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ARTICLE

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN A TRANSFORMING WORLD ORDER: MIDDLE POWER STRATEGIES AND PROSPECTS

Buğra SARI* & İsmail Erkam SULA**

Abstract

This article examines Türkiye's role as a middle power in a changing global order, exploring whether the country fits this classification and how its foreign policy under Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reflects this. Türkiye emerges as a significant actor with the capability to shape international affairs both in its region and beyond. The analysis emphasizes Türkiye's proactive foreign policy approach, highlighting its capacity to undertake greater responsibilities on the global stage. In the era of Foreign Minister Fidan, Türkiye seems to be transitioning into a "middle power with significant global responsibilities". By examining pivotal foreign policy initiatives under Fidan and Türkiye's strategic engagements, this study elucidates how Türkiye is advancing its middle power status. Additionally, the article offers valuable insights into potential future paths for Turkish foreign policy, taking into account emerging regional and global challenges as well as opportunities. The article aims to offer a comprehensive understanding of Türkiye's evolving foreign policy and its wider implications.

Keywords

Foreign policy, global order, Hakan Fidan, middle power, Türkiye

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Introduction

Over the past decade, there has been a notable shift in global politics, presenting a substantial challenge to the efficacy of current governance frameworks in tackling the intricate demands of global society. International organizations tasked with overseeing trade, environmental conservation, public health, and security encounter considerable obstacles in adapting to swift transformations. At the same time, the functions of long-standing military alliances are being redefined as they confront the evolving global challenges and threats of the modern era. Despite the pressing nature of these challenges, creating efficient mechanisms for global governance remains a formidable undertaking. In this context, many nations prioritize individual responses over actively engaging in global cooperation, showing a hesitance to join collective endeavors.

Given the intricacies of the present landscape, nations such as Türkiye have strategic opportunities to assert their positions and make a lasting impact on the global arena. Therefore, this article contends that Türkiye, led by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, has adopted a more assertive stance in its foreign policy to broaden its influence and take on greater responsibilities in global affairs. In this context, Türkiye is actively participating in significant initiatives and forging strategic partnerships to position itself as a crucial middle power aspiring for the status of a great power.

However, Türkiye's pursuit of global influence may encounter obstacles due to various challenges. The presence of regional conflicts entangled with terrorism, ongoing crises such as the situation in neighboring Syria, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Russia-Ukraine War, all present intricate diplomatic and security challenges. Additionally, they contribute to geopolitical tensions, notably in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The multifaceted and transnational nature of these challenges underscores the pressing need for enhanced global governance structures. These challenges also highlight the hurdles that Türkiye must surmount to sustain its current position and accomplish its objectives.

Therefore, this article asserts that Türkiye, positioned as a middle power within the current international system, holds the potential to make noteworthy contributions to enhancing global governance and addressing urgent global issues. In this endeavor, Türkiye has the potential to significantly shape the future of global governance by capitalizing on its geopolitical position, harnessing its existing resources and diplomatic expertise, and fostering collaboration with other middle powers. In order to succeed, Türkiye needs to adopt a strategic

approach that adeptly integrates its material capabilities with its national interests and foreign policy vision. This requires Türkiye, as a middle power, to adhere steadfastly to key behavioral traits such as multilateralism, cooperation, and constructive engagement with the global community.

The evolving role of Türkiye as a middle power, coupled with its ambitions for global influence, carries significant implications for the future landscape of global politics.

The evolving role of Türkiye as a middle power, coupled with its ambitions for global influence, carries significant implications for the future landscape of global politics. Through the adoption of a forward-looking foreign policy, cultivation of strategic partnerships, and advocacy for robust global governance, Türkiye holds the potential to make substantial contributions towards tackling the multifaceted challenges confronting the world today. As Türkiye navigates the intricacies of the modern global landscape, it possesses considerable potential to shape the course of international politics and foster peace, stability, and prosperity both within its region and on a broader scale.

From our perspective, Türkiye displays the attributes of a middle power while concurrently aspiring for acknowledgment as a great power. Our analysis of recent shifts in Turkish foreign policy commences with an elucidation of the concept of middle power. We then go on to examine closely Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan's foreign policy speeches, interviews, and writings to comprehend his policy objectives and vision. Through an assessment of Türkiye's foreign policy objectives and transformations under Foreign Minister Fidan, our aim is to shed light on the country's regional and global foreign policy endeavors. In the last section, the article culminates by providing recommendations for potential future foreign policy trajectories for Türkiye as it endeavors to take on increased responsibilities on the global platform.

The Concept of Middle Power and Türkiye's Power Status

In recent years, particularly in the last decade, the idea of middle power has garnered considerable attention within the realm of International Relations (IR) literature. A significant amount of scholarly investigation has been dedicated to examining how the concept can be used to analyze the power dynamics among different states in the international power hierarchy. Despite the abundance of

literature on the subject, reaching a unanimous understanding of its meaning proves to be difficult. The reason for this variation lies in the fact that different traditions in the literature prioritize different facets of the concept based on their unique theoretical underpinnings. However, the notion of middle power can be divided into two fundamental strands: the realist strand and the liberal strand. The realist strand primarily considers material capabilities as the defining factor for middle power status, while the liberal strand places greater emphasis on the foreign policy characteristics and behaviors demonstrated by states.[1] Going into details, Holbraad stands out as a prominent figure embodying the realist perspective. Middle power, as he describes it, pertains to a state that falls between small nations and principal members of the state system in terms of power, being notably stronger than the former but notably weaker than the latter.[2]

Holbraad's assessment of a state's power status primarily revolves around the evaluation of tangible resources. A state's GNP and population size are deemed to be the primary indicators, while the size of the army, military expenditure, and the quantity of specific armaments are considered secondary indicators.[3] A middle power is defined as a state that possesses tangible resources that are not as abundant as those of great powers yet surpass the resources of small powers. These resources grant middle powers a wider range of maneuverability in the realm of international politics when compared to small powers. Moreover, as White suggests, a middle power is not limited merely to complying with the demands of great powers, but instead has the capacity to engage in negotiations and even exhibit resistance to some extent.[4]

A middle power is defined as a state that possesses tangible resources that are not as abundant as those of great powers yet surpass the resources of small powers.

Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that middle powers are not immune to the influence exerted by great powers. In fact, when it comes to pursuing their own interests in the realm of international politics, middle powers face certain limitations in comparison to the great powers. Consequently, while a middle power may seek to break free from the dominant influence of great powers, its position in global politics is ultimately shaped by the nature of the interactions between great powers in a multipolar international environment.[5] Additionally, the nature of the relationship between a middle power and great powers is

another key determinant in shaping the policies pursued by the middle power in the realm of international politics.

The proponents of the liberal strand find the analysis based on rank in the material power hierarchy to be problematic due to its heavy reliance on quantifiable measures of power.[6] The realist strand has been accused of neglecting crucial aspects such as the behavior of middle powers, their soft power capabilities, and their foreign policy strategies. To rectify these omissions, the liberal strand examines the conduct of states in international politics, with a particular emphasis on identifying a state as a middle power. This alternative viewpoint seeks to offer a more comprehensive analysis of middle powers and their significance in the global context. In this respect, Evans and Grant identify specific behavioral patterns exhibited by middle powers, including a preference for multilateral approaches to global issues, a willingness to seek compromise in international conflicts, and a commitment to upholding principles of good international citizenship in their diplomatic endeavors.[7] In addition, Higgott and Cooper contend that middle powers conform to, promote, preserve, and bolster the norms of the international system.[8] Cooper et al. have also identified three distinct patterns that characterize the behavior of middle powers, namely the role of a catalyst, a facilitator, and a manager. The concept of being a catalyst refers to a middle power's capacity to initiate and inspire action on an international issue, thereby attracting followers. Being a facilitator entails the ability to foster collaboration and form coalitions in specific areas related to the issue at hand. Lastly, being a manager signifies a middle power's skill in establishing institutions and shaping norms within the realm of international politics.[9]

The primary behavioral feature of middle powers within the liberal framework is their inclination towards seeking multilateral cooperation. Keohane argues that middle powers, in this context, refer to states that lack the capability to act independently with effectiveness; however, they possess the ability to exert significant influence either within a collective or by leveraging international institutions.[10] Mares reinforces Keohane's position by recognizing that middle powers can bolster their presence in the global system by creating and actively engaging in coalitions.[11] Hence, middle powers often turn to multilateral cooperation to avoid being overshadowed by great powers. Middle powers find opportunities to voice and advance their own interests with greater autonomy in multilateral frameworks than in bilateral contexts.

Although the realist and liberal perspectives offer distinct viewpoints on the concept of middle power, they should not be viewed as mutually exclusive. Müftüler and Yüksel posit that the integration of these two strands is essential for a comprehensive definition of the concept and a more extensive comprehension of the power status of states.[12] Accordingly, a middle power is situated between great powers and small powers in the international power hierarchy due to its moderate level of material resources. Additionally, middle powers utilize their economic, military, diplomatic, and political resources to form alliances, spearhead initiatives, engage with other states, and play an active role in international organizations to advance their own interests. Furthermore, middle powers demonstrate good international citizenship by adhering to the norms and regulations of the global system.

Considering these elements, we assert that Türkiye can be identified as a middle power due to its material capabilities and foreign policy behavior. From a realist standpoint, Türkiye is situated in an intermediary position in the international system, owing to its tangible resources such as geography, GDP, military power, and population. Accordingly, Türkiye's geographic location grants it a significant advantage; situated between the industrialized West and the energy-rich regions of the Middle East and Caspian, Türkiye occupies a pivotal position.[13] Furthermore, the strategic value of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits enhances Türkiye's effectiveness in the realm of international politics.[14]

The significance of economic indicators cannot be overstated for middle powers such as Türkiye, as they are fundamental for assuming a successful middle power role on the global stage. Despite facing chronic economic crises and instability in the 1990s, Türkiye has been able to recover from its economic disorder and achieve stability since the 2000s.

The significance of economic indicators cannot be overstated for middle powers such as Türkiye, as they are fundamental for assuming a successful middle power role on the global stage.

Türkiye's economy, as measured by its nominal GDP in 2022, reached an estimated value of $907,118 million. This placed Türkiye in the 19th position among the world's economies. Türkiye's economy also represented the 11th largest purchasing power GDP in 2022 with an estimated value of $3,182,086 million.[15] Türkiye's economy earns it a place in the Group of 20 (G20). With a sizable economy, Türkiye possesses a substantial population. As of 31 December

2023, Türkiye's population stood at 85,372,377. The demographic composition of this population exhibits a youthful and vibrant structure: approximately 68.3% of the population falls within the age range of 15-64.[16] Furthermore, approximately 50% of the populace consists of individuals below the age of 30 while projections suggest that this youthful and vibrant demographic will surge to approximately 93.4 million by the year 2050.[17]

Türkiye also possesses a substantial military force and defense budget. By the year 2023, Türkiye boasted a grand total of 890,700 military personnel, with 355,200 serving on active duty, 156,800 in the gendarmerie, and 378,700 in the reserves, positioning it as the second-largest army within NATO, following the United States.[18] Türkiye's military expenditure in 2022 amounted to $16,195 million, ranking it seventh among NATO member countries.[19] Meanwhile, the Turkish Armed Forces is recognized as one of the most technologically advanced armies worldwide and the advancements achieved by the Turkish defense industry greatly contribute to this reputation. At present, the Turkish defense sector has successfully diminished the reliance of the Turkish Armed Forces on external sources and has emerged as the primary contributor to their formidable capabilities. Türkiye has the capability to manufacture a wide range of wheeled and tracked armored and unarmored ground vehicles, such as tanks, howitzers, air defense systems, ballistic missiles, combat vehicles, and personnel carriers. Additionally, Türkiye is proficient in producing naval platforms like corvettes, frigates, destroyers, coastal security boats, submarines, and other types of vessels. Türkiye also has the capacity to develop armed and unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters, and training aircraft. Türkiye is self-sufficient in producing various types of ammunition, including infantry rifles, anti-tank weapons, electronic warfare systems, and radar systems. In 2021, Türkiye's defense industry sector recorded a turnover of $12,196 million, out of which $4,396 million was generated through exports. Alongside the United States, many nations in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and South America have exhibited interest in Türkiye's defense industry offerings.[20]

Besides its material assets, Türkiye can be considered a middle power in terms of its foreign policy conduct. Middle powers, as per the liberal strand, typically opt for collaborative approaches to global issues, act as mediators in the international sphere, adhere to international norms, and exhibit responsible international behavior to steer their diplomatic endeavors. Turkish foreign policy has been in line with the typical behavior exhibited by middle powers, particularly after the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came into

power in 2002. Historically, Türkiye held the belief that it was encircled by adversaries.[21] This mindset influenced Turkish foreign policy, leading to strained relations with neighboring nations.[22] To counteract this perception, since the 2000s, Türkiye has initiated efforts to reengage with its surrounding regions, fostering economic and political interconnectedness. As a result, within the realm of economics, there have been scholarly debates surrounding Türkiye's evolution into a trading state,[23] which aligns aptly with the distinctive behavior exhibited by middle powers. Furthermore, Turkish leaders, diplomats, and officials have commenced highlighting the importance of cultural and historical bonds with their neighboring regions. The transformation in rhetoric is apparent in Türkiye's reconfiguring of its geographic imagination: rather than prioritizing security concerns, Türkiye now views its geography in terms of the social, political, and economic benefits it offers.[24]

The evolving perspective in Turkish foreign policy has been supported by strategies designed to promote the security and stability of the global system. Accordingly, Türkiye has successfully implemented proactive measures in its foreign policy by creating mediation and peacekeeping mechanisms, engaging in high-level political and diplomatic dialogues, fostering economic integration with neighboring countries, and promoting multicultural initiatives. With regard to mediation and peacekeeping mechanisms, Türkiye not only launches unilateral initiatives, but also actively participates in multilateral mechanisms, including assuming co-chair positions in the Groups of Friends at the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC); organizing international Mediation Conferences; and implementing the "Mediation for Peace Certificate Program."[25] Türkiye's efforts to mediate between Syria and Israel, Syria and Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia, as well as Hamas and Fatah, and its role in promoting peace agreements in Gaza and Lebanon are among its unilateral initiatives. As part of its multilateral initiatives, Türkiye has been actively engaged in various conflict resolution efforts across a wide geographical area. These efforts have included initiatives aimed at fostering internal reconciliation in countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, and Kyrgyzstan. Türkiye has also spearheaded two separate trilateral cooperation processes involving Serbia and Croatia, with the goal of establishing lasting peace and stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, Türkiye has initiated a trilateral cooperation mechanism with Afghanistan and Pakistan, which plays a crucial role in maintaining peace and security in the former. Türkiye has also been involved in the "Heart of Asia - Istanbul Process" initiative, which aims to promote regional ownership. Türkiye has been actively

involved in dialogue efforts to resolve Iran's nuclear program issue peacefully, support talks between Somalia and Somaliland, assist in the peace process in the South Philippines, and facilitate dialogue between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.[26]

The most notable effort among these is the Black Sea Grain Initiative, also known as the "Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports," which is often referred to as the "Grain Deal" in media reports. This agreement was established during the Russian invasion of Ukraine and involves Russia, Ukraine, Türkiye, and the UN. In July 2022, the signing ceremony was held at Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul, Türkiye. The ceremony holds great significance as it signifies the first major agreement between the conflicting parties since the Russian invasion commenced in February 2022. The signed documents encompass provisions for the secure transportation of grain, foodstuffs, and fertilizers, and include the creation of demined corridors in the Black Sea, through which ships can safely navigate. Meanwhile, Türkiye has taken on the responsibility of inspecting all merchant vessels. Concurrently, another agreement was reached to enable the UN to facilitate the unimpeded export of Russian food, fertilizers, and raw materials.[27]

Türkiye has also emerged as a significant benefactor in the realm of humanitarian development on a global scale. The Global Humanitarian Assistance Report reveals that in 2018, Türkiye maintained its position as the largest donor country worldwide, providing an official humanitarian aid amounting to $8,399 million. Türkiye also retained its title as the "Most Generous Country" in 2018, allocating 0.79% of its gross national income (GNI) to official humanitarian assistance.[28] In this regard, Türkiye allocates its resources to various sectors such as education, health, water and sanitation, agriculture, shelter, and administrative and civil infrastructure development. These efforts extend to 170 countries across the globe, encompassing regions like the Middle East, Africa, Balkans, Central Asia, Latin America, and Caucasia.[29] By investing in these areas, Türkiye showcases its growing soft power capabilities, an asset for middle powers in the realm of international politics.

Consistent with the concept of multilateralism, a fundamental trait of a middle power, Türkiye has demonstrated a proactive approach in its foreign policy by actively participating in global organizations and fostering relationships multilaterally with countries and regions across the world. As a result, Türkiye

has aimed to establish a prominent global presence by expanding its influence globally and striving to maintain a balanced relationship between the East and West, and the North and South. Türkiye has shown significant involvement in a wide array of international organizations including the OIC, UN, NATO, OSCE, D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation (D-8), G20, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC), the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), MIKTA, and various other global institutions.[30]

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Türkiye's strategic focus lies in fostering ties with the U.S., Russia, China, and European Union nations simultaneously. This strategy underscores the importance of multidimensional engagement with various global players, a characteristic often associated with middle powers. By broadening its network of relationships, Türkiye aims to bolster the efficacy of its foreign policies in line with the assumption that a middle power's influence in world politics is contingent upon the strength of its connections with great powers and the quality of its engagements with them. Alongside great powers, Türkiye is continuously reinforcing its close relationships with the countries in the Balkans, the Middle East, North Africa, South Caucasus, and South and Central Asia. Moreover, Türkiye is furthering its partnership strategy in Africa and steadily extending its outreach to the nations in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Asia Anew Initiative, which was announced in 2019, has enabled Türkiye to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive and holistic policy towards Asia and the Pacific, where the influential powers of the 21st century are emerging. Due to its expanding and diversifying comprehensive strategies, Türkiye has established the fifth-largest diplomatic network worldwide, consisting of 261 missions. Utilizing a variety of political, economic, humanitarian, and cultural instruments, Türkiye engages in a diplomacy that considers global perspectives while implementing actions at a local level across the globe.[31]

Consequently, taking into account its material capabilities and foreign policy conduct, particularly since the 2000s, Türkiye can be identified as a middle

power according to both the realist and liberal strands. Türkiye holds concrete assets exceeding those of small powers yet falling short of great powers. Additionally, it engages in a proactive approach to foreign policy within the realm of global politics by adhering to international norms, promoting peace and stability in its vicinity and beyond as a responsible global player, striving for meaningful participation in international organizations, and broadening its connections with various global actors.

Hakan Fidan's Leadership: Elevating Türkiye's Foreign Policy to Embrace Greater Responsibilities

As Türkiye often faces numerous challenges on both regional and global scales, when Hakan Fidan became foreign minister, the country's foreign policy was already burdened with many significant political issues. Türkiye was already struggling with challenges arising from conflicts in neighboring regions, including the Syrian Civil War, political instability in Iraq, and tensions with regional actors in the Eastern Mediterranean. These tensions were compounded by the country's counterterrorism efforts and struggle to manage the refugee flow. Concurrently, disagreements with Türkiye's "key allies" persisted on these and other matters.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan envisions Türkiye as a fully independent country with an international agenda. He sees Türkiye as a key player capable of disrupting designs by others on international and regional settings when necessary, tirelessly seeking to strengthen its position in global politics. He describes a foreign policy focused on enhancing the unity, security, and prosperity of the Turkish state and nation. This policy is based on increasing capabilities shaped around civilizational values and is independent of any external influence.[32] In his latest article, Fidan explains Türkiye's foreign policy with reference to four dynamics: (1) the challenges in global politics; (2) Türkiye's foreign policy vision; (3) Türkiye's foreign policy objectives; and (4) the transformation and adaptation of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[33] Fidan claims that the world is moving through a complex era where many interrelated and simultaneous crises are occurring, and that these crises are challenging the current international system. Existing global governance mechanisms have

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan envisions Türkiye as a fully independent country with an international agenda.

turned into fields of clashing great power interests and have consequently lost their effectiveness in addressing global crises across various issue areas such as politics, military, economy, environment, technology, and society. It is essential to combat challenges globally and regionally, including armed conflicts, terrorism, irregular migration, xenophobia, Islamophobia, the climate crisis, food shortages, and cyber threats. These challenges arise in various areas and exacerbate each other. Moreover, alongside the security risks stemming from the Russia-Ukraine War, the world lacks global governance mechanisms capable of addressing issues like global inflation, economic recession, energy crises, and food insecurity. Many of these crises and challenges have emerged, particularly in and around Türkiye and the heart of Europe.[34]

In the face of these issue areas, Fidan seeks to develop an active and multidimensional foreign policy vision for Türkiye, whereby the country aims to improve and contribute to a more "inclusive, effective, fair and secure" international system based on "solidarity, rather than polarity."[35] Through patience and determination, Fidan demonstrates, Türkiye seeks to become an architect of such a system that prioritizes welfare, peace, security, stability, and prosperity for all. Based on this vision, Fidan determines and describes four main objectives for Türkiye: "[i] Contributing to Peace and Security in the Region and Creating New Cooperation Models (…); [ii] Further Institutionalization of Foreign Relations (…); [iii] Development of an Environment of Prosperity (…); and [iv] Advancement of Global Goals."[36] In line with these objectives, Türkiye's foreign policy is turning pro-active both in its region and in global politics. While eliminating the threats to its security, the country will seek to develop new economic and political ties in its region and beyond. Türkiye aims to maintain and strengthen existing alliances and commitments, on the one hand, and establish new strategic relations, on the other. These relations will be used to further develop the country's economy, which according to Fidan will serve not only Türkiye but its partners around the world as well. Türkiye, through solidarity with other international actors, aims to offer solutions to global problems including, but not limited to, development, food security, environmental degradation, racism, xenophobia, and Islamophobia.[37]

In various speeches following his appointment, Fidan frequently refers to both regional and global political crises and Türkiye's potential role in their management.[38] He describes a proactive stance in regional politics, addressing counterterrorism, the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Russia-Ukraine War, and relations with regional actors such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. He

focuses on Türkiye's relations with its allies, specifically mentioning NATO, and emphasizes the inadequacy of existing global governance mechanisms. He observes a shift in the post-WWII world order and stresses the necessity of reform in global politics. Under Hakan Fidan's leadership in the foreign ministry, Türkiye, demonstrating a willingness to play a role in managing all these issues, envisions "great power" responsibilities.

As discussed in the previous section, we argue that Türkiye can be considered a middle power. Under Fidan's leadership, Türkiye appears to become a middle power shouldering great power responsibility. However, there are certain limits that may hinder the fulfillment of this vision. While foreign policy visions may be expansive, ultimately foreign policy behavior tends to align with or be constrained by the country's power status; in other words, the realization of aspirations is significantly influenced by power dynamics. From this perspective, assuming responsibilities in various issues and attempting to expand their sphere of influence is particularly challenging for states classified as middle powers.

In the context of a transforming global order, three fundamental foreign policy strategies can be proposed for middle powers. First, such states should refrain from exceeding the limits of their material capabilities in their aspirations to shoulder responsibilities or ascend to great power status. Ultimately, a state's position and potential are determined by its material capabilities or limitations. When formulating foreign policy, identifying a strategy that aligns with the state's power status and realpolitik would be a suitable starting point for middle powers. Second, middle powers should keenly observe shifts in global politics and strive to wield influence effectively in areas where they possess a comparative advantage. They can assess opportunities to become influential players in specific issue domains. For instance, beyond traditional foreign policy concerns such as war and defense, they can significantly contribute to enhancing governance mechanisms aimed at addressing emerging global challenges across various sectors, including health, environment, sustainability, human rights, migration, and mass mobility. Lastly, as middle powers endeavor to enhance their material capabilities, they should also focus on increasing their prestige. Just as the accumulation of material elements such as military and economic power takes time, so does the acquisition of prestige. Having substantial power does not necessarily imply effective utilization of that power in foreign policy. Prestige is a value that enhances power, multiplying its impact

in foreign policy; at the same time, it is a value that is challenging to build yet easy to lose.[39]

Türkiye should also strengthen cooperation with other middle powers via focusing on shared strategic interests. Such collaborations can focus on areas such as the global climate crisis, technology and defense, migration, and mass mobility.

These fundamental foreign policy strategies are also applicable to Türkiye's foreign policy envisioned by Fidan. The transformation in the global system, driven by shifts in geopolitical dynamics, presents not only challenges but also significant opportunities for middle powers like Türkiye, which aim to elevate their power status beyond material limitations. While great powers are busy with their own rivalries and competition, new opportunities rise for middle powers. We can anticipate that middle powers with significant spheres of influence in their geographical regions will have greater maneuverability. There are emerging areas in international politics where both Türkiye and other middle powers can play more effective and significant roles. The exploration of these areas can help Türkiye identify new directions and transform existing ones within its foreign policy. While Türkiye continues to enhance its military and economic power, it should also maintain its role as an advocate for global peace and stability. Türkiye can continue to offer widespread and regular healthcare and development assistance, like the aid it provided during the COVID-19 pandemic. Middle powers can prioritize interest-based cooperation mechanisms and thereby achieve a much more effective position in the new world order. Türkiye should also strengthen cooperation with other middle powers via focusing on shared strategic interests. Such collaborations can focus on areas such as the global climate crisis, technology and defense, migration, and mass mobility. "If the old-world order is changing and a new one is being established, Türkiye could emerge as a highly influential actor in this new order if its foreign policy vision is realistically crafted."[40] Under Fidan's ministry, Türkiye appears poised to assume greater responsibility in global politics by cooperating and collaborating with other significant middle powers. The burden of global transformations should not be borne by a single country but rather by counterparts with shared interests. It is a significant task for the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to identify those shared interests and determine with whom they are shared.

Conclusion

Türkiye demonstrates qualities of a middle power in the international system both in terms of material power hierarchy and foreign policy behaviors. This is to say that Türkiye boasts a significant advantage, particularly in its geography, GDP, and military capacity when compared to smaller powers; however, it still falls behind compared to great powers. Hence, Türkiye occupies a position in international politics as a middle power, situated between small and great powers. By actively engaging in international organizations, adhering to the norms and regulations of the global system, promoting international peace and stability, and advocating for diplomatic and multilateral approaches to global issues, Türkiye's foreign policy demonstrates the characteristic behavior of a middle power.

This article expanded on the idea that Türkiye shows all the signs of a middle power, taking on responsibilities similar to those of a great power under the guidance of Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Türkiye sees itself as a key player capable of influencing global events not only within its own region but also on a broader scale. This is evident in Türkiye's active participation in significant endeavors and the forging of strategic alliances in order to position itself as a prominent middle power with ambitions for achieving great power status. Türkiye assumes responsibilities in various issues while attempting to expand its sphere of influence which is particularly challenging for states classified as middle powers.

