplomacy, the number of network memberships is greater in municipalities with comparably larger populations and a greater number of institutionalized structure employees. Among the most populous cities in Turkey, Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Gaziantep have distinct institutional frameworks for foreign relations and a relatively large number of employees. In a number of Turkish municipalities, the foreign relations unit is led by a single individual. In addition, the amount of appropriate and qualified personnel is viewed as a crucial factor influencing a variety of activities in these units, such as membership in transnational networks and the number of activities to be conducted within the network. The organizational structures of metropolitan municipalities in Turkey show that there are units called the Department of Foreign Relations or the Directorate of Foreign Relations that deal with these issues. In fact, the Foreign Relations Directorate of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality is comparable in size to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is larger than the foreign ministries of many countries (Akman, 2017: 486-487).

Structure-Based Classification of Transnational Networks Involving Municipalities in Turkey

The following table depicts the structure-based distribution of transnational networks with Turkish municipal members (member structures, period of cooperation, geographic domains, functional categories, purpose/purposes, and number of activities).

Table 3

Classification of Transnational Networks Involving Turkish Municipalities According to Their Structure

Type of Classification		Number	Total	Rate	Total
Member Structures	Inter-City Structures	46	98	47%	100%
	Hybrid Structures	52		53%	
Functional Types	Structures with Technical Functions	52	98	53%	100%
	Structures with Economic Functions	4		4%	
	Structures with Political Functions	40		41%	
	Structures with Hybrid Functions	2		2%	
Purpose(s)	Hybrid purposes	3	98	3%	100%
	Local advocacy	8		8%	
	Political dialogue	40		41%	
	Sustainability	11		11.5%	
	Business associations Based on disadvantaged groups' rights	11		11.5%	
	Economic development	3		3%	
	Culture-identity-protection	16		16%	
	Security	2		2%	
Digitalization, technology, innovation and science	4	4%			

Of the 98 transnational networks comprised of Turkish municipalities, 46 have inter-city membership structures, while 52 have hybrid membership structures.

According to the functional types of the municipalities, 52 of the 98 transnational municipal networks in Turkey have technical purposes, 4 have economic functions, 40 have political roles, and 2 have hybrid functions. The Global Fund for Cities Development (GFCD) serves a financial purpose. The Covenant of Mayors for Peace (www.yereldiplomasi.gov.tr) serves a political purpose, whereas the Cities for Mobility Network (CfM) serves a technical purpose. In conclusion, the Union of Turkish World Municipalities serves a hybrid purpose (economic, political and technical).

Table 4

The Relationship between Membership Structures and Functional Types of Transnational Networks

	Total	Functional Types			
		Technical	Economic	Political	Hybrid
Inter-city Membership	46	19	0	25	2
Hybrid Membership	52	33	4	16	0

Table 4 demonstrates that the majority of hybrid membership networks have technical functions based on the relationship between membership structures and functional types in the classification of transnational networks. Many urban problems, particularly those that can be categorized as complex, necessitate multi-stakeholder accountability for their resolution because they affect multiple sectors and individuals (Head, 2008). The diverse resources that each participant possesses in response to the issue are essential for mobilization because they provide a forum for discussing alternative solutions. Discussion of these multiple potential sources of solutions may yield more fruitful outcomes when determining the best option (Head and Alford, 2015). The participation of stakeholders in decision-making processes regarding issues that affect them (Huxham et al., 2000), even though the balance in power relations between stakeholders is debatable, is essential in the context of democratic debates, depending on the nature of the problem and the affected region.

Based on the relationship between membership structures and functional types in the classification of transnational networks, Table 4 demonstrates that the majority of networks with intercity memberships are political in nature. The resilience of a state is in the reshaping of intergovernmental relations, just as it is for private businesses. A public administration perspective that is more accessible to the public, less bureaucratic, more flexible, more innovative, more entrepreneurial, and more effective has begun to emerge in this context (Weiss, 1995, p. 229). In an effort to influence public policy, advocacy activities have become one of the public administration strategies used to develop participatory processes (Babaoglu, 2016, p. 295). As a response to higher levels of government, local governments favor constructing new advocacy mechanisms for the representation of various rights and interests and engaging in advocacy efforts (Loftis and Kettler, 2015, p. 193-194). The collaborative efforts to amplify and safeguard the voice of the local in the global sphere have a significant impact on the political functions of transnational networks, with inter-city structures taking the lead.

Relationships Between Turkish Municipalities and Transnational Networks

By 2021, 54 provinces, eight municipal unions, a museum affiliated with a municipality, and one corporation in Turkey will have established a total of 359 transnational networks acting in collaboration. There are a total of 141 cooperating municipalities in 54 provinces.

Table 5

Types of Member Municipalities of Transnational Municipal Networks in Turkey and the Number of Acts of Cooperation

	Sub-urban Municipality	District Municipality	City Municipality	Metropolitan District Municipality	Metropolitan Municipality	Total
Number of Municipalities	8	15	21	71	26	141
Number of Acts of Cooperation	8	19	34	119	157	338
Cooperation Per Municipality	1.00	1.26	1.62	1.68	6.03	-

The distribution of Turkish municipalities that are members of transnational networks by municipality type and number of memberships/cooperation is shown in Table 5. Accordingly, out of 141 municipalities, 18 percent are metropolitan municipalities, 50 percent are metropolitan district municipalities, 14 percent are city municipalities, 12 percent are district municipalities and 6 percent are sub-urban municipalities. Additionally, the distribution of Turkish municipalities by type is indicative of their populations. The evaluation of the number of partnerships established by Turkish municipalities that are members of transnational networks within the scope of Table 4's municipality distribution reveals a total of 338 distinct acts of cooperation established by 141 member municipalities. Metropolitan municipalities formed 47 percent of the 338 partnerships, while metropolitan district municipalities formed 35 percent. Eighteen percent of non-metropolitan municipalities demonstrate cooperation. In Turkey, member municipalities of transnational networks are frequently densely populated. There is a correlation between the size of a municipality's population and its participation in transnational networks. Specifically, metropolitan communities appear to have a greater propensity to join networks. Larger municipalities in Turkey are more likely than smaller municipalities to collaborate with transnational networks. It is believed that eight municipalities are members of transnational networks and that each municipality collaborates with only one network. Furthermore, 26 metropolitan municipalities that are part of transnational networks have established a total of 157 affiliations acting in cooperation.

As indicated previously, Turkish municipalities with foreign relations units are more likely to participate in transnational networks. Municipalities with foreign relations units are also among the most populous (metropolitan municipalities). According to the research conducted by Erdem and Ersavaş Kavanoz (2021, p. 39), 18 of the 45 Turkish municipalities with foreign relations units in 2020 were metropolitan municipalities, while the remaining 25 were metropolitan district municipalities. There is one foreign relations unit in each provincial and district municipality. Twenty-seven municipalities have a population of 500,001 or higher.

Table 6

Distribution of Municipalities with Memberships to Transnational Networks in Turkey by Geographical Locations and Human Development Indexes

GEO-GRAPHICAL REGIONS	Number of Municipalities	HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEXES ³								
		Value			Ranking					
		0.000-0.499	0.500-0.799	0.800-1.000	Between 1-15	Between 16-30	Between 31-45	Between 46-60	Between 61-75	Between 75-81
Eastern Anatolia Region	16	-	14	2	2	2	2	-	2	8
Black Sea Region	24	-	15	9	6	7	6	3	2	-
Mediterranean Region	29	-	5	24	11	14	1	3	-	-
South-eastern Anatolia Region	46	-	46	-	-	-	-	30	12	4
Aegean Region	54	-	9	45	42	3	4	5	-	-
Central Anatolia Region	45	-	18	27	27	2	15	1	-	-
Marmara Region	124	-	13	111	109	7	3	2	3	-

In the relationship between municipalities and memberships in transnational networks, geographical region appears to be as significant as size. Table 6 depicts the geographical distribution of Turkish municipalities that are members of transnational networks. It is observed that Marmara municipalities have the highest number of transnational network memberships. Eastern Anatolia municipalities have established the fewest memberships. Bursa, Kocaeli, Bursa, and Istanbul, which are among the top 15 provinces on the list, are located in the Marmara region, which has a very high human development index score. The majority of municipalities in the Marmara region of Turkey that are members of transnational networks (109/124 in Table 5) are among the top 15 provinces with a “very high” index of human development. In Eastern Anatolia, where the number of collaborations is lowest, the majority of provinces (14/16 in Table 6) with collaborations have a “high” human development index. On the human development index, half of the participating cities (8/16 in Table 6) rank at or near the bottom. Istanbul, with 57 partnerships, and Bursa, with 35 collaborations, are among the Marmara region provinces with the most network memberships. In terms of disparities in regional development, the number of Turkish municipalities that are part of transnational networks is crucial.

In regions with a large number of memberships, the geographic distribution of transnational network memberships is dominated by one or two cities. Istanbul has 57 memberships and Bursa has 35 memberships in the Marmara region, while Izmir has

3 Human Development Index data was obtained from <https://ingev.org/>.

seven memberships in the Aegean region, Gaziantep has 28 memberships in the Southeast region, and Ankara has 23 memberships in the Central Anatolia region. Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Bursa are the most populous metropolitan cities in Turkey, and they are connected to transnational networks. The number of transnational networks in which Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality participates has increased in recent years, according to data from the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization, and Climate Change. It should be taken into account that Fatma Sahin, the mayor of Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality, chairs two transnational municipal networks: the United Cities and Local Governments Middle East and West Asia Section (UCLG-MEWA), the Asian Mayors Forum (AMF)⁴.




Figure 1. Distribution of Municipalities in Turkey by Years of Membership to Transnational Networks⁵

Figure 1 depicts the distribution of cities according to their years of membership in transnational networks. In the 1990s, Turkish municipalities began to join transnational networks. Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality joined the METROPOLIS network as the first municipality in 1995. Until the 2000s, only Turkish provinces remained members of transnational networks. The number of transnational network memberships increased dramatically in 2003 compared to previous years. This year, smaller administrative units than provinces (district municipalities) also joined the networks. In the process of local government reform in Turkey at the turn of the 21st century, significant progress was made in local governments' international relations. The reform process was concluded between 2004 and 2005, with the EU and the World Bank (WB) playing crucial roles in its conclusion. Prior to the reform, these actors had various demands regarding local governments. One of these demands was that municipalities be allowed to establish relations with foreign and transnational local government organizations (Alici, 2007: 7; Güler, 2003b: 3). In the post-reform period in Turkey, there have been important developments regarding these demands. Article 74 of Law No. 5393 on Municipalities adopted in 2005 directly regulates the transnational relations of municipalities under the title of "relations abroad". In Law No. 5393, joint services and project expenditures with domestic and foreign public and private sectors and NGOs are listed among "municipal expenditures" under Article 60. Similar provisions are regulated for special provincial administrations in Turkey in Articles 43 and 62 of Law No. 5302 on Special Provincial

4 National network of municipalities in Turkey, association.

5 For the memberships to the International Union of Local Governments, Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East Regional Organization (UCLG-MEWA) network, the dates of when the memberships were approved by the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change are not given.

Administration. The Europeanization process has also been an important factor in the establishment of foreign relations units within the organizational structure of municipalities in Turkey. The Europeanization process is also an important factor in the establishment of foreign relations units within the organizational structure of municipalities in Turkey. The municipalities in Turkey that have foreign relations units have established these units to facilitate participation in EU and other international organizations' projects or access to grants and foreign resources needed for municipal projects, to follow up the activities of the EU and other international organizations, and to organize information and training activities, conferences, seminars and workshops to facilitate the EU harmonization process (Ersavas Kavanoz and Erdem, 2021: 39). The globalization process is a significant impetus for international relations-related activities. Globally, the globalization process makes national borders largely invisible. Local governments in Turkey are placing a greater emphasis on cooperation and partnerships and pursuing greater visibility on the international stage, both in terms of seeking solutions to common issues and bolstering their administrative and financial autonomy.

Conclusion

There is no single classification of municipal networks internationally. Today's municipal networks differ in terms of their objectives, involved parties, and roles. In addition, population size, institutional structure, and level of development may impact the network memberships of cities. In this context, an analysis of transnational networks involving Turkish municipalities and network-affiliated municipalities was conducted. In this context, the study aims to identify the factors that determine the relationship between the transnational networks that include Turkish municipalities and the municipalities that are network members.

The first finding within the scope of the investigation relates to the institutional structure. The vast majority of Turkish cities that are members of transnational networks lack independent foreign relations units and even fewer possess foreign relations units. Moreover, it was demonstrated that the few municipalities with foreign relations units were more likely to be part of transnational networks than the majority of municipalities without such units.

The second finding within the scope of the study relates to the population sizes and levels of development of the network's participating municipalities. In Turkey, the population size corresponds to the type of municipality. The membership of municipalities in transnational networks is significantly influenced by their size. It has been observed that as the population of a municipality rises, the number of memberships in transnational networks rises as well. The rate of institutionalization of foreign relations increases as the population of a municipality grows in Turkey. The degree of urbanization also distinguishes municipalities based on their location. The municipalities in the Marmara region, which has a very high human development index, have the most memberships in transnational networks, according to the findings.

The third finding of the study is that national and international policies influence the participation of Turkish municipalities in transnational networks. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Turkish local government reform process pushed municipalities'

incorporation into transnational networks. Especially in recent years, as a result of the effect of globalization on membership growth, towns have tended to benefit more from collaboration.

The study's final conclusion concerns the relationship between the member structures and functions of transnational networks. Although it is challenging to categorize transnational networks that include municipalities based on their structure and to generalize the results, the findings indicate that the membership structure of transnational networks is related to their activities. Transnational networks with technical functions are networks with hybrid memberships due to the complexity and interconnectedness of the topics they address. In the case of inter-city transnational networks developed by cities and urban communities, it has been observed that inter-city transnational networks are also typically characterized as networks with political functions due to political concerns such as bringing the local voice to the global arena.

Although our study makes a significant contribution to the study of the relationship between transnational municipal networks and the membership decisions of municipalities in those networks, additional research is required to produce more robust findings on the subject. Our findings are based on a single case study: Turkey. Consequently, there may be country-specific influences on our findings. Future research should expand the scope of our data by applying the same categorization scheme to other nations. A truly cross-national analysis would enhance the external validity of our findings and serve as a solid starting point for identifying causal mechanisms. We were unable to interview municipal officials about their motivations for joining transnational municipalities networks due to limited resources. Incorporating in-depth interviews would also increase the scope of our investigation and help us comprehend their decision-making process. Keeping in mind all of these caveats, we believe that our study represents an important first step in the right direction.

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Annex 1

Transnational (Municipal) Network	Abbreviated name	Websites of the network
Union Internationale Des Transports Publics	UITP	https://www.uitp.org/
International Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing	ISPRS	https://www.isprs.org/
The International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions	IFLA	https://www.ifla.org/
International Council of Museums	ICOM	https://icom.museum/en/
Deutsche Vereinigung Für Wasserwirtschaft, Abwasser Und Abfall	DWA	https://de.dwa.de/de/
The Council of European Municipalities and Regions	CEMR	https://www.ccre.org/
Association of Towns Awarded the Europe Prize	EUROPEPRIZE	https://www.coe.int/
The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe	COE	https://www.coe.int/
World Federation of United and Twinned Towns	FMCU-UTO	https://uia.org/s/or/en
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development	OECD	https://www.oecd.org/
Arab Towns Organization	ATO	https://arab.org/
Conseil International Des Organisations De Festivals De Folklore Et D'arts Traditionnels	CIOFF	https://www.cioff.org/
International Water Resources Association	IWRA	https://www.iwra.org/
Organization of Islamic Capitals and Cities	OICC	https://www.oicc.org/
Mayors for Peace	–	https://www.mayorsforpeace.org/en/
The Assembly of European Regions	AER	https://aer.eu/
World Association of the Major Metropolises	METROPOLIS	https://www.metropolis.org/
The International Association of Hand Papermakers and Paper Artists	IAPMA	https://www.iapma.info/
The League Of Historical Cities	LHC	https://www.lhc-s.org/
Botanic Gardens Conservation International	BGCI	https://www.bgci.org/
World Health Organization - Healthy Cities Network	–	https://www.who.int/
Phase V (2009-2013) of The WHO European Healthy Cities	–	https://www.who.int/
Phase VII (2019-2024) of The WHO European Healthy Cities	–	https://www.who.int/
The Walled Towns Friendship Circle	WTFC	https://www.europeanwalledtowns.org/
Local Governments for Sustainability	ICLEI	https://iclei.org/
Energy Cities	EC	https://energy-cities.eu/
Medcities	MEDCITIES	https://medcities.org/
	EUROCITIES	https://eurocities.eu/
European Association of Development Agencies	EURADA	https://www.eurada.org/

The European Association of Zoos and Aquaria	EAZA	https://www.eaza.net/
World Academy for Local Government and Democracy	WALD	https://wald.org.tr/
Association Of Cities for Recycling	ACR	https://acrplus.org/en/
Standing Committee for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of Local and Regional Authorities	COPPEM	https://uia.org/
European Network of Training Organizations for Local and Regional Authorities	ENTO	https://ento.org/
Asia Pacific Network of Science and Technology Centers	ASPAC	https://www.aspacnet.org/
Alliance of Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Cities	AVEC	https://uia.org/
European Association for Local Democracy	ALDA	https://www.alda-europe.eu/
L'associazione Cittaslow	CITTASLOW	https://www.cittaslow.it/
The European Association of Historic Towns and Regions	EAHTR	www.historic-towns.org
Eurocities Heritage Europe	_	https://eurocities.eu/
Network of Associations of Local Authorities of South-East Europe	NALAS	http://www.nalas.eu/
Lighting Urban Community International	LUCI	https://www.luciasociation.org/
Union of Turkish World Municipalities	TDBB	https://www.tdbb.org.tr/
Earthquakes and Megacities Initiative	EMI	https://emi-megacities.org/
İslam İşbirliği Diyalog ve İşbirliği Gençlik Forumu	ICYF-DC	https://www.icyforum.org/
International Union of Local Authorities Section for the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East Region	UCLG-MEWA	https://uclg-mewa.org/
European Coalition of Cities against Racism	ECCAR	https://www.eccar.info/en
Creative Cities Network	_	https://en.unesco.org/
European Association of Service Providers for Persons with Disabilities	EASPD	https://www.easpd.eu/
European Destination of Excellence	EDEN	https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/
European Network of Living Labs	ENoLL	https://enoll.org/
The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation	EGTC	http://www.egtctritia.eu/
The European Charter for Equality of Women and Men in Local Life	_	https://charter-equality.eu/the-charter/
The European Network for Accessible Tourism	ENAT	https://www.accessibletourism.org/
The North Africa and Middle East Science Centers Network	NAMES	https://www.namesnetwork.org/
Cities For Mobility	CfM	https://www.cities-for-mobility.net/
Delice Network	DELICE	https://www.delice-network.com/
Avrupa Akdeniz Zirvesi	_	https://www.mfa.gov.tr/akdeniz-icin-birlik.tr.mfa
Covenant of Mayors	CoMO	https://eu-mayors.ec.europa.eu/en/home

Global Fund for Cities Development	FMDV	https://www.financeyourcities.org/
International Federation of Parks and Recreation Administration	IFPRA	https://uia.org/s/or/en/
Global Design Cities Organization	GDCO	https://globaldesigningcities.org/
Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate&Energy	Covenant of Mayors	https://eu-mayors.ec.europa.eu/en/home
Akıllı Ulaşım Sistemleri Derneği	AUSDER	https://austurkiye.org.tr/
Rotta Dı Aenea Association	-	https://www.aeneasroute.org/en/
Euromed Summit	EUROMED	https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/agenda/our-events
United Local Authorities for Peace	ULAP	https://www.ulap.net.ph/
The WHO Global Network for Age-friendly Cities and Communities (the Network)	GAFC	https://globalcitieshub.org/
Glocal Forum	GF	-
The Association For International Sport for All	TAFISA	http://tafisa.org/
Local Authorities Partnership Programme in The Mediterranean	MED-PACT	https://med.ucf.edu/global-health/med-pact/
Asian Mayors Forum	AMF	https://www.mayors.asia/
European Union European Capitals Conference	-	https://culture.ec.europa.eu/policies/culture-in-cities-and-regions/designated-capitals-of-culture
European Social Network	ESN	https://www.esn-eu.org/
European Walled Towns	EWT	www.europeanwalledtowns.org
World e-Governments Organization	WEGO	https://seoulsolution.kr/en/content/world-e-government-organization-wego
World Conference on Transport Research Society	WCTRS	https://wctrs-society.com/
The Co-Mayors of İpekyolu Municipality	-	-
Black Sea Capitals Association	BSCA	-
Inter-City Intangible Cultural Cooperation Network	ICCN	https://www.iccnheritage.org/
Cities4Forests	Cities4Forests	https://cities4forests.com/
TELECITIES	TELECITIES	-
The International Sport and Culture Association	ISCA	https://www.isca.org/
Agricity	AGRICITY	https://www.agricities.com/
Creative Cities Network	UCCN	https://en.unesco.org/creative-cities/home
The World Union of Wholesale Markets	WUWM	https://wuwm.org/
The World Administrative Cities Association	WACA	-
International Planetarium Society	IPS	https://www.ips-planetarium.org/
European Cities Against Drugs	ECAD	https://www.ecad.net/
Centrum Für Internationale Migration Undentwicklung	CIM	https://www.cimonline.de/de/html/index.html
Rainbow Cities Network	RCN	https://www.rainbowcities.com/
Secure Network Society	-	-
European Youth Capital	EYC	https://www.youthforum.org/topics/youthcapital

The European Network of Science Centers and Museums	ECSİTE	https://www.ecsite.eu/
European Museum Forum	EMF	https://www.europeanforum.museum/en/
Global City Indicators Facility	GCIF	https://www.iso.org/organization/660833.html
International Conference on Localization and Emerging Technologies	ICLET	https://conference.iium.edu.my/iclet2023/
Culinary Heritage	–	https://www.culinaryheritage.net/



Political Communication in Disaster: Analysis of Two Main Political Alliances' Tweets After 2023 Great Earthquakes in Türkiye

Afet Dönemlerinde Siyasal İletişim: Türkiye'de 2023 Büyük Depremleri Sonrası İki Ana Siyasi İttifakın Tweetlerinin Analizi

Hayriye Nur Görkemli¹ , Hatice Mine Yayla² , Betül Çetinkaya³ 

Abstract

The presidential elections of 2023 in Türkiye witnessed the competition of two major alliance groups, comprising different parties, namely the People's Alliance and National Alliance. This study aims to investigate and analyze these two main groups' party and leader tweets after the two successive major earthquakes which occurred on February 6, 2023 and hit 11 cities in Türkiye and northern Syria, causing more than 50,000 deaths. Within the study, organizations' and leaders' tweets of both alliances during the first week after the earthquakes were manually gathered and categorized. They are grouped and analyzed under three main categories: information type, interaction numbers, and daily course of tweets. Despite the higher number of followers of leaders, it is observed that parties in both alliances preferred to post from party accounts rather than leader accounts. Parties of the People's Alliance shared predominantly "informational" messages, whereas the parties under the National Alliance used social media extensively during the disaster mostly for "information" and "criticism" purposes. The study also found that the average interaction per tweet of the presidential candidates in both alliances was higher than all other accounts. Moreover, the daily flow of messages was roughly parallel across the two alliances.

Keywords: Crisis Communication, Disaster Communication, Digital Political Communication, Content Analysis, Political Alliances

Öz

Türkiye'de 2023 Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimleri, farklı partilerden oluşan iki büyük ittifak grubunun (Cumhur İttifakı ve Millet İttifakı) rekabetine sahne olmuştur. Bu araştırma, 6 Şubat 2023 tarihinde meydana gelen ve Suriye'nin kuzey kesimleriyle birlikte Türkiye'nin 11 şehrini etkileyerek 50.000'den fazla kişinin ölümüne neden olan iki büyük depremin ardından bu iki ana ittifak grubunun parti ve lider tweetlerini inceleyip analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Depremlerin ilk sekiz günü boyunca her iki ittifakın parti ve liderlerinin tweetleri manuel olarak toplanarak gruplandırılmıştır. Veriler tweetlerde aktarılan veri türü, etkileşim sayıları ve tweetlerin günlük seyri açısından analiz edilmiştir. Araştırma sonucunda liderlerin takipçi sayılarının daha yüksek olmasına rağmen, her iki ittifaktaki partilerin lider hesaplarından ziyade parti hesaplarından paylaşım yapmayı tercih ettikleri görülmektedir. Cumhur İttifakı içinde analiz edilen partiler ağırlıklı olarak "bilgilendirme" mesajları paylaşırken, Millet İttifakı içindeki partilerin afet sırasında sosyal medyayı daha çok "bilgilendirme" ve "eleştiri" amaçlı kullandıkları görülmüştür. Her iki ittifaktaki cumhurbaşkanı adaylarının tweet başına ortalama etkileşiminin diğer tüm hesaplardan daha yüksek olduğu da araştırma sonucunda tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca, mesajların günlük akış seyrinin iki ittifak grubunda da paralel olduğu görülmüştür.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kriz İletişimi, Afet İletişimi, Dijital Siyasal İletişim, İçerik Analizi, Siyasal İttifaklar

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Introduction

Social media offers timely, dynamic, interactive, creative, limitless, and simultaneous communication experiences to its users and these peculiarities made it very popular in daily life. Today, it is estimated that around 4.76 billion people use social media as of January 2023 and this number is close to 59.4% of the world population (www.datareportal). As Grunig (2013) argues, in crisis circumstances, social media tools are actively used. Rapid developments in communication technologies allow important transformations to be experienced in crisis management. For instance, in the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, usage of social media in disaster communication was not prevalent. However, within five years, it became a very active tool in the 2013 Ya'n earthquake (Li, 2014: 249). Natural disasters are extreme events affecting a large number of people's lives and resources. So in these conditions, different bodies (public, government, emergency organizations, etc.) require timely and free-flowing information, and social media provides this opportunity to its users (Li, 2014:250-251; Shahbazi et al, 2018:416). Digital platforms eliminate the "gatekeepers", so they play a complementary role to traditional media (Gilardi et al 2022:39). Through these platforms, politicians freely and quickly reach wide audiences, express their views, and impress their voters.

Twitter, which enables its users to share and read short messages called "tweets", is one of the most popular social media tools. People can follow each other, get updates from the posts, comment on them, like and repost (retweet) the messages, and create or follow specific groups of messages under hashtags. Because of all these characteristics, it is a widely used medium for political bodies in various events, including crisis circumstances (Malasig and Quinto, 2016: 141).

This study aims to analyze the Twitter accounts of the two main electoral alliances ahead of the upcoming presidential elections following two consecutive earthquakes that occurred on February 6, 2023, in Kahramanmaraş, Türkiye. These two earthquakes with magnitudes of 7.7 and 7.6 hit 11 cities in Türkiye and northern regions of Syria and caused more than 50,000 deaths. This study investigates the content and the type of messages of the two polarized political groups in the aftermath of this disaster. In this context, the first part of the study will provide an analysis of the literature about the use of social media in disaster periods and the usage of digital platforms in political communication. The next part analyzes and compares the tweets of the two main alliance groups after the earthquakes. The last section is devoted to conclusions and recommendations.

