


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Navigating Diplomacy: A Text Analysis of Sino-American Public Diplomacy and the Resolution of Saudi-Iranian Tensions

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Abstract

This study analyzes the divergent approaches of Sino-American public diplomacy in the context of Saudi-Iranian reconciliation. Utilizing text analysis of governmental policy documents, this research explores how China, and the United States employ distinct strategies in Middle Eastern when dealing with the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran between 2016-2023. While the United States historically emphasizes the promotion of democratic values and human rights, China adopts a pragmatic, economic-focused approach, as exemplified by its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In March 2023, the reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran facilitated by Chinese government, underscores the effectiveness of China's strategy emphasizing non-interference, mutual benefits, and economic development. The findings suggest that China's approach, centered around economic cooperation and non-interference, may offer a new "Chinese model" for conflict resolution in the Middle East areas. The paper contributes to the understanding of shifting global diplomatic dynamics and the potential for alternative conflict resolution methods in a complex regional landscape.



Introduction

The landscape of Middle Eastern geopolitics is dynamic and intricate, characterized by the interweaving of ideological and religious issues with both domestic and international frameworks. This interplay gives rise to a myriad of complex relationships and interactions among Islamic countries (Cerioli, 2018: 295). Saudi Arabia and Iran, while sharing the foundational roots of Islam, showcase significant contrasts in their internal attributes, stemming from diverse interpretations of religious doctrines, cultural backgrounds, and political systems. The conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran dates back to the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, marked by ideological differences and regional power struggles. Tensions escalated with the severance of diplomatic relations in 1988, following confrontations and mutual distrust.

After the Cold War, both the United States (US) and China have been actively involved in addressing Middle Eastern issues. The United States has been an important participant in the Middle East's geopolitical landscape, marked by key interventions such as the Gulf and Iraq Wars, support in the Yemen Civil War, and a strategic shift with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) withdrawal, all reflecting its ongoing engagement and complex relationships in the region. The interests of the country are wide-ranging, leading to the complexity of its specific policies.

On March 10, 2023, under China's mediation, Iran and Saudi Arabia restored diplomatic relations after seven years since 2016. The three countries announced an agreement that included the restoration of diplomatic ties, with the reopening of each other's embassies and representative offices within two months; an emphasis on respecting national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs; and an agreement for the foreign ministers of both countries to meet, arrange the dispatch of ambassadors, and discuss strengthening bilateral relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2023). The successful reconciliation shows China's growing involvement in the Middle East area and reshaping the dynamic. Until 2024, China has established comprehensive strategic partnerships or strategic partnerships with 12 Arab nations. Furthermore, twenty-one Arab states, in addition to the Arab League, have officially joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Aluf, 2024).

The successful reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia prompts our research question: What different approaches to public diplomacy have China and the US adopted in addressing issues in the Middle East? Why was China able to facilitate the reconciliation between

Saudi Arabia and Iran? While the US has historically played a key role in the Middle East, its efforts at conflict resolution have been deeply influenced by western values and strategic interests. While with the rise of China as a significant player on the global stage, a new pattern of conflict resolution begins to emerge. China's approach offers a new perspective that diverges from traditional western methods, exploring alternative pathways for peace and stability in the Middle East.

To answer the question, our research is organized in three parts. We first examine the existing literature on the ideology of public diplomacy in both China and the US and propose our hypotheses on the discussed issue. In the second part, we have selected the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, spanning from the severance of diplomatic ties in 2016 to the reconciliation in 2023, as a case study. Through text analysis of publicly released governmental policy documents, we aim to categorize and accentuate the divergent public policy strategies of China and the US to substantiate our hypothesis. Our objective is to identify and illustrate the distinct strategies employed by each country in addressing the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, using visual representations such as graphs of frequently used words to support our findings. In the last part, we discussed divergences in diplomatic approaches between the US and China, offering our analyses based on the results obtained.

1. US and China's Participation in the Middle East

Public diplomacy, fundamentally defined as the strategic engagement and relationship management between countries and foreign publics or governments, stands as a cornerstone of modern international politics. This conception evolved notably during the Cold War, primarily in reaction to the expanding reach of mass media and the escalating influence of public opinion (Snow, 2020: 23). In the context of today's globalized environment, the role of public diplomacy is increasingly critical, shaping the international perception of a nation and steering its foreign engagements (Gurgu, 2016: 127). According to Cull (2008: 43), public diplomacy transcends the mere boundaries of being an ancillary function of international relations; rather, it is integral to the fabric of global communication, fostering substantive connections between nations, their citizens, and governmental frameworks. This paradigm is underscored by its significant impact on foreign policy formulation and decision-making processes (Daimah, 2022).

In the arena of conflict mediation, public diplomacy emerges as a pivotal tool in the phases of conflict prevention, resolution, and post-conflict reconciliation (Melissen, 2005: 145).



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This form of diplomacy facilitates the alteration of perceptions and fosters mutual understanding through strategic communication and engagement, thereby laying the groundwork for peaceful negotiations and diplomatic resolutions (Potter, 2008: 67; Sheaffer, 2009: 449). A critical component of this strategy is news management, which involves the strategic control and dissemination of information to manage public perceptions and maintain favorable media coverage during diplomatic crises. By shaping media narratives, news management not only supports negotiation processes but also plays a crucial role in preventing the escalation of conflicts (Leonard, 2002). Effective news management requires a proactive approach to communication, ensuring that all media releases and public statements support a coherent diplomatic strategy. This includes the timing of communications to maximize impact, choosing the right channels to reach target audiences, and framing messages to align with diplomatic objectives. The ability to manage news effectively can calm tensions and pave the way for effective dialogue, thereby enhancing the prospects for successful mediation.

Furthermore, the involvement of third parties in mediation and political engagement contributes significantly to the peacebuilding process, creating vital political avenues for dialogue and discourse (Papagianni, 2010: 250). Zartman (1985: 28) argues that the efficacy of a mediator is attributed to their capacity to foster a desirable outcome and redistribute the balance of power among conflicting parties. The strategies of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention are crucial for halting the progression of armed conflicts before they intensify (Zyck, 2012: 68).

1.1. The US's Value-Driven Public Diplomacy

American public diplomacy has traditionally been tied to the promotion of its core democratic values – freedom, equality, and democracy. This characteristic can be traced back to President Wilson's advocacy for national self-determination in the aftermath of World War I. Fast-forwarding to the 21st century, the endeavors of the US to implant democratic systems in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan serve as contemporary examples of this ongoing commitment to the propagation of democratic principles (Zakaria, 2008: 13). Fast-forwarding to the dawn of the 21st century, the narrative of US international interaction remains imbued with its enduring dedication to the propagation of democratic values. The endeavors of the US to institute democratic systems in war-torn countries like Iraq and Afghanistan can be seen as contemporary manifestations of this ongoing commitment (Berman, 2003).

Owing to its global leadership position, the US has been a central figure in the development of international security measures since World War II, adopting a strategy profoundly rooted in its core values (Stasinopoulos, 2003: 311). This strategy is characterized by a multifaceted approach that includes the application of military force, arms control, and the advancement of democracy and human rights (Murphy, 2003: 3). Particularly following the events of September 11, the US has significantly influenced the progression of international security institutions, illustrating its substantial impact in this realm (Chainoglou, 2011: 25). Moreover, US involvement in the international law concerning global security reflects its stance on multilateral institutions, its initiatives in the War on Terror, and its navigation of competitive geopolitical landscapes (Jorgensen, 2020). In implementing its strategy, the US emphasizes enhancing the capabilities of partner nations to address security threats effectively, with news management ensuring that such engagements are perceived as collaborative and constructive, rather than imperialistic.

However, the role of the U.S. as a global champion of democracy can sometimes lead to interventionist policies. According to Ikenberry (2001: 19), the US playing the role of a global champion of democracy can often result in interventionist policies that ignore the nuances of local political and cultural dynamics. The imposition of American-styled democracy can inadvertently exacerbate internal conflicts and disrupt traditional structures of governance. This highlights the inherent complexity and controversial nature of democracy promotion as a key facet of American public diplomacy. It raises questions about the practicality and efficiency of this approach, given the varying socio-cultural landscapes across different countries (Nye, 2004: 134). Furthermore, some other scholars also doubts whether the US's interventions were really motivated by its commitment to global security and democracy, or the US just used global security and democracy as a strategic narrative tool in the matrix of contemporary geopolitical maneuvers, particularly evident in Kosovo and Iraq (Hehir, 2009; Ritter, 2003). These studies reveal the multi-faceted nature of US public diplomacy, which encompasses an intricate interplay between its commitment to democratic ideals and the crucial reality of its implementation.

1.2. China's Pragmatic Public Diplomacy

In contrast to the US's values-driven diplomacy, China adopts a pragmatically economic approach to its public diplomacy. With its historical context and unique sociopolitical structure, China tends to prioritize economic development over ideological exportation in its diplomatic

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endeavors, notably the BRI. The BRI, proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013, is a clear reflection of this approach. It involves an ambitious plan to boost trade and stimulate economic growth across Asia and beyond by investing massively in infrastructure projects, including ports, roads, and railways. This plan, as Wang (2016) argues, is aimed at enhancing China's economic prowess and strategic influence, albeit devoid of direct ideological imposition. News management plays a critical role in China's public diplomacy by carefully curating the narrative surrounding China's international engagements to emphasize mutual economic benefits and cooperation rather than dominance or geopolitical maneuvering. Callahan (2015) examines China's pursuit of a "new type of international relations", distinct from the "American-led liberal international order". According to him, China seeks to build its global image and influence through partnerships based on mutual economic benefit rather than overtly exporting its political or social values. This form of relationship building presents a contrast to American normative power, which largely relies on the diffusion of its political model and democratic values.

China's security strategy has been also characterized as pragmatic, primarily centering on strengthening bilateral relationships (Tow, 2011: 157). According to Liu (2017: 151), China has encountered a blend of conventional and unconventional security challenges, prompting a strategic pivot towards providing public security goods and aligning with the interests of significant international stakeholders. This strategic shift marks a divergence from the US's security approach, inclining more towards cooperative security measures (Yahuda, 2003). Saunders (2020) points out that China's global military and security engagements have not only intensified but have also embraced traditional military objectives alongside military diplomacy. This broader engagement is part of China's evolving international conduct, which now features a more prominent role in global security (Medeiros, 2009: 37). Nonetheless, Heath (2018) posits that the global ramifications of China's quest for overseas security has provoked significant debate and concern.

China's diplomatic strategy, with its pragmatic emphasis, presents a complicated situation for the global order. Critics often argue that it is akin to a double-edged sword with profound implications. On one hand, China has positioned itself as a key economic player and financier in developing countries, providing significant loans and investments. However, many scholars argue that the "no-strings-attached" nature of these financial interactions may ensnare these developing nations into a problematic debt trap, severely jeopardizing their fiscal stability and future growth

(Brautigam, 2020). There is also an ongoing debate about China's willingness to engage with authoritarian regimes. Critics argue that this approach undermines the promotion of democratic values and encourages the perpetuation of autocratic governance worldwide (Shambaugh, 2020: 13). This position is problematic as it seemingly contradicts the global aspiration for upholding and promoting human rights and democratic processes (Nye, 2021: 9). In essence, the economic orientation of Chinese diplomacy creates a nuanced debate about its long-term effects on international relations and global stability.

2. Research Hypothesis

We formulate two hypotheses derived from the reviewed literature that articulate the distinct features of public diplomacy as practiced by the US and China.

Hypothesis 1: American public diplomacy is driven by a combination of the promotion of democratic values such as freedom, equality, and democracy, as well as the pursuit of national interests.

This hypothesis is grounded in the historical and ideological foundations of American foreign policy. The US has consistently positioned itself as a global champion of democracy, aiming to shape international norms and governance structures in alignment with its foundational values. This approach has been evident in various American diplomatic and international aid efforts, particularly in the post-World War II era and more recently in the reconstruction efforts of countries like Iraq and Afghanistan.

Hypothesis 2: Chinese public diplomacy adopts a pragmatic and economic-focused approach, prioritizing economic development and international partnerships over the exportation of ideological values.

In contrast to the American approach, China's public diplomacy is hypothesized to be characterized by pragmatism and an emphasis on economic relationships. Initiatives such as the BRI exemplify China's strategy of leveraging economic investments and infrastructure development to bolster its global influence and strategic interests. This hypothesis suggests that China's diplomatic efforts are less about exporting a particular political ideology and more about establishing a network of economic partnerships and dependencies.



3. Conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran

To evaluate our hypotheses, we intend to examine the reconciliation orchestrated by the Chinese government as a case study, contrasting the public policy strategies of China and the US. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been engaged in a prolonged state of conflict. Following the victory of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979, the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran pursued an internal and external strategy of “neither East nor West, only Islamic”. At that time, Iran considered Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries as the primary targets of its “exporting revolution” policy, leading to a comprehensive confrontation in the Iran-Saudi relations (Liu, 2023: 18). In the 1980s, Iran and Iraq erupted into war, during which Saudi Arabia chose to support Iraq in an attempt to contain Iran’s potential for external expansion. In July 1987, strained relations reached a critical point during a conflict in Mecca, resulting in the tragic deaths of 275 Iranians. This led to protests in Tehran and caused the death of a Saudi diplomat. As a consequence, Saudi Arabia announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Iran in April 1988 for the first time.

In 1989, following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Ali Khamenei succeeded him as the Supreme Leader of Iran. During the presidency of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani from 1989 to 1997, Iran, facing domestic economic difficulties and the disastrous consequences of the Iran-Iraq War, adopted a more moderate foreign policy approach. Improving relations with Gulf Arab states became a priority. After Iran restored diplomatic relations with Iraq in 1990, it reestablished diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia in 1991. After Mohammad Khatami was elected as President of Iran in May 1997, the Iranian government pursued a moderate diplomatic policy, making efforts to improve relations with Gulf countries. While Iraq War in 2003 led to a sudden and severe shift in the situation in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf region, where sectarian conflicts increasingly intensified. In the year of 2011, the Arab Spring fuels bilateral tensions and further speeded up the competition among Gulf countries (Aydın, 2013: 124). Iran and Saudi Arabia again cut ties in 2016 due to the attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran and the Saudi consulate in Mashhad, following the execution of a prominent Shiite cleric by the Saudi government.

The Middle Eastern foreign policies of China and the US are vastly different, reflecting deep disparities in the public diplomacy philosophies of the two countries (Yao and Tian, 2023: 24). On March 10, 2023, China, Saudi Arabia, and Iran issued a tripartite joint statement in Beijing, announcing that Saudi Arabia and Iran had reached an agreement to restore diplomatic

relations. The reconciliation agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran marked an end to seven years of hostility and decades of political rivalry. Both parties agreed to reactivate the security cooperation agreement signed on April 17, 2001 (22nd of 1st month, 1422 Hijri), and the general agreement signed on May 27, 1998 (2nd of 2nd month, 1419 Hijri), encompassing economic, trade, investment, technology, science, cultural, sports, and youth fields. The announcement by Saudi Arabia and Iran to restore diplomatic relations marks a constructive role played by China's active mediation. This stands in stark contrast to the long-standing approach of the US in the Middle East, which has involved forming alliances and exacerbating conflicts. We selected the severance of diplomatic ties in 2016 to the reconciliation in 2023 as our study period to further explore the differences between China and US' public diplomacy when dealing with the conflict issue.

4. Methodology

4.1. Framing

The concept of framing in the media serves to simplify and interpret complex issues for public consumption (Kim et al., 2002: 10). This simplification process is critical in the realm of news, where information must be made accessible and understandable to a broad audience. According to Robert Entman (1993: 52), framing involves selecting and highlighting certain aspects of perceived reality within a communicative text to promote a particular understanding or perspective. This includes defining problems, suggesting causes, passing moral judgments, and recommending solutions. The strategic choice of what to include and what to omit can significantly influence the audience's perception and interpretation of events and issues. This theory helps explain how framing can shape individuals' perceptions and understandings by attributing particular causes or solutions to events or issues. By framing a situation in a certain light, media can guide the audience towards a specific viewpoint or understanding, impacting their perception and potentially their actions in response to the issue at hand.

The importance of framing extends into the analysis of public diplomacy, where it shapes how national policies and actions are perceived internationally. Scholars have done a lot of research delving into the framing processes in public diplomacy and their impact on public audiences (Snow, 2004: 474; Pan and Kosicki, 1993: 57). Their studies suggest that the way information is framed can affect the public's understanding and attitude towards foreign policies and international relations. Specific words, phrases, or metaphors that seem to carry a lot of



weight or are repeated throughout the text. These often indicate what is the emphasis and can point towards the underlying frame.

5. Data Collection

To answer the research question, we utilized the text analysis software NVivo to examine the frequency of word usage. NVivo supports multiple languages, including English and Chinese, allowing for comprehensive data analysis. The analysis of China and United State's public policies is carried out through the lens of framing to identify the area of focus in the policy-making and how they deal with the relationships between the countries in the international domain. The online data and information we gathered for this research span from January 4, 2016, to June 19, 2023. This seven-year period marks the timeframe from when Iran and Saudi Arabia severed their relations completely, until their reconciliation on March 10, 2023, facilitated by China's negotiation efforts.

We have gathered official documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, with a particular focus on Saudi Arabia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China, 2024a) and Iran (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China, 2024b). These documents are listed under the tab of nations and organizations including related news, spokesman's speech, speech, and official files.

We also collected the official documents from the U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Saudi Arabia (U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Saudi Arabia, 2024) and U.S. Virtual Embassy Iran (U.S. Virtual Embassy Iran, 2024a; 2024b). The text we collect includes news, speeches, press releases, and events.

Owing to the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China does not translate every document into English, we have chosen to use the original Chinese texts for a comprehensive study. To ensure clarity and reference, we have included the translated texts along with the original Chinese words in the appendix. We have chosen to focus on the top ten most frequently used words, excluding names of places and conjunction words for a more substantial and relevant analysis.

6. Result

The graph shows the top ten most frequently used words, excluding names of places and conjunction words in each country.

In our text analysis of official Chinese documents, the ten most frequently used terms were: “cooperation” (appearing 1390 times), “development” (1093 times), “bilateral” (707 times), “international” (702 times), “mutual” (547 times), “security” (451 times), “peace” (359 times), “stable” (333 times), “economic” (302 times), and “dialogue” (222 times). These terms highlight China’s emphasis on collaboration, growth, and stability in its foreign policy discourse.

The recurrent utilization of the term “cooperation” signifies a central tenet within China’s foreign policy, highlighting a commitment to fostering collaborative relationships with other nations, particularly within the realms of economic and developmental cooperation. This alignment is congruent with China’s active promotion of the BRI, aimed at facilitating regional and global economic integration through substantial investments in infrastructure and facilitation of trade partnerships. Additionally, the frequent recurrence of the terms “development” and “economy” underscores China’s steadfast dedication to fostering economic growth and advancement, reflecting the pragmatic orientation of its foreign policy, which prioritizes economic imperatives and developmental objectives. Moreover, the deployment of terms such as “bilateral” and “international” indicates China’s diplomatic approach, emphasizing the significance of bilateral engagements alongside active participation in multilateral international forums and organizations. The incorporation of terms such as “mutual”, “security”, “peace”, and “stability” reveals China’s emphasis on principles of mutual respect, regional security, as well as the pursuit of peace and stability in its foreign relations. This underscores China’s commitment to non-interference and the pursuit of common security objectives.

The utilization of the term “dialogue” illustrates China’s preference for diplomatic discourse and negotiation as a means to address international conflicts and foster collaborative international relations. Usage of these terms elucidates the fundamental characteristics of China’s foreign policy, which revolves around economic centrality and underscores cooperation, development, mutual respect, and stability, while also emphasizing the resolution of international disputes through dialogue and diplomatic channels. From our textual analysis of official documents released by the US, the top ten most frequently used terms are: “security” (appearing 462 times), “rights” (372 times), “international” (354 times), “human” (236 times), “woman” (225 times), “terrorist” (191 times), “financial” (181 times), “media” (166 times), “individual” (157 times), and “sanction” (151 times). These terms underscore the U.S.’ emphasis on security, human rights, and financial stability in its foreign policy discourse.



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The frequent use of the term “security” indicates that the US’ foreign policy emphasizes national and international security, particularly in combating terrorism and maintaining regional stability. The recurrent inclusion of terms such as “rights”, “human rights”, and “women” serves to underscore the paramount importance that the US attributes to the safeguarding of human rights, particularly in the context of advancing women’s rights and achieving gender equality. This underscores the values-oriented character inherent in the US foreign policy, which prioritizes the advancement of democratic principles and human rights values. Additionally, the utilization of the term “international” signifies the proactive engagement of the US within multilateral international frameworks and organizations when navigating international affairs. The presence of terms such as “terrorists”, “finance”, and “sanctions” elucidates the emphasis placed by the US foreign policy on counterterrorism efforts, ensuring financial stability, and leveraging sanctions as diplomatic instruments. The usage of terms like “media” and “individual” underscores the emphasis placed by the US on the role of media and the protection of individual rights within its foreign policy agenda. In summary, the recurrent incorporation of these terms unveils the foundational elements of the values-driven nature inherent in the US foreign policy, which prioritizes the protection of human rights, the promotion of core values, and the resolution of international issues through concerted efforts involving multilateral cooperation and judicious use of sanctions.

As depicted in Figure 1, China and the US exhibit notable differences in handling international policies, particularly concerning relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran, despite both countries’ significant focus on regional security. These differences not only reflect distinct geopolitical strategic orientations but also exhibit their respective ideological viewpoints and core principles of foreign policy. In contrast, the analysis of US foreign policy discourse underscores the emphasis on human rights and financial stability. This indicates a preference in US foreign policy for promoting democratic values and human rights, while utilizing sanctions as means to uphold international order and security. These divergent approaches reflect the differing roles and influences of the two countries on the international stage, as well as their distinct strategies in addressing international conflicts and promoting reconciliation.




Figure 1. *The Frequently Used Frame by China and US*

7. Discussion

The notable differences between China and the US in their approaches to relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran not only reflect distinct geopolitical strategic orientations between the two nations but also underscore their respective ideological viewpoints and core principles of public policies.

7.1. Challenges of the US Values-Driven Diplomatic Strategy in the Middle East

Rooted in its liberal democratic tradition, the US places significant emphasis on a range of Western values, including individual freedom, secular governance, political pluralism, and economic liberalism. These principles form the cornerstone of US diplomacy and often shape its foreign policy. However, these values may face numerous challenges in Middle Eastern countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran, due to significant differences with the cultural, religious, and social norms of these nations (Esposito, 1992). Saudi Arabia is renowned for its strict adherence to Sunni Islam, particularly the interpretation provided by the Wahhabi sect, which guides its societal and political life. The country's restrictions on women's rights and freedom of speech starkly contrast with Western liberal values. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia operates under an absolute monarchy, lacking elected parliamentary institutions at the national level, which differs from the



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norms of democratic political participation. While Iran is a theocratic republic, with Shia Islam occupying a central position in its political structure. The Supreme Leader, a religious figure, holds ultimate authority and wields significant influence over all government departments. Despite Iran having electoral institutions such as the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the presidency, candidates must obtain approval from the Guardian Council to ensure their alignment with the principles of the Islamic Revolution (Hiro, 1989). The enforcement of religious laws in both countries reflects a strong interaction between religion and politics, contrasting sharply with the Western values often advocated in US diplomacy. Given these cultural and political differences, the American-style values-driven democracy may be perceived as undermining traditional norms and threatening the established political systems of Saudi Arabia and Iran (Hassan, 2015: 479).

Human rights issues also play a significant role in US foreign policy in the Middle East. The human rights records of countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran differ significantly from the liberal democratic values advocated by the US, complicating diplomatic relations with these nations. Saudi Arabia has faced ongoing criticism for its human rights record, particularly concerning freedom of speech, women's rights, and treatment of minority groups (Ghaziani and Ghaziani, 2022: 310). The high-profile murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 brought global attention to the country's press freedom situation. Despite some recent progress in women's rights, such as allowing women to drive and participate in public activities, institutional shortcomings remain significant barriers to full women's rights. Iran's human rights record is also troubling, criticized for restricting freedom of speech and association, mistreating racial and religious minority groups, and implementing harsh punishments without fair trials. (Gadd et. al., 2017) Iran's treatment of LGBTQ+ individuals is also a subject of criticism, as homosexuality is considered a crime under Iranian law. These human rights abuses contrast sharply with the liberal democratic values upheld by the US, posing a challenge to the US diplomatic relations with these countries as it seeks to balance advocating for human rights improvements with geopolitical realities and national security interests. Finding a balance between promoting its values and safeguarding strategic interests is a complex and challenging task for the US.

Given the significant cultural and political differences highlighted in the preceding discussion, the US intervention in Middle Eastern affairs has been characterized as interventionism and geopolitical manipulation, leading to longstanding disputes in the region and persistent distrust of the US (Ricks, 2006). A prominent example is the 1953 coup in Iran,

orchestrated jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US and the intelligence agencies of the United Kingdom, with the aim of overthrowing Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who was seeking to nationalize Iran's oil industry at the time. The outcome of the coup was the reinstatement of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, whose authoritarian rule persisted until the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Many Iranians vividly remember the role played by the US in this event, viewing it as a typical example of Western interference in their country's affairs, further fueling distrust of the US (Kinzer, 2003). In the case of Saudi Arabia, its relationship with the US is more complex. While the US has long been the main supplier of arms to Saudi Arabia and has provided support in its regional conflicts, this connection is often seen as transactional, based on shared interests in oil and regional security rather than shared cultural or political values (Vitalis, 2006). Consequently, Saudi Arabia may approach with skepticism and caution the reconciliation methods advocated by the US, viewing them as another form of Western intervention in regional affairs. On February 12, 2024, China exhibited the FC-31 fighter model at the Saudi Defense Show, highlighting potential military cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia (Choi, 2024). However, military procurement was suspended following a bilateral agreement with the United States on May 2, 2024 (Nardelli, Jacobs, & Martin, 2024). This development indicates Saudi Arabia's interest in exploring new avenues for military collaboration despite existing commitments.