However, assuming comparable responsibilities to those of a great power poses a particularly daunting challenge for states categorized as middle powers. The article proposed three key foreign policy strategies to overcome the challenges for Türkiye as a middle power with aspirations for great power status. Thus,

> (i) Türkiye should exercise caution in surpassing the limits of its material capabilities as it seeks to shoulder great power responsibilities or achieve great power status.
>
> (ii) Türkiye should be careful when choosing the areas of responsibility it undertakes as it is essential for a middle power to monitor changes in global politics closely and work towards exerting influence strategically in areas where it has a competitive edge over other nations.

(iii) Türkiye should tread carefully in its efforts to enhance its material capabilities as it should also prioritize enhancing its reputation. Without legitimacy and plausibility within the international order, having significant power does not automatically guarantee effective utilization of that power in foreign policy.

In our assessment, the third strategy emerges as a challenging and hazardous endeavor for Türkiye as a middle power when considering the long-term implications. This is because, turning to Morgenthau's terminology, the desire for power and control is a prevalent human trait, yet it often leads individuals to a position of subordination under others.[41] The effort to suppress this undesirable truth becomes evident as the individuals exercising power effectively employ justifications and legitimacy to assist them in this pursuit. In other words, individuals exercising power effectively must constantly persuade the individuals obligated to comply that the power exercises are in the best interests of the broader community.[42] In this manner, according to Morgenthau, the key to mastering international politics lies in the wisdom and moral strength of a statesman.[43] The conduct of Turkish foreign policy under Fidan should thus be sensitive to balance its aspirations for regional and global influence with the need to legitimize its actions and garner cooperation from other actors in the international arena.

Endnotes

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ARTICLE

WAR OF ROLES: NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS, ALTERCASTING, AND U.S.-CHINA RIVALRY IN THE WAR IN UKRAINE

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Abstract

This article explores the behaviors of the U.S. and China regarding the war in Ukraine from a role theory perspective. The developments on the ground reveal that the American and Chinese positions on the Russia-Ukraine war should be viewed not independently from each other but within the context of their global strategic competition as well as the roles they attribute to themselves, known as national role conceptions, and the roles they attribute to one another, known as altercasting. From that point of view, the study argues that the war in Ukraine is not only a war of geopolitical significance between the West and Russia, but it is also a war of roles between the U.S. and China.

Keywords

U.S., China, role theory, national role conceptions, altercasting, Russia-Ukraine war

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Introduction

The war initiated by Russia in Ukraine in February 2022 has ushered in a new era of great power competition. This war has not only revealed the divergent security expectations between the West and Russia, but it has also sparked a new front in the U.S.-China rivalry. Zelensky, the Ukrainian leader, has stated that he would participate in peace talks only if the U.S. and Chinese leaderships attend.[1] In the meantime, the fact that China has signaled interest in mediating between Russia and Ukraine has increased expectations about China's growing diplomatic presence after arranging talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023. While the U.S. has not objected to the Chinese proposition to mediate between the fighting parts in Ukraine, U.S. State Secretary Blinken recently made clear that the U.S. has a cautious stance toward China's "pro-Russian neutrality."[2] Evidently, the Ukrainian war has revealed the divergent security expectations between the West and Russia. At the same time, however, the very same war holds in its background, the clash of national role conceptions between the U.S. and China, which compete on a global scale.

This article aims to understand the behaviors of the U.S. and China regarding the war in Ukraine from a role theory perspective. The developments on the ground reveal that the American and Chinese positions on the Russia-Ukraine war should be viewed not independently from each other but within the context of their global strategic competition, and the roles they attribute to themselves (national role conceptions) and to each other (altercasting). As mentioned by the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2022, the U.S. views China as the only competitor with "both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective."[3] From that perspective, this article argues that the war in Ukraine is both a war of geopolitical significance between the West and Russia and a war of roles between the U.S. and China. Put differently, the study stresses that the return of geopolitics with the Russia-Ukraine war has triggered a great power role contestation between the U.S. and China.

First, the study will provide a brief overview of role theory, focusing in particular on the notions of national role conception and altercasting. The second section sheds light on how the U.S. conceives its national role and how throughout history it has attempted to cast China into a particular role. This section also reveals how the Chinese resistance against the U.S. altercasting efforts has strengthened since the early 2010s and how China has begun to cast

back the U.S. The third and final section discusses the contesting national role conceptions and altercasting efforts by the U.S. and China since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.

Theorizing the U.S.-China Rivalry: A Framework for Role Theory

Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), as a subfield of the discipline of international relations, was born under the Cold War dynamics due to "dissatisfaction with the simplistic nature of realist accounts of foreign policy"[4] to shed light on foreign policy decisions taken by countries of the rival camps. Particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. administrations prioritized research in this field to understand and explain how foreign policy in the Soviet system was formed and by whom. While there have been manifold seminal studies stressing different factors in the foreign policy decision-making process since then, K. J. Holsti's article titled "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy" stands out in the literature on role theory, breathing new life into the existing literature on FPA. In his work from 1970, Holsti argued that categorizing the world in terms of blocs and neutrals was simplistic, and that there were special factors contributing to the foreign policy preferences of states, such as roles.[5] Although the concept of role was frequently used in diverse fields of social sciences by sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists in previous decades, Holsti's work brought role theory to FPA.[6] Walker also contributed to the revitalization of role theory in FPA with his edited book *The Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*, in 1987.[7]

According to Holsti, the policymakers' conceptions about their country's role and the expectations of other actors are the main drivers behind foreign policy decisions.

According to Holsti, the policymakers' conceptions about their country's role and the expectations of other actors are the main drivers behind foreign policy decisions. In this framework, role conceptions are essential and are based on the perceptions of foreign policymakers. How foreign policymakers conceive of their countries' role within the international system, and more specifically, how they position their countries vis-à-vis other countries, is critical. One could argue that roles serve as roadmaps helping policymakers in making decisions.[8] In his groundbreaking study, Holsti scrutinized hundreds of statements made

by highest-level policymakers from 71 governments between January 1965 and December 1967 and revealed 17 distinct national role conceptions. Yet, according to role theory, roles are not only constituted by the actors, but they are relational entities. In other words, roles define a "self" vis-à-vis another in a given group.[9] Harnish stresses that states' roles are social positions which are constituted by ego and alter expectations.[10]

Holsti attributed three dimensions to role theory. The first dimension includes national role conception, namely an actor's self-perception and self-attributed position. The second dimension is based on role expectations, or, in Holsti's terms, role prescriptions; in other words, the expectations of others and the expectations emanating from the dynamics of the international system on the actor. The third dimension is role performance or the foreign policy behavior of a state, namely, all decisions and actions taken by the state when performing a role.[11] One could argue that while the first dimension represents the ego dimension, the second one represents the alter dimension.[12] From Holsti's perspective, role theory underlines the interaction between the ego and alter dimensions, and he stresses these two as independent variables affecting the role performance of an actor.[13] However, he also adds that "self-defined national role conceptions seemingly take precedence over externally derived role prescriptions."[14]

Altercasting comes up as a critical concept, which takes the alter dimension one step further. Weinstein and Deutschberger defined altercasting as "projecting an identity, to be assumed by other(s) with whom one is in interaction, which is congruent with one's own goals."[15] This definition, which dates back to 1963, portrayed altercasting as a basic technique of interpersonal control since the purpose of altercasting is to "cast Alter into a particular identity or role type."[16] Cast contributed to the same argument by stressing that even if ego may attempt to altercast alter, alter may resist by generating its own role conception.[17] Although altercasting was first launched in the field of social psychology, the concept was subsequently incorporated into role theory and FPA particularly with the studies conducted by Thies. According to Thies, altercasting is mainly based on manipulating since "in order to altercast, Ego needs to manipulate cues during interaction in order to influence Alter's definition of the situation."[18] Thies also contributed to the abovementioned argument by Cast, indicating that power plays a critical role in whose definition of the situation prevails.[19] In other words, "more powerful actors should be able to generate their own role identities, behave in ways consistent with these role identities, altercast role

identities on others, and resist attempts at being altercast in turn."[20] In short, accepting or rejecting attempts of altercasting depends on power and in that respect, relations between the U.S. and China emerge as an excellent test case for altercasting.

U.S. National Role Conceptions and Attempts to Altercast China from Past to Present

One might argue that since the foundation of the Union, the U.S. national role conceptions have been revolving around a special belief, namely American exceptionalism. This belief derives from the ideas that the U.S. has an exceptional history, geography, natural richness, and population, and stresses that the U.S. is an exceptional nation.[21] Being an exceptional nation has attributed a strong sense of mission to the U.S. in its foreign relations, leading the U.S. to conceive itself throughout history as a leader, a defender of the faith, a global police force, a benign hegemon, a responsible great power, a liberator, and a democratizer. While the sense of being unique has led American policymakers to portray the U.S. as a responsible great power in its foreign relations with other countries, the same policymakers have simultaneously stressed the pragmatic pursuit of American interests. Therefore, the U.S. national role conceptions have included other more realistic roles such as "pragmatically internationalist power in global order" and "ego-centric maximizer of national interests."[22] This is how moral responsibility in the self-conceived roles of the U.S. has been balanced with more realist inclinations. While different U.S. executives have developed different foreign policy strategies depending on the changing global context throughout the decades, the U.S. national role conceptions toward different regions and countries have presented more continuities than changes.[23]

One might argue that since the foundation of the Union, the U.S. national role conceptions have been revolving around a special belief, namely American exceptionalism.

The Open Door Policy, a set of guiding principles sent as diplomatic notes by U.S. Secretary of State John Hay to Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and Japan in 1899, had a major influence on how the U.S. initially approached China. In his notes, Hay declared that in order to maintain China's

territorial and administrative integrity, the U.S. would pursue complete equality of privileges among all great nations trading with China. The U.S. policy's primary goal was to prevent any other state from assuming a dominant position in China. Thies argues that with the 1899 Open Door Policy the U.S. constructed a role identity for itself in Northeast Asia which was mainly based on the roles of "balancer," i.e., the one who balances the great powers' interests and privileges in China; "great power," the one authorizing Chinese political independence from other great powers; and "regional protector," the one who protects regional states from the interference of other powers.[24] Thies maintains that particularly the last role was an attempt by the U.S. to project a special role to China, which was congruent with the U.S. regional goals and interests. Thus, while the U.S. attributed the "regional protector" role to itself, it attributed the role of "protectee" to China.[25]

It is important to note that in the early 20th century, China had neither the capacity nor the will to resist and contain the role projected on itself by the U.S. The U.S. attempts to cast China into a protectee and a subordinate actor succeeded, and continued for a long time. Although Mao depicted China as a revolutionary state in 1949 and constructed a new national role conception for the country,[26] the altercasting by the U.S. largely undermined China's role conceptions in the 1950s and 1960s. However, the role projected on China changed in the early 1970s when the U.S. recognized the People's Republic of China and this time, began to altercast a "great power" role on China in order to create a rift between China and the Soviet Union in the détente era.[27] This time, the projected role by the U.S. on China was consistent with China's self-conceived role. By the end of the 1970s, the Chinese government initiated a number of reforms to incorporate the principles of a free market economy into a socialist state, which resulted in a considerable level of economic growth. This is how China rekindled expectations for a return to its historical international power status.[28]

The U.S. attempts to altercast China continued steadily in the subsequent decades. With the outbreak of the Second Cold War in the 1980s, once the U.S. re-asserted itself more clearly as the defender of liberal democracy and free market capitalism, it altercasted the "troubled modernizer" role on China and transmitted the message that China was a pupil who had to learn from the teacher, namely the U.S. After the incidents of Tiananmen Square in 1989 though, a key incident that changed the U.S. perception of China,[29] the projected

role on China changed from "troubled modernizer" to "failed modernizer,"[30] a new role symbolizing that China had failed to embrace liberal values such as democracy and human rights. Even if China resisted the U.S. by generating its own role conception in those decades, the U.S. attempts to altercast China prevailed over China's own national role conceptions since, as Thies argues, "power plays a critical role in whose definition of the situation prevails."[31]

Unsurprisingly, in the first decade of the 2000s, when China achieved significant levels of economic growth following more than two decades of modernization reforms, the resistance coming from China to counter attempts at being altercast by the U.S. began to strengthen and become more visible. In effect, while China was "role taking" in the 1990s, in other words, taking the role attributed by others, namely the U.S., in the early 2000s, it started to engage in "role bargaining," or bargaining the role attributed by others.[32] By repeatedly highlighting the historical legacy of China's imperial position, Chinese leaders resisted and bargained previously attributed roles to China. Carnsten-Gottwald and Duggan stress that Chinese foreign policy at that time was marked by "an adaptation of its historical role conception as a 'leading developing country' to that of a 'responsible care taker.'"[33] In return, China's efforts to bargain the projected roles on itself created room for mounting concerns in the U.S., whose policymakers began to question whether China could be a responsible stakeholder within the U.S.-led liberal international order. Shortgen argues that these concerns led the U.S. to support China's entry into the World Trade Organization, a support symbolizing the "altercasting strategy aimed at ensuring Chinese restraint."[34]

A key illustration of the role bargaining process initiated by China came with the concept of "China's Peaceful Rise," introduced by Bijian, a veteran Chinese politician, in 2005.

A key illustration of the role bargaining process initiated by China came with the concept of "China's Peaceful Rise," introduced by Bijian, a veteran Chinese politician, in 2005. Accordingly, Chinese rapid development since the late 1970s had paved the way for China to achieve great power status in the first decade of the 2000s. However, for Bijian, the Chinese rise to this status would not pose a threat to international peace and security since China would help to maintain a peaceful international environment.[35] Thus, China's peaceful rise

was completely in line with the principles it was looking for in foreign relations: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.[36] While Chinese policymakers referred to China's rise and development as "peaceful," there have been opposing views in the U.S., both in academic and political circles. According to Mearsheimer, for example, China could not rise peacefully, so the U.S. and China were likely to engage in an intense security competition with "considerable potential for war."[37] For Nye, though, the two great powers would not necessarily go to war and instead would learn how to coexist.[38]

The 2010s began with growing debates on China's rise both in international society and within the U.S. According to Shortgen, it was in the second decade of the 21st century that China left aside its "role bargaining" and adopted "role making." In other words, since the early 2010s, China is not only resisting and bargaining the projected roles for itself, but it is also challenging them by constructing its own role and, more importantly, altercasting back the U.S. as a hegemonic power "attempting to victimize China and prevent China from attaining its rightful role in the international system."[39] Needless to say, China's impressive economic capabilities, in other words, the change in the relative distribution of power in Sino-American relations, is the main driver behind this fundamental change.

China's self-perception as a "responsible great power" has been consolidated, particularly since 2012, with the ascension of Xi Jinping to the position of Chinese leader. Xi's vision for China, characterized by rising confidence, assertiveness, and leadership, bears many similarities with that of Mao on the grounds that it underlines the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.[40] This vision, also known as the "Chinese Dream," requires a re-evaluation of China's 21st century roles within the international system.[41] The speech made by General Secretary Xi in 2012 has been evaluated as China's definitive abandonment of its low-profile role conceptualizations from previous decades.[42] Today, China's national role conceptions present a variety from guardian of the developing world and a leading member of the most powerful nations to peace-broker, anti-imperialist, and a responsible great power looking for a more just and equitable international order.[43]

More interestingly, today, China does not only have the power to construct its own role within the international system and to impose its self-conceived role as a fact, but it also has the capacity to altercast back. For many in China, the term "Chinese rise" should be replaced by "Chinese re-emergence" onto the world stage since Chinese history is largely marked by a great power legacy. From this perspective, the goal of Chinese foreign policy is not to bring a fundamental novelty to the international system, but to return China to its former glory.[44] Meanwhile, according to the Chinese, the U.S. stands as an impediment that seeks to block the awakening of free nations. As Mao stated in 1960, "What imperialism fears most is the awakening of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples, the awakening of the peoples of all countries. We should unite and drive US imperialism from Asia, Africa, and Latin America back to where it came from."[45] Not coincidentally, the current Chinese leadership frequently stresses that China is looking for a more just and equitable international order.[46] China does not hold back in this regard when condemning the U.S. for leading a liberal order that has resulted in countless injustices for the rest of the world. For example, in the wake of the visit of Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in 2022, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson criticized the U.S. for acting as a "hypocrite provocateur," claiming itself to be a "moral judge" in world affairs.[47] One should notice that China is casting back the U.S. into an imperialist, unfair hegemonic power meddling in the internal and regional affairs of others.

Naturally, efforts of altercasting back by China are not at all welcome in the U.S. Today, the U.S. does not only perceive China as an economic, strategic, and sociocultural rival,[48] but it is also vigilantly looking for an overarching strategy toward China. Although the U.S. policymakers have refrained from pronouncing the concept of "containment" so far,[49] in order not to revitalize the specter of the Cold War and not to alienate China, key security documents reveal that the main goal of the U.S. toward China should be to counter and roll back Chinese intentions to make sure that it is "America, not China, who sets the international agenda."[50] By underlining China's revisionist claims, particularly in island disputes with Japan over areas of the South China Sea, the U.S. casts China into the roles of violator of liberal international order/norms and as an irresponsible great power while these projected roles are completely rejected by the Chinese leadership with an altercasting back effort. Recently, the war in Ukraine constitutes a perfect example of the clash of national role conceptions and altercasting efforts between the U.S. and China.

The War in Ukraine: A War of Roles between the U.S. and China?

Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, both the U.S. and China have frequently called for the end of all hostilities in Ukraine. Yet, they have differed from each other in identifying the aggressor and in the way they suggested hostilities should cease. The U.S. policymakers have made it clear that Ukraine is the victim and that Russia, as the aggressor, should withdraw its troops from Ukraine immediately and respect the state sovereignty of Ukraine as the first step to end this "unprovoked and unjustified war."[51] From the U.S. point of view, Russian leader Putin, with his "authoritarian rule, neo-imperialism and nationalism," has not only challenged the state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine because of Ukraine's pro-Western trajectory, but has also undermined all liberal values and norms that have marked the world since the end of World War II.[52] In that sense, it is not surprising that the U.S. has coordinated efforts to impose severe sanctions on Russia, and has spearheaded the Western nations to unite against Russia and send economic and military aid to Ukraine.[53] The U.S. policymakers have emphasized that while they would not intervene against Russia on behalf of Ukrainians, they would assist them in fending off Russian aggression.[54] One may contend that the U.S. stance on the war in Ukraine not only fully complies with the self-conceived roles the U.S. has been embracing since its founding, such as leader, responsible great power, liberator, and democratizer, but also aids the U.S. in justifying its roles. In other words, by opposing Russian aggression in Ukraine, the U.S. performs and strengthens its national role conceptions.

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In return, China has frequently stressed that respecting the sovereignty of all countries – without mentioning Ukraine – and ceasing hostilities should be top priorities for all sides. Yet, it has also stated that "the legitimate security concerns of any country" – without mentioning Russia – have to be respected,[55] and that abandoning the Cold War mentality – without mentioning the U.S. – is a must for

a peace in Ukraine.[56] China has not pronounced the word "war" and has preferred the word "crisis" to define the battlefield in Ukraine; it has also refrained from describing Russia as "aggressor/invader" and Ukraine as "victim."[57] While China has stated that it is in a "neutral" position and has stated numerous times that it is not a party to the "crisis" as part of its traditional policy to stay out of others' conflicts, it has also emphasized that it is not just Russia that has the blame since the "Cold War mentality" imposed by the U.S. is what started this "crisis."[58] In addition to this, China has declared that it is against the unilateral sanctions against Russia, since from the Chinese point of view, the sanctions coordinated by the U.S. serve only to exacerbate global economic problems including the rising prices of food, crude oil, and natural gas, as stated by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[59] Thus, since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the Chinese position is in line with China's self-conceived roles, such as anti-imperialist and responsible great power looking for a more just and equitable international order, since from the Chinese perspective, the "crisis" in Ukraine is not a matter of Russian expansionism but is directly linked to the U.S. Cold War mentality and to U.S. hegemonic ambitions, which have, in turn, irritated Russia.

One could argue that both the U.S. and China have been insistently altercasting each other since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. Many Americans think China is considering providing arms and ammunition to Russia, which China vehemently rejects, while China's professed "neutrality" with regard to the conflict in Ukraine could only be characterized as a pro-Russian neutrality. The fact that China's economic ties with Russia fundamentally improved following the harsh sanctions imposed by Western nations on Russia in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine has not only generated significant criticism by the U.S.,[60] but it has also contributed to the U.S. efforts to cast China as a violator of international order/norms and an irresponsible great power taking sides with the aggressor.

Just before the invasion of Ukraine, on 4 February 2022, General Secretary Xi and President Putin met before the opening ceremony of the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics and made a common statement on their "no limits friendship." The reports about this meeting do not necessarily imply that two leaders discussed the invasion of Ukraine directly; however, their statement was retrospectively perceived by Western media as "the most detailed and assertive statement of Russian and Chinese resolve to work together to build a new international order based on their view of human rights and democracy."[61] In addition, the

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a statement on China's position on the "political settlement of the Ukrainian crisis" on 24 February 2023 where the Chinese proposed a twelve-point peace plan to end hostilities in Ukraine. Among the twelve points, while there are some common principles with those advocated by the U.S., such as respecting the sovereignty of all countries, ceasing hostilities, resuming peace talks, resolving the humanitarian crisis, protecting civilians, and keeping the nuclear power plants safe, there are some other points that contradict the U.S. position such as "abandoning the Cold War mentality" and "stopping unilateral sanctions against Russia."[62] The absence of any point urging Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine in China's peace plan contributed to the U.S. efforts to altercast China.[63]

While China tries to project an image of being a neutral, responsible great power seeking peace in Ukraine, the U.S. argues that China has frequently rehashed Russian justification for the invasion.

While China tries to project an image of being a neutral, responsible great power seeking peace in Ukraine, the U.S. argues that China has frequently rehashed Russian justification for the invasion. It should come as no surprise that statements made by prominent members of the U.S. administration have transmitted the message to the world public opinion that China acts or may act as an irresponsible great power undermining the existing international order. After the announcement of China's twelve-point peace plan, for example, U.S. President Biden stated that China's position on the Ukrainian war was not "rational" and that the plan was not "beneficial to anyone other than Russia.[64] With his remarks, Biden cast doubt on China's claims of impartiality and painted it as a partial power putting forth an unfair scheme. He also contributed to the discussions on China's ambivalent diplomatic posture, asking how a major power could offer a purported peace plan that only benefits the aggressor while claiming to be neutral, anti-imperialist, and seeking a just and equitable international order. U.S. Secretary of State Blinken similarly emphasized his hesitance toward China's peace initiative by characterizing China's position as morally indefensible: "There is a victim and there's an aggressor, there is no moral equivalence between the two positions. Until recently, it was very unclear whether China accepted that basic principle."[65] In another recent statement, Blinken stressed that he had asked China's government "to be vigilant about private companies that may be providing Russia with technology that could be used against Ukraine."[66] Blinken made it clear that although China may not be

acting directly in violation of international order, by choosing to turn a blind eye to Chinese firms' military support for Russian aggression in Ukraine, it was in indirect violation of international order. Thus, Blinken did not only portray the U.S. as a responsible great power and liberator asking China to be vigilant about this issue, but he also successfully cast China into the roles of violator of international order (albeit indirectly) and irresponsible great power.

While the U.S. altercast role of violator of international order and irresponsible great power still captures the U.S. view of China in the Russia-Ukraine war, the Chinese counter-cast role of imperialist, unjust hegemonic power captures China's view of the U.S. As official statements demonstrate, China resists attempts at being altercast by projecting its self-conceived role and by casting back the U.S. In response to U.S. efforts to portray China as an ambivalent power, Chinese key figures conspicuously underline that the Chinese diplomatic position regarding Ukraine is not ambivalent, unjust, or partial. In contrast, the Chinese position is completely consistent with China's self-attributed roles, such as an anti-imperialist, responsible great power, since for the Chinese, the security of one country (Ukraine) shall not be preserved at the expense of the security of others (Russia). Therefore, the West should recognize the indivisibility of security, as a basic component of the Global Security Initiative, a security framework launched by General Secretary Xi at the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference in April 2022.[67] From this vantage point, a new conception of security that takes into account the legitimate rights and interests of both Western and non-Western states should replace the one that is dominated by the West.[68]

Similarly, China sees and reflects the U.S. as a hegemon that enforces Cold War thinking and forbids non-Western states from taking a more decisive role. Accordingly, the U.S. is insistently attempting to victimize non-Western powers, such as China and Russia, and prevent them from acquiring their rightful status in the world. For Wang Yi, for instance, the foreign minister of China, the "Cold War mentality" of operating in "exclusive small circles" jeopardizes international security.[69] Accordingly, both the U.S. mentality and the international order it leads need a fundamental shift in perspective. It is not a coincidence that China's Foreign Ministry, around the same time with its twelve-point peace plan regarding Ukraine, in February 2023, released another official document titled "U.S. hegemony and Its Perils." In the document, the Chinese stated that since the end of World War II, the U.S. "has acted more boldly to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, pursue, maintain and

abuse hegemony, advance subversion and infiltration, and willfully wage wars, bringing harm to the international community."[70] While the Chinese ministry elaborated in detail on the justifications of U.S. political, military, economic, technological, and cultural hegemony, it also expressed the reasons why China should react against the "unilateral, egoistic and regressive hegemonic practices" of the U.S.

China's disapproval of the U.S.-led international order helps to explain China's lukewarm attitude regarding sanctions against Russia.

China's disapproval of the U.S.-led international order helps to explain China's lukewarm attitude regarding sanctions against Russia. The sanctions problem is a key focus of China's attempts to cast back the U.S. The argument that China is not a party to the conflict in Ukraine is commonly used to support China's determination to maintain normal trade relations with Russia. According to the Chinese, the U.S. employs sanctions against Russia as a means of gaining more power and preserving its unjust global system. Chinese Defense Minister at the time, Wei Fenghe stated that sanctions are not effective ways to solve problems. In contrast, sanctions may even exacerbate tensions.[71] Similarly, the U.S. Department of Commerce's decision in June 2022 to sanction five Chinese companies for their support for Russia's military according to Zhao Lijian, China's foreign ministry spokesperson, is "another example of U.S. unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction."[72] Lijian depicted China as an anti-imperialist force seeking to protect the legitimate rights and interests of its corporations against the U.S., which acts as a hegemon reshaping the globe unilaterally.