Social Media Usage in Disasters and Digital Political Communication

Disasters can be defined as natural or human-generated catastrophes that can cause great environmental damage and deaths (britannica.com). In these cases, continuous, interactive, effective, and fast communication plays a crucial role. During disasters, individuals need to let the people know whether they are safe or not. Moreover, for organizing and mobilizing help, efficient connections are vital. In these extreme cases, social media provides many useful functions making it essential to the general public, administrators, and various organizations (Splendiani and Cprielli, 2022:510).

Even though the phrase "social media" has no set definition, it refers to a variety of internet-based tools for information sharing and communication (Li, 2014: 251). Because they make the subject visual and interactive, social networking sites offer a lot of potential

for promoting readiness, knowledge, and involvement in crisis response (Malasig and Quinto, 2016: 143).

Social media is thought to outperform traditional mass media in terms of capacity and interactive two-way communication during hazard communication (Wang and Zhuang, 2017:162; Saroj and Pal, 2020: 1). It enables individuals to be ready, informed, and involved during times of disaster (Malasig and Quinto, 2016: 143). Various studies show that the internet and smartphones are preferred tools to help people communicate with each other in extreme cases. Jung and Moro (2014:5126) give the example that during the SARS epidemic, people preferred to use the internet as the source of information since they believed that the mainstream media didn't provide enough information. This platform offers users the chance to build rapid and extensive interactions. Therefore, it is preferred more than traditional media in addressing the public's need for information about emergencies, and it serves as a 'backchannel' that feeds broadcasters as it can provide information before official channels (Li, 2014: 252). People try to inform their family and friends in the disaster region about their safety and security. They look for or exchange information on necessities. The public can benefit from social media when many phone networks are unable to handle a sudden rush of calls during disasters.

Jung and Moro (2014: 5123) mention the five potential functions of social media in disaster communication. Firstly, it provides interpersonal communication at the micro level. Secondly, it serves as a channel for local governments. Thirdly, it has a function for organizations and local media at the meso level. Fourthly, social media serves as channels for mass media at the macro level, and lastly, it has a cross-level information sharing and gathering function among micro, meso, and macro level agents. Furthermore, Li (2014:253) claims that during disasters social media is either used passively to disseminate information or as an emergency management tool to spread event knowledge and alerts, collect victim assistance requests, track user actions and upload pictures or texts to calculate loss.

Digital platforms, which are intensively used by local and central governments in disaster management, are also an effective means of communication in the process of political communication. Gilardi et al (2022: 42-44) lists three reasons for social media preference in political communication. Firstly, politicians are freer in social media when engaging with the public, journalists, and political opponents, since this medium provides communication without restrictions in terms of time, duration, or content. Secondly, social media is not only for communicating with the target audience in political communication but also for setting the agenda in particular. The absence of traditional media's gatekeepers makes this new media preferable. Lastly, political actors can use social media to communicate not only with social media users but also with groups beyond them. This is because journalists and traditional media closely follow politicians' social media accounts and generate news based on their posts. With all these features, social media is a very popular means of communication that provides access to large masses without time, place, and content restrictions and is also a very effective tool in setting a political agenda.

During disasters, politicians actively take part in the transmission of information through the media. For instance, U.S. government agencies used Twitter for disaster communication during the 2010 Haiti Earthquake and 2012 Hurricane Sandy (Wang and

Zhuang, 2017:162). Ewart et al (2011:3) claim that a disaster is also an opportunity for politicians to be heavily involved in the media and reconstruct their profiles. Politics always have a role in the decision of what information is made public during a crisis, and the majority of large organizations and governmental bodies have policies that specifically address this matter. Wei et al (2010:1016) claim that in a crisis period, released information is always “a political decision”. For this reason, politicians have to consciously use social media, which is a very effective communication tool in crisis and disaster periods. Coombs (1999:114-121) emphasizes the importance of being prompt, consistent, clear, informative, and instructive in times of crisis, stating that silence on the part of managers in times of crisis would mean passivity and uncertainty.

In the limited literature on the subject, messages sent by politicians during disasters are mostly analyzed in terms of their impact on the public (Cole and Fellows, 2008; Raynolds, 2009; Arceneaux and Stein, 2006; Strömbäck and Nord, 2006). Studies show the importance of these messages to inform, motivate, activate, and impress the masses from the target audiences’ perspectives. In their study, based on their interview with emergency agencies, Mc Lean and Ewart (2015:521) recommended several principles to politicians for disaster communication. They claim that during disasters, politicians have important leadership and communication functions. However, their visits to affected areas shouldn’t be seen as a tactical public relations opportunity and should be carried out within operational plans for supportive purposes.

Among other social media applications, Twitter is one of the most widely used in political communication (Bostanci, 2014:12). It is very simple to use, and it provides brief, rapid, and effective communication. Moreover, and most importantly, its easy access without any privacy or authorization concerns makes Twitter a preferred medium (Saroj and Pal, 2020:1). It is a prominent platform for political communication with two characteristics: as a “substitute” route to get over restrictions from other political arenas, or as an “amplifier” to amplify party statements (Silva and Prokosch, 2022:776).

The following section analyzes the use of Twitter by two political alliance groups in Türkiye in the aftermath of the successive earthquakes in southeastern Türkiye, which devastated a vast region and resulted in the deaths of more than 50,000 people.

Comparison of Two Alliances’ Party and Leader Tweets in the First Days of the Disaster

About Two Main Alliances

In the run-up to the 2023 presidential elections in Türkiye there were two main alliance groups: the People’s Alliance and National Alliance. Although there has been an increase in the number of parties joining alliances in the run-up to the elections, at the time of the study, between 6-13 February 2023, there were two political parties in the People’s Alliance and six in the National Alliance. The People’s Alliance is an electoral alliance between the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). The AKP, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the MHP, led by Devlet Bahçeli, entered the elections together in 2018, and this alliance was established to re-elect Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the president. The main rival of this alliance, the

National Alliance, is the electoral alliance established in 2018 between the Republican People's Party (CHP), İYİ Party, Felicity Party (SAADET), and Democrat Party (DP). For the 2023 elections, this alliance included 6 parties with the participation of the Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA) and Future Party (GP). The alliance, which was also referred to as 'Table of Six', aimed to designate and support a candidate against Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. These two main alliances, which were first established in 2018, expanded their scope over time with the participation or external support of other parties before the May 14, 2023 elections. The names, leaders, and political views of the parties in these two main alliance groups as of the date of the research are summarized in Table 1 below:

Table 1
Names, Leaders and Political Views of the Parties in Two Alliances

People's Alliance			National Alliance (Table of Six)		
Party	Leader	Ideology/Position	Party	Leader	Ideology/Position
AKP	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Right wing/Conservatism	CHP	Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu	Centre-left/Social democracy
MHP	Devlet Bahçeli	Far-right/Turkish Nationalism	İYİ Party	Meral Akşener	Center-right/Turkish Nationalism
			SAADET	Temel Karamollaoğlu	Far-right/Religious Nationalism
			DP	Gültekin Uysal	Center-right/Liberal conservatism
			DEVA	Ali Babacan	Center-right/Liberal democracy, conservatism
			GP	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Center-right/Liberal conservatism

On February 6, 2023, two major earthquakes with intensities of 7.8 Mw and 7.5 Mw occurred 9 hours apart in Kahramanmaraş's Pazarcık and Ekinözü districts, the epicenter of which is located in the southeast of Türkiye. According to official figures, at least 50,783 people in Türkiye (haberturk.com) and at least 8,476 people in Syria (reliefweb.int) died, and more than 122,000 people in total were injured as a result of earthquakes as of April 2023. In the aftermath of these two earthquakes, which are described as the biggest disasters in the region in the last century, the Twitter feeds of the two main political alliance parties in Türkiye in the run-up to the upcoming presidential election will constitute the main subject of this study. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has been in the administration of Türkiye since 2002, became a candidate to be president again with the support of the MHP. On the other side, an alliance consisting of 6 political parties joined forces so that he would not be president again. The findings on the social media feeds of the parties and leaders in these two alliances during the first 8 days of the earthquakes are presented in the following section.

Study Content

The aim of this study is to investigate and analyze these two main electoral and political alliance groups' party and leader tweets after the two successive major earthquakes,

which occurred on February 6, 2023, and hit 11 cities of Türkiye and northern Syria, causing more than 50,000 deaths. Since the incident is relatively recent, there has been limited research regarding the use of tweets on the disaster before the election period. A limited number of studies in the literature examined the impact of social media posts of politicians during disasters from the perspective of the public (Cole and Fellows, 2008; Raynolds, 2009; Arceneaux and Stein, 2006; Strömbäck and Nord, 2006). Unlike other studies in the literature, this study will provide data on how the ruling and opposition alliances conducted their political communication activities through social media during the big earthquake disaster in the upcoming election process.

Twitter accounts of the political parties within the People's and National Alliance competing in the 2023 presidential elections and also the Twitter accounts of the leaders of these parties constitute the sample of this study. The Twitter account of the Presidency of the Turkish Republic, where President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's messages are conveyed, was also evaluated within the People's Alliance. Of the 17 Twitter accounts in the sample, five were examined under the title of People's Alliance and 12 under the title of National Alliance. The sample of the study was selected purposive sampling.

In the first week of the disasters, the news in the country was all about the disasters, but in the following days, new topics were added to the news. Moreover, on February 6, 2023, when the earthquake occurred, the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye declared one week of national mourning (Ministry of Communication of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, 2023). Therefore, since the agenda was only the earthquakes, and based on the date of national mourning, solely the posts of the political parties and leaders of the two main alliances between February 6 and February 13, 2023 were analyzed. Another limitation of the study is that the communication activities of the parties during the earthquake were analyzed only through Twitter. Lastly, the study only covers the messages of the parties and leaders of the two strongest alliance groups in the presidential elections, not all parties in Türkiye. These two alliance groups received more than 94% of the votes of all voters in the first round of the elections in May 14, 2023 (www.ysk.gov.tr).

In the study, tweets of political alliance leaders and parties were analyzed by the content analysis method. Krippendorff (1989:403) defined content analysis as "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context". Content analyses are research syntheses that have an important role in disseminating the researched information and shaping future research, policies, practices, and public perception (Suri and Clarke, 2009: 395-430). In the first stage, the type of media to be selected is determined and the sample is selected by limiting it (Geray, 2004: 108-140).

The analyzed tweets were manually categorized, and a coding scale was created. The 100 tweets were selected as a sample and they were coded by two researchers according to this coding chart. The reliability coefficient was calculated as 0.92 which was found to be sufficient for the reliability of the research.

$$R = 2(C1,2)/(C1+C2)$$

$$0.92 = 2(92)/(100+100)$$

- R Reliability Coefficient
 C 1,2 Number of Common Coding by Two Researchers
 $C1$ Number of Coding by The First Researcher
 $C2$ Number of Coding by The Second Researcher

This study analyses a total of 1,644 tweets sent by the leaders and their parties between February 6 and February 13, 2023, when the sole agenda of the country was the great earthquake disaster. In addition, the period also covers the national mourning. The research is designed to answer the following research questions:

RQ1. What are the dominant tweet categories of ruling and opposition alliances during the research period?

RQ2. What are the dominant tweet types of ruling and opposition alliances during the research period?

RQ3. What is the interaction level of tweets of ruling and opposition alliances during the research period?

Findings

As of the date of the study, the parties in the two main election alliances in Türkiye, the leaders of these parties and the number of followers of their Twitter accounts are given in Table 2 below. The official Twitter account of the Presidency of the Turkish Republic is also analyzed under the People's Alliance.

Table 2
Twitter Accounts of Political Parties and Leaders Included in the Research (as of April, 10, 2023)

PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE		NATIONAL ALLIANCE	
Parties/Leaders	Followers	Parties/Leaders	Followers
Recep Tayyip ERDOĞAN (AKP) https://twitter.com/RTErdogan	20.2 M	Kemal KILIÇDAROĞLU (CHP) https://twitter.com/kilicdarogluk	9.7 M
Presidency of Turkish Republic https://twitter.com/tcbestepe	9.4 M	Meral AKŞENER (İYİ) https://twitter.com/meral_aksener	5.9 M
Devlet BAHÇELİ (MHP) https://twitter.com/dbdevletbahceli	5.6 M	Ahmet DAVUTOĞLU (GP) https://twitter.com/Ahmet_Davutoglu	5.8 M
AKP https://twitter.com/Akparti	3.2 M	CHP https://twitter.com/herkesicinCHP	2.4 M
MHP https://twitter.com/MHP_Bilgi	2.6 M	Ali BABACAN (DEVA) https://twitter.com/alibabacan	1.2 M
		Temel KARAMOLLAOĞLU (SP) https://twitter.com/T_Karamollaoglu	1.1 M
		İYİ https://twitter.com/iyiparti	1 M
		DEVA https://twitter.com/devapartisi	418 K

		SP https://twitter.com/SaadetPartisi	360 K
		GP https://twitter.com/GelecekPartiTR	263 K
		Gültekin UYSAL (DP) https://twitter.com/DpGultekinUysal	240 K
		DP https://twitter.com/_DemokratParti	28 K
TOTAL	41 M		28.4 M

In Table 2, the first noticeable situation is that political party leaders have more followers on Twitter than the political parties they represent. While Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has the highest number of followers (20.2 Million) in the People's Alliance, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu has the highest number of followers (9.7 Million) in the National Alliance. This shows that the presidential candidates of both alliances have the highest number of Twitter followers. It is seen that the number of followers of President Erdoğan is approximately twice the number of followers of Kılıçdaroğlu. The total number of followers of the five Twitter accounts analyzed under the People's Alliance is 41 million, whereas the number of followers of the 12 Twitter accounts analyzed under the National Alliance is 28.4 million. This shows that the People's Alliance has the potential to reach its target audience more through Twitter. The account with the second-highest number of followers among the accounts analyzed within the People's Alliance is the Twitter account of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye with approximately 9.4 million followers. The number of followers of Erdoğan's AKP (3.2 million) is behind the number of followers of alliance partner MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli (5.6 million). After Kılıçdaroğlu, Meral Akşener and Ahmet Davutoğlu have the highest number of Twitter followers in the National Alliance (5.9 million and 5.8 million, respectively). Among the accounts analyzed in the National Alliance, Akşener and Davutoğlu have approximately the same number of followers as MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli in the People's Alliance. The number of Twitter followers of the 6 political parties in the National Alliance is less than the 2.6 million followers of the MHP, the second partner of the People's Alliance. This indicates that the MHP has the potential to reach a larger audience through Twitter than the other parties in the National Alliance. After these three leaders, the account with the highest number of followers in the National Alliance belongs to the CHP, led by presidential candidate Kılıçdaroğlu (2.4 million).

Table 3
Coding Chart of the Twitter Posts

Post Category	Post Subjects
INFORMATION	Information about the magnitude and effects of earthquake
	Search and Rescue Assignment Decisions
	Announcement of Official Decisions
	Visits
	Infrastructure Works
	Warnings
	Comprehensive Press Statement on the Earthquake
Other	

HELP/SUPPORT	Food and drink Aid Humanitarian Aid and Construction Equipment Assignments Financial Aid Aid for Services
EMOTIONAL POSTS	Emotional Posts (messages of get well soon, condolences, prayer, remembrance and gratitude)
CRITICISM	Criticism of Search and Rescue Criticism of Earthquake Policies Criticism of Crisis Management and Organization Criticism of Communication Processes Messages of Pessimism / Despair Other
NON-EARTHQUAKE POSTS	Non-Earthquake posts

As shown in Table 3, all tweets shared by political parties and political party leaders between February 6 and 13, 2023 were categorized according to their topics and a coding chart was created. The tweets of both alliances were categorized under five main headings: information, aid/support, emotional sharing, criticism and non-earthquake sharing. The post categories were also coded under the subject groups, as given in Table 3. As shown in the table, messages of get well soon, condolences, prayer, remembrance and conveying gratitude, etc. were grouped under emotional posts.




Figure 1. Comparison of Tweets by Numbers and Categories

Figure 1 shows the number and category of tweets of the two alliances during the research period. Both alliance groups shared Tweets in five categories determined above (i.e. information, aid support, emotional sharing, criticism, and non-earthquake). While a total of 531 posts were made from five accounts analyzed within the People's Alliance, a total of 813 posts were made from 12 accounts analyzed under the National Alliance. It is observed that both alliance groups shared similar numbers of posts in the "Information" and "Help" categories. The People's Alliance shared the most in the

“Information” category with 291 tweets, which constituted 55.3% of their total shares. Similarly, the National Alliance also made the most posts in the “information” category. The proportion of 305 information posts made by the National Alliance in total posts is 37.7%. Under the “information” category, the People’s Alliance mostly shared “General Comprehensive Press Release on Earthquake”, while the National Alliance mostly shared “Visit Posts”. In the “Help” category, the People’s Alliance shared 130 (24.5%) tweets, while the National Alliance shared 128 tweets (15.7%). In emotional posts, the National Alliance shared more than the People’s Alliance (161 and 104, respectively). “Criticism” is one of the categories in which the National Alliance tweeted most differently from the People’s Alliance. The National Alliance tweeted criticism intensively with 186 posts and a share of 22.8% in all its posts. It was observed that the National Alliance intensively criticized earthquake policies, crisis management, and organization. “Non-Earthquake Information” posts were made at a very low rate among all posts in both alliances.

While the rate of non-earthquake posts of the People’s Alliance is 0.7%, the rate of non-earthquake posts of the National Alliance is 4.1%. Table 4 below shows the distribution of message topics within the determined categories in detail.

Table 4
Comparison of Tweet Subjects of Two Alliance Groups

CATEGORY	SUBJECT	PEOPLE’S ALLIANCE		NATIONAL ALLIANCE	
		f	%	f	%
INFORMATION	Information about the magnitude and effects of earthquake	24	4.5	6	0.7
	Search and assignment decisions	40	7.5	44	5.4
	Announcement of Official Decisions	13	2.4	3	0.4
	Visits	27	5.7	98	12.1
	Other	24	4.5	48	6.0
	Warnings	10	1.9	20	2.5
	Comprehensive Press Statement on Earthquake	142	26.7	78	9.6
	Infrastructure Works	11	2.1	8	1.0
	Sub-Total	291	55.3	305	37.7
HELP/SUPPORT	Food and drink aid	16	3.0	9	1.1
	Humanitarian aid and Construction equipment assignments	70	13.2	71	8.7
	Financial aid	28	5.3	39	4.8
	Aid for services	16	3.0	9	1.1
	Sub-Total	130	24.5	128	15.7
EMOTIONAL POSTS	Emotional posts (messages of get well soon, condolences, prayer, remembrance and gratitude)	104	19.6	161	19.8
	Sub-Total	104	19.6	161	19.8
NON-EARTH-QUAKE POSTS	Non-Earthquake Posts	4	0.7	17	2.1
	Non-Earthquake Criticism	0	0	16	2.0
	Sub-Total	4	0.7	33	4.1
CRITICISM	Criticism of Search and Rescue	0	0	23	2.8
	Criticism of Earthquake Policies	0	0	72	8.9

	Criticism of Crisis Management and Organization	0	0	46	5.6
	Criticism of Communication Processes	0	0	14	1.7
	Other	0	0	17	2.1
	Messages of Pessimism / Despair	2	0.4	14	1.7
	Sub-Total	2	0.4	186	22.8
TOTAL		531	100	813	100

Table 5 below shows the sharing details of the parties and leaders in the alliances. The data in the table are visualized and presented below as Figure 1 and Figure 2 for the People's and National Alliances. Although the number of followers of leaders is much higher than that of their parties (Table 2), party accounts were used much more actively than leader accounts during the research period. The fact that voters follow leader accounts more than party accounts, but tweets were shared more on party accounts, is interpreted as a wrong strategy.

Table 5
Distribution of Tweets of Parties and Leaders in Alliances by Category

	Emotional	Information	Help	Criticism	NonEarthq.	Total
Peop. Allian.						
AKP	32	134	87	0	1	254
Presidency of TR	53	133	20	0	0	206
MHP	8	9	19	1	3	40
R.Tayyip Erdoğan	10	15	2	0	0	27
Devlet Bahçeli	1	0	2	1	0	4
Sub-Total	104	291	130	2	4	531
Nat. Allian.						
CHP	20	97	26	33	8	184
DEVA	27	48	21	70	2	168
İYİ	28	32	31	7	2	102
M.Akşener (İYİ)	22	19	21	5	1	68
GP	15	24	13	4	2	56
A.Babacan(DEVA)	15	18	6	12	0	51
K.Kılıçdaro.(CHP)	7	19	0	12	9	47
SP	5	20	3	8	0	36
A.Davutoğlu(GP)	6	15	2	3	4	30
DP	6	5	3	13	2	29
G.Uysal(DP)	5	3	0	12	3	23
T.Karamol.(SP)	5	5	2	7	0	19
Sub-Total	161	305	128	186	33	813
Total	265	596	258	188	37	1344

Of the total 531 posts of the People's Alliance, 254 belonged to the AKP and 206 to the official account of the Presidency of the Republic. The content of the posts was dominated by the "information" category and the number of tweets was 134 and 133, respectively. In the AKP Twitter account, the second most frequently sent message category was help with 87 posts, whereas the Presidency account sent emotional messages with 53 posts as the second-most frequent category. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has almost as many

followers as the sum of the followers of all leaders in the National Alliance, had only 27 tweets. The leader account should be used more actively than just the party account to reach more people. This study found that Erdoğan's Twitter account was not used very effectively.

In the People's Alliance, Devlet Bahçeli's number of tweets during this period was only 4. The number of posts by the MHP in the alliance is also very low compared to the number of posts by the AKP and the Presidency of the Republic (Fig.2). In terms of the number of followers, the MHP, which has more followers than all parties in the National Alliance, and Devlet Bahçeli, who has 5.6 million followers, did not use their Twitter accounts effectively during the research period.




Figure 2. Tweets of the People's Alliance

Of the 813 posts by the National Alliance, 184 were by the CHP, 168 by DEVA, and 102 by the İYİ Party. Approximately half (52.7%) of the posts of the CHP, the party of presidential candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, were informative and 17.9% were critical. The DEVA party, the second party in the National Alliance with the highest number of posts, had the largest share of criticism in its posts (41.6%). In the messages of the İYİ Party, messages of information, help, and emotional content were shared in almost equal proportions, while messages of criticism were rarely shared. During the research period, among other leaders in National Alliance, Meral Akşener (İYİ) was the leader who used her Twitter account most effectively. In the National Alliance, the CHP, İYİ Party, GP, SP,

K. Kılıçdaroğlu, A. Babacan, and A. Davutoğlu (GP), in order, gave the most informative posts. While M. Akşener shared emotional and helpful messages, DEVA, DP, G.Uysal (DP), and T. Karamollaoğlu (SP) focused on criticism among other posts (Fig. 3).




Figure 3. Tweets of the National Alliance

Half of the messages of both alliances were sent as “Retweet”. The People’s Alliance’s posts were 39.0% text and 32.8% live video. The National Alliance, however, had 31.5% text and 29.5% video posts, respectively (Table 6).

Table 6
Type and Format of Tweets

Type of Tweets	PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE		NATIONAL ALLIANCE	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Tweet	270	50.8	387	47.6
Retweet	261	49.2	426	52.4
Total	531	100.0	813	100.0
Format of Tweets	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Photo	129	24.3	21	2.6
Text	207	39,0	256	31.5
Live Video	174	32.8	68	8.4
Video and Photo	7	1.3	8	1.0
Video	14	2.6	240	29.5
Official Letter	0	0	21	2.6
Text and Photo	0	0	199	24.5
Total	531	100	813	100,0

Like, Retweet and Reply numbers were among the key performance indicators that show the effectiveness of messages. Table 7 shows the number of replies, retweets, and likes of the tweets of both alliances. When both alliances are compared, it is noticeable that the number of replies, retweets, and likes of the National Alliance was higher than the People's Alliance. However, since the number of tweets of the People's Alliance analyzed under five accounts (531) was less than the number of tweets of the National's Alliance (813), which consisted of 12 accounts, it would be more correct to calculate interactions per message. The interaction rates are calculated by dividing the number of replies, retweets, and likes by the total number of tweets sent by the alliances. Accordingly, the People's Alliance had a higher number of retweets per tweet (1,825.2) than the National Alliance (1,552.9). However, likes per tweet was 6,267.7 for the People's Alliance compared to 9,247.3 for the National Alliance. The number of "replies" per tweet was more than twice as high for the National Alliance compared to the People's Alliance (782.7 and 327.2, respectively). As a general assessment, the tweets of the National Alliance received more interaction during the research period. Within the People's Alliance, the account that received the highest number of interactions was the account of the Presidency of the Turkish Republic, followed closely by the accounts of the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Within the National Alliance, the accounts of the CHP and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu were by far the most influential. The total number of interactions between these two accounts was higher than the total number of interactions of the People's Alliance. This shows that the Twitter accounts of the CHP and Kılıçdaroğlu received much more interaction in the first 8 days of the earthquake (Table 7).

Table 7
Interactions per Tweet

PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE							
Account	No. of Tweets (A)	Reply (B)	Reply per Tweet (B/A)	Retweet (C)	Retweet per Tweet (C/A)	Like (D)	Likes per Tweet (D/A)
T.R. Presidency.	206	61,793	299.9	400,543	1,944.3	1,358,893	6,596.5
AKP	254	39,133	154.0	236,840	932.4	746,714	2,939.8
R.T.Erdoğan	27	54,322	1,358.0	244,571	9,058.1	937,100	34,707.4
MHP	40	13,423	335.5	68,382	1,709.5	214,975	5,374.3
D. Bahçeli	4	5,289	1,322.2	18,854	4,713.5	70,500	17,625.0
Total	531	173,960	327.6	969,190	1,825.2	3,328,182	6,267.76
NATIONAL ALLIANCE							
Account	No. of Tweets (A)	Reply (B)	Reply per Tweet (B/A)	Retweet (C)	Retweet per Tweet (C/A)	Like (D)	Likes per Tweet (D/A)
CHP	184	281,844	1,531.7	530,077	2,880.8	3,458,800	18,797.8
K.Kılıçdaroğlu	47	276,955	5,892.6	460,067	9,788.6	2,823,544	60,075.4
İYİ	102	17,381	170.4	79,988	784.1	363,799	3,566.6
M. Akşener	68	15,024	220.9	75,154	1,105.2	348,910	5,131.0
A.Babacan	51	11,967	234.6	27,151	532.3	128,884	2,527.1
DP	29	3,329	114.7	12,604	434.6	61,188	2,109.9
G. Uysal	23	3,640	158.2	10,728	466.4	54,029	2,349.0
T. Karamoll..	19	4,002	210.6	9,419	495.7	52,788	2,778.3
A. Davutoğlu	30	3,975	132.5	8,473	282.4	26,245	874.8
GP	56	4,297	76.7	7,839	139.9	24,050	429.4
SP	36	463	12.8	5,447	151.3	18,501	513.9
DEVA	168	13,480	80.2	35,629	212.0	157,350	936.6
Total	813	636,357	782.7	1,262,576	1,552.9	7,518,088	9,247.3

Table 8 shows the interaction rates of the alliances' posts according to the number of followers. During the research period, the overall interaction rates per follower of the National Alliance's posts were higher than the People's Alliance. The number of Replies per follower was approximately 5.5 times higher, the number of retweets per follower was 1.8 times higher and the number of likes per follower was approximately 3.3 times higher in favor of the National Alliance. Within the People's Alliance, the AKP had the highest engagement rate per follower, while within the National Alliance, the DP had the highest engagement rate per follower.