In addition to external factors, domestic politics pose significant challenges to formulating a comprehensive strategy to resolve the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In any democratic country, the decision-making process of foreign policy is profoundly influenced by a range of domestic political factors, a reality that the US policymakers must carefully navigate. Public opinion and media narratives are key factors shaping the US foreign policy (Gilboa, 2005). Extensive media coverage of issues such as Iran's nuclear program, human rights concerns in Saudi Arabia, and their roles in regional conflicts shapes public perceptions in the US. Consequently, public opinion tends to be skeptical of these countries, leaning towards supporting a hardline policy rather than engagement or compromise. Politicians advocating for a more conciliatory approach may face opposition from voters, making the adoption of nuanced diplomatic strategies challenging. Additionally, lobbying activities by interest groups further complicate the US' ability to promote reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Influential lobbying groups, including pro-Israeli organizations, defense industry interests, and various human rights organizations, seek to shape the US policy towards these countries. For example,



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pro-Israeli lobbying groups wield significant influence, and policies perceived as favorable to Iran often face significant resistance in the US due to tensions between Iran and Israel. These lobbying efforts may influence decision-makers, hindering efforts for more cooperative diplomacy. Another factor influencing the US foreign policy is partisan political inconsistency. With changes in government, the US policy towards the Middle East may undergo drastic changes, as evidenced by the transition from the Obama administration's Iran nuclear deal to the Trump administration's "maximum pressure" strategy (Joo bani and Daheshvar, 2020). These policy shifts reflect differing viewpoints within and between political parties on how best to handle relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia. The discontinuity of policies may undermine the stability and effectiveness of diplomatic efforts in the region.

7.2. China's Opportunity in the Middle East

China's emphasis on infrastructure development and development projects aligns with the urgent needs of Middle Eastern countries for economic growth and modernization. The BRI, proposed in 2013, encompasses the "Silk Road Economic Belt" and the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road" to promote regional multilateral cooperation. Through the BRI, China has invested heavily in infrastructure projects in the Middle East, such as ports, roads, railways, and energy facilities. These projects not only provide the necessary material foundation for local economic development but also establish long-term economic partnerships between China and Middle Eastern countries. China is the largest trading partner for both Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively. Saudi Arabia has become China's first trade partner in the Middle East with a trade volume exceeding \$100 billion. From January to November 2023, the bilateral trade between China and Saudi Arabia amounted to \$98.61 billion, with China exporting goods worth \$38.85 billion and importing goods worth \$59.76 billion (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2024a). China's exports to Iran amounted to \$9.24 billion, while imports from Iran totaled \$4.17 billion during this period (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2024b). The biggest collaboration with the Saudi Arabia is the NEOM in Tabuk, as for the Saudi Vision 2030 in building the avant-garde future city for sustainable development, including basic water supply and railway transportation. (Xinhua News Agency, 2023). Saudi Arabian service Saudi Call, planned to launch construction of 100MW data centers with Chinese Shanghai Luamotong Group and China Mobile International Limited. In Iran, significant investment initiatives by Chinese entities include the establishment of Haier Iran Company by Haier Group

as a joint venture situated in the Isfahan Industrial Park, as well as the investment and establishment of a joint venture valve production plant by Suzhou Valve Factory. Compared to the value-driven foreign policy of the US, China's economically centered strategy prioritizes practical interests and win-win outcomes rather than ideological export or political intervention. This pragmatic approach largely addresses the urgent needs of Middle Eastern countries for economic development and modernization, thus making it easier to gain support and trust from these countries. As a stakeholder in the Gulf region, China actively promotes the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran based on the concepts of a community of shared interests, a community of shared security, and a community of shared responsibilities (Sun, 2023: 100).

China's development goes beyond national prosperity, with a commitment to sustainable development for all humanity and a focus on shared human values as collaboration. On, April 21, 2022, Xi Jinping launched the GSI called for "common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security" and again reemphasized China's role as "non-interference in domestic affairs" and rejection of unilateralism in responses to the current tension between Russia and Ukraine. The reconciliation of Iran and Saudi Arabia can be interpreted as a successful implementation of the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind and the Global Security Initiative. It offers a Chinese solution and is a concentrated embodiment of the concept of a community of shared destiny for mankind for the Middle East issues. In December 7-10, 2022, Xi Jinping attends China- Arab summit, China-GCC summit and visits Saudi Arabia (Xinhua News, 2022). In February 2023, Iranian President Raisi visited China. During China's interactions with Saudi Arabia and Iran, both countries welcomed China's proposals for achieving security and stability in the Middle East and promoting dialogue among Persian Gulf countries. China expressed support for regional countries to enhance unity and cooperation, resolve differences through dialogue, achieve neighborly friendship, and pledged to work with Saudi Arabia and Iran to jointly uphold regional peace, security, and stability (Liu and Xu, 2023: 156). China advocates the global security concept in the middle east by stating in the GSI:

"A concept of common security, respecting and safeguarding the security of every country; a holistic approach, maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional domains and enhancing security governance in a coordinated way; a commitment to cooperation, bringing about security through political dialogue and peaceful negotiation; and pursuit of sustainable security, resolving conflicts through development and eliminating the breeding ground for insecurity."



It aligns with the needs of the Saudi Arabia and Iran, successful establish a platform the the bilateral conversation.

7.3. China's Future Risks and Roles in the Middle East Area

Firstly, China maintains a principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. This policy, while helping to maintain a certain level of diplomatic neutrality, may simultaneously restrict Beijing's willingness and capability to involve itself deeply in regional security issues. Unlike other global powers that might adopt more interventionist strategies, China's stance limits its operational scope, particularly in a region as tumultuous and conflict-ridden as the Middle East. Additionally, China's economic and political ties with multiple Middle Eastern countries may lead to conflicting interests, making it challenging for China to take sides or exert strong influence (Niu, 2014). These intertwined relations, marked by significant investments and strategic partnerships, impose constraints on China's ability to favor one nation over another without jeopardizing other bilateral relations or economic interests. Consequently, China is faced with a delicate balancing act: striving to maintain its non-interference policy while attempting to safeguard its diverse interests in a region characterized by intersecting rivalries and conflicting agendas. This balancing act complicates China's ability to assert strong influence or take definitive sides, thereby affecting its overall impact and presence in Middle Eastern geopolitics.

Secondly, China's military footprint in the Middle East remains notably smaller than that of the US. This limited presence reflects a cautious approach to regional engagement, aligning with its broader strategy of non-interference and economic prioritization. This lack of on-the-ground military experience poses challenges for China in understanding the full spectrum of security issues that characterize the Middle East. Moreover, this inexperience could affect Beijing's ability to project power or influence outcomes in the region effectively. While China has made strides in establishing economic influence through initiatives like the BRI, its military and strategic depth in handling the complex dynamics of Middle Eastern politics, particularly those involving armed conflict and national security concerns, remains underdeveloped (Sevilla, 2019). Consequently, this disparity in military involvement and regional experience could limit China's role and effectiveness as a stabilizing force or a mediator in ongoing Middle Eastern conflicts.

Thirdly, the US and its allies have long-established military bases, forged political alliances, and cultivated significant economic interests in the Middle East, creating a complex web of influence and commitments that have shaped the regional geopolitical landscape. Against this backdrop, China's escalating presence in the region, primarily driven by its economic ambitions and the strategic objectives of the Belt and Road Initiative, introduces a new dimension to the already intricate balance of power. This growing Chinese involvement may not only be viewed with suspicion by Western powers but also by regional actors who are accustomed to the existing US-led security and political order. As China continues to expand its economic, political, and to a lesser extent, military footprint, there is a potential for increasing geopolitical rivalries (Roy, 2016). This could manifest in various ways, including heightened scrutiny of Chinese intentions, competition over influence with traditional powers, and possible tensions with countries within the region itself. The perceived challenge to established interests and alliances by China's rising engagement could thus lead to a reevaluation of regional strategies by both global and local players, potentially exacerbating existing conflicts or sparking new ones in the struggle for dominance and control in this strategically vital area.

In summary, while China's recent diplomatic achievements highlight its growing influence, the path to becoming a dominant security force in the Middle East is fraught with challenges. These include its own foreign policy principles, a lack of military engagement and experience, and the complex web of regional dynamics. All these factors will significantly shape China's future role and influence in the region.

Conclusion

Based on the results and discussion, our first and second hypotheses are confirmed. There is a significant distinction between China's and the US' approaches to public diplomacy in the Middle East. On the issue of Saudi Arabia and Iran, China leans towards a cooperative and developmental approach, driven by economic considerations, whereas the US focuses more on a value-driven approach emphasizing human rights. This divergence highlights the contrasting strategic priorities and diplomatic styles of the two global powers in addressing regional conflicts.

China's proposal on the Saudi-Iran issue, grounded in the respect for the cultural and security concepts of each country, may offer new possibilities for resolving Middle Eastern conflicts. This approach, by aligning with the concept of a community of shared destiny for mankind, suggests a model for international relations that prioritizes mutual respect and

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Collective well-being over traditional power dynamics. The Chinese solution reflects an innovative pathway that could inspire future efforts towards peace and stability in the region.

Despite its success, China's approach faces challenges amidst the complexities of the Middle Eastern context. The sustainability and effectiveness of the Chinese solution in the future will need to adapt to the changing circumstances and dynamics of the region. As such, while offering a promising alternative, the viability of this approach requires careful navigation of the intricate political and cultural landscapes of the Middle East, underlining the need for a flexible and responsive strategy in pursuing lasting peace and development.

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**Appendix:**

Original Chinese	Translated words
合作	Cooperation
发展	Development
双方	Bilateral
国际	International
共同	Collaborative
安全	Security
和平	Peace
稳定	Stable
经济	Economy
对话	Dialogue

Examining the Japanese Fear of ISIS with Soft Terrorism Concept*

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Internet.

Abstract

Terrorism has emerged as a paramount challenge in recent times. With current terrorist organizations adeptly embracing internet technologies and seamlessly integrating them into their strategies, the landscape of terrorism has evolved into a multifaceted global concern. For instance, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has had a negative impact not only on the citizens of the countries they directly target but also on the psychology of individuals in non-targeted countries through their internet-focused strategies. Despite not carrying out any attacks on Japan, the majority of the Japanese perceive ISIS as a significant threat to their nation. This finding serves as a prime example of how a terrorist organization like ISIS, utilizing internet strategies proficiently, can detrimentally affect individuals in non-targeted countries. This study demonstrates how the soft terrorism concept elucidates the heightened fear of ISIS in Japan. By conducting a Google Trends analysis, the Japanese case is examined in this research. The findings indicate that the soft terrorism activities of ISIS have both short-term and long-term adverse effects on the Japanese, primarily attributed to the dissemination of brutal images and videos posted by ISIS on the internet, as posited by the soft terrorism concept.

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Introduction

The terrorism problem has progressively transcended global borders and taken on added complexity due to technological advancements. A pivotal factor in this transformation is the adeptness of current terrorist organizations in adapting to the evolving internet and social media technologies and effectively integrating these tools into their strategies. Particularly within an increasingly globalized world, the internet has assumed a central role in the tactical arsenal of terrorist groups, leveraging its structure to eliminate geographical barriers and facilitate interactions among countless individuals (Bertram, 2016: 225–252). In alignment with this perspective, Weinberg and Eubank (2007) contend that the internet facilitates the propagation of terrorism across regions, as social media and internet platforms have dismantled temporal and spatial constraints.

Current terrorist groups spread their brutal propaganda more easily and globally via the internet. In addition, terrorist organizations have increased their capacity to create and increase fear among people with their internet strategies (Tulga, 2022: 80). Existing terrorist groups use violent photos and videos on the internet as psychological weapons and try to create fear among people with this strategy (Hoffman, 2006: 103-121). Today, it is seen that this effect is not limited to the citizens of the countries that are the direct targets of terrorism. It also negatively affects the psychology of the citizens of countries that are not directly affected by terrorist attacks (Tulga, 2022: 15).

However, the traditional terrorism literature faces challenges in explaining the phenomenon of terrorism-related anxiety or trends in countries not directly targeted by terrorist organizations. For this reason, the soft terrorism concept has been formulated to explain the strategies used by such organizations and the subsequent negative impact on ordinary citizens. A terrorist attack in a distant part of the world can have negative repercussions on people residing in various regions, even if they are not the direct targets of such attacks, due to “soft” terrorism (Finseraas and Listhaug, 2013). This is because, rather than the terrorist attack itself, social media and exaggerated violent posts on the internet play a significant role (Braithwaite, 2013). The primary factor that induces fear, captures attention, and terrorizes individuals is the dissemination of exaggerated violence through soft terrorism elements such as social media and the internet (Tulga, 2022: 26).

Within this study, the influence of the “soft terrorism” concept is examined through the lens of the Japanese context, and an analysis of Google Trends data is undertaken to comprehend its effects on Japan. Specifically, the study centers on Japanese Google searches utilizing the keyword “ISIS” from January 2014 to December 2018. Furthermore, in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of searches related to ISIS, a comparative analysis is conducted by examining inquiries regarding the English Premier League -a globally prominent term- in Japan.

The most important reason for choosing Google Trends analysis in this study is that it is thought that examining Google searches can show the interest and orientation of the public in detail (Scharnow and Vogelgesang, 2011: 110). In particular, problems such as the relatively low usage rate of Twitter and the selection and sensitivity bias in survey analyses make the Google Trends analysis an indispensable resource to understand the Japanese fear of ISIS and their trends towards ISIS.

In the next part of this study, the literature focusing on the relationship between terrorism and the internet has been reviewed. I try to show the different views in the literature. In the following section, I will define the soft terrorism concept and explain why Japan is an ideal case for this research. In the third section, I will describe the analysis methods used in this study. The findings obtained as a result of the analysis are explained in the fourth part of the study. In the fifth chapter, the study’s essential findings are summarized, and the consistency or differences between these findings with the results in the current literature are shown. The study will be concluded with a conclusion chapter.

1. Literature Review

Numerous views in academic studies focus on the goals of terrorism. However, one of the most prominent views in the literature is that creating an atmosphere of panic and fear among people to achieve some of the purposes of terrorist organizations is one of the most fundamental goals of terrorism (Weinberg and Eubank, 2008: 190). Many scholars argue that the internet, which allows interaction regardless of distance or a physical location in the globalizing world, is susceptible to exploitation and manipulation by terrorist organizations in their pursuit of goals (Bertram, 2016: 230). Similarly, Hoffman (2006) thinks that the internet has some features that terrorists can use for their purposes, and therefore the internet has become a dangerous tool for terrorists. For this reason, it is thought that the internet has become one of the most important



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parts of the strategies of many terrorist organizations (Brück and Müller, 2010: 1-15).

Many academic studies argue that with the integration of terrorist organizations into internet technologies and the effective use of the internet by terrorist groups, the aim of creating fear becomes relatively more straightforward, and this fear environment spreads to wider regions of the world (Lavano et al., 2008: 306). In this direction, Qin et al. (2006: 80) argue that terrorist organizations aim to arouse fear and desperation among the public within the scope of psychological warfare through their internet activities. Similarly, Tsfati and Weimann (2002: 317-332) state that terrorist organizations have entered the homes of millions of people via the internet, and this is an essential psychological breakthrough for terrorist organizations.

One of the earliest examples of the relationship between terrorist organizations and the internet is seen in the case of the Islamic State of Iraq. The Islamic State of Iraq posted many videos on the internet containing the group's deadly attacks (Milton, 2018). One of the most striking of these videos was when the organization's leader, Al-Zarqawi, beheaded Nicolas Berg (Nye, 2005). The video was posted on the internet and viewed millions of times by people living in different parts of the world (Cohen-Almagor, 2016: 82).

Given the sustained presence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), this terrorist entity stands apart in notable ways from other extremist organizations, largely owing to its adept utilization of the internet and emerging technologies (Cohen-Almagor, 2016: 81). ISIS has disseminated myriad videos and images across the web, depicting harrowing scenes of violence, bloodshed, suicide, and hostage situations. In a broader context, Hamiti (2016: 132) argues that behind the choreographed and videotaped acts of violence, ISIS has a calculated strategy to create an atmosphere of fear among the populace. Through its online endeavors, ISIS does not merely impact the citizens of the nations it directly targets; it casts a negative influence on a multitude of other countries as well (Milton, 2018).

On the other hand, some studies argue that fear-based reactions are more common in areas close to the attack rather than in remote areas (Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2012: 1453). In this direction, Mahat-Shamir and colleagues (2018: 310) find that physical proximity to the terrorist attack, rather than exposure to social media or the internet, is highly associated with both psychological distress and fear of terrorism. Social media and the internet are only effective for sharing violent videos and pictures. Still, these images on social media and the internet are not as

effective as physical terrorist attacks (Tulga, 2022).

However, despite all these studies in the literature, there are still unanswered questions. For example, as a result of the surveys conducted by many research institutions such as the PEW Research Center, it is revealed that more than half of the citizens of countries such as Korea, Japan, and Argentina see the ISIS threat as the most critical threat to their country, even though they are not the target of ISIS or are not even close to the geographies where ISIS attacks (Poushter and Manevich, 2017). The soft terrorism concept can somewhat explain the fear or negative thoughts toward organizations in these countries. In this direction, the soft terrorism concept will be described in detail in the following part of the study.

2. Theoretical Framework

Nowadays, the development of technology has influenced people's daily lives and caused many innovations (Tulga, 2020). The internet has increased news speed and people's access to information on many issues. Technological progress, especially internet development, has also affected terrorist organizations in the past few years, and these developments have become a significant part of terrorist strategies (Tulga, 2022: 96). With the internet and social media, today's terrorist organizations can influence not only the direct victims of terrorist attacks but also everyone exposed to terrorist groups' posts on the internet and social media (Marin, 2016). Current terrorist groups' effective use of social media and internet technologies has enabled the organizations to broadcast their violent videos and images uncensored, falsely, or exaggeratedly (Barceló and Labzina, 2020: 1539-1559), and this has caused a flow of online violence that spreads all over the world (Marin, 2016).

Today's terrorist organizations could create a general feeling of anxiety and fear among people, using no weapons or with a small-scale attack (Tulga, 2022: 10; Tulga, 2023). In a brief time, millions of people in Japan, Canada, or South Africa can access much more information, brutal images, and videos that could create fear about a terrorist attack in Iraq, Syria, or France (Tulga, 2022). Therefore, social media, the internet, and developing technologies increase the reach and impact of terrorism and terrorist attacks. Because of the news, internet, and social media posts they see, emotions such as fear, and horror emerge. As a result, terrorist attacks affect people even though they are far from the area where the terrorist attack took place (Kaakinen et al., 2021: 1020).



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Therefore, it is possible to explain the atmosphere of fear created by terrorist organizations such as ISIS among the citizens of countries that are not directly targeted by terrorist attacks with the soft terrorism concept. In essence, soft terrorism attempts to elucidate how terrorist organizations utilize technologies such as the internet and social media, and the negative impacts of this utilization on individuals residing in various regions across the globe.

The essential elements of this concept are social media and the internet. The best example of the soft terrorism concept is the violent pictures and false and exaggerated information shared on social media or the internet (Tulga, 2022: 112). The soft terrorism concept enables terrorist organizations, members, sympathizers, and supporters to achieve their goals of negatively affecting people's psychology. A terrorist attack that occurs in a distant part of the world has a negative impact on people in various regions through the soft terrorism strategy employed by terrorist groups. Because the posts, including excessive violence (Braithwaite, 2013: 98), on social media and the internet play a more important role than the terrorist attack. Today's terrorist organizations, such as ISIS, by using the soft terrorism strategy, overestimate their brutality, power, and capacity, causing broader fear and surprise in public. Unlike previous terrorist groups, today's terrorist organizations cause shocks and fear not only in the country they target but also in many regions or countries with their soft terrorism strategies.

The soft terrorism concept also enables terrorist groups to create a sense of sudden surprise, which is crucial in achieving the goals of terrorism by instilling fear and capturing the public's attention (Tulga, 2023). Some political scientists suggest that terrorist organizations gain public attention, surprise, and fear by demonstrating their power, violence, and capabilities (Hoffman and McCormick, 2004; Siegel and Young, 2009). Soft terrorism strategies enable current terrorist groups to easily create an atmosphere of surprise, which can quickly spread to larger audiences and result in lower costs for terrorist organizations (Tulga, 2023).

In summary, terrorist groups effectively instigate an atmosphere of fear worldwide and attract the attention of individuals through the use of soft terrorism strategies (Tulga, 2023). The soft terrorism essentially offers a framework to comprehend and elucidate the adverse effects of existing terrorist organizations on people residing in various parts of the world, particularly those who are not the direct targets of terrorist activities, and how these organizations manage to garner attention (Tulga, 2023).

ISIS could be considered an example of the soft terrorism concept. The organization disseminates its violent acts through elements of soft terrorism, such as the internet and social media platforms, reaching individuals globally (Tulga, 2022). For instance, the widely publicized burning of a Jordanian fighter pilot on January 3, 2015, and the burning of two Turkish soldiers on December 22, 2016, were broadcast online, attracting thousands of viewers in a short period of time. These incidents exemplify a calculated strategy by ISIS to instill fear among people and attract the attention of individuals living in various parts of the world through the implementation of soft terrorism strategies (Tulga, 2022).

The effects of ISIS' soft terrorism strategy can be seen in countries such as Greece, Japan, Korea, and Argentina. In all these countries, according to the 2017 PEW Research Center survey, those who consider ISIS as the biggest threat to their country constitute the vast majority of those surveyed (Poushter and Manevich, 2017: 1). However, all these countries have not been faced with any ISIS attacks, and all of them, except for Greece, are far from the main geographic areas that ISIS targets. In particular, Japan differs from these countries in the long run. This is because, in the surveys of the PEW Research Center from 2015 to 2018, most Japanese respondents considered ISIS a threat to their country (Poushter and Huang, 2019: 25).




Figure 1. *ISIS is a Major Threat for Japan (Poushter and Huang, 2019)*

Japan offers an essential example for testing the soft terrorism concept due to the high threat perception or fear of ISIS between 2015 and 2018. Therefore, in this study, I choose Japan as a case, which is analyzed with Google Trends to make sense of the threat perception and trend towards ISIS. The methods used in the analysis will be explained in detail in the next section of the study.

3. Research Design

In this study, to understand the effect of the soft terrorism concept on the Japanese, I focus on Google searches specifically in Japan between January 2014 and December 2018. This analysis examines the change in Japanese interest in ISIS and the events that led to the increase and decrease in interest in ISIS.




Figure 2. Analysis Steps

One of the paramount phases in the analysis of Google Trends involves the meticulous selection and examination of specific keywords that faithfully reflect public sentiment. The judicious choice of terms for Google Trends analysis is believed to provide a more precise gauge of public interest and inclinations (Scharkow and Vogelgesang, 2011: 110). Nevertheless, given that Google Trends analysis is predicated on a single keyword, its findings can be deceptive and lack meaningful insights. Consequently, the keyword under scrutiny necessitates comparison with another

keyword. Thus, in this study, a juxtaposition was conducted between searches related to ISIS and inquiries concerning one of the most globally pervasive search terms, the English Premier League.

Category	Key Words
ISIS	“ISIS”
Premier League	“English Premier League”
Searched Dates	01.01.2014 – 31.12.2018
Formulas	gtrends (keyword = c(“ISIS”, “Premier League”), geo = “JP”, time = “2014-01-01 2018-12-31”, gprop = “web”, hl = “ja-JP”)

Table 1. Information about Google Trends Analysis

The obtained dataset shows us weekly searches related to ISIS and the English Premier League. For the results, I first tested the stationarity of the dataset. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is a standard statistical test used to determine whether time series datasets are stationary. This test is one of the most widely used statistical tests for analyzing a series' stationarity (Cheung and Lai, 1995: 278).

	Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test	Lag	P- Value
ISIS	-5,064	6	<0.05 (***)
Premier League	-5,045	6	<0.05 (***)

Table 2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results

As a result of the ADF test, both variables are stationary because the p-values of Google searches for both keywords are less than 0.05. In other words, both variables do not have a time-dependent structure, show a constant change over time, and have an ideal structure for trend analysis. With this result, the time-series dataset is also suitable for correlation analysis because non-stationary data are prone to spurious correlation results (Mellon, 2013: 285). Therefore, an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test result of less than 0.05 indicates that the patterns observed in the dataset used in this research are unlikely to be due to chance or random fluctuations (Zhang et al., 2015: 287).

Then, the obtained and tested dataset on a weekly basis were converted into monthly data. Weekly Google search data is best structured to analyze searches over several weeks rather than demonstrating long-term trends. On the other hand, monthly data is the most accurate way to indicate long-term trends (Eichenauer et al., 2021: 700). For this reason, our weekly data is averaged and converted into monthly data. The following formula was used to calculate the mean of the data;

(1)

$$X_{Average} = \frac{X_{Sum\ of\ All\ Data\ Points}}{X_{Number\ of\ Data\ Points}}$$

Following the conversion of the data to monthly data, the most searched words were analyzed to provide more detailed information about the Japanese trends towards ISIS. The ten

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most searched terms related to ISIS were found in this direction. Finding the most searched words is an important step in understanding the impact of the soft terrorism concept on the Japanese, as it provides an opportunity to understand the Japanese interest in ISIS.

Then, the terrorist attacks by ISIS worldwide and in “Western” countries such as America, England, France, Germany, and Australia were combined with Google searches. The most important reason for considering these two variables separately in this study is that it is understood that the entire terrorist attacks of ISIS or the terrorist attacks carried out in certain countries attract more attention in the eyes of the Japanese. Data on terrorist attacks organized by ISIS are taken from START’s Global Terrorism Database (START, 2022). As a result of the merging process, a dataset with four variables and 60 observations was reached.