China's efforts to resist the U.S. altercasting by generating its own national role conception and its efforts to cast back the U.S. have crystallized more clearly with China's recent interest in mediating between Russia and Ukraine. When Chinese leader Xi contacted Zelensky, his Ukrainian counterpart, for the first time in April 2023 and later declared he would designate an envoy to work on a future peace for Ukraine, China presented itself as a prospective mediator and peace-broker.[73] Evidently, there are reasons behind the Chinese decision to construct a "peace-broker" role for itself.

It is not surprising to see that the continuation of the war in Ukraine appears to bear costs to China in three fields. The first field includes strategic costs as

rather than eroding the U.S.-led alliance system, the conflict in Ukraine has strengthened ties between the democracies of the U.S., Europe, and Asia. This global unity of liberal democracies is nothing more than a handicap for the Chinese leadership, which has long spoken of a post-Western order.[74] The second field includes economic costs. Evidently, the European perception of China is harmed by China's "no-limit friendship" with Russia. Since February 2022, Chinese commerce with Russia has been flourishing, while China's economic ties with the EU are in jeopardy. Given that the EU is China's largest export market, in the event of a protracted conflict, China will be forced to choose between its economic links to the West and those with Russia, and to determine which is more lucrative than the other. As a result, China's current propensity to satisfy Russian trade demands cannot be a viable tactic for China's long-term economic objectives.[75] It is also true that the conflict in Ukraine presents a problem for China's Belt and Road Initiative, a program to use land and sea networks to link Asia with Africa and Europe in order to improve regional integration, boost commerce, and promote economic growth. With the war it experiences, Ukraine, which is at the geographical center of this project aiming to revive the historical legacy of the Silk Road, makes it difficult for China to carry out its long-term objectives.[76]

The third field includes the costs that China has incurred in its national role conceptions since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. While China has emphasized repeatedly it takes no sides in the Russia-Ukraine "crisis", its relations with Russia call into question China's claim to be neutral and contribute to U.S. efforts to altercast China as an irresponsible great power in violation of international order. In short, China is well aware that although today, it is powerful enough to resist attempts at being altercast by the U.S., in the long term, a prolonged war serves to justify the roles attributed to it by the U.S. Under these circumstances, the best way for China to consolidate its self-perceived position and justify its self-attributed roles as an anti-imperialist and responsible great power is to mediate meticulously between Russia and Ukraine

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to end the war. Also, a probable mediation helps China to cast back the U.S. by transmitting the message to the world public that it is China, not the U.S., which has a bigger leverage in global diplomacy as a responsible great power.[77] In that regard, mediation is a must for China not only in dealing with the strategic and economic costs emanating from the war, but also in order to contain the costs regarding China's roles. Rather than being an option, mediation appears to be incumbent for China to justify its national role conceptions, resist attempts at being altercast by the U.S., and to cast back the U.S. in this war of roles.

What's more intriguing is that the U.S. has not protested China's desire to mediate in Ukraine. This is not because the U.S. fully supports the Chinese diplomacy, but because any U.S. opposition to the Chinese mediation would be a blow to the U.S. self-attributed role as a responsible great power. To put it another way, despite its worries about China, the U.S. does not want to come across as being "anti-peace."[78] However, by speculating on how a pro-Russian power could mediate a reasonable settlement in Ukraine, the U.S. administration has made clear its reservations over a potential Chinese mediation. Yet, even by raising this query, the U.S. projects an ambivalent great power role on China.

Conclusion

As of the time of writing, China's mediation proposal has not resulted in any tangible progress. However, it appears that only China has the power to pressure Russia to halt the invasion.[79] China's exports to Russia increased by 67.2% in the first half of 2023,[80] despite the U.S. continuing to spearhead sanctions against the latter. Whether China will be keen to mediate between Russia and Ukraine remains to be seen. This article, however, underlines that mediation between Russia and Ukraine appears to be a necessary strategy for China rather than an option.

The main argument presented in this article is that both the U.S. and Chinese positions regarding the war in Ukraine should be viewed through the lens of their global strategic competition. The U.S. and Chinese national role conceptions, either self-conceived or self-attributed roles, and their mutual altercasting efforts are critical for shedding light on their behaviors in the Russia-Ukraine war. Contributing a new perspective to the literature, this article has used conceptualizations such as national role conceptions and altercasting borrowed from role theory to scrutinize both great powers' approaches to the war in Ukraine. The study argues that the war in Ukraine is a war of roles between the

U.S. and China, and that the future of Ukraine remains a secondary issue for both.

The article also supports the arguments put forth by Thies and Shortgen, who have contributed to role theory with their studies on altercasting and "role taking, bargaining, and making." China, which was subject to the U.S. altercasting efforts since the end of the 19th century, is now strong enough to resist attempts at being altercast. While China has abandoned "role taking" and "role bargaining" processes, it has been "role making," particularly since the early 2010s, due to the fundamental change in the distribution of world power. Today, China is not only constructing and projecting its self-attributed roles to the world, but it is also casting back the U.S. The war in Ukraine demonstrates that both the U.S. and China, with the positions they adopt, are empowering their national role conceptions while altercasting each other. Whose altercasting will prevail over the other remains to be seen over time.

Given the ever-increasing rivalry between Washington and Beijing, this article is a moderate attempt to understand both great powers' positions in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Assessing a process that is already in motion is extremely difficult. We anticipate that this study will serve as a guide for further investigation into the U.S. and Chinese perspectives on the war in Ukraine.

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ARTICLE

NAVIGATING THE COMPLEXITIES OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION BY THE EUROPEAN UNION: LESSONS FROM BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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Abstract

This article analyzes the European Union's (EU) adoption of a liberal intervention approach within post-conflict regions, with a particular emphasis on the Western Balkans, notably Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The EU's democracy promotion initiatives in BiH center around priorities such as good governance, bolstering civil society, and safeguarding human rights. However, the efficacy of promoting civil society in nascent political systems raises a crucial question: to what extent does promoting civil society in the context of undeveloped political systems hinder rather than facilitate the consolidation of democracy? Despite the EU's efforts, influenced by Europeanization and the liberal democratic model emphasizing civil society, BiH faces inherent challenges at the national level. First, this study examines the dual role of the EU in BiH as a "peace governor" and a "democracy promoter," scrutinizing the intricacies of the EU civil society promotion mechanisms. Then, it analyzes the challenges and repercussions of civil society promotion on democracy consolidation in BiH. The article also addresses BiH's political and financial dependency on the EU, underlining the implications of Europeanization. It concludes with recommendations emphasizing a balanced integration of top-down and bottom-up approaches alongside BiH's self-sufficiency as an essential factor in its democratic progression.

Keywords

Bosnia and Herzegovina, civil society organizations, democracy promotion, self-sufficiency, European Union, Western Balkans.

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Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has intervened and been involved in post-conflict zones via various mechanisms. Major donors within the international community, such as international organizations, international financial organizations, and the European Union (EU), are principal actors. They tend to focus on governance mechanisms based on a comprehensive understanding of development. After the end of the Cold War, the development concept underwent a significant transformation. On a broader scope, development refers to reconstructing post-conflict zones through political, economic, and social frameworks. These frameworks include capacity-building programs, development projects, good governance, democracy promotion programs, and financial initiatives aligned with the neoliberal free market system and are consistent with the liberal peace understanding.[1] One of the main motivations of liberal peace is to pave the way for the liberal internationalization of post-conflict countries. Main motivations are characterized as: (1) ensuring democracy, (2) implementing economic reforms based on the international market, and (3) structuring new institutions and organizations parallel to the understanding of the "modern state."[2] Within this framework, Dillon and Reid emphasized that in the liberal internationalization project, in addition to developing the interstate system, the transformation of sovereign state forms through discourses such as, among others, civil society, civil rights, and judicial power, is effective.[3] In this respect, the EU has been one of the significant actors in the Western Balkans since the Dayton Agreement in 2005; for the last two decades, the EU has been involved in the region in various roles.

In some countries, notably Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the EU has acted as an "international protector" without excluding the use of its conditionality mechanism.[4] Like other prominent international donors, the EU adopts the liberal pattern of intervention in post-conflict zones, particularly in the Western Balkans. The core focus of this article is the EU's democracy promotion programs in BiH, which have a particular reference to fostering civil society. The EU's priorities are good governance, civil society, and ensuring human rights in its democracy promotion programs. This study's main research question is, "To what extent does promoting civil society in the context of undeveloped political systems hinder rather than facilitate the consolidation of democracy?" After the EU's attempts, which are shaped by Europeanization and the European liberal democracy model, including good governance and assured free elections, it is not necessarily feasible to expect a significant and fast change in democracy

level in BiH. Instead, it could actually hamper the process. Due to features that are not yet performing at the national level, Bosnia and Herzegovina strives to adopt "liberal democracy" despite its political and financial dependencies on the EU. For this reason, I contend that, notwithstanding the EU democracy promotion programs, the focus should be on bottom-up approaches rather than on the typically top-down approaches of the international context. In support of my argument, the first section addresses the dual and complicated role of the EU in BiH as a "peace governor" and "democracy promoter." The second part discusses the EU's civil society promotion mechanisms in BiH in detail. The following section focuses on civil society promotion in the consolidation of democracy by the EU in BiH in regard to its challenges and consequences in BiH. The last section addresses the future implications of the EU's civil society promotion in BiH with respect to an increase in political dependency, explicitly focusing on the impact of Europeanization and an increase in financial dependency. In the final part, specific recommendations about a balanced integration of top-down and bottom-up approaches and the BiH's self-sufficiency are presented.

The EU as a "Peace Governor" and "Democracy Promoter" in BiH

After the end of the Cold War, one of the most remarkable events of the 20th century was the dissolution of Yugoslavia. As this straitjacket of the 20th century gave way, it fundamentally reshaped the Western Balkans. Putting aside the emergence of new republics, the problems that came to the surface have to this day not been fully resolved. State-building is problematic as transforming and making comprehensive reforms regarding political regimes and structures is challenging. Aside from ethnic clashes within the societies, one of the most apparent problems has been the political characteristics of these countries favoring elitist approaches. The communist-led governments brought about more severe problems regarding democracy, governance, and civil society building. Good governance strategies, which involved civil society in a democratic environment, were obstructed by the political traditions of authoritarian, communist-led governments.

It is also worth noting that the 20th century could be considered the third wave of democratization across certain regions of the world including the Western Balkans. Thus, from the 1990s onwards, Europe's post-communist regimes had commenced dealing with democratization.[5] Throughout the third wave of democratization, so-called post-communist young democracies of the region

were labelled "defective democracies since they lacked a holistic approach… [and] [a]s such, they have sought systemic equilibrium."[6] Systemic equilibrium, though, has been mainly hampered by the circuitous nature of the political structure, which undermines civil society.

In 2000, the EU started the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) in Bosnia and Herzegovina which can be designated as the inception of the close engagement of the EU with the country. The European Council, meeting in Thessaloniki in June 2003, officially supported the aim of integrating the Balkan region into mainstream Euro-Atlantic organizations. This marked a significant change in the EU's approach to BiH, shifting from years of providing economic aid with limited conditions to recognizing that the future of the Balkans lies within the European Union.[7] Juncos recapitulates that "Europeanizing Bosnia" seemed more attractive than "Balkanizing Europe," which was also motivated by restoring the union's reputation after its failure to stop the war at the beginning of the 1990s.[8]

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This intense engagement of the EU with BiH is also related to the enlargement of the union's policies and principles. Through the democratization process aligned with the *acquis communautaire*, the EU has aimed to expand peace and security across the continent. In the words of Rehn, former European commissioner for enlargement, "Enlargement has proven to be one of the most important instruments for European security. It reflects the essence of the EU as a civilian power; by extending the area of peace and stability, democracy, and the rule of law, the EU has achieved far more through its gravitational pull than it could ever have done with a stick or a sword."[9] Enlargement is consistent with the Europeanization of the Western Balkans, which is transforming post-conflict countries in the region by expanding European identity. In other words, post-conflict state-building is understood as "the strengthening or the construction of legitimate governmental institutions in countries that are emerging from conflicts."[10] However, this also reflects the problematic aspects of the EU's international post-conflict practices: outside intervention is used to promote self-government, local ownership, and universal liberal values as a recipe for

local problems, which results in contradictions between short-term and long-term needs and past practices in post-conflict contexts.[11]

In BiH, the EU has a special representative (EUSR) responsible for tackling the post-conflict context by administering the Dayton Agreement's implementation that ended the war in the 1990s. These representatives differ from EU ambassadors, who have a special role in managing conflict-related problems. Johann Sattler is the current EU representative in BiH.[12] In addition, in 2004, nine years after the war ended, the EU launched military operation ALTHEA in BiH. The EU also deployed a robust military force (EUFOR), which is composed of twenty EU member countries and non-EU troop-contributing countries such as Türkiye and the United Kingdom. Besides the international actors' involvement, BiH's domestic political system is complex. The Dayton constitution established a highly decentralized state composed of two entities: the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska (RS). At the state level, there is a rotating three-member presidency of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serb delegates.[13] However, the Dayton Agreement was signed in Ohio as a primarily American initiative, besides the US, the EU also had an active role in ending the war in BiH. Slye argues that the agreement represents "the institutionalization of ethnicity in Bosnia."[14] After the completion of Dayton, in December 1995, the Madrid European Council committed to the EU's contribution to the civilian implementation of the agreement.[15]

As mentioned above, the EUSR plays a very central role in BiH in terms of imposing and supervising issues of high politics. This is how the EU channeled Bosnia and Herzegovina as a weak state.[16] Chandler argues that the EUSR mandate includes the power to impose legislation directly and dismiss various elected government and public officials.[17] Furthermore, this representative system is externally designed and applied in a top-down, regulatory trend, led by high representatives who "set and imposed the political agenda and punished those local actors who did not implement it."[18] Unfortunately, this EU governance model discourages and voids the self-governance mechanisms of the Bosnian people. The intense EU engagement with BiH in the 2000s can also be

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interpreted as characteristic of the important role played by the EU, which was marginalized during the Dayton negotiation, in the international policy response to BiH's swingback from the U.S to the Europe. The EU's attempt to "Europeanize Bosnia" is also related to BiH's location, which is in Europe, but outside the EU. The EU, therefore, assumes that it is responsible for expanding its regional footprint and securing the continent to prevent any upcoming violence. In the mid-2000s, the EU and other international actors started to promote the reforms of the Dayton agreements to increase the efficiency and functionality of the Bosnian state and make it possible to meet the requirements of the acquis *communautaire* as part of the state-building process. In February 2016, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted its application for EU membership. After the Commission issued its opinion on the application in May 2019, the European Council reviewed the recommendation made by the Commission in October 2022. Subsequently, it granted Bosnia and Herzegovina candidate status in December 2022.

As discussed earlier, the EU has started to promote capable state administration, democracy promotion, and good governance in BiH, mainly through the SAP, which was launched in 2000. Regarding financial support, public administration reform and institution building have been priority areas of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), which was first launched in 2007. The EU pre-accession funds are a significant investment into the future of both the enlargement region and the EU. These funds support beneficiaries in implementing the necessary political and economic reforms, preparing them for the rights and obligations of the EU membership.[19] The first IPA, between 2007 and 2013, focused on transition assistance and institution building. The second IPA, between 2014 and 2020, concentrated on Country Action Programmes, and the last IPA, allocated for 2021-2027, focuses on Cross-Border Cooperation Programmes.[20]

Table 1: IPA Budget Allocation

IPA I Budget (2007-2013)	€11,5 billion
IPA II Budget (2014-2020)	€12,8 billion
IPA III Budget (2021-2027)	€14,162 billion

Source: European Commission[21]

As demonstrated in Table 1, the total IPA budget has gradually increased, reaching €14 billion for IPA III (2021-2027). The current beneficiaries of this assistance are Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Türkiye.

Table 2: BiH 2014-2020: Instrument for Pre-accession (IPA) Commitments (Million Euros)



Source: European Commission[22]

According to Table 2, the IPA II funding allocations in the period 2014-2020 amount to €552.1 million, including funds for the Civil Society Facility (€ 9.1 million).[23] In this respect, the funds for civil society funds are allocated under "Democracy and the Rule of Law," which is a priory sector aiming to strengthen democratic institutions and reform the civil service. Whereas the total amount of funds for "Democracy and the Rule of Law" for 2014-2017 was €116 million, the fund's total amount for 2014-2020 is €223 million.[24] This pillar represents the second-highest fund of IPA commitments after "Competitiveness and Growth," which includes sectors such as environment, energy, transport, education, and social policies,[25] and exemplifies the EU's strong emphasis on supporting civil society, which is regarded as a potent tool for fostering democracy.

However, the problem is that the blurred lines between member state building and peacebuilding have left BiH in a complex position, and, at the same time, increased the debate about the EU's exercising conditionality after the 2003 Thessaloniki EU-Western Balkan Summit that "(t)he future of the Balkans is within the European Union."[26] The integration of the Western Balkans

The integration of the Western Balkans into the EU is now presented as part of a strategy of strengthening the union itself.

into the EU is now presented as part of a strategy of strengthening the union itself.[27] Since the 2000s, the EU has indeed used its foreign policy in the region regarding membership conditionality to promote reform. The EU enlargement and Europeanization policies are said to have extended peace and security to other areas of the continent through the democratization process fostered by adopting the acquis *communautaire*. Hence, the EU cannot escape the politics of state building because enlargement is an inherently political process that contains technical reforms and specific models of political, economic, and social re-organization.[28] Therefore, it is worth noting that Europeanization can be defined as a massive commitment to the values of the EU to reconstruct political and socio-economic frameworks. Generally, the EU has used "the membership carrot to further the process of central state-building to create an affordable and sustainable state capable of coping with the membership obligations."[29] Consequently, the EU's position has become much more ambiguous as in the meantime it aims to act as a "peace governor" and "democracy promoter." To sum up, the EU has been perceived as a "normative empire"[30] which is eager to impose its norms on other countries in the name of peacebuilding and democracy promotion.

The EU's Civil Society Promotion Mechanisms in BiH

This section addresses specific mechanisms of civil society promotion by the EU which has a particular focus and attention on building effective civil society in its peacebuilding and enlargement policies. Civil rights have been mentioned in all EU progress reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2005.[31] The EU has funded civil rights projects through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and IPA. From 2005 onwards, civil society has become one of the key EU topics and it is closely tracked in its progress reports.[32] The international community, including the EU, has aimed to promote democracy and good governance aligned with social groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The following sections will address the details of the EU's civil society organizations (CSO)-led approach. However, there are vital problems which should be addressed here. First, although civil society is a primary focus, the budget for BiH under EIDHR and IPA was limited.[33] For example, civil society and media funding was around €1 million in 2003, whereas BiH received €20 million annually between 2001 and 2003.[34] This example demonstrates that civil society was not a priority area for the EU's democracy promotion agenda. However, this changed after 2006, when the first IPA was announced and planned for 2007-2010. Second, the EU's initiatives in peacebuilding, state building, and democracy promotion are criticized as being

one-size-fits-all programs[35] that mostly rely on the technocratic mechanisms of regulation.[36] These problems demonstrate the inefficiencies of the European intervention and the limitations regarding bottom-up and localized practices.

Starting from the first IPA, the EU has concentrated on increasing the capacity of civil society, supporting CSOs and NGOs, and strengthening local democracy. Between 2011 and 2013, BiH received €8.5 million under this scheme.[37] Furthermore, the EIDHR, which is "the concrete expression of the EU commitment to support and promote democracy and human rights," was updated in 2014.[38] The difference between the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 EIDHR is addressing new realities, and increasing the support of the EU for the development of thriving civil societies and their specific role as key actors for positive change in support of human rights and democracy.[39] The EIDHR's budget is €1,332,752,000 for 2014-2020 and is mainly channeled through civil society organizations whose projects are selected following calls for proposals (Delegations or Headquarters).[40] It is also important to note that the EIDHR complements the other EU external assistance instruments. However, according to Chandler, the EU is acting imperially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which also echoes "normative empire" arguments. Chandler states,

> The European Union has denied its power in the very processes of exercising it, through presenting its diktat in the language of 'partnership' and country 'ownership', internationalizing the mechanisms of its domination through engaging a multitude of external states and international organizations, internationalizing or Europeanizing the candidate state's core institutions of governance and through engaging with and attempting to create a policy-advocating 'civil society'.[41]

This statement shows the top-down style of Europeanization through reforming core local institutions. In fact, the power of conditionality stems directly from the asymmetrical interdependence between the EU and the candidate countries, particularly in economic terms.[42] Regarding the EIDHR, Belloni puts forth another problem, namely that the EU's state-building approach "reflects the same approach to regional development grounded on an external initiative that characterized international intervention for the best part of the last decade."[43] This approach makes Bosnia "the recipient of strategies developed elsewhere."[44] Put differently, the EU's approach to state building encounters a familiar contradiction in many international initiatives, stemming from the challenge of facilitating reforms and fostering self-governance externally.

The EIDHR is the EU's new civil society instrument, which aims to encourage a bottom-up democracy perspective. Although there are very significant critiques of the EU's approaches, as discussed above, this instrument is adapted to consolidate and support democracy through a powerful civil society, including fostering CSOs or NGOs that are non-profit and voluntary citizens' groups organized on a local, national, or international level. According to the European Commission,

> Work with, for and through civil society organizations will give the response strategy [of the EIDHR] its critical profile. It will, on the one hand, promote the kind of open society, which civil society requires in order to thrive, and on the other hand, will support civil society in becoming an effective force for dialogue and reform relying on the role of men, women and children as individuals with the power, capacity and will to create development.[45]

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According to this statement, as Kurki argues, "civil society becomes a sphere for co-opting and shaping of the right kind of rational conduct."[46] The EIDHR serves as a significant instrument that intersects with and enhances other external assistance mechanisms, yet it also stands apart from these aid endeavors. Operating within its own budgetary framework, it pursues its internal objectives autonomously. The EIDHR has five primary objectives: (i) enhancing respect for human rights in countries where they are most at risk; (ii) strengthening civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reform; (iii) supporting actions on human rights and democracy in areas covered by EU guidelines; (iv) supporting international and regional frameworks for protection of human rights and the rule of law; and (v) assisting and organizing electoral observer missions.[47] The EIDHR II (2007-2013) was reformed with a heavier emphasis being placed on strong civil society. The most striking part of the reforms was the heavier emphasis on strong civil society. The EIDHR's primary operating system is still the call for proposals, although some non-calls-for-proposal-based projects have also been allowed in the EIDHR II.[48] This instrument is a grant-based system with grants given primarily for specific project work by civil society organizations.[49] The CSO-led approaches of the EU democracy promotion programs, particularly the EIDHR, are based on this working

mechanism. Since 2015, the EIDHR has supported diverse civil society and human rights organizations in BiH that focus on different areas such as basic education rights for all children, education on gender-based violence, rural women, and inclusion of Roma youth.[50] The beneficiaries of these projects, which last from 18 to 30 months, are civil society organizations based in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is important to note that the EIDHR and these beneficiaries work as co-financers of the projects.[51]

Besides state building and creating a democratic state, one of the main objectives of the EIDHR is to promote reforms "from below". As such, the focus is on societal issues, and the target beneficiaries are civil society organizations. However, contrary to expectations, this EU approach can turn into a top-down political instrument that coerces populations and the state as well. First, civil society is defined as an entity that "defends fundamental freedoms which form the basis of all democratic processes." This means that the EU mainly selects CSOs to be part of the democratization process. In other words, in order to be selected as EU partners, CSOs must focus/propagate fundamental EU freedoms that will Europeanize BiH. These specific CSOs are expected to follow similar norms and principles with those adopted by the EU; however, this might risk local ownership of societal change in favor of change trickling down from/via the EU.

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Second, the EIDHR sees CSOs as an "autonomous" and "effective" change-inducing set of actors,[52] and therefore, CSOs have the intentionality and self-belief to see themselves as crucial democratizing actors. This vast role attributed to CSOs can challenge the political balance of BiH based on a fragile, already-existing rotating three-member presidency of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serb delegates. Hence, this EU democratization process can lead to a political clash between the political elites and the CSOs favoring EU norms and values, ending up in rising political dependency on the EU.

Third, the top-down EIDHR mechanism amplifies the role of CSOs as "service providers" in a typical liberal democratic state. Nevertheless, Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be perceived as a completely democratic state where

the government plays a diminished role, but rather as a setting where CSOs operate as "service providers," bridging the void left by the state. In addition to the critique leveled thus far at the EIDHR, analytical discussions will be addressed and expanded in detail in the later sections of the article.

The Promotion of Civil Society in the Consolidation of Democracy by the EU in BiH and Its Consequences

In addition to the discussions addressed above, this section provides a detailed analytical framework of arguments regarding civil society facilitation, its challenges, and its consequences in BiH. The fostering of civil society faces multiple challenges, namely that of little trust amongst the community and ethnic clashes, and, as a result, encouraging participation in political decision-making, which is an essential component of democratic consolidation, is likely to be hindered. Civil society is perceived as giving citizens incentives to participate widely and to encourage the public scrutiny of the states.[53]

In order to stabilize systemic equilibrium in the post-communist countries of the Western Balkans, civil society should be supported. The EU has attempted to promote civil society to bolster democratization; a weak civil society could severely influence democratic consolidation, as one of major risks for liberal democratic states. This, in turn, could lead to more corruption, ineffective legal systems, and socio-economic tensions, which are considered to be potential risks that characterize weak democracies.[54] In order to support this point, Diamond et al. argue that discrepancies in terms of ethnicity which are associated with socio-economic tensions are considered higher risks for the consolidation of democracy.[55] For this reason, as discussed earlier, the EU's primary goal has been to promote civil society to consolidate democracy in defective democracies and create liberal democratic systems in the Western Balkans through IPA contributions and the EIDHR. It should be borne in mind that civil society is the arena between the public sphere and the state that fills the vacuums left by authoritarian regimes and which should be far from the manipulations of elitist approaches. The ideal democracy should be the compound of bottom-up and top-down approaches. However, as evidenced by the top-down approaches of the EU, the latter has worked only to make recipients more dependent on it in a more asymmetrical political structure.