Table 8
Interactions of Posts per Follower

PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE							
Account	No. of Followers (E)	Reply (B)	Reply per Follower (B/E)	Retweet (C)	Retweet per Follower (C/E)	Like (D)	Likes per Follower (D/E)
T.R. Presidency.	9.4M	61,793	0.007	400,543	0.043	1,358,893	0.145
AKP	3.2M	39,133	0.012	236,840	0.074	746,714	0.233

R.T.Erdoğan	20.2M	54,322	0.003	244,571	0.012	937,100	0.046
MHP	2.6M	13,423	0.005	68,382	0.026	214,975	0.083
D. Bahçeli	5.6M	5,289	0.001	18,854	0.003	70,500	0.013
Total	41M	173,960	0.004	969,190	0.024	3,328,182	0.081
NATIONAL ALLIANCE							
Account	No. of Followers (E)	Reply (B)	Reply per Follower (B/E)	Retweet (C)	Retweet per Follower (C/E)	Like (D)	Likes per Follower (D/E)
CHP	2.4M	281,844	0.117	530,077	0.221	3,458,800	1.441
K.Kılıçdar.	9.7M	276,955	0.029	460,067	0.047	2,823,544	0.291
İYİ	1M	17,381	0.017	79,988	0.080	363,799	0.364
M. Akşener	5.9M	15,024	0.003	75,154	0.013	348,910	0.060
A.Babacan	1.2M	11,967	0.010	27,151	0.034	128,884	0.107
DP	28K	3,329	0.119	12,604	0.450	61,188	2.185
G. Uysal	240K	3,640	0.015	10,728	0.045	54,029	0.225
T. Karamol.	1.1M	4,002	0.004	9,419	0.009	52,788	0.048
A. Davutoğ.	5.8M	3,975	0.001	8,473	0.002	26,245	0.005
GP	263K	4,297	0.016	7,839	0.022	24,050	0.091
SP	360K	463	0.001	5,447	0.015	18,501	0.051
DEVA	418K	13,480	0.032	35,629	0.085	157,350	0.376
Total	28.4M	636,357	0.022	1,262,576	0.045	7,518,088	0.265

The daily trend of the share numbers between 6-13 February after the Kahramanmaraş-centered earthquake show that the People's Alliance shared more in the first two days compared to the National Alliance, and the shares gradually decreased at the end of the 8th day with slight fluctuations. The National Alliance, however, shared more posts than the People's Alliance, except for the first two days, but at the end of the 8th day, the message numbers of both alliances were the same (Fig. 4).




Figure 4. Number of Shares of Alliances by Days

In the People's Alliance, it is noteworthy that the tweet shares of the Presidency of Turkish Republic were higher in the first two days, while the number of shares of the AKP

was higher in the following days. The MHP had a higher number of tweets in the first two days, and very few afterwards. Again, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Devlet Bahçeli used their Twitter accounts very little during this period (Figure 5).




Figure 5. People's Alliance's Daily Flow of Tweets

When the 8-day course of the Twitter accounts of parties under the National Alliance is analyzed, it is observed that the CHP and DEVA used their accounts intensively and continued their posts in an increasing trend, especially on days 4-5-6 and 7 after the earthquake. Other parties continued to post less and in a horizontal trend (Figure 6).




Figure 6. National Alliance Parties' Daily Flow of Tweets

An analysis of the posts of the leaders in the Millet alliance shows that Meral Akşener, Ali Babacan and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu posted more than the other leaders in the alliance and that the number of tweets of these leaders fluctuated over the days. The other leaders in the alliance shared fewer tweets and the number of tweets followed a horizontal trend over the days.




Figure 7. National Alliance Party Leaders' Daily Flow of Tweets

In general, although the number of followers of the leaders within the alliance is higher than the number of followers of their party accounts, the posts are mostly made from party accounts. While principally informative messages were shared by accounts under the People's Alliance, informative and critical messages were posted by the accounts under National Alliance. It was also found that the average interaction per tweet of presidential candidates in both alliances was higher than all other accounts. Apart from this, the daily flow of the number of messages during the research period was almost parallel in both alliance groups.

Conclusion and Discussion

Political communication can be defined as the communicative activities carried out by political parties and leaders to convince certain masses and to spur them to action when necessary (Aziz, 2014:19). It is possible to say that the roles of political parties and their leaders are of great importance in times of crisis or disaster. In a disaster period, political parties and leaders assume responsibility, and citizens need guidance from an authority (Köresenyi, 2013:2).

Social media is a very effective tool in disaster communication, offering its users fast and unlimited communication. With these features, it is possible for politicians to convey their messages through social media to their followers and even to a much wider audience than through traditional media organizations. In times of crises and disasters, making statements is not only about informing, organizing, helping, and criticizing, but it also contains a political dimension. In this context, the Twitter messages of the political alliances of the two presidential candidates in the run-up to the upcoming presidential elections in Türkiye following the two massive earthquakes that occurred in Kahramanmaraş on 6 February 2023, which were called "the disaster of the century" in the wider region, were analyzed between February 6 and February 13, 2023. The dates covered the national mourning period when the sole topic on the agenda was the

earthquake. The aim of this study is to investigate how the political parties and leaders in the two main alliances in the election process conducted their political communications through Twitter during the disaster.

The People's Alliance with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has more followers than the National Alliance with the candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. This increases the potential for the People's Alliance's messages to reach a wider audience. The account with the highest number of followers in the People's Alliance belongs to President Erdoğan with 20.2 million followers. One of the main findings of the study was that political party leaders have much more followers than the accounts of the party they represent. Despite the higher number of followers of leaders, parties in both alliances chose to post from party accounts rather than leader accounts. This has been interpreted as a wrong strategy in terms of reaching a wider audience. The posts of the People's Alliance were predominantly made from the official accounts of the AKP and the Presidency of the Republic, while Devlet Bahçeli and the MHP, the other member of the alliance with a high number of followers, did not use Twitter effectively during this period.

The People's Alliance shared predominantly informational messages. They are followed by messages of help and emotional content. Although informational messages constituted the majority of the messages of the National Alliance, it was observed that messages with content critiquing the government in terms of earthquake policies and crisis management were also intense. The National Alliance used social media extensively during the disaster to point out the negligence and mistakes in the disaster response. Although the CHP, the party of presidential candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, mainly sent informational messages, DEVA, one of the parties in the alliance with the highest number of posts, used tweets criticizing the government extensively. The İYİ Party, the other high-sharing party in the National Alliance, equally emphasized information, aid, and emotional content. Within this alliance, it was observed that the GP, SP, and DP did not share as much as their other partners.

During the research period, the fact that there are only two parties in the People's Alliance and that it has a presidential leader with a very high number of followers constitute an important advantage in terms of ensuring consistency in the messages given on behalf of the alliance. However, it can be argued that this advantage was not effectively utilized for two important reasons. The first is that the presidential candidate Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, despite his large number of followers, posted very few messages from his own account and that the messages were predominantly from the official website of the Presidency of the Republic, which had fewer followers, and from his party account. Secondly, it can be argued that the accounts of the MHP and Devlet Bahçeli gave a passive appearance in this process due to the fact that they were not used effectively, despite their large number of followers. In the National Alliance, the presence of six different parties is a disadvantage unless the messages conveyed create the perception of a strong and consistent alliance that brings together different segments of the population and emphasizes the plurality of voices. The messages of the National Alliance were scattered, not integrated. If the alliance had an official Twitter account with a planned communication perspective in line with a philosophy of consensus, it could have been used effectively during the disaster response. The absence of a Twitter account for the alliance had a negative impact on the

consistency, effectiveness, and accessibility of messages during the presidential elections. The different emphasis of the messages of each political party and leader within the National Alliance was far from having a consistent impact on followers and voters. In addition, the lack of effective use of party accounts other than the CHP, DEVA, and İYİ Party during this period was also a negative point.

The study also examined the number of likes, retweets, and replies, which are among the key performance indicators of social media, and give an idea about the effectiveness of the posts. When the average number of likes, retweets, and replies per tweet of each alliance was evaluated, it was observed that the tweets of the National Alliance received more likes and more replies. The tweets of the People's Alliance were retweeted more. When the number of replies, retweets and likes per tweet in both Alliances is analyzed, it is observed that the average interaction of the National Alliance was higher than the People's Alliance, and the average interaction per tweet of the presidential candidates in both alliances was higher than all other accounts. This situation was interpreted as a suggestion that the strategy of predominantly communicating messages from party accounts rather than leader accounts during the research period was not very accurate.

Finally, the study analyzed how the tweets of the alliances followed a day-by-day pattern. The National Alliance shared more posts than the People's Alliance, except for the first two days, but at the end of the 8th day, the message numbers of both alliances were the same. However, it can be said that the daily flow of messages was roughly parallel across the two alliances.

Social media and especially Twitter, which is an important tool of political communication, should be used effectively in both crisis and election processes in order to manage the crisis well and to achieve political goals by staying in touch with large masses. This study examines the content, interactions, and daily flow of tweets sent by members of two different electoral alliances after two major earthquakes centered in Kahramanmaraş, Türkiye. The study is expected to contribute to the literature on political tweets in disaster communication. It is thought that the research conducted with content analysis will add a different perspective to similar studies and provide diversity to the literature in terms of comparison with the results obtained. In addition, the scope of this study can be expanded to include not only the earthquake period but also the entire election campaign period so the study can be further developed.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

Assembling Paperwork and Material Infrastructures: A New Materialist Inquiry on Modern State Formation

Evraklar ve Maddi Altyapıların Öbekleşmesi: Modern Devlet Oluşumu Üzerine
Yeni Materyalist Bir Sorgulama

Orhan Hayal¹

Abstract

This paper looks at nonhuman forms of state formation. The state is a socio-material assemblage of human and nonhuman materials, technologies, natural forces, and etc.. It is neither a rational human actor or an instrument, nor is it an ideologic reification that conceals real social domination and exploitation, nor is it a sociolinguistic construction that codifies multiple and dispersed governmental techniques. The fact that the state is constructed does not preclude it from being an actual entity with real effects. This paper considers paperwork and infrastructure as apparent materializations of state power. Paper production and its circulation within routine bureaucratic practices, as well as infrastructural technologies that drive natural forces, bring the state together while also allowing it to govern over people and land. Infrastructures are actants that form state-citizen interactions. There are competing political ambitions, economic interests, expertise, technology, and materials underlying their construction and maintenance. Modifications in their composition and function over time affect citizens' perceptions and their conduct toward the state. As opposed to the dualist ontology of social constructionism, which implies a contradiction between nature and culture, matter and meaning, origin and construction, this paper argues that state formation is an ongoing process in the continuity and entanglement of so-called dualities.

Keywords: State Formation, New Materialism, Assemblage, Paperwork, Infrastructures

Öz

Bu makale devlet oluşumunun insan olmayan biçimlerini ele almaktadır. Devlet insan ve insan olmayan materyallerin, teknolojilerin, doğal kuvvetlerin, vd. sosyo-materyal öbekleşmesidir. Ne insan-benzeri rasyonel bir aktör ya da şey-benzeri bir araç, ne gerçek toplumsal tahakküm ve sömürüyü gizleyen ideolojik bir şeyleştirme, ne de çoklu ve dağınık yönetim tekniklerini kodlayan sosyo-dilbilimsel bir inşadır. Devletin inşa olması, onun gerçek etkilere sahip aktüel bir varlık olmasını engellemez. Bu makale evrak işlerini ve altyapıyı devlet iktidarının en belirgin maddileşmeleri olarak değerlendirir. Rutin bürokratik pratikler içerisindeki kâğıt üretimi ve dolaşımı, doğal kuvvetleri harekete geçiren altyapı teknolojileri devleti bir araya getirirken aynı zamanda insanlar ve ülke üzerinde iktidar icra etmesini sağlar. Altyapılar devlet-yurttaş etkileşimlerini biçimlendiren eyleyicidirler. İnşaları ve sürdürülmelerinin ardında rakip siyasal hırslar, ekonomik çıkarlar, uzmanlıklar, teknolojiler ve materyaller vardır. Bunların bileşiminde ve işlevinde zaman içinde meydana gelen değişiklikler, yurttaşların devlete dair algılarını ve tutumlarını etkiler. Bu makale, sosyal inşacılığın doğa ve kültür, madde ve anlam, köken ve inşa arasında çelişki varsayan düalist ontolojisinin aksine devlet oluşumunun sözde ikiliklerin sürekliliği ve dolanıklığında devam eden bir süreç olduğunu savunmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Devlet oluşumu, Yeni materyalizm, Öbekleşme, Evraklar, Altyapılar

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Introduction

The growing power of supranational economic institutions, increased movement of capital, labor, goods, technology and information, global threats of terrorism, war, migration, environmental disasters, and epidemics are perceived as challenges to nation-states. The state is considered obsolete. The power of the state in the international system, economy, and social life are heavily contested, particularly in issues of globalization and neoliberalism. State phobia was common among Marxists and liberals at the dawn of the crisis of the European welfare state, as Foucault observed with remarkable clarity, long before neoliberal withdrawal discourse was popular. The concept of the state as an anthropomorphic being is concealed under the assumption that it strengthens and lessens over time, that it is born and it dies. Leviathan has always been the most powerful image of the state. Many philosophical claims, from Hobbes to Weber and further, have sought to clarify the state's ontological status and legitimacy, its right limits, and appropriate tasks, and how it is related to the people.

During the early Cold War, American political scientists saw the term "state" as a scientifically unfounded European myth and preferred to use "political system" (Almond, 1960; Easton, 1963). Scholars were entrusted with presenting an ostensibly stable American political system as a model of modernization for emerging nations (Mitchell, 1999, p. 78). The emancipation movements of the 1960s proved that the political system that pluralists claimed was in balance failed to establish social norms and persuade people of these compelling norms. Then, there was a revival of state theory with the instrumentalism-structuralism debate, to which Poulantzas and Milliband were protagonists. Milliband maintained the traditional Marxist opinion that the state was a bourgeois instrument, but Poulantzas, influenced by Gramsci and Althusser, recognized the state's relative autonomy in terms of its structural role in the reproduction of class society structure.¹ Weberian historical sociologists criticized Marxist and pluralist theories for being overly focused on society, calling for "bringing the state back in" (Evans, Rueschemeyer, & Skocpol, 1985). Accordingly, the state is an administrative and repressive organization that is potentially autonomous from socioeconomic structures and interests. It is organized to maintain control over its territory and population on the one hand, and to compete militarily with other states in the international system on the other (Skocpol, 2004, pp. 44, 59). This offers a historical sociological argument for modern state formation. The modern state is built on military-fiscal needs. The organization of coercion and the conduct of war resulted in political centralization, the modern tax system, internal security, and courts (Tilly, 1985). As a result, the state has a macrostructural reality that stands above and beyond society. The organizational realist perspective reifies the state as a rational and integrated actor with a human-like agency capable of acting in its own interests.

This paper is an attempt to consider the state in non-reified yet realistic terms. It echoes the reification critique leveled against Marxist and Weberian theories of the state (Abrams, 1988; Bourdieu, 1994; Trouillot, 2001). The state is not a distinct entity in the sense of an anthropomorphic sovereign or bourgeois instrument. It is not an authoritative power or bureaucratic field above and beyond society. It is a social construct since it is not an ontologically being-in-itself. However, unlike constructivist ideas, the state is neither a simple ideological edifice that conceals real dominance, nor is it a discursive achievement

that encodes concrete power relations and governmental processes. The fact that the state is a construct does not diminish its existence as a living assemblage with actual affects. The recent material turn in the social sciences offers a way to think about the state in realistic terms. This paper refers to assemblage thinking and actor-network theory, which enable an understanding of reality independently of the human mind and conception. The contribution of the two theoretical underpinnings confirm that the state is a construct and is looking for a more-than-human perspective on it. It is obvious that the insights of Foucault and the subsequent governmentality literature about routine and everyday operations, practices, and techniques that constitute the state have greatly contributed to our understanding. The Foucauldian nominalism, on the other hand, keeps a nature-culture dichotomy that sustains anthropocentrism, and treats matter as inert and distant in the face of the human world, whether through the lens of linguistic devices or so-called concrete power relations. Any genealogy of the state in concrete terms must look at not only governmental procedures and techniques, but also the mundane materiality of statehood. This paper focuses on the paperwork and physical infrastructures, where the state's materiality is most obvious. It offers an overview of dominant approaches in state theory, while building a critical discussion of governmentality literature as well as a theoretical reflection on how to use the material to rethink the state. Furthermore, it draws on current ethnographic studies on paperwork and material infrastructures, and it gives examples of state materialization processes in Turkey, which could guide future research.

Analytics of Government: A Genealogy of Modern State

Foucault is an outspoken opponent of broad notions of the state. The idea of the state appears methodologically unproductive in the microphysics of power, which analyzes the complex and detailed nature of power relations. Power relations and their analysis are beyond the boundaries of the state (Foucault, 2005, pp. 72-73). The state issue, which was abandoned in the microphysics of power, was brought back in the sequel with the concept of governmentality. Foucault criticized the “overvaluation of state” in liberal and Marxist accounts. The state is nothing more than a “hybrid reality” and “mystified abstraction” that has never had the unity, individuality and functionality given to it (Foucault, 2007, p. 109). It is neither universal nor autonomous source of power. The state is a mobile shape of ongoing *statifications* of numerous governmental techniques and processes (Foucault, 2008, p. 77). So, analytics of government is a “genealogy of the modern state and its apparatuses that is not based on... a circular ontology of the state asserting itself and growing like a huge monster or automatic machine, but on the basis of a history of governmental reason” (Foucault, 2007, p. 354).

Following Foucault, his colleagues deconstructed the institutional reality given to the state, and studied power relations beyond it. Rose and Miller, two of Foucault's most well-known followers, proposed “taking the state back out” as opposed to the “bring the state back in” agenda of the historical sociology of state formation. Rather than “amounts of revenue, size of the court, expenditure on arms, miles marched by an army per day”, a government analytics should focus on the discursive field in which such problematics of government are recognized (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 177). State appears as a historically variable linguistic device. It is a specific way of discursively codifying governmental

problems, dividing the political sphere with its own ways of rule from other non-political spheres, or granting institutional durability to certain governmental technologies rather than being an essential or functional entity. Anglo-Saxon governmentality studies misrepresented Foucault as having no interest in the state (Curtis, 1995). Scholars who read the courses at the *Collège de France* discovered that Foucault, who previously suggested the king's beheading, did not simply dismiss the state when questioning the unity attributed to the state, but rather considered the state in the context of a more general history of power relations and governmentalities (Biebricher & Vogelmann, 2012; Jessop, 2007; Lemke, 2007).

This theoretical shift results in the emergence of new literature that addresses the empirical and everyday dimensions of state formation. In fact, understanding the state entails being preoccupied with the mundane processes (Painter, 2006). States are not simply functional bureaucratic apparatuses, but also strong sources of symbolic and cultural production, which are represented and understood in certain ways (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985; Steinmetz, 1999). Accordingly, the state becomes embodied in people's lives through routine bureaucratic procedures such as lining up for a monthly ration or sending a letter, obtaining a notarized document or answering enumerator's questions, paying taxes or going through an inspection, applying for a passport or attending a hearing (Aretxaga, 2003, p. 396; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2000, p. 328; Hansen & Stepputat, 2001, p. 8; Sharma & Gupta, 2006, p. 11).

Akhil Gupta, a well-known post-colonial state theorist, investigated how the state, as a trans-local structure in the discourse of corruption arising from villagers' daily encounters with lower-level officials and their routine bureaucratic practices, was established in people's imagination while also embedded in the fabric of daily life (Gupta, 1995). People experience the state as a concrete and all-encompassing reality with distinctive spatial characteristics. Routine bureaucratic practices foster the two pillars of the spatially reified state image, which are perceptions of the state being vertically above society and encompassing all localities from the body to household, neighborhood, urban, and regional (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002).

Contrary to the idea of a coherent and integrated actor-state as the source of power, *cultural turn* and governmentality argue that the state is a social construct that has the effect of interrelated political, economic, and social networks through diverse discourses and meanings. It is an effect of governmental technologies and practices or a discursive construct that manifests itself in people's minds through maps, textbooks, flags, ceremonies, and monumental buildings. However, that approach simply recognizes the representational power of material culture and overlooks the materiality of technology and apparatuses (Molnar, 2016).

The body, natural processes, the built environment, and technologies are discussed in the microphysics of power, biopolitics, security apparatuses, and governmentality. In the analytics of power, Foucault introduced *dispositif* as a system of relations between discursive and non-discursive practices (Foucault, 1980, p. 194). Similarly, "government is the right disposition of things arranged so as to lead to a suitable end". It is the "administration of things" that governs people, just as "to govern" a ship struggling with eventualities of winds, reefs, storms, and so on (Foucault, 2007, pp. 49, 96-97). Despite

all these references, does Foucault take the materiality of matter seriously enough?

Foucault technically discussed the development of disciplinary writing, but he failed to address the technological and material evolution of paper and writing tools as an actual agent able to affect political programs (Dittmer, 2017, p. 45). He mentioned the prison where individual bodies were disciplined but excluded the construction technology, engineering, and materials that made possible such a physical environment. Foucault and following governmentality studies looked at the subjection of a population's biological processes to governmental processes, that modern government operates by regulating the population and its environment, and that it is a process that extends beyond the state and encompasses a wide range of expertise. While governmentality studies recognized the relevance of science and technology in politics, they exclusively addressed mentalities (Carroll, 2006, p. 7) and ignored the materiality of vital infrastructure and the physical environment (Behrent, 2013, p. 82). Governmentality appears to be restricted to how people's conduct is conducted. But, the existence of materials, their performance, and the management of the effects they produce are at the heart of politics (Barry, 2013, p. 181). Nonhuman nature is simply not subject to governmental intervention (Anand, 2017, pp. 216-217). The built environment, objects, machines, and technologies are neither social constructs reflecting people's intent nor inert things serving to provide a foundation for social interactions, power relations, and human organizations (Barry, 2001, p. 11). It is difficult to understand the macro reality of the state from the microphysics of power or to discuss the *statification* of local, dispersed governmental tactics and practices without the intermediaries of materiality.

Assembling State: Material Turn in State Theory

The *material turn*, including science and technology studies (STS) on the social construction of scientific phenomena and large technical systems, as well as an actor-network theory (ANT) and assemblage thought on the agentic capacities of non-human materials and processes in political and social life, led to historical and ethnographic studies on the critical role of infrastructure, built environment, technology, science, engineering, and nature in the formation and daily functioning of modern states (Joyce & Bennett, 2010). New materialists criticize the social constructionism for maintaining the nature-culture dichotomy and anthropocentrism by putting human meanings and intentions at the center of the universe. (Braidotti, 2013; Connolly, 2013; Fox & Alldred, 2017; Rekrut, 2018).

Materiality consists of more than simply "matter". It has an excess, force, vibrancy, and relationality that forces matter to be active, creative, productive, and unpredictable (Coole & Frost, 2010, p. 9). Material world is relational and in constant flux. There is a single plane of consistency and material continuity formed of matter-energy flows. The physical and social worlds are the material effects of a constantly changing world. Agency is not a uniquely human trait, but rather a capability that inorganic life and entities of all kinds may possess to varying degrees. All human or non-human bodies are heterogeneous, uneven, outwardly open, affective assemblages whose acting forces and capacities change depending on their interaction with other bodies and their environment (Barad, 2007; Bennett, 2010).

Assemblage is the English translation of the French term *agencement* used by Deleuze and Guattari. “It is a multiplicity which is made up of many heterogeneous terms and which establishes liaisons, relations between them, across ages, sexes and reigns - different natures” (Deleuze & Parnet, 2007, p. 69). Assemblage is not a hierarchically structured organic whole, but it exhibits a degree of consistency driven by co-functioning to produce specific effects. Similar to the ANT, it offers a broad view of the social, consisting of both non-human and humans, and recognizes the fact that the “world has to be built from utterly heterogeneous parts that will never make a whole, but at best a fragile, revisable, and diverse composite material” (Latour, 2010a, p. 474). Consider the feudal knight as a “man-horse-stirrup” assemblage (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), or the early Mesopotamian empires as assemblages of “geology-hydrology-solar-biology-technology-politics” (Protevi, 2013).

Assemblage lets us reimagine the state in several ways. First, the idea of an organic state, which is hierarchically ordered with well-defined boundaries and functions, is replaced by a heterogenous, contingent, ongoing, fragile but with a variable degree of coherent formation. Second, it is no longer possible to postulate an ontological distinction between nature and culture, because a wide range of non-humans, both natural and artificial, perform agency in the ongoing formation of state. Third, the fact that an assemblage is an emergent whole generated through the interaction of its component pieces doesn’t imply that it can be reduced into those parts. Assemblage has agency over its constituents once it is assembled (DeLanda, 2006, p. 34). Therefore, the assembling state is an actual entity with actual effects. Fourth, the assemblage’s flat ontology displaces the reified spatial and scalar image of the state. It rejects centralizing essentialism in both the up-down vertical imaginary and the radiating (out from here) spatiality of horizontality (Marston, Jones III, & Woodward, 2005, p. 422).

State theory is built upon scalar thought, the traditional Euclidian, Cartesian, and Westphalian notions of a geographical scale as a fixed, bounded, self-enclosed, and pre-given container. However, scales are contingent effects of various networking practices rather than preexisting frames of action, or structural frameworks in which processes may operate. Discursive and material scalar apparatuses strive to transform scales into striped, stratified, hierarchical, ahistorical frames with defined relationships, functions, and limits (Isin, 2007; Legg, 2009). ANT’s alternative notion of scale refers to bigger or smaller networks, not levels, spheres, or layers. Scalar thought presumes a top-down or bottom-up order, as if a society truly had a top or a bottom (Latour, 1996, pp. 371-372). Being wider or larger in level or size is not what separates the macro from the micro, the global from the national, or the national from the regional. Rather, it is to have a greater number of connections. The purpose of social theory is to explain how particular networks and interactions consolidate in the face of overwhelming opposition, create institutional patterns, and become macrosocial entities (Law, 1992). How do people act as though they are one person? How does a micro actor evolve to become a macro actor? It is a translation procedure that necessitates employing non-human agents. While building social networks, people cannot rely on symbolic relations. They need to use more “durable” materials (Callon & Latour, 1981, p. 284). Consider Benedict Anderson’s concept of an “imagined community” for the nation. It is a social construction built on

imagined bonds through print-capitalism and print-languages that provide a unified field for communicative exchanges (Anderson, 1991, pp. 44-45). However, it is impossible to imagine the formation and survival of a nation or a nation-state without the hard work of “innumerable nonhuman agents such as print machines, newspapers, telephone and railroad lines, roads, coastal steamers, geological surveys, post offices, national museums, stamps, maps, trigonometric points, border fences, and custom points” (Olsen, 2010, pp. 140-141). There are two ways to understand the materiality of the state and its materialization process in this study: paperwork and infrastructures.