Variables	Number of Observation	mean	median	min	max
Search_ISIS	60	3,951	1,675	0,25	47
Search_Premier League	60	36,423	37,75	8,25	82,8
ISIS_attacks_world	60	127,417	143	31	231
ISIS_attacks_west	60	1,850	1	0	9

Table 3. Descriptive Analysis

Following the merging process, the normalization method was applied to the attacks by ISIS worldwide and in Western countries. Normalization is a critical step in preventing the repetition, consistency, and inadequacy of the data. Since the Google Trends data is already normalized, the normalization process was applied only to two variables focusing on the attacks by ISIS around the world and in “Western” countries. The following formula was used in the normalization process:

(2)

$$x_{Normalisation} = \frac{x - x_{min.}}{x_{max.} - x_{min.}}$$

In the last analysis step of the study, the cross-correlation between the variables in the data set was analyzed. I try to explain, to some extent, with the correlation process, the role of attacks

of ISIS in the searches of the Japanese about ISIS on Google. The cross-correlation method was used because the dataset examined in the correlation analysis was a time series. Cross-correlation is a conventional technique employed to establish the temporal relationship between various indicators and a specific target variable. It involves calculating correlations across time to pinpoint time lags that exhibit the maximum correlation between variables (Eichenauer et al., 2021: 700).

(3)

$$r_k(A, B) = \frac{\sum(A_t - A)(B_{t-k} - B)}{\sqrt{\sum(A_t - A)^2} \sqrt{\sum(B_t - B)^2}}$$

The correlation analysis does not aim to provide information about causation. It is only intended to show the direction and trend of this relationship if there is a statistical relationship between the variables in the data set. The findings obtained from all these analyses will be explained in detail in the following part of the study.

4. Results

The first finding was reached as a result of the analysis of the trends that focused on the terms “ISIS” and “English Premier League,” covering the years between January 2014 and December 2018. As the English Premier League is one of the most searched terms in the world and across Japan, searches for the Premier League in Japan are generally expected to be much higher than searches related to ISIS.




Figure 3. Google Trends about English Premier League and ISIS



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As expected, it is seen that searches for the Premier League, in general, are higher than for ISIS. However, in comparing general trends, it is seen that January 2015, February 2015, and November 2015 are especially prominent, and the searches related to ISIS in these months are much higher than those related to the Premier League. Between 21 January and 2 February, it is seen that ISIS beheaded two Japanese citizens, Haruna Yukawa and Kenji Goto, in Syria, and videos of this brutal act were posted on the internet.

The second period that searches related to ISIS surpassed inquiries related to the Premier League is November 2015. Especially between 13 November and 20 November, it is seen that the searches associated with ISIS are high, and all of these searches are related to the attacks organized by ISIS in Paris, France. It is seen that the most searched words during this period are predominantly about images and videos of the attack.

Apart from these two periods, there are also two more periods that increased Japanese interest in ISIS, and searches for ISIS surpassed searches for the Premier League in the short term. It is seen that these dates are 23 October 2017 and 31 July to 1 August 2018. When we look at the features of these dates, it is seen that 23 October 2017 was the date when the Marawi Siege in the Philippines ended, and the most searched words in this period were the terms “Philippines ISIS” and “Mindanao Islamic State.” On 31 July and 1 August 2018, the searches seemed to be related to Junpei Yasuda, who was kidnapped in Syria. Searches about ISIS seem to have increased during this period due to negative experiences such as Junpei Yasuda being abducted in Syria despite not being abducted by ISIS and the brutal murder of two Japanese citizens at the beginning of 2015. In this period, it is seen that the most searched words are “ISIS execution,” “Haruna Yukawa,” and “Islamic State hostage.”

Then, to understand the general interest of Japanese people in ISIS, the ten most searched terms related to ISIS between 2014 and 2018 are found. The ten most searched terms show that ISIS execution images and videos of atrocities attracted the attention of the Japanese. In particular, the beheading of two Japanese citizens by ISIS in 2015 and the uploading of videos and images of this atrocity on the internet seem to have negatively affected the Japanese’s perception of ISIS in the long run.

ISIS	
Value	Subject
100	イスラム (Islam)
96	isis 後藤 (ISIS Gotō)
72	イスラム 国 (ISIS)
69	isis 動画 (isis videos)
67	isis 湯川 (isis yukawa)
52	isis 処刑 (isis execution)
42	isis コラ (ISIS memes)
39	日本人 isis (Japanese man isis)
35	クソ コラ グランプリ isis (Japanese Anti-ISIS memes)
34	isis 斬首された (ISIS beheaded)

Table 4. Most Searched Terms on Google

The research is concluded with a cross-correlation analysis. The first correlation analysis covers Google searches on ISIS and its terrorist attacks around the world between 2014 and 2018. Cross-correlation coefficients below 0.5 signify a moderate level of correlation, whereas those approaching 0.6 indicate a stronger correlation. Specifically, at a lag of -3, the coefficient stands at 0.58, signifying a significant positive correlation. This observation implies a connection between searches related to ISIS in Japan and global attacks, with a three-time-step shift. At a lag of 0, the correlation is approximately 0.60, suggesting a simultaneous positive correlation. Furthermore, as the lag increases after lag 0, the correlations diminish, alluding to delayed connections between searches about ISIS in Japan and the occurrence of global attacks by the group. Interestingly, these correlations tend to intensify with closer temporal proximity.

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


Figure 4. Correlation Result Between Search on ISIS and ISIS' Attacks around the World

As a result of the correlation analysis focusing on the ISIS terrorist attacks in “Western” countries and the Japanese Google searches for ISIS shows that the correlation or statistical relationship between the two variables is weaker. The sole notable outcome emerges from the correlation analysis conducted at a lag of -10. Specifically, at Lag -10, the correlation coefficient registers at 0.52. These findings collectively indicate a statistically significant positive correlation between the two variables at Lag -10, albeit presenting a moderate degree of correlation between them.




Figure 5. Correlation Result Between Search on ISIS and ISIS' Attacks in Western Countries

In short, these cross-correlation results can help identify any time lags where the two series are correlated, which can help identify the direction between variables. However, it is essential to note that correlation does not necessarily imply causation and further analysis may be needed to establish a causal relationship between the two-time series.

5. Discussion

As a result of the analysis, numerous findings are reached. While some of these findings are similar to the findings of the studies in the literature, some results differ from the findings in the literature. In addition, the results show how the soft terrorism strategies of ISIS shaped Japanese attitudes towards ISIS.

The first finding in this direction results from an analysis of Japanese interest in the English Premier League and ISIS. Looking at the trends towards the Premier League and ISIS, it is seen that the trend towards the Premier League, which is one of the most searched words in the world and Japan in the long term, surpasses the trend towards ISIS. However, as soft terrorism suggests, it is evident that Japanese interest in ISIS has surpassed that of the Premier League after the brutal acts broadcasted by ISIS on the internet and social media and attracted attention in various parts of the world.




Figure 6. Japanese Daily Basis Search on Google about ISIS

In other words, it is seen that ISIS' brutal events posted on the internet play an important role in the increase in the trends towards ISIS, and, with one exception, the interest in ISIS is short-lived. The exception is the case of Kenji Goto and Haruna Yukawa, two Japanese nationals who were beheaded in northern Syria. This finding is consistent with the results of some studies in the literature. In this direction, Misis, Bush, and Hendrix (2017: 128) found that the public's fear of terrorism in the United States of America changed over time and that the public's fear of terrorism decreased over time passed. Lin, Margolin, and Wen wrote a similar study in 2017. The authors found that, due to the Paris attacks in November 2015, fear and anger among people



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increased sharply immediately after the attack (Lin et al., 2017: 1583). Still, these emotions began to decrease sharply in the following days (Lin et al., 2017: 1585). A similar situation could be seen in the Japan case, but the effects of the beheading of Kenji Goto and Haruna Yukawa were not short-lived, as it became clear in the inquiry for the most searched words. It is seen that interest in ISIS has increased due to the fact that the Japanese continued to conduct Google searches for Haruna Yukawa and Kenji Goto even in 2018 and due to the possibility of repetition of bad memories as a result of events such as the kidnapping of Junpei Yasuda.

Another result supporting this finding was reached as a result of the examination of the most searched words. Based on the most searched terms, it is seen that the atrocities organized by ISIS and uploaded on the internet are among the most important factors affecting the Japanese interest in ISIS. In particular, it was found that the effect of the beheading of two Japanese citizens in Northern Syria and their videos on the internet was significant and long-lasting. However, it seems that other brutal acts by ISIS also attracted the attention of the Japanese, but the effect was short-lived. An example of this situation is that one of the most searched ISIS-related topics on 23 October was “three young men beheaded by ISIS in Wilayat Al-Khayr.” In addition, it has been found that the term “ISIS execution” in general is one of the words frequently sought by the Japanese. These findings are consistent with the result of Hoffman’s research in 2017. The author found a positive and strong relationship between the fear and interest in ISIS in Western European countries and the consumption of violent videos and images broadcast by ISIS (Hoffman, 2017: 86). This finding is also consistent with the soft terrorism concept because it argues that terrorist organizations, their sympathizers, and their supporters influence people’s psychology through violent videos and pictures posted on the internet (Tulga, 2022: 120).

The third key finding of this study emerged through cross-correlation analysis. This analysis delved into the attacks orchestrated by ISIS both globally and within “Western” nations, leading to the derivation of two distinct conclusions. Evidently, a relatively robust, positive, and statistically significant correlation surfaced between the worldwide spectrum of ISIS attacks and Japanese Google searches related to ISIS. More specifically, the most pronounced correlation manifested at Lag -3 and 0. These outcomes insinuate the potential existence of a lagged association between Google searches pertaining to ISIS in Japan and the occurrence of global terrorist attacks by ISIS. Notably, the correlation grows stronger when the temporal proximity of

events is closer. Conversely, a relatively weak correlation has been revealed between ISIS's attacks on "Western" countries such as America, Germany, and France and searches related to ISIS in Japan occasionally. Notably, the statistically strongest correlation between ISIS attacks on these "Western" nations and Japanese Google searches for ISIS is observed at Lag -10. It is vital to acknowledge that correlation analysis inherently lacks the capacity to elucidate causation; its primary objective lies in delineating the statistical interrelation between chosen variables and the direction of this relationship.

All these results show that the soft terrorism strategies of ISIS had adverse effects on the Japanese and that ISIS attracted the attention of the Japanese without any attack on mainland Japan. In addition, these results are not consistent with the argument of some scholars, such as Simons, that terrorism and terrorism-related propaganda outputs only create fear in the targeted audiences (Simons, 2020: 20). These results show that terrorist organizations affect millions of people in different parts of the world with their soft terrorism strategies. In addition, these results are inconsistent with the arguments of Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer (2012: 1450) that reactions based on negative emotions are more common in places close to the attack after terrorist attacks. As a result of the study, it was found that although ISIS did not attack near Japan, it affected the Japanese with soft terrorism strategies.

However, despite these findings, the study has a significant shortcoming. The most critical weakness of the study is that the results of the Google Trends analysis were not supported by face-to-face interviews. Through face-to-face interviews, more in-depth information based on people's subjective thoughts can be provided on Japanese fears of ISIS or the impact of ISIS' soft terrorism strategies on the Japanese.

Conclusion

With the adaptation of terrorist organizations to developing technologies and the internet, the problem of terrorism has become more complex and negatively affects people living in many countries around the world. Especially as the internet has removed borders, the images of brutality that terrorist organizations broadcast on the internet reach millions of people quickly and negatively affect thousands of people living in different parts of the world (Tulga, 2022).

Terrorist organizations understand the power of the internet and social media channels (Tulga, 2020: 50). For this reason, they use the internet effectively in their strategies. Terrorist



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organizations aim to expand their war with these strategies. At the same time, the internet is used to create fear in public (Tulga, 2020: 60). ISIS is one of the organizations that use the internet and social media technologies most effectively, and its internet strategies have a negative impact on thousands of people living in various countries around the world. Some studies prepared in this direction reveal that people living in countries that are or are not the direct target of ISIS in many parts of the world define ISIS as one of the main threats (Mansour, 2018: 100).

However, the existing literature has difficulties answering questions about how existing terrorist organizations such as ISIS negatively affect people in countries that are not their direct targets. The soft terrorism concept has been developed to give some answers to the questions that the literature cannot answer. I have also tried to show the success of these strategies in influencing public opinion in countries that are not direct targets of terrorism. Accordingly, in this study, Japan, which is not the direct target of ISIS but where the fear of ISIS is relatively high, has been chosen as the case. In this study, I try to interpret the fear and trend perceptions of the Japanese towards ISIS with Google Trends analysis.

As a result of the analysis, many significant findings were reached. It was found that the Japanese attitudes towards ISIS increased due to its actions, which were broadcast on the internet and attracted attention. It has been seen that the most important reason behind the trends of the Japanese towards ISIS is the brutal actions of ISIS, especially the beheading of the two Japanese. While some acts of ISIS have a short-lived impact on Japanese attitudes towards ISIS, events such as the killing of two Japanese citizens in northern Syria have been found to have a long-term effect.

In conclusion, existing terrorist organizations such as ISIS can create an atmosphere of fear and attract the public's attention, even in countries that do not have a direct target, such as Japan, with their soft terrorism strategies. It has been shown that the argument underlined by many studies in the literature that the fear of terrorism is directly related to the experience of a physical terrorist attack is not consistent in cases such as Japan and that fear of terrorism can be created with soft terrorism strategies in countries that are not exposed to physical terrorist attacks. Soft terrorist elements such as social media and the internet expand the harmful effects of terrorism and cause the fear of terrorism to increase even in countries that are not directly affected by the attacks.

However, despite these findings, the study has a significant limitation. This limitation is because the study's findings were not supported by the subjective opinions of the Japanese. Findings from face-to-face interviews can provide more in-depth information on the impact of soft terrorism on the Japanese.

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Youth Participation in South Sudan's Civil Wars: The Perception of Victimhood*

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Abstract

Scholars have often focused on the negative involvement of young people in violent conflicts in the African continent, subsequently denying them the attention they need during post-conflict peacebuilding processes. In South Sudan, this study challenges the negative portrayal of young people who participated in the country's civil wars, arguing that they were victims of their political and economic circumstances. Using primary and secondary data, the author interviewed youth leaders leading various civil society youth organisations promoting the country's peacebuilding process and used academic papers, websites, newspaper articles, and reports of credible local and international organizations. The paper concludes that while indeed young people participated in South Sudan's pre and post-independent conflicts, they were mere victims of their political and economic predicaments. Thus, instead of entirely viewing young people's role in the conflicts from the 'perpetrator angle,' we should focus on examining it from the 'perception of victimhood.' This lays the foundation for their full inclusion in the post-conflict peacebuilding processes such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

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Introduction

Some scholars such as Omeje (2005), Urdal (2006), Aning and Atta-Asamoah (2011), and Paolo (2017) have primarily focused on the negative involvement of young people in violent conflicts in Africa. In the case of South Sudan, this study challenges the negative portrayal of young people who participated in the country's civil wars. The argument of this paper is simple: the youth who participated in South Sudan's armed conflicts were not deliberate perpetrators, but rather victims of their political and economic predicaments. They were either brainwashed to fight for causes they did not support or were victims of their political and economic circumstances.

South Sudan, despite being the newest country in Africa, possesses a history that predates its official establishment in 2011. Formerly known as Southern Sudan, the region operated autonomously under the central government of Sudan. Before attaining independence in 1956, Sudan was subject to the rule of various powers, including Ottoman-Egypt, the Mahdist regime, and British-Egyptian condominium rule (Derso, 2012; Ewald, 1991). Of particular importance is the British-Egyptian rule which endured from 1899 until 1956, when Sudan achieved independence (Sanderson, 1962). The condominium rule implemented regulations such as the 'Southern Policy (Mayo, 1994) or the 1922 Passports and Permits Ordinance' (see Ruay, 1994; Dani, 2016), resulting in the socio-cultural division of Sudan. While Britain introduced English and Christianity to Southern Sudanese, Northern Sudanese remained Arabized and Islamized. Following independence, the absence of comprehensive plans for the unification of the two regions led to sustained marginalization and historical repression of Southern Sudanese by the central government in Northern Sudan (Derso, 2012; Aljazeera, 2011; Deng and Ruay, 1994). This protracted situation culminated in fifty years of civil wars between the two regions, with a resolution only coming with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. After gaining independence in 2011, South Sudan was immediately embroiled in a deadly civil war, causing significant devastation, including among its substantial youth population.

Young people, including the youth, played significant roles in these violent conflicts, often violating international humanitarian law. However, a closer examination of these roles prompts us to inquire whether these acts were deliberate as portrayed in the academic literature or were outcomes of the endemic failures of the system. As portrayed throughout the article, these youth were merely victims of their political and economic predicaments dictated by years of systemic corruption and historical youth marginalization perpetrated by corrupt political leadership over

decades of political rule.

This study provides a new perspective on the role of South Sudanese youth throughout the country's turbulent history. In a continent where post-conflict peacebuilding processes, such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, have historically marginalized a highly affected group of people (Mbawa, 2003), this article aims to bring attention to the youth affected by civil wars. This may contribute to the full reintegration of young people affected by civil wars, especially in South Sudan.

This paper utilized a qualitative research approach to collect in-depth and detailed data. Data was gathered from seven youth leaders who are actively engaged in peacebuilding efforts through well-established youth organizations in South Sudan. The researcher conducted a series of structured and semi-structured interviews to gain insights and perspectives from the youth leaders regarding their experiences, challenges, and young people's role in the South Sudanese armed conflicts. This methodology allowed for a comprehensive analysis and understanding of the youth's position and roles in these conflicts. The study's original contribution is underpinned by the interviews with youth leaders, providing significant insights into the reality of South Sudan's youth from the perspective of the victims, themselves.

To meet the ethical demands of the author's university, the Social Sciences University of Ankara, the university's ethics committee provided the author with an ethics approval certificate. This certificate is attached to this paper as an appendix. For ethical considerations, respondents are labelled as Youth Leader 1, Youth Leader 2 etc, without revealing their identities. Furthermore, the author reviewed academic papers, credible reports of regional and international organizations and documentary and archival records of international media institutions such as the British Broadcasting Cooperation, Aljazeera and the like.

Although the study remains highly relevant to academic discourse, it has some limitations that should be noted. One of these limitations is that a larger sample size would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of the subject matter. However, due to the ongoing war situation in the country, it was difficult to reach as many youth leaders as required. Moreover, it was even more challenging to reach youth ex-combatants for interviews. In future studies, these limitations must be considered in evaluating the role of youth in armed conflicts, especially in the case of South Sudan.



Youth Participation in South Sudan's Civil Wars: The Perception of Victimhood

This article first introduces the study, laying the theoretical and methodological foundation for the rest of the paper. It then moves on to trace the violent historical processes that led to the country's eventual independence, paying special attention to the role of the youth within this chequered history. Subsequently, after examining Southern Sudan's successful secession from North Sudan¹, the paper proceeds to assess the post-independence armed conflicts that occurred in South Sudan and the role of South Sudanese youth in these conflicts. Finally, the last section concludes the paper, weighing the argument of the paper, and youth leaders' position, with the literature.

1.1. Southern Sudan, Historicity and the Youth

South Sudan has a rich history that goes back many centuries. Before becoming the world's newest state in 2011, South Sudan was a semi-autonomous region known as Southern Sudan, within Sudan, administered by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement- SPLM. The northern part of Sudan, with the central government, which is known as Sudan today, was mainly inhabited by Arabs and it remains the same today (Deng and Ruay, 1994). The southern part, now known as South Sudan, was predominantly populated by black people and has remained the same until today. This racial composition is a complex tapestry, shaped by various factors. The region's pre-colonial era saw migration playing a significant role in determining the demographics of the region. The Arab composition of North Sudan can be traced back to medieval Arab adventurers who travelled into sub-Saharan Africa in the 16th century, describing the land as 'Bilad es-Sudan,' an Arabic term meaning the 'land of the Blacks,' (Deng and Ruay, 1994). Over time, the various indigenous tribes of Sudan, such as the Nuba and Zing, coexisted with the arriving Arabs, resulting in a rich and diverse cultural makeup (Deng and Ruay, 1994; Leonardi, 2007; Beswick, 2016).

However, the Ottoman-Egyptian conquest of Sudan from 1821 to 1855 (Warburg, 1985; Ewald, 1991) brought about significant changes. The Sudanese people experienced brutal subjugation and forced labor, with the Ottoman-Egyptian forces imposing their will on the region (Collins, 1976; Warburg, 1989; Derso, 2012). This period saw the introduction of Islam as the dominant religion in the region, which replaced traditional African religions (Ewald, 1991). Also, upon the arrival of the British in 1899, the condominium rule established with Egypt further divided Sudan. Britain introduced English and Christianity to the Southerners and barred the

¹ The term "North Sudan" is used in this context to refer to present day Sudan.

highly Arabized and Islamized Northerners from interacting with them (Ruay, 1994; Dani, 2016). After independence, Northern Sudan's bid to overturn this policy saw the central government in the North introducing Arabic as the only official language in the country (Abdelhay et al., 2016). This greatly affected Southern Sudanese who mainly conducted their official affairs using English. In Moses' words, for instance, the discrimination of Southerners in the academic arena is made clear in his interview with Al-Jazeera in 2011:

“When I started school in the North, they told my father ‘Your son is studying the religion of non-believers, and he reads English. Here, we do not have the English and religion of non-believers. He must take Islamic studies.’ When we went to the Ministry of Education, they told us to go back to the head teacher to solve our problem. We went and he refused to make any changes. Thus, I took Islamic studies. Even when I only failed Islamic studies, I repeated the entire year- year 3.” (Aljazeera English, 2011: 6:25).

Put together, the rule of Ottoman-Egypt, Anglo-Egyptian Condominium and the post-independence governance marked by discrimination and oppressive policies deepened the divide between Northern and Southern Sudan, leading to two major civil wars between 1955 and 1972, and again from 1983 to 2005 (Collins, 1988; Aljazeera English, 2011; Woodward, 2011; Dersso, 2012; Khalid, 2018), which caused significant loss of life and displacement. The first Sudanese civil war was triggered by a specific event. This is explained below by Joseph Lagu, the former Southern Sudanese rebel commander who formed the first major rebel movement, the ‘Anyanya’, during Sudan's first civil armed conflict against the Northern Sudanese government:

“When a group of Southern Sudanese soldiers within the Sudanese army refused to obey their Northern Sudanese commanders, one of the Northern Sudanese commanders shot a Southern Sudanese soldier in the arm as a warning for disobedience. Southern Sudanese soldiers then broke into the garrison, got weapons, and killed northern commanders and any Northern Sudanese civilians they could find.” (Aljazeera English, 2011: 11:36).

Within the course of the conflict, power in Northern Sudan changed hands. Gaafar Muhammad al-Nimeiry took power in a coup in 1969 (Khalid, 2018). With him, the first Sudanese conflict eventually ended three years later when he and the South Sudanese Anyanya rebel movement signed the Addis Ababa Agreement (Woodward, 2011; Khalid, 2018). This agreement was incorporated into the Sudanese constitution adopted the following year. Subsequently,



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Southern Sudan became an autonomous region courtesy of Sudan's 1973 constitution (Dersso, 2012).

However, this period of relief, dignity, inclusivity, and hope would only last as much as the central government in the North would allow it. In a dramatic move in 1983, President Nimeiry degraded Southern Sudan's autonomy to "three weak and powerless administrative regions," stripping southerners of their autonomy (Dersso, 2012). Johnson (2003) has it that the second Sudanese civil war started in 1983 (see also Savage, 2014) in retaliation to Sudan's central government's suspension of the constitution that gave southerners autonomy and against several racial and ethnic discriminations suffered by southerners under the northern government. Southerners vehemently disliked President Nimeiry's policies including his unilateral decision to violate the 1973 constitution by dissolving Southern Sudan's autonomy in 1983. This and a combination of other factors gave birth to the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement/Army-SPLM/A (Collins, 1988; Tounsel, 2016), with Dr John Garang as the leader (Collins, 1988) and the second major armed conflict that would last for the next 22 years ending only in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Equally, these conflicts had significant effects on the youth, including children. A considerable proportion of young people fought alongside the Sudanese Government's military and opposition groups such as SPLM/A. This position is supported by the views of young people themselves and existing literature. For example, Youth Leader 3 expressed the impact of these civil wars on the youth population more vividly below:

"It is not new to recruit young people from South Sudan into armed groups. History shows that during Dr. John Garang's secessionist movement to liberate Southern Sudan from the North, most of the SPLM fighting forces were composed of young individuals who were mobilized through coercion."²

As also noted by Leonardi (2007), young people, including children, were key targets of recruitment by the major parties in these wars; many who evaded capture and forceful recruitment became known as the 'Lost Boys.' In 1994, there were over 20,000 displaced children and youth, aged 7 to 17, who had also lost their parents and had stopped going to school (Biel, 2003). Nearly half of the 20,000 young men and boys who fled Sudan during this sad exodus -known as the Lost Boys of Sudan- died from malnutrition, hunger, murder, and other causes on their way to

² Author's online interview conducted in March 2023

refugee camps in Kenya -a neighboring country- (International Rescue Committee -IRC, 2014). The 20,000 children mentioned above were thought to have resisted capture by both the military and the SPLM (Biel, 2003; IRC, 2014). Youth have also exploited their military enlistment to make investments in their home or family domain to fend against capture by the military domain and the domain of “home” (Leonardi, 2007).

Many youths might have also joined, especially the liberation movements to fight dictatorship, historical repression, and marginalization and to secure their future as this was the main goal of the SPLM. Judging from historical documentaries³, Sudanese soldiers and members of the liberation movements appeared to be mainly young boys. The main goal of these liberation movements and the conditions that precipitated their establishment, strongly point to the key argument of this paper: that the youths who took part in various conflicts as pointed out by the literature were mere victims of their political and economic predicaments. As presented throughout the discourse on Sudan’s post-independence wars (and as it will also be presented later in the sections that discuss South Sudan’s post-independence wars), political repression, marginalization, racial, cultural, and economic discrimination, orchestrated by central governments in Sudan, had forced Southerners, mostly young people, to take up arms to defend their future through violence.