First, the EU has adopted a trickle-down effect in its promotion of civil society in the region. The EU's primary goal through the democratization of BiH has been to expand Europeanization by increasing transnational actions to make

the Balkans a part of the EU.[56] The EU started the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) in 1999 and an important part of this process was the integration of the Balkans by enhancing the influence of civil society.[57] In order to create a people-centered transformation process in BiH, the EU applied methods that relied on trickle-down effects such as top-down policy programs.[58] Improving the EU's transnational actions was supposed to facilitate a democratic system successfully; however, as mentioned earlier, rather than consolidating, it has undermined the local context and bottom-up approaches. One of the salient aspects of democratization programs illustrated by Dimitrova and Pridham is that these top-down approaches can neglect some of the domestic context's crucial details.[59] Dimitrova and Pridham explain this aspect as follows:

> For democracy promotion is often an asymmetrical exercise requiring 'donors' to export their experience, skills, and merchandise to 'recipients'; whereas, increasingly, there is a school of thought in the democracy-promotion literature that argues for local participation and bottom-up practices to complement traditional top-down procedures.[60]

The authors argue that they should be complemented by domestic bottom-up initiatives, which are also the primary sources of civil society. To ensure local participation and achieve an ideal democracy, these two approaches should be compounded. The EU Commission demands the implementation of a "one-size-fits-all" method to enhance reform in the Western Balkans.[61] However, the EU's top-down method neglects each country's intrinsic agendas and is not a feasible way to facilitate democracy promotion in the Balkans. As a result, despite the EU initiatives, BiH's asymmetrical conjuncture of rising elitist approaches and bipolar attitudes might innately continue to increase, potentially hindering the democratic transition process.

This brings us to another crucial aspect of these EU initiatives: the elitist approach to politics has become more dominant. The top-down mechanisms of democracy promotion rely highly on national governments as watchdogs of the internal process and national governments' will and their institutions as well.[62] It should be noted that the political atmosphere in BiH is fragile and not fully democratic. Therefore, the elitist components could easily manipulate the watchdog missions sent to observe national governments. The problems regarding elitist approaches and their dominance over the rest of society might pose a risk for democratization and lead to political imbalance. Unfortunately, the political and social atmosphere in Bosnia and Herzegovina has allowed

for external intervention by local elites in favor of their interests in the local political context. One of the underlying reasons is that the architecture of political regimes in the Balkans was mainly fostered by communist and autocratic regimes. For this reason, the transformation of BiH is unlikely to rely solely on the EU initiatives, which favor civil society, since these initiatives have tended to bring more advantages to elitist politicians. Therefore, to make the transformation process more effective, the elitist attitude of national governments should be eliminated rather than reinforced, and societal rights must be promoted, such as the demand for equal rights within the community engaging with civil society.

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Secondly, the EU mainly focuses on the CSO-led approach, which is expected to improve civil society's engagement and attain ideal democracy; however, there are deficiencies in these initiatives as well. To begin with the importance of the CSO-led approach, CSOs and NGOs are important for bolstering civil society through a democratic approach and their participation. Since the communist regime collapsed in BiH, CSOs and NGOs have been considered the only international agencies that could channel aid to the region,[63] and were subsequently burdened with much of this responsibility. One of the fundamental concerns of these organizations has been to increase the capacity of civil society engagement in BiH, which is an essential component of democratization and democracy promotion, and, in this manner, to generate citizen empowerment.[64] This has been one of the vital parts of the reconstruction of the whole region after the end of the Cold War. Yet, in contrast to the expectations associated with the CSO-led approach, in the process of implementation of a new liberal democracy, citizens could not fully engage with the new democracies since they would need more channels to engage with it.[65] The focal point of these organizations is that they were supposed to improve their skills to respond to citizens and their needs by channeling them to various agencies. Instead, they mainly focused on competence among other international agencies, including the EU, in the international arena, which highly obstructed the democratization of BiH.[66]

In addition to the problems and deficiencies that stem from rivalry amongst CSOs and other international agencies, CSOs have decided to involve themselves in decision-making procedures and political initiatives.[67] In other words, the involvement of these organizations in the internal context was not only about promoting civil society but also about being one of the significant voices throughout the political procedures. However, this engendered more serious outcomes. To explain further, we can use the metaphor of a newborn child for BiH's civil and political structure: if the newborn is raised in a foreign culture, the child will grow up dissimilar to their biological parents. The vital point here is that these outside actors, who are not sufficiently familiar with the societal and political values of the local context, could likely fail regarding the promotion of democracy, which must be unique to each country and its traditional values and norms. Thus, one could argue that CSOs have insufficient local background and knowledge to bring liberal democracy to the people of BiH. In other words, the approaches of CSOs are limited to actions of Europeanization connected to EU enlargement policies shaped by ideas of "fundamental freedoms." As discussed above, such initiatives could create a more asymmetrical political context by undermining civil society participation during the policy-making procedures.

The other point worth mentioning is related to a lack of sufficient infrastructure and the poor coordination of CSOs and NGOs, which are likely to bring about more ambiguities in BiH regarding democracy promotion. CSOs, which are the EU's main instruments, have been deemed to alleviate the formality of international actors' top-down approaches through their involvement in the local political context.[68] However, know-how strategies could not be observed or improved during this assistance. Such strategies need to be in place in the early stage of democracy consolidation in order to increase and implement highly efficient methods for an understanding of the ideal, permanent liberal democracy according the EU standards. Yet, defective methods and initiatives have hampered Bosnia and Herzegovina's democratization process.

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Bottom-up approaches are also important in this process. In other words, civil society should be essential in engaging the community and society. Furthermore,

grassroots-level initiatives might pave the way for self-expression values, which are a crucial part of a democratic order. Self-expression values could be the voice of Balkan citizens and are not merely crucial in providing benefits for the prospects of elite-challenging actions such as those undertaken by CSOs. Self-expression values play crucial roles in civic outcomes that strengthen democratic institutions.[69] However, the multiplicity of various CSOs, NGOs, and external actors have made Bosnians focus exclusively on these agents,[70] and as Bosnians had difficulties how to engage with these international donors in contrast to the citizens of liberal democratic states, unfortunately, this rendered the external actors' approaches meaningless. Hence, civil society has become an autonomous service provider to fill the state's gap. Ultimately, in order to engage a CSO-led approach to civil society development more efficiently, an institutional framework, local values and/or norms, and local political structures should be considered as significant elements.

Future Implications of the Promotion of Civil Society by the EU in BiH

1. Increase in Political Dependency

> [T]he heavy influence of the international community, the fragmented constitutional structure, and persistence of parallel and clientalistic institutions that perpetuate insecurity and patronage contribute to hindering the advocacy role of civil society and retard the transition to substantive democratization.[71]

As discussed above, it is very likely that the BiH democratization process is at risk of resulting in a highly fragmented structure created by interference from international actors, especially the EU, which favors clientalistic relations and a patronage system. In my opinion, this might bring about an increase in political dependency. Although BiH and many other countries are already under the significant influence of the EU regarding enlargement and Europeanization policies, this rising influence, which causes higher dependency, could hamper civil society and the democratization process. Another detrimental impact of the EU democracy promotion programs stems from the bureaucratic characteristics of the CSO-led approach, which the EU encourages.[72] This suggests that the administrative requirements of organizations are highly dependent on the bureaucracy and local political structures, which are not always accessible. At the same time, their influence can spread only if they favor the local bureaucracy. In addition, non-state actors are encouraged by the EU to participate in policy-making procedures to stimulate citizenship participation. Their involvement

in these procedures works to bolster the local actors' elitist approaches. The problem that arises from the EU's attitude is that the autonomy and self-determination of Balkan states, including BiH, in terms of controlling their policy-making procedures is highly overshadowed by the EU's political efforts in the Balkan region.[73] The reason is that the EU has accredited itself as a policy leader, peace governor, and democracy promoter. A salient point here is that the EU has emerged as a policy actor in fields of "hard power" rather than "soft power", such as the promotion and enhancement of civil society,[74] and has engaged in a revision of its neighborhood policy, putting at the forefront notions such as deep democracy and sustainable stability.[75]

In a nutshell, these EU approaches make Western Balkan countries more politically dependent on the EU, and local actors and NGOs have gained the impression that they are entirely dependent on the international community without questioning this dependency or the possibility of sanctions.[76] To illustrate this point further, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) served as the EU Special Representative to BiH. The OHR has been accredited by the EU with creating laws and contributing to the legislation process, which can define civil society's advocacy roles. The fundamental problem of the OHR, as an example of international intervention within a legal framework, is that it stimulated more attention from the international community; in other words, political dependence has unfortunately increased and the OHR could not remedy BiH's democratic deficit. Furthermore, this exacerbated the democratization process aimed at promoting civil society.[77]

Thus, I sustain that these complex EU tasks and initiatives have brought about more deadlocks within the political context of Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of policy making and citizen participation. In other words, these deadlocks have hampered citizens' engagement in political processes.[78] Consequently, it is ironic that despite the "considerable efforts of the EU, the position of the non-governmental sector in Bosnia remains very weak even now."[79]

According to the EU's enlargement policies, BiH must fulfil and follow Europeanized norms and values to achieve a democratic transition. According to the EU Action Document "EU Civil Society Facility and Media Programme for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2021-2023" by the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, "Enhancing the Accession Process - A Credible EU Perspective for the Western Balkans" spells out that "a core objective of the European Union's engagement with the Western Balkans is to prepare them to

meet all the membership requirements. This includes supporting fundamental democratic, the rule of law, and economic reforms and alignment with core European values. This will, in turn, foster solid and accelerated economic growth and social convergence."[80]

Civil society, and fostering democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are seen as fundamental elements of Europeanization. In other words, the EU appears as a "normative empire" regarding its enlargement policies in the Western Balkans, having the responsibility to "prepare" and "make them" ready to be part of the European world. As mentioned earlier, civil society development has been seen as an essential component of this process. However, with respect to the EU democracy promotion programs in BiH, what we perceive is, in fact, the imposition of Europeanization. This is to say, whenever the EU attempts to diffuse democratic norms within the various parts of Europe, this turns into an imposition rather than diffusion.[81] The example of BiH shows that if the country can follow the ideal democratic structure imposed by the EU and completes its candidacy procedure, it will continue to be more dependent on norms and values which are defined in the context of Europeanization. Yet, this might neglect the inherent natures of countries in terms of political and social contexts. In this respect, the underlying narrative is often based on Europe's own history in which intergovernmental institutions are vital actors of cooperation.[82] Through this "domestic analogy,"[83] the EU seeks to reconstruct an international environment based on it's the premise of its own self-perception.[84] In other words, through democracy promotion and civil society facility funds, the EU aims to implement its governance agenda. To achieve this, as discussed earlier, top-down approaches aligned with conditionality are employed.[85] Here, the EU designates the conditions to be fulfilled for a third country to receive predetermined material or symbolic benefits from the EU.[86]

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Moreover, the efforts of the EU could pave the way for more participation of elitist approaches in the political contexts, which could hinder the development of civil society. The goals set for Europeanization could cause a fundamental backlash towards the promotional initiatives for democratization in BiH by the EU, and, in fact, demonstrate an ignorance towards the inherent nature and

culture of post-communist regimes. Whitlock points out that due to a lack of political progress, Bosnia and Herzegovina has suffered from a "dependency syndrome" that dates to the period of the Ottoman Empire.[87] In the current context, the dependency of the Ottoman period has been replaced by the significant impact of Europeanization, which has greatly dominated the political agenda of BiH. Hence, from my standpoint, the increasing political dependency on BiH caused by Europeanization could engender an even more circuitous atmosphere than that of the Cold War.

2. Increase in Financial Dependency

The second point relates to the increasing financial dependency of BiH on EU funding for the promotion of civil society. Civil society should be considered a cross-cutting issue, not a separate sector. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU is promoting the involvement of CSOs in consultations regarding the programing of EU funds (namely IPA I, IPA II, and EIDHR) and the preparation of the EU annual enlargement report.[88] The EU integration process will be a significant challenge for Bosnia and Herzegovina with a particular role for CSOs.[89] How this will threaten the facilitation of democracy depends on the increase in self-sufficiency, which could be a catalyst for democratic transition in BiH. After the 1990s, the EU emerged as a single major donor that promoted funding for the reconstruction of BiH.[90] According to the EU Action Document, while project-level impacts are visible, the broader impact from Civil Society Facility (CSF) funding in Bosnia and Herzegovina is less strong.[91] The document also noted that donor involvement is shrinking, leaving the EU as the main donor since the 1990s. The EU's major financial assistance program in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is based on Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, and Europeanization (CARDS)[92] with BiH being the country that has received the most extensive funding from CARDS within the Balkan region. This funding has amounted to circa €295 million with 24% of it allocated to promoting civil society.[93] As mentioned above, this was replaced by Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). According to Table 2, the amount of funds for "Democracy and the Rule of Law" in 2014-2017 was €116 million, while the total amount of this fund for 2014-2020 was €223 million.[94] From 2007 onwards, funding for civil society development has increased under IPA, leading to BiH's increasing financial dependency on the EU.[95] In other words, contrary to expectations, the external funding will make BiH more dependent on the EU agenda and its granting of funds for civil society.

The future implications on BiH's political and financial dependencies can be summed up as follows: "In civil society and politics, as well as in the economic development of Bosnia, dependencies on the international actors have been created which limit the development of a democratic culture and render a transfer to complete self-rule more difficult."[96] Currently, one of the primary objectives should be to encourage local funding for civil society development to foster BiH's self-reliance, which could be considered a crucial part of becoming a democratic country. Otherwise, throughout the following years, the level of financial dependency of BiH on the EU will continue to increase sharply.

Conclusion

In light of the arguments above, this final section puts forth a set of relevant recommen dations. First, the main objective of donors should be to harmonize bottom-up and top-down approaches by considering the nature of BiH's local agenda. A horizontal system can be established in which there should be functional cooperation at diverse levels, including local actors and public, private, and EU actors. The transition should be considered a long and challenging process, and each step should be undertaken rigorously. Due to the high risk of manipulation by elitists under the CSO-led approach of the EU, bottom-up approaches, which could favor civil society rather than elitists, should be developed. Most Western Balkans countries, including BiH, have less favorable domestic conditions for effective international influence.[97] Therefore, the development and improvement of the institutional framework of BiH and Western Balkan countries should be considered a priority, as this is the foundation on which civil society can develop. This would lessen the risk inherent in the competitive CSO-led approach and reinforce the balancing of top-down and bottom-up approaches.

Currently, one of the primary objectives should be to encourage local funding for civil society development to foster BiH's self-reliance, which could be considered a crucial part of becoming a democratic country.

Secondly, it is crucial to minimize the risk of the EU intervention becoming a permanent feature in the political fabric of Western Balkan countries. Once stabilized, BiH should be encouraged to manage its own responsibilities regarding its affairs and problems.[98] Self-sufficiency is an inseparable part of a

well-functioning democracy. For this reason, BiH should gain more experience in terms of being self-sufficient rather than depending on the EU regarding financial and political issues.

This article has underscored the complex and often unintended consequences of democracy promotion programs in the context of transitioning political systems, particularly in CEE countries like BiH. While these programs aim to bolster civil society and promote democratic values, it has been suggested that they may inadvertently hinder the consolidation of democracy.

Furthermore, this article has also addressed the fact that the predominance of CSO-led initiatives within the EU's democratization framework risks perpetuating existing power imbalances and reinforcing entrenched elites, thereby undermining the prospects for genuine democratic participation. This can lead to an increase in the existing asymmetrical order.

Finally, this study has revealed that the emergence of heightened political and financial dependencies further complicates the transition to liberal European democracy, especially in the absence of substantial improvements to local institutional frameworks. It is significant to reassess the efficacy of current top-down approaches and prioritize integrating bottom-up strategies. By fostering grassroots initiatives and empowering local actors, we can better address the structural challenges impeding democratic consolidation in BiH and other similar contexts. This calls for a nuanced and inclusive approach that recognizes the diverse socio-political dynamics at play and actively involves all stakeholders in a horizontal network that can shape the future of democracy in the region.

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ARTICLE

THE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT CELAL BAYAR AND SOVIET AMBASSADOR NIKITA S. RYZHOV IN THE CONTEXT OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

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Abstract

During the Cold War, the international system was shaped by the rivalry between the U.S. and the USSR. Since the USSR constituted the primary threat to the security of Türkiye and the Western alliance it became a part of during this period, it is generally accepted that Türkiye as a member of NATO pursued a foreign policy entirely in line with Western interests. This study, however, argues otherwise by analyzing the official records that reveal the content of the high-level meetings held between Turkish President Celal Bayar and Nikita S. Ryzhov, who served as the Soviet ambassador to Ankara between 1957 and 1966. Based on these records, it is understood that a multilateral approach prevailed in Turkish foreign policy and Ankara sought to implement this approach during the most difficult years of the Cold War. In fact, during the Cold War period, Turkish-Soviet relations continued to improve in certain areas. To support this argument, the study extensively analyzes the documents obtained from the archives of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, which have never been published before and which were obtained with special permission for the purpose of this study.

Keywords

Celal Bayar, Nikita S. Ryzhov, Turkish foreign policy, Soviet Union (USSR), Cold War

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Introduction

Due to its strategic geographical location, Türkiye has historically been a country on which the great powers devise their plans for achieving geopolitical supremacy against one another. The most concrete example of this situation was the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire at the hands of the European great powers following World War I. For this reason, Türkiye took careful steps in order to stay out of World War II. As a newly established republic and as a country which had just come out of a major world war, Ankara chose to pursue a foreign policy that was based on neutrality in World War II. Thus, Türkiye declared war against the Axis Powers only towards the very end of the war due to its desire not to become excluded from the new international system which was being shaped by the Allied Powers at the time.

Yet, right after World War II, the U.S. and the USSR entered into a new conflict with each other which would be later known as the "Cold War." Although there were several crises around the world in this new period, there were no direct armed hostilities between the two superpowers. At the same time, however, other states in the international system started to gather under the leadership of either Washington or Moscow. This meant that the USSR and the U.S., which represented rivalling political ideologies, tried to attract as many states as possible to their own side. The U.S. succeeded in bringing together the Western European countries under its leadership and declared communism and the USSR as the key threats to Western security. Washington also started the policy of containment against the USSR and a Western military alliance led by the U.S. was established under the name of "North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)." The USSR, on the other hand, consolidated its influence over the Eastern European communist regimes and established its own military alliance that was called the "Warsaw Pact." In such a bipolar international system, Türkiye chose to position itself on the side of the West due to the threat perceptions caused by Soviet territorial demands from Ankara and sought to join the pro-Western international organizations like NATO. In addition to security concerns, which was undoubtedly Türkiye's main problem at the time, economic interests also played a role in Ankara's decision to align with the Western bloc after 1945.

The position of a state in the international system is quite crucial in determining that state's foreign policy choices, even though it is true that historical factors also play an important role in the foreign policymaking process. In the period

1950-1960, which is the focus of this study, Türkiye largely pursued a pro-Western foreign policy approach due to its alliance and collaboration with the Western bloc. Most of the studies that focus on this period in Turkish foreign policy emphasize that Türkiye gradually became a part of the Western alliance which culminated in its accession to NATO in 1952, and since then, has been determining its foreign policy priorities in line with the requirements of its alliance ties with the West.[1] However, there are also studies arguing that it is not sufficient to study Türkiye's foreign policy approach during this period exclusively in light of its relations with the West and that other actors, including the Soviet Union, should also be taken into consideration.[2]

Studies that deal with Turkish foreign policy in this period also focus on the diplomatic initiatives and activities led by prominent statesmen such as Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar.[3] In this study, the documents obtained from the archives of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye are used to reveal the basics of Turkish foreign policy and the development of Türkiye's relations with the USSR in the period 1950-1960. Especially by analyzing the records of the meetings held between President Celal Bayar and Soviet ambassador to Ankara Nikita S. Ryzhov, the study aims to reveal the dynamics of Turkish-Soviet bilateral relations. It should be emphasized that these documents have never been used in any study before and were obtained with special permission.

The article seeks to understand whether Türkiye pursued a fully integrated foreign policy with the West as many other studies on Turkish foreign policy claim. To this end, the article will first focus on the role of Celal Bayar in Turkish diplomacy and particularly the state duties he undertook during the establishment of the Republic of Türkiye as well as his diplomatic contacts during the period when he served as prime minister and president. Then, the foreign policy of Türkiye in this period will be generally evaluated in light of the Cold War dynamics. Finally, the relations between Türkiye and the USSR will be analyzed in line with the documents obtained from the presidential archives.

The article argues that the claims that Türkiye pursued a purely pro-Western foreign policy during the Cold War period provide an incomplete assessment as Türkiye actually acted in line with its national interests and in accordance with its traditional multilateral foreign policy approach. In fact, during this period, Türkiye prioritized its negotiations with the Soviet Union despite its alliance ties with the U.S., especially after it became clear that its economic expectations

from the West would not be met. These negotiations also show that Türkiye's threat perceptions about the USSR were visibly alleviated in time and Ankara later sought to cooperate with this country in specific areas.

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Celal Bayar and His Role in Turkish Diplomacy

Celal Bayar, who assumed very important roles during the foundation period of the Republic of Türkiye, served as prime minister in the 9th and 10th governments (1937-1939) and later as president (1950-1960). He also assumed critical duties especially in the field of economy during the establishment period of the Turkish state. For instance, he was one of the founders of Türkiye's first national bank, Türkiye İş Bankası, and for a while served as the bank's general manager.[4] In 1932, he was appointed as the minister of economy, and even prepared the "Report on the East (Anatolia)" which focused on the prospects for economic development of this region. It could be argued that his successful work in this period paved the way for his appointment as prime minister later.

Bayar's period as prime minister (1937-1939) witnessed his struggle with pressing domestic political problems and, as a result, he could not devote greater attention to foreign policy issues. However, he started to take more active roles in political life, especially after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's death in 1938. For instance, he played a crucial role in the establishment of the Democrat Party (DP) in 1946, which became a turning point in Turkish political history as it signaled the beginning of the multiparty era in Türkiye.[5]

It should also be noted that as World War II was approaching, the Soviet Union did not want Türkiye to be completely on the side of the West, so Moscow made attempts from time to time to improve its relations with Türkiye. Therefore, when Bayar was still serving as prime minister, a trade treaty was concluded with the Soviet Union.[6] This development indicated that Bayar was in favor of a multilateral diplomacy approach and tried to carry out a policy of balance between the Soviet Union and the West to protect Türkiye's interests.

The 1950s, the period when Bayar served as president, however, witnessed the deepening of the relations between Türkiye and the U.S. In fact, in 1954,

Bayar became the first Turkish president to pay a visit to the U.S.[7] This visit along with Türkiye's accession to NATO as a full member in 1952 and the permissions given to the U.S. by the Turkish government to establish military bases in certain regions of the country led to a hardening of the Soviet Union's attitude towards Türkiye. This was also why Bayar, who generally defended a multilateral approach in foreign policy, started to view the Soviet Union as a significant threat like many other Western countries at that time.[8]

Meanwhile, in the period leading up to the May 1960 military coup, the Turkish government was looking for support from its Western allies in order to alleviate the economic difficulties at home. The failure to attract greater Western economic support in this period compelled the Turkish leaders to turn to the Soviet Union and try to establish diplomatic contacts with Moscow. As a result, after so many years, Soviet Ambassador Ryzhov and the accompanying Soviet diplomatic delegation met with Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu at a dinner which was followed with curiosity and skepticism by the diplomats of Western countries.[9] During this meeting, Ambassador Ryzhov stated that the Soviets were aware of the dire economic situation in Türkiye and ready to provide economic support to Ankara. The new momentum in Turkish-Soviet relations in this period was also noted by the German ambassador who reported that Türkiye's aim was to strengthen its commercial links with the countries in the Eastern Bloc.[10]

Turkish Foreign Policy and the Cold War in the 1950s

As stated earlier, taking lessons from the Ottoman Empire, which was a member of the losing alliance in World War I, the young Republic of Türkiye acted much more cautiously during World War II and tried to stay out of the war for as long as possible. The fact that Ankara had not yet recovered from the losses of World War I greatly impacted this decision, urging the Turkish leaders to follow the principle of neutrality in foreign policy in World War II. However, in the following period, Ankara chose to be involved in the Western alliance.[11] This was mainly because after World War II, a radical geopolitical change took place in Eastern Europe, since the Soviet Union refused to withdraw from the regions it had occupied during World War II and established communist governments in these countries.[12] Against these moves, the U.S. established NATO in order to contain the spread of Soviet influence in Europe. Therefore, when Türkiye became a member of NATO in 1952, this also meant that Turkish foreign policy

would now be guided by the objective of containing the Soviet Union in line with NATO strategies.[13]

Ankara's choice to approach the West was closely related with the Stalin leadership's unexpected requests from the Turkish government in March 1946 concerning the joint control of the Turkish Straits and returning Türkiye's eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan to the Soviet Union.[14] Facing the threat of such demands and surrounded by countries with communist regimes in its north and west, Türkiye's security concerns became much more Soviet-centered and the foreign policy of the DP government was built on these concerns. This was also why during the DP period, serious deviations were observed in traditional Turkish foreign policy instead of pursuing a more balanced and status quo-oriented approach. Even though Westernism had been a traditional element of Turkish foreign policy, in this new period, Ankara became much more dependent on the U.S.[15] Yet, it should also be emphasized that the DP government in addition to strategic concerns had economic expectations from the West.[16]

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Türkiye's rapprochement with the West after World War II caused the toughening of the Soviet approach towards Ankara as exemplified by the "battle of diplomatic notes" that took place between the two governments about the status of the Turkish Straits in 1945-1946.[17] This tense relationship did not change significantly until Stalin's death in 1953. The new Soviet leadership's diplomatic note to Ankara dated 30 May 1953 for normalization of bilateral relations could be regarded as a turning point in this regard. In this note, Moscow officially informed Ankara that it had given up its previous territorial demands.[18] This, in turn, led to a change in Türkiye's approach towards the Soviet Union over time. The more accommodationist policies of Khrushchev, who succeeded Stalin, played an important role in the softening of the Turkish government's attitudes towards Moscow. Nevertheless, the decision of the DP government, which failed to receive greater economic support from the U.S., to approach the Soviet Union in 1959-1960 was largely a tactical rather than a

strategic move as the Cold War was still going on.[19]

It should be noted that despite the positive repercussions of the death of Stalin on Turkish-Soviet relations, new tensions emerged between the two countries due to Moscow's policies in the Middle East such as supporting the anti-Western government of Syria and the coup in Iraq in 1957-1958. Türkiye's membership in NATO and especially the permission given by Ankara for the deployment of medium-range Jupiter missiles in the Turkish territories caused great unrest in Moscow.[20] The shooting down of an American U-2 spy plane over Soviet territories shortly after it took off from the military base in Türkiye in May 1960 was another crisis that strained the Turkish-Soviet relations.