Paperwork

People complain about the red tape of bureaucracy, the vast amount of paperwork for the most basic tasks, and the time wasted running about between departments and civil servants. To begin, draft and sign a petition in the relevant form. It must be submitted with additional supporting documents. Locate the officer on-site and ensure that your petition is stamped and recorded. It is not uncommon for a petitioner to be refused due to misspellings or a lack of documentation. According to Weber, modern state offices rely on the performance of civil servants and the circulation of written documents (Weber, 1978, p. 219). He lowers the latter to a passive means of bureaucratic organization built around norms and regulations. Weber regards Bakunin’s anarchism as naive for believing that by destroying archives, the obligations that subjugate people may be eliminated. Because it is the established rules and regulations, irrespective of written documents, that keep the bureaucracy running (Weber, 1978, p. 988). But a modern bureaucracy would be impossible without agentic roles using a wide range of materials. The primary one of them is paper, whose usage and circulation have grown in the everyday operations of the state (Latour, 1986, p. 28).

The “archive-conscious paper state” emerged in the early modern period. Absolute monarchies adopted ecclesiastical scriptural and archival technologies to keep track of their subjects’ lives. There were monarchs who sat at a desk rather than riding a horse, surrounded by scribes rather than knights, who grappled with mounds of documents rather than adversaries, and who boasted of knowing everything that happened throughout their reign. Philip II, the King of Spain, was known as “the king of paper” among his subjects (Burke, 2008, p. 119). The state is more interested than ever in when, how, and with whom people do what. It results in an uninterrupted writing activity. The microphysics of power is at work in disciplinary writing. It comprises several smaller techniques such as taking notes, keeping records, fabricating files, and organizing facts into columns and tables (Foucault, 1995, pp. 189-190).

Bureaucratic writing is often seen as a tool of hierarchical mechanisms of authority and control. Written materials are just manifestations of formal organizations and interactions. However, there is a complex paper economy-politics. Increased file circulation and detailed documentation practices may not necessarily result in an enhancement of institutional control. Decisions made through a dossier may weaken managerial authority over staff by making it difficult to identify who is doing what (Hull, 2012, pp. 114-115). Furthermore, paperwork has a life of its own. It is not a simple job to draft and reproduce documents. Despite the printing revolution, modern office clerks, like medieval monks, remained to

craft and reproduce documents using feathers extracted from geese, inks derived from gall nuts, and surfaces made of dirty rags and animal skins. It required a long, laborious, and error-prone procedure to transform these basic materials into documents, archives, and power. Important reports and critical notifications could be ruined by broken quills and spilled ink. Many faults in the document fabrication were rectified, but not totally eradicated, with the invention of wood-based paper, synthetic inks, and metal nibs in the nineteenth century. Pen nibs break and ink smears. Handwriting is distorted. Even if the writing on the paper was clear, the document could arrive late or not at all. Despite the challenges, paperwork became a technology of political representation. The claimant must gather documents supporting his claim, submit it to the appropriate government agency with the letterhead and signed petition, and wait for a response. He cannot rely on personal ties with those in power. A universe of rights replaces the world of privileges (Kafka, 2012).

The quantity, density, and speed with which paperwork circulates contribute to the internal consistency of heterogeneous state assemblage. Paper is more than just a substance that represents “outside” reality (Asdal, 2015). It is an actant in the production of facts, as well as in the processing and modification of reality. Localities may be recorded and conveyed to a distant center of power thanks to the material composition of paper and technologies that embody this composition in paper form. While traditional institutional histories emphasize human decisions and action, it’s difficult to think of a laboratory, government office, judiciary, ministry, or parliament without the plethora of paperwork performed using papers and files. Many non-human agents have a part in the formation of a scientific discovery, administrative decision, litigation, policy, or legislation (Latour, 1987). Take a post office and the national postal system, which are vital to the flow of information in the modern state. The extensive postal network ensures the state’s internal stability. Its operation, beginning with the mailbox, require the mediation of a plethora of things: staples, stamps, inks, envelopes, papers, forms, furniture, sorting and transport systems, maps, street names, and home numbers (Joyce, 2013).

Bruno Latour traced files through the halls of France’s highest court, the Conseil d’Etat. How do you make a case file that is ready to use? Each case in France is wrapped in a cardboard file held together by elastic bands (Latour, 2010b, p. 71). Stamps, rubber, paper clips, and other office items are crucial in court. The complaint, which is accompanied by a fax or a petition, is converted into a file that grows with the evidence, expert reports, notes, and receipts before being presented to the judge. Papers and files circulate through departments, hierarchies, and floors. As a result, preparing the bulky file for court is a difficult and thorough procedure mediated by numerous types of materials. Similarly, Jason Dittmer analyzed the agency of paper, documentation, and archiving procedures in the long history of the British Foreign Office. For the first time, foreign affairs were understood as distinct from other aspects of statecraft. They should be performed by a specialized office. The formation of a foreign office as a specific apparatus within the general state assemblage would be unthinkable without material practices and materials. Paper as a diplomatic material affects the foreign policy choices and the daily functioning of diplomacy. Problems such as the location and physical characteristics of the building where foreign affairs are conducted, increased paperwork, paper usage, and archival

storage all play an important role in this process. It results in novel architectural solutions that improve efficiency (Dittmer, 2017).

A typewriter, keyboard, or photocopier can be used in place of handwriting. Records may be adapted to electronic media, and documents in dusty archives can be backed up on hard drives. The state machine in government offices may evolve with new components to perform more quickly and effectively. The frightening and disappointing atmosphere of government offices, such as in Turkey, can leave lasting impressions in the memory of citizens who experience it over time. It can be handled and escalated by neoliberal reformers' and new public managers' rhetoric, leading to dramatic administrative and technological adjustments. Turkey has made steps toward digitalizing public administration in a way that is uncommon worldwide. Most public services are now available through a single website called "e-devlet kapısı" (e-Government Gateway). It evokes the Sublime Porte, the historic Ottoman government complex that gained the title from its big and majestic gate that is still physically present today in Istanbul. Citizens who log in to the website via their usernames and passwords issued by PTT (state-owned Post and Telegraph Agency) can download barcoded samples of official papers, which they previously had to physically request from different agencies to their own personal computers in pdf format 24 hours a day/seven days a week (24/7). Of course, it comes with its own set of risks. The network may malfunction, and a citizens' personal information could be leaked. That is exactly what happened. People are nonetheless glad to be partially rid of grumpy personnel who said go now and return tomorrow, the gloomy atmosphere of government offices, the never-ending queues, and the money paid for each copy of official documents. However, paperwork remains, with transactions being physically printed on paper, filed, and archived. People will be obliged to visit government offices to get a sense of place. Larger and more gorgeous public buildings will continue to be built.

Material Infrastructures

When we leave government offices, we are still in a built environment. This physical setting, which surrounds daily living, is outfitted with a wide range of infrastructures. People are subjected to governmental effects in their daily lives through means other than discourse and ideology. The built environment and physical infrastructures facilitate the ongoing activities of daily life. However, unlike documents that display clear signs of the state, the relationship between these infrastructures and the state is far more oblique. The state has its most concrete and naturalized existence in the infrastructural form. Infrastructures are thought of as basic tools employed by the state to extend its jurisdiction. But these are "intermediators" who actively participate in the formation of states, not merely mediators who allow us to imagine the state.

Infrastructures are social-material assemblages that mobilize resources such as labor, capital, materials, science, and technology in their construction and maintenance. Modern infrastructures are defined by the fact that they are designed to be hidden behind other structures (Star & Ruhleder, 1996). It is a "black box" effect that conceals the underlying social, economic, political, and material relations. Infrastructures appear to be resilient, reliable, and uncontested technical systems of rational planning. Nonetheless, the idea of "infrastructural inversion" reveals hidden connections among people, things, institutions, development ideologies, authorities, and inequalities (Bowker & Star, 1999).

It is a modern phenomenon that brings together engineering, technology, political will, and economic ambition to build standardized infrastructures that integrate nation-states (Harvey & Knox, 2012). Chandra Mukerji's studies of seventeenth-century France give insight on the overlooked importance of material infrastructures and engineering practices in the rise of modern states. The impersonal, centralized, and territorial state, according to Mukerji, is neither the result of centralization in which the means of violence are monopolized in accordance with a rational-legal authority nor a necessary social development. It is more about the specific arrangement of things, the mobilization of nature, and the transformation of the landscape. The work of ordering things, however, is not a linguistic classification of the natural world in the Foucauldian sense, but rather a material achievement performed in the field via engineering practices (Mukerji, 1997, p. 324). France becomes a territorial state not only in people's minds or on a map, but physically in the landscape with fortifications that secure borders, roads and bridges that connect cities and villages and enable rapid deployment of troops, canals and waterways that allow the navy to navigate between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean without crossing the Strait of Gibraltar. It emerges as an "unintended state" from the improvisation techniques of ordinary actors (Mukerji, 2010b). The logistical power, which allows it to transform the landscape and mobilize nature, is responsible for its legitimacy and impersonal administration (Mukerji, 2003, 2010a).

The infrastructural state evolved in the nineteenth century. Infrastructures, with their physical forms, material compositions, and technological mechanisms, enabled the power to control and direct the circulation of vital substances, as well as people and manufactured goods. Land, people, and the built environment were materially incorporated into governmental processes through scientific-engineering practices (Carroll, 2006). New measuring, calculating, planning, mapping, and engineering practices emerged into infrastructure design, construction, and maintenance, as did a new style of administration founded on centralized knowledge and expertise (Guldi, 2012). State-planned and funded infrastructures have become a common aspect of daily life.

Infrastructures, according to Foucault-inspired scholars, are governmental technologies utilized by liberal governance. They were material conditions of the liberal milieu that allow for the free movement of people and things, particularly in metropolitan areas. Sewers, water pipes, and electrical wires that pierced and connected their residences and were a daily component of their private affairs were far easier and more reliable to govern people's conduct than census takers, teachers, physicians, and military officers (Gandy, 1999; Joyce, 2003; Otter, 2002). Liberal forces were less sensitive at urban peripheries, rural and colonial frontiers. Infrastructures were the authoritative and disciplinary tools used on deprived bodies of urban workers, just as they were the technologies of dominance over land and people as exploitable resources in the colonial world (Prakash, 1999, p. 161). They instilled disgust for the "other," promoting stereotypes of colonial peoples' uncivilized and polluting bodies.

The uneven infrastructures inherited by colonial rulers constituted the material foundation of the post-colonial emergent nations, that furthered development understanding. Large technical systems were emblematic infrastructures of the Cold War-era transnational technopolitics.² Rival superpowers sought to expand their influence in

emergent nations by providing technical and financial assistance. The United States Bureau of Reclamation, for example, was a geopolitical agent within technopolitical networks, seeking to spread the Tennessee Valley Authority's multipurpose project of developing an entire river system as a universalized model of river basin development, including high dams, irrigation canals, flood control systems, and hydropower plants (Sneddon & Fox, 2011). These were outstanding in the scale in which they changed resource allocation over space and time, among entire populations, and ecosystems. They promised more than agricultural prosperity or technological improvement for postcolonial governments. It was the ability to engineer the natural and social environment that best represented a modern state's strength as a techno-economic power (Mitchell, 2002, p. 21).

Any modernization, whether in the West, the communist world, or the Third World, produced infrastructured rural landscapes, an engineered socio-natural environment. Increasingly complex and interconnected infrastructures actualized the networked physicality of the modern state, both domestically and in wider geopolitical relations. Ottoman-Turkish modernization was an early example of modern infrastructures utilized as a concrete way to civilization and development in a non-Western context. It was the contentious history of an emergent state concerned with the well-being of its population and the extension of its actuality in socio-natural localities. The Ottoman Empire integrated into the expanding techno-political networks of the nineteenth century. The imperial realm was physically reshaped, and not limited to the built environment of the capital and large port cities. Railways, *chaussee* roads, and telegraph lines crisscrossed the rural landscape. It was equipped with ports, coal depots, and quarantine stations. The reclaimed rivers and lakes became navigable. The drained swamps provided new agricultural fields. Irrigation canals transformed the plains into fertile agricultural basins (Akpınar, 2021; Barak, 2020; Bolaños, 2022; Gratien, 2022; Low, 2020; Petriat, 2014). It represented the "will to improve" conditions of the population deemed in need of improvement, typical of developmental state bureaucracies (Li, 2007). They were a key aspect of social and political engineering (Dalakoglou, 2017, p. 162) that made the social world legible to the state in a constant and coercive manner (Scott, 1998). However, it was not only imperial bureaucrats and experts, but also foreigners, local actors, the press, and the public that played a role in the infrastructural expansion. As a result, people were frequently engaged in actual political struggles that brought the infrastructural connection into existence. It embodied the people's desire for development if achieved; otherwise, it would lead them to believe they were ostracized (Harvey, 2018, p. 98).

This is exactly what happened when it came to building a well-connected transportation network throughout Türkiye. It was one of the major challenges of the modernizing state's expanding territorial integrity, and its changing relation to distant localities and the natural environment. The notion of roads as the "blood vessels" of a nation and an essential way to achieve political integrity and economic development in the country dates to the nineteenth century. The state gradually organized for roads. A Western-style organization was established, laws were issued, foreign experts were invited in, and schools were opened for training engineers and public officers. Road construction plans for the entire country were drafted, as were technical standards and maps. It was to construct roads appropriate for horse-drawn carriages (Tekeli & İlkin, 2004). Despite

the railways constructed by European capital, the state had to rely on road taxes and forced labor for road construction. Many plans remained incomplete owing to insufficient engineering, skilled work, and funding.

During the Great War, officers experienced the absence of well-paved roads that granted the circulation of troops and supplies (Aydemir, 1987). In the early Republic period, the single-party government prioritized the expansion of the railway network above highways. Most of the population was isolated in villages, lacking access to roads and markets. Following WWII and the multi-party system, the infrastructural development of the Anatolian rural landscape defined Turkish politics. The construction of highways connecting Anatolia's remote villages and towns to the rest of the nation and world markets was a political matter agreed upon by landowners, middle peasants, townspeople, politicians competing for power, foreign experts, and American geopolitical interests. America provided knowledge, expertise, methods, and technology (Adalet, 2018). The state was reorganized by founding a self-governing agency, the General Directorate of Highways specialized in road construction and maintenance, similar to the US Bureau of Public Roads. Scientific research methods, computer-based calculations, and mechanized earth-moving and construction machines transformed road building from labor-intensive to a technically and technologically complex operation. The few macadam roads were first replaced by more extensive stabilized roads. Asphalt was gradually utilized to pave road surfaces. This method was meant to connect as many places as possible to the road (Hilts, 1948). The roads were curvy, narrow, bumpy, and dirty. They were neither speedy nor safe. Nonetheless, the road to a village was unlike the state's authoritative and disciplinary face of gendarmes, census takers, tax collectors, physicians, and teachers. It was a promise of redemption for villages decimated by poverty and disease. It proclaimed and carried new opportunities, such as health, education, drinking water, electricity, radio, newspapers, food, coffee, household items, coats, shirts, and shoes (Tütengil, 1961). Villagers were now beneficiaries of public services in exchange for votes, rather than forced labor in road building far from their homes and fields, hungry and thirsty, and using rudimentary equipment such as pickaxes and shovels. Just as the state generated speed, movement, and connectivity on highways, it also created citizens as *desiring-subjects* for development and a more prosperous future. Today, the state and Turkish politics continues to materialize in the growth of material possibilities deemed as satisfying ordinary people's development desires through the construction of increasingly complex, growing, and costly infrastructure technologies free of the roughness of the socio-natural environment such as well-paved double and divided highways that traverse deep valleys and high mountains with viaducts and tunnels and are equipped with the highest and longest suspension bridges.

Infrastructures that once embodied the state's power and will to engineer individual and collective subjectivities may succumb to apathy and decay when modifications occur to the assembling constituents or introduction of new governmental rationalities, technologies, and materials. It affects both the way the state treats its citizens, and the way citizens conduct themselves and what they predict of the state. The state may disregard the internal disparity in infrastructure quality and uneven access. It reveals the state's leaky dominance (Anand, 2015). As an example, the neoliberal rationality employs new

specialties, which include calculating techniques, audit systems, and electronic devices to regulate public expenditure on infrastructures vital to citizens. Stephen Collier traces the Soviet social modernization and neoliberal reforms following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the small industrial city of Belaya Kalitva in southern Russia through mundane elements such as pipes, wires, apartment blocks, bureaucratic routines, and social norms assembling the city's collective life. The city, built around an industrial facility, was connected to the factory and to national networks not just by labor ties but also by vital infrastructures, particularly a central heating system. There were no valves and meters to measure individual consumption and "effective demand". This material setup ensured the city's vitality. It also constrained the drive for neoliberal restructuring and marketization. This restructuring led to a cut in the government funding that was necessary to maintain the central heating system which caused the city to decline (Collier, 2011).

Prepaid water meters which force people to pay in advance for a particular quantity of water in post-apartheid South Africa revealed technopolitical aspects of applied technology, such as disputes over citizenship, marketization of public services, and racial and class issues. Prepaid meters led to the emergence of a new sort of "calculated citizenship" in which access to basic public services were based on one's capacity to pay, reducing the state's responsibility to that of a technocratic service provider. It reinforced the patterns of inequality and exclusion by making it harder for low-income households to access reliable water sources (Von Schnitzler, 2016). Water leaks or the illegal use of electricity that was not calculated by the neoliberal audit systems might serve as the basis of an informal relation between the state and citizens. The leaky operation of an infrastructure that defies rational planning and assessment, or apathy and complicity of authorities for this malfunction can assure population governance without producing greater social problems. Alternatively, as mentioned above in Turkiye, costly turnpike highways constructed by public-private partnerships established the state-citizen relation as an all-powerful patron-state backed by market forces and desiring-customers, rather than the state's so-called neoliberal withdrawal.

Conclusion

People may oppose policies or wish to reduce government, but they all expect the government to get work done quickly or upkeep the infrastructures that makes their lives simpler. Even if they dislike what they perceive as the state system, they desire the benefits it delivers, feed it with fresh demands, and fight for them. This paper rethinks the state as an ever-changing assemblage of people and materials rather than a source of power or a totalizing system that, either mentally or physically, encloses all bodies, souls, minds, or positions in an insurmountable iron cage of rational bureaucratic organization. No questions are asked in this paper on what the state is, its origin, who controls it, whose interests it represents, the foundation of its legitimacy, its head, arms, and legs. That approach seems to disintegrate the reality of the state into a formless entity with no coherence. It is somewhat correct because it disregards any a priori existence or consistency attributed to the state. However, it shouldn't lead to a conclusion that negates the state's actuality and renders it into a discursive, ideological, or symbolic fiction. The state occurs not just in the socio-cultural domain, but also in the realms

of paperwork and material infrastructures, where nature and culture, human and non-human, discursive and non-discursive are entangled. Assemblage and ANT offer an ontologically and methodologically more-than-human perspective on state formation. The scale and boundary concerns that have long plagued state theory disappear when the state is considered as a heterogeneous, contingent, and emergent outcome of assembling discursive and non-discursive constituents.

The state is powerful because of its multi-sited, material, and technical assemblage. Its fragile networked assemblage can maintain a certain consistency and function if only the requisite prices for materials are paid. First, documents flowing between floors of a single government office or among agencies geographically dispersed across the whole country give the state the appearance of a tightly woven network just by virtue of their physical form and movement, regardless of the instructions and information they consist of. They might act as vectors for further modifications to the state in which they appear to offer durability, as in the situation of the Turkish government's distinctive digitalization. So, what happens to the apparently all-encompassing state image and the localities it frames as recognizable scales when all public services are digitized, and paperwork disappears? I think the application of the Presidency's Communication Center (CIMER) offers a partial answer. It might, however, be a subject of further study.

Second, statecraft, first and foremost, is to draw a striated space wherein material-energy flows might be caught, governed, and exploited. Infrastructures appear to be effective instruments for the state's extensive power in *enframing* the socio-natural environment. Infrastructures are more than just a conduit for state authority; they are actants in interactions between the state and citizens. Infrastructures that make daily life easier or more difficult have a huge influence on people's perceptions of the state. They may fail to deliver on their promises, causing more issues than they were intended to eliminate, even creating new inequalities. People remain affectively committed to infrastructures despite their uneven development, loss of function and meaning, and failures. As a result, understanding the reality of the state that surrounds us fails without the materiality of matter, whether in the form of paper or large-scale infrastructures. These things are abundant in our surroundings. They empower the state to encompass us and relate our bodies and desires to itself while our conscious is asleep.

- 1 Poulantzas abandons structuralism in favor of a relational concept of the state. He questions the idea of the state as both a tool and a subject. The state is a social relation. It is the materialization of power relations between classes and class fractions. Poulantzas makes several references to Foucault (Poulantzas, 2000, p. 128). Jessop introduces the "strategic-relational approach" (Jessop, 2008). See also for Marxist debates on the state (Barrow, 1993; Jessop, 1982).
- 2 Technopolitics is a way of organizing an assemblage of human and nonhumans, things, and ideas in such a manner that human intentions and plans appear to dominate, govern, and regulate the nonhuman world. It is, nevertheless, a technical body in which intentional and human are always vanquished by unforeseeable human and nonhuman interactions (Mitchell, 2002, pp. 42-43).

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Re-Conceptualization of Political Trust in Relation to Justice

Adaletle İlişkili Olarak Siyasal Güvenin Yeniden Kavramsallaştırılması

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Abstract

This study seeks to contribute to the conceptualization of political trust by uncovering its moral and affective dimensions, particularly its relationship with justice. In the current atmosphere of politics, political trust becomes a complex concept, especially in the face of injustices. Despite extensive discussions on trust and justice in the literature, the interplay between them within the political context remains underexplored. While analytic philosophy delves into a multifaceted exploration of trust, political science often limits its perspective to a performance evaluation grounded in rational calculations and interests. The deficiency in analytic philosophy lies in its failure to adequately address the socio-political dimension of trust, as it adopts a predominantly individualistic viewpoint that neglects politically significant aspects, including justice. The prevailing trend in political science tends to downplay the affective and moral facets of trust. This study endeavours to bridge this gap by re-evaluating our approach to political trust, emphasizing its importance and exploring its determinants, particularly in connection to justice. The argument posits that, in addition to and beyond rational evaluations in politics, a comprehensive understanding of political trust and its relationship to justice necessitates an examination of the affective and moral components, underlying perceptions of trust and justice in real political and social contexts.

Keywords: Trust, Political trust, Justice, Moral emotions

Öz

Bu çalışma, siyasal güvenin özellikle adaletle ilişkili olan ahlaki ve duygusal boyutlarını ortaya çıkararak siyasal güvenin kavramsallaştırılmasına katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Mevcut siyasi atmosferin oluşturduğu adaletsizlikler karşısında siyasal güven karmaşık bir kavram haline gelmiştir. Literatürde güven ve adalet üzerine yapılan geniş tartışmalara rağmen, bunların siyasi bağlamdaki etkileşimi üzerinde henüz yeterli çalışma bulunmamaktadır. Analitik felsefe, güven konusu çok boyutlu olarak incelemekte, ancak siyaset bilimi genellikle perspektifini rasyonel hesaplamalara ve çıkarılara dayalı bir performans değerlendirmesine sınırlamaktadır. Analitik felsefenin eksikliği, özellikle adalet dahil olmak üzere politik açıdan önemli yönleri ihmal eden, bireyci bir bakış açısı benimsemesi nedeniyle siyasal güvenin sosyo-politik boyutuna yeterince odaklanmamasında yatar. Öte yandan, siyaset bilimindeki yaygın eğilim, güvenin duygusal ve ahlaki yönlerini göz ardı etmektedir. Bu çalışma, siyasal güvene yaklaşımımızı, önemini ve adalet açısından belirleyici faktörlerini yeniden değerlendirerek bu boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlamaktadır. Siyasette rasyonel değerlendirmelerin yanı sıra, güven ve adalet algılarının duygusal ve ahlaki bileşenleri üzerinden değerlendirilmesinin, siyasal güveni ve onun adaletle olan ilişkisini gerçek siyasi ve sosyal koşulları anlamak açısından önemli olduğu savunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güven, Siyasal güven, Adalet, Ahlaki duygular

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Introduction

Trust has been a subject of study in various academic fields, ranging from sociology to philosophy, psychology to politics. Consequently, there exist diverse definitions without complete agreement, but each approach contributes to understanding the characteristics of the concept. The central question revolves around the sources of trust: whom do we trust, with what motivations, who is trustworthy, and how do we decide or feel it? Trust can be rooted in rational evaluations based on information and past experiences, assumed to support reciprocal interests (Dasgupta, 1988; Gambetta, 1988; Luhmann, 1988; Coleman, 1999; Hardin, 2001, 2002). Alternatively, trust may be based on emotions and moral values, such as sharing values, goodwill, and caring for others (Baier, 1986; Jones, 1996, 1999, 2019; Lahno, 2001; Uslaner, 2002, 2004; Barbalet, 2006), or it can be seen as a virtue, a desirable aspect of character (Flores & Solomon, 1998; Potter, 2002). Various conceptualizations of trust unveil crucial dimensions; therefore, it is a blend of these elements with the presence of complexity of when and why an element precedes others in particular circumstances. However, the crucial oversight in all approaches lies in how our trust in others, whether in interpersonal, social, or political realms, is intricately linked to our perception of justice—a moral ingredient essential to trust relations. Trust appears as a reflection of expectations which includes moral judgements about the other's fairness or rightness.

Despite a broad philosophical study on theorization of trust, theorization on political trust has remained narrow in terms of its determinants. The research on political trust is still dominated by the rational choice approach, focusing on its interest-seeking aspect. It is plausible to claim that a person is inclined to trust the government more when its performance is demonstrated to be satisfactory. The positive correlation observed between the factors associated with good governance and political trust substantiates this claim. While this perspective also accounts for the institutional requisites of political justice, it oversimplifies the intricate nature of political trust, which encompasses far more complex constituents and implications. When making moral judgments about a political issue or leader, our tendency to trust or distrust is intricately connected to our sense of justice. To gain a more nuanced understanding of political trust, it is essential to consider justice as a crucial variable, along with its moral and affective dimensions. Additionally, other features of trust, such as solidarity, care, and empathy, become more significant in this context, in relation to justice. Moreover, the prevailing approach unintentionally neglects the profound significance of political trust, which underpins the very foundations of society and politics, extending beyond the evaluation of state officials' performance. In spite of the necessity and inevitability of a conceptual distinction between political and social trust, it is valuable to acknowledge their interconnected nature, illustrating how political trust is intertwined with individual and social spheres.