Eventually, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005 brought an end to the long-standing conflict, paving the way for the eventual independence of Southern Sudan in 2011. The CPA addressed issues of power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and self-determination, which were the main causes of the civil war. However, the implementation of the agreement was slow, and the region continued to face various challenges, including inter-tribal violence, political instability, and economic difficulties eventually leading to the secession of the South in 2011.

1.2. Southern Sudan, Independence and the Springboard for Civil Wars

In 2011, the people of Southern Sudan voted overwhelmingly for the complete independence of the country from Northern Sudan, as stipulated in the 2005 CPA (UNMISS, n.d.). The Liberation Council of the SPLM/A, led by Salva Kiir Mayardit and Riek Machar, continued to oversee the affairs of the new nation. For the people of Southern Sudan, independence was a long-awaited dream fulfilled, offering hope for a better future.

³ See Aljazeera English, 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7okF15IeSXE>.



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However, some academics viewed this future as not particularly bright. They envisioned challenges in state building, such as managing oil and water and ensuring an orderly transition. The country's developmental, political, and security challenges were seen as great obstacles to progress, making it reliant on international assistance (Belloni, 2011; Nathan, 2011). De Waal (2014) and The Sentry (2019) also criticized South Sudanese political leadership, referring to it as a 'kleptocratic state', with corruption in its major resources, particularly oil, projected to lead to prolonged conflicts and the destruction of the country. Unfortunately, this fear eventually manifested through civil wars shortly after the country's independence.

1.3. South Sudan and the Civil Wars

As mentioned above, challenges with the orderly transition of the country started to manifest immediately after the referendum. South Sudan's top political godfathers started disagreeing over key political issues. The stories surrounding the cradle of the South Sudanese post-independence conflicts are overly complicated. To unravel this, we need to undertake two processes. First, to understand why South Sudan's vice president and other cabinet members were sacked and second, whether this may have ignited the civil war. There are two stories surrounding the sacking of Riek Machar, the country's vice president, and other cabinet members. The one told by South Sudan's president and the other told by others. On the one hand, President Kiir believes he sacked his vice and several other cabinet members due to an attempted or a failed coup d'état they had both implicitly and explicitly participated in (Radon and Logan, 2014). Consequently, Machar was relieved of his duty of being the vice president of South Sudan. While President Kiir attempted to arrest him and others, Machar fled to safety and started a guerilla warfare (through the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement in Opposition-SPLM-IO) against the Kiir government while others were detained. However, as captivating as the coup d'état story of President Kiir may be, it is exceedingly difficult to validate such a story put forward by the president (Aljazeera English, 2016). On the other hand, President Kiir is said to have felt threatened by Machar's call to challenge his leadership of the SPLM party and that of the country in a democratic process. In the following excerpt, an interview with a prominent youth leader in South Sudan accounts for this 'democratic version' of the story.

“Riek Machar demanded democratic processes. Among other things, Machar asked for elections within the SPLM political wing to be periodic and elections should be held especially for the party leadership position. Moreover, these elections must be held by secret ballot and not by ‘raising

hands' as they used to be. As such, he had decided to challenge the current president and leader of the SPLM political party for the position of chair and in the subsequent national election.”⁴

The excerpts above have also been supported by some sources with Aljazeera English (2016) citing disagreement over who should lead the presidential race of the party to be the real cause of the civil war. In this case, while President Kiir cited a coup d'état attempt to be the main cause of the removal of his vice and other cabinet members, it is also possible that the real cause of his move to sack his vice president might have been that he felt threatened by the democratic demands of Machar, his vice. Above all, while disagreement remains over the real cause of the sacking, the point to note here is that the civil war started after President Kiir sacked and attempted to arrest Machar and the others (note that while others were arrested, Machar escaped). The national army then split along ethnic lines with some backing Kiir and others backing Machar (Aljazeera English, 2016).

There is also a second position concerning the causes of the civil war in South Sudan. Scholars such as Nyadera (2018) relate the causes of the armed conflicts in Africa's newest country to ethnic animosities and rivalry. But this has been quickly debunked by other scholars. For example, to negate Nyadera's argument of 'ethnic animosities and rivalry' being the key driver of South Sudan's civil war, Radon and Logan (2014) argued that six out of the eleven political figures detained by the government concerning the suspected coup hailed from the Dinka ethnic group (President Kiir's tribes' men), only two were Nuers (Machar's tribe), and the remaining three were from other ethnic groupings. Therefore, while ethnic animosities may be part of the factors that exacerbated the civil war, as observed above, trigger factors point directly to a power struggle between the two key political elites within the SPLM Liberation Council. However, Adeba (2014), noted that the conflict however developed ethnic undertones that turned the Nuer and the Dinka, the major ethnic groups in South Sudan, against one another, even though its basic causes were political (Adeba, 2014; cited in Young, 2016). Figure 1 below shows South Sudan's ethnic composition.

⁴ Youth Leader 2, Author's online interview conducted in March 2023

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


Figure 1. *Ethnic Composition of South Sudan* (GlobalSecurity.org)

The political incapacity of the SPLM itself may have contributed to the conflicts that have occurred within its structure. As Lyman (2013) pointed out, with a small political branch, the SPLM party is still primarily a liberation army. Moreover, the military wing of the government of South Sudan, Sudan People's Liberation Army-SPLA (Savage, 2014) is more of a coalition of militias, each of which is frequently based on ethnicity than it is a cohesive national force, and almost all of its top officers are former generals.

The conflict eventually ended with IGAD's brokered peace deal signed in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia in August 2015. This accord, Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCRSS)⁵, made a provision for the setting up of a government of national unity that is purely transitional wherein the country's first vice president was to be elected by the armed opposition, the SPLM-IO (UN Peacemaker, n.d).

1.3.1. The 2015 Accord and the Relapse

As it is with several peace deals, the 2015 South Sudanese peace accord faced enormous challenges to the extent of a relapse to violence and subsequently another civil war. It seemed from the beginning that some key parties to the agreement did not anticipate a positive outcome. There were differences in opinion regarding the full implementation of the accord. For instance, while President Kiir is believed to have voiced negative prospects for the 2015 peace deal, his vice president was hopeful. In different statements, they stated as follows:

⁵ See IGAD <https://shorturl.at/qrEYZ>, accessed 10th May, 2023.

President Salva Kiir Mayardit:

“We are not moving forward with the implementation of this agreement because of the way it was designed. And when I signed this agreement in August last year, I told Uganda’s President, Yoweri Museveni, that it was not meant to be implemented.”⁶

Riek Machar:

“The accord should be carried out by both the spirit and the letter of the accord. Because the deal represents a road plan for reforms and, secondly, for establishing an entirely novel system of governance for the country that would lead to democratic elections.”⁷

With statements like these, it was clear that the country would eventually relapse into another deadly civil war. Indeed, it did. President Kiir and Machar were in a meeting to discuss ways forward for the 2015 peace accord when fighting broke out outside of the meeting premises between security forces of the government (Mainly Salva Kiir) and the bodyguards of Riek Machar. This and subsequent events led to the outbreak of South Sudan’s second civil war after independence.

1.3.2. The 2018 Deal: A Revitalized Peace

The second South Sudanese conflict, since independence, eventually ended in August 2018 with the Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS⁸) being signed, and the Reconstituted Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGONU) being established in 2021 (IGAD, 2018). As with many peace accords, the revitalized agreement made arrangements to hold national elections as part of the implementation of the provisions of the accord. However, there have been several challenges. The power-sharing transitional government headed by President Kiir, with Machar as his vice plus four other vices, announced a two-year extension of the transitional government and thus postponed South Sudan’s first election since independence to December 2024 (Crisis Group, 2023). President Kiir defended that he took such a decision to prevent another relapse and not with a motive to stay in power longer. His first vice president, Machar also supported him that, indeed, elections need political space, and such a space did not exist in South Sudan at the moment (Machol, 2022).

⁶ See Aljazeera English, 12:00, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uB0kf_liEQ4.

⁷ See Aljazeera English, 2016, 15:39, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uB0kf_liEQ4.

⁸ See IGAD, <https://shorturl.at/dqU29>, accessed 10th May, 2023.



1.4. The Civil War and the Youth

The youth played active roles in South Sudan's civil war. However, like many other African nations where youth have experienced "the bitterness of war," youth involvement in the civil war in South Sudan is a result of their political and economic predicament. In other words, they were unintentional victims of the conflict and violence rather than "deliberate participants" in it.

Young people's role in the South Sudanese conflict has received some attention in both academic and grey literature (UN Human, 2013; Craze, et al., 2016). Since the conflict erupted in 2013, there have been reports that young people have played significant roles in it. For example, a UN report (2013) shows that armed youth organizations like the Gojam or "White Army" and the SPLM/A-IO engaged in combat together. According to the same report, armed youth also assisted government troops, such as the Sudan People's Liberation Army, in planning their operations. Unconfirmed reports, such as those obtained from the author's discussion with South Sudanese youth leaders, indicate that young people also make up most of the membership of other, smaller rebel groups like the National Salvation Army (NAS). However, regarding the role of certain youth groups like the Nuer White Army in the South Sudanese conflict, Young (2016) has been quick to warn that since the White Army is a creation of the community, its defence of the community and attacks on government buildings and towns largely serve community interests rather than those of the SPLM-IO.

Since the war erupted in 2013, South Sudan has experienced grievous human rights violations (United Nations Mission in South Sudan, 2014; UNICEF, 2016). Most of the grievous violations of international law such as sexual slavery, rape, looting and destruction, killing, and abduction, have occurred in the Unity State region, the stronghold of the SPLM/O (Craze et al., 2016). Implicitly, these crimes point to the youth as part of the perpetrators. As such, without consideration of the rationale surrounding their involvement, the literature above has unequivocally accused the youth of being deliberate perpetrators of these crimes.

While the literature above presents the role of youths as drivers or part of the drivers of conflict and co-perpetrators of heinous crimes in the South Sudanese war, it is significant to understand that further examination of the rationale of this role reveals quite a different story. Youth participants were mere victims of these conflicts. These youths were either brainwashed or sometimes forcefully mobilized. As rightly stated by a UN (2023) report, geographical, racial, and

other identity-based markers have been used by political, military, and traditional elites to incite factions against one another, and they frequently exploit them. As a result, there is a culture of intense mistrust, retaliation, and violence that people use to acquire and assert their political, and socioeconomic control over others. According to Human Rights Watch (2015), thousands of young people, some as young as thirteen, were enlisted in armed groups during the South Sudanese conflict. UNICEF (2016) also estimated that by 2016, since the beginning of the fighting in December 2013, approximately sixteen thousand kids had been enlisted by the parties to the conflict. Sometimes, the youths also took the law into their own hands to change their own political and economic realities. As presented in Stringham and Forney (2017), the ‘white army,’ mostly youth militias, frequently rebelled against the governing elite, whom they held accountable for the rising gaps between urban and rural areas across ethnic boundaries.

Young people’s decision to join armed movements could also not be far from their economic realities. According to Doki (2014), a senior professor of development studies, at Juba University noted that revenues from South Sudan’s oil were not being harnessed to employ the country’s youth, thus nursing hatred for the few government officials who appeared to have enjoyed the oil revenue. This fragile state of the country’s youth made them highly susceptible to being recruited into violence. In fact, in a 2011 World Bank report, the majority of young people cited unemployment as the reason for joining armed movements (World Bank, 2011). As a result, Deng (2016) asserted that youth unemployment significantly affects how much young people contribute to South Sudan’s gross domestic product since as compared to the regional (17%) and income group (13%) averages, youth unemployment is greater than 20% in 2022. In 2023, 76% of South Sudanese needed humanitarian assistance (World Bank, 2023).

There is no doubt that the literature discussed above, regarding youth combatants being victims of their political and economic predicaments, closely mirrors actual events. The author engaged seven energetic youth leaders from South Sudan to understand young people’s role in the South Sudanese conflict from the young people’s perspective. It was evident from their responses that the youths who took part in the fighting did so under duress or because of their very own political and economic circumstances. These vulnerabilities are outlined in the excerpts below:

Youth Leader 1:

“Wherever there is a conflict, there are unmet needs. In South Sudan, the majority of the combat troops are composed of young persons under thirty, specifically, the National Salvation Army

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(NAS), and the SPLM/IO, a group in which my brother fought. They join these groups for several reasons. They are also compelled by economic hardship. Additionally, they are being coerced into joining the fighting troops.”⁹

Youth Leader 4:

“South Sudanese youth joined rebel movements because they wanted to show their allegiance to particular ethnic groups. These youth were being misled into fighting along tribal lines, which was not in their best interests as individuals. As a young person in such situations, you have very few options, especially when survival is at stake.”¹⁰

One of the major weaknesses, as stated by Youth Leader 1, is the economic situation of young people, which is caused by subpar political leadership that dates back to South Sudan's pre-independence era. If we were to take a deeper look at the viewpoint of other South Sudanese youth leaders on why young people participated in the conflicts in South Sudan, we would also see that one of the main arguments of this paper -that the youth who engaged in the conflict were victims rather than deliberate drivers- is clearly outlined.

Youth Leader 2:

“The majority of the rebel movements took advantage of young people's idleness and unemployment. Young individuals under thirty make up 71% of the combat groups. Instead of actively inciting violence, they were only its victims. These youngsters were primarily being brainwashed. They were misled by political leaders using phrases like “the other side is targeting us—our tribe.” “We need to fight and deal with them to improve the country for us because they are the reason you are unemployed.”¹¹

Youth Leader 5:

“The youth were used by the warring parties to inflict atrocities on communities. While several of them, including children, were forcefully recruited, others were brainwashed into believing that the socio-economic predicament of the country, especially that of the youth, could only be addressed through fighting and the youth had a major role to play in such a fight. And that was it; they fought for what they believed was a fight for their future.”¹²

⁹ Author's online interview conducted in April 2023.

¹⁰ Author's online interview conducted in May 2023.

¹¹ Author's online interview conducted in March 2023.

¹² Author's online interviews conducted in May 2023.

It is evident from the argument made above, which is supported by both primary and secondary sources, that the youth who took part in South Sudan's civil war were victims of their political and economic challenges rather than being "deliberate drivers of the conflict." As such, it would be very unfair and uninformed to categorically paint these youths as deliberate drivers of conflict and violence in South Sudan.

Conclusion

South Sudan has gone through several facets of cultural, economic, and political instability; as well as civil wars after gaining independence from the North. Within these wars, the role of the youth has taken the central stage. This study has introduced South Sudan's turbulent history, its post-independent conflicts and the role of the youth. In detail, it first examined the country's history with Sudan with a special focus on the youth within this chequered history.

At independence, the discourse revealed that the newly independent South relapsed into two major armed conflicts in 2013 and 2016. In these conflicts, the role of the youth was addressed. This article established that while young people indeed participated in the conflicts, they were victims of their political and economic circumstances rather than being deliberate perpetrators of the conflict. In summary, the political elites were using the youth to execute ethnic and political violence on their behalf. The lack of economic opportunity also exacerbated this victimhood.

This vulnerability was vehemently and vividly expressed by the various youth leaders interviewed for this study, challenging the widely held perspective in the literature of youth being deliberate participants in armed conflicts. Interview excerpts from "Youth leader-1,2,3,4 and 5" unequivocally demonstrate how these youth were either being brainwashed into fighting for courses other than theirs or were being subdued by their political and economic predicament.

Explicitly, this study's results emphasize the critical needs of young people during the delicate phase of post-conflict peacebuilding. Traditionally, processes like disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration have overlooked the youth, leading to their inadequate reintegration into society. Despite the previously mentioned limitations to the study, generally, this article effectively introduces a fresh perspective to the conversation about youth, conflict, and peace, highlighting the distinct ways in which armed conflicts impact them.

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The Role of Leadership and Re-Colonization: A Postcolonial Look at Botswana and Zimbabwe

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Abstract

This paper employs postcolonial criticism to examine the roles of leaders of independence movements in the decolonization process. The objective is to ascertain the extent to which the policies of the colonial period are reflected in the leadership understanding and roles of the administrative culture in colonist-colony-colonized relations and to what extent the policies of the colonial period are related to re-colonization. This paper examines how the dominant themes of the debates during the colonial period were reflected in the attitudes and policies of the post-independence leaders. In conclusion, this study asserts that a comparable experience in the process of re-colonization is reflected in the dominance of certain policies and debates surrounding nationalization, despite the movements of independence that originated against the colonists. In this regard, the article compares the leaders of Botswana and Zimbabwe, two neighboring countries with similar historical backgrounds but disparate experiences. This comparison, based on postcolonial criticism, has revealed that although the decolonization process has been experienced, it offers examples of leadership, one positive and the other negative, as a continuation of re-colonialism.



Introduction

In the field of international relations, the postcolonial approach offers a critical lens through which to examine sociological, political, economic, humanitarian, and environmental experiences during and after the colonial period. This paper employs postcolonial criticism to compare leadership roles in the decolonization process. The objective is to ascertain the extent to which the policies of the colonial period are reflected in the leadership understanding and roles of the administrative culture in the relations between colonists, colonies, and colonized peoples. Additionally, the paper seeks to determine the degree to which the policies of the colonial period are related to re-colonization. Consequently, the objective is to contribute to the postcolonial criticism literature by providing examples of leaders' attitudes through the concept of recolonization and hybridization.

This article compares the leaders of Botswana and Zimbabwe, two countries with similar historical backgrounds and shared borders that nevertheless underwent different colonization periods and processes of decolonization. The objective of this comparison is to elucidate how the leaders of two distinct colonial countries approached the management of the independence process, considering the cultural legacy inherited from the colonial period. A comparison of the two cases serves to elucidate the disparate roles of the colonial process in the formation of dominant classes and in the differentiation of the experience and perspectives of these classes.

This paper is distinctive in its examination of the circumstances of two leaders in both traditional and colonial periods. The paper examines the effects of these periods on the leaders who carried out the decolonization process and the reflections of these effects on the independence processes of the countries through the method of comparative analysis. The objective of this comparison is to elucidate how the leaders of two distinct colonial countries perceived the management culture inherited from the colonial period and how they managed the independence process.

In the initial section, the interrelationship between decolonization, re-colonization, and leadership is explored through the lens of postcolonial criticism. In the second chapter, the traditional understanding of leadership in the two countries prior to colonization is examined, along with the roles of leaders in that context. Additionally, the practices and methods employed by colonialists during the colonial period are revealed. In the third chapter, the post-independence

policies of the leaders are revealed by investigating how the decisions and roles of the leaders who led the independence movements were reflected in the decolonization process. In the fourth chapter, the similarities and differences between the two cases are determined. This comparison, based on postcolonial criticism, has determined that although there is a process of decolonization, there are leadership examples, one positive and the other negative, which can be considered a continuation of re-colonialism.

1. The Relationality of Decolonization, Re-colonization, and Leadership

Postcolonial theory endeavors to elucidate the active transformation movements of the present day (Young, 2016: 5) by associating the past with the present and perpetuating vestiges of the past in its perspective. The theory employs the concepts of decolonization and neo-colonization (Saul, 1993: x-xii) to offer a critical perspective on the continued influence of colonial relations, often observed to persist beyond the colonial period. In this context, the concept of re-colonization, which is discussed in conjunction with globalization in postcolonial criticism, represents a more comprehensive and explanatory basis. Re-colonization is a process by which former colonial powers retain their influence over a formerly colonized, but currently independent, nation-state by effectively multiplying or reproducing the former colony's conditions (Mohanty, 2003: 2-3). The process of decolonization and the role of leadership in the process of recolonization should be examined in the context of the three-component formulation (colonist-colony-colonized) (Bhabha, 1994: 173). Additionally, the relationship between the leaders of the colonial independence movements during decolonization and recolonization should be compared and their roles critically evaluated.

A widely accepted academic theory of colonialism has yet to be established. (Horvath, 1972: 45). The study of colonialism encompasses a range of disciplines, including economics, politics, and culture. In essence, colonialism can be defined as a relationship of sovereignty (Loomba, 1998: 19) or as a power seizing a country or region outside its borders and using it for its own benefit (İpek and Oyman, 2017: 406). In this context, the term “colonizer” refers to the entity that exercises its sovereign power to place its own population in a specific geographical region, thereby transforming it into a colony and establishing administrative mechanisms (Horvath, 1972: 47). Conversely, the term “settled geographical region” refers to the colonized entity (İpek and Oyman, 2017: 420-421). In this relational context, the role of the ruling class in shaping the cycle and that of leaders in managing the process become crucial.



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When examined in a postcolonial framework, this cycle is observed to move in an interactive process. The term “postcolonialism” can be understood not only as the end of the colonial period, but also as opposition to colonial rule and the various legacies it leaves behind for the colonized (Loomba, 1998: 29-30). This implies that secessionist movements in former colonies become intertwined with the political, economic, and cultural legacies left behind by the colonizer. The intertwined cultural legacies do not, in fact, bring an end to colonialism; rather, they transform it, creating new states that have gained some independence but continue to be relatively dependent.

As discussions of the process of decolonization advanced, the term “neo-colonialism” emerged as a key concept in the field. In conjunction with the term “globalization,” the term acquired a more general meaning as a result of the phenomenon of globalization. Neo-colonialization is defined as the failure or incompleteness of decolonization. The term refers to new nation-states that were previously colonies but are currently officially independent and sovereign nations. However, they remain subject to their former colonizers (Kimche, 1971: 205; Saul, 1993: x-xii). During the period of colonization, the colonizer establishes a population within the region and establishes the colony under its rule. During the subsequent period of decolonization, the colony actively separates from the colonizer (Emerson, 1965: 45-46).

In this context, it can be posited that the relations between colonists, colonies, and colonized peoples are characterized by an intricate, two-way factual dynamic. The colonized entity, in turn, imitates the colonizer, becoming hybridized while separating from the colonizer through a treaty or a war of liberation (Ashcroft, 1998: 10; Bhabha, 1994: 126). It lives within both its own culture and the political and economic culture in which it was governed by the colonizer (Sawant, 2012: 120). This overlapping context transforms the newly independent state, creating a hybrid culture that is a combination of its traditional culture and the culture it inherited from the colonizer. Consequently, a complete decolonization cannot be achieved; instead, the process becomes one of re-colonization. In this context, the leadership of the people or groups needed to manage and direct this process assumes new importance. This phenomenon has historically occurred in Africa.

The leaders played a pivotal role in the independence movements that led to the decolonization of much of Africa. It is not possible to examine the leadership and the process separately from the cultural context (Baba, 2014: 3). Once more, the concept of hybridization

emerges in Bhabha's postcolonial critique, and it is possible to observe this hybridization in leadership culture and in political and economic policies and practices that resulted (Bhabha, 1984:130-133).

The primary focus of leadership studies in colonized Africa was the examination of the nature of leadership cultures that were characteristic of Africa as a colony. The nature of African leadership during the colonial period was largely shaped by the interests and priorities of the colonizer. The appointment of colonial administrators, such as governors, district officers, security chiefs, and other political officials by the colonizer (Baba, 2014: 6-7), exerted a powerful influence in shaping the political landscape of Africa today. Three distinct types of leaders emerged during this period: colonial administrators, chiefs, and nationalist leaders, which included nationalist politicians and guerrilla leaders. These three leadership categories are conceptually distinct yet semantically intertwined.

Colonial administrators relied heavily on local intermediaries and traditional power structures to achieve their goals. This transformation of tribal chiefs in traditional power structures into "subject leaders" (Rathbone, 2000: 10) is a notable consequence of this approach.

The third category of leaders comprises educated elites who assumed leadership of the nationalist movement for independence (Baba, 2014: 7). This category of leaders was born and raised during the colonial period, attended European schools, and visited European capitals. With some exceptions, they held salaried positions in the colony's civil service (Emerson, 1965: 58-59). In this historical context, hybridization, which plays a pivotal role in postcolonial criticism, reflects the leaders and their roles and represents the initial stage of re-colonization.

2. Colonization Policies in Botswana and Zimbabwe

Prior to the year 1900, the primary focus of international relations between Africa and Europe was trade. However, as the 20th century approached, the nature of this interaction shifted from one of trade and exchange to one of subordination and control. This shift paved the way for competition between European countries to colonize Africa. To mitigate the conflicts that arose over the unpopulated territories in Africa, European countries established colonies and initiated colonization processes. In the end, the conflicting interests of European countries over African lands and the resulting aggression between European powers led to the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference, where European powers seeking expansionist and economic advantages in non-



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European regions discussed the division of Africa. The Berlin Conference's decisions were instrumental in establishing the parameters for the partition of Africa (Falola and Chukwuemeka, 2018: 79-83) and formalizing colonial policies. It can be argued that the classical colonial perspective, as developed by missionary understanding, has undergone a transformation and evolution, giving rise to a new process that can be defined as imperialism.

The question of control over the inland areas adjacent to the coast remained unresolved at the Berlin Conference. European powers engaged in conflict with one another in areas removed from the coastline until the 1890 Brussels Conference, at which point it was agreed that the principle of effective occupation would be applied to the interior regions. Subsequently, a European power's claim to a specific region was validated by the presence of traders and missionaries from that country in the region, as well as by the existence of agreements between that country and local chiefs in the region. Additionally, physical occupation and/or the presence of settlements of that country in the region were considered evidence of effective occupation. Evidence of effective occupation was documented in the form of a joint agreement between representatives of the European power and African chiefs, or between two European powers. In consequence of these agreements, the European powers delineated the boundaries of their colonies and established the parameters of their spheres of influence (Falola and Chukwuemeka, 2018: 84).

During this period, Britain expanded its presence on the African continent, establishing colonies and effecting its occupation activities toward the north. These included Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Bechuanaland (now Botswana), which were occupied in 1889 (Sandler, 2017: 230; Güneş, 2018: 636). From this point forward, Cecil Rhodes, a private entrepreneur in South Africa, intensified his efforts to secure valuable territory for the British in Rhodesia and Bechuanaland and to establish British control from Cape Town to Cairo. The British consolidated their control during the Boer War (1899-1902), establishing the Union of South Africa by joining the Boer republics of the Orange Free State and Transvaal. The British East Africa Company and the British South Africa Company played a role in the administration of the colonies (Falola and Chukwuemeka, 2018: 84). Subsequently, Britain pursued an indirect rule and administration policy in its relations with its colonies and those who were colonized by them.