Despite such tensions, the efforts of Ambassador Ryzhov, who took office in Ankara in 1957, were crucial in the normalization of the ties between Türkiye and the Soviet Union.[21] In 1959, after many years, Dr. Lütfi Kırdar became the first high-level Turkish official to visit the Soviet Union as the minister of health and social welfare. This visit could be regarded as a message to the West which failed to meet the demands of the DP government in the economic sphere. It was also one of the early examples of the "multilateral approach" which would become even more visible in Turkish foreign policy in the 1960s. It should be noted that Prime Minister Menderes was also expected to pay an official visit to Moscow which could not take place due to the May 1960 coup that brought the end of the DP period in Türkiye.[22] While Menderes's planned visit was closely related with economic factors, as argued earlier, the new policy to approach the Soviet Union was supported by Foreign Minister Zorlu and President Bayar. [23]

Meetings of President Bayar with Ambassador Ryzhov (8 April and 23 May 1958)

During the Cold War, diplomatic talks continued between Türkiye and the Soviet Union. Given the circumstances of the Cold War period and the timing of these meetings, they are considered to be of great importance in terms of the development of bilateral relations. For example, President Bayar received Ambassador Ryzhov at the Çankaya Presidential Palace in Ankara on 8 April 1958. The request for the meeting came from the Soviet ambassador. The ambassador first stated that he would be going to Moscow the next day, and asked Bayar whether he had any message to convey to Marshal Voroshilov who was the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. Bayar asked Ryzhov to convey his personal greetings and correspondence to Marshal Voroshilov.[24]

During the meeting, relations between Türkiye and Soviet Union, particularly in the economic and political sphere, were discussed and mutual views on these topics were shared. The Soviet ambassador stated that the commercial relations between the two countries had recently gained positive momentum and that the agreement made with Türkiye İş Bankası for supplying the bank with Soviet credits was very important in this context. He stated that a similar agreement had just been made with another Turkish bank, Sümerbank, and that the Soviets were closely following the steps taken by the Turkish government for the development of Türkiye's national economy and industry.

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President Bayar, on the other hand, expressed his desire for the development of economic and commercial ties between the two countries within the framework of normal friendly relations. He asserted that the opportunities for greater Turkish-Soviet economic cooperation were favorable and that it would be beneficial for both sides to proceed by analyzing these economic opportunities and conditions. He mentioned that the Turkish government was ready to support the solution of problems in this matter. As he had previously served as the minister of economy, Bayar was well aware of the advancement of Soviet economy, and the importance for the Turkish economy of the textile factories founded in Nazilli and Kayseri with Soviet investment before the Cold War.[25] Bayar emphasized that the financing conditions offered by the Soviets to Türkiye were favorable and he would provide personal support to develop bilateral economic relations, since they would also be beneficial for Türkiye. Such statements by Bayar, as evidenced by the archival documents, provide precious insight into the Turkish foreign policy of the period as they indicate an aim to pursue a multilateral approach. Considering the fact that Türkiye was a member of NATO during this period, the talks with the Soviet Union emphasized the versatility of Turkish foreign policy. [26]

While Ryzhov expressed his satisfaction with Bayar's remarks, he mentioned a difficulty encountered in the commercial relations between the two countries and pointed to the fact that the price offers made by Türkiye were quite high and, in some spheres, Turkish prices were almost 30 percent higher than the

international market prices. For Ryzhov, this was an obstacle that hampered the attractiveness of the Turkish goods for businessmen from the Soviet Union. Reiterating that such obstacles hindered the development of commercial relations and that their solution was very crucial to obtaining fruitful results in economic cooperation, the Soviet ambassador stated, once again, that he would be bringing up this topic to his superiors in his upcoming visit to Moscow. He added that if progress could be made in trade relations, this would be reflected in political issues. This was important for Ryzhov; he also mentioned that Moscow's positive attitude towards Ankara did not change even when the Turkish government was hesitant to develop political relations with the Soviets in the Cold War.[27]

This shows that the USSR wanted to develop its relations with Türkiye in all spheres; initially, the USSR was aiming for an economic rapprochement which would subsequently lead to the development of political relations. Therefore, while Bayar reiterated his personal commitment to the development of economic relations between the two countries and requested the Soviet ambassador to convey this message to Moscow, he asked Ryzhov to share his views about the political issues.[28] The Soviet ambassador responded by saying that he admired Bayar's extensive experience in politics, but it would not be appropriate for him to express his personal opinion before the Turkish head of state due to the restrictions of the diplomatic protocol rules. Nevertheless, he politely expressed his desire to hear President Bayar's opinion on the issue. Bayar, in turn, expressed his willingness to share his opinion openly on political matters and requested that his remarks be conveyed to Moscow as stated.[29]

Bayar began by noting the substantial differences between the two countries following World War II and stated that it was unnecessary to repeat the reasons for these differences once again. He emphasized Türkiye's alliance ties (referring to NATO), and the commitments and loyalty that came along with these ties. However, he clarified that Turkish membership in this alliance did not imply a desire to view other countries as adversaries or to support aggression against these countries. He made clear that Türkiye's main purpose in joining this alliance was related with the principle of self-defense. He expressed his pleasure to hear that the Soviet Union desired the continuation and progress of relations between the two countries despite Türkiye's alliance ties with the West and stated that he personally shared the same desire. Under these circumstances, he noted that the progress of political and economic relations between the two countries would be beneficial for both.

Bayar expressed his intention to speak a little more on the topic and asked the Soviet ambassador to excuse him if those remarks would not be to the ambassador's liking.[30] He stated one more time that after World War II there was a "malentendu," or misunderstanding, between Ankara and Moscow and that it would be pointless to dwell on this. Yet, he stated that a new era could be initiated in Turkish-Soviet relations, since it had been a long time since the end of World War II. At the same time, however, Bayar emphasized that while Türkiye had confronted new problems in the international sphere during this period, the Soviet Union was not very supportive and Moscow criticized Ankara on almost all international issues. Bayar argued that this Soviet policy was incorrect and emphasized that countries were entitled to pursue their own interests and policies. Thus, he believed that Türkiye's NATO membership was in accordance with Turkish national interests, just as the Soviet Union was following its own national interests. Bayar stated that during some meetings with Soviet officials in international forums, some of them displayed a hostile behavior toward Türkiye which was not in line with diplomatic courtesy. He was particularly critical of the fact that Türkiye was openly threatened by Soviet diplomats who used phrases such as "we are strong like this" or "we are strong like that" or "if we want, we can do this or that."

It should be mentioned that the Soviet ambassador had been acquainted with the Turks during the War of Independence that started in Anatolia shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. This is why Bayar told Ryzhov that he should remember that Turks would respond negatively and react strongly when threatened. Bayar emphasized that diplomatic relations should be developed with a welcoming rather than a stern approach in the political realm, since both countries desired friendly relations. He added that he expressed these points openly and in good faith and requested that the Soviet ambassador convey them to Moscow. Bayar's statements hold historical significance in the context of Turkish diplomacy, since he openly pointed out the political problems between Türkiye and the Soviet Union, which had led to the deterioration of the relations between the two countries. It is also remarkable that he explicitly warned the Soviets

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about their previous threats to Ankara.[31]

Ambassador Ryzhov responded briefly to Bayar's remarks by saying that Türkiye's inclusion in NATO should not hinder good relations between Ankara and Moscow. He mentioned that the stern approach that dominated the diplomatic relations between the two countries could be easily softened and that one of the reasons for the "maletendu" which was mentioned earlier was the lack of a mutual and comprehensive dialogue. He addressed the mutual suspicion and mistrust which was visible between Ankara and Moscow and emphasized the need to work together to alleviate such feelings and rebuild trust in bilateral relations. In response, Bayar clarified to the ambassador that his goal in bringing up this issue was not to complain, but rather to underscore the importance of avoiding such a stern approach for the development of relations.[32] Ambassador Ryzhov stated that he understood President Bayar well and assured him that the issues discussed in the meeting would not remain unresolved.

At the end of the meeting, applying a diplomatic tactic to soften the tense conversation, Bayar mentioned that during a previous trip to the Soviet Union, the "Soviet friends" had referred to him as "tamada" (master / leader), offered him "Narzan", one of Russia's oldest and most popular natural mineral water brands, and asked if they could refer to him as "tamada" once again after so many years. Ambassador Ryzhov responded by saying that this would always be possible. Ryzhov asked whether the existing conditions were sufficiently ripe for Turkish-Soviet relations to proceed in a sincere atmosphere. Bayar stated that it would not possible to resolve all the issues in only one meeting and stressed the necessity for conducting diplomatic talks in stages. He highlighted that genuine friendly relations between the two countries could only be attained by acknowledging and navigating the existing problems, i.e., developing relations within the framework of realpolitik. Before the meeting ended, Ryzhov stated once again that he would convey Bayar's greetings to Marshal Voroshilov and expressed his wish to meet Bayar once again when he returned to Ankara. Bayar concluded the meeting by saying that he would be waiting for the next meeting.[33]

Upon the request of the Soviet side, Bayar and Ryzhov met once more on 23 May 1958. In this second meeting, which took place after Ryzhov's return from Moscow, the ambassador began by stating that he met Marshal Voroshilov several times and he extended his greetings to Bayar. Ryzhov said that he

conveyed Bayar's messages from the last meeting to Marshal Voroshilov and other officials of the Soviet government adding that Bayar's messages were appreciated on the Soviet side. He further emphasized the recollection of their past friendship and the time they lived as good friends and neighbors.

The Soviet ambassador told Bayar that according to the prevailing opinion in Moscow, Türkiye's involvement in certain military pacts with other countries did not prevent the maintenance of good neighborly relations between the two countries. Additionally, he emphasized that despite the Soviet Union's opposition to the military bloc to which Türkiye belonged, Moscow still aimed to foster neighborly relations with Ankara. He highlighted that there would be numerous opportunities for re-establishing the amicable atmosphere between Türkiye and the Soviet Union, and for rejuvenating political and economic cooperation.[34]

Ryzhov drew attention to the USSR's economic capacity and to the fact that both sides would benefit from the development of economic ties. He mentioned that Marshal Voroshilov attentively listened to Bayar's messages and indicated his desire to meet Bayar personally after saying "a good *tamada* is always a good *tamada*, whether in Ankara, Moscow, or elsewhere."[35] Yet, Ryzhov added that the Soviet side was ready to conduct negotiations with Türkiye in a discreet manner, i.e., without publicizing the subjects on the radio or in newspapers. He mentioned the Soviet government's ongoing efforts to resume dialogue with the West emphasizing the importance of enabling mutual dialogue even if there were disagreements with these countries. The Soviet ambassador noted that a number of diplomatic messages had already been exchanged between U.S. President Eisenhower and Soviet leader Khrushchev, and negotiations were underway in Moscow between the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the U.S., British, and French ambassadors. He indicated that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was actively involved in organizing a high-level meeting with these ambassadors and assured that he would inform President Bayar if there would be progress on this issues.[36]

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Another issue that was mentioned by Ryzhov in the meeting was that of atomic and hydrogen bombs. He told Bayar that the Soviet government did not believe it was feasible to ban the use of these bombs immediately, but expressed their readiness to prevent the use of these weapons by armies. In other words, the Soviet government would be ready to take the first step on this issue and would offer, at least, to stop the production of new bombs.

The Soviet ambassador emphasized Moscow's achievements in chemical industry, metallurgy and machinery, and reiterated their desire to develop cooperation with Türkiye in these spheres. He talked about the Soviets' interest in cooperating with Ankara to build new hydroelectric and hydrothermal power plants in Türkiye as well as chemical, textile, antibiotic, and flour factories. The Soviet side informed President Bayar of their interest in supplying Türkiye with tractors, agricultural tools, bulldozers, lorries, and a novel tool for mining and petroleum exploration known as "Turbodur," which even the Americans did not possess at the time.[37]

Ryzhov's messages imply that the USSR was ready to foster relations with Türkiye especially in the economic sphere. Coupled with Türkiye's positive response, these messages, particularly in a period marked by the heightened tensions of the Cold War, hold great significance in Turkish diplomatic history. It should be noted that such efforts to achieve rapprochement between the two countries were also expected to have geopolitical repercussions. However, it seems that the anticipated progression in bilateral relations did not materialize very quickly. Indeed, it could be argued that one of the factors that led to the 1960 military coup in Türkiye might be related with the military leaders' desire to prevent a possible Turkish-Soviet rapprochement.

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In response to Ryzhov, President Bayar thanked the ambassador for the information he shared with the Turkish side and emphasized that he had nothing to add to what he had stated in the previous meeting regarding political issues. Yet, he reiterated once again Türkiye's adherence to its international commitments and emphasized the importance of maintaining this fidelity. However, he also expressed the possibility of fostering friendly ties with the USSR.

Bayar talked about his views regarding economic matters.[38] Stating that the USSR was capable of achieving significant advancement in the economic field and citing the Soviets' positive role in the Turkish economy in the past, he emphasized that the Turkish government sought to achieve greater industrialization in the country with its limited means in order to increase the welfare of the Turkish people and there was much to learn from the experiences of the Soviet Union in this regard. However, he emphasized the importance of agreeing on the financial conditions and suggested that Turkish officials should decide whether these conditions comply with the international standards. The Soviet ambassador in response reiterated that Türkiye's membership in certain military blocs would not pose a problem for the Soviet government to deepen cooperation. He re-emphasized that Moscow did not have any preconditions regarding this point and clarified that the goal of the Soviet side was to develop bilateral relations. Bayar, on the other hand, affirmed that Türkiye did not want to enter into new military commitments against the Soviets in order not to complicate the situation.

Ryzhov mentioned the possibility of discussing economic matters with the Turkish president in detail,[39] but Bayar told him this was unnecessary as he only desired to be informed about the main subjects (like terms of payment). He emphasized the importance of organizing meetings with Prime Minister Menderes and other Turkish officials on this issue. The Soviet ambassador mentioned that he had not met with any other Turkish government representatives yet and expressed his intention to meet with the prime minister. He underscored the absence of preconditions for cooperating with other countries, but noted that discussions on economic relations inevitably encompassed political relations. Nevertheless, he expressed once again the Soviet side's desire to develop amicable relations with Türkiye without any prerequisites.[40]

Lastly, Ryzhov stated that he had been subjected to questions from journalists after the last meeting, and that the press would again be asking questions. Therefore, he told Bayar that he intended to tell the press that he had come to convey his congratulations for the anniversary of Bayar's election as president. Bayar in response said that the Turkish side would define the meeting as a normal diplomatic correspondence and an official communique would be released by the Turkish government on the president's reception of the Soviet ambassador. This conversation shows that both sides preferred to keep the content of the meeting confidential since they understood that in order to develop bilateral relations they should act more cautiously due to the difficult conditions of the Cold War period.[41]

It should be noted that the first meeting between Bayar and Ryzhov lasted 90 minutes, while the second one lasted 70 minutes. As stated earlier, these meetings are of great importance in terms of understanding the history of Turkish-Soviet relations especially considering the political circumstances of the period. It should be remembered that the two states belonged to opposite blocs at the time. Under normal conditions, such diplomatic exchanges between a head of state and an ambassador are expected to have repercussions on the development of cooperation between the respective countries. However, if these two countries belong to opposing military blocs, both the content and the course of such exchanges become quite significant.

It should be emphasized that in the following years, the rapprochement efforts between Türkiye and the Soviet Union were particularly effective in the economic field. However, despite the development of cooperation in economic matters, political relations could not improve significantly due to the ongoing mutual distrust between the two governments as well as the domestic political turmoil in Türkiye which became more visible after the 1960 military coup. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that economic links with the Soviet Union deepened in an uninterrupted manner in the subsequent periods.

Conclusion

During the Cold War, which was an era characterized by unique dynamics, the meetings between high-level officials from Türkiye, a NATO member-state, and the USSR, representing the opposing pole, hold a significant place in Turkish diplomatic history. The records of these meetings clearly reveal the efforts of both sides to achieve reconciliation particularly in the economic sphere. It should be noted that the secrecy surrounding the talks between Turkish and Soviet officials indicates that the bilateral relations had regional and global repercussions.

It is commonly ascertained in the literature that the Cold War began to soften in 1953-1960 and that this period opened the way for the development of relations between Türkiye and the USSR. However, contrary to these interpretations, Turkish-Soviet relations, in fact, faced a number of problems in these years. For example, during the crisis regarding Syria in 1957, Ankara and Moscow came to the brink of a military confrontation for the first time after many years. Similarly, the coup in Iraq in July 1958 caused tensions in Turkish-Soviet relations once again. In addition, the Jupiter missiles issue and the U-2 spy plane incident also negatively affected the relations between the two neighbors.

Against this backdrop, the meetings between President Bayar and Ambassador Ryzhov are very important for the history of Turkish foreign policy. Even though the mutual desire of the two countries, which were on opposing sides of the Cold War blocs, to improve their political and economic relations was related with realpolitik in international relations, it was nevertheless a remarkable development considering the conditions of the time.

The prevailing assumption during this period was that Türkiye was aligned with the Western alliance and shaped its foreign policy with a Western-oriented approach. However, both literature findings and analysis of the meeting records reveal this understanding to be an incomplete assessment. The records of the meetings between Turkish President Celal Bayar and Russian Ambassador Nikita S. Ryzhov on 8 April and 23 May 1958, and especially Bayar's approach to events and his evaluations and analyses, are important for understanding traditional Turkish foreign policy and Ankara's versatility. These records also provide important clues for understanding and analyzing the present-day Türkiye-Russia relations. It could be argued that it is essential for Türkiye to pursue a multidimensional foreign policy due to geopolitical and geoeconomic dynamics. This multidimensional foreign policy tradition is a legacy that has been transferred from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Türkiye.

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25 Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov was a Soviet soldier and politician who became a marshal of the Soviet Union and a Communist Party leader. During the Turkish War of Independence, he was sent to Ankara to contribute to the tactics and strategy of the war with his military knowledge. He served as people's commissar of defense in 1925-1940. During World War II, he led the defense of Leningrad and prevented the Nazi Wehrmacht from capturing the city. At the end of the war, he was promoted to the rank of field marshal and became a member of the Politburo in 1947. Between 1953 and 1960, he served as president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. He died in 1969. In memory of his visit to Izmir, a major street in Izmir was named "Voroshilov Street" in November 1933 and Voroshilov was given the title of honorary citizen of Izmir. A statue of Voroshilov is located behind Atatürk at the Taksim Republic Monument.
26 Nazilli and Kayseri textile factories were built with the loan provided by communist Russia after İsmet İnönü's visit to Moscow in 1932. Russian specialists came to Türkiye, surveyed the location of the factories, built the plants, operated them, and trained the workers. One of these experts was Ambassador Ryzhov, who came to Türkiye as a technician at that time.
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ARTICLE

PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: PAST AND PRESENT

Şener ÇELİK* & Mithat BAYDUR**

Abstract

The article examines the impact of progressivism on contemporary U.S. foreign policy. American progressivism, which is said to have its roots in the British settlement house movement and the Fabian Society in Britain in the late 19th century, was a political philosophy and reform movement that developed against the consequences of modernism such as business corruption, environmental pollution, and the growth of capital at the expense of society's interest. Strongly affiliated with expansionism and interventionism, it was also influential in foreign policy during the period between 1890 and 1910. Theodore Roosevelt's Big Stick Diplomacy, William Taft's Dollar Diplomacy, and Woodrow Wilson's Moral Diplomacy prominently reflected this liberal internationalist trend. In this study, we investigate the foreign policy understanding of today's progressives, analyzing the bills, resolutions, and joint/concurrent resolutions sponsored by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Bernie Sanders, and Elizabeth Warren who represent the progressive wing in the Democratic Party. We argue that modern progressivism differs from its origins in that it prioritizes international cooperation, the non-intervention principle, and refraining from the use of force. Among the article's important findings are that progressives do not seek hegemonic supremacy, that they advocate a normative understanding of foreign policy that prioritizes values over interests, and that they distance themselves from a pro-interventionist political philosophy. On the other hand, they do not strongly question American leadership at the dawn of the 21st century.

Keywords

Progressivism, American foreign policy, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren

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Introduction

At the beginning of the 20th century, U.S. foreign policy came under the influence of the progressive view which defined itself by features such as multilateralism, international cooperation, and peaceful settlement of disputes, yet in reality represented aggressive expansionism and military interventionism. As a matter of fact, this reformist movement – if we can call it such – whose historical roots are not universally agreed upon, and the related political philosophy and applied practices focused mainly on domestic issues such as labor exploitation, corruption, and environmental pollution caused by newly found industries rather than foreign policy. The definition of the "Progressive Era" generally refers to the decades between the 1890s and 1910s, although the period does not have distinct starting and ending dates. The movement became a political party in the interwar period with the support of labor unions and socialists, and remained in American politics until the end of the 1940s. In the post-Cold War period, albeit with a low profile, progressivism constituted an important part of the American left – or, at least of the social democrat tendency.

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By the beginning of the 21st century, progressive thought existed as a strong opposition to the moderate wing of the Democratic Party. Focused mainly on income inequality, health care reform, and environmental justice in domestic politics, in foreign policy, progressives defended multilateralism, cooperation with international institutions, and peaceful solutions for armed conflicts by refraining from the use of force. Although the studies to date have been valuable in terms of contributing to the literature, there have not been many studies comparing the historical origins of progressivism with the present day. Addressing this point makes this research particularly original and useful. The current study examines today's foreign policy understanding of the progressive thought in the U.S., starting from the historical roots and the foreign policy paradigm of the early 20th century. Our research questions include what problems modern progressives prioritize compared to those at the beginning of the 20th century, how they intend to solve these problems, what their main strategies are for U.S. foreign policy, and what, if any, their core values are in politics. After revealing the approaches

to the historical roots of progressivism in the literature in the first part, in the second part, we turn to the foreign policy in the 1901-1921 period. In the last section, we examine the bills, resolutions, joint resolutions, and acts that have been submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Bernie Sanders, and Elizabeth Warren, the Democratic Party's most known progressive politicians, and try to establish which foreign policy issues were prioritized, how modern progressives approach contemporary problems in international relations, and what solutions they offer.

The research for this paper relies on the analysis of the laws that progressive legislators have sponsored or co-sponsored. For this purpose, the relevant legislation was accessed in official primary sources, such as the online U.S. Congress database. When selecting the relevant laws, the criteria of foreign policy and the period 2019-2021 were applied. Alongside bills, resolutions, concurrent resolutions, and joint resolutions were also analyzed in order to ascertain as accurately as possible the foreign policy views of U.S. progressives.

While searching for these documents, we chose "sponsored legislation" and "cosponsored legislation" under the title of "sponsorship", and the 116th and 117th Congress covering 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 respectively to keep the research up-to-date. As for "bill type," we considered bills, resolutions, concurrent resolutions, and joint resolutions brought before the Senate and the House. Regarding "subject – policy", we set the "international affairs" option. Since all three senators have prepared a large number of foreign policy laws as sponsors and cosponsors, only three bills or resolutions by each person were examined.

The Roots of American Progressivism

The question of where and how the roots of progressivism appeared is not an uncomplicated issue for researchers of U.S. foreign policy. According to Stokes, the widening gap between wealthy and indigent people in the then newly founded cities at the beginning of the 1890s prompted some social fragments in middle-class Americans, which we call "progressives," to explore the British settlement house movement. Stokes writes that the leaders of the British settlement house movement were dedicated to the task of making Christianity more relevant to the solution of social problems, and therefore, Americans who were interested in the settlements also found themselves being introduced to intellectuals who were developing a liberal theology such as Samuel Barnett, the founder of Toynbee Hall.[1] American progressives with historical and cultural ties to Britain were also similarly influenced by the British Fabian Society which was founded in

London in 1884 as a discussion group and consequently gave strong support to the progressive movement in London. The ties between British Fabians and American progressives become most clearly visible of the correspondence of American academics like Richard Fay and Edward Ross.

Thelen, on the other hand, in his research conducted in the late 1960s, traced the roots of progressivism to the 1880s, without drawing a connection to the UK but by referring to the same period, and claimed that the beginning of the movement dates back to the Gilded Age. His approach indicates that the origins of progressivism could be found in the class and status conflicts of the late 19th century which formed the driving forces that made men become reformers.[2] Accordingly, dozens of groups and individuals in the 1880s envisioned some change that would improve society, such as civil service reform, scientific agriculture, enforcement of vice laws, nonpartisan local elections, and tax reform.

The basic ideas of progressivism have also been closely associated in the literature with land ownership and land use. Examining the subject in terms of zoning studies, Claeys claimed that the main features of progressive political theory consist of freedom and individual expression in the use of land; the concept of property; freedom of rein to express communal visions of community, security, and aesthetics; and implementation of majority-driven community visions by local planning experts.[3] The work and scholarship of conventional land use scholars depend particularly on Haar and Wolf's tenets of progressive jurisprudence; however, in Claeys's assessment these tenets are highly open to discussion since they do not stand on their own, but make perfect sense as applications of what was formerly known as progressive political theory. Admittedly, the interaction between progressivism and land ownership and use is a subject that requires further research.

Substantially, progressivism is a phenomenon more deserving of attention in the context of dissatisfaction with the established social and political order in the U.S. at the end of the 19th century. In their remarkable study, Van Patten and Davidson assert that, at the turn of the century, there was an examination of all aspects of society and a call for democratic renewal and reinvigoration. The late 19th and early 20th centuries

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reflected an intellectual ferment in the United States shaped by the emergence of new religions and the role of women in society as can be seen in the example of Mary Baker Eddy who founded the Christian Science Church and Aimee Semple McPherson who established the Foursquare Church. As for the fields of philosophy of education, epistemology, journalism, and ethics, John Dewey reflected the soul searching and demand for change in educational institutions. Progressivism has also been studied in the context of the transformation of economic production models. From this perspective, Halpin and Williams put forward that the intellectual development of American progressivism has its roots in the difficult transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy in the 19th and 20th centuries. Progressivism emerged as a necessary response to the shifting nature of American life, with scientific progress leading to further innovation in industrial technology as cities grew. On the other hand, the monopolization of key industries like steel, textiles, and railroads threatened laborers and consumers alike.

Towards the end of the 1890s, progressivism also showed its effect on foreign policy. Lang claims that the U.S. leap onto the world stage with its victories in the Spanish-American War coincided with the rise of progressivism.[4] However, contrary to popular belief, it is claimed that at the down of the 19th century, progressives were not really opposed to imperialist policies. Between 1898 and 1917, American progressives developed an imperial attitude, joining others in defining commercial expansion overseas as essential to the normal functioning of the economy. They believed that new markets had to be secured and maintained if economic depression, social strife, and class warfare were to be averted. Although similar widespread judgments have remained dominant in public opinion in different fields, each of them is open to question, as is the case with imperialism. Leonard made a strong argument against these judgments by analyzing some of these fields. The progressives, according to the canonical narrative, advocated for labor, opposed the "survival of the fittest" doctrine, and were critical of war and imperialism, yet, according to Leonard, this was not the real situation. First, progressives, in fact, defended a radically restricted vision of who among the poor and dispossessed deserved uplift, a vision that eugenically sorted the poor into "worthy" and "unworthy" categories. A similar situation applies to the "survival of the fittest" doctrine. No eugenicist opposed the natural selection doctrine, so, progressives who endorsed eugenic policies necessarily defended it as well. As for war and imperialism, progressives such as Theodore Roosevelt were proponents rather than opponents of military adventurism. Many progressives condemned World War I not for its senseless destruction of human life, but for its destruction "of the better class of person."[5]

In terms of internationalism, it can be said that progressives believed that the U.S. needed to collaborate with other countries to solve international issues. This led to the establishment of the League of Nations with the U.S. participation. On the diplomatic side, progressives advocated focusing on diplomacy rather than military force to resolve international conflicts leading to the U.S. participation in international agreements and treaties. In terms of human rights and international law, progressivism advocated that human rights and justice are universal values, and that the U.S. should react to human rights violations in other countries. Some progressives called for the U.S. to take a more active role in advocating for human rights on the international stage.