This study aims to outline the fundamental components of political trust and its connection to justice, challenging the predominant approach to political trust and enriching it by incorporating the dimension of justice. The first section introduces three basic approaches to trust in reference to the studies in analytical philosophy which mostly discuss trust at the interpersonal level, namely, the rational choice, the emotion-based, and the virtue approaches. The second section critically examines the limitations of the

mainstream approach, specifically the rational choice theory, in political trust research. It proposes a broader approach to political trust that considers the plural and intricate nature of rationality, and the intersectionality of morality and politics to elucidate how political trust takes form and is influenced by moral and affective judgments. In light of the re-conceptualization of political trust, the last section delves into the relationship between political trust and justice, exploring the shared affective and non-affective dimensions in both concepts—all of which contribute to strengthening the connection between trust and justice.

The Approaches to Trust

The Rational Choice Approach

The rational choice approach defines trust as a rationally assessed belief or decision, cognitively made in accordance with self-interests and based on information and/or past experiences with trustee. A trust relationship can exist as much and as long as it serves for the interests of both parties, which imposes an obligation to the parties to respond to trust back in a trustworthy manner. Echoing the social contract view, the account suggests that when it is acknowledged by all parties that the betrayal of trust is not in anyone's interest, the trust relationship can sustain itself. In that vein, Gambetta (1988), for instance, defines trust as a basis for cooperation, and argues that people are more likely to opt for building a trust relationship even if it is risky for maximizing self-interests because the cost of damaging the cooperation is regarded as higher. Luhmann (1988), similarly touches upon trust's helping to solve problems of risks in the face of complexities of the modern world. For him, the "unmanageable complexity" of the modern world has led people to rely on strategies rather than emotions in deciding whether to trust or not. Familiarities, at this point, work as facilitators for reducing the possible risks of uncertainty comes along with trusting. Information, brought by familiarity, therefore, plays a crucial role in determining trust.

Indeed, in addition to its emphasis on cooperative and information-based characteristics of trust, the vital principle of the rational choice approach is its equating rationality with utility maximization. The mainstream rational choice theorist, James S. Coleman (1990), defines the parties of a trust relationship as "purposive, having the aim of satisfying their interests" (p. 96). Trust can be built when both parties make rational calculations of potential gains and losses, and are willing to maintain their relationship. From a utilitarian perspective, Russell Hardin, who is one of the most referred theorists in trust studies, defines trust as a rational assessment, which he calls "encapsulated interest view" that "my trust of you is encapsulated in your interest in fulfilling the trust" when there is "an incentive grounded in the value of maintaining the relationship into the future" (Hardin, 2001, p. 3). Therefore, for him, trust is possible when a trustor makes a rational calculation whether trustworthiness of the trustee is in accordance with his/her self-interests. Moreover, Hardin, limits the domain of trust, defining it as a three-part relationship: "A trust B to do X" (Hardin, 2002, p. 9). For instance, a doctor can be trusted in his/her expertise but not in his/her friend-relationships. Thus, he is sceptical whether people tend to trust others in the specific contexts about that their information lacks.

In a hypothetical case, for Hardin, for example, a shopkeeper does not choose to sell bad food to avoid losing customers (e.g. not to ruin his/her reputation in the neighbourhood or to not be punished by the authorities). His/her motivation to be trustworthy is then associated to his/her self-interests. On the other hand, what the rational choice approach might miss is that, his/her trustworthiness is also dependent on the just rules of the relationship between the shopkeeper and customers set up legally and socially. For instance, if there is no legal regulation on selling bad food or any social norm that makes it not worthy to maintain a trustful and just relationship between the shopkeeper and customers (e.g. tourists are deceived in the marketplace mostly because they are not regular customers who can ruin the shops' reputation), it would be not in the interest of the shopkeeper to be trustworthy. The important point which is overlooked in the rational choice approach is that even if a trust relationship serves for the interests of the parties, the relationship needs to be grounded on a just one. If deceiving a customer does not lead to any legal punishment or social condemnation, it would become a matter of injustice, as well as damaging trust relationships. While the establishment of justice in the relationship between the shopkeeper and customers does not guarantee a trustful condition, a just order is a prerequisite for meeting their reciprocal self-interests. Consequently, this sets the foundation for the flourishing of a trust relationship.

Emotion-Based Trust

The alternative approaches to the rational choice theorization of trust are various but it would be plausible to categorize them under the title of trust as an emotion because their main distinctive theorization commonly lies in the argument that people are more likely to rely on their emotions in trusting when information about the possible trustee is absent and/or the trustor deliberately chooses not to rely on the existent information. The view does not regard emotions as non-cognitive, irrational or unreasonable but as a kind of pattern to perceive the world and oneself, and is a sort of insight that the evidence partially exists (Jones, 1996; Lahno, 2001; Barbalet, 2006). In a similar way to the Aristotelian understanding, emotions function to shape our conscious life by guiding us to perceive and judge the world in a certain way (Lahno, 2001).

Underlining its cooperative function, Lahno (2001) approaches trust as displaying an emotional attitude towards others so as to deal with the uncertainties of the world where familiarity among them is not present. Unlike Luhmann, Lahno (2001) argues that the complexities of the world are so unmanageable that it makes it harder to make rational or strategic calculations in trusting; therefore, people tend to trust based on their emotions. These emotions are fed by sharing common values and goals; however, in a trust relationship, parties need to treat each other as persons with dignity, acknowledging and respecting their personal values, goals and capability to choose actions.

In a similar line, trust is also defined as reliance of the good will of the others by Baier, suggesting that "Where one depends on another's good will, one is necessarily vulnerable to the limits of that good will. One leaves others an opportunity to harm one when one trusts, and also shows one's confidence that they will not take it" (1986, p. 235). Two arguments arise out from the definition; firstly, trusting makes the trustor open him/herself to the other by recognizing the possibility of harm, but secondly, with the

confidence that the trustee will pass the possibility of harm, and act with a good will. On the other hand, the trustee acknowledges his/her responsibility to look after or care for the trustor because the trustor trusts the discretionary power of the trustee (Baier, 1986). Both trustor and trustee share a common understanding that they care for what each other cares. This relationship between trustor and trustee reveals the need for concern for others rather than mere personal interests.

A contemporary philosopher in trust studies, Karen Jones, has developed the argument, describing trust as an affective attitude where the trustor has an attitude of optimism that the trustee is competent and responsive to his/her dependency in the domain of the trust relationship (Jones, 2019). This optimism is not a general outlook but specific to the domain of trust and about the good will and competency of the other. The determinants of competence might be technical, such as professionalism and expertise; but they may also have moral or virtuous characteristics, such as kindness, loyalty or compassion (Jones, 1999). In critique to the rational choice approach, Jones (1996) also argues that trust is not a belief and cannot be willed due to the fact that it is mostly resistant to information or evidence; rather, trusting is the attitude of optimism itself and emotionally motivated which determines a distinctive personal insight.

Referring to the above example of the shopkeeper, the emotion-based approach would suggest that trusting by the customer is possible not solely due to the shopkeeper's self-interest in avoiding selling bad food but also a display of his/her responsibility to care about and concern for the customer's wellbeing. Care and concern here is necessary to show that the shopkeeper is committed to upholding trust even if it goes against his/her own interests. While the shopkeeper's self-interest aligns with his/her trustworthiness, it is not sufficient for earning trust; being trustworthy also demands a moral motivation. If trust arises out of some particular emotions, as the account argues, then some of these emotions could be moral ones. Although the account does not provide a comprehensive explanation of these moral dimensions of trust, one of them is justice. Trust is also a reflection of expectations which includes moral judgements about the other's fairness or rightness. The emphasis on caring in trust relations also aligns with its connection to justice. The ethics of care, for instance, advocates for the moral obligation to address the specific needs of individuals, emphasizing the interconnectedness and interdependency among people, unlike the liberal idea that relies on an abstract view of individuals and rights for justice. The concept of care involves both caring for others and caring about others, necessitating the recognition of their needs, a willingness to assume moral responsibility for their well-being, and the aptitude to respond competently to their requirements (Tronto, 1994). Care, in this context, encompasses various practices, dispositions, or virtues aimed at maintaining and restoring individuals and their environments, contributing to the cultivation of a more just society. Therefore, care incorporates components of both justice and trust.

The Virtue Account

The virtue account agrees with the emotion-based approach in many senses but it approaches trust from the virtue ethics perspective. Potter (2002), for instance, describes the necessity of good will and caring for the other in trust relations as a disposition—displayed in a personal character that diffuses in many contexts. Therefore, trust is a

“prediction of being well-treated that is grounded in a belief that ... the other’s good will is part of a more general disposition that extends beyond the context of this particular relationship” (Potter, 2002, p. 5). Similarly, trustworthiness is “taking care of those things that others entrust to one and (following the Doctrine of the Mean) whose ways of caring are neither excessive nor deficient” (Potter, 2002, p. 16). As the virtue ethics suggests, the mean is desirable too because excess of trust can surpass the capabilities of a trustee, leading to inevitable disappointment on the part of the trustor due to overly high expectations. Alternatively, trust may impose excessive power on the trustee, increasing the risks of betrayal. On the other hand, a lack of trust or trustworthiness reflects a lack of moral concern for the others, resulting in annulling any kind of cooperation. Another feature of trust and trustworthiness is that they are both virtues because there is a circular relationship between them. According to Potter (2002), gaining trust necessitates possessing the virtue of trustworthiness. However, being trustworthy also requires being trusted. A person can develop a trustworthy character when entrusted with the care of certain values, as this is the only means through which they can demonstrate care and responsibility.

The main argument of the virtue account, departing from Jones (1996), is that trust can be willed because virtues require acting with choices, which entails engaging the will (Potter, 2002; Flores & Solomon, 1998). If trust could not be willed, then it would be impossible to cultivate it. Regarding cultivation of trust and trustworthiness in society, the account, moreover, underlines that even if they are individual dispositions, the formation of one’s character is, in part, influenced by social, political, and economic structures. The institutional and cultural framework of society, where power and privilege asymmetry endure, plays a crucial role in determining how responsibilities are distributed, how accountability of institutions is ensured, and how people are optimistic about the future. Therefore, trust and trustworthiness can flourish by all these means of society.

The virtue account is the only account among philosophical approaches to trust that is more convenient to search for the components of trust in political matters in relation to justice. This is firstly because it makes a reference to virtues’ socially constructed nature, affecting the formation of the dispositions for trust and trustworthiness. Potter (2002) interprets Aristotle in the way that the virtue of an individual is interconnected with the virtue of the state and its institutions. Thus, the structure of society plays a crucial role in either fostering or constraining individuals’ capacity for morality, as well as in bolstering or diminishing trust. Consequently, the just set up of a society brings out a trustful and trustworthy society. Moreover, the circular relationship between trust and trustworthiness that perpetuates each other pushes people to develop sensitivity against injustices. Regarding the unwarranted distrust marginalized people face, for instance, Potter (2002) refers to the necessity of consistency with a conception of justice in deciding whom to trust. In a similar vein, secondly, in connection between virtues and justice, O’Neill (1996) suggests that the institutional acknowledgment of the principles of justice¹ alone does not guarantee the establishment of a completely just society. Virtues that influence our actions, attitudes, and emotions, imposing moral obligations, are necessary to bridge

1 O’Neill (1996) defines the universal principle of justice as rejection of injury while the inclusive principle of virtue is defined as rejection of indifference to and neglect of others.

the gap at the interpersonal, social, and institutional levels. Virtues such as care and concern, identified as integral to trust, contribute to the development of solidarity, while the virtue of trust itself fosters cooperation, participation, and engagement with others, thus constructing a trustworthy and just social framework.

Political Trust

Not all the philosophical approaches presented above directly describe political trust specifically but they all reveal important elements of trust in general which also connote to the political trust definition. In addition to these components of trust, political trust is commonly defined in terms of its object—towards politicians and political institutions, such as government, judiciary, parliament, bureaucracy and so forth, and its sources as based on the performance of these groups (Uslaner, 2018). Although it is necessary to make a distinction between types of trust in terms of their scope, such as interpersonal trust, social trust and political trust, it is also crucial to acknowledge the multifaced nature of trust in politics. It would be valuable to regard the scope of political trust as wide as the scope of the political because the political realm is effective in shaping interpersonal and social trust, too. For instance, research reveals that the dislike towards the rival parties' supporters, Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. has been intensified to a higher degree in the last ten years due to the dual design of politics as friends and enemies boosted by populist leaders (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2018), which also signals rising distrust between these two groups of partisans. Trust has also been polarized socially because of the growing negativity that partisans hold towards the opposing political party, which also leads to politically motivated reasoning in individual or social circumstances (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2018). This example exposes that distrust toward a political party due to the politics' boosting polarization has also led to distrust among the partisans at the social level. Although motivations behind to trust or distrust a political party differs from trusting or distrusting a person or a group of people, the realm of politics diffuses to the social realm. Nussbaum (2018) gives another example of the current rise of distrust among the U.S. citizens who are polarized along political lines, "My students don't trust anyone who voted for Trump, and they view such people as like a hostile force, "deplorables" at best, fascists at worst. Many Trump supporters return the compliment, seeing students and universities as subversive enemies of "real people" (pp. 7-8). Hence, even though the conceptualization of political trust regards the object of it as political leaders and institutions, its sources and spheres of influence are wider. Consequently, it is worthy to consider the intersectionality of the realms of trust in social and political areas in order to better grasp how political trust functions and what the underlying motivations are.

In terms of the sources of political trust, the mainstream approach addresses the performance evaluation of politicians and institutions based on information. According to Uslaner (2018), political trust seeks to assess how well the performance aligns with public expectations. The criteria used to measure it typically focus on whether individuals have confidence that political leaders and institutions operate within their designated roles. In spite of the complexity of this evaluation, the prominent approach to political trust embraces the rational choice approach that it is regarded as a strategic decision

by evaluating the actions or commitments of political leaders and institutions based on whether they serve for the benefits of the trustors. The performance evaluation is therefore also regarded as possible only when parties possess adequate information about or have past experiences with the trustee—politicians or institutions. Consequently, Hardin (1999) argues that two forms of political trust—trust in society and trust in the government—are unlikely to exist, as both society and government remain largely unknown to people. He interprets trust in society as arising from a Hobbesian understanding, where a government is needed to establish order in society, and citizens are obligated not to violate rules. On the other hand, trust in the government is seen as a Lockean concept, reflecting society's delegation of power to governors through a tacit trust for their own benefit and the protection of property (Hardin, 1999). Hardin emphasizes that the initial notion of the state providing order to foster citizen "trust" is not precisely trust in his terms but rather a form of fear that encourages individuals to "go along" with each other, yielding mutual benefits. The latter, according to Hardin, poses a challenge because trust cannot be implicitly established; it requires specific knowledge about the trustor. Therefore, citizens cannot trust the government since they lack sufficient knowledge about its institutions and officials. Hardin contends that citizens can only have confidence in governmental institutions based on their past activities, enhancing predictability through inductive expectations. Despite the fact that what people expect from the politics is supposed to go along with their self-interests, as the rational choice suggests; it is more challenging to understand the everyday politics from a merely self-utility maximization perspective.

Indeed, building trust, even in individual relationships, cannot rely solely on knowledge or self-interests. In politics as well, there are numerous instances where people act with a lack of information or ignorance of their self-interests. The essence of the rational choice perspective, in a general sense, lies in how social agents rationalize their judgments and align their actions with their interests. However, rationality at the individual level varies and does not always correspond to the rationality of the broader social and economic system. Although Hardin contextualizes trust with his three-party definition, providing a more practical and particularistic account, his theory falls short by not conceptualizing the context but reducing it to interest-seeking, resulting in an insufficient macro-level explanation for the social. Hardin's pessimism and skepticism about fostering trust among citizens and towards state institutions stem from this outlook, as he contends that it is not "rational" to trust citizens or state officials. Human action, however, occurs with different senses of rationality. The approach referred to as rational is the liberal and capitalist system, where individuals predominantly exhibit egoist moral tendencies with the goal of maximizing self-interests, and trust is seen as a means to navigate the complexities of society due to high interdependence in maintaining strategic relationships. Therefore, while Hardin argues that "The worst failing of contemporary political philosophy is its frequent irrelevance to actual and plausible conditions," (as cited in Gaus, 2018, p. 23), he, in fact, idealizes rationality by equating it with maximizing self-interests. Rationality, in this sense, may be an ideal for a liberal society and political system; however, the contemporary world is much more complex than this assertion suggests.

The idealized version of rationality, advocated by Hardin, does not always manifest itself in the political arena in the presence of several dynamics affecting political

trust sources. Cross-cultural research in political trust, for instance, reveal that some illiberal countries exhibit a higher level of political trust, as seen in China, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan, compared to their liberal counterparts (van der Meer, 2017). Another study examining generalized trust in Chinese society finds that there is not a positive correlation between institutional confidence (used in the sense of Hardin's terminology) and institutional performance despite the prevalence of "extensive corruption in Chinese political institutions" (Steinhardt, 2011, p. 11). Setting aside potential methodological flaws in the research, the fact that this finding challenges the argument that corruption weakens trust in the state (e.g., Rothstein, 2011) also poses a challenge to the rational choice approach. This challenge arises from the similar understanding of objective and universal rationality, which is mostly relevant in liberal societies and political systems. It does not imply that corruption is not a significant factor in weakening social and political trust—there are also numerous cases, particularly in Western democracies, where it erodes trust at both the societal and political levels. However, this counter-argument indicates that other variables impact political trust beyond mere rational performance evaluation. For instance, another study conducted in 13 Western European countries reveals that citizens with lower levels of education are less likely to view corruption in governmental institutions as a significant factor in diminishing trust in the government (Hakhverdian & Mayne, 2012). Considering that the majority of these studies are based on determinants used by the rational choice approach—such as performance evaluation based on past information and self-interests—the results highlight how the rationality of citizens differs contextually, for example, in terms of geography and education level, from what the approach itself endorses.

As an alternative to the classical understanding of the rational choice theory, the role of emotions in political assessment and behavior, in addition to or rather than self-utility maximization, is more recently discussed in the literature, challenging to some extent the modern liberal understanding that has traditionally emphasized reasoning, rationality, and objectivity over motives such as desires or passion. For example, emotions, such as anger, are recognized as significant motivators for political mobilization and collective action against injustices (Koçan & Öncü, 2014; Thompson, 2006). The substantial influence of emotions in politics underscores that rationality is multifaceted, and simplifying it to self-utility or interest does not align with actual circumstances. This complexity is also evident in the realm of trust in politics, especially when information is scarce or distorted. As discussed earlier, information is a key element of trust at both personal and political levels. While it may be an ideal criterion for deciding to trust, it may not always be readily available, or it could be deceptive and manipulated. The first case is relevant when considering trust in experts or policies that ordinary citizens may not comprehend. If a policy is not understandable, individuals lack the necessary information to trust or distrust. The latter circumstance often occurs in populist and/or authoritarian regimes, where media control makes it challenging to rely on circulating information. Even accepting this information as true may not lead the trustor to the warranted trust. Additionally, individuals may choose not to rely on the information altogether. In fact, as what the emotion-based and the virtue approaches suggest trust is linked to a specific perception of the trustee, contingent upon both the trustee's characteristics and the trustor's own viewpoint—how he/she interprets the context, the world at large, or the

trustee in particular. This dynamic is similarly evident in political behavior influenced by trust. Therefore, it is not surprising that research on trust in populist parties in Central Europe conducted by Hajdinjak (2022) indicates that in countries where a populist party holds undisputed power, such as Hungary and Poland, supporters of the party are more inclined to trust political institutions. The study reveals that this trust is influenced by ideological alignment with the party and the perception of governance as more democratic, producing favorable outcomes. This does not necessarily imply that the populist party is inherently trustworthy or the opposite; rather, the supporters' affinity toward it shapes their interpretation of its political institutions as trustworthy. Even when considering Hungary and Poland as among the more authoritarian regimes in Europe, the operation of trust as an emotion in this context does not necessarily imply its irrationality or negate reason. Instead, it highlights, alongside the manipulative nature of populism, how trust possesses an emotional character in actual political behavior.

Another crucial aspect to consider is the connection between emotions and morality, which the rational choice theory overlooks. If utility maximization is not the only moral motivation and emotions are effective in shaping political attitudes and action, the connection between emotions and morality matters in understanding how political trust operates, too. Emotions are often classified in diverse ways, one of which includes moral sentiments. Jasper (2008) places moral sentiments in a category that necessitates cognitive processing. These are intricate emotions that may initially manifest as reflexive anger, for instance, but as they persist, they transform into a blend of reflex and moral emotion, such as hate. Jasper (2008) rightly suggests that, unlike the Kantian deontological model, following a moral rule may stem from a moral sentiment, or at the very least, it motivates the right action. Engaging in morally correct behavior, for example, brings about feelings of pride, and adhering to this moral rule intersects with emotions like pride or satisfaction. These emotions are particularly influential when others are present to endorse the morally upright action, or when the actor is uncertain about what is morally right. Therefore, moral sentiments are inherently social; they are shaped by society, and they, in turn, influence the social fabric. Contemporary research in game theory, offering alternative variables to market exchange, indicates that "people are willing to pay a great deal to remedy perceived injustices" rather than solely maximizing personal gains. Individuals are more likely to opt for equal distribution to others due to their outrage against unfairness (Jasper, 2008, p. 166). This example aligns with the argument put forth by Koçan & Öncü (2014) regarding the motivation of Gezi protesters. They contend that evaluating the injustices faced by the initial demonstrators is a "moral shock or outrage" toward the police and the government and an affinity toward the demonstrators, leading to moral engagement of larger groups in the fight against injustices (p. 184). This perspective also resonates with the moralistic character of trust. As the emotion-based approach asserts, individuals believe that others will behave in a way they wish for themselves, irrespective of self-interests or past experiences, based on the assumption that people share the same moral values. The shopkeeper example presented above supports the argument that a customer is more likely to trust the shopkeeper if he/she believes that the shopkeeper cares about the wellness of the customer, mainly because he/she is one of the fellow members of the society who shares the same morals. This belief, moreover, can be rooted in affects. Jasper (2008) defines affects as "another type of emotion, more stable and

more tied to cognition,” such as love, hate, respect, and trust, providing something akin to basic values (pp. 162-163). While a positive affect arises from sharing the same values, fostering trust, hate with the belief of different morals can activate distrust. Furthermore, these affects, whether positive or negative, are more likely to motivate political action (Jasper, 2008). For instance, when the media and populist parties heighten the perception of security threats, people may become anxious or scared, leading to increased distrust toward the out-group. Erişen’s study (2018) which shows the affective polarization in Turkey along political lines is another example of how liking or disliking party leaders is both caused by and produces enthusiasm or anger, influencing other political decisions and voting behavior. The same study also unveils that individuals identifying with right-wing ideology are more likely to feel threatened by the Gezi protests while trusting the political institutions governed by the incumbent party (Erişen, 2018). It is reasonable to assume that the affection toward the protestors would correlate positively with distrust in political institutions in Turkey. Consequently, political action or stance tends to be shaped by moral judgments, influenced by both affective and non-affective components.

Political trust is, therefore, more complex than the rational choice theory formulates. Equation of rationality with utility maximization is to some extent a reductionist approach in exploring the sources of political trust. Hardin’s pessimism on political trust aligns with the approach; however, he poses a normative outlook to the politics and trust in line with the liberal understanding. The components of political trust, on the other hand, are various, including emotions and moral judgements in the presence or without solid information about the politics. The emotion-based approach is successful in explaining the sources of trust but the virtue account offers more in revealing the social dynamics and sphere of trust in relation to political trust. Being individual dispositions socially and politically constructed shows how sources and tendency of trust intersect at interpersonal, social and political levels, as how political polarization affects political and social trust at the same time.

Political Trust and Justice

Given the framework of political trust that encompasses individual and social aspects and is affected by emotional and non-emotional motivations, what is missing in the presented approaches is the interconnection of trust and justice in politics. Despite the implicit touches, neither the approaches to trust discussed in analytical philosophy nor empirical studies in political science regarding political trust have provided or pointed out a conceptualization of the relationship between trust and justice. However, our trust in others—whether on an interpersonal, social, or political level—is closely tied to our perception of justice. When moral judgments about a political issue or leader guide our decisions to trust or distrust, these judgments inherently involve our perception of justice. In trust relationships, individuals accept vulnerability with the expectation that others will act in their favor. This acting for the good of others inherently encompasses, or even revolves around, doing what is just. Trust can be established when this relationship is perceived as just. This is evident in why supporters of the Turkish government trust political institutions while Gezi protesters oppose the government, driven by their belief in the injustice of the situation. Similarly, the social polarization of citizens along political

lines, often seen in populist regimes, reflects people's judgments not only about politicians but also about each other's sense of justice. Political tension, whether characterized by high levels of trust or distrust, manifests among citizens who are more likely to view out-groups as untrustworthy and less likely to recognize the injustices they face. Thus, trust and justice are intricately intertwined, and the question of how we determine what is just aligns with the process of deciding to trust or not. In addition to the rational processes such as calculating risks, searching for solid information, and the like, both trust and justice share a critical component: their connection to moral judgments of political matters, which also possess affective dimensions. While the act of trust involves affective dimensions, the perception and act of justice can be shaped through the same elements that affect trust. These affective dimensions can also be produced by a reasoning process, including rational choices, although they do not always have to. Neglecting the influence of affective dimensions on political decision-making hinders the conceptualization of political trust from understanding and explaining the actual circumstances of politics.

Undoubtedly, the connection between the concepts is in line with the rational choice approach to trust, too. As discussed in the shopkeeper example, a well-established just structure fosters political trust. The common elements of justice and trust also encompass explicit determinants of good governance. Extensive empirical studies on political trust embrace this perspective. The rule of law, for instance, referring to processes, mechanisms, practices, and norms that ensure a non-arbitrary use of power by governments and citizens, is expected to be a critical determinant of political trust. Citizens are more likely to trust a well-functioning state governed by the rule of law, confident that they will be equally treated, protected, and provided for. The concept of good governance in democracies encompasses various variables, including impartiality, transparency, income equality, and incorruption. In a recent study on public and political trust, the OECD (2022) uses indicators such as responsiveness and reliability in providing services and policies, emphasizing values like openness, integrity, and fairness. The study, was conducted in countries such as Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, indicates an overall decline in trust during the pandemic, though not as much as during the 2008 economic crisis. Despite the pandemic, the majority of people express satisfaction with general public services, such as health services, administrative services, and education, increasing trust in their governments (OECD, 2022). However, the study also identifies lower levels of trust among young people, women, less-educated individuals, and those with low incomes. Moreover, fewer people believe that their governments meet expectations for participation, representation, and responsiveness. While acknowledging differences between countries, and considering that the countries in the study are high-income well-developed democracies, citizens' evaluations and perceptions of government performance appear parallel to the "rational" aspects of trust in relation to justice. The lower trust levels among groups alienated from the political system are akin to the way the perception of injustices decreases trust. Citizens in developed democracies may have higher expectations for participating in decision-making processes, contributing to their lower trust levels when these expectations are not met. Another report on the perception of corruption in public administration, conducted by Transparency International in 2022,

reveals that OECD countries (on average) are perceived as having the lowest corruption levels compared to other regions. However, Colombia, Mexico, and Turkey are perceived to have the highest level of corruption (2022 Yolsuzluk Algı Endeksi Açıklandı!, 2023). While large-scale research on political trust in Turkey is lacking, it is unsurprising that the high level of perceived corruption has led to a high level of distrust, even as trust in the government remains relatively high.