The British Empire did not treat all African countries in an identical manner. The British regarded colonies that were adaptable to the conditions of conquest as separate and distinctive

entities. To these, they introduced and developed administrative systems (Falola and Chukwuemeka, 2018: 87), granting these colonies (or the authorities in such colonies) limited powers of self-governance (Emerson, 1965: 72). Each such colony was governed by a governor in an autonomous capacity. The governor presided over the central government with the assistance of the executive and legislative councils. While the legislative councils included a few Africans, the executive councils were exclusively composed of British officers. The authority of each council was constrained to the colony (Falola and Chukwuemeka, 2018: 87). It would appear that Europeans accorded tribal chiefs a status that was greater than that accorded to them by indigenous traditions. However, this was done in a way that was tailored to the needs of European officials, who relied on the cooperation of the tribal chiefs. The centralized authority of the tribal chief was a convenient tool to employ when a certain tribal chief acted inconsistently. In such instances, a more obedient successor was replaced (Emerson, 1965: 237-238) in order to maintain the administrative order.

The colonial policies implemented by Britain in Botswana and Zimbabwe were based on the same principles but had different purposes and forms of practice. Colonial rule presented a challenge for some Africans and an opportunity for others. The fact that both realities were experienced and felt in the general environment created a complex dilemma (Parker and Rathbone, 2007: 92). Ultimately, in implementing and applying its colonial policies in a differentiated manner across regions, Britain as a colonizer established the foundations for a perceived unevenness of approach and a distinct cultural understanding among tribal leaders, particularly in the case of Botswana and Zimbabwe.

In the case of Botswana, the indigenous conditions of the pre-colonial period exhibited cultural and ethnic homogeneity in general, and Botswana's pre-colonial tribalism was conducted in a way that was relatively tolerant compared to other African tribes. The tribal chiefs were held in high esteem and, despite their considerable political influence, were regarded as equals to the people. The most significant institution in guaranteeing equality between the chief and his constituents was the tradition of tribal assemblies, or kgotla. These facilitated a close connection between the chief and his people, establishing and reinforcing political and economic bonds for all concerned (Beaulier, 2003: 228). This form of local government was not significantly altered by the advent of British colonial rule in the region.



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As early as 1853, the chief of the Bakwena tribe, Sechele, traveled to Cape Town with the intention of requesting British protection for Botswana from the Boers. However, the British had largely ignored such appeals until 1885. The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, which formalized the colonization of Africa, marked a shift in British attention from the Cape Colony to central Africa and Botswana. This was due to the fact that Botswana had begun to appear more valuable to the British, and their views on Botswana's importance had changed during the 30-year period leading up to the conference. This was due to a number of interrelated factors. First, the discovery of diamond mines in 1867 and then gold mines in Witwatersrand in 1884-1885 led to an increase in the perceived economic value of Botswana. Secondly, Botswana was identified as a strategically vital territory, serving as a barrier to Germany's Southwest Africa on one hand and the Boer states on the other. Consequently, Britain unquestionably proclaimed a crown colony in British Bechuanaland in 1885 and established the Bechuanaland Protectorate in the same year (Acemoğlu et al., 2001: 11-12).

In 1895, following the establishment of the Protectorate, three Tswana chiefs—the Bangwato chief Khama III, the Bangwaketse chief Bathoen, and the Bakwena chief Sebele—traveled to Britain and pledged to oversee the Protectorate in collaboration with Queen Victoria. In contrast to numerous other pre-colonial African tribes, the Tswana tribes exhibited an exceptional capacity for collaboration in the face of external challenges (Acemoğlu et al., 2001: 13). The collaboration of tribal leaders with colonizers, coupled with the manner in which Botswana was colonized and the presumed unification with South Africa, prompted the implementation of a relatively lenient colonial policy (Picard, 1987: 36).

The British government did not extend its involvement in Bechuanaland beyond defense expenditures and commercial activities. It did not establish any kind of administrative system in the territory, as evidenced by Parson (1984: 22). Instead, it focused on pursuing its own strategic and commercial interests.

The colonization process of Zimbabwe was notable for its divergence from that of Botswana. Prior to colonization, Zimbabwe did not possess a homogeneous culture in the same way that Botswana did. Instead, the region was dominated by a long-standing and intense conflict between the Shona and Ndebele peoples. During this period, the discovery of gold mines in the region attracted the attention of Britain. Consequently, the Ndebele chief, Lobengula, granted several land concessions to the British in exchange for arms. The most extensive of these

concessions was granted in 1888 to Cecil John Rhodes, who was engaged in missionary activities at the time. This was the Rudd concession, which included exclusive mining rights to most of the areas in the east of the mainland (Mlambo, 2014: 41) and was one of the most influential gains in the colonization of Zimbabwe.

However, the British South Africa Company encountered significant challenges in its efforts to colonize the region during the 1896-97 period. In early 1896, Lobengula led the Ndebele people to revolt against both the colonizing conquerors and the Shona people in an uprising known as the siege of Bulawayo. This was suppressed by colonial forces from Kimberley and Mafikeng in present-day South Africa. Although the siege was lifted, hostilities between the British and the Ndebele people continued until mid-1896, when the Ndebele negotiated a separate peace treaty with Cecil Rhodes (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008: 56). The Shona leaders, with the support of Britain, continued their conflicts with the Ndebele people until they were ultimately vanquished. In 1898, all the leaders of the rebellion were either captured or exiled.

The establishment of Rhodesia as a settler colony, rather than an indirect administrative colony, was a consequence of the struggles and conflicts that had preceded it. Britain's central colonizing policies included the seizure of Rhodesia's lands, the introduction of segregated colonial rule, and the installation of European settlers. The nascent colony's inherent weakness and the considerable distance between London and Salisbury (present-day Harare) necessitated the formation of alliances with local African leaders to effectively administer the area and suppress rebellion. To illustrate, cattle looted in the 1890s were returned to the Ndebele chiefs in exchange for their cooperation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 150). A complex system of racial discrimination and hierarchy was established with the intention of effectively controlling the local indigenous population. The colony population from Europe was granted citizenship, civil rights, and access to cosmopolitan centers, while indigenous people were excluded from these privileges.

The loosely administered colonization process in Botswana, the willingness of the Botswanian tribal chiefs to collaborate, and the policies implemented as a result of their agreements with Britain have been posited as factors that may have contributed to Botswana's more seamless transition to independence than Zimbabwe. The colonization of Zimbabwe was conducted in an atmosphere of conflict and without compromise, although concessions were granted. Consequently, due to the disparities in the independence processes of both countries and the legacies of the colonization processes in terms of administrative culture and leadership



understanding, the comparison of the leaders' reflections on the process management is of particular significance in order to elucidate the post-colonial leaders' approaches to process management.

3. Leaders' Attitudes During and After the Independence Process

During the colonial period, a variety of techniques were employed with the objective of erasing the identities of the colonized colonies. For example, as with the alteration of country names, numerous street and city names have also been modified in accordance with the colonial identity and culture. In the context of the decolonization process, the majority of indigenous and local city and street names were reinstated in the countries that achieved independence. As with numerous other efforts in Africa, the decolonization process sought to eradicate numerous symbols of colonialism, with a similar objective to that of the colonial administrations in Botswana and Zimbabwe (Manatsha, 2014: 275-278). A review of the historical record reveals that the majority of countries that gained independence during the decolonization period employed a similar method to reconstruct their identities. Nevertheless, the independence of most countries has resulted in disparate trajectories being pursued.

The countries of Botswana and Zimbabwe, which were previously British colonies, achieved their independence through disparate pathways. Botswana sought to address its challenges through a culture of reconciliation, achieving independence in 1966 without conflict, civil war, or resistance. In the context of British efforts to unite South Africa and Bechuanaland, the Botswana National Party was established in 1948 and led by Seretse Khama until his marriage to a British citizen rendered his leadership untenable and resulted in his removal from office (Acemoğlu et al., 2001: 13).

In 1960, the anti-racist and anti-colonial Botswana People's Party (BPP) was established, and Khama responded by founding the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which appealed to rural people and tribal chiefs (Beaulier, 2003: 228-230). Subsequently, Khama collaborated with the opposition on the path to independence. Botswana's independence was formally recognized in 1965, when Khama was elected president in the inaugural national elections. Botswana was thus established with a democratic system similar to the Westminster parliamentary system and made English common law its legal framework, though it still managed to preserve some important features of its tribal law (Parson, 1984: 39).

In contrast to Botswana, Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1980 following a lengthy period of armed conflict. With the cessation of hostilities, the New Rhodesia-Zimbabwe state was established (Hulec, 2019: 58-59) and a new provisional government and then a new Constitution was adopted on the principle of universal suffrage in 1979. The nascent parliament included twenty-eight members of the colonial settler community and seventy-two members of the indigenous population. The primary objective of Abel Muzoreva, the newly appointed prime minister and head of the United African National Council (UANC), was to maintain the ceasefire. However, he faced significant opposition from Joshua Nkomo, the president of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and Robert Mugabe, the president of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and head of the High Command of guerrillas abroad. Mugabe repeatedly proclaimed that the colonial government must be overthrown by military force and that a socialist Zimbabwe must be established. In contrast, the provisional government adopted a policy of "safe return" for guerrillas (Hulec, 2019: 60).

In the context of these developments, the Lancaster House conference resulted in the holding of free elections in March 1980. The previously established unity between Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, known as the Patriotic Front, disintegrated. Both leaders participated in the elections separately. Mugabe represented his new party, the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)-ZANU (PF), while Nkomo represented his former party, the Zimbabwe African People's Party-ZAPU. Rather than ideological differences, their disparate ethnic affiliations were the primary source of contention between them (Zimbabwe Review, 2019: 12). This is indicative of the impact of Mugabe's electoral success.

Following Botswana's independence in 1966, Khama pursued the policy of active neutrality in foreign affairs, focusing on the rectification of bureaucratic and economic programs during his presidency until 1980 (Tlou et al., 1995: 20). This period is regarded as the period during which Botswana's national and international identity was formed (Morton et al., 2008: 16). During this period, when Zimbabwe declared its independence and initiated new regulations, Botswana sought to maintain its own structural and developmental framework. However, when the Mugabe administration in Zimbabwe introduced plans for economic restructuring and new reforms in rural areas with its National Development Plan, it faced a tense reaction from the opposition party (Wekwete, 1989: 131).



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Tensions and conflicts in the political and governmental arenas of Zimbabwe persisted intermittently throughout the period following its independence. The political rivalry between the ruling and opposition parties and their leaders was reflected in society, and the polarization of society was further intensified by tribalism, land issues, and ideological divisions. Although Zimbabwe initially continued to develop economically, the increasing unemployment and unequal distribution of income in an increasingly tense environment disrupted any lasting balance.

Conversely, Botswana permitted tribal chiefs the right to speak in parliament during its independence process and continued its development in a planned way (Parson, 1984: 39). The country's social and economic development was shaped by its positive political structure. Between 1980 and 1998, the centralization of the state administration continued, accompanied by investments in education, health, and infrastructure under President Quett Masire, who succeeded Khama upon his death. Moreover, the country's foreign policy underwent significant developments. As a result of the indirect support extended to Namibia's independence process, relations with the Republic of South Africa became strained (Williams and Hackland, 1988: 147-148). Following Masire, Festus Mogae assumed the presidency and confronted mounting unemployment and the AIDS epidemic (Fredriksen, 2003: 339).

The conditions imposed by the land distribution clause of the Lancaster House Treaty in Zimbabwe constrained the government's ability to address the country's economic challenges, including inflation and poverty. This situation began to have an economic impact on Zimbabwe, which had previously been a country that could even export. Between 1990 and 1995, the price of food in Zimbabwe increased by 516%, while prices for medical care, transportation, and education increased by 300%. A significant proportion of the population, 62%, was unable to meet their basic needs. The occurrence of farm occupations and the country's deteriorating economy collectively contributed to the emergence of new levels of instability, which in turn led to a surge in immigration to neighboring countries. It is noteworthy that Botswana was also adversely affected by this influx of immigrants. Mugabe was unable to maintain the economic stability that had been established by the European colonialists. This was compounded by poor land reform management and increasing drought, which led to a crisis in Zimbabwe's economy (Dinç, 2012: 339).

The authoritarian and oppressive nature of the regime established by Mugabe, which was based on the British colonial model, initially appeared to be a pragmatic approach that relieved

British colonial farmers and seemed to offer the opportunity for compromise. Nevertheless, as time progressed, it became increasingly challenging to ignore the negative aspects of Mugabe's rule, including his self-perception as Zimbabwe's savior and his refusal to tolerate opposition. These factors contributed to the emergence of overt conflict within the country (Moore, 2010: 756). In such an environment, it is relatively straightforward to argue that Mugabe's administration transformed the country into a dictatorship. However, it is also evident that the political, economic, and social structures of the country presented significant challenges to the government's ability to overcome these weaknesses.

The country was weakened by this process, and it faced a crisis when the 5th Brigade, supported by North Korea, began killing guerrillas from the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), which was the rival party led by Joshua Nkomo (Dinç, 2012: 340). This resulted in the country being dragged further into internal conflict. Ultimately, Mugabe emerged as the executive president of Zimbabwe, effectively consolidating political power. As a consequence of the aforementioned developments, the country was governed under a state of emergency until 1990, during the tenure of the Mugabe administration.

Following Zimbabwe's independence, it became necessary for the country to transition to a participatory system. However, the Mugabe regime was unable to effectively manage this process. The regime became increasingly authoritarian, particularly in the 2000s. For over half a century, constitutions in this region did not impose any restrictions on leaders with regard to the distribution of land rights. The regime perceived land distribution as a more attractive and secure means of garnering voter support than providing education, health, or public services. This was particularly evident in competitive multi-party elections. Furthermore, land distribution became a means of prolonging the political control that was losing support due to economic crises and the waning financial capacity of the state (Kriger, 2010: 175). Indeed, Mugabe defined land reform as the conquest of the conquered and saw it as an inevitable part of owning the country (Dinç, 2012: 342-343). In Zimbabwe, the upper echelon of society exercised control and imposed reforms and policies on the population, thereby weakening the country and contributing to the emergence of discontent and instability. In Botswana, however, the situation was quite different. The public accepted and followed policies without any rift between the rural and urban sectors. With regard to this matter, the decision-making processes and the policies of the leaders of these two neighboring countries exhibit a considerable degree of divergence rather than convergence.



4. Similarities and Differences Between the Leaders of Botswana and Zimbabwe

Ian Khama, who ascended to the presidency of Botswana in 2008, introduced more radical policies than those previously implemented by previous administrations. One of the most controversial aspects of his presidency was his establishment of an internal security unit that bore resemblance to the FBI. This move greatly concerned politicians of the opposition. Furthermore, his appointment of military and police officers to numerous significant state positions, including the vice presidency, led to perceptions that the government had become militarized (Good, 2010: 320). Khama publicly criticized Zimbabwe's failure to include the opposition in the administration and also condemned the Sudanese president for the Darfur incident, indicating that the country's foreign policy was becoming increasingly affected. It is evident that Botswana had commenced the process of adopting a more Western-oriented foreign policy than other African countries. In light of these developments in foreign policy and politics, Botswana's economy began to utilise its resources in a more efficient manner. In particular, the equal distribution of Botswana's diamond mine profits across all echelons of society (Beaulier, 2003: 228-230) significantly impacted the country's development.

The government of Botswana invested the majority of the country's diamond profits in education, health, and infrastructure programs, prioritizing sustainability and development (Acemoğlu et al., 2001: 13). The Botswana economy exhibited an average growth rate of 7% between 1965 and 1995, making it the fastest-growing economy in the world (Beaulier, 2003: 231). This growth resulted in the country's transition from being the world's poorest to a middle-income country (Bayram, 2014: 83). The education and decision-making processes of Botswana's leaders, which were influenced by Western ideals, played a pivotal role in the implementation of utilitarian policies that facilitated the country's economic growth.

Botswana's history and culture set it apart from other African countries, contributing to its stability. Botswana exhibited greater homogeneity in ethnicity and language compared to other African countries, with a tribal culture that could be described as semi-democratic even in the pre-colonial period (Düsing, 2002: 182). The acceptance of Christianity and British protection during the colonial rivalry afforded Botswana's Tswana tribes protection from both Boer and German threats and from attacks from neighboring peoples (Gulbrandsen, 2012: 239). This prevented the formation of deep-rooted enmity and distrust with neighboring states. Moreover, Botswana did not experience the civil wars, military coups, and long-term political instability that plague many

African countries. In fact, the country demonstrated its political effectiveness before forming an army (N'Diaye, 2001: 75-80). Finally, Botswana's leaders concentrated their efforts on achieving good leadership and good governance. This entailed the legitimacy of the structural organization of the state and how Botswana's successive administrations took office, maintained their mandates, and implemented their policies. Such features as democratic elections, judicial independence, and transparency in Botswana (Robinson, 2009: 6-7) were regarded as remarkable by the Western world and placed Botswana at a significant advantage relative to other African countries.

Zimbabwe's process differed from that of other countries. Mugabe took action to ensure the legitimacy of his regime and to increase the support he received. The pressures from elite indigenous groups and the farm occupiers had an impact on the 1999 constitutional amendment. A referendum for this was held in 2000, but it failed, mustering support from just 20% of the urban population. The land problem became a chronic problem for the country. In response to the aforementioned challenges, the government initiated a program of rapid land reform and introduced sanctions. The state became increasingly radicalized by the land reform sanctions, and when necessary resorted to violence to enforce them, which led to a deterioration in relations with the West (Moyo, 2010: 250). Meanwhile, those who supported the land reform viewed it as the completion of the interrupted revolution.

The distribution of lands that changed hands was also a source of contention. The implementation of land reform was not conducted in an open and transparent manner, and it was utilized for political gain, becoming a tool to secure the allegiance of military officers. This resulted in the formation of a new wealthy indigenous class that lacked the requisite agricultural expertise, which in turn negatively impacted agricultural yields (Nnoma, 2008: 383). Another source of problems was the intervention of political parties in the political, social, and economic sectors (Scarnecchia, 2006: 227).

Operation "Move the Rubbish" in 2005 served as another indicator of the Mugabe regime's attitudes and inclinations. The government implemented the operation with little advance notice in Zimbabwe's major urban areas. In just two months, 700,000 citizens were forcibly evicted from their homes and properties. The public was led to believe that this operation targeted those who had voted for the opposition and who were attempting to survive within the informal economy. The opposition contended that the government was seizing profitable



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activities in urban centers and expanding ZANU patronage (Tibaijuka, 2005: 64). The country was experiencing a series of negative developments.

These policies and actions ultimately resulted in a chronic failure of agricultural production during Mugabe's tenure. The degeneration and loss of discipline of the armed forces, namely the army and the police, and the self-interested relations of the bureaucracy contributed to the continued unresolved expropriation problem. Consequently, the economic downturn constrained the resources available to ZANU and the distribution of these resources. Those who benefited from the activities of the regime were the party leaders and political and military bureaucrats. As corruption spread throughout the entire economy, investments in education and health were disrupted, crime rates increased, and outward migration began (Bratton and Masunungure, 2008: 52). The legitimacy of elections was called into question, particularly in the wake of the referendum's defeat in 2000. To retain power, Mugabe became increasingly dictatorial, accused the opposition of treason, and resorted to torture and assassination to achieve his objectives (Maudeni, 2004: 191). Throughout this period, ZANU failed to transition from a military complex engaged in the struggle for independence to a political structure capable of governing.

There are numerous reasons why ZANU was unable to transform. The state was unable to establish its institutions as autonomous entities, and these institutions were perceived as the exclusive domain of the party. Furthermore, there was a proliferation of economic corruption within the party structure. The roles of propaganda and the military in politics became institutionalized. Finally, the opposition was accused of using propaganda and subcontracted forces to support a permanent armed struggle within the country (Bratton and Masunungure, 2008: 54).

It is evident that the processes of state management in both countries underwent disparate developments both during and after the attainment of independence. In one case, a conciliatory political understanding emerged; in the other, an authoritarian political regime dominated by a leader who achieved his objectives through the use of violence and conflict. The two states held disparate understandings of the opposition, which were reflected in their respective social and political policies, public relations, and the role of the military in their governments. The two states share only one similarity: their tribal origins and the legacy of British colonial administration.

Conclusion

Postcolonial criticism encompasses the social and administrative culture of the colonized region both before and during the colonial period. It serves as a foundation for the analysis of independence movements. Prior understandings of leadership and forms of administration that had become established in the region were disrupted by the colonial period. Nevertheless, they persisted in the indigenous culture. This phenomenon was most evident in the social movements that emerged during the decolonization period and the leadership administering them. The separation movements were intricately intertwined with the native culture of the colonized regions and the social, political, and economic cultural legacies left by the colonizer.

Botswana and Zimbabwe both emerged from a pre-colonial tribal understanding, yet each saw different political cultures emerge. In Botswana, a relatively conciliatory understanding existed, in contrast to Zimbabwe, where a more confrontational political culture developed in the competition between different tribes for dominance. During the colonial period, the administration policies of Britain were indirect, with the leaders being used for social control according to the interests and priorities of the British in the region. In this context, traditional tribal power structures were employed, with the colonizer transforming tribal chiefs in the colonized region into subject leaders who served the colonizing administration. The decolonization process revealed that leaders were equally influenced by traditional political culture as well as the colonial experience. Cultural hybridization is thus reflected in leadership understanding and roles.

The colonial policies of Britain differed from one region to another, laying the foundation for approaches that synthesized traditional culture and colonial culture in the leadership of Botswana and Zimbabwe. In colonizing Botswana, Britain exploited the country's pre-colonial tribal practices to meet its own ends. This involved maintaining the kgotla meetings, which tolerated opposition, established a political bond between the chief and his people, and reinforced the economic bond of the people with the chief. In Botswana, the traditional understanding that emphasized cooperation rather than intertribal rivalry created an environment of reconciliation and succeeded in avoiding conflict with the colonizer during the independence process. The smooth transition to independence was facilitated by leaders who were educated in Europe and able to maintain traditional and local cultural attitudes toward administration. In Botswana, a hybrid social and political culture positively affected the country's understanding of leadership and



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continued to influence the country's understanding of its politics, social practices, and practices for economic sustainability even after it gained its independence from Britain. As the process of dependency continued, the decisions and practices of the leaders in the independence movements evolved into a form of re-colonization rather than a decline into decolonization.

It can be observed that Botswana exhibits a notable distinction from Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe, for instance, is characterised by a cultural milieu that is less homogenous and conciliatory in nature. Zimbabwe's social structure is such that it is inherently susceptible to conflict. This is due to the fact that the country developed on the basis of competition between different tribes. Prior to colonization, different tribal leaders in Zimbabwe engaged in a struggle for dominance. During the colonial period, the country continued to be a region characterized by revolts against the colonizer. However, with the advent of British colonial rule, these rebellions were quelled, the local population was marginalized, and the leaders were either apprehended or exiled. In Zimbabwe, the colonizer pursued a colonial settlement policy rather than an indirect one with the objective of establishing a traditional administration structure that would serve their own interests.

In Zimbabwe, a culture of confrontation and conflict has historically prevailed. These paths and methods served to reinforce the exclusion of the indigenous people from the government and policy-making, thereby highlighting the aggression of the governed toward the colonizer during the independence process. This aggression also facilitated the implementation of a socialist framework for the administration of the country, which was predicated on the denial of the colonizers and colonial culture. The leaders of Zimbabwe, who historically espoused a confrontational social and political culture, sought to perpetuate these attitudes and adopted a stance of East versus West. An examination of the prominent leadership role reveals the ascendancy of leaders who ideologically assimilated socialist leadership and defended independence by transforming rather than combining traditional and local culture and governance. Nevertheless, the opposition in Zimbabwe appeared to espouse a more liberal stance.

It is therefore notable that the understanding of leadership that played a role in Zimbabwe had a bilateral interaction, and that this situation also conflicted under various opposing views. From this perspective, a two-sided and more negative hybridization in Zimbabwe's political and leadership culture established an east-versus-west attitude that directed action. This negative hybridization created a state of antagonism toward the Western Bloc, while simultaneously

depending on the Eastern Bloc. This situation can be expressed negatively as a re-colonization of Zimbabwe, which contrasts with the colonial period.

The divergent political developments of Botswana and Zimbabwe were due to their inherent cultural traditions and to the presence of a hybridized leadership that occurred exclusively in Botswana. It seems plausible to explain this phenomenon of divergent development through the concept of re-colonization rather than decolonization. This is because the leader's practices, decisions, or preferences were unable to transform the countries into fully independent states.

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2015 Mülteci Krizi Sonrası Almanya ve Macaristan'ın Uluslararası Göç Politikaları: Realist Gelenek Çerçevesinde Bir Analiz

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Özet

Makale, 2015 Mülteci Krizi'nden sonra Almanya ve Macaristan'da ulusal göç mevzuatına getirilen değişikliklere odaklanmaktadır ve adı geçen ülkelerin Arap Baharı sonucunda yaşanan kitlesel göçe verdiği tepkileri araştırmaktadır. Çalışma objesi olarak Almanya ve Macaristan'ın tercih edilmesinin temel nedeni ise hem göçe yaklaşımı hem de yönetici kadrosu açısından iki farklı örneği teşkil eden devletlerin ele alınmasının daha analitik sonuçlara ulaşmaya yardımcı olacağıdır. Çalışma, Almanya ve Macaristan'ın uluslararası göç politikalarının fiiliyatta ulusal çıkarların ifadesi olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Önerilen araştırma tezine cevap verebilmek için çalışmada 2015 mülteci krizi sonrası dönemde Almanya ve Macaristan'ın ulusal göç politikalarında yaptıkları reformlar realist gelenek çerçevesinde analiz edilmiştir. Çalışmanın sonucunda, her iki devletin Realizmin düzensiz göçe dair ortaya koyduğu önermelere uygun bir seyir izlediği ve uluslararası göç politikalarının çıkar odaklı pragmatizm üzerine kurulu olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Aynı zamanda, Neoklasik Realizmin politika yapımı ile ilgili ortaya koyduğu hipotezlere uygun olacak şekilde her iki ülkenin kriz sürecindeki politikalarının iç siyasetteki gelişmelerden ve ülkelerin iç özelliklerinden önemli ölçüde etkilendiği görülmüştür.