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Beyond all these discussions, arguments, and claims, as an interlude conclusion, it may not be completely correct to suggest that progressivism is purely a middle-class radical revisionist movement. As Stone put forth, progressive leadership in the U.S. at the beginning of the 20th century, certainly included middle-class reformers and professionals, but it also included businesspeople To complicate the matter further, many of the middle-class reformers – together with many of the businesspeople – would often rail against Wall Street, the monopolies, and the trusts. Yet, it was entirely possible for both reformers and businessmen (people?) to collaborate in the same political party; for example, one of the progressives' leaders was George W. Perkins, J.P. Morgan's partner, representing the very essence of Wall Street. In brief, in the early 1900s, the progressives, or at least, the leading personalities of this community, were comprised of complex and composite interest groups representing different sociocultural and economic castes.

Progressive U.S. Foreign Policy in the Historical Context

Many progressives, including President Theodore Roosevelt, saw no conflict between imperialism and reform at home, accepting both as forms of uplift, reform, and improvement. Such progressives saw an opportunity to further the progressive agenda around the world in these new colonies; however, after the violence of the Philippine-American War, other progressives became increasingly vocal about their opposition to U.S. foreign intervention and imperialism.[6]

Roosevelt's big stick diplomacy, William Howard Taft's dollar diplomacy, and Woodrow Wilson's moral diplomacy were significant policies that represented the planning and execution of the period's foreign policy understanding. The grand strategy put into practice in the Mexican Revolution and the invasions of Haiti and the Dominican Republic were essentially the prelude to the interventionism that would span almost the entire 20th century. Hence, it can be claimed that at the beginning of the 1900s the traces of the Monroe Doctrine's isolationism were long gone, and the relations of the U.S. with other nations were far from being anti-interventionist.

On 2 September 1901, Roosevelt made a speech where he used the words "speak softly and carry a big stick." The phrase, which gave rise to the aphorism "big stick policy," was frequently used by the press to refer particularly to his foreign policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to Tilchin, Roosevelt's big stick diplomacy was founded in five central principles. The first was the possession of a formidable military capability; the second, to act justly toward other nations; the third, never to bluff; the fourth, to strike only if prepared to strike hard; and the fifth, to allow an honorable adversary to save face in defeat.[7] As Leuchtenburg clearly noted back in the early 1950s, Roosevelt's accession to the presidency brought the new imperialist movement to full power; thus, in all of his foreign ventures, namely in the Dominican Republic, Panama, the Far East, and in building a greater U.S. fleet, Roosevelt had the support of the majority of the progressives.[8] The basic idea of the big stick policy and a big navy was not limited to the Executive Office, but was also sincerely embraced by all cabinet members. Secretary of the Navy, and later U.S. Attorney General, Charles Joseph Bonaparte shared with a great many progressives Roosevelt's enthusiasm for a big navy, a viewpoint of inestimable advantage for a Secretary of the Navy.

Roosevelt's policies found resonance in different instruments, though not by direct use of force and military interventionism. The most important of these instruments was the U.S. dollar, originally printed by a less famous body of the U.S. government, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing of the Department of the Treasury. As Rosenberg sums up, it was the American international lending and financial advising in the early 20th century – and more specifically, the practice that President Taft called "dollar diplomacy."[9] Taft surrounded himself with like-minded corporate lawyers and bankers, and businessmen who were their clients, and the objective of his foreign policy became concentrated on assisting American businessmen in the protection and expansion of investment and trade, especially in Latin America and the Far East.[10] This policy involved cooperation

among three groups – each with a specific mission – in the country: private bankers would extend loans to risky foreign governments; financial experts, formally or informally connected to the loan process, would assume tasks of fiscal reorganization and administrative management in the borrowing country; and government officials would orchestrate such private sector involvement.

Another political instrument of the period was the Open Door policy carried into effect based on Secretary of State John Hay's international trade. Proposed to keep China open to trade with all countries on an equal basis – and being more of a realist political strategy than of a liberal economic approach – the Open Door policy was an attempt to construct a sphere of influence in Eastern Asia, particularly in China. As discussed by Irwin, this policy was given priority both for commercial and diplomatic reasons, so that China would not be dominated by any one power.[11] The economic rise of China created challenges for the U.S. policy in Asia and elsewhere, and rules-based institutions provided a way of embedding China in a system that serves the long-run interests of the U.S. What is interesting is that nearly the exact same policy route would be tracked by Roosevelt's foreign policy team led by Elihu Root between 1905 and 1909. Some claim that Root's involvement in the Open Door policy began in the first instance with the Boxer Rebellion when he was secretary of war in McKinley's administration, and that he gained further insight into the policy followed by Hay while acting as counsel for J.P. Morgan during the negotiations of the latter with China over the Canton-Hankow railway concession, before being appointed secretary of state by Roosevelt.

Dedicated to the promotion of human rights and democratic government in international relations, Wilson's way of thinking in foreign affairs reflected more of a rules-based and moral-oriented policy in the Progressive Era's autumn. Addressing business leaders in Mobile, Alabama, on 27 October 1913, he said that interest did not tie nations together, but, instead, it sometimes separated them. Emphasizing the development of constitutional liberty in the world, and human rights together with national integrity and opportunity as against material interests, Wilson stated that, sympathy and understanding

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unite them [the world's nations]" and that "[i]t is a spiritual union which [the U.S.] seeks."[12] In line with this worldview shaped by political ethics, Wilson opposed loans by U.S. banks to China under conditions that would in short order endanger the sovereignty of that country, as bankers moved in to reclaim politically the credits they had extended.[13] Wilson's address to Congress on 2 April 1917, laying out America's war aims, formed a foundational statement of progressivism in foreign policy.[14] However, his discourse which seemed to move away from expansionism was not reflected in foreign policy practice. The occupation of the Dominican Republic, and the interventions in Haiti, Cuba, Panama, and Honduras showed that he was close not to a so-called progressive peace policy, but rather to expansionism that had been ongoing since the beginning of the period. Along the same line, the Wilson administration rejected the legitimacy of the Huerta government in Mexico demanding re-election which later led to Huerta's flight from the country. Wilson's famous "Fourteen Points" declaration, which he announced after World War I, included controversial topics such as self-determination, and similarly reflected a good intention in discourse. Yet, the declaration did not succeed apart from paving the way for interventionism that would extend into the Cold War and beyond.

Progressive U.S. Foreign Policy Today

Especially after the Trump administration's "America First" nostalgia based on a fanciful pre-World War I logic, various interpretations have been put forth regarding the content, objectives, principles, and nature of the new progressive foreign policy that the U.S. should follow. Before examining the approaches of the progressive lawmakers as seen in the U.S. legislation, it may be useful to take a brief look at such evaluations in the literature. First, as Jackson argues prophylactically, progressivism is not a monolithic movement, but, on the contrary, it is intellectually diverse. For theories of security, comparing progressives and liberal internationalists, Jackson asserts that there appear some significant continuities and considerable divergences between at least two different factions: liberal internationalism prioritizes military superiority, while progressive internationalism prioritizes military sufficiency. The first emphasizes alliances, while the second defends democratic alliances. What is essential for liberal internationalism is international institutions, while the significant factor for the progressives is the reformation of international institutions. Finally, liberal internationalists stress economic interdependence, while the progressives stress mutual threat reduction.[15] As set out here, different factions of the movement – if we can call it a definitive and particular "movement," of course – have different priorities and perceptions.

On the other hand, Ettinger, referring to Waltz's research and the leftist movements of the 20th century claims that it is possible to derive five broad propositions that can inform a leftist or progressive U.S. foreign policy. Based on the rejection of any conceptual distinction between foreign and domestic policy, the first principle is the theoretical underpinning of a left-wing foreign policy worldview. Following from this, with a much more practical orientation, the second principle affirms that the existing liberal international order is deeply flawed but worth preserving. The third principle is anti-authoritarianism. Accordingly, there is a long history of Marxist thought rejecting the authoritarianism of state tyranny and capital. The fourth principle refers to the opposition to militarism, the handmaiden of imperialism. Finally, economic justice and the pursuit of social democracy as the foundation for global economic relations constitute the last principle.[16] Within the scope of a progressive foreign policy strategy, it seems that the U.S. government will not adopt a single behavioral model regarding international problems while assigning different priorities to the policy under the influence of different paradigms.

Sponsored and Cosponsored Foreign Policy Legislation by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez

Popularly known by her initials AOC, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez has been serving as the representative for New York's 14th Congressional District since 2019 as a member of the Democratic Party. Pushing Democratic leadership to consider policies such as gun control, Medicare for All, and a Green New Deal focused on addressing climate change, she is part of a tightknit group of liberal – and an informal group of progressive – House freshmen known in social media as "The Squad." The latter includes Ocasio-Cortez, Rashida Tlaib, the representative for Michigan, ~~and~~ Ilhan Omar, the representative for Minnesota, Ayanna Soyini Pressley, the representative for Massachusetts, all of whom belong to the Democratic Party.[17]

Not necessarily in cooperation with the members of the Squad, Ocasio-Cortez has sponsored and cosponsored 53 resolutions, concurrent resolutions, joint resolutions, and bills on foreign policy between 2019 and 2021. All of these laws show traces of a new progressive paradigm that, in one way or another, diverges from a previous so-called traditional foreign policy based on the use of hard power, military strength, coercive diplomacy, sanctions regime, and, to some extent, American exceptionalism as a pattern of behavior. "The Concurrent Resolution 83 on Iran, directing the President pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to terminate the use of U.S. Armed Forces

to engage in hostilities in or against Iran," clearly supported the people of Iraq, Iran, and other countries throughout the Middle East who demand an end to government corruption and violations of basic human rights.[18] According to the resolution, "over the past eight months [as of 1 August 2020], in response to rising tensions with Iran, the United States has introduced over 15,000 additional forces into the Middle East"; however, "the American people and members of the United States Armed Forces deserve a credible explanation regarding such use of military force." The language used in the resolution represents a departure from the infamous "Axis of Evil" discourse that has been used since the Bush administration, and directly advocates that the Iranian people's search for democracy should be supported. Ocasio-Cortez, together with other sponsors and co-sponsors, explicitly rejects the realistic approach to foreign policy in general – and to Iran in particular – based on the use of force or threat of use of force. Moreover, the resolution, which emphasizes the concern about the military power increase in the Middle East in 2020, also has a moral understanding that advocates accountability and transparency to the public, reflecting a progressive tendency towards foreign policy issues.

The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act is also representative of the normative approaches of Ocasio-Cortez and other progressive legislators, this time embodied in international human rights law. The act argues that "[i]n the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China, the Government of the People's Republic of China has, since 2017, arbitrarily detained as many as 1.8 million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in a system of extrajudicial mass internment camps."[19] Asserting that "China has subjected detainees to forced labor, torture, political indoctrination, and other severe human rights abuses," the act states, "it is the policy of the United States to prohibit the import of all goods, wares, articles, or merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured, wholly or in part, by forced labor from the People's Republic of China and particularly any such goods, wares, articles, or merchandise produced in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China." In terms of presenting a sanctions regime which seems to rely as a policy upon the Global Magnitsky Act, this law expresses the intention of a relatively harsher political behavior than the Iranian Resolution mentioned above.

Another resolution by Ocasio-Cortez that recommends complying with international law written in a liberal tone was prepared in 2019, conveying the opinion of the House of Representatives on the ratification of the United

Nations Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Emphasizing that "the United States is one of the world's wealthiest countries," Resolution 666 highlights that "every American has the right to just working conditions, quality healthcare, an excellent education, healthy food, and safe housing"; however, "according to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, 40 million people in the United States live in poverty and the country ranked 35th out of 37 in terms of poverty and inequality, and 36th in terms of access to water and sanitation."[20] Therefore, Resolution 666 stresses that "the United States must ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which guarantees the basic rights of the peoples to reach an adequate standard of living – together with other rights such as the right to social security, right to free education, and right to participation in cultural life." Considering the isolationist, non-interventionist, and protectionist policy which manifested itself with the withdrawal of the U.S. from significant international agreements such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Paris Climate Agreement, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action during the Trump administration, it can be said that Resolution 666 marks a considerable crossroads in progressive foreign policy strategy. On the other hand, although the Biden administration has begun to return to international agreements, for now, this effort seems far from the radical view represented by the Squad. That said, Resolution 666 can be considered important since it strongly refers to the normative approach in international relations based on the progressive moral sentiment shaped by the embracive policy ethics within the Democratic Party.

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Sponsored and Cosponsored Foreign Policy Legislation by Bernie Sanders

Serving as a U.S. senator from Vermont since 2007, Bernie Sanders is the longest-serving independent in U.S. congressional history. Affiliated with the Vermont Progressive Party, he co-founded the Congressional Progressive

Caucus, a group of mostly liberal Democrats, and was a major candidate for the Democratic Presidential nomination in 2016 and 2020. In international affairs, he is known for his support for reducing military spending, diplomacy, and international cooperation.

In the "No War Against Iran Act (A Bill to Prohibit the Use of Funds for Military Force against Iran, and for Other Purposes)," Sanders and other sponsors clearly emphasized that "the U.S. does not have a legal instrument that would make it legal to use of force against Iran." Referring to the Authorization for Use of Military Force, the law adopted after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the act states, "Nothing in the Authorization for Use of Military Force – or any other provision of law enacted before the date of the enactment of this Act may be construed to provide authorization for the use of military force against Iran."[21] The sponsors of the act also attempted to deprive the administration of financial resources for a military intervention against Iran. The act implemented this limitation with the provision that "no Federal funds may be obligated or expended for any use of military force in or against Iran unless Congress has declared war; or enacted specific statutory authorization for such use of military force."

Sanders, with other progressive-leaning Democrats, has also succeeded in passing a similar law on the hostilities in the Republic of Yemen through Congress as a joint resolution. Under the title of "Joint Resolution to Direct the Removal of United States Armed Forces from Hostilities in the Republic of Yemen That Have Not Been Authorized by Congress," it was announced that "Congress has not declared war with respect to, or provided a specific statutory authorization for, the conflict between military forces led by Saudi Arabia, including forces from the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Senegal, and Sudan against the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, in the Republic of Yemen; yet, since March 2015, members of the United States Armed Forces have been introduced into hostilities between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis, including providing to the Saudi-led coalition aerial targeting assistance, intelligence sharing, and mid-flight aerial refueling."[22] The lawmakers asserted that "Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution states that 'at any time that the United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs.' Hereby, the Congress directs the President to remove the U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities in or affecting the Republic of Yemen." In this joint resolution, Sanders and other sponsors criticized the presidential war powers

by applying constitutional law, deeming it necessary to have a declaration of war or a specific authorization in order to proceed with any military intervention.

The global COVID-19 pandemic which dominated 2020 was an important indicator of progressives' liberal attitudes towards cooperation with international organizations. The law titled "A Bill to Support Efforts by International Financial Institutions to Provide a Robust Global Response to the COVID–19 Pandemic," which saw no further action in legislation after being referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate encourages the U.S. to re-engage with international organizations. According to the bill sponsored by Sanders and others, "The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director of each international financial institution to use the voice and vote of the United States at that institution to seek to ensure adequate fiscal space for world economies in response to the global coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic."[23] The bill introduced a series of legal measures including seeking to ensure adequate fiscal space for world economies in response to the global coronavirus disease; the suspension of all debt service payments to the institution; the relaxation of fiscal targets for any government operating a program supported by the institution, or seeking financing from the institution, in response to the pandemic; and, the requirement of approval of all Special Drawing Rights allocation transfers from wealthier member countries to countries that are emerging markets or developing countries. After the Trump administration's decision to withdraw from UNESCO in 2017 and from the Human Rights Council and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in 2018, and the threat to leave WHO in 2020, the bill clearly amounted to a move towards an alinement policy. While the progressives are not as strong in the legislature as the so-called moderates represented by President Biden, it is clear that they prioritize a more liberal and multilateralist tendency on their foreign policy agenda.

The global COVID-19 pandemic which dominated 2020 was an important indicator of progressives' liberal attitudes towards cooperation with international organizations.

Sponsored and Cosponsored Foreign Policy Legislation by Elizabeth Warren

A former law professor who is currently the senior senator from Massachusetts and was a candidate in the 2020 Democratic Party Presidential primaries, Elizabeth Warren is known by the public for her expertise in bankruptcy law,

advocating stringent banking regulations, and taking a strong anti-monopoly stand. Considered one of the 20 most influential progressives in America, Warren's foreign policy agenda has been largely shaped by liberal arguments such accusations against China of human rights violations, calling climate change "an existential threat," and opposition to many of the counterterrorism practices in the decade that followed the September 11 terrorist attacks.

The bill prepared on Korea reflects Warren's ethical considerations in her political preferences. The legal regulation "A Bill to Prevent an Unconstitutional War with North Korea" declares that the Constitution, in Article I, Section 8, grants Congress "the sole power to declare war; and, the constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief exercised only pursuant to a declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, or a national emergency."[24] Stressing that "28,500 American soldiers and over 100,000 American civilians live in North Korea," the bill clearly states "no Federal funds may be obligated or expended for any use of military force in or against North Korea." Warren and the bill's other lawmakers courageously sought to prevent the Executive Office from attempting to start a military conflict, regardless of whether it was authorized or unauthorized. Moreover, according to their assessment, "It is the sense of Congress that a conflict on the Korean peninsula would have catastrophic consequences for the American people, for members of the United States Armed Forces stationed in the region, for United States interests, for United States allies the Republic of Korea and Japan; therefore, the President, in coordination with United States allies, should explore and pursue every feasible opportunity to engage in talks with the Government of North Korea on concrete steps to reduce tensions and improve communication, and to reinvigorate high-level negotiations aimed at achieving a diplomatic agreement." Although the bill appears to be primarily concerned with U.S. interests, it is important that it guides the president to refrain from the use of force and presents dialogue as a policy option. Supporting the concepts of communication, negotiation, and diplomatic agreement emphasized in the bill, together with the phrase to "pursue every feasible opportunity," stand as evidence that progressive priority favors the peaceful resolution of conflicts, breaking away from the harsh rhetoric and hard power exercises of Republican governments of the post-September 11 era.

Among international issues, Warren and other progressives are particularly sensitive about global warming and climate change. Warren was the cosponsor of the "International Climate Accountability Act" of 2019. Stressing that parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change reached a

landmark agreement to combat climate change and to accelerate and intensify the actions and investments needed for a sustainable low carbon future, the purpose of the 2019 was to prohibit the use of funds to advance the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris Climate Agreement of 2015. In order to prevent any administration from withdrawing from the agreement, the act states that "no funds are authorized to be appropriated, obligated, or expended to take any action to advance the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement."[25] The lawmakers, including Warren, added a plan to the act for the U.S. to meet its nationally determined contribution under the Paris Climate Agreement, limiting the Executive Office to a specific time to enforce the law. Thereafter, "Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available to the public a plan for the United States to meet its nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement." The law robustly challenged the policies of the Trump administration which was generally supported by sectors with high carbon footprints such as the oil and weapons industries. In this manner, Warren and the other sponsors clearly demonstrated the extent to which they essentially differ from the Republicans and even from the moderate Democrats in the legislative body of government.

> Among international issues, Warren and other progressives are particularly sensitive about global warming and climate change.

One of the latest bills introduced by Warren and other sponsors in 2021 was the "Bill to Establish the China Censorship Monitor and Action Group, and for Other Purposes." The bill stated that "the President shall establish an interagency task force, which shall be known as the 'China Censorship Monitor and Action Group'."[26] The bill proposed that "[t]he Task Force shall oversee the development and execution of an integrated Federal Government strategy to monitor and address the impacts of efforts directed, or directly supported, by the Government of the People's Republic of China to censor or intimidate, in the United States or in any of its possessions or territories, any United States person, including United States companies that conduct business in the People's Republic of China, which are exercising their right to freedom of speech." According to the bill, "The Task Force shall submit an annual report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes the strategic objectives and policies, the activities, and the results of the activities." Additionally, "The report shall assess major trends,

patterns, and methods of the Government of the People's Republic of China's efforts to direct or directly support censorship and intimidation of United States persons, including United States companies that conduct business in the People's Republic of China." The agency and its reporting mechanism mentioned in the bill do not seem to be instruments with the power to create a high deterrent legal pressure on China for its censorship crimes. The authorities and responsibilities of the institution are far from being concrete, and the purpose is not clear enough to make any predictions about how functional it may be. Warren and the other sponsors could be criticized for drafting such a vague and ineffective legal text so as to avoid a high-profile challenge towards China. Nevertheless, this approach is understandable given the progressives' traditional cooperative and multilateralist foreign policy philosophy. After all, lawmakers affiliated with progressivism have always avoided using belligerent language, at the risk of being accused of passivism. In this sense, one cannot expect Warren to be an exception.

Conclusion

Having discussed the strategies upon which the progressive foreign policy tradition was built at the beginning of the 20th century, the article has revealed the problems and solutions to those problems offered by U.S. progressives. The movement, which is claimed to have its roots in the British settlement house movement and the relations between American intellectuals and the British Fabian Society, led to a search for reform structured by social and political instruments such as civil service reform, scientific agriculture, enforcement of vice laws, nonpartisan local elections, and tax reform. On the other hand, U.S. progressives developed an expansionist and interventionist attitude, and did not pursue a pacifist path in foreign policy that was completely independent of the imperialist approach. Theodore Roosevelt's big stick diplomacy, William Howard Taft's dollar diplomacy, and Woodrow Wilson's moral diplomacy far from defended anti-interventionism and non-interference. Although the modern progressives were very close to winning in the 2020 presidential elections, they did not succeed in seizing power. However, the laws, bills, and resolutions prepared by the Democratic Party's progressive lawmakers offer important clues about how they view the world at large and what foreign policy line they would follow if they held a majority in legislation or in the Executive Office.

The article presented foreign policy approaches by examining three bills, resolutions, and joint/concurrent resolutions prepared by each of the three most important progressive lawmakers in the U.S. legislature. In Concurrent

Resolution 83, signed by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the use of force against Iran was opposed. In Joint Resolution 7, prepared by Bernie Sanders, the U.S. Armed Forces was called to withdraw from being a party to the conflicts in Yemen. In a similar vein, the International Climate Accountability Act of 2019, prepared by Elizabeth Warren, recommended the establishment of mechanisms that will prevent the U.S. from leaving the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. The article showed that today's progressives, unlike their early 20th-century counterparts, do not seek hegemonic supremacy, or, at least, they stay away from such discourse. Progressives today advocate a normative understanding of foreign policy that prioritizes values over interests, and they are distant to a pro-interventionist political philosophy, even if they do not strongly question American leadership at the dawn of the 21st century.

Overall, these findings challenge conventional narratives surrounding progressive foreign policy, emphasizing the importance of ethical considerations and strategic restraint in navigating the complexities of the international arena and providing insights into the evolving landscape of progressive foreign policy. By prioritizing values, promoting diplomatic solutions, and advocating for strategic restraint, progressives offer a distinct perspective on addressing global challenges. Understanding these nuances is essential for fostering informed discourse and crafting effective strategies that prioritize peace, justice, and international cooperation.

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ARTICLE

THE SELF-SETTLEMENT OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN TÜRKIYE: DYNAMICS, CHALLENGES, AND REFUGEE AGENCY

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Abstract

Türkiye hosts the largest population of Syrian refugees globally, with more than 95% residing in urban areas, showcasing the phenomenon of self-settlement. This article examines the dynamics and challenges of Syrians' self-settlement in Türkiye across three periods: 2011-2015, 2016-2019, and 2019 onwards. It identifies key actors, analyzes settlement/housing policies, and evaluates governance structures using secondary analysis of academic research, government policies, legal documents, NGO reports, and media coverage. The findings reveal that despite a centralized migration management approach, Syrians' settlement in Turkish cities heavily relies on their self-reliance primarily due to the absence of comprehensive housing/settlement policies and limited intervention of local authorities and civil society organizations. While self-reliance facilitates social participation, against the backdrop of the lack of proper support mechanisms, it also perpetuates Syrians' disadvantaged positions, leading to an insecure struggle for survival. This study outlines two sets of main challenges of Syrians' self-settling in Türkiye along with policy/legal recommendations. The first set encompasses socioeconomic, ethnic, and legal (status) aspects, discrimination and informal settlements, while the second addresses the administrative dimension, assessing the roles of local governments, civil society, and non-state actors.

Keywords

Self-settlement, refugees, housing, self-reliance, Syrians, Türkiye

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Introduction

As of June 2023, an estimated 110 million individuals had been forcibly displaced, with the Syrian civil war playing a crucial role.[1] Since 2010, 13 million Syrians have experienced displacement; of this total, nearly six million individuals have undergone internal displacement within Syria, while the remaining have sought refuge in other countries.[2] As of February 2024, Türkiye is the leading global host of the largest refugee population, accommodating 3,159,174 registered Syrians.[3] In the context of Syrian forced migration, Türkiye is notably featured in policy/political debates and research on three durable solutions (outlined by UNHCR) in response to displacement, namely third-country resettlement, voluntary return/repatriation, and local integration.[4] Third-country resettlement pertains to the process of refugees being resettled in countries other than their country of origin or initial host country, while return signifies refugees voluntarily agreeing to return to their home country when conditions allow.[5] Local integration involves refugees becoming economically, socially, and politically incorporated into the host country when returning home is not feasible or advisable.[6]

Resettlement and return studies primarily concern the macro-scale governance of migration, international relations, and politics under the shadow of methodological nationalist approaches that examine migration movements, their consequences, and governance at the nation-state level.[7] Integration studies offer insights into local consequences of forced migration and the engagement of refugees in social, economic, and cultural aspects of everyday life, but they often fail to acknowledge the initial experiences of refugees such as first encounters and initial sheltering.[8] Consequently, resettlement, return, and integration processes provide limited information regarding refugees' initial settlement in their host country/city. To respond to this gap, research focusing on refugee settlement is crucially needed whereby settlement refers to the initial establishment of a new residence for refugees, typically in protection centers or in (temporary) settlements in urban/rural areas and meeting immediate humanitarian needs through the provision of basic necessities and support.