Rationality that the rational choice approach emphasizes for trust is grounded on an objective evaluation of information regarding the political matters. Thus, political trust requires full information and awareness of the political matters. As seen in the examples in the previous section, it is not possible and/or the case all the time. Misinformation, deception or biases that are boosted by politics can lead to misplacement of trust and distrust in politics. As Potter (2002) from the virtue approach argues that power relations within politics affect whom to trust, implying that they also influence either promoting justice or perpetuating injustices. Echoing the virtue account, Fricker's theorization of epistemic injustice (2007) is relevant in this context. She suggests that power holders, individuals or institutions, can affect the credibility and knowledge of others, affecting trust relations. As a form of epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice involves unfair treatment due to identity prejudices, undermining the credibility of a speaker's testimony. In other words, some people's testimonies are discredited based on false assumptions merely because of their "disadvantaged" identities. Fricker (2007) suggests that the primary reason for this unwarranted distrust or lack of trust in one's testimony is the belief that the speaker is not competent and/or sincere, unjustly dishonoring them. Credibility deficit can misplace or hinder trust and distrust but on the other hand, credibility excess is also possible within epistemic injustice (Medina, 2017), as affirming the virtue account that seeks for a balance for trust and trustworthiness. Trials based on testimonies of women in assault cases, for example, have sparked debates about whether women's testimony is sufficient for accusations. Disproportionate trust is also evident in the case of some political figures. It is a very common tool for especially populist politicians to distort the perception of reality through marginalizing the opposition or some specific group of people, such as immigrants, LGBT groups and so forth. While creating distrust towards certain groups based on their political, ethnic, and sexual identities, it also fosters high levels of trust among their own supporters. This aligns with Fricker's power argument that the more powerful one is, the more trusted they are, resulting in injustice. This dynamic includes oppression, exclusion, underestimation, and distortion of actual facts and meanings, intentionally structured to sustain injustices. Among many others, Fricker's conceptualization of epistemic injustices firstly shows how epistemic processes (acquisition and evaluation of information) can be causes of injustices due to the misplacement of trust or distrust. Secondly, it shows how the realm of the politics affects trust and justice relations at the interpersonal level.

In addition to information-based trust that is in relation to justice, moral and emotional components of trust emerge more in line with what the emotion-based and virtue accounts offer. The most common and important components are solidarity, care, and empathy because they are interconnected elements in both concepts, representing the affective and moral components of trust. These aspects play a crucial role in reinforcing the relationship

between trust and justice in a circular manner. Justice is essential for trust, while the act of trust, laden with moral obligation, can also contribute to the flourishing of justice. Solidarity, for example, serves as a foundation for cooperation, similar to trust, and collective political action formed through solidarity often aims at achieving justice. In the Rawlsian theory of justice (2001), solidarity is crucial for creating a shared understanding of justice, spreading just principles across society and its political institutions. Civic solidarity involves the moral obligation to protect citizens from vulnerabilities by ensuring basic needs, while political solidarity aims at social change against injustices and oppression (Scholz, 2008), as in the way of moral sentiments that bring out political action. At all levels, embracing, caring for, and concerning those in the out-group are essential. Trust in cooperation operates similarly. Beyond seeking interest maximization through cooperation, trust is also built upon shared moral values. The observation that greater inclusivity in the moral community leads to increased trust supports the idea that trust imposes an obligation on the trustee to be trustworthy and just, fostering a reciprocal relationship of trust and justice in society. This argument also supports the virtue account that O'Neill proposes that virtues like care and concern, recognized as essential to trust, play a crucial role in cultivating solidarity. Simultaneously, the virtue of trust fosters cooperation, participation, and engagement with others, thereby building a reliable and equitable social framework.

Similarly, care is a shared component of justice and trust. In this context, care refers not only to meeting someone's needs but also to genuine concern for and care about others. Trust theorists like Baier (1986), Jones (1996), and Potter (2002) include care in their will and virtue accounts of trust, arguing that trust is established when one depends on another's goodwill and willingness to care for what the other values. It is a cooperative activity that necessitates sharing the same values and common concerns. Citizens' trust in politicians can be viewed in a similar light, as citizens expect politicians to care not only by recognizing and meeting needs but also by taking responsibility for them and working for their welfare with competence. This expectation aligns with what a state is expected and appointed to do, and it is also what justice requires. For citizens to trust the state, they should believe that the state fulfills its duty with good intentions. The perception of being cared for, especially for a specific group, can lead to high trust in the state. Some political leaders portraying a fatherly figure for their "people" is a sign of their will to provide care, address their needs, and offer protection.

Last but not least, empathic motivation in trust relations becomes more significant in understanding the circular relationship between trust and justice. Mansbridge's (1999) concept of altruistic trust highlights the relationship between the act of trust and justice, suggesting that trust reinforces justice. Trust, resulting from empathy, may serve as a display of respect and provide a model for others. In the same way the virtue account argues, trust imposes a responsibility on the trustee to respond in a trustworthy manner, encouraging the trustee to act justly. Therefore, trust expands both trust and justice simultaneously. Social polarization, influenced by clientelist politics, for instance, can be mitigated by trusting a fellow citizen to act justly toward an out-group, encouraging her to be just, unlike the testimonial injustices based on identity biases. Empathy's role as a motive for acknowledging just principles is crucial in shaping trust. Demonstrating empathy and feeling recognized, respected, and supported can increase trust, asserting the idea that justice raises trust.

Conclusion

In sum, all the approaches to trust touched upon in this study are significant in providing important elements of trust in general and political trust in particular. The missing element, however, is justice. As the rational choice approach suggests, political trust demonstrates a positive correlation with the objective benchmarks of justice; when political practices align with the principles of justice in an ideal, objective, and universal manner, citizens are more inclined to trust both the government and each other. The explicit indicators of justice influencing trust levels lend support to this assertion. Moreover, trust and perception of justice share similarities in that both emerge from moral judgments, incorporating moral emotions. Consequently, political trust entails affective and normative assessments alongside information-based evaluations, including those related to justice. While the act of trust involves affective dimensions, the perception and act of justice can similarly be moulded through the same elements that influence trust. These affective dimensions may emerge through a reasoning process and can involve rational choices, but they extend beyond mere rationality. The emotion-based account is here successful in unveiling the affective dimension of trust which also works with moral judgements where information is lacking or manipulated. Trust's relation to solidarity, care and empathy also goes along in a similar way with its relation to justice. Trust's imposing moral obligation to the trustee to be cared, recognized and cooperate is also an expected outcome of justice. In addition to the common affective dimensions of trust and justice, the virtue account contribution is significant for revealing the relationship between the two concepts with its emphasis on trust's leading to the expansion of trust. While justice can contribute to the establishment of political trust, the reverse is also true – political trust can foster justice when it stems from the fulfilment of the responsibility to be just and trustworthy. Furthermore, as the virtue account suggests, since the capability of trusting and being trustworthy is socially gained, the politics is responsible for cultivating trust and justice.

It is worth noting that the study aimed to reconceptualize political trust in three primary ways: firstly, by encompassing a broader scope that considers its interpersonal and social dimensions; secondly, by emphasizing its emotional and moral determinants alongside rational and information-based sources; and thirdly, by incorporating justice as a crucial component. In doing so, it was targeted to provide some examples and theorizations from different disciplines, and to compare the philosophical approaches to trust in terms of their capability in covering the relationship between trust and justice in politics. While the rational choice approach to trust presents an unmoral notion of trust, the emotion-based and virtue accounts are found more successful in elaborating on this relationship that matters in politics. The studies adopting the virtue account viewpoint, however, are more inclined to connect trust and justice including social and political perspectives and to offer more for the cultivation of trust and justice together. Regarding the political science perspective which has a tendency to rely on the rational choice approach, a more comprehensive view of political trust, including its emotional and moral determinants, is considered to enhance our understanding of politics and the pursuit of a trustful and just society. It is believed that future research on the relationship between trust and justice will pave the way for new discussions and yield significant contributions across various disciplines.

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Deciphering the Strategic Codes of Organizing: Political Undertones in Orwell's Animal Farm

Örgütlenmenin Stratejik Kodlarını Çözmek: Orwell'in Hayvan Çiftliğindeki Siyasi Tonlar

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Abstract

This study aims to understand the strategic foundations of organizing within the context of political behavior. Organizing, whether viewed through a sociological lens or analyzed through the dynamics of power inside an organization, is an unavoidable need that necessitates skilled management. A comprehensive survey of the available literature shows notable publications that provide light on this topic. Notably, "Animal Farm," George Orwell's classic, was meticulously analyzed using qualitative data analysis paradigms. This investigation resulted in creating a conceptual framework outlining the organizational strategic principles. During this investigation, important themes developed that addressed topics such as: What causes an organization to form? What fundamental processes are at work? How is the current order modified? What motivational techniques are used? What shape is the emergent structure taking? What measures assure its long-term viability? How do standard unfreeze-change-refreeze sequences work? What causes the redesigned system to fail? According to these results, the study provides expanded insights useful for academic discourse and entities dealing with organizational complexities. Also, this intersection of literature study with in-depth qualitative analysis promises a more nuanced understanding, essential for scholars and practitioners negotiating the junction of politics and organizational behavior.

Keywords: Organizing, Political Behavior, Strategic Codes, George Orwell, Animal Farm

Öz

Bu çalışma politik davranış bağlamında örgütlenmenin stratejik temellerini anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. İster sosyolojik bir bakış açısıyla bakılsın ister bir organizasyon içindeki güç dinamikleri üzerinden analiz edilsin, örgütlenme, yetenekli yönetim gerektiren kaçınılmaz bir ihtiyaçtır. Mevcut literatür kapsamlı bir şekilde incelendiğinde, konuya ilişkin önemli yayınlara rastlanmıştır. Bu bağlamda George Orwell'in klasiği olan "Hayvan Çiftliği" değerlendirmeye alınmış ve nitel veri analiz paradigmaları kullanılarak titizlikle analiz edilmiştir. Araştırma, örgütsel stratejik ilkelerin ana hatlarını çizen kavramsal bir çerçevenin oluşturulmasıyla sonuçlanmıştır. Araştırma sırasında şu konuları ele alan önemli temalar geliştirilmiştir: Bir örgütlenmenin oluşmasına ne sebep olur? Hangi temel süreçler iş başında yer alır? Mevcut düzen nasıl değiştirilir? Hangi motivasyon teknikleri kullanılıyor? Ortaya çıkan yapı nasıl şekillendiriliyor? Hangi önlemler onun uzun vadeli sürdürülebilirliğini garanti ediyor? Standart çözme-değiştirme-yeniden dondurma dizileri nasıl çalışıyor? Yeniden tasarlanan sistemin başarısız olmasına ne sebep oluyor? Bu sonuçlara göre araştırma, akademik söylem ve örgütsel karmaşıklıklarla uğraşan kuruluşlar için yararlı genişletilmiş bilgiler sunmaktadır. Ayrıca literatür ile niteliksel analizin bu şekilde kesişmesi, politik ve örgütsel davranış kavşağını müzakere eden akademisyenler ve uygulayıcılar için gerekli olan daha incelikli bir anlayış vaat etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Örgütlenme, Politik Davranış, Stratejik Kodlar, George Orwell, Hayvan Çiftliği

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Introduction

Organizational engagement is an intrinsic characteristic of modern human existence. Each individual's interaction with organized structures ranges from founding to joining, influencing, or being influenced. Contemporary discourse posits that such engagements, as mediums of struggle and power accumulation, have assumed heightened importance compared to historical paradigms. Examining societal constructs provides ample illustrations of this intricate dance of power dynamics. Within organizations, individuals gravitate toward core centers of influence, echoing Zaleznik's (1970) assertion about the proximity to the power nucleus. This gravitational pull toward power centers underscores instances where individuals form alliances with entities possessing unique power resources, compensating for individual deficiencies. Corporations strategize and form alliances in their quest for market supremacy, and similarly, political entities, notwithstanding profound ideological divergences, can coalesce for ascendancy. Such insights highlight an organizational strategy's intricate and often hidden aspects, exemplified by combining diverse intentions to achieve tangible collaboration.

A meticulous analysis of organizational processes, whether formal or informal, unveils a bifurcation: overt and shared elements juxtaposed against those that are covert and withheld. The former is discernible, inviting more lucid articulations, while the latter, by virtue of various imperatives, necessitates strategic obfuscation. Strategic behaviors of this nature necessitate meticulous consideration of factors such as modality, time, and appropriate partners for dissemination. Elucidating this dichotomy, the conceptual bifurcation in the 'sharing of objectives' becomes salient. "Real goals" serve as nomenclature for the covert, unarticulated objectives, while "stated goals" epitomize the overt, articulated ones. Entities with a preponderance of overt elements are taxonomically characterized as transparent, whereas their counterparts, dominated by covert elements, are designated as enigmatic. The strategic imperative of these covert dimensions, considering their potential ramifications – whether gains or debacles – for the entity or individual, elevates their significance in organizational discourse. Consequently, although outcomes vary across stakeholders, the strategic concealment of such facets can be rationalized within certain boundaries of organizational pragmatism (Robbins et al., 2010).

In contemporary discourse surrounding power dynamics, individuals frequently articulate a quest for power grounded in multifaceted motivations. These motivations span from pursuing enhanced conditions and self-preservation to the aspiration for invulnerability. Notably, the mechanisms and instruments employed in attaining power are contingent upon individualistic paradigms shaped by values, convictions, and presuppositions. Consequently, no universal *modus operandi* or tool deemed universally suitable exists. Moreover, while the essence of power — fundamentally characterized by its capability to influence (Hicks & Gullet, 1979) — is ubiquitously acknowledged, there is a burgeoning debate concerning the quantitatively 'optimal' extent of power one should wield. Overaccumulation of power can engender detrimental ramifications both at the micro (individual) and macro (organizational) echelons, manifesting behaviors symptomatic of 'power intoxication'. Organizationally, the legitimacy of power is evaluated by its alignment with and representation of the majority's vested interests. Any deviation from this normative benchmark categorizes power as illegitimate. On an

individual scale, power is perceived as legitimate when it champions individual rights but transgresses into the realm of illegitimacy when it infringes upon others' prerogatives (Pansardi, 2012).

This study seeks to delineate the strategic facets of organizational behavior within political contexts. The act of organizing, irrespective of its sociological interpretation or perception within intra-organizational power dynamics, remains inevitable. An astute comprehension of this phenomenon necessitates a profound grasp of its strategic underpinnings. Hence, crucial questions revolve around what triggers the formation of an organization, the complex processes involved, interventions in the existing system, the motivational tools employed, the design of the new structure, strategies for ensuring its sustainability, and factors leading to the dissolution of an emerging system.

When delving into the vast academic literature, numerous noteworthy publications have been identified that offer detailed insights into the subject matter. One such work that this research gravitates toward is the magnum opus "Animal Farm" (1945) by George Orwell, a luminary who adopted this pseudonym. This literary masterpiece not only offers a mirror to its epoch but also exhibits a timeless resonance (Turna, 2020). Within its narrative, the novel unfurls a farm ensnared in administrative quandaries, anthropomorphic animals embodying disparate attributes delineating leadership and subservient roles, and a compendium of events emphasizing collective agendas, transitions of power, obliteration and reconstruction of orders, power architectures, uncharted adversities, power tugs-of-war, and the intricate dance of crisis management and systemic disintegration. Therefore, Animal Farm offers remarkable arguments in terms of its causes and consequences in the context of both socio-psychological and socio-political behaviors in order to understand the strategic foundations of organization. Scholarly debate delves into many aspects of the story, hypothesizing that the metaphorical farm may be analogous to real-world organizational dynamics and that its characters may represent specific psychosocial archetypes (Bozkurt et al., 2018; Fidan, 2018; Altparmak & Durakolu, 2021). While the studies on this work (e.g., Carter, 1974; Ingle, 1993; Carr, 2010; Fajrina, 2016; Albloly and Nour, 2019; Xie, 2020) are descriptive of the research subject, they also attract attention with their diversity of perspective and factual descriptiveness.

We carefully designed the research approach, integrating elements of qualitative data analysis, such as content and descriptive analysis. The study began with thoroughly examining the literature on organizational constructs and political behaviors. Subsequent stages involved data extraction and analysis methods, such as block text extraction, identifying and reviewing key excerpts, and thematic development. The study's outcome was synthesized into a conceptual framework and cross-referenced with relevant literature, allowing for a comprehensive discussion and summary of the findings.

Review of Literature: Organization and Political Behavior

Within the expansive realm of organizational theory, multiple frameworks decipher the intricacies of organizational life. System theory, for instance, understands organizations as arenas defined by salient actors, boundaries, and inter-relations. Conversely, the contingency theory posits that organizational behaviors are contingent upon specific external conditions. Viewed through the resource dependence approach, organizations

are entities interdependent in a mutual quest for resource acquisition. The agency theory defines this structure as a stratified entity with delegated responsibilities and rights, while the transaction cost theory emphasizes the economic implications of inter-organizational relations. Organizational ecology theory envisages a Darwinian battlefield where resilience determines survival and institutionalization theory underscores the indispensability of legitimacy in organizational longevity. Lastly, the organizational network theory postulates organizations as matrices wherein social connections equate to accrued power.

At a macroscopic level, organizations manifest as structured entities, formal or informal, marshaling resources toward predefined objectives. As Barnard (1938) opined, they are intricate systems of coordinated endeavors. This concept of coordination, as elaborated by luminaries such as Schein (1977) and Etzioni (1964), stems from individual deficiencies, propelling individuals to team up with peers with.

Within these structured confines, the phenomenon of political behavior surfaces. Robbins (1989) define this as attempts by individuals to modify the behaviors of their peers to correlate with self-driven interests. Such politicking is not a mere sideline activity but a core component, significantly influencing organizational trajectories (Cook et al., 1999). Ryan (1984) contextualizes political behavior within the scope of power, asserting it as the mechanism through which power translates into tangible actions. Essentially, these maneuvers bear the potential to dictate, or be dictated by, the broader organizational objectives (Farrell et al., 1982). Emergent in environments characterized by resource paucity, ambiguity in regulations, and pronounced rivalry (Mintzberg, 1983; 1985), such behaviors often employ a spectrum of tactics, from alliance forging to strategic power plays over pivotal resources (Schein, 1977). However, it is paramount to acknowledge the dual-edged nature of political behaviors. Depending on one's vantage, they can be perceived as constructive or detrimental (Parker et al., 1995).

Methodology

This study explores the strategic features of organizational structuring, following the fundamental principles of qualitative research methodology. Recognizing that qualitative research is intrinsically oriented toward unveiling profound interpretations beyond superficial occurrences (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), the corpus under scrutiny in this investigation has been subject to a rigorous interpretive analysis. This approach ensures congruence with its theoretical framework while adopting an integrative and holistic lens. Figure 1 presents a schematic illustration that provides a comprehensive understanding of the intricacies of the data-gathering procedure, which is crucial for obtaining the research conclusions.




Figure 1. Methodology for Data and Findings Acquisition in Research

Upon careful examination of Figure 1, one discerns that the initiation of the data acquisition process is anchored in the “delineation of the research problem.” The primary problem domain of this research is to identify strategically significant dimensions relevant to non-manifested or concealed aspects of organizational structures, specifically Orwell’s Animal Farm, by following the basic principles of qualitative research methodology that allows content analysis. Existing literature indicates that specific issues are hidden from various stakeholders during the organization’s lifecycle stages—inauguration, maturation, and dissolution. Such concealed facets invariably illuminate the inherent objective of organizational structures. As a result, identifying the proclivities shown at various junctures is critical for its key interlocutors: leaders and followers.

A thorough “bibliographic selection” was conducted during the subsequent phase to resolve the previously indicated research dilemma. Through an exhaustive literature review, specific seminal works were identified that might bear direct or tangential relevance to the research paradigm. In evaluating these works, salient inquiries were rigorously pursued, such as the underlying impetuses for organizational inception, principal processes executed, modus operandi of interventions in the prevailing paradigm, etc. Post this assiduous content analysis, George Orwell’s magnum opus, “Animal Farm,” emerged as the quintessential text aligning with the research’s objectives.

In the tertiary phase, a fundamental explanation of the chosen literary work was carried out, following which “textual segments” possibly bearing multifaceted importance to the research paradigm were delimited. A thoroughly edited compendium encompassing these pieces and spanning approximately 20 pages was compiled. In order to facilitate more rigorous analysis, text segments with similar thematic elements were grouped into corresponding categories. From this refined corpus, salient sentences, quintessentially capturing the crux, were extrapolated. According to the recognized scholarly paradigms outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1990), three distinct modes of conceptual distillation are proposed. The modality based on extractions derived from raw data was carefully utilized within the scope of this investigation. The fundamental principles expressed in the selected sentences were further explained using content analysis.

In the penultimate phase, the textual segments were subjected to rigorous analytical scrutiny, after which “highlighted sentences” evoked semantic congruities and divergences were identified. Given the length of these highlighted sentences, it was deemed impractical to include them in their entirety within the research framework. Hence, representative “coded expressions” were identified and allocated. An initial perusal of the text yielded 477 such highlighted sentences and 65 coded expressions pertinent to organizational theory and political comportment. Subsequent evaluations, however, refined this repository to an aggregate of 36 coded expressions.

In the last stage, considering the manifest and hidden meanings embedded within the highlighted sentences, coded terms were integrated under relevant “thematic umbrellas.” The exploration of these topics was based on the significant questions that the research aimed to clarify. Ensuring internal coherence necessitated the presence of robust linkages amongst aggregated sentence clusters, while external coherence mandated the preservation of thematic sanctity and semantic contiguity. Each highlighted sentence was

put through an analytical crucible, examining its basic message, relational dynamics (with other segments and the overarching theme), and vectors of uniformity and divergence. A quintet of thematic pillars was then used to explain the research structure.

Table 1 presents a concise summary encompassing the highlighted sentences, coded expressions, and emergent themes extracted by researchers from Orwell’s *Animal Farm* (1945). Given the enormous amount of highlighted sentences, providing an entire list in this context is impossible. As a result, a few phrases representative of the researchers’ analytical rigor and inference have been included in the table. Comprehensive analyses of the highlighted sentences are incorporated in the part that explains the conceptual framework.

Table 1
Extracted Noteworthy Sentences, Code Expressions, and Central Themes from the Novel “Animal Farm”

Sample Emphatic Sentences	Code Phrases	Themes
<i>...The meadows are overgrown with wild vegetation, the structures lack roofing, the fences are in disrepair, and there is an inadequate provision of sustenance...(p.14)</i>	Inadequate Sense of Responsibility	Factors Leading to Organizational Structuring
<i>...Jones devoted his entire day to drinking... He was so inebriated that he couldn't even recall closing the doors...(p.7-14)</i>	Managerial Negligence	
<i>...such as animal life, misery, and slavery... ...Almost all of our labor is being stolen by humans...(p.8-9)</i>	Injustice Perception	
<i>...Never forget that your duty entails hostility toward humans and all their actions...(p.10)</i>	Sense of Revenge	

Sample Emphatic Sentences	Code Phrases	Themes
<p>...Over the span of three months, numerous clandestine activities unfolded... secret nocturnal gatherings were convened to formulate the tenets of Animalism... (p.13)</p>	<p>Planning</p>	<p>Intervention in the Current System-Managed Core Processes</p>
<p>...Anything that walks on four legs or has wings is considered our ally...Ribbons are deemed as attire, and attire symbolizes humanity... (p.10-15)</p>	<p>Stakeholder Identification</p>	
<p>...The responsibility for informing and organizing other animals was assigned to the pigs regarded as intelligent... Snowball was responsible for defense... (p.13-25)</p>	<p>Task Distribution</p>	
<p>...After their diligent work, they managed to condense the principles of Animalism into seven commandments... "Four legs good, two legs evil"... (p.17-22)</p>	<p>Doctrine Formulation</p>	
<p>Napoleon, by sending pigeons to neighboring farms every day, was narrating the story of the revolution... The song 'Beasts of England' started becoming widely known everywhere... (p.24-25)</p>	<p>Disseminating Doctrine</p>	
<p>...While engaging in the struggle against humanity, it is imperative to refrain from emulating them... None among them addressed one another as "Sir"... (p.10-64)</p>	<p>Formulating the Core Principles</p>	
<p>...Any creature walking on two legs is deemed our adversary... Are you aware of who, in the dead of night, was responsible for toppling our windmill? Snowball!... (p.10-38)</p>	<p>Locating the Adversary</p>	
<p>Napoleon refrained from creating any specific plans; instead, he consistently asserted that Snowball's plans would lead to nothing... (p.29)</p>	<p>Strategic Direction</p>	
<p>The plans he drafted were actually stolen from Napoleon's working papers... It turns out Snowball had been in cahoots with Jones right from the start!... (p.33-43)</p>	<p>Disinformation</p>	
<p>The animals didn't voice any grievances about their efforts or sacrifices; for they were cognizant of the benefits it brought to themselves and generations to come... (p.34)</p>	<p>Benefit Orientation</p>	<p>Employed Motivational Strategies</p>
<p>...Emotions have no place here! War is just war. The only good human is a deceased one... If we take one wrong step, the enemy will be upon us... (p.26-32)</p>	<p>Idealization</p>	
<p>Do you understand the consequences of our failure in our mission?... I believe none of you wishes for Jones to come back, am I correct?... (p.23)</p>	<p>Harm Tension</p>	

Sample Emphatic Sentences	Code Phrases	Themes
<i>Napoleon acted with celerity and mercilessness... All the knives used by Jones were discarded into the well, harnesses, reins, and horse blinders were consigned to the flames... The animals had eradicated any traces reminiscent of Jones... (p.41-15-16)</i>	Erasure of the Old Regime's Traces (Dissolution)	Shaping the New Order
<i>...trade with neighboring farms is permissible... Sleeping in a bed with sheets is prohibited... No animal shall unjustly kill another animal... Excessive consumption of alcohol is strictly prohibited... (p.35-37-47-54)</i>	Definition of New Rules (Formation)	
<i>...Meetings concluded with the rendition of "Beasts of England"... Entry into the barn was preceded by paying reverence to the skulls of the animals... (p.21-33)</i>	Organizational Symbols/ Rituals	
<i>...They were in imminent danger of starving to death. It was of paramount importance to keep this fact hidden from the external world... (p.40)</i>	Concealment of Weakness	
<i>...He recited figures from paper, asserting a five hundred percent increase in all forms of production..., he described it using numerous visuals and the animals began to recall... (p.47-43)</i>	Production of Reasonable Justification	
<i>...We are the intellectual laborers... The more intelligent pigs should be authorized to make all decisions concerning farm policies... (p.23-29)</i>	Imposing Inherent Inequality	
<i>...Despite their lack of trust in Pilkington as a human, they favored him over Frederick, whom they both feared and loathed... (p.49)</i>	Compulsion	
<i>...The narrative of confession and execution persisted until a pile of corpses had formed at Napoleon's feet... (p.45)</i>	Elimination of Threats	
<i>Napoleon casually wandering the farmhouse garden with a pipe in his mouth... the pigs obtaining radios and arranging telephone connections didn't appear unusual... (p.65)</i>	Normalization	
<i>...If they experienced hunger, it was not due to the oppressor humans feeding them... If they toiled diligently, they were doing it at least for their own benefit... (p.64)</i>	Solidification	
<i>...Regardless of circumstances, they would remain loyal, work tirelessly, obey orders, and acknowledge Napoleon's leadership... (p.46)</i>	Fostering Commitment	

Sample Emphatic Sentences	Code Phrases	Themes
<i>...Through a specific directive, the prohibition of the song 'Beasts of England' was formally announced... While all animals are considered equal, it is noted that some animals are, in fact, more equal than others... (p.46-65)</i>	Dissolution of Values/Purposes	Factors Leading to the Collapse of New Regime
<i>...They had arrived at a time when no one dared to express their thoughts, and ferocious, growling dogs ruled the land... this was not the system that all animals had aspired to and labored for... (p.46)</i>	Disappointment	
<i>...As a standard protocol, if a pig encountered another animal on the path, it was universally accepted that the other animals should step aside and wait... (p.56)</i>	Growing Disparity Between Classes	
<i>... Given that the animals and humans had come together on equal terms for the first time, what activities could they be engaged in indoors?... (p.65)</i>	Actions Raising Doubt	
<i>...The uprising had diminished into a vague recollection, merely whispered from one mouth to another... and some who had never even heard of the rebellion had been compromised... (p.62)</i>	Deletion of Pedagogical Components	
<i>...word got around that the pigs somehow came up with the funds to purchase an additional crate of whiskey for themselves... (p.61)</i>	Proliferation of Negative Narratives	
<i>...they were shivering from the cold, and hunger pangs were a frequent companion... the luxuries that were once dreamt of were no longer being discussed... (p.40-63)</i>	Unfulfilled Promises	
<i>...the animals voiced numerous grievances when the pigs and dogs were not in close proximity... a question arose as to whether they should be more afraid of the pigs or the humans... (p.57-65)</i>	Rising Complaints	
<i>...herd of pigs exited the farmhouse; all of them were walking on their hind legs... Napoleon stepped outside, wielding a whip in his hoof... (p.64)</i>	Return to Repressive Methods	

Evaluation and Conceptual Framework

In the concluding phase, we sought to derive a conceptual framework from the findings about the study's central problem. The evaluative approach hinged on descriptive analysis, a method emphasizing data organization, classification by predefined themes, and interpretation rooted in causality, occasionally drawing comparisons to other phenomena when deemed relevant (Elliott & Timulak, 2005). From this vantage point, 477 sentences highlighting organization and political behavior, alongside 36 codified statements and 5 thematic elements from the research dataset, were meticulously linked, characterized, and analyzed, ensuring alignment with the study's objectives and narrative consistency.