International Migration Policies of Germany and Hungary After the 2015 Refugee Crisis: An Analysis in the Framework of the Realism

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Abstract

The article focuses on the changes brought to the national immigration legislation in Germany and Hungary after the 2015 Refugee Crisis. The main reason for choosing Germany and Hungary as the study objects lies in the fact that considering the states that constitute two different examples in terms of both their approach to immigration and their administrative staff will help to reach more analytical results. The study claims that the international migration policies of Germany and Hungary are the expression of national interests in practice. In order to answer the proposed research thesis, the reforms made by Germany and Hungary in their national migration policies in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis were analyzed within the framework of the realist tradition. As a result of the study, it has been determined that both states follow a course in accordance with the axioms of Realism on irregular migration and their international migration policies are based on interest-oriented pragmatism. At the same time, in accordance with the hypotheses put forward by Neoclassical Realism about policy making, it was seen that the policies of both countries during the crisis were significantly affected by the developments in domestic politics and the internal characteristics of the countries.

Giriş

Göç, devletler açısından ulusal güvenlik başta olmak üzere ev sahibi toplumun ekonomisini ve kültürel gelişimini etkileyen bir olgudur. Üstelik uluslararası göç politikaları geliştirme süreci dış politika, sosyal politikalar veya iş gücü piyasası politikası gibi diğer politikaların önceliklerinden etkilenmektedir. Avrupa Birliği (AB) gibi ulus üstü örgütlere üye olan devletler açısından göç yönetimi daha da karmaşık ve zorlu bir süreçtir. Zira AB üye devletleri için uluslararası göçün yönetimi, yalnızca iç siyasetten, dış politikadan, ülkenin ekonomik ve demografik yapısından değil AB mevzuatından ve uluslararası sorumluluklardan etkilenmektedir. Buna bağlı olarak 2015 yılında patlak veren mülteci krizi¹, ulus üstü alanda bütünleşme sürecine etkisini gösteren tartışmalı bir konu olmuştur (Kosinska, 2021: 67). AB içerisinde de göçün yönetimine ilişkin iki farklı söylem ortaya çıkmıştır. Biri, etkili göç yönetimi amacıyla üye devletler arasında dayanışmanın güçlendirilmesi diğeri ise artan göç hareketleriyle ilgili potansiyel tehditler nedeniyle iç sınırlarda kontrollerin yeniden başlatılması üzerinedir (Kosinska, 2021: 67). Bu süreçte üye devletler iç ve dış güvenlik kavramları arasındaki ayrımın altını daha fazla çizmeye başlamış ve birlikten bağımsız olarak kendi göç politikalarını oluşturmuşlardır (Erdoğan, 2021: 66). Buradan yola çıkarak, AB üyesi olan Almanya ve Macaristan'ın 2015 mülteci krizine yönelik göç politikalarını belirleyen temel kaygıları ve göç yönetimini etkileyen temel unsurları tespit etmek bu çalışmanın amacını oluşturmaktadır.

Çalışma, Almanya ve Macaristan'ın uluslararası göç politikalarının fiiliyatta ulusal çıkarların ifadesi olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Önerilen araştırma tezine cevap verebilmek için çalışmada 2015 mülteci krizi sonrası dönemde Almanya ve Macaristan'ın ulusal göç politikalarında yaptıkları reformlar analiz edilmiştir. Ancak araştırma sorusunun geniş olmasından dolayı çalışma 2015-2020 yılları arasındaki göç mevzuatındaki değişikliklere odaklanmaktadır. Çalışma, mülteci krizinin doruğa ulaştığı 2015 yılının yaz aylarından 2020 yılında yaşanan küresel salgın nedeniyle kitlesel göçün yoğunluğunun azaldığı döneme kadar olan süreyi kapsamaktadır. Söz konusu sınırlandırma, konunun daha analitik bir perspektiften incelenmesini mümkün kılmanın yanı sıra adı geçen

¹ Göç esas olarak olumsuz bir olgu değildir ve bilindiği üzere birçok devlet ekonomik ve demografik nedenlerle göçü teşvik etmektedir. Devletlerin güvenliğini tehdit eden ise göçün düzensiz olmasıdır. Bu doğrultuda; 2015 yılında yaşanan yoğun düzensiz göç hareketi, AB üye devletlerinin tutarsız ve açıkça başarısız göç yönetimi ile birleşince bir kriz ortaya çıkarmıştır. Söz konusu krizin birçok boyutunun olmasıyla birlikte, bir yandan mültecilerin güvenliği açısından birçok insani drama yol açması diğeri yandan AB bütünleşme sürecini olumsuz etkilemesi nedeniyle etik-politik bir kriz olduğunu söylemek mümkündür.

devletlerin kriz koşullarında kitlesel göçe ne şekilde cevap verdiklerini de ortaya koymaya yardımcı olacaktır.

Çalışmanın ilk bölümünde kavramsal çerçeve çizilmiş ve bu doğrultuda uluslararası göç yönetimi kavramı kısaca anlatılmıştır. Ardından, realist kuramın uluslararası göçe bakışı ele alınmış ve göç-güvenlik ilişkisi realist gelenek çerçevesinde tartışılmıştır. Teorik çerçeve olarak Realist geleneğin seçilmesinin temel nedeni, uluslararası göç politikasını oluşturma süreçlerini analiz etmede sistem, yapı ve iç politika unsurlarını birleştirerek çalışmamıza çoğul bir bakış açısı sağlamasında yatmaktadır. Söz konusu teorik çerçevenin göç çalışmalarında sıkça başvurulan yaklaşımların ötesine geçerek özellikle devletlerin kitlesel göçü güvenlikleştirmelerinin nedenlerini anlamada yararlı bir mercek sunacağına inanmaktayız.

Çalışmanın ikinci kısmında betimsel içerik analizi yöntemiyle Almanya ve Macaristan'ın 2015 yılı sonrası dönemde benimsediği göç politikaları incelenmiştir. Ardından söz konusu iki devletin uluslararası göçe yaklaşımları karşılaştırmalı analize tabi tutulmuştur. Çalışma objesi olarak Almanya ve Macaristan'ın tercih edilmesinin temel nedeni ise hem göçe yaklaşımı hem de yönetici kadrosu açısından iki farklı örneği teşkil eden devletlerin ele alınmasının daha analitik sonuçlara ulaşmaya yardımcı olacağına yatmaktadır. Bu sayede hem açıkça göçmen karşıtı hem de görece daha ılımlı devletlerin göç politikalarının temelinde çıkar odaklı realizm üzerine kurulu olduğu ortaya konmaya çalışılacaktır.

1. Uluslararası Göç ve Göç Yönetimi

Uluslararası göç, göçmenlerin göç kararı almalarından göç ettikleri ülkeye yerleşmelerine kadarki süreci ifade etmektedir (Uluslararası Göç Örgütü, 2017: 88). Bu tanıma dayanan uluslararası göç politikaları, özellikle göçmenlerin² göç ettikleri ülkeye uyumunu esas almaktadır (Şimşek, 2018: 371). Faist'in (2000: 30) belirttiği gibi, uluslararası göç, çok sayıda bağ ile çok sayıda ulus-devlet içindeki iki ya da daha çok konumu ve hareket edenlerle kalanlar arasındaki çeşitli bağları özetleyen çok boyutlu ekonomik, siyasi, kültürel ve demografik bir süreçtir. Dolayısıyla, uluslararası göç sosyal dönüşüm süreci içerisinde değerlendirilmesi gereken karmaşık bir olgudur. Göç, kimlik, kültür, istihdam ve kalkınma gibi alanları doğrudan etkilemektedir (Meyers, 2000: 1245). Buna bağlı olarak, uluslararası göç devletleri ulusal çıkarları, egemenliği ve kimliği korumayı

² Göçmen; şemsiye bir terim olup, göçe neden olan etkilerden ve göçün zorunlu veya gönüllü gerçekleşmiş olması durumundan bağımsız olarak tüm insan hareketlilikleri göçmen olarak sınıflandırılmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda söz konusu terim; işçilerden, uluslararası öğrencilere, sığınmacı ve mültecilere kadar geniş bir grubu kapsamaktadır.

amaçlayan eylemlere zorlamaktadır. Ayrıca göç yönetimi, bir yandan vatandaşların çıkarlarını ön plana çıkarırken diğer yandan göçmenlerin güvenliklerinin ve haklarının sağlanmasını da içermelidir. Dolayısıyla devletler çoğu zaman, göçmenleri sosyal hayattan dışlama ve temel insan haklarına erişimlerini engelleme hakkına sahip olup olmadıkları sorusuyla karşı karşıya kalmaktadır. Göç olgusunu karmaşıklaştıran diğer bir husus ise, devletlerin ulusal çıkarları birbirinden farklılaşması ve dolayısıyla uluslararası düzeyde göç yönetimine ilişkin ortak bir strateji belirlemenin güçlüğüdür.

Göç olgusunun karmaşıklığını göz önünde bulunduran Ukraynalı araştırmacı Yevtukh'un (1997: 54) uluslararası göç politikası tanımı dikkat çekmektedir. Yevtukh'a göre uluslararası göç politikalarının temel amacı; göç akışlarını düzenlemek, göç süreçlerinin olumsuz sonuçlarının üstesinden gelmek, gelen göçmenleri niceliksel ve niteliksel açılardan kontrol altında tutmak, göçmenlerin güvenliğini ve onların topluma entegrasyonu için gerekli sosyo-ekonomik ve kültürel koşulları yaratmaktır. Bu tanımdan da anlaşılacağı üzere uluslararası göç, uzun vadeli bir sosyal dönüşüm olarak ele alınmalıdır.

Genel olarak değerlendirilecek olursa, devletlerin uluslararası göç politikaları ve göçü yönetme yaklaşımları ülkelerin ekonomik, toplumsal, siyasal ve kültürel özelliğine bağlı olmanın yanı sıra göçün özelliğine göre farklılıklar göstermektedir (Şimşek ve İçduygu, 2017: 7). Ancak genel olarak devletin temel amacı göçü kontrol etmektir. Nitekim devletler çıkarları temelinde, göçmenlerin gelişini engellemeye çalıştığı gibi bazı göçmen gruplarının gelişini teşvik de edebilir (Meyers, 2000: 1246). Benzer şekilde, kimi devletlerin uluslararası göç politikaları, göçmenlerin geçici olmadığını dikkate alarak entegrasyonu da ihtiva ederken kimi ülkeler, göçmenlerin girişini kontrol etmeyi entegrasyon politikalarından daha etkili bir uygulama olarak görmektedir (Şimşek, 2018: 372). Bundan yola çıkarak bir sonraki bölümde realist teorinin uluslararası göçe bakışı ele alınacaktır.

2. Realist Teori Açısından Uluslararası Göç

Arap Baharı sonucunda Avrupa'ya doğru artan göç hareketliliği ile devletler ve uluslararası örgütler uluslararası göç politikaları çerçevesinde güvenlik olgusunu gündeme taşımıştır. Avrupa ülkelerine ulaşmaya çalışırken mültecilerin hayatlarını tehlikeye atması göçe insan odaklı değerlendirmeleri güçlendirse de devlet güvenliği halen göç politikalarını belirleyen en önemli unsurdur (Şimşek ve İçduygu, 2017: 6). Özellikle Orta Doğu'dan Avrupa'ya artan göç ulus-

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devletlerin güvenliğini tehdit eden toplumsal bir sorun olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Buna bağlı olarak, göç politikalarında devlet güvenliğini merkeze koyan realist bir bakış açısı yaygınlık kazanmaktadır.

Klasik uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri, uluslararası olayların meydana gelme nedenlerini açıklamaya çalışırken genellikle egemen devletler arasındaki ilişkilere odaklanmaktadırlar. Devleti uluslararası sistemin başat aktörleri olarak gören realist yaklaşım, uluslararası göçü sistem düzeyinde bir sorun olarak görmemektedir (Meyers, 2000: 1263). Realizm, uluslararası göçü terörizm gibi belli güvenlik konuları ile ilişkilendirmekte veya askeri gücün demografik bir unsur olarak değerlendirmektedir (Miller, 2000: 32-33). Diğer bir ifade ile klasik realistler, mültecilerin uluslararası sistemi etkileme potansiyelini hafife almaktadır. Realistlere göre devletler her şeyden önce kendilerini dış dünyadan gelebilecek tehditlere karşı korumaya çalışmaktadırlar. Bu nedenle, özellikle düzensiz göç, klasik uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri tarafından devlete yönelik bir tehdittir ve bu bağlamda bir ulusal güvenlik sorunu olarak değerlendirilmektedir (Baklacioğlu, 2010: 47). Nitekim realist akımın önde gelen temsilcilerinden Samuel Huntington (2004: 182) göçü ulusal tehdit olarak tanımlamakta ve göçün sebep olabileceği asimilasyona dikkat çekmektedir. Göçe çözüm olarak ise göçe kısıtlama getirilmesi ve giriş çıkışa yönelik birtakım ölçütlerin belirlenmesini önermektedir. Öte yandan Hollifield (2000: 154), devletlerin uluslararası göçü ulusal çıkarları doğrultusunda düzenlediğini belirtmiştir. Göç yönetimi ulusal güvenlik konusudur ve devletler uluslararası sistemdeki güç dağılımını dikkate alarak göçmenleri kabul etmekte veya girişlerini engellemektedir. Bu kapsamda göç politikaları, güç dağılımı ve devletlerin uluslararası sistemdeki konumları gibi yapısal faktörler tarafından belirlenmektedir.

Görüldüğü gibi, klasik realistler gerçek ve potansiyel ulusal tehditlere odaklanmaktadır. Bu çerçevede güvenlik ve stratejik meseleler yüksek siyaset olarak ele alınırken, ekonomik ve sosyal meseleler daha az önemli veya düşük siyaset olarak görülmektedir (Miller, 2000: 32). Göç politikalarının oluşumunda hem ulusal hem de uluslararası faktörlerin etkili olduğu göz önünde bulundurulduğunda klasik realizm göç politikalarını açıklamakta sınırlı bir perspektif sunmaktadır. Buna karşılık neoklasik realizm, dış politikanın oluşumunda uluslararası sistemin yapısı, devletlerin iç dinamikleri ve bunların kendi aralarındaki karmaşık etkileşimleri gibi farklı unsurları ele almaktadır (Firoozabadi ve Ashkezari, 2016: 95). Neoklasik realistler; devletlerin iç özelliklerinin ve liderlerinin uluslararası tehdit ve fırsatlara ilişkin değerlendirmelerinin bu liderlerin izleyecekleri politikaları nasıl etkilediğini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Örneğin Gilpin (2006: 53), uluslararası

ilişkilerdeki ekonomik faktörlerin önemine dikkat çekerek, göçe ilişkin engellerin vatandaşların gerçek ücretlerini ve sosyal refahını korumayı amaçlayan politikalarla inşa edildiğini belirtmiştir.

Neoklasik realizm, devlet politikalarını anlamının, dış politikaların formüle edildiği ve uygulandığı bağlamların yakından incelenmesinden geçtiğini savunmaktadır (Rose, 1998: 145). Bu doğrultuda; devletler arasındaki güç dağılımı, karar vericilerin uluslararası sistem yapısından doğan baskılara ilişkin algıları ve diğer devletlerin niyetleri gibi karar vericilerinin hareket özgürlüğünü etkileyen değişkenler analize dahil edilmektedir (Rose, 1998: 146). Daha açık bir ifadeyle, söz konusu yaklaşımın devlet davranışlarını, liderlerin algıları ve beklentilerini, ülkenin iç meselelerini ve politik gündemlerini; diğer yandan ise güç dengesi, müttefik ilişkileri gibi unsurları etkilediği kabul edilmektedir (Rose, 1998: 147). Bu bağlamda neoklasik realizm göç çalışmalarına daha geniş bir perspektif sunarak konumuz olan devletlerin uluslararası göç politikalarını dış ve iç faktörler açısından analiz etmeye olanak sağlayacaktır.

3. 2015 Mülteci Krizi Sonrası Macaristan ve Almanya'nın Ulusal Göç Politikaları

2010 yılı başında başlayan Arap Baharı'nın uluslararası toplum üzerinde çok yönlü etkileri olmuştur. Suriye başta olmak üzere Orta Doğu ülkelerinden Avrupa kıtasına doğru kitlesel göç hareketliliği bunlardan biridir. Özellikle 2015 yılında hız kazanan kitlesel göç AB devletleri için kriz haline dönüşmüştür. Sınır ötesi nüfus hareketlerinin insani ve iç siyasi sonuçları üzerine birçok tartışma yaşandığı AB'de, göç ve sığınma hakkı meseleleri en önemli gündem başlıklarından birisi olmuştur (Üstün, 2021: 396).

AB üye devletlerinin hangi şekilde ve şartlarda göçmenleri kabul edeceği, kimlere mülteci statüsü vereceği hususu uzun yıllar boyunca üyelerin kendi yetki ve düzenleme alanında bulunmuştur. Ancak, AB üyesi olan devletlerin ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasi entegrasyonu arttıkça göç yönetimi, AB'nin siyasi gündeminin merkezi bir unsuru haline gelmiştir. Nitekim zamanla göçmen akışını düzenleme ihtiyacı ortak göç politikalarını gerekli kılmıştır. Bu doğrultuda üye devletler AB çatısı altında göç ve sığınma politikalarıyla ilgili ortak düzenlemeler yapmaya başlamış ve bu düzenlemelerin hükümlerini kendi iç hukuklarına yerleştirmişlerdir. AB ortak göç politikasının tarihsel gelişimini incelemek bu çalışmayı aşacağı için sadece 2015 yılında patlak veren mülteci krizinin AB'nin göçü yönetme araçlarını ve mevzuatını yetersiz bıraktığını söylemek yeterli olacaktır. Söz konusu süreçte üye devletler ulusal çıkarılara vurgu yaparak zaman zaman AB

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hukuku ile de uyuşmayan kendi göç politikalarını oluşturmaya yönelmişlerdir.³ Buna bağlı olarak AB'nin söz konusu krize dayanışma içinde güçlü bir cevap vermesini engelleyen üç temel nedenden bahsetmek mümkündür. Birincisi, göçmenler çoğunlukla Almanya ve Fransa gibi devletlerden sığınma talep etmiştir. Buna bağlı olarak diğer devletler için bu kriz, adı geçen devletlerin sorunu olarak görülmüştür. İkincisi, özellikle kriz anında popülizm ve seçim kaygılarının artmasıyla birlikte üye devletlerin iç siyasi gündeminden kaynaklı problemler bu süreci etkilemiştir. Üçüncüsü ise, üye devletlerin farklılaşan ulusal çıkarları, AB iltica sistemi ile uyumlaştırılmayan göç politikalarına yol açmıştır (Tavacı, 2023: 110).

Böylece, AB üyelerinin kriz sürecinde izledikleri politikalar ve sorunun çözümünde aldıkları roller çoğunlukla iç siyasetleri ve ulusal çıkarları tarafından etkilenmiştir. Bu açıdan Almanya sığınmacıların gitmek istediği hedef bir ülke olarak krizden en çok etkilenen devletlerden biri olsa da süreci, krizin insani boyutunu göz önünde bulundurarak yönetmeye çalışmıştır. Almanya aynı zamanda AB'nin yönlendirici gücü olarak mülteci krizi ile yakından ilgilenmiş ve AB'nin bu krize yönelik yaklaşımını belirlemeye çalışmıştır. Çalışmanın diğer örneğini oluşturan Macaristan ise konumu itibarıyla Avrupa'nın doğu kara sınırını oluşturmaktadır ve binlerce sığınmacı için Avrupa'nın kapısıdır. Almanya gibi yoğun mülteci akışına maruz kalmakla beraber Macaristan krize farklı bir şekilde yanıt vermiştir. Macaristan yönetimi, AB göç politikalarını eleştirerek mülteci karşıtı retorik geliştirmiş ve sınır güvenliğine dayalı göç politikalarını benimsemiştir.

3.1. Mülteci Krizi sonrası Macaristan Ulusal Göç Politikaları

Sığınmacıların Avrupa'ya ulaşmak için en sık kullandığı rotalardan biri olan Doğu Akdeniz rotası üzerinde yer alan Macaristan, sınırlarında yüksek sayıda sığınmacı ile karşı karşıya kalmıştır (Frontex, 2017: 5). Bununla birlikte Macaristan, sığınmacılar için hedef ülke olmaktan ziyade daha çok transit ülke konumundadır. Bu açıdan Fransa, Almanya ve İspanya gibi hedef ülkelere kabul edilmeyen sığınmacılar geri Dublin sistemi⁴ sayesinde transit ülkelere gönderilmektedir. Böyle olunca Polonya ve Macaristan gibi geçiş ülkeleri mülteci sayısı açısından büyük yük altında kalmaktadır (Kaya ve Bianca, 2018: 418).

³ Avrupa Birliği Göç Politikası hakkında ayrıntılı bilgi için bkz.: Aykaç, M., Yertüm, U. (2017). Avrupa Birliği göç politikalarının gelişimi: misafir işçi kabulünden sığınmacı akınına. *Journal of Social Policy Conferences*, 70(1), 1-29.

⁴ Dublin sistemi sığınmacıların AB içinde yalnızca tek bir üye devlette uluslararası koruma başvurusu yapabileceğini tanımlamaktadır. Dublin III Tüzüğü'ne göre sığınmacılar, başvuruları için sorumlu kabul edilen devletten farklı bir üye devlete başvurularını gerçekleştirirse, sorumlu üye devlete geri gönderilebilirler (Dublin III Tüzüğü, 24(4)).

2015 yılında krizin patlak vermesi AB’de sığınmacıların yerleştirilmesine yönelik kota sistemi uygulanmaya koyulmuştur. Ancak Macaristan bu yerleştirme planına karşı çıkmıştır. Macaristan’a sığınma amacıyla gelen göçmenlerin çoğunun ekonomik göçmenler olduğu ve asıl amaçlarının Macaristan ve AB’nin sunduğu fırsatlardan yararlanmak olduğunu vurgulayan Orban, göçmenlerin ülkeye yasa dışı yollardan girdiğini iddia etmiştir. AB’nin göç politikalarını da eleştirerek Macaristan’ın kendisini savunacağı dile getirmiştir (Bocskor, 2018: 560). Bu doğrultuda, sığınmacıların ülkeye girişini engellemek isteyen Macaristan yönetimi, 2015 yılında sınırı boyunca önce dikenli teller, sonra duvar dikmiştir. Avrupa Komisyonu, Macaristan’ın AB hukukuna aykırı politikaları ve sığınma başvurusunda bulunanları ülkeden çıkmaya zorlaması dolayısıyla 2015’te ihlal prosedürü başlatmıştır (Avrupa Komisyonu, 2017).

24 Nisan 2015’te Orban yönetimi “Göç ve Terörizm Hakkında Milli Müzakere” başlıklı bir anketle göçe karşı bir kampanya başlatmıştır. Posta yoluyla 18 yaşın üzerindeki her vatandaşa 12 sorudan oluşan bir anket ve Başbakan Orban tarafından imzalanan bir mektup gönderilmiştir. Sığınmacıları ekonomik göçmenler olarak nitelendiren Başbakan artan ekonomik göçmenleri Macaristan için durdurulması gereken yeni bir tehdit olarak değerlendirmiştir (Bocskor, 2018: 560-561). Ayrıca, anketin başlığından da anlaşılacağı üzere göç ve göçmenler terörizmle ilişkilendirilmiştir. Söz konusu anket göçü güvenlik ve ekonomiye yönelik bir tehdit olarak yansıtmaktadır. Böylelikle vatandaşların göç ve göçmenlere yönelik daha katı kuralları desteklemesi amaçlanmaktadır. Nitekim, yukarıda değindiğimiz Sırbistan sınırına çekilen tel örgü uluslararası kamuoyunun tepkisini çekse de Macar vatandaşları tarafından desteklenmiştir (Bocskor, 2018: 564; Wike vd., 2016: 3-6).

2016 yılında İltica Kanunu ve Devlet Sınırları Kanunu’nda değişiklikler yapılmıştır. Bu değişikliklerle hükümet, Macaristan’daki mültecilere ve ikincil koruma statüsüne sahip kişilere yapılan yardımı kesmeye başlamıştır. Mülteci statüsü kazandıktan sonra barınma merkezlerinde kalma süresi ise 60 günden 30 güne indirilmiştir. Ayrıca, daha önce mülteci veya ikincil koruma statüsüne hak kazanmış kişilerin uygunlukları her üç yılda bir yeniden değerlendirilecektir (Nagy, 2016: 1050). Bu değişiklik öncesinde mültecilerin uygunluk değerlendirmesi için herhangi bir süre sınırı bulunmazken ikincil koruma statüsü için uygunluk değerlendirmesi beş yılda bir yapılmaktaydı. Ayrıca Macaristan, sığınmacılara yönelik aylık mali yardım ve çocuklar için okul yardımını tamamen iptal etmiştir. Bunun yanında mültecilerin ve ikincil koruma statüsündeki kişilerin topluma entegrasyonu için geliştirilen programlara son verilmiştir (Hungarian Helsinki

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Committee, 2016: 1). Bu değişikliklerle Orban hükümeti, Macaristan'ın mülteci ve sığınmacılara daha iyi bir yaşam için yardım etmeyeceğini belirtmiştir (Hungarian Government, 2016). Akabinde de Macaristan'ın Sırbistan ve Hırvatistan sınırındaki sekiz kilometrelik alanda belgesiz olarak kalan kişileri sığınma başvuru hakkı vermeden sınır dışı etmiştir.