In response to Syrians' incoming, Türkiye has established camps, predominantly in border cities, but has not pursued an obligatory encampment policy and/or pilot city application entailing the placement of refugees in specific cities/settlements. Türkiye has granted temporary protection (TP) status to Syrians, allowing them to disperse to

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cities, under the condition of registering and not leaving without permission. This approach is rooted in the perception that Syrians are guests in need of humanitarian assistance, and they are expected to return when conditions normalize. More than 95% of Syrian refugees in Türkiye reside in non-camp settings, allowing us to witness a less common process in other country contexts: the self-settling of refugees in urban areas. Self-settling refers to the ability of refugees to act as independent agents, with their individual agency power influencing decisions related to their journeys and settlements.[9] However, self-settlement is not solely driven by refugees'/migrants' own choices as it can also occur due to lack of other choices, absence of guiding policies, or as a survival strategy. Thus, it encompasses far more than just finding accommodation and selecting a location; it is a key indicator of their overall integration and engagement in society. While numerous studies in Türkiye explore how Syrians integrate into urban areas in terms of education, employment, and their social inclusion,[10] there is a limited focus on the self-settlement process.

Therefore, this study aims to elucidate the dynamics and challenges of the Syrians' self-settling in Türkiye within the existent legal and policy framework. It also seeks to discuss the role of key (non)state actors and scrutinize the policies framing the housing and settlement process. This study complements fieldwork-based literature on refugees' self-settlement experiences in Türkiye by focusing on its legal and political dimensions.[11] The discussion relies on secondary analysis, utilizing a desk study to review a range of research materials produced particularly since 2011, including academic research, government policies and programs, laws and regulations, situation reports by civil society organizations (CSOs), bilateral agreements, statistical reports, and media coverage. Qualitative content analysis was employed to analyze the data. The article starts with an extensive literature review on refugees' self-settling and particularly focuses on Syrians' experiences in Lebanon, Jordan, Germany, and Sweden, representing different country responses to Syrian incoming. Then, it examines Syrians' settlement/housing in Türkiye across three periods, discussing dynamics, policies, and actors involved. Following this, it addresses the challenges in Syrians' self-settling process, drawing from academic literature, country practices, and internal dynamics, and concludes with policy recommendations.

On Settlement: Extent, Policies, and Refugee Agency

The concept of settlement, although occasionally used interchangeably with resettlement and integration, distinguishes itself in terms of temporality and spatiality. First, resettlement involves the permanent relocation of refugees to

a new country where they attain legal residency and receive sustained support for long-term integration.[12] Resettlement is mostly limited to a small number of refugees annually, less than 1% globally, prioritizing the most vulnerable cases with specific risks or needs.[13] Second, integration refers to "the process of settlement, interaction with the host society, and social change that follows immigration,"[14] entailing access to resources and social citizenship. Contrary to these two concepts, settlement encompasses fulfilling the basic needs of refugees and enabling temporary or permanent accommodation, regardless of legal status or conceived level of vulnerability. Settlement is also about the provision of the space in which protection is offered while access to basic services and resources is ensured. In this context, settlement is not only the initial phase but also a prerequisite for integration.

Different approaches are observed in various country practices regarding the settlement of refugees. These approaches vary based on the international protection context, volume and scale of mobility, identified needs, and asylum policies of the countries. As Bakewell underlines, especially during mass refugee movements, determining where protection should be available is crucial for three main reasons.[15] First, integrating a high number of refugees into the host country's society often poses social challenges with potential resentment from the local population. Second, providing immediate basic needs, like food, water, shelter, and medical assistance becomes challenging, and locating refugees in known and accessible locations facilitates aid distribution. Lastly, states are primarily concerned about security, as refugees near the border may attract hostile attention and pose potential threats to the local population, especially during conflicts. Consequently, when confronted with large waves of refugees, the prevailing reaction by states has been the establishment of camps. Refugee camps are the specialized protection zones established to meet the basic and urgent needs of displaced individuals collectively.[16] In accordance, encampment is a policy requiring refugees to stay in a designated area exclusively allocated for their use, unless they have obtained specific permission to live elsewhere. Camp regulations often face criticism for creating spatial barriers and hindering integration by treating displaced individuals as temporary guests with limited mobility.[17]

Settlement encompasses fulfilling the basic needs of refugees and enabling temporary or permanent accommodation, regardless of legal status or conceived level of vulnerability.

Dispersal policy is another prevalent approach in the settlement of refugees. States often enforce or encourage refugees to settle in predetermined areas. Dispersal policies are employed to prevent the concentration of refugees in cities, reduce spatial segregation, provide suitable housing, and distribute costs nationwide to minimize potential social discomforts.[18] Some OECD countries, such as Denmark, Finland, Portugal, and Sweden, develop dispersal policies linked to employment, while others like Austria consider municipality size, immigrant ratio, and individuals' familial and health status. Dispersal applications are typically no-choice, requiring asylum seekers/refugees to remain in selected localities unless permitted otherwise.

Social housing is another settlement policy applied by countries to offer affordable accommodation to asylum seekers. For example, in the UK, social buildings are allocated to asylum seekers until their application processes are completed.[19] In the Netherlands, while policies exist to aid refugees with housing, residency in public/social housing is not obligatory.[20] Canada's Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP) provides social housing for government-assisted refugees (GARs) during the arrival year.[21] Another approach to settlement is the implementation of local settlement policies. Here, urban or rural areas are identified, and refugees are encouraged to settle there. The objective is to engage refugees in income-generating activities (e.g., agriculture) and facilitate their integration into social interactions, ultimately aiming for their self-reliance. For example, in Uganda, each refugee household residing in the preselected settlement receives initial food rations and a plot of land for subsistence agriculture under the Self Reliance Strategy.[22]

Besides state-led applications, there are other possibilities wherein refugees decide where they reside and self-settle. The concept of self-settling is linked to the idea of self-reliance, as refugees opting for self-settlement in urban areas often seek independence and agency outside of governmental and international humanitarian frameworks.[23] Studies on the reasons behind refugees' self-settlement encompass a range of motivations. Early studies highlighted the importance of seeking education and employment in cities, while recent research emphasizes the value of livelihood opportunities in urban areas.[24] In this context, prominent factors include but are not limited to the housing market conditions, social aid mechanisms, health, education and infrastructure services, labor market conditions, and the presence of family/relatives and co-ethnics.[25] However, asserting that the self-settling process occurs at the

refugees' initiative is a misleading. On one hand, governments often intervene to facilitate, promote, and regulate the self-settlement of refugees through implementing livelihood programs, addressing structural impediments in attaining self-reliance, and providing land use rights. On the other hand, refugees' self-settlement involves an interplay of opportunities and constraints for livelihoods, and the engagement of various actors, including CSOs, local population, municipal decision-makers, and other local actors. Self-settlement is also shaped by the availability of resources and refugees' capacity to navigate legal and social obstacles.

The Self-Settlement of Syrians in Diverse Country Contexts: A Brief Overview

Türkiye is hosting around 3.2 million Syrians and is followed by Lebanon (784,884), Jordan (639,552), Iraq (273,258), and Egypt (155,825).[26] These countries host Syrians under temporary protection. However, the number of Syrians seeking asylum or granted refugee status in European countries should also not be underestimated. Germany hosts 522,575 Syrians, Sweden 111,199 Syrians, Austria 73,923 Syrians, and the Netherlands 45,141 Syrians. The varying legal statuses granted to them in different countries have led to significant disparities in the rights and processes concerning their initial reception, accommodation, settlement, and integration. Therefore, this phase of the study will concentrate on the settlement processes of Syrians in Lebanon and Jordan where they are granted temporary protection status, and in Germany and Sweden where Syrians are recognized as refugees. However, it is important to note that the selected countries exhibit significant differences in their migration histories, legal frameworks and policies on migration, arrival infrastructures, and most importantly, in terms of their geographical positions and the speed, volume, and profile of incoming Syrians. Therefore, this section aims to establish a foundation for a comprehensive discussion of Syrians' self-settlement process in the Turkish context, rather than providing a comparative analysis.

Lebanon is the second country hosting the highest number of displaced Syrians under TP. Not being a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention, Lebanon has not formally recognized Syrians as refugees. Lebanon initially viewed the Syrians' situation as temporary and implemented an open door policy. In 2014, Lebanon initiated a policy to decrease the number of Syrians by restricting access to the country and encouraging return. Concerning Syrians' settlement, Lebanon has not introduced any encampment policy for Syrian refugees,

reflecting a predominantly non-encampment approach. This approach is thought to be influenced by the long-standing presence of Palestinian refugee camps in the country for more than 60 years.[27] Consequently, Syrians have attempted to address their housing needs independently. According to Fawaz, Syrians initially sought shelter in informal settlements and existing Palestinian refugee camps; however, they predominantly secured housing through rental arrangements.[28] Due to an uneven influx, rental prices have spiked in cities where Syrians settled the most like Beirut, leading to the emergence of housing profiteers and informal housing. Some realtors, driven by the potential for high profits, aggressively pursued strategies like apartment re-subdivision and encouraging Lebanese landlords to vacate. This attracted external investors who converted entire buildings into profitable rental housing.

Jordan hosts around 640,000 Syrians, and similar to Lebanon, does not officially recognize Syrians as refugees. Jordan initially maintained an open door policy, however, due to increasing numbers of newcomers and security concerns related to DAESH, it securitized the borders with stringent visa requirements and surveillance measures.[29] In this context, entry for Syrians was restricted, allowing access only in extreme humanitarian cases. Jordan initially embraced a non-encampment policy, rejecting the establishment of camps. Later, the country reversed its stance and set up six camps, accommodating nearly one-fifth of Syrians. Nevertheless, approximately 20% of Syrians resided in camps when first established, and in time, the majority has dispersed across urban areas.[30]

In Germany, Syrians are granted refugee status, providing access to social security, education, and work permits. Syrians typically stay in reception centers for an average of three months.[31] Afterwards, individuals are relocated to one of Germany's 16 federal states based on tax revenues, quota applications, and population sizes. The responsibility for the distribution and financing of Syrians' accommodation lies with the federal states, with local actors handling most aspects of implementation, reception, accommodation, and integration. Upon arrival in federal states, asylum seekers are distributed to various communities, cities, and towns, primarily residing in the collective housing facilities provided.[32] Such accommodation serves as temporary shelters until individuals attain refugee status or find permanent housing. Some states impose restrictions, preventing refugees from leaving the assigned accommodation or communities for three years, unless they can demonstrate educational or job

opportunities in other states. Under this system, refugees lack the autonomy to select their settlement locations or move independently between municipalities. Upon obtaining refugee status, individuals are entitled to receive public grants and rent allowances.[33]

In Sweden, Syrians are also recognized as refugees. Until 2015, Sweden granted asylum to 49% of overall applicants, with an impressive 89% acceptance rate for Syrians who receive permanent residence status.[34] In 2015, Sweden adjusted its policy due to a spike in asylum seekers and enacted a law mandating that applicants after November 2015 would only get temporary residency, conforming to EU minimum standards to prompt asylum seekers to seek refuge elsewhere. The Migration Agency handles the asylum process, arranging travel and accommodation for resettled refugees and processing asylum applications. CSOs also play a crucial role, providing support at arrival points and aiding in the integration process. Municipalities and city councils are vital actors as they cover most of refugee intake costs, and provide housing for unaccompanied minors.[35] Additionally, they bear responsibility for offering varying levels of health and social services, and education to resettled individuals. While awaiting application processing, asylum seekers in Sweden can choose between government-provided housing or finding their own accommodation. Due to financial constraints, many Syrian refugees opt for government housing, typically situated outside major cities. Resettled refugees lack housing location choice, often residing in areas with limited employment prospects. After obtaining a residency permit, asylum seekers can either settle independently or be assigned to a municipality with available housing. Municipalities receive government financial aid for refugee integration and accommodation expenses.

The Self-Settlement of Syrians in Türkiye

The self-settlement process of Syrians in Türkiye will be examined in three periods concerning initial reception and accommodation, settling in camps (i.e., temporary protection centers) and/or cities, and the actors involved, along with the tools and channels used. This analysis will be conducted in the context of Türkiye's migration management policies and their relation to political, social, and economic changes since 2011. These three periods are:

1. 2011-2015: Syrians' encampment and unforced dispersal to cities. The period was marked by an open door policy and immediate solutions for accommodation.

2. 2016-2019: Syrians as urban refugees and actors in the rental housing market. The period was marked by strict border policies and securitization attempts, and increased Syrian presence in cities.

3. 2019-ongoing: Syrians as long-term residents. The period is marked by growing anti-refugee rhetoric, and restrictions on Syrians' mobility and settlement.

Period 1: 2011-2015

Türkiye welcomed Syrians as guests with a humanitarian response, initially implementing open border and non-refoulement policies, and granting them TP. Türkiye did not recognize Syrians as refugees due to the geographical limitations put on the Geneva Convention in 1951 which exempts the country from providing refugee status to individuals from non-European countries. Thus, Syrians cannot benefit from conditional refugee status and/or apply for international protection from other countries. TP status ensures Syrians' legal stay, access to basic services, and protection from refoulement, and is not equivalent to a residence permit. There is no time limit for the continuation of TP.

Triggered by the mass migration of Syrians, Türkiye revised its legal framework for migration and asylum in 2013 and introduced the "Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP)."

Triggered by the mass migration of Syrians, Türkiye revised its legal framework for migration and asylum in 2013 and introduced the "Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP)." This law, maintaining the geographical limitations introduced above, became a key document for refugees, conditional refugees, and temporary protection. The law led to the establishment of the Presidency of Migration Management (PMM), formerly known as the Directorate General for Migration Management, as the primary institution responsible for migration management. Following the law, the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) entered into force and introduced how individuals under TP would access services like healthcare, education, the labor market, and social assistance. Concerning settlement and housing, the LFIP does not commit to providing shelter for those under protection. Article 95(1) specifies that "applicants and international protection beneficiaries are responsible for arranging their

own accommodation." However, the law empowers the PMM to establish "Reception and Accommodation Centers" to address the needs of applicants and international beneficiaries, including accommodation, food, healthcare, and social support, with priority given to those with special needs. The camps constructed near the Türkiye-Syria border played a crucial role in providing accommodation for Syrians. Initially, 23 camps with varying capacities were nearly fully occupied until 2015.[36] The camps, well-maintained in infrastructure and essential services, provided amenities such as kindergartens, primary to high school education, vocational training courses, Turkish language classes, internet rooms, grocery stores, markets, health centers, and post offices.

Other than camps, Türkiye did not formulate an intrusive policy concerning the accommodation and settlement of Syrians with the exception of the Dilution Policy in 2022. No specific tools, such as credit and rent support, tax reductions, were utilized for Syrians in Türkiye. However, Syrians received financial aid through the Emergency Social Safety Net Program (ESSN) and the Conditional Educational Assistance to Foreigners (CCET) for education and health services. Residence in camps was not obligatory, and Syrians were granted the right to settle in cities as long as they registered, resided, and refrained from unauthorized relocation. Under the circumstances, more than 95% of Syrians in Türkiye opted for self-settlement, primarily in urban areas either through the rental housing market or informal arrangements such as unofficial subletting, staying with relatives, and makeshift housing. Syrians predominantly settled in border towns (Kilis, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa) and major metropolises (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir).

Period 2: 2016-2019

In 2015, the surge in crossings reignited intensive migration diplomacy between the EU and Türkiye, and led to the formulation of the EU-Türkiye Joint Action Plan in November 2015 and the EU-Türkiye statement of March 2016. Initially, both sides agreed that individuals arriving illegally in Greece would be returned to Türkiye. Furthermore, for each Syrian returned to Türkiye, an EU member state pledged to resettle one Syrian refugee from Türkiye. The EU agreed to provide financial aid to improve refugee living conditions in Türkiye and to resume Türkiye's membership negotiations.

In internal politics, the focus on addressing mass migration shifted from humanitarianism to securitization, in line with domestic and foreign policy priorities. The open door policy gradually become more hesitant, although no official declaration of a closed door policy was made. From 2016 onwards, Syrians'

entrance to Türkiye without passports was restricted, except for those requiring urgent medical attention. Certain border entry points were also temporarily closed for security reasons and as of 8 January 2016, Türkiye ceased allowing visa-free entry for Syrians.[37] This policy shift possibly mirrored changes in Türkiye's public opinion against refugees (i.e., anti-refugee stances), economic challenges, and a tense election period. Additionally, following a failed coup attempt in July 2016, Türkiye reshaped its securitization policies and intensified its operations against terrorist organizations. In January 2016, construction of a concrete wall began on the Syrian border in Hatay's Yayladağı district. Moreover, since 2017, the Turkish government has established safe zones within Syria's borders as a result of military intervention, notably Operation Euphrates Shield launched in August 2016. These zones serve three main purposes: sheltering civilians from regime attacks during escalations, reducing migratory pressure on Türkiye's border, and facilitating the voluntary return of Syrian nationals.[38]

In terms of settlement and accommodation, this period is characterized by a gradual decrease in camp settlements and an increase in urban concentration. The decline in camp occupancy is attributed to the voluntary nature of staying in camps and strict rules regulating camp life and entry-exit, as well as the Syrians' preference for living outside camps mainly to generate income.[39] Due to their prolonged stay in Türkiye, Syrians largely moved from camps and border cities to industrialized and/or metropolitan areas to access developed services and the job market. Under these circumstances, the fundamental question became: how and under what conditions did Syrians settle in cities? Syrians freely entered the rental housing market, but they were not allowed to buy land or real estate.[40] Thus, their housing was heavily reliant on the functionality of the rental housing market. However, this does not imply easy and sustainable access to housing mostly because rental prices surged significantly in border towns and metropolitan areas, with large refugee populations.[41] Syrians with limited financial means or with no means at all were engaged in a struggle for survival, residing in crowded conditions in small apartments, storage areas, parks, ruins, damaged dwellings, and makeshift and unauthorized temporary arrangements. Various research in Türkiye has demonstrated that Syrians largely resided in impoverished, low-quality, and affordable areas in cities, primarily in dilapidated homes on city outskirts and inner-city deprived areas.[42]

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Period 3: 2019-ongoing

The prolonged stay of Syrians in Türkiye, combined with policy shortcomings concerning settlement, housing, and formal employment, heightened competition between locals and Syrians for scarce urban resources. Language barriers and perceived cultural dissimilarities paved the way towards an increase in anti-Syrian sentiments, characterized by exclusionary rhetoric prevalent in political party declarations and media. This period has been dominated by restrictive border and mobility policies, and discourses centered around repatriation. For example, in 2019, the Governorship of Istanbul announced that Syrians in Istanbul who initially registered in other cities upon their arrival would be returned to their original registration cities.[43]

During this period, difficulties in accessing rental housing persisted and intensified such as speculative rent increases and the reluctance of landlords and realtors to rent to Syrians. Informal settlements and alternative forms of housing became more prevalent, including accommodation in dilapidated houses, abandoned buildings, converted sheds, newly constructed backyard rooms, car garages, and storage areas for coal and wood.[44] Additionally, Kahraman emphasized that Syrians predominantly reside in informal settlements and areas undergoing urban redevelopment, often through basic renovations of demolished or vacated dwellings.[45] Te Lintelo et al. highlighted that with the incoming and prolonged stay of Syrians in Turkish cities, a new bottom-tier rental housing segment is emerging, showing limited overlap with the historical *gecekondu* (slum-type settlements) experience in terms of formation and development.[46] They also noted that Syrians are often compelled to choose the cheapest options available, characterized by insecure verbal lease agreements and substandard living conditions.

Since 2019, new policy schemes on controlling Syrians' settlements in cities have emerged as a result of the increasing concentration of Syrians in cities; their involvement in urban life, and the job and housing markets

Since 2019, new policy schemes on controlling Syrians' settlements in cities have emerged as a result of the increasing concentration of Syrians in cities; their involvement in urban life, and the job and housing markets; increasing urban informalities; growing unrest in society towards the foreign population; and the current culmination of policies aimed at restricting the residential mobility of Syrians. The most prominent example of this is the Dilution Policy introduced in February

2022. Within the scope of the *Fight Against Spatial Concentration Plan* by the Ministry of Interior to increase social cohesion and prevent segregation of specific groups (including Syrians), a dilution policy was initiated in certain neighborhoods or districts in 16 provinces, stating that the foreign population should not exceed 25% of the neighborhood population. To achieve this goal, selected areas of residence are closed to foreign registrations, with refugees being voluntarily relocated to different districts. Ankara, Antalya, Aydın, Bursa, Çanakkale, Düzce, Edirne, Hatay, Istanbul, Izmir, Kırklareli, Kocaeli, Muğla, Sakarya, Tekirdağ, and Yalova provinces, along with 800 neighborhoods in 52 provinces, have closed registrations for Syrians.[47]

Discussion and Concluding Remarks

In this framework, the main challenges of Syrians' self-settling process will be further discussed under two headings with relevant policy recommendations. The first focuses on the socioeconomic, ethnic, and legal dimensions of self-settling, discrimination, and informal settlements. The second discusses the administrative dimension of the process, evaluating the involvement of local governments, civil society, and non-state actors.

Economic and legal status-based challenges of self-settlement

Due to the state of war, the migration of Syrians to Türkiye has occurred without institutional and/or financial readiness, resulting in a significant portion of them being economically disadvantaged. Consequently, many have been stuck in unhealthy, insecure, and often informal settlements concentrated on outskirts or in cities. Difficulties in accessing the formal job market (mostly based on paperwork), the inadequacy of EU-based social assistance mechanisms, and the anti-refugee rhetoric have further exacerbated this disadvantaged situation. Moreover, TP status in Türkiye grants Syrians temporary rights and limits their long-term settlement options. Syrians' prolonged displacement under TP largely reproduces precariousness, unpredictability, and disadvantage in daily life. Challenges include barriers to self-reliance, bureaucratic obstacles in accessing housing and employment, and discrimination, all leading to the social marginalization of Syrians as individuals reliant on aid mechanisms. Due to the precarious legal status and deepening economic disadvantage, many Syrians live in makeshift accommodation like tents, abandoned buildings, or garages, sacrificing safety and comfort. At the same time, these dwellings often do not meet legal standards, making it impossible to obtain the proof of residence required for registration with local migration authorities. Another challenge is

the growing hostility towards Syrians in Turkish society. As Kibreab points out the self-settlement of refugees might disturb host communities because refugees (in)directly compete with locals for jobs, limited affordable housing, and public services.[48] While reports on the impact of Syrians on the welfare of Turkish society show no negative national impact and no discernible effects on the formal economy,[49] the perceived issues including the increases in rental costs and living expenses, alongside decreases in wages and illegal hiring of Syrians by small businesses have negatively influenced the perception of Syrians by natives.

What can be done against all these challenges? Currently, the legal framework focuses on TP for Syrians, without offering long-term residency or citizenship rights. The question of how long Syrians will remain under TP is uncertain. To enable self-settled Syrians to integrate into Turkish society, transitioning from being mere guests to active contributors in economic, social, and cultural aspects of life is essential. Thus, it is crucial to establish clear timeframes and facilitate their transition to permanent statuses. This necessitates legal measures, including lifting geographical restrictions preventing Türkiye from granting refugee status to non-Europeans. In the self-settling process of Syrians, supportive programs and policies are vital to enhance their self-reliance beyond being seen as guests, ensuring access to economic freedom, the labor market, and education, alongside basic rights. This requires comprehensive governance where state and non-state actors work effectively to determine the steps and boundaries for the self-settling process. To lower social unrest, a humanitarian discourse is required which recognizes Syrians as individuals entitled to equal status with the native population in terms of human rights. Statements implying that Syrians are merely guests can indirectly contribute to negative perceptions among the local population.

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There is also a growing need for an urban perspective in managing the settlement process. As also underlined by Fawaz, refugees increasingly seek shelter and

livelihoods in urban areas due to protracted displacements.[50] Thus, the refugee crisis and/or humanitarian crisis becomes more of an urban crisis, aligning with contemporary debates on urbanization. Temporary shelters in camps cannot provide a permanent solution for the housing needs of three million Syrians, as maintaining high standards in these centers is costly and not sustainable. Moreover, many studies indicate that Syrians primarily access housing through renting. This necessitates examining housing production and acquisition processes beyond the market lens and investigating the nature of the housing market segment that addresses the needs of Syrian refugees, especially the most vulnerable. This includes exploring how rental contracts are structured, accessing housing without registration, controlling speculative rent increases, and preventing inhumane living conditions. Examining Syrians' housing access and settlement patterns reveals the reliance on informal housing in cities to accommodate large numbers of refugees. In urban areas where there is no comprehensive settlement plan or regulations supporting self-reliance in the housing market, urban informalities offer a partial solution to the accommodation issue. This situation exposes the city's infrastructure, residents, and refugees to a high level of vulnerability that needs to be reduced. To reduce (additional) vulnerabilities, it is crucial to understand the gaps addressed by existing informal housing channels and to leverage their strengths, such as social networks that are instrumental in facilitating housing exchanges in efficient ways. However, of utmost importance is the development of a comprehensive settlement plan or housing action plan crafted through negotiations among stakeholders at various levels to regulate newcomers' self-settlement from their first day onwards.

Administrative and governance challenges of self-settlement

Türkiye's migration management has a highly central character under the leadership of the Presidency of Migration Management (PMM). The PMM is the sole institution managing all migration and asylum-related processes. The PMM's activities, supported by relevant ministries and state actors, manage migration on a macro scale. At the city level, the PMM extends its reach through provincial directorates and governorships. The role of international and local NGOs and municipalities remains primarily limited to integration-focused activities, like social support, language courses, and vocational training, with minimal involvement in key urban outcomes of migration like housing and settlement.

When examining this phenomenon within the context of other nations, Türkiye appears to distinguish from them. In Germany and Sweden, migration

management is predominantly state-controlled, irrespective of newcomers' legal status. However, the responsibility for managing the urban outcomes of migration, including initial reception, settlement, and housing, is clearly divided among regional and local governments and NGOs. Following Türkiye, Jordan and Lebanon host the largest numbers of Syrian refugees, with a more ambiguous approach to managing their settlement process. In these countries, there is also a macro-level management approach led by the state, including deterrent measures such as voluntary return of Syrians and making it more difficult to extend residency permits. Yet, observing a clear policy framework on these matters is challenging. Syrians in Lebanon and Jordan are struggling to self-settle in urban areas under precarious conditions. As observed in Fawaz's research, non-state actors such as realtors and building managers prominently engage in Syrian refugees' access to housing, rental arrangements, and settlement processes. While these actors might be filling policy gaps in addressing critical needs, their unregulated activities extend beyond market dynamics often further disadvantaging Syrians and placing them in even more precarious situations.