The first step of conceptual framework development involved analyzing coded terms concerning relevant literature. This was followed by connecting these expressions to the contextual meanings and themes in George Orwell's "Animal Farm" through a hermeneutic lens. The conclusions derived from these studies are outlined below.

Organizational Catalysts in Orwell's "Animal Farm"

Orwell's "Animal Farm" offers four distinct causative factors, interlinked in a cause-effect paradigm, that spur organizational tendencies: a) Inadequate Sense of Responsibility b) Managerial Negligence c) Perception of Injustice, and d) Vindictive Sentiments.

Orwell suggests that the foundational crack in an extant organizational structure initiates with the leadership's diminished responsibility cognizance. The consciousness of responsibility, as defined in academic discourse, refers to an individual's understanding of the circumstances within their domain of influence and their recognition of the ethical and legal ramifications that arise from their behavior (Glover, 1970). A leadership void, characterized either by ambiguous jurisdictional boundaries or an explicit boundary coupled with a leader's ignorance of the same, is deemed a critical vulnerability. Such shortcomings can inadvertently nurture informal structural formations.

This flaw often expands from a mere oversight to an encompassing managerial lapse. From a managerial perspective, such behaviors are untenable as they challenge the leadership's authoritative stature, both in essence and operationality. In such a milieu, matters of rights and equity are usually subtle when favorable power dynamics can be overtly exacerbated by vested interests using perceptual management tools. This trajectory can swiftly devolve into a tumultuous state, inundated with incisive criticisms and, at its least harmful, cultivating an environment rife with unjust perceptions. Scholarly literature defines this perceived injustice as an innate conviction of receiving unfair, disrespectful treatment and incurring undue hardships due to external actions (Iverson et al., 2018:1156).

The equity theory posits that when individuals perceive their endeavors as undervalued and their rewards as inequitable, they undergo profound emotional strain and strive for redress (Adams, 1965). Such perceptions often culminate in a retaliatory impulse (Jones, 2008), sometimes manifesting as vindictive acts like sabotage (Skarlicki et al., 2008; Durrah, 2020). From an academic viewpoint, revenge is conceptualized as a calculated adverse reaction toward perceived grievances, simultaneously exemplifying a specific aggressive state and a protective, justice-driven response (Strelan et al., 2014). Consequently, this fertile revenge-incubating setting will invariably streamline new informal organizational endeavors, rendering them both expected and endorsed.

Intervening in the Established System: Key Operational Processes

Orwell's work highlights nine key processes regarding interventions in an established system within an organizational context. These processes are Planning, Formation of Core Principles, Stakeholder Identification, Task Distribution, Doctrine Formulation, Doctrine Dissemination, Identification of Adversaries, Strategic Direction, and Disinformation.

Every organization, whether birthed from a new initiative or embedded within an existing structure, either formal or informal, is a product of meticulous planning. The

initial step of any intervention commences with planning. An effective plan is essential for a triumphant intervention. Planning involves unified future-oriented decisions within a political framework, often sidelining overt competition. During this phase, the primary and secondary objectives of the organization are outlined, setting its course. Decisions are made on the purposes to achieve within a stipulated timeframe. Deliberations on foundational principles occur, seeking a commitment to these principles and setting expectations accordingly.

The establishment of these core principles serves as robust behavioral guidelines that resonate with the organization's foundational elements. In general, these principles delineate the organization's trajectory and establish a non-negotiable benchmark for all. However, they're often designed with adaptability in mind, ensuring relevance amidst evolving conditions. While every plan inherently affects various stakeholders, the extent and nature of this impact might differ. Typically, these stakeholders fall into two categories: Proponents and Opponents. Thus, during the planning stage, it's crucial to assess these entities' potential sensitivities and reactions thoroughly. Moreover, discretion is exercised regarding information dissemination, making it a critical juncture in the process.

Following stakeholder identification, task allocation emerges as a pivotal step, especially concerning the plan's execution. The effectiveness of this distribution is instrumental to the success of the intervention, with selections often prioritizing loyalty and affiliation over competence and merit, especially in political contexts. Post-task allocation doctrines, which encapsulate the essence and purpose of the organization, are developed. While these doctrines might be explicit for the foundational elements, endorsement is required for broader acceptance. Subsequently, these doctrines are shared judiciously among all relevant stakeholders.

The process of identifying adversaries is paramount for stimulating cognitive and active engagement toward achieving organizational goals. Politically, the mere insinuation or creation of an adversary can catalyze action. Strategic direction, another predominant process, typically emphasizes the drawbacks of the competitors rather than the organization's own undertakings. Finally, disinformation seeks to obfuscate by casting aspersions on the competitor's commendable actions, often propagating that these actions are derivative or purloined, undermining their authenticity and value.

Motivational Methods Used

In Orwell's work, the motivational methods used within the context of organization can be broadly discussed as Idealization, Benefit Orientation, and Harm Tension.

Idealization refers to motivation where an emotional bond is established and reflected toward achieving what is idealized without relying on any benefit or harm. In such a motivational atmosphere, actions are driven by ideological reasons, not tied to rewards or punishments. There's an underlying perspective: "It doesn't matter if I lose as long as the ideology I believe in wins." This is the organizational process's most desired, anticipated, and pursued state. However, such a perspective seldom dominates vast masses. It is predominantly present among founders and those closer to them. Acting for the sake of acting is not the agenda under this form of motivation.

Benefit Orientation is a form of guidance that leverages material or intangible rewards or promises if a particular goal is achieved. All tools in this process target human nature (physiological, psychological, social) and are inherently encouraging. It is need-based. It has the potential to trigger emotions and feelings, bringing effort and sacrifice to the forefront while substantially reducing complaints. It is emphasized both directly and indirectly.

Harm Tension is a method where potential punishments and losses are highlighted in case the desired results are not achieved or in instances of failure. The tools used predominantly have an intimidating aspect. Sometimes, this is felt directly, while at other times, it is implied. While it primarily suppresses feelings and emotions, there is a forceful behavioral choice among alternative negative scenarios. There's a progression toward the objective through subjugation. It exhibits a trend of avoiding more negative outcomes. Although considered problematic as a long-term guidance method, it is an effective short-term solution.

Shaping the New Order

In the context of establishing a new order, examining Orwell's work provides us with several fundamental principles: Erasure of the Old Regime's Traces (Dissolution), Definition of New Rules (Formation), Organizational Symbols/Rituals, Concealment of Weaknesses, Production of Reasonable Justifications, Imposition of Inherent Inequality, Compulsion, Elimination of Threats, Normalization, Solidification, and Fostering Commitment.

Organizational structures and systems inherently mirror their designers' and founders' ideologies, values, beliefs, and assumptions. Infusing these attributes into all visible and invisible processes and procedures is a challenge in ensuring their permanence. Establishing a new order begins primarily by erasing traces of these attributes in the existing system. This dissolution is perceived as a critical transition point for leaders. An effective dissolution is essential, or the maturation of the new order becomes arduous. Strategically, it might be better not to erase all traces but to retain those that demonstrate the necessity of the new system while removing elements that might induce nostalgia for the old regime.

Concurrently, goals and mission-driven principles are introduced to shape the new order. Fundamentally, this phase demands a profound mental and behavioral transformation. Members are asked to abandon familiar behaviors and adopt new ones. Resistance is expected and countered through socioeconomic and socio-psychological motivation mechanisms, which are critical in embedding desired behaviors and solidifying new ones.

Simultaneously, emphasis is placed on visibility endeavors. Symbols and rituals that can represent the new order are created. The aim is for every aspect of the organization to echo the new system's messages, facilitating mental acceptance. However, the establishment of a new order is not without its vulnerabilities. Proactively addressing these weaknesses is of the utmost importance. If it is not possible to preempt them, they must be concealed or managed. The revelation of these vulnerabilities can undermine the morale of supporters while bolstering the confidence of those who oppose.

During this transformation, unforeseen challenges are inevitable. Crafting cogent justifications for these challenges becomes strategically vital. While appeasing everyone might be impractical, generating arguments that convince allies while weakening opposition is crucial for organizational longevity and stability. Initially, organizational life during the formation of a new order often downplays power dynamics. However, as the order stabilizes, inherent inequalities based on power emerge. These power dynamics become more palpable, and the notion of equality is challenged. Confronting this situation requires a firmer, more authoritative approach. Resisters are given a stark choice: revert to the old ways or accept their new roles.

If resistance persists, threats are swiftly neutralized. Opponents are portrayed as self-centered individuals, detrimental to the collective good. Actions against them are presented with a veneer of victory. Post-elimination, the new state becomes normalized. Behaviors once deemed objectionable now pass without comment. The new norms are internalized, transformed into core values, and solidified within the organizational fabric. These established norms infiltrate all organizational processes. Individual and organizational goals align, fostering a heightened sense of commitment. Members are prepared to make sacrifices for the betterment of the organization. Loyalty becomes paramount.

Factors Leading to the Collapse of the New Order

In Orwell's work, when discussing the establishment of a new order, the factors leading to its demise are Dissolution of Values/Purpose, Unfulfilled Promises, Disappointment, Growing Disparity between Classes, Erosion of Doctrinal Elements, Actions Raising Doubt, Proliferation of Negative Narratives, Rising Complaints, and a Return to Repressive Methods.

Like any system, the existence and sustainability of an organizational order hinge on the enduring significance of its founding purposes and values. Any behavior or practice that diverges from these objectives damages the ties that bind the organization, even if invisible. Within the realm of political behavior, the most pernicious and precarious actions include subtle and ongoing departures from the established objectives, gradually undermining the organization's integrity. While adapting to changing conditions by revising one's goals is a natural inclination, convincingly communicating these changes to stakeholders is crucial. Otherwise, members who perceive the loss of unity in purpose will find it challenging to remain committed, precipitating the inevitable decline of the new order.

In organizational life, promises often activate and sustain motivational processes. Expectations and aspirations are built upon them. Members keenly and eagerly monitor their realization. Deviations or neglect of these promises elicits urgent responses, given their propensity to amplify vulnerabilities, acting like a domino effect. Therefore, fulfilling promises and their potential realization is a pivotal factor in the continuity of the new order. Non-realization disappoints its proponents while bolstering the opposition, exposing the organization to external and internal pressures that can hasten the order's decline.

Every new system is built on dreams and expectations, often related to past adversities like undeserved treatment, unwanted attitudes, or not being valued. All sacrifices made to

establish the new order aim to avoid reliving these past problems. Witnessing recurrences of these issues, especially in an order they helped create, significantly heightens tension and disappointment, making this negative psychological state one of the most potent drivers toward the collapse of the new order.

As the new order persists, it may gradually evolve to a point where departures from its value-centric foundation become evident. The increasing disparity between classes is one such manifestation. Over time, the emphasis shifts from purpose-centric to position/class-centric perspectives. This increase in privilege and entitlement intensifies, eroding all forms of member commitment, indicating the new order is nearing a breaking point.

Another alarming trend is the gradual disregard for foundational teachings and principles, leading to internal contradictions. What were once guiding principles become trivialized, indicating that the new order has lost its functionality.

Consequently, attention is directed toward overt actions undertaken by individuals in positions of authority, giving rise to skepticism. Although these activities are currently evident, they can be rationalized based on ostensibly logical justifications. The environment exhibits a limited degree of receptivity. Hence, the most prudent course of action may be adopting a strategy of waiting patiently.

As dissatisfaction grows, negative narratives start at a grassroots level through gossip and murmurs but snowball into more exaggerated tales of grievances. Soon, almost everyone, whether supporter or critic, has something to grumble about. Complaints increase in number and intensity, making containment challenging.

By this point, the opportunity for constructive solutions has long passed. A shift to repressive measures is seen as the inevitable solution. The new order reverts to the very issues criticized in the old one. The only difference is in the implementers. We have come full circle. The cycle is ripe for the emergence of yet another “new order.”

Findings

Upon scrutinizing George Orwell’s “Animal Farm” through the lens of qualitative data analysis methodologies, this study has discerned pivotal codes pertinent to the strategic facets of organizational behavior within a political milieu. These derived codes augment the scholarly corpus with an explorative nuance in specific dimensions. Concurrently, they render enriching elucidations that bolster a profound comprehension of the underpinnings of strategic organization. When juxtaposed with extant academic outputs, the study’s outcomes notably resonate with seminal works such as Mintzberg’s (1985) “Organizations as Political Arenas”; Strelan et al.’s (2013) “Power and Revenge”; Pansardi’s (2012) “Necessary Power and Excessive Power: Two Distinct Paradigms?”; Aronson and Cope’s (1968) “The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend”; Hussain et al.’s (2018) “A Critical Examination of Kurt Lewin’s Change Model: Probing the Role of Leadership and Employee Engagement in Organizational Transformation”; Werther’s (1987) “Loyalty: A Comparative Analysis Across Institutional Structures”; Fischer and Ravizza’s (1991) “Responsibility and Its Inevitable Facets.”

The empirical insights suggest that one key impetus behind organizational dynamics, particularly those about informal intra-organizational alternative structuring, is attributable

to cavities in the praxis of managerial responsibility. Such oversights, whether accidental or deliberate, pave the way for adversarial factions within the organization to identify and exploit vulnerable stratagems. Furthermore, perceptions of marginalization or perceived inequities in managerial paradigms, irrespective of their integrity, catalyze sentiments of retribution, thus ensnaring entities in endeavors of subversive reorganization. In light of these findings, there emerges an imperative for vigilance against any manifestation of managerial dereliction and to assiduously eschew strategies that inadvertently foment sentiments of retributive justice among diverse stakeholder groups.

If unchecked, alternative organizational approaches can lead to various interventions in the established order by concerned parties. These interventions often run in tandem, creating a multi-layered approach to change. Initially, a strategy for an alternative organization is formed, prioritizing unity in thought and action over competition. Decisions are formulated considering future outcomes, while goals are established to guide actions and aspirations. The potential repercussions of these activities are analyzed through a systematic examination, focusing on identifying the parties that may be affected and taking appropriate safeguards to mitigate any adverse effects.

Moreover, to effectively implement this plan, roles and responsibilities are delegated. Fundamental principles (or red lines) are discussed, and agreements are formed around them. On the one hand, doctrines that rationalize and emotionally convey the intent of the new organization are created. At the same time, on the other, there's an intensified focus on identifying adversaries to sustain cognitive and action-driven momentum. Furthermore, any positive actions from opposing parties are undermined through disinformation, further accelerating the destruction of the old and the construction of the new.

In solidifying the new order, various motivational tools are employed. The process often starts with "idealization" - forging an emotional connection to a vision, transforming individual desires and expectations into sacrifices for a more significant cause. Gradually, this approach shifts to either a benefit-driven method, where rewards (tangible or intangible) are promised upon achieving set goals, or a harm-aversion method, where potential punishments or losses are highlighted to instill fear and drive action.

Once the new order takes shape, attention turns to ensuring its longevity and robustness. Efforts are first directed toward erasing remnants of the old system that could invoke nostalgia. The ideals and beliefs of the new system's architects infiltrate all visible and behind-the-scenes processes. Visibility activities, such as creating organizational symbols and establishing rituals, strengthen the newly established order. In the interim, promptly mitigating vulnerabilities that arise is prioritized. As the system matures, inherent power imbalances become evident, leading to escalating interventions to maintain order. Perceived threats are eliminated if necessary, creating a new status quo that becomes normalized over time. This new normal then evolves into organizational values and gets institutionalized.

However, there are various reasons why such a new order might fail. Chief among them is the erosion of the original purpose and values that bound the organization together. A significant breach of trust can occur when promised rewards are not delivered. Often, teachings and foundational beliefs emphasized during formation are disregarded, leading

to internal contradictions. Previously concealed actions have become openly visible and are justified as fundamental entitlements. Over time, most individuals develop a sense of discontentment against the emerging structure.

Open criticisms rise, and with them, the spread of misinformation. When the situation reaches this point, corrective actions might be too late. Returning to oppressive methods becomes an inevitable solution, resetting the cycle toward forming a new order.

In conclusion, in an organizational setting fraught with managerial challenges, actions driven by those in governing positions' relational and behavioral attributes are inevitable. While there might initially be a strong desire for unity around mutual interests, conflicts become more apparent over time. While initially motivating, taking control by like-minded individuals can eventually introduce destructive challenges. Regardless of the circumstances, there will always be those ready to navigate the collapse and envision new beginnings.

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AMAÇ KAPSAM

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, siyaset bilimi, kamu yönetimi, uluslararası ilişkiler, alanlarında uluslararası ve disiplinlerarası makaleler yayınlamaktadır. Dergi, aşağıda belirtilen konuları kapsamak ile birlikte sadece bu konular ile kısıtlı değildir:

- Siyaset biliminin tüm alt disiplinleri, siyaset teorisi, siyaset felsefesi, politik davranış, siyasi kurumlar ve siyasi tarih
- Kamu yönetiminin tüm alt disiplinleri,
- Uluslararası ilişkiler ile ilgili tüm konular: uluslararası hukuk, iktisat, etik, strateji, felsefe, kültür, çevre, güvenlik, terör, bölgesel çalışmalar, küreselleşme ve diğer konular,

Dergi, yukarıda adı geçen disiplinlerin çeşitli yönlerini inceleyen, İngilizce yazılmış araştırma esaslı makalelerin yanında teorik ve kavramsal makaleleri yayınlamaktadır. Ayrıca, dergi uluslararası alandaki akademisyenlerin konuk editörlüğünde çeşitli temalar ile ilgili özel sayılar yayınlamaktadır.

EDİTORYAL POLİTİKALAR VE HAKEM SÜRECİ

Yayın Politikası

Dergiye yayımlanmak üzere gönderilen makalelerin içeriği derginin amaç ve kapsamı ile uyumlu olmalıdır. Dergi, orijinal araştırma niteliğindeki yazıları yayınlamaya öncelik vermektedir. Genel İlkeler Daha önce yayımlanmamış ya da yayımlanmak üzere başka bir dergide halen değerlendirmede olmayan ve her bir yazar tarafından onaylanan makaleler değerlendirilmek üzere kabul edilir. Ön değerlendirmeyi geçen yazılar iThenticate intihal tarama programından geçirilir. İntihal incelemesinden sonra, uygun makaleler Editör tarafından orijinaliteleri, metodolojileri, makalede ele alınan konunun önemi ve derginin kapsamına uygunluğu açısından değerlendirilir. Bilimsel toplantılarda sunulan özet bildirimler, makalede belirtilmesi koşulu ile kaynak olarak kabul edilir. Editör, gönderilen makale biçimsel esaslara uygun ise, gelen yazıyı yurtiçinden ve /veya yurtdışından en az iki hakemin değerlendirmesine sunar, hakemler gerek gördüğü takdirde yazıda istenen değişiklikler yazarlar tarafından yapıldıktan sonra yayımlanmasına onay verir. Makale yayımlanmak üzere Dergiye gönderildikten sonra yazarlardan hiçbirinin ismi, tüm yazarların yazılı izni olmadan yazar listesinden silinemez ve yeni bir isim yazar olarak eklenemez ve yazar sırası değiştirilemez. Yayına kabul edilmeyen makale, resim ve fotoğraflar yazarlara geri gönderilmez. Yayımlanan yazı ve resimlerin tüm hakları Dergiye aittir.

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Hakem Süreci

Daha önce yayınlanmamış ya da yayınlanmak üzere başka bir dergide halen değerlendirmede olmayan ve her bir yazar tarafından onaylanan makaleler değerlendirilmek üzere kabul edilir. Gönderilen ve ön kontrolü geçen makaleler iThenticate yazılımı kullanılarak intihal için taranır. İntihal kontrolünden sonra, uygun olan makaleler baş editör tarafından orijinallik, metodoloji, işlenen konunun önemi ve dergi kapsamı ile uyumluluğu açısından değerlendirilir. Baş editör, makaleleri, yazarların etnik kökeninden, cinsiyetinden, cinsel yöneliminden, uyruğundan, dini inancından ve siyasi felsefesinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirir. Yayına gönderilen makalelerin adil bir şekilde çift taraflı kör hakem değerlendirmesinden geçmelerini sağlar.

Seçilen makaleler en az iki ulusal/uluslararası hakeme değerlendirmeye gönderilir; yayın kararı, hakemlerin talepleri doğrultusunda yazarların gerçekleştirdiği düzenlemelerin ve hakem sürecinin sonrasında baş editör tarafından verilir.

Hakemlerin değerlendirmeleri objektif olmalıdır. Hakem süreci sırasında hakemlerin aşağıdaki hususları dikkate alarak değerlendirmelerini yapmaları beklenir.

- Makale yeni ve önemli bir bilgi içeriyor mu?
- Öz, makalenin içeriğini net ve düzgün bir şekilde tanımlıyor mu?
- Yöntem bütünlüklü ve anlaşılır şekilde tanımlanmış mı?
- Yapılan yorum ve varılan sonuçlar bulgularla kanıtlanıyor mu?
- Alandaki diğer çalışmalara yeterli referans verilmiş mi?
- Dil kalitesi yeterli mi?

Hakemler, gönderilen makalelere ilişkin tüm bilginin, makale yayınlanana kadar gizli kalmasını sağlamalı ve yazar tarafında herhangi bir telif hakkı ihlali ve intihal fark ederlerse editöre raporlamalıdır. Hakem, makale konusu hakkında kendini vasıflı hissetmiyor ya da zamanında geri dönüş sağlaması mümkün görünmüyorsa, editöre bu durumu bildirmeli ve hakem sürecine kendisini dahil etmemesini istemelidir.

Değerlendirme sürecinde editör hakemlere gözden geçirme için gönderilen makalelerin, yazarların özel mülkü olduğunu ve bunun imtiyazlı bir iletişim olduğunu açıkça belirtir. Hakemler ve yayın kurulu üyeleri başka kişilerle makaleleri tartışamazlar. Hakemlerin kimliğinin gizli kalmasına özen gösterilmelidir.

YAYIN ETİĞİ VE İLKELER

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, yayın etiğinde en yüksek standartlara bağlıdır ve Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE), Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), Open Access Scholarly Publishers Association (OASPA) ve World Association of Medical Editors (WAME) tarafından yayınlanan etik yayıncılık ilkelerini benimser; Principles of Transparency

and Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing başlığı altında ifade edilen ilkeler için adres: <https://publicationethics.org/resources/guidelines-new/principles-transparency-andbest-practice-scholarly-publishing> Gönderilen tüm makaleler orijinal, yayınlanmamış ve başka bir dergide değerlendirme sürecinde olmamalıdır. Her bir makale editörlerden biri ve en az iki hakem tarafından çift kör değerlendirmeden geçirilir. İntihal, duplikasyon, sahte yazarlık/inkar edilen yazarlık, araştırma/veri fabrikasyonu, makale dilimleme, dilimleyerek yayın, telif hakları ihlali ve çıkar çatışmasının gizlenmesi, etik dışı davranışlar olarak kabul edilir. Kabul edilen etik standartlara uygun olmayan tüm makaleler yayından çıkarılır. Buna yayından sonra tespit edilen olası kuraldışı, uygunsuzluklar içeren makaleler de dahildir.

Araştırma Etiği

Dergi araştırma etiğinde en yüksek standartları gözetir ve aşağıda tanımlanan uluslararası araştırma etiği ilkelerini benimser. Makalelerin etik kurallara uygunluğu yazarların sorumluluğundadır. - Araştırmanın tasarlanması, tasarımın gözden geçirilmesi ve araştırmanın yürütülmesinde, bütünlük, kalite ve şeffaflık ilkeleri sağlanmalıdır.