Mart 2017'de Macaristan Parlamentosu tarafından sığınmacılara yönelik 2017/39 Sayılı Kanun onaylanmıştır. Buna göre, ülkeye giriş yapan sığınmacılar gözetimine alınabilecektir. Daha önce mülteci başvurusunda bulunan kişiler ve ülkeye giriş yapmış sığınmacılar ise sınır bölgelerinde kurulacak konteyner kamplarına yerleştirilecektir (Council of Europe, 2018: 6). AB müktesebatı ve uluslararası hukuktan doğan yükümlülüklerine açıkça aykırı olan bu yasa uluslararası örgütlerin yanı sıra Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği tarafından da eleştirilmiştir. Aynı yıl, sınır dışı edilmenin kapsamı yeni değişikliklerle genişletilmiştir. Buna göre, Macaristan'da yasa dışı olarak kalan kişiler, sığınma başvurusu hakkı verilmeden Macaristan-Sırbistan sınırının dışına atılmıştır (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2017: 1-2).

Mülteci karşıtı önlemler çerçevesinde Haziran 2018'de anayasa düzeyinde değişiklikler kabul edilmiştir. Önemli bir kısmı göçmenlerle ilgili olan düzenlemeler, göçmen ve mülteci haklarını sınırlandırdığı için çok ses getirmiştir. Nitekim Macaristan, uluslararası koruma hakkının alınması için yeni bir kriter eklemiştir. Buna göre, sığınmacıların sadece menşe ülkelerinde değil transit ülkelerde de kötü muameleye maruz kalma şartı aranmaya başlamıştır. Daha açık bir ifadeyle Macaristan'a mülteciler için güvenli sayılan ülkeler üzerinden gelen ve o ülkelerde tehdit altında olmayan bir mülteci Macaristan'dan sığınma hakkı alamaz. Bu aslında birçok sığınma başvurusunun doğrudan reddedileceği anlamına gelmektedir. Zira Macaristan'a ulaşmak isteyen birçok sığınmacı Türkiye veya Sırbistan'dan geçmektedir. Sırbistan ise sığınmacılara yeterli koruma sağlayan bir ülke olarak güvenli bir üçüncü ülke listesinde yer alması nedeniyle başvuruların çoğu otomatik olarak reddedilmektedir (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2018: 1). Birçok sivil toplum kuruluşu (STK) ve AB yetkilisi bu değişiklikleri eleştirerek bunları, insan hakları ve AB hukuku ihlali olarak görmektedir. Ayrıca STK çalışanlarının mülteci veya sığınmacıların kaldığı tesislere girişine izin verilmemesi ve STK'ların insanlara herhangi bir yardım yapmasının engellenmesi birçok endişeye yol açmıştır. (Hungarian Helsinki Committee and Menedek, 2021: 1).

Ayrıca, yapılan değişikliklerle Macaristan, kitlesel göç nedeniyle "kriz hali" olarak adlandırılan yeni bir olağanüstü hâl türü getirmiştir. Şöyle ki, Macaristan'a gelen sığınmacı sayısı bir ayda günde 500 kişiyi, iki haftada günde 750 kişiyi veya bir haftada günde 800 kişiyi aşarsa,

hükümet kitlesel göç nedeniyle kriz hali ilan edebilmektedir. Kitlesel göçten kaynaklanan kriz durumu, polisin düzensiz olarak kalan ve Macaristan'da sığınma talebinde bulunmak isteyen göçmenleri sınır çitinden geri itme yetkisine sahip olduğu anlamına gelmektedir. Bu da ülkenin herhangi bir yerinden, herhangi bir yasal prosedür veya bu tedbire itiraz etme fırsatı olmadan yapılmaktadır (European Database of Asylum Law, 2016: 17). Ayrıca, 2020 yılına kadar kriz hali nedeniyle, sığınma başvuruları yalnızca sınırda (geçiş bölgesi içinde) yapılabilmiş ve sığınmacılar herhangi bir yasal dayanak olmaksızın tüm sığınma prosedürü boyunca Röszke ve Tompa transit bölgesinde tutulmuştur.

Mayıs 2020'de Avrupa Birliği Adalet Divanı (ABAD), transit bölgelere yerleştirmenin yasa dışı gözaltı olarak nitelendirildiğine hükmeden önemli bir karar yayımlamıştır (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2020). Geçiş bölgeleri daha sonra kapatılmış ve yaklaşık 300 kişi açık veya yarı açık tesislere taşınmıştır. ABAD kararının ardından sığınma başvurularının ancak bir niyet beyanının sığınma makamı tarafından onaylanmasından sonra yapılabileceği yeni bir sığınma sistemi uygulamaya koyulmuştur. Niyet beyanları ise yalnızca Kyiv'deki veya Belgrad'daki Macaristan Büyükelçiliğine sunulabilmektedir. Macaristan'da yasal olarak ikamet eden göçmenlerin de sığınma başvuruları adı geçen şehirlerde kabul edilmektedir. Görünen o ki, sığınmacıların sığınma prosedürlerine erişmesi neredeyse imkânsız hale getirilmiştir. Yeni sığınma sisteminin sonucu olarak, 2020 yılında sadece 92 sığınma başvurusu kayıt altına alınmıştır. Reddedilme oranı ise 2019 yılına nazaran nispeten düşmüş ve %73 olarak kaydedilmiştir (European Database of Asylum Law, 2021: 11). Şöyle ki 2019 yılında 468; 2018 yılında 670; 2017 yılında 3.397; 2016 yılında 29.432, 2015 yılında ise 175.960 başvuru kaydedilmiştir. 2015 yılında ret oranı %83,3 olmuştur (Asylum Information Database, 2020: 7; Asylum Information Database, 2016: 6; Asylum Information Database, 2017: 7).

3.2. Mülteci Krizi Sonrası Almanya'nın Ulusal Göç Politikası

Almanya Federal Cumhuriyeti 2015 yılında açık kapı politikası çerçevesinde Suriye, Irak ve Afganistan'daki güvensiz koşullar nedeniyle 1.000.000 mülteciyi kabul edeceğini bildirmiştir (Politico, 2017). Angela Merkel hükümeti Almanya'nın uluslararası korumaya ihtiyacı olanlara kapı açacağını ilan ederek AB göç politikalarında dayanışmanın öncülüğünü yapmıştır. Bunun neticesinde 2015 yılında Almanya'ya Batı Balkan ülkelerinden gelenler dahil 1.091.894 sığınma başvurusu yapılmıştır. Dolayısıyla, Almanya'nın açık kapı politikası, Orta Doğu'dan gelen sığınmacıların hareketliliğini hedeflese de onların yanı sıra AB üyesi olmayan Balkan ülkeleri başta

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olmak üzere ekonomik amaçlı göçmen hareketliliğini teşvik etmiş ve Almanya'da göçmen sayısı hızla artmaya başlamıştır. Bunun sonucunda birkaç ay gibi kısa bir zamanda “hoş geldiniz” politikası yerini giderek daha sınırlayıcı politikalara bırakmaya başlamıştır. Bu noktada belirtmek gerekir ki bu hızlı değişimde artan göçmen sayılarının yanı sıra Almanya'nın iç siyasetindeki aşırı sağın yükselişi de etkili olmuştur (Erdoğan, 2021: 81).

Ekim 2015'te sığınmacı sayısını azaltmayı amaçlayan ilk resmî düzenleme yapılmıştır. Bu çerçevede, sığınma prosedürlerini hızlandırmak için sığınma kararlarına itiraz süreci kısaltılmıştır. Ardından, İltica Prosedürü Hızlandırma Kanunu (Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetz, Asylum Act) uyarınca Kosova, Arnavutluk ve Karadağ güvenli üçüncü ülke kabul edilmiştir (Kirchhoff ve Lorenz, 2018: 59). 2016 yılından itibaren Almanya kalıcı mülteci statülerini geçici statülerle değiştirmeye başlamıştır. Örneğin, aile birleşimi gerekçesiyle daha önce otomatik olarak verilen mülteci statüleri ek koruma statüsü ile değişmiştir (Stevens, 2017: 187). Bunun sonucunda, 2016 yılına kadar genel koruma oranı çok yüksek seviyede iken politika değişikliği nedeniyle 2016'nın başında Federal Göç ve Mülteciler Dairesi (BAMF) rekor sayıda vakada mülteci korumasının yerine ikincil koruma kararı vermiştir. Bu değişiklik, en çok Suriye vatandaşlarını etkilemiştir. 2015 yılında Suriyelilerin %95,8'i mülteci statüsüne sahipken 2016 yılına gelindiğinde bu oran %56,4'e gerilemiştir (European Database of Asylum Law, 2017: 8).

Özellikle 2016 yılıyla başlayan süreçte Alman halkının mültecilere yönelik yaklaşımı değişmeye başlamıştır (Erdoğan, 2021: 80). Buna bağlı olarak Almanya'nın alması gereken mülteci sayısı, entegrasyon programlarının maliyeti, mültecilerin Alman kültürel kimliğine tehdit olup olmadığı gibi sorular üzerinden tartışmalar yaşanmaya başlanmıştır. Kamuoyu baskısının altında kalan hükümet, sığınmacı sayısını daha da azaltmayı amaçlayan kapsayıcı düzenlemeler ve mültecilerin Alman toplumuna uyumunu sağlayan politikaları ortaya koymuştur (Erdoğan, 2021: 80). Önemli bir düzenleme Temmuz 2018'de Federal İçişleri Bakanlığı tarafından açıklanan Göç Ana Planı (Der Masterplan Migration) adındaki plan olmuştur. Adı geçen Plan, ulusal ve AB düzeyinde göç yönetimi üzerine tavsiyeler içermektedir. Planın giriş kısmında Almanya'nın yeni göçmenleri kabul edebilmesi için göçün düzenli ve kontrollü olması gerektiği, hiçbir ülkenin sınırsız sayıda mülteciyi kabul edemeyeceği ve entegrasyonun ancak göç sınırlıysa başarılı olabileceği dile getirilmiştir. Plan Almanya'nın nitelikli ve eğitilmiş kişileri istediğinin ve uyum programının ülkeye giren herkes için değil, kalmalarına izin verilenler için uygulanacağını, sığınma talebi reddedilenlerin ülkeyi terk etmesi gerektiğinin ve 2015 yılındaki gibi bir akışa izin

verilmeyeceğinin altını çizmektedir (The Migration Master Plan, 2018). Bahse konu plan Almanya'nın ülkesinde nitelikli ve eğitilmiş göçmenleri görmek istediğini ortaya koymaktadır. Eğitilmiş ve niteliklilerin göçüne ilişkin politikalar sığınmacılar arasında ayrımcılık olarak görülebilse de aslında Alman halkının da çıkarlarını gözeterek göç siyaseti ile ekonomik gerekliliklerin bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıktığını söyleyebiliriz.

Bu gelişmelere paralel olarak 2019 yılında Düzenli İade Kanunu kabul edilmiştir. Bu kanun genel olarak, sığınma başvuruları reddedilen ve kapsamlı bir soruşturmada sonra, herhangi bir kapsamda korumaya muhtaç olmadıkları ve Alman topraklarını terk etmeleri gerektiği tespit edilen kişileri ilgilendirmektedir. Düzenleme, sınır dışı edilmesi gerekirken geçerli mazereti olmadan görüşmeye gelmeyen kişilerin tutuklanmasını öngörmektedir. Ayrıca Kanun, BAMF'ye mültecilerin statüsünü iptal etme yetkisi vermektedir (Koop, 2019). Bunun yanı sıra, gözaltı merkezlerinin kısıtlı olması sebebiyle, sınır dışı edileceklerin normal cezaevlerinde tutulması öngörülmüştür. Düzenlemeye göre, pasaport almak için gereken işlemleri yapmayanlara çalışmaktan men ya da oturma izninin reddi gibi cezalar öngörülmüştür. Ayrıca, devlet sırrı sayılacak konular genişletilmiştir. Buna göre elçilik ve doktor randevuları devlet sırrı kapsamına girmiş ve sığınmacılara danışmanlık sunan sivil toplum kuruluşlarının yardım ve suç ortaklığı ile suçlanması mümkün hale gelmiştir (Koop, 2019). Özetle, başarısız sığınmacıların sınır dışı edilmesini hızlandıran bu yasa özellikle geri gönderilmelerinde engeller bulunan yabancıların etkin geri dönüşlerinin gerçekleştirilmesini kolaylaştırmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Öte yandan Düzenli İade Kanunu, tolerans statüsünün⁵ kullanım alanlarını artırmıştır. Tolerans statüsüne sahip göçmenler Alman toplumuna uyum sağladıktan sonra sürekli kalma hakkı alabilmektedirler (Koop, 2019). Entegre olanlar tolerans statüsünde olsalar dahi belirli süre sonunda vatandaşlık almaları mümkün hale gelmiştir. Bu gelişmeler ışığında Almanya'nın göç yönetiminin entegrasyon ve sığınmacıların mülteci statüsünü hak etmesi gerekliliği üzerinde kurulduğu söylenebilir. Diğer taraftan, iç siyasetteki gelişmeler ve ekonomik gereklilikler hem sığınma sistemini hem de göç politikalarını önemli ölçüde etkilemiştir.

⁵ Tolerans statüsü; geçici bir statü olup diğer yasal statülere başvurma hakkı vermemektedir. Köken ülkenin güvenli olarak kabulü halinde geri dönüş gerektiren ve çalışma hakkı, seyahat, yükseköğretim veya entegrasyon kurslarına katılma hakkı sunmayan bir statüdür. Ayrıntılı bilgi için bkz. Erdoğan, Z. (2021). Alman Sığınma Sisteminde Açık Kapıdan Entegrasyon Siyasetine Geçiş ve Tolerans Politikası. *Atasobed*, 25 (Özel Sayı), 65-86.

4. Almanya ve Macaristan'ın Uluslararası Göç Politikaları: Realist Bir Analiz

Göç, insan haklarının evrensel olarak tanınması ile devletlerin sınır yönetimi ve göçmen kabulüne ilişkin egemenlik haklarından kaynaklanan yetkilerini saklı tutmak istemeleri arasında sıkışmış durumdadır. İlke olarak egemen devletleri göçmenleri kabul etmeye zorlayan hiçbir uluslararası hukuk hükmü mevcut değildir. Avrupa içinde göç konusu AB hukuku, AİHS, ulusal kanunlar ve Avrupa devletleri tarafından kabul edilen diğer uluslararası yükümlülükler tarafından düzenlenmektedir. AİHS kapsamında, devletler uluslararası hukuk gereği, kendi vatandaşı olmayan şahısların ülkelerine girişlerini kontrol etme ve onları sınır dışı etme hakkına sahiptirler (Avrupa Birliği Temel Haklar Ajansı, 2014: 27).⁶ Aynı şekilde Birleşmiş Milletler İnsan Hakları Evrensel Beyannamesi'nin 13. maddesi, kişinin doğduğu ülkeyi terk etme ve ona geri dönme hakkını tanısa da bu, başka bir egemen devlete giriş hakkını teşkil etmemektedir. Bu doğrultuda göçmenleri kabul eden ülkelerin bunu bir takdir ve ulusal çıkar meselesi olarak gördüğünü söylemek yanlış olmayacaktır (Bureyko, 2014: 10).

Devletlerin uluslararası göç politikalarını belirleyen birçok unsur olsa da ulusal ekonomiyi korumak, ulusal güvenliği sağlamak ve ulusal kültürleri koruyup sosyal uyumun aşınmasını önlemek, göç politikalarını şekillendiren asıl etkenlerdir (Duncan, 2020: 11). Ekonomik çıkarlar sıkı sınır güvenliğine dayalı göç politikalarına yol açan en önemli sebep olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır (Duncan, 2020: 12). Bununla birlikte göç, gelir artışına ve yeni ekonomik gelişim dinamikleri oluşturmaya yardımcı olmaktadır. Dolayısıyla ekonomik unsur göçün teşvik edilmesinde de belirleyici etken olabilmektedir (Taylor, 1999: 63). Ancak göçmenlerin ekonomik katkıları çerçevesinde seçilmesi son derece risklidir. Zira bir ülkenin iş gücü piyasa koşulları sürekli değişmektedir. Buna bağlı olarak, yerel ekonominin hangi becerilere ve hangi sayılara ihtiyaç duyacağına ilişkin önceden tahminde bulunmak kolay değildir (Duncan, 2020: 10). Bu zorluklar nedeniyle birçok devlet, göçmenlerin potansiyel ekonomik katkılarına bakılmaksızın çeşitli bahanelerle bunların ülkeye girişlerini sınırlandırmaya çalışmaktadır.

Ulusal çıkarların korunması, maddi kaynakları ve güvenliği kapsamının yanı sıra sosyal ve kültürel unsurları da kapsamaktadır. Küreselleşme ile birlikte uluslararası göçün hız kazanmasının sonucunda birçok devlet artan nüfus çeşitliliği ile karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Bu çerçevede, toplumlar

⁶ Öte yandan AİHM içtihadı devletlerin bir kişiyi sınırdan geri çevirme hakkına belirli sınırlamalar getirmektedir. İçtihat, belirli koşullar altında, kişinin başta aile hayatına saygı hakkı olmak üzere AİHS'in tanıdığı belli haklarını kullanabilmesi için devletlerin bir bireyin o ülke topraklarına girişine izin vermelerini talep etmektedir (Avrupa Birliği Temel Haklar Ajansı, 2014: 27).

artan kültürel çeşitliliği kültürlerine yönelik tehdit olarak görmeye başladığını ve buna bağlı olarak kimlik kaygılarının arttığını görmek mümkündür. Başka bir deyişle yoğun göçe maruz kalan devletlerin vatandaşları kültürel çeşitlilik içinde bir tehdit altında bulunduğunu düşünmektedirler (Unutulmaz, 2012: 138). Nitekim göçmenler varış ülkelerinde asimile olmamaya çalışmaktadır. Gelişen teknoloji ile hızlı iletişim ve ulaşım imkânlarının artması, modern göçmenin ana vatanlarıyla ilişkilerini koparmamış ve gittikleri ülkelerde kültürlerini ve dillerini kaybetmemek için bir arada yaşamayı tercih ettiği gözlemlenmiştir. Bunun neticesinde Almanya’da ve diğer ülkelerde kent merkezlerinde farklı kültürleri barındıran mahalleler ortaya çıkmıştır (Yanık-Aslan, 2021: 113). Üstelik göçmenlerin yüksek doğurganlık oranı yerel nüfus içinde dengenin göçmenler lehine değişmesine yol açmaktadır (Unutulmaz, 2012: 138). Dolayısıyla devletler, başarılı toplumların dayanağı olarak kabul edilen sosyal uyumun aşınmasını önlemek için sınırlandırıcı göç politikalarına başvurmuşlardır (Duncan, 2020: 11). Buradaki tehdit algısı, farklı kültürlerden insanların ortak toplumsal hedefler doğrultusunda iş birliği yapamayacaklarıdır. Zira farklı kültürleri temsil eden bireyler başarılı bir topluma dair kökten farklı vizyonlara sahip olabilmektedir. Bu da toplum içinde kutuplaşmaya yol açıp bir dizi toplumsal soruna yola açabilmektedir (Duncan, 2020: 11).

Ulusal güvenliğin korunması, göçmenlerin kabulünü sınırlandırmak ve sınırları güçlü bir şekilde kontrol etmek için sık sık dile getirilen bir başka nedendir. Göç ile ilişkilendirilen tehditler arasında terörizm, casusluk, ulus aşan suç biçimleri, ulusal sağlığa yönelik tehlikeler veya düşmanca askeri faaliyetler yer almaktadır. Sınır yönetiminin temelini ulusal güvenlik oluşturması nedeniyle göç ve güvenlik doğrudan bağlantılı iki olgu olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Westphalia Antlaşması ile oluşturulan egemen sınırlar rejiminin, insan hakları hukuku nedeniyle giderek erozyona uğradığı yönündeki inanca rağmen, modern uluslararası ilişkilerin temeli hala devlet sınırlarının dokunulmazlığını oluşturmaya devam etmektedir. Özetle, devletin bekası ve güvenliği, her hükûmetin başlıca sorumluluğudur. Dolayısıyla ulusal güvenliği tehdit eden her gelişme sınır kontrolleri ve anti terörizmle oluşturulan önlemlerin arttırılmasına yol açmaktadır (Özçelik, 2019: 257). Uluslararası göçün güvenlik sorunu olarak değerlendirilmesiyle, sığınmacı ve göçmenlerin insan haklarının ve temel özgürlüklerinin göz ardı edildiğine ilişkin literatürde geniş bir alan kaplamaktadır. Bu çalışma konuyu devlet güvenliği açısından değerlendirdiği için söz konusu tartışma kapsam dışı bırakılmıştır.

4.1. Uluslararası Göç ile İlgili Ekonomik Çıkarlar ve Kaygılar

Göç politikası bağlamında Angela Merkel'in şansöyelik yıllarını iki döneme ayırmak mümkündür. Bunlardan birinci dönem 2005-2015 yıllarını kapsarken ikinci dönem 2015'ten sonrasına denk gelmektedir. Birinci dönemde Alman hükümeti, göç politikasını devletin genel sosyo-ekonomik gidişatına etkili bir şekilde entegre etmeyi başarmıştır. Olumlu ekonomik göstergeler ve işgücü piyasasındaki yüksek talebin varlığı, yöneticilerin ve genel olarak toplumun göçmenlere sıcak bakmasını sağlamıştır (Sokolov ve Davydov, 2023: 47). Sığınmacılara karşı kazan-kazan yaklaşımını benimseyen Almanya, genel olarak göçmenleri ülkeyi zenginleştirici unsurlar olarak görmüştür (Papademetriou ve Benton, 2016: 14). Bu çerçevede, krizin başında 280 bin sığınmacıyı kabul eden Almanya dünyanın en çok sığınmacı başvurusu alan ülkelerinden birisi olmuştur (Asylum Information Database, 2016: 11). Sığınmacı sayısındaki bu hızlı artışla birlikte Merkel yönetimindeki Alman göç politikasının ikinci dönemi başlamıştır. Bu dönemin başında krizi fırsata çevirmek isteyen Merkel yönetimi Almanya'nın işgücü ihtiyacını gidermeyi amaçlamıştır. Ancak çok sayıda mültecinin Alman toplumuna "uyumlaştırma" gerekliliği ekonomik ve mali sıkıntıların artmasına yol açmıştır.⁷ Bu durum ülkenin siyasi hayatında ciddi bir sorun haline gelerek Alman toplumundaki kutuplaşmayı artırmış ve kamuoyunda memnuniyetsizlik yaratmıştır (Sokolov ve Davydov, 2023: 41).

Bu doğrultuda göçmen ve sığınmacılara yönelik kısıtlayıcı kanunlar çıkartmaya başlamıştır. Mayıs 2016'da Almanya, Yeni Entegrasyon Kanunu kabul etmiştir. Son derece radikal bir yaklaşım olarak değerlendirilen bu kanun, tüm yeni gelenlere potansiyel vatandaş olarak bakmakta ve onlara o doğrultuda yatırım yapılmasını öngörmektedir (Hanesch, 2016: 1). Buna göre, tüm sığınmacılar Alman iş piyasası ve entegrasyon hizmetlerinden faydalanma imkanına sahip olabilmektedir (Künnecke, 2018: 85). Görüldüğü gibi kanun, çıkar odaklı realizm üzerine kurulmuştur. Nitekim söz konusu sığınmacıların çoğu, başvuruları reddedilse bile iade edilmeyecektir. Almanya'da kalması muhtemel yabancıların entegre olmaması ise onların marjinalleşmesi ve toplumdan dışlanması açısından çok daha fazla soruna ve maliyete yol açabilecektir. Ayrıca, bölgelerine geri dönen insanları yararlı becerilerle donatmak ülkelerinin kalkınma amacına hizmet edebilmektedir (Papademetriou ve Benton, 2016: 21).

⁷ 2015-2016 yılları arasında Alman hükümeti, mültecilerin entegrasyonu ve altyapı inşası için 20 milyar avro harcamıştır (Pavlov, 2023: 83).

2016 yılın sonuna gelindiğinde mülteci kabulleri önemli oranda azalmaya başlamıştır. Bunun temel nedeni Almanya'nın bu süreçte, kabul edilen göçmen sayısını sınırlamak ve yalnızca yerel iş gücü arzındaki boşlukları dolduracak becerileri olan göçmenleri kabul etmeye yönelik politikalar geliştirmek istemesidir. Böylece, becerileri yerel iş gücünü tamamlayan sığınmacılar kabul edilerek vatandaşlar ve göçmenler arasında istihdam konusunda gereksiz rekabetin önüne geçilmeye çalışılmıştır (Wolla, 2014). Bu doğrultuda, Almanya eğitilmiş ve nitelikli sığınmacılara öncelik vermeye başlamıştır. Bu yaklaşım, sığınmacılar arasında ayrımcılık olarak görülse de aslında Alman halkının da çıkarlarını gözeterek entegrasyon siyaseti ile ekonomik gerekliliklerin bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıktığını söyleyebiliriz.