- Araştırma ekibi ve katılımcılar, araştırmanın amacı, yöntemleri ve öngörülen olası kullanımları; araştırmaya katılımın gerektirdikleri ve varsa riskleri hakkında tam olarak bilgilendirilmelidir.
- Araştırma katılımcılarının sağladığı bilgilerin gizliliği ve yanıt verenlerin gizliliği sağlanmalıdır. Araştırma katılımcıların özerkliğini ve saygınlığını koruyacak şekilde tasarlanmalıdır.
- Araştırma katılımcıları gönüllü olarak araştırmada yer almalı, herhangi bir zorlama altında olmamalıdır. - Katılımcıların zarar görmesinden kaçınılmalıdır. Araştırma, katılımcıları riske sokmayacak şekilde planlanmalıdır.
- Araştırma bağımsızlığıyla ilgili açık ve net olunmalı; çıkar çatışması varsa belirtilmelidir.
- Deneysel çalışmalarda, araştırmaya katılmaya karar veren katılımcıların yazılı bilgilendirilmiş onayı alınmalıdır. Çocukların ve vesayet altındakilerin veya tasdiklenmiş akıl hastalığı bulunanların yasal vasisinin onayı alınmalıdır.
- Çalışma herhangi bir kurum ya da kuruluştaki gerçekleştirilecekse bu kurum ya da kuruluştan çalışma yapılacağına dair onay alınmalıdır.
- İnsan ögesi bulunan çalışmalarda, “yöntem” bölümünde katılımcılardan “bilgilendirilmiş onam” alındığının ve çalışmanın yapıldığı kurumdaki etik kurul onayı alındığı belirtilmesi gerekir.

Yazarların Sorumluluğu

Makalelerin bilimsel ve etik kurallara uygunluğu yazarların sorumluluğundadır. Yazar makalenin orijinal olduğu, daha önce başka bir yerde yayınlanmadığı ve başka bir yerde, başka bir dilde yayınlanmak üzere değerlendirilmediği konusunda teminat sağlamalıdır. Uygulamadaki telif kanunları ve anlaşmaları gözetilmelidir. Telifle bağlı materyaller (örneğin tablolar, şekiller veya büyük alıntılar) gerekli izin ve teşekkürle kullanılmalıdır. Başka yazarların, katkıda bulunanların çalışmaları ya da yararlanılan kaynaklar uygun biçimde kullanılmalı ve referanslarda belirtilmelidir. Gönderilen makalede tüm yazarların akademik ve bilimsel olarak doğrudan katkısı olmalıdır, bu bağlamda “yazar” yayınlanan bir araştırmanın kavramsallaştırılmasına ve dizaynına, verilerin elde edilmesine, analizine ya da yorumlanmasına belirgin katkı yapan, yazının yazılması ya da bunun içerik açısından eleştirel biçimde gözden geçirilmesinde görev yapan birisi olarak görülür. Yazar

olabilmenin diğer koşulları ise, makaledeki çalışmayı planlamak veya icra etmek ve / veya revize etmektir. Fon sağlanması, veri toplanması ya da araştırma grubunun genel süpervizyonu tek başına yazarlık hakkı kazandırmaz. Yazar olarak gösterilen tüm bireyler sayılan tüm ölçütleri karşılamalıdır ve yukarıdaki ölçütleri karşılayan her birey yazar olarak gösterilebilir. Yazarların isim sıralaması ortak verilen bir karar olmalıdır. Tüm yazarlar yazar sıralamasını Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu'nda imzalı olarak belirtmek zorundadırlar. Yazarlık için yeterli ölçütleri karşılamayan ancak çalışmaya katkısı olan tüm bireyler “teşekkür / bilgiler” kısmında sıralanmalıdır. Bunlara örnek olarak ise sadece teknik destek sağlayan, yazıma yardımcı olan ya da sadece genel bir destek sağlayan, finansal ve materyal desteği sunan kişiler verilebilir. Bütün yazarlar, araştırmanın sonuçlarını ya da bilimsel değerlendirmeyi etkileyebilme potansiyeli olan finansal ilişkiler, çıkar çatışması ve çıkar rekabetini beyan etmelidirler. Bir yazar kendi yayınlanmış yazısında belirgin bir hata ya da yanlışlık tespit ederse, bu yanlışlıklara ilişkin düzeltme ya da geri çekme için editör ile hemen temasa geçme ve işbirliği yapma sorumluluğunu taşır.

Editör ve Hakem Sorumlulukları

Baş editör, makaleleri, yazarların etnik kökeninden, cinsiyetinden, cinsel yöneliminden, uyuğundan, dini inancından ve siyasi felsefesinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirir. Yayına gönderilen makalelerin adil bir şekilde çift taraflı kör hakem değerlendirmesinden geçmelerini sağlar. Gönderilen makalelere ilişkin tüm bilginin, makale yayınlanana kadar gizli kalacağını garanti eder. Baş editör içerik ve yayının toplam kalitesinden sorumludur. Gereğinde hata sayfası yayınlamalı ya da düzeltme yapmalıdır. Baş editör; yazarlar, editörler ve hakemler arasında çıkar çatışmasına izin vermez. Hakem atama konusunda tam yetkiye sahiptir ve Dergide yayınlanacak makalelerle ilgili nihai kararı vermekle yükümlüdür.

Hakemlerin araştırmayla ilgili, yazarlarla ve/veya araştırmanın finansal destekçileriyle çıkar çatışmaları olmamalıdır. Değerlendirmelerinin sonucunda tarafsız bir yargıya varmalıdırlar. Gönderilmiş yazılara ilişkin tüm bilginin gizli tutulmasını sağlamalı ve yazar tarafında herhangi bir telif hakkı ihlali ve intihal fark ederlerse editöre raporlamalıdırlar. Hakem, makale konusu hakkında kendini vasıflı hissetmiyor ya da zamanında geri dönüş sağlaması mümkün görünmüyorsa, editöre bu durumu bildirmeli ve hakem sürecine kendisini dahil etmemesini istemelidir. Değerlendirme sürecinde editör hakemlere gözden geçirme için gönderilen makalelerin, yazarların özel mülkü olduğunu ve bunun imtiyazlı bir iletişim olduğunu açıkça belirtir. Hakemler ve yayın kurulu üyeleri başka kişilerle makaleleri tartışamazlar. Hakemlerin kimliğinin gizli kalmasına özen gösterilmelidir. Bazı durumlarda editörün kararıyla, ilgili hakemlerin makaleye ait yorumları aynı makaleyi yorumlayan diğer hakemlere gönderilerek hakemlerin bu süreçte aydınlatılması sağlanabilir.

YAZILARIN HAZIRLANMASI

Dil

Dergide İngilizce dilinde makaleler yayınlanır.

Yazıların Hazırlanması ve Gönderimi

Aksi belirtilmedikçe gönderilen yazılarla ilgili tüm yazışmalar ilk yazarla yapılacaktır. Makale gönderimi online olarak <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/siyasal> üzerinden yapılmalıdır. Gönderilen

yazılar, yazının yayınlanmak üzere gönderildiğini ifade eden, makale türünü belirten ve makaleyle ilgili bilgileri içeren (bkz: Son Kontrol Listesi) bir mektup; yazının elektronik formunu içeren Microsoft Word 2003 ve üzerindeki versiyonları ile yazılmış elektronik dosya ve tüm yazarların imzaladığı Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu eklenerek gönderilmelidir.

1. Çalışmalar, A4 sayfada üst, alt, sağ ve sol taraftan 2,5 cm. boşluk bırakılarak, 12 punto Times New Roman harf karakterleriyle ve 1,5 satır aralık ölçüsü ile hazırlanmalıdır.
2. Çalışmalar 4500 - 8500 sözcük arasında olmalı ve sayfa numaraları sayfanın altında ve ortada yer almalıdır.
3. Yazar/yazarların adları çalışmanın başlığının hemen altında sağa bitişik şekilde verilmelidir. Ayrıca yıldız dipnot şeklinde (*) yazarın unvanı, kurumu ve e-posta adresi ve telefonu sayfanın en altında dipnotta belirtilmelidir.
4. Giriş bölümünden önce 180-200 kelimelik çalışmanın kapsamını, amacını, ulaşılan sonuçları ve kullanılan yöntemi kaydeden İngilizce ve Türkçe öz yer almalıdır. Çalışmanın İngilizce ve Türkçe başlığı İngilizce özet üzerinde yer almalıdır. İngilizce ve Türkçe özet altında çalışmanın içeriğini temsil eden 3-5 adet İngilizce ve Türkçe anahtar kelime yer almalıdır.
5. Çalışmaların başlıca şu unsurları içermesi gerekmektedir: İngilizce ve Türkçe başlık, öz ve anahtar kelimeler; ana metin bölümleri, son notlar ve kaynaklar.
6. Metin içi alıntılama ve kaynak gösterme için APA (American Psychological Association) kaynak sitilinin 6. versiyonu kullanılmalıdır. APA 6 stili hakkında bilgi için; <http://jps.istanbul.edu.tr/tr/content/yazarlara-bilgi/kaynaklar> sayfasını ziyaret edebilir veya Yazarlara Bilgi'nin Kaynaklar başlığı altında ilgili açıklama ve örnekleri inceleyebilirsiniz.
7. Çalışmalarda tablo, grafik ve şekil gibi göstergeler ancak çalışmanın takip edilebilmesi açısından gereklilik arz ettiği durumlarda, numaralandırılarak, tanımlayıcı bir başlık ile birlikte verilmelidir. Tablolara ait başlık üstte, Şekiller'e ait başlık altta yer almalıdır. Demografik özellikler gibi metin içinde verilebilecek veriler, ayrıca tablolar ile ifade edilmemelidir.
8. Yayınlanmak üzere gönderilen makale ile birlikte yazar bilgilerini içeren kapak sayfası gönderilmelidir. Kapak sayfasında, makalenin başlığı, yazar veya yazarların bağlı oldukları kurum ve unvanları, kendilerine ulaşılabilecek adresler, cep, iş ve faks numaraları ve e-posta adresleri yer almalıdır (bkz. Son Kontrol Listesi).
9. Kurallar dâhilinde dergimize yayınlanmak üzere gönderilen çalışmaların her türlü sorumluluğu yazar/yazarlarına aittir.
10. Yayın kurulu ve hakem raporları doğrultusunda yazarlardan, metin üzerinde bazı düzeltmeler yapmaları istenebilir.

KAYNAKLAR

Derleme yazıları okuyucular için bir konudaki kaynaklara ulaşmayı kolaylaştıran bir araç olsa da, her zaman orijinal çalışmayı doğru olarak yansıtmaz. Bu yüzden mümkün olduğunca yazarlar orijinal çalışmalarını kaynak göstermelidir. Öte yandan, bir konuda çok fazla sayıda orijinal çalışmanın kaynak gösterilmesi yer israfına neden olabilir. Birkaç anahtar orijinal çalışmanın kaynak gösterilmesi genelde uzun listelerle aynı işi görür. Ayrıca günümüzde kaynaklar elektronik versiyonlara eklenebilmekte ve okuyucular elektronik literatür taramalarıyla yayınlara kolaylıkla ulaşabilmektedir.

Kabul edilmiş ancak henüz sayıya dahil edilmemiş makaleler Early View olarak yayınlanır ve

bu makalelere atıflar “advance online publication” şeklinde verilmelidir. Genel bir kaynaktan elde edilemeyecek temel bir konu olmadıkça “kişisel iletişimlere” atıfta bulunulmamalıdır. Eğer atıfta bulunulursa parantez içinde iletişim kurulan kişinin adı ve iletişimin tarihi belirtilmelidir. Bilimsel makaleler için yazarlar bu kaynaktan yazılı izin ve iletişimin doğruluğunu gösterir belge almalıdır. Kaynakların doğruluğundan yazar(lar) sorumludur. Tüm kaynaklar metinde belirtilmelidir. Kaynaklar alfabetik olarak sıralanmalıdır.

Referans Stili ve Formatı

SIYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences, metin içi alıntılama ve kaynak gösterme için APA (American Psychological Association) kaynak sitilinin 6. edisyonunu benimser. APA 6. Edisyon hakkında bilgi için:

- American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American Psychological Association (6th ed.). Washington, DC: APA.
- <http://www.apastyle.org/>

Kaynakların doğruluğundan yazar(lar) sorumludur. Tüm kaynaklar metinde belirtilmelidir. Kaynaklar aşağıdaki örneklerdeki gibi gösterilmelidir.

Metin İçinde Kaynak Gösterme

Kaynaklar metinde parantez içinde yazarların soyadı ve yayın tarihi yazılarak belirtilmelidir. Birden fazla kaynak gösterilecekse kaynaklar arasında (;) işareti kullanılmalıdır. Kaynaklar alfabetik olarak sıralanmalıdır.

Örnekler:

Birden fazla kaynak;

(Esin ve ark., 2002; Karasar 1995)

Tek yazarlı kaynak;

(Akyolcu, 2007)

İki yazarlı kaynak;

(Sayiner ve Demirci, 2007, s. 72)

Üç, dört ve beş yazarlı kaynak;

Metin içinde ilk kullanımda: (Ailen, Ciambune ve Welch 2000, s. 12–13) Metin içinde tekrarlayan kullanımlarda: (Ailen ve ark., 2000)

Altı ve daha çok yazarlı kaynak;

(Çavdar ve ark., 2003)

Kaynaklar Bölümünde Kaynak Gösterme

Kullanılan tüm kaynaklar metnin sonunda ayrı bir bölüm halinde yazar soyadlarına göre alfabetik olarak numaralandırılmadan verilmelidir.

Kaynak yazımı ile ilgili örnekler aşağıda verilmiştir.

Kitap

a) Türkçe Kitap

Karasar, N. (1995). *Araştırmalarda rapor hazırlama* (8.bs). Ankara: 3A Eğitim Danışmanlık Ltd.

b) Türkçeye Çevrilmiş Kitap

Mucchielli, A. (1991). *Zihniyetler* (A. Kotil, Çev.). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

c) Editörlü Kitap

Ören, T., Üney, T. ve Çölkesen, R. (Ed.). (2006). *Türkiye bilişim ansiklopedisi*. İstanbul: Papatya Yayıncılık.

d) Çok Yazarlı Türkçe Kitap

Tonta, Y., Bitirim, Y. ve Sever, H. (2002). *Türkçe arama motorlarında performans değerlendirme*. Ankara: Total Bilişim.

e) İngilizce Kitap

Kamien R., & Kamien A. (2014). *Music: An appreciation*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education.

f) İngilizce Kitap İçerisinde Bölüm

Bassett, C. (2006). Cultural studies and new media. In G. Hall & C. Birchall (Eds.), *New cultural studies: Adventures in theory* (pp. 220–237). Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.

g) Türkçe Kitap İçerisinde Bölüm

Erkmen, T. (2012). Örgüt kültürü: Fonksiyonları, öğeleri, işletme yönetimi ve liderlikteki önemi. M. Zencirkıran (Ed.), *Örgüt sosyolojisi kitabı* içinde (s. 233–263). Bursa: Dora Basım Yayın.

h) Yayıncının ve Yazarın Kurum Olduğu Yayın

Türk Standartları Enstitüsü. (1974). *Adlandırma ilkeleri*. Ankara: Yazar.

Makale

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b) İngilizce Makale

de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (1999). The discursive construction of national identity. *Discourse and Society*, 10(2), 149–173. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926599010002002>

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Lal, H., Cunningham, A. L., Godeaux, O., Chlibek, R., Diez-Domingo, J., Hwang, S.-J. ... Heineman, T. C. (2015). Efficacy of an adjuvanted herpes zoster subunit vaccine in older adults. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 372, 2087–2096. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1501184>

d) DOI'si Olmayan Online Edinilmiş Makale

Al, U. ve Doğan, G. (2012). Hacettepe Üniversitesi Bilgi ve Belge Yönetimi Bölümü tezlerinin atf analizi. *Türk Kütüphaneciliği*, 26, 349–369. Erişim adresi: <http://www.tk.org.tr/>

e) DOI'si Olan Makale

Turner, S. J. (2010). Website statistics 2.0: Using Google Analytics to measure library website effectiveness. *Technical Services Quarterly*, 27, 261–278. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07317131003765910>

f) Advance Online Olarak Yayımlanmış Makale

Smith, J. A. (2010). Citing advance online publication: A review. *Journal of Psychology*. Advance online publication. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a45d7867>

g) Popüler Dergi Makalesi

Semerçioğlu, C. (2015, Haziran). Sıradanlığın rayihası. *Sabit Fikir*, 52, 38–39.

Tez, Sunum, Bildiri

a) Türkçe Tezler

Sarı, E. (2008). *Kültür kimlik ve politika: Mardin’de kültürlerarasılık*. (Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi). Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara.

b) Ticari Veritabanında Yer Alan Yüksek Lisans Ya da Doktora Tezi

Van Brunt, D. (1997). *Networked consumer health information systems* (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. (UMI No. 9943436)

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d) Web’de Yer Alan İngilizce Yüksek Lisans/Doktora Tezi

Tonta, Y. A. (1992). *An analysis of search failures in online library catalogs* (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley). Retrieved from <http://yunus.hacettepe.edu.tr/~tonta/yayinlar/phd/ickapak.html>

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g) Online Olarak Erişilen Konferans Bildiri Özeti

Çınar, M., Doğan, D. ve Seferoğlu, S. S. (2015, Şubat). *Eğitimde dijital araçlar: Google sınıf uygulaması üzerine bir değerlendirme* [Öz]. Akademik Bilişim Konferansında sunulan bildiri, Anadolu Üniversitesi, Eskişehir. Erişim adresi: [http://ab2015.anadolu.edu.tr /index.php?menu=5&submenu=27](http://ab2015.anadolu.edu.tr/index.php?menu=5&submenu=27)

h) Düzenli Olarak Online Yayınlanan Bildiriler

Herculano-Houzel, S., Collins, C. E., Wong, P., Kaas, J. H., & Lent, R. (2008). The basic nonuniformity of the cerebral cortex. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 105, 12593-12598. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0805417105>

i) Kitap Şeklinde Yayınlanan Bildiriler

Schneider, R. (2013). Research data literacy. S. Kurbanoglu ve ark. (Ed.), *Communications in Computer and Information Science: Vol. 397. Worldwide Communalities and Challenges in Information Literacy Research and Practice* içinde (s. 134-140). Cham, İsviçre: Springer. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03919-0>

j) Kongre Bildirisi

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b) Online Gazete Yazısı

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Marcoux, A. (2008). Business ethics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*. Retrieved from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-business/>

e) Podcast

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Shore, D. (Senarist), Jackson, M. (Senarist) ve Bookstaver, S. (Yönetmen). (2012). Runaways [Televizyon dizisi bölümü]. D. Shore (Baş yapımcı), *House M.D.* içinde. New York, NY: Fox Broadcasting.

g) Müzik Kaydı

Say, F. (2009). Galata Kulesi. *İstanbul senfonisi* [CD] içinde. İstanbul: Ak Müzik.

SON KONTROL LİSTESİ

Aşağıdaki listede eksik olmadığından emin olun:

- Editöre mektup
 - ✓ Makalenin türü
 - ✓ Başka bir dergiye gönderilmemiş olduğu bilgisi
 - ✓ Sponsor veya ticari bir firma ile ilişkisi (varsa belirtiniz)
 - ✓ İstatistik kontrolünün yapıldığı (araştırma makaleleri için)
 - ✓ İngilizce yönünden kontrolünün yapıldığı
 - ✓ Yazarlara Bilgide detaylı olarak anlatılan dergi politikalarının gözden geçirildiği
 - ✓ Kaynakların APA6'ya göre belirtildiği
- Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu
- Daha önce basılmış ve telifle bağlı materyal (yazı-resim-tablo) kullanılmış ise izin belgesi
- Kapak sayfası
 - ✓ Makalenin türü
 - ✓ Makalenin Türkçe ve İngilizce başlığı
 - ✓ Yazarların ismi soyadı, unvanları ve bağlı oldukları kurumlar (üniversite ve fakülte bilgisinden sonra şehir ve ülke bilgisi de yer almalıdır), e-posta adresleri
 - ✓ Sorumlu yazarın e-posta adresi, açık yazışma adresi, iş telefonu, GSM, faks nosu
 - ✓ Tüm yazarların ORCID'leri

- Makale ana metni
 - ✓ Makalenin İngilizce ve Türkçe başlığı
 - ✓ Özetler: 180-200 kelime İngilizce ve Türkçe
 - ✓ Anahtar Kelimeler: 3-5 adet İngilizce ve Türkçe
 - ✓ Makale ana metin bölümleri
 - ✓ Finansal destek (varsa belirtiniz)
 - ✓ Çıkar çatışması (varsa belirtiniz)
 - ✓ Etik Kurul İzni (varsa belirtiniz)
 - ✓ Teşekkür (varsa belirtiniz)
 - ✓ Kaynaklar
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AIM AND SCOPE

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b) Book Translated into Turkish

Mucchielli, A. (1991). *Zihniyetler* [Mindsets] (A. Kotil, Trans.). İstanbul, Turkey: İletişim Yayınları.

c) Edited Book

Ören, T., Üney, T., & Çölkesen, R. (Eds.). (2006). *Türkiye bilişim ansiklopedisi* [Turkish Encyclopedia of Informatics]. İstanbul, Turkey: Papatya Yayıncılık.

d) Turkish Book with Multiple Authors

Tonta, Y., Bitirim, Y., & Sever, H. (2002). *Türkçe arama motorlarında performans değerlendirme* [Performance evaluation in Turkish search engines]. Ankara, Turkey: Total Bilişim.

e) Book in English

Kamien R., & Kamien A. (2014). *Music: An appreciation*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education.

f) Chapter in an Edited Book

Bassett, C. (2006). Cultural studies and new media. In G. Hall & C. Birchall (Eds.), *New cultural studies: Adventures in theory* (pp. 220–237). Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.

g) Chapter in an Edited Book in Turkish

Erkmen, T. (2012). Örgüt kültürü: Fonksiyonları, öğeleri, işletme yönetimi ve liderlikteki önemi [Organization culture: Its functions, elements and importance in leadership and business management]. In M. Zencirkıran (Ed.), *Örgüt sosyolojisi* [Organization sociology] (pp. 233–263). Bursa, Turkey: Dora Basım Yayın.

h) Book with the same organization as author and publisher

American Psychological Association. (2009). *Publication manual of the American psychological association* (6th ed.). Washington, DC: Author.

Article

a) Turkish Article

Mutlu, B., & Savaşer, S. (2007). Çocuğu ameliyat sonrası yoğun bakımda olan ebeveynlerde stres nedenleri ve azaltma girişimleri [Source and intervention reduction of stress for parents whose children are in intensive care unit after surgery]. *Istanbul University Florence Nightingale Journal of Nursing*, 15(60), 179–182.

b) English Article

de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (1999). The discursive construction of national identity. *Discourse and Society*, 10(2), 149–173. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926599010002002>

c) Journal Article with DOI and More Than Seven Authors

Lal, H., Cunningham, A. L., Godeaux, O., Chlibek, R., Diez-Domingo, J., Hwang, S.-J. ... Heineman, T. C. (2015). Efficacy of an adjuvanted herpes zoster subunit vaccine in older adults. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 372, 2087–2096. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1501184>

d) Journal Article from Web, without DOI

Sidani, S. (2003). Enhancing the evaluation of nursing care effectiveness. *Canadian Journal of Nursing Research*, 35(3), 26–38. Retrieved from <http://cjr.mcgill.ca>

e) Journal Article with DOI

Turner, S. J. (2010). Website statistics 2.0: Using Google Analytics to measure library website effectiveness. *Technical Services Quarterly*, 27, 261–278. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07317131003765910>

f) Advance Online Publication

Smith, J. A. (2010). Citing advance online publication: A review. *Journal of Psychology: Advance online publication*. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a45d7867>

g) Article in a Magazine

Henry, W. A., III. (1990, April 9). Making the grade in today's schools. *Time*, 135, 28–31.

Doctoral Dissertation, Master's Thesis, Presentation, Proceeding

a) Dissertation/Thesis from a Commercial Database

Van Brunt, D. (1997). *Networked consumer health information systems* (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 9943436)

b) Dissertation/Thesis from an Institutional Database

Yaylılı-Yıldız, B. (2014). *University campuses as places of potential publicness: Exploring the politicals, social and cultural practices in Ege University* (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from Retrieved from: <http://library.iyte.edu.tr/tr/hizli-erisim/iyte-tez-portali>

c) Dissertation/Thesis from Web

Tonta, Y. A. (1992). *An analysis of search failures in online library catalogs* (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley). Retrieved from <http://yunus.hacettepe.edu.tr/~tonta/yayinlar/phd/ickapak.html>

d) Dissertation/Thesis abstracted in Dissertations Abstracts International

Appelbaum, L. G. (2005). Three studies of human information processing: Texture amplification, motion representation, and figure-ground segregation. *Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B. Sciences and Engineering*, 65(10), 5428.

e) Symposium Contribution

Krinsky-McHale, S. J., Zigman, W. B., & Silverman, W. (2012, August). Are neuropsychiatric symptoms markers of prodromal Alzheimer's disease in adults with Down syndrome? In W. B. Zigman (Chair), *Predictors of mild cognitive impairment, dementia, and mortality in adults with Down syndrome*. Symposium conducted at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Orlando, FL.

f) Conference Paper Abstract Retrieved Online

Liu, S. (2005, May). *Defending against business crises with the help of intelligent agent based early warning solutions*. Paper presented at the Seventh International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems, Miami, FL. Abstract retrieved from http://www.iceis.org/iceis2005/abstracts_2005.htm

g) Conference Paper - In Regularly Published Proceedings and Retrieved Online

Herculano-Houzel, S., Collins, C. E., Wong, P., Kaas, J. H., & Lent, R. (2008). The basic nonuniformity of the cerebral cortex. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 105, 12593–12598. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0805417105>

h) Proceeding in Book Form

Parsons, O. A., Pryzwansky, W. B., Weinstein, D. J., & Wiens, A. N. (1995). Taxonomy for psychology. In J. N. Reich, H. Sands, & A. N. Wiens (Eds.), *Education and training beyond the doctoral degree: Proceedings of the American Psychological Association National Conference on Postdoctoral Education and Training in Psychology* (pp. 45–50). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

i) Paper Presentation

Nguyen, C. A. (2012, August). *Humor and deception in advertising: When laughter may not be the best medicine*. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Orlando, FL.

Other Sources

a) Newspaper Article

Browne, R. (2010, March 21). This brainless patient is no dummy. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 45.

b) Newspaper Article with no Author

New drug appears to sharply cut risk of death from heart failure. (1993, July 15). *The Washington Post*, p. A12.

c) Web Page/Blog Post

Bordwell, D. (2013, June 18). David Koepp: Making the world movie-sized [Web log post]. Retrieved from <http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/page/27/>

d) Online Encyclopedia/Dictionary

Ignition. (1989). In *Oxford English online dictionary* (2nd ed.). Retrieved from <http://dictionary.oed.com>

Marcoux, A. (2008). Business ethics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.). *The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*. Retrieved from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-business/>

e) Podcast

Dunning, B. (Producer). (2011, January 12). *in Fact: Conspiracy theories* [Video podcast]. Retrieved from <http://itunes.apple.com/>

f) Single Episode in a Television Series

Egan, D. (Writer), & Alexander, J. (Director). (2005). Failure to communicate. [Television series episode]. In D. Shore (Executive producer), *House*; New York, NY: Fox Broadcasting.

g) Music

Fuchs, G. (2004). Light the menorah. On *Eight nights of Hanukkah* [CD]. Brick, NJ: Kid Kosher.

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