Macaristan'da ise, Orban hükümeti sığınmacıları ekonomik göçmenler olarak göstererek sınırlarını katı bir şekilde korumaktadır. Macaristan söz konusu yaklaşımını vatandaşlarının ekonomik çıkarlarını korumak istemesi ile gerekçelendirmektedir. Ülkeye giriş yapan çok sayıda göçmenin ucuz iş gücü oluşturarak yerel halkın emek piyasalarından çıkarılmasına neden olacağına dair korkular dile getirilmiştir (Duncan, 2020: 11). Dahası emek fazlasının, genel olarak, daha yüksek işsizlik, düşük ücretler ve daha yüksek kamu maliyetleri ile sonuçlanması Macaristan'ın kaldıramayacağı yüksek maliyetlere sebebiyet vermesi muhtemeldir. Dolayısıyla, devletlerin ulusal çıkarlarını zedelemeyen başarılı bir göç yönetimi, Almanya örneğinde gördüğümüz gibi ülkenin geleceğine dair çok yönlü analizler içeren uzun vadeli programları gerekli kılmaktadır. Üstelik yukarıda değinildiği gibi iş gücü ihtiyacını doğru bir şekilde tahmin etmek her zaman kolay olmamaktadır. Kitleli göçün ise ulusal çıkar açısından her zaman risk içeren ve maliyetli bir olgu olduğu göz önüne alındığında, Macaristan gibi göç yönetiminde uzmanlaşmamış devletlerin kısıtlayıcı sığınma politikalarını tercih ettiğini söyleyebiliriz. Ayrıca, Macaristan her ne kadar çalışma çağındaki göçmenlere ihtiyaç duysa da özellikle Arap sığınmacıları ulusal tehdit olarak algılamaktadır. Bunun temel nedeni göçmenlerin ülkenin sosyal yapısını bozabileceği korkusudur. Nitekim Macaristan 2004 yılında AB'ye üye olmasından sonra sürekli göç veren ülke konumuna gelmiştir (Shikhatov ve Starodubtseva, 2020: 29-30). Şöyle ki, 2016 yılı itibarıyla Macaristan'da dokuz milyon Macar ikamet ederken yurt dışında yaşayan Macar sayısı beş buçuk milyona ulaşmış durumdadır (Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2018).

4.2. Uluslararası Göç ile İlgili Kültürel Kaygılar

Göçün kültür ve kimliğe yönelik sebep olabileceği sorunlara Almanya ve Macaristan'ın verdiği cevaplar önemli ölçüde farklılaşsa da temelde kendi toplumunun çıkarını önceleyen

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pragmatizme dayanmaktadır. Almanya, kültürel çeşitliliğin yol açabileceği sorunların üstesinden gelmek için yukarıda değinildiği gibi ülkeye giren sığınmacılara yatırım yapmakta ve bunların Alman toplumuyla bütünleşmesini teşvik etmektedir. Sığınmacıların ve diğer göçmenlerin giderek artması, Alman politikacılarını uzun vadeli entegrasyona yöneltmiştir. Bununla birlikte, Almanya'da ulusun hâkim tanımı doğum ve soy birliğine dayanmakta ve bu da kademeli ayrımcılığın (differential exclusion) söz konusu olduğu bir göçmen rejimine yol açmaktadır (Castles ve Miller, 2008: 338). Kademeli ayrımcılık, göçmenlerin toplumun iş piyasası başta olmak üzere belirli alanlarına dahil edilmesi yurttaşlık, sosyal yardım sistemi ve siyasal katılım alanlardan ise dışlanması anlamına gelmektedir (Güllüpınar, 2014: 3). Dolayısıyla, Alman entegrasyonu programları sığınmacıları Alman ulusu ile tam anlamıyla uyumundan ziyade sığınmacıları emek piyasasına hazırlamayı ve bu doğrultuda fayda sağlanmayı amaçlamaktadır. Almanya'nın sığınmacıların emek gücünden faydalanmakta ancak onları Alman ulusuna dahil etmekten kaçınmaktadır. Bu noktada belirtmek gereken önemli bir husus, ekonomik pragmatizmin ışığında verilen haklar yerli ve yabancı ayrımının çok keskin olduğu bir yurttaşlık sistemine yol açmaktadır (Güllüpınar, 2014: 5). Bu da sığınmacılar ve diğer göçmenlerin ulusun bir parçası olarak görülmemesine ve buna bağlı olarak güvenliğe ve ulusal kimliğe bir tehdit olarak algılanmasına neden olmaktadır (Cohen, 2006: 32).

Macaristan ise, kimlik kaygıları doğrultusunda popülist bir retorik geliştirmekte ve sıkı sınır güvenliğine dayalı göç politikaları ortaya koymaktadır. Macaristan'da nüfusun giderek yaşlandığı, çalışma çağındaki çok sayıda gencin ülkeyi terk ettiği görülmektedir. Bu durumun yakın gelecekte ülkede iş gücü sıkıntısına yol açacağı tahmin edilmektedir (Shikhatov ve Starodubtseva, 2020: 28). Bu koşullar altında, çalışma çağındaki göçmenler, iş gücü sorununu çözebilecek ve doğum oranını da olumlu yönde etkileyebilecektir. Yeni iş gücüne ihtiyaç duyan Macaristan, Orta Doğu ve Afrika'dan gelen sığınmacıları kabul etmemekle beraber Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinden göçü çekmektedir. Bu doğrultuda “Üyeleri Farklı Vatandaşlığa Sahip Macar Ailelerinin Yeniden Birleştirilme ve Ulusal Birliğin Güçlendirilmesi” adındaki kanun çerçevesinde eski Avusturya-Macaristan İmparatorluğu'nun çöküşünden sonra ortaya çıkan bağımsız devletlerin içinde kalan etnik Macar azınlıkların Macaristan'daki akrabaları ile birleşmesi teşvik edilmektedir. Bunun sonucunda Polonya, Hırvatistan, Romanya, Ukrayna ve Sırbistan vatandaşı olup Macar azınlığa mensup olan kimseler adı geçen kanun çerçevesinde oturma izni elde edebilmektedir (Shikhatov ve Starodubtseva, 2020: 29-30). Görüldüğü gibi, Macaristan da Almanya'nın eğitilmiş ve nitelikli

sığınmacı seçtiği gibi etnik yakınlığa göre göçmen seçmektedir. Böylece, ülkenin sosyal yapısını bozmayan ve kolay entegre olan göçmenlerin gelmesini teşvik etmek amaçlanmaktadır. Buna karşın, ülkelerinde ölüm riskiyle karşı karşıya kalan ve buna bağlı olarak korunmaya ihtiyaç duyan Arap sığınmacıları ulusal çıkarlar doğrultusunda sınır dışı edilmektedir.

4.3. Uluslararası Göç ile İlgili Güvenlik Kaygıları

Avrupa’da göç politikalarının güvenlik odaklı bir hal alması 11 Eylül saldırıları sonrası dönemde belirgin hale gelmiştir. Akabinde Madrid ve Londra’da meydana gelen bombalı saldırılar özellikle Müslümanlara karşı güvensizliğin daha da tırmanmasına yol açmıştır. Kasım 2015’te Paris’te yaşanan terör saldırılarının ardından Avrupa kamuoyunda İslam karşıtlığı ve mültecilere yönelik güvensizlik yükselişe geçerken, siyasi liderler güvenlik odaklı ve sınırların korunmasını hedefleyen politikaları öne çıkarmıştır. Buna karşılık Merkel yönetimi bu süreçte mültecileri terör saldırıları ile ilişkilendirmekten uzak durmuş ve “İslamcı terörizm fenomeni, mültecilerle birlikte bize gelen bir fenomen değildir” ifadesini kullanarak göçü güvenleştirmekten kaçınmıştır (Demir ve Atak, 2020: 130). Dahası 2015 krizine kadar Alman toplumunda mülteciler işgücü olarak görülmüş ve özellikle toplumunun yaşlanması göz önüne alındığında Almanya’nın dünya pazarındaki rekabet gücünü garanti altına alacak bir araç olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Kimlik ve kültür konuları bu bağlamda kamuoyunda tartışılmamış aksine ülkenin tam kalkınması için aşılması gereken engeller olarak görülmüştür. Bununla birlikte Almanya’nın düzensiz göçten en çok etkilenen Avrupa devleti durumuna düşmesi Alman toplumunda güvenlik kaygılarına yol açmıştır. Buna bağlı olarak “açık kapı politikası” birçok Alman siyasetçi ve kamuoyu tarafından ekonomiyi güçlendirme fırsatından ziyade sosyo-ekonomik sisteme ve genel olarak güvenliğe yönelik bir tehdit olarak algılanmaya başlamıştır (Sokolov ve Davydov, 2023:47). Bu kaygılar dolayısıyla Merkel yönetimi hem “açık kapı” politikasına son vermiş hem de AB’yi de göç yönetimine ortak etmeye çalışmıştır.

Ancak ortak sorumluluk kapsamında yük paylaşımına yönelik çağrılar bazı üye ülke liderlerinden karşılık bulmamıştır. Merkel’in söz konusu yaklaşımına en büyük itirazı getiren ülkeler Vişegrad Dörtlüsü⁸ olmuştur. Mültecileri ulusal güvenliğe tehdit olarak gören kimi Avrupa ülkelerinin Avrupa Komisyonu kararlarına uymaması ve Almanya iç siyasetinde artan ırkçı ve aşırı söylemler Merkel’i mülteci politikalarını değiştirmeye zorlamıştır. AB düzeyindeki

⁸ Vişegrad Grubu olarak da bilinen Vişegrad Dörtlüsü; dört Orta Avrupa ülkesinden oluşan (Çek Cumhuriyeti, Macaristan, Polonya ve Slovakya) bölgesel bir ortaklığı ifade etmektedir.

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çabalarının yetersiz kalması sonucunda Almanya lideri dikkatini Türkiye'ye çevirmiştir. Değerler-çıklarlar ikileminde çıkarlardan yana karar veren Almanya; Mart 2016'da AB-Türkiye arasında imzalanan ve göç krizine bir yanıt olarak sunulan 18 Mart Mutabakatı'nın mimarı olmuştur. Mutabakatın sonucunda taraflar, 2013 yılında imzalanan ve aşamalı olarak yürürlüğe girecek olan Türkiye-AB Geri Kabul Anlaşması'nın⁹ 2016 Haziran ayından itibaren uygulanması konusunda mutabakata varmıştır. Bu tarz anlaşmalar, AB'nin düzensiz göçle mücadele stratejisinin bir parçası olup göç politikasının dışsallaştırılmasının en önemli araçlarından biri olarak görülmektedir. Göçe dair politikaların güvenlikçi bir yaklaşımla oluşturulması ile ilişkilendirilen “dışsallaştırma” kavramı, akademisyenler tarafından AB'nin sığınmacıların kabulü ve barınması veya başvurularının işlenmesi konusundaki sorumluluğunun bir kısmını üçüncü devletlere devretmek için yürüttüğü politikaları tanımlamak için kullanılmaktadır (Tavacı, 2023: 114). Bu anlamda dışsallaştırma politikası, hem Avrupa değerlerini ihlal etmesi nedeniyle eleştirilmekte hem de mülteci sorununun üçüncü ülkelere yıkılması şeklinde değerlendirilmektedir (Demir ve Atak, 2023: 131). Görüldüğü gibi, krizin başında Merkel yönetimi insani bir yaklaşımla mültecilere kapı açsa da ülkedeki siyasi koşullar ve AB düzeyindeki fikir ayrılıkları nedeniyle açık kapı politikalarına son vermek zorunda kalmıştır. Sonuç olarak, Almanya yönetimi iç ve dış baskılar sonucunda olsa da ulusal çıkar odaklı hareket etmiş ve mülteciler konusunda oldukça sınırlı bir yaklaşım benimsemiştir.

Macaristan, göçü güvenlik açısından değerlendirirken açıkça realist bir yaklaşım sergilemektedir. Bu doğrultuda, göçmenler ulusal güvenliğe yönelik bir tehdit olarak görülmekte ve bunların ülkeye girişleri engellenmektedir. Orban hükûmeti uyguladığı sıkı sınır kontrolü stratejisine bağlı olarak özellikle Orta Doğu'dan gelen sığınmacıları tehlike, korku ve suç kaynağı olarak göstermeye çalışmaktadır (Thorleifsson, 2017: 324). Genel olarak bakıldığında ise, Macaristan yönetiminin göç karşıtı kampanyalarının ekonomi, kültür ve güvenlik olmak üzere üç konu üzerinde biçimlendiği görülmektedir. Başka bir ifade ile sığınmacılar ve düzensiz göçmenler ulusal tehdit olarak tanımlamakta ve ülkeye girişleri engellenmeye çalışılmaktadır. Ancak, göçmen karşıtı söylemi etrafında şekillenen göç politikaları, göç alan ülkelerde ırkçılık ve ayrımcılık ideolojilerini beslemektedir (Akçapar, 2010: 566). Mülteci veya sığınmacı konumundaki bireyler, potansiyel bir suçlu, terörist ya da en iyi ihtimalle sığınma sistemini istismar eden kişi olarak

⁹ “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Avrupa Birliği Arasında İzinsiz İkamet Eden Kişilerin Geri Kabulüne İlişkin Anlaşma”, özünde, karşılıklılık temelinde, Türkiye veya AB üyesi bir devlet açısından düzensiz göçmen olan vatandaş, üçüncü ülke vatandaşı veya vatansız kişinin duruma göre geri kabulü veya transit geçişi ile ilgili koşulları, esasları ve usulleri tespit etmektedir (Morice ve Claire, 2013: 113; European Council, 2016).

algılanmaktadır. Bu durum, aslında çıkmaz bir döngü yaratmaktadır. Terörizm ve yabancı düşmanlığı söylemleri ile dışlanan göçmenlerin topluma entegrasyonu zorlaşmakta, toplumsal kutuplaşma derinleşmekte, toplumsal ve güvenlik sorunları ortaya çıkmaktadır (Akçapar, 2010: 567).

Sonuç

2015 mülteci krizi, AB üyelerini hem iç siyasetleri hem de sorunun çözümünde aldıkları roller açısından etkilemiştir. Bu açıdan Almanya sığınmacıların gitmek istediği hedef bir ülke olarak krizden en çok etkilenen devletlerden biri olmuştur. Buna rağmen bu süreci, krizin insani boyutunu göz önünde bulundurarak yönetmeye çalışmıştır. Almanya aynı zamanda AB'nin yönlendirici gücü olarak mülteci krizi ile yakından ilgilenmiştir. Macaristan ise Almanya gibi yoğun mülteci akışına maruz kalsa da beraber krize farklı bir şekilde yanıt vermiş ve AB göç politikalarını eleştirerek açıkça sınır güvenliğine dayalı göç politikalarını benimsemiştir.

Almanya ve Macaristan'ın uluslararası göç yönetimi, göçmenlere olan yaklaşım ve insan haklarına saygı açısından birbirine karşıt örnekler oluşturmakla beraber kriz sürecinde ortaya koydukları göç politikaları temelde devlet ve toplum güvenliğini öncelemiştir. Macaristan kâr-zarar hesabı çerçevesinde açıkça mülteci karşıtı bir yaklaşım benimserken Almanya özellikle krizin başında sığınmacıların güvenliklerine önem vermiştir. 2016 yılı ile beraber Almanya, sığınmacı sayısını azaltmayı amaçlayan uygulamalara başvurmuş ve devletin çıkarlarını önceleyen politikaları ortaya koymaya başlamıştır.

Almanya'nın mülteci krizi yönetiminde göze çarpan en önemli husus, Merkel yönetiminin ilk aşmada sığınmacılara yönelik takındığı olumlu tepki ile ertesi yıl bunların ülkeye girişlerini kısıtlamayı amaçlayan politikalar arasındaki tutarsızlıktır. Bu tutarsızlığı Alman Hükümetinin karşı karşıya kaldığı dış ve iç baskılar çerçevesinde açıklamak mümkündür. Almanya'nın göç politikalarını Ortak Avrupa Sığınma Sistemine uyumlu kılma yükümlülüğü dış baskılar olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu noktada şunu belirtmek yerinde olacaktır, Almanya'nın mülteci krizini AB düzeyinde ve AB mevzuatına uygun bir şekilde çözmeye çabalaması bu devleti Macaristan'dan farklı kılan en önemli husustur. Nitekim Macar Hükümeti göç yönetiminde ulusal egemenliğe vurgu yaparken, Almanya öncelikle AB çerçevesinde “ortak” bir çözüm aramıştır. Ayrıca krizin insani boyutunu göz önünde bulundurarak mülteci karşıtı retoriğe karşı çıkmış ve mültecilerin Alman toplumuna uyumunu sağlayacak politikalar geliştirmiştir.

2015 Mülteci Krizi Sonrası Almanya ve Macaristan'ın Uluslararası Göç Politikaları: Realist Gelenek Çerçevesinde Bir Analiz

Öte yandan entegrasyon politikalarının yüksek maliyeti Alman kamuoyunda artan memnuniyetsizliğe yol açmıştır. Bunun yanında Almanya'nın 2015 mülteci krizindeki göç politikaları, hükümet liderinin sığınmacılara yönelik algılarından ve Alman iç siyasetinde artan ırkçı söylemlerden önemli ölçüde etkilenmiştir. Bunlar söz konusu süreçte iç baskıları oluşturmuştur. Buna bağlı olarak Almanya söz konusu süreçte sığınmacıları güvenlikleştirmekten kaçınsa da AB genelinde ve ülke içinde mülteci karşıtlığının yükselmesi Merkel yönetimini sınırlayıcı göç politikalarına itmiştir. Bu doğrultuda Almanya bir yandan göçmenlerin geçici olmadığını dikkate alarak entegrasyon politikalarına önem vermiştir. Diğer yandan da sığınmacı yükünü azaltmak için AB düzeyinde mültecilerin üye ülkeler arasında orantısız olarak paylaşılmasını sağlamaya çalışmıştır. Böylece neoklasik realizm yaklaşımının politika yapımı ile ilgili ortaya koyduğu hipotezler, Almanya'nın gerek mülteci krizinde izlediği siyaseti, gerek ülke içinde yürüttüğü entegrasyon politikalarını izah etmektedir.

Macaristan'ın göç politikasının başlıca amacı, çalışmanın son bölümünde vurgulandığı gibi, etnik kimliği korumaktır. Bu anlamda Macaristan yönetimi göç politikalarını AB mevzuatı ile uyumlaştırmaya karşı çıkmış ve bu yöndeki baskıları ulusal çıkar alanına müdahale girişimi olarak algılamıştır. Buna bağlı olarak özellikle kültürel açıdan kendine uzak olan sığınmacılar ulusal tehdit olarak algılanmış ve popülist yönetim başta olmak üzere ülkenin iç dinamikleri göç yönetimi üzerinde belirleyici rol oynamıştır. Ayrıca, Almanya'ya nazaran göç yönetimi konusunda daha az tecrübeli olan Macaristan, realizmin düzensiz göçe dair ortaya koyduğu önermelere uygun bir seyir izleyerek kâr-zarar anlayışı çerçevesinde göçmenlerin girişini kontrol etmeyi entegrasyon politikalarından daha etkili görmektedir. Hatta sığınmacıların olası ekonomik ve demografik katkılarına rağmen Macaristan yönetimi bunların sebep olabileceği asimilasyondan dolayı mülteci karşıtı bir yaklaşım benimsemektedir.

Bir vaka incelemesi olarak seçilen Almanya ve Macaristan'ın mülteci krizindeki göç yönetiminden hareketle, bu çalışmanın altını çizdiği iki temel husus bulunmaktadır. Birincisi uluslararası göç sosyal dönüşüm süreci içerisinde değerlendirilmesi gereken karmaşık bir olgudur. Almanya örneğinde görüldüğü gibi, göçmenlerin ve mültecilerin göç ettikleri ülkenin emek piyasasına uyumunu esas almak başarılı bir göç yönetimi için yeterli değildir. Zira başat grubun etnisite ile tanımlandığı koşullarda göçmenlerin ve onların çocuklarının toplum içinde kendilerine yer bulmaları ve marjinalleşmemeleri oldukça zor görünmektedir. Diğer bir husus ise, sığınmacıların ve diğer göçmenlerin ülkeye girişlerini sınırlandırmanın göçün olumsuz etkilerini

önlemek için yeterli olmadığıdır. Macaristan'da uygulanan göç politikalarının da gösterdiği gibi, ulus devleti merkeze koyan politikalar bir yandan göçün olumlu katkılarının göz ardı edilmesine yol açmakta, diğer yandan ülkede yabancı karşıtlığını kışkırtmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, çalışmanın başında da söylendiği gibi, göç yönetimi hem ev sahibi toplumun hem de göçmenlerin çıkarlarını dengeleyen kapsamlı politikaları gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu dengenin sağlanması ise ancak devletlerin göç sürecini uzun vadeli bir sosyal dönüşüm olarak ele alması ve göçmenlere yönelik algılarının değişmesi ile mümkün olacaktır.

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Afrika kıtasında birikim krizi nedeniyle kaynaklardan mahrum kalan ve yönetim krizi nedeniyle meşruiyetten yoksun olan devletlerde, devlet otoriteleri zayıflamakta, söz konusu durum siyasi örgütlerin kuruluşuna ya da güç kazanmasına yol açmaktadır. Bahse konu durum ilgili ülkelerde istikrarsız bir siyasi zemin oluşmasına da neden olmaktadır. Ayrıca Afrika ülkelerindeki toplumsal yapıların anlaşılması açısından ülkelerin dinî yapılarının da anlaşılması önem arz etmektedir. 2022 yılında Afrika kıtası ile ilgili yayımlanan eserler arasında yer alan “Afrika'da Dinî ve Siyasi Hareketler” kitabı, kıtanın siyasi istikrarsızlığına neden olan hem dinî hem siyasi yöne sahip hareketleri ele almaktadır. Prof. Dr. Enver Arpa editörlüğünde hazırlanan kitapta “dinî-siyasi hareket” olgusu ile “halkı, kendi dinî yorumları ekseninde dönüştürmeyi ve rejimi kendi izanı çerçevesinde şekillendirmeyi amaçlayan oluşumlar” ifade edilmektedir. Zira kitapta bahse konu hareketler ilk başta dinî bir temelle kurulmuş olsalar da ülkede oluşan zayıf devlet yapısından faydalanarak dinî yorumlarını yayma ile güç ve çıkar elde etme maksadıyla ülke siyasetine karışmakta, zaman zaman da şiddete başvurmaktadır.

Kıtadaki dinî ve siyasi oluşumlar hakkında kapsamlı bir eser olan bu kitap, ilahiyat, siyaset bilimi, tarih, uluslararası ilişkiler ve bölge çalışmaları gibi alanlarda öğrenim gören öğrencilere, politika yapıcılara, ilgili ülkelerde faaliyet yürüten Türk misyonları ile Türk firmalarına ve Afrika çalışmalarına ilgi duyan tüm kesimlere hitap etmektedir. Eser, Afrika özelinde Türkçe literatürün zenginleşmesine katkı sunmakta ve günümüzde kıta ülkelerinin güvenliğini tehdit eden güncel bir alana ışık tutmaktadır. Afrika’da dinî ve siyasi yönleri olan birtakım hareketleri toplu bir şekilde ele alma bağlamında değerlendirildiğinde ise söz konusu alanda yazılan ilk eser olması nedeni ile bu kitap, Afrika literatürü açısından önemli bir boşluğu doldurmaktadır. Böylelikle kitap, Afrika literatürünün farklı konuları kapsayarak daha da gelişmesi hususuna katkı sunmaktadır.

Afrika’da söz konusu özelliklere sahip dinî ve siyasi oluşumlar, kitap bölümlerinde İhvân-ı Müslimîn, Selefî, Şîî ve Hristiyan eksenli olmak üzere dört ana grup temelinde ele alınmaktadır. Toplamda 13 makaleden oluşan kitabın ön sözünde kitap bölümlerinin mevzubahis 4 ana eksen temelinde tasnif edildiği belirtilmiştir. Eserde ilgili bölümlerde ele alınan hareketlerin ortaya çıkış nedenleri, liderlerinin hayatları, siyasete ya da şiddete başvurma nedenleri, örgütsel yapılanmaları, başlıca referansları, mücadele yöntemleri vb. konular objektif bir anlatımla ele alınmaya çalışılmıştır. Ayrıca kitapta yer alan çalışmalarda, hareketlerin buldukları ülkeler hakkında genel bilgilere ve özellikle de ülkelerin siyasi tarihlerine kısaca değinilmektedir. Böylelikle kitapta çeşitli Afrika ülkeleri hakkında ülke profilleri de sunulmuş olmaktadır.

Kitap bölümlerinin çoğunluğunda değinilen önemli bir husus, örgütlerin etkinliğinin azaltılabilmesi için hareketlerin kırılma ve şiddete evrilme noktalarının tespit edilmesi gerektiğidir. Kitabın bazı bölümlerinde vurgulanan bir diğer konu da terör ve şiddet eğilimi olan hareketlerle mücadele bağlamında sadece şiddetin bastırılmasının yeterli olmayacağı aynı zamanda kaynaklarının kurutulmasının ve sosyal, politik, ekonomik ve düşünsel olarak da mücadele edilmesinin gerektiğidir. İlâveten hareketlerin örgütsel yapısının kuvvetli olmadığı durumlarda devletin söz konusu örgütleri baskılamasının, örgütün şiddete ve terör eylemlerine yönelmesine sebep olabileceği noktasının önemi de belirtilmiştir.

Sonuç olarak kitap bölümlerinde de değerlendirildiği üzere çeşitli sebeplerle zamanla kendi dinî düşüncelerinden uzaklaşan örgütler güç, ekonomik gelir, çıkar ve meşruiyet elde etmek maksadıyla teröre ve şiddete başvurmakta; silah kaçakçılığı, uyuşturucu satıcılığı, adam kaçırmaya vb. yasa dışı faaliyetlerde bulunmaktadır. Bahse konu hareketlerin, ilk kuruldukları haliyle düşünce örgütü olarak kalmaları durumunda daha çok üye çekecekleri aşikârdır. Fakat son yıllarda çeşitli



Prof. Dr. Enver ARPA (Ed.) Afrika'da Dinî ve Siyasi Hareketler (Ankara, Nobel Yayıncılık, 2022)

dinî kimlikler altında ortaya çıkan siyasi hareketlerin siyasal hedeflerini gerçekleştirmek amacıyla şiddet ve terör olaylarına başvurmaları, Afrikalı devletlerin güvenliği noktasında önemli bir tehdit oluşturmaya başlamıştır. Mevzubahis durum ülkeleri siyasi istikrarsızlık, ekonomik olarak gerileme, devlet inşasının sekteye uğraması gibi bir takım olumsuzluklar ile karşı karşıya bırakmaktadır.