In this context, it is possible to discuss three key administrative and governance challenges regarding the self-settlement process of Syrians in Türkiye: (i) the limited role of municipalities; (ii) the limited role of CSOs; and (iii) the involvement of diverse non-state actors.

(i) Türkiye has initiated national efforts to manage Syrians' incoming through specialized institutions and camps, yet local governments face challenges in adapting policies for urban refugees without a clear national strategy. Local governments are only referenced as collaborative partners of the PMM in managing Syrians' settlement and integration processes in Articles 96 and 104 of Law No. 6458. They are not entitled to address Syrians' housing needs in terms of provision, financial support, or guidance. Nevertheless, some municipalities extend services to Syrians by leveraging Articles 13 and 38 of the Municipality Law, which afford individuals access to city services based on local residency. According to Sunata, municipalities fall into three categories concerning their services for Syrians under TP:[51] (i) municipalities establishing dedicated integration units; (ii) municipalities providing urban amenities and integration-oriented services; and (iii) municipalities contemplating tax measures for the urban Syrian populace receiving public

services. However, services vary between districts in terms of extent, delivery mode, and funding, reflecting diverse interpretations of Syrians' needs. Central budget support to municipalities is based on citizen counts (along economic indicators, infrastructure needs, etc.) and mostly excludes Syrians. Population projections employed by municipalities to forecast future trends and develop facilities and urban services also exclude Syrians. Some municipalities explicitly avoid supporting refugees due to fears of attracting more refugees or losing local elections amidst rising anti-Syrian sentiments. Consequently, Syrians are primarily subjected to discrimination and (intentionally) excluded from municipal services, omitted from housing needs assessments, and unable to receive support during the housing access process.

(ii) Numerous CSOs have commenced operations in settlements characterized by a high concentration of Syrians. They engage in activities such as providing technical support for registration, monitoring repatriation and resettlement processes, and facilitating access to education. However, political apprehensions, such as concerns over conspiracies and transparency, prompted governmental authorities to impose regulatory restrictions especially on international CSOs. Consequently, certain CSOs were compelled to adhere to financial obligations, employ local personnel, and operate under surveillance.[52] Various Turkish associations, cooperatives, and foundations provide support for Syrians, albeit typically on a small scale. While they offer services such as advocacy, psychological support, and education, they notably do not provide rent support, housing assistance, or settlement services. CSOs supporting Syrians often regard them as passive recipients of charity rather than active participants, leading to a problematic cycle of dependence.[53]

(iii) Similar to observations in Lebanon and Jordan, the policy nonaction of Turkish authorities on Syrians' settlement and housing access, coupled with the limited roles of municipalities and CSOs in managing urban migration consequences, has inevitably prompted the involvement of local non-state actors – realtors, families, friends, acquaintances, co-ethnics and pioneer migrants, ethnic and class-based networks, landlords, *mukhtars* (non-partisan elected administrators at neighborhood level), labor brokers

(known as çavuş in Turkish), tradespeople, and local political party representatives – who take active roles in shaping Syrians' location choices and housing access. As indicated in various research,[54] this situation reveals that many actors without a direct role in migration governance often engage in activities lacking long-term strategies or plans, and devoid of collaboration, based on their (arbitrary) decisions; (conflicting) individual/collective interests (e.g., making profits, gaining symbolic power over other ethnic/social groups); and unequal social, economic, and political power and resources/capital. For example, realtors, collaborating with landlords, may set higher rental prices targeting refugees and employ ethnic discrimination in the housing market.[55] *Mukhtars* often offer services such as finding accommodation, providing furniture, accompanying individuals to hospitals, and assisting in job placement for some Syrians.[56] While these actors may partially address needs and mitigate policy gaps, it is crucial to acknowledge that such arbitrary practices often hinder Syrians' access to healthy housing, integration, and social inclusion, serving the interests of certain non-state actors.

The policy and legal recommendations provided below may contribute to addressing the administrative challenges. First, there is a need for the implementation of a multi-scale and multi-actor migration governance in Türkiye. Here, migration ought to be perceived as a process that yields outcomes not solely regulated by national-level policies but also at regional/urban and even neighborhood levels. Simultaneously, as seen in many Turkish cities hosting Syrians, numerous non-state local actors play a role in Syrians' housing access and location choice. In this context, transitioning to a robust governance model that involves central and local authorities, civil society, and non-state actors seems crucial. Looking specifically at the self-settling process, the implementation of this governance model requires increasing the authority, resources, and responsibilities of municipalities and civil society, as well as ensuring coordination to facilitate collaboration with the PMM. Second, municipalities need to be redefined as active stakeholders, beyond merely being potential auxiliary actors in migration management, in order to play a decisive role in Syrian settlement, access to housing and urban services, and integration. Syrians should be recognized as "urban citizens" rather than guests and be included in urban planning processes by incorporating them into municipal zoning plans and population projections that form the basis for the allocation of services and resources among social groups. Considering

the massive incoming of Syrians to specific settlements, there is a necessity to recognize the burdens placed on municipalities' jurisdiction and to enhance their institutional and financial capabilities to address growing needs. Third, considering CSOs' strong field-based insights, equipped human resources, and their interactions with Syrians and local population in daily life, they need to be recognized as effective actors in governing the local consequences of migration. Lastly, awareness about non-state actors is essential. These actors not only fill policy gaps, support state policies, and provide practical solutions to problems, but also reproduce exploitative and discriminatory systems, perpetuate informality, and act in their own interests. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the underlying issues beneath the informal solutions they produce within an ethical framework and comprehend what their practices actually address.

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ARTICLE

INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF BOSNIAN MUSLIMS: FROM BERLIN TO SAINT-GERMAIN

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Abstract

The impact of international treaties and laws on the identities of nations is an under-researched subject. Although it is possible to obtain some information about the impact of different international agreements on the development of nations in a disconnected manner in different publications, it has so far been difficult to find a systematic and comprehensive study on the matter. The same gap also exists in the academic studies on the emergence of Bosniak identity and nationalism. This article aims to fill this gap by examining the impact of the international agreements signed over a period of more than forty years on the national development of the Bosnian Muslims who assumed an important position in the defense policies that the Ottomans began to follow from the 17th century onwards. However, in the first half of the 19th century, conflicts would erupt between the Ottoman government and the Bosnian ajans (local leaders). Istanbul's centralization efforts created unrest in Bosnia and led the Bosnian Muslims to emphasize their Bosniak identity (Bošnjaštvo) to differentiate themselves from the Ottomans. On the other hand, in the late Ottoman period, the conflicts between the Serbs, the Montenegrins, and the Ottoman Empire and the Bosnian Muslims who sided with it were perceived as a struggle between Christianity and Islam. This process resulted in the strengthening of

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Bosnian Muslims' Muslim identity (Muslimanstvo). After the Berlin Treaty of 1878, the Bosnian Muslims found themselves within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, creating disappointment and anger among them as they thought that they had been let down by the Ottomans, and ultimately bolstering their Bosniak identity. The Istanbul Convention of 1879, the Protocol of 1909 between the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the Istanbul Treaty of 1914, and the Minority Treaty of 1919, which regulated the rights of Muslims, all underlined their Muslim identity. The Protocol of 1909, which marked the end of Ottoman sovereignty in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was a major trauma for the Bosnian Muslims. It not only underlined their Muslim identity by defining Muslims' rights but also contributed to their Bosniak identity by severing their links with the Ottoman Empire indefinitely. However, the political conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the decades to come pushed Muslimhood as the identity of the Bosnian Muslims to the forefront.

Keywords

Bosnian Muslims, international treaties, identity, nationalism, Austro-Hungarian Empire

Introduction

The first international treaties on the protection of minorities were concerned with religious rights.[1] In the Balkans, "the protection of minorities," as a concept of international law, has its roots in "the protection of religious minorities." In the 18th and 19th centuries, the European powers signed several treaties with the Ottoman Empire for the protection of its Christian citizens. Gradually, Austria, France, and Russia became the protector countries for the Ottoman Christians. With the sultanic decree of 1856 (*Hatt-ı Hümayun*), the Ottoman Empire promised full freedom to all the religious communities under its rule. According to Article 62 of the Berlin Treaty, the Ottoman Empire confirmed the religious freedom of all its citizens.[2]

The great powers also imposed minority protection on the newly established Balkan nation states in the 19th century. With the London Protocol of 1830, Greece was obliged to provide religious equality and freedom to its citizens. The Berlin Treaty imposed certain regulations on Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, and Bulgaria to prevent discriminatory treatment of their religious communities in terms of their civil and political rights. These regulations were similar to those

previously imposed on the Ottoman Empire. Regulations concerning minority protection would continue within the frameworks of bilateral agreements until World War I.[3]

After World War I, the problem of national minorities became acute because of the extensive territorial reshaping.[4] The minority question was mentioned more and more in the press and public opinions of different countries. Here, the term "minority" refers to the ethnic or national minorities which differ from the majority in a particular country by their race, language, or religion. In this new period, particularly the question of ethnic minority was no longer considered as an issue of domestic politics but rather as a question of international importance.[5]

After World War I, the problem of national minorities became acute because of the extensive territorial reshaping.

During the Versailles Peace Conference, a special committee was established to focus on the situation of the minorities in Eastern and Central Europe. Initially, its main concern was the Jews living in Poland. However, the peace agreements signed after World War I with the other Central and Eastern European countries also included some obligations concerning the minorities. The so-called minority treaties were first imposed on the newly established countries like Czechoslovakia and Poland. The Saint-German Treaty, which was signed between Austria and the Allied and Associated Powers on 10 September 1919, obliged the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to make a separate treaty on its minorities. The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes tried to convince the other countries at the conference that it was the heir to the former Serbian Kingdom. With this and some other arguments, its officials tried to avoid signing the Minority Treaty.[6] However, under the existing international conditions, they had to sign it.[7] Later, the same obligations concerning the minorities were imposed on the countries which would join the League of Nations. The Scandinavian countries, France, Italy, Britain, and Belgium did not sign the minority treaties.[8]

In the interwar period, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes signed several treaties with its neighbors for the regulation of the rights of the minorities. The Bled Treaty, which was signed in 1927 with Romania, was supposed to regulate the Romanian elementary schools in the Yugoslav part of Banat and the Yugoslav schools in Romanian Banat. However, it was not until the signing

of a new convention on the minority schools by the two countries in 1933 that this issue was resolved. The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes signed four treaties with Italy up to 1925 to regulate the rights of the Italians in the kingdom and the Yugoslavs in Italy.[9] Among all the treaties signed by the kingdom, the Saint-Germain Treaty was the only one which directly concerned Bosnia and Herzegovina.[10]

The Muslims of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes gained an international status of "minority" with Article 10 of the Minority Treaty signed in 1919. According to this article, the family and personal issues of the Muslims would be regulated according to Muslim customs. The Minority Treaty considered the Muslims a "religious community" (*vjerska zajednica*). It is important to note, that Article 10 was the product of a long historical process. With Article 11, the treaty put the rights of the Muslims under international protection. In other words, for the first time, the distinctiveness of the Bosnian Muslims gained an international protection. The Minority Treaty made a new and important contribution to the affirmation of the identity of the Bosnian Muslims and to the formation of a Muslim nation.[11]

The Berlin Treaty and Bosnian Muslims

The Berlin Treaty was the most important single treaty in the 19th century in shaping the borders of the Balkan countries. With this treaty, Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania gained their independence while Bulgaria became autonomous. The same treaty would also have important consequences for Bosnia and Herzegovina, since the Austro-Hungarian Empire was given the right to occupy these two provinces with Article 25. Despite the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Empire became the de facto ruler of these provinces, Bosnia and Herzegovina would continue to remain under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. The legal status of these provinces was a kind of nudum ius.[12] Bosnia and Herzegovina's complicated international status was of great importance for the political developments in these provinces in the decades to come.[13]

The Berlin Treaty was the most important single treaty in the 19th century in shaping the borders of the Balkan countries. With this treaty, Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania gained their independence while Bulgaria became autonomous.

With the Berlin Congress, the Austro-Hungarian Empire did not assume any concrete responsibility towards its new citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the rights of the Muslims would be clarified by the Istanbul Convention (or the so-called Yenipazar Convention) signed by the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires on 21 April 1879. In the convention's preamble, it was confirmed that the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina would not threaten the sovereignty of the sultan in these two provinces. According to the convention's first article, former officials who possessed the necessary requirements for their jobs would remain in their posts. In the case of their change, Austria-Hungary would prefer to appoint new officials from among the local population.[14]

According to the convention's second article, all religions in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be granted freedom of practice, and particularly the Muslims would enjoy total freedom in communication with their religious leaders (ulema) and the Austrian officials would pay maximum attention to the protection of the lives and properties of the Muslims. Those who attacked the lives, properties, or religion of the Muslims would be severely punished. The Muslims were allowed to mention the name of the sultan in their prayers and to hoist the Ottoman flag on the minarets according to the custom. The third article of the convention states that the revenues of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be spent only on meeting the needs of these provinces.[15]

Some rights granted to the Muslims by the Istanbul Convention were violated or not fulfilled. These would constitute some of the most important demands of the Bosnian Muslims in the years to come. The first Muslim party, the Muslim National Organization (*Muslimanska narodna organizacija*, MNO) established in 1906, particularly stressed that from the perspective of international law, Bosnia and Herzegovina was an integral part of the Ottoman Empire.[16] Furthermore, the Muslims were encouraged by the Ottoman officials to be the watchdogs of the provisions of the Istanbul Convention and to protect their rights.[17]

The Bosnians offered a fierce resistance which would continue for nearly three months to the Austro-Hungarian occupation. The Austro-Hungarian army needed more than 150,000 troops to crush this resistance. The Muslims constituted the core of the resistance, while the Serbs and some Croats and Jews also supported it. The Muslims and the Serbs cooperated in cities such as Sarajevo, Banjaluka, and Mostar.[18] The Ottoman policy towards the armed resistance against the Austro-Hungarian invasion was ambiguous.[19] The Ottoman government hoped

that the resistance would be successful so that they could delay the occupation through diplomacy and change the Treaty of Berlin.[20] Since open support to the resistance was diplomatically impossible, the Ottomans secretly sent troops and munitions.[21] However, this help was not sufficient to change the situation on the ground. The resistance against the Austro-Hungarian army would gradually gain an anti-Ottoman character, since the local people thought that the Ottomans had let them down. The fact that some Ottoman officials who stayed in Bosnia were forced to wear Bosnian clothes shows that the resistance was more than an act of self-defense driven by patriotic feelings.[22] It created a certain sense of unity among the Bosnians as well as strengthening the Bosniak identity of the Muslims against the Ottomans.[23]

Despite the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina was placed temporarily under the direct control of the Austro-Hungarian monarch, the country was ruled for thirty years like a no-man's land. Bosnia and Herzegovina had no assembly until 1910 and had no representatives in Vienna or Budapest.[24] After 1890, approximately 10,000 foreigners were settled in the newly established agrarian colonies in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[25] The rhetoric used by the Austrians and Germans concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina shows that Austrian and German public opinion considered Bosnia and Herzegovina as a kind of colony.[26]

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After the occupation, the relationship between the religious communities and the state in Bosnia-Herzegovina was based on the Austro-Hungarian regulation of 1874. The Austro-Hungarian government granted the status of "recognized religions" to six religious communities: the Islamic, Roman Catholic, Serbian Orthodox, Evangelical, Greek Catholic, and Judaic communities. Islam, the former dominant religion, became just one of the recognized religions in a non-Muslim state and the Bosniaks became a religious minority.[27] Furthermore, the Muslims, who constituted the upper class in Bosnian society by representing the state during the Ottoman period, were afraid that they might be treated at the same level as the tenants (*kmets*) by the new government.[28]

The Catholics would adapt themselves more easily to the new Catholic Austro-Hungarian regime than the other groups in Bosnia. Moreover, the Orthodox

Christians and Jews had already established their own communal organizations under the Ottoman *millet* system. Creating a new system for Islamic affairs, independent from the state, was a new challenge for the Bosnian Muslims.[29] The Austro-Hungarian government responded positively to the demand of some Muslims to create a new religious institution and the *Medžlis-i Ulema*, which was composed of four high-ranking clerics (*ulema*) with the religious leader (*Reisül Ulema*) at its head, was established. The Islamic Religious Community (*Islamska vjerska zajednica*, IVZ), which was organized in 1882, was the first national-religious organization of the Bosnian Muslims independent from the *Shajkh-al-Islam* in Istanbul.[30]

The Austro-Hungarian government was determined to reduce the influence of the Ottoman Empire in Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the fact that according to the Istanbul Convention, the Muslims were free in their contacts with their religious leaders.

After the occupation, the Ottoman bureaucrats had left Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Muslims had lost their contacts not only with the Shajkh-al-Islam but also with the Ministry of Vakufs[31] (or the *Evkaf Ministry*) in Istanbul.[32] The new religious body was responsible for the religious education (*mearif*) and hierarchy (*ilmiyye*) as well as for the religious foundations. The connection between the shari'ah courts and the IVZ was relatively weak, since these courts were part of the justice system of the new administration.[33] The Austro-Hungarian government was determined to reduce the influence of the Ottoman Empire in Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the fact that according to the Istanbul Convention, the Muslims were free in their contacts with their religious leaders. In contrast to the Albanian religious authorities, who cut their links with Istanbul on their own will, the Bosnian Muslims tried to keep the connection with *Shajkh-al-Islam* intact.[34] The issue of relations with Istanbul would play an important role in the Muslim autonomy movement (*pokret za vjersku i vakufsko mearifsku autonomiju*) during the Austro-Hungarian period.

Despite the violations of the Istanbul Convention, the Austro-Hungarian government provided a more liberal political climate for the Muslims compared with the political regimes in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria.[35] This would create suitable conditions for the national development of the Bosnian Muslims. However, the Bosnian Muslims, who used to represent the state during the Ottoman period, first lost their former political status and gradually their economic and social privileges. This would lead to an inevitable conflict

between the Bosnian Muslims and the cultural and religious values of the new administration. The fact that the nationality policy of the Austro-Hungarian government was basically based on the Muslims could not prevent the emergence of the Muslim opposition, which would result in the establishment of the first political party of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the MNO, in 1906.

Communication among the Muslims was composed of personal networks such as business and patron-client relations, personal friendships, marriage alliances, etc.[36] The personal networks of the Bosnian Muslims were not confined to Bosnia and Herzegovina and reached Istanbul. After the occupation, the official links between the Bosnian Muslims and the Ottoman government were replaced by unofficial links. Džabić, the leader of the Muslim autonomy movement, was in touch with the Ottoman government and was taking directions from Ottoman officials.[37] Despite the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina was ruled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it was still nominally under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. Bosnia and Herzegovina's complicated international structure provided a suitable base for the continuation of Ottoman influence, particularly among the Muslims. The pan-Islamic policy of the Ottoman government would play an important role in the spread of the Muslim opposition in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[38]

However, the main stimulus behind the Muslim opposition was to be found in Bosnian society.[39] During the Austro-Hungarian period, Bosnia and Herzegovina witnessed an intensive industrialization and bureaucratization process. The Muslims, who constituted the majority of the city population, had difficulties in adjusting to the new economic and social conditions. Since there was no established Muslim bourgeoisie, different Muslim elite groups would take the lead in the national development of the Bosnian Muslims during this modernization process. Intellectuals, landowners, and clerics constituted the most important Muslim elite groups.[40]

The conflict and rivalry within the Muslim elite and between the Muslim elite, on the one side, and the Austro-Hungarian government (*Landesregierung*) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the elites of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, on the other, would shape the national development of the Bosnian Muslims. The main forms of the elite conflicts were: (1) the conflict between the landowners and the government; (2) the conflict between the Muslim and Croat clerics; (3) the conflict between the Muslim clerics and the government; and (4) the conflict between the radical and moderate wings of the Muslim elite.[41]

The Protocol of 1909 between the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires

On 7 October 1908, the Austro-Hungarian Empire proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Ottoman protests and the boycott of Austrian goods did not bring any concrete result and the Ottoman Empire had no choice but to accept the annexation on 26 February 1909. German support for the annexation played an important role in this decision.[42] After the annexation, Bosnia and Herzegovina became a Habsburg province; however, it occupied a unique place within the framework of the empire. In the dualist structure of the monarchy, it belonged neither to Austria (*Cislajtaniji*) nor Hungary (*Translajtaniji*), and with its different legal system it constituted a *corpus separatum.* The Bosnians were neither Austrian nor Hungarian citizens but "members of the land of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (*bosansko hercegovački zemaljski pripadnici*). Until the proclamation of the constitution in 1910, Bosnia and Herzegovina did not enjoy the right of self-government or equal political rights with the other two parts of the monarchy and had no say in common affairs.[43]

After the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire signed a protocol on 26 February 1909 on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandžak Novipazar. With this protocol, the Ottoman Empire recognized the decision of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina. In return, Austria-Hungary gave up its rights to Sandžak deriving from the Berlin Treaty and the Istanbul Convention.[44] According to Article 4, the Muslims were assured freedom and the right to practice their religion publicly as in the past. The Muslims would continue to enjoy the same civil and political rights as other citizens of different religious backgrounds. The name of the sultan as caliph would continue to be pronounced in the public prayers of the Muslims. The rights of the vakufs would be respected as in the past and no obstacle would be placed in the way of the Muslims' relations with their spiritual leaders in Istanbul. The *Reisül Ulema* was explicitly given the right to contact the *Shajkh-al-Islam* in Istanbul.[45] This was an important step taken by the *Landesregierung*. However, from then onward, the practice of religious rituals and the mentioning of the name of the sultan in the prayers were not signs of Ottoman sovereignty but merely the rights enjoyed by the Muslim religious leaders. All in all, it is possible to say that this protocol did not drastically change the status of the Muslims, with the exception of the change in the nomination of the *Reisül Ulema*.[46]

The protocol created a new political atmosphere in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It paved the way for the religious autonomy granted by the Austro-Hungarian

Empire to the Muslims in 1909. This was followed by the promulgation of the constitution and the opening of the first Bosnian Assembly in 1910. This religious autonomy marked an important milestone in the national development of the Bosnian Muslims by strengthening their feeling of distinctiveness. Furthermore, the Muslims were represented as a separate group in the Bosnian Assembly. Finally, the religious autonomy of 1909 constituted the basis for the recognition of the Muslims of the Yugoslav Kingdom as a religious minority by the Minority Treaty.

The Istanbul Treaty of 1914

After the Balkan Wars, during the London Conference in December 1912, the issue of the protection of the national and religious minorities was raised; however, no concrete results were achieved. Likewise, the Bucharest Treaty, which ended the Balkan Wars, did not regulate the rights of minorities. However, the Peace Treaty signed between the Ottoman Empire and Serbia on 14 March 1914 brought some concrete measures for the protection of the Muslims in Serbia.[47]

According to Article 8 of this treaty, the Muslims would enjoy the same civil and political rights as the other Serbian citizens of different religions. They would enjoy total freedom in the practice of their religious rituals and their customs would be respected. The Muslims could resume mentioning the name of the sultan as caliph in their prayers and they would elect the muftis of their regions. The chief mufti would be nominated by the Serbian king from among three candidates elected by the muftis. The religious leader of the Muslims would obtain his *menshura* (authorization) from the *Shajkh-al-Islam* in Istanbul through the mediation of the Serbian embassy. The Islamic Community was also responsible for the administration and control of the vakufs. Beyond the religious and vakuf issues, the muftis would be in charge of the family law of the Muslims.[48] According to Article 9 of the treaty, all the private Muslim schools and their properties would be recognized by the state. In these schools, although teaching of the Serbian language would be obligatory, they were allowed to use the Turkish (Ottoman) language in their education in conformity with the official program. A special school would be established to educate muftis, and not only the government officials but also the chief mufti and muftis would be able to control this school.[49]

The rights granted to the Muslims with this treaty were more concrete and precise than those in the Istanbul Convention (1879) and the Protocol of 1909. However, the actual situation of the Islamic Community would remain similar

and the nomination of the Muslim religious leader would be carried out by the Serbian king and the mufti of Serbia jointly, but not by the sultan. The Istanbul Treaty was ratified by the Serbian Assembly, but the beginning of World War I prevented it from taking effect and it was annulled by the Serbian government on 26 December 1914.[50]

The Saint-Germain Treaty and Bosnian Muslims

The Saint-German Treaty was signed between the Allied and Associated powers and Austria after World War I on 10 September 1919. Article 51 obliged the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to accept the necessary regulations to protect the interests of citizens who were different from the majority of citizens by their race, language, or religion. Article 51 also envisaged a separate treaty between the Kingdom of the Serbs, Coats, and Slovenes and the great powers for the protection of the minorities.[51] With this treaty, the kingdom would no longer be responsible for the obligations included in Article 35 of the Berlin Treaty,[5] which had secured the civil, political, and religious rights of its citizens.

Article 51 obliged the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to accept the necessary regulations to protect the interests of citizens who were different from the majority of citizens by their race, language, or religion.

Initially, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and Romania did not sign the minority treaties. Belgrade wanted the regulations concerning the minorities to be confined to the newly gained territories. The government in Belgrade considered this as an important national issue and the delegation of the kingdom was instructed not to sign the treaty if it was detrimental to the interests of the state. This issue would even lead to the resignation of the Davidović government in Belgrade, and the Yugoslav delegation was called back for further discussions.[53] The Yugoslav delegation had used different arguments, geographic, historic, ethnic, democratic, religious, or strategic in character, to justify its position during the peace conference. However, the basic concept upon which the position of the kingdom largely relied was the "nationality principle."[54] Paradoxically, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes tried to prevent the implementation of this principle for the minorities in the south of its own territory. The new state would be based on the idea that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were tribes of one nation with three names (*troimeni narod*) and was not inclined to accept the existence of minorities.[55]

During the conference, the kingdom's delegation underlined that Serbia, in contrast to Romania, had treated its minorities well in the past. According to the Yugoslav delegation, the Macedonian Slavs were Serbs and they did not constitute a minority. As far as the Muslims were concerned, the delegation stated that their situation was already regulated by the Istanbul Treaty in 1914, despite the fact that this treaty had been annulled at the beginning of the war.[56] The delegation decisively resisted the granting of national minority rights to the Albanians and Orthodox Macedonians. It accepted the religious rights of the Muslims, but rejected their national rights, which was a clear indication, according to Milan Bartoš, of the dominance of the idea of a Greater Serbia in Belgrade.[57]

The demand of the kingdom's delegation led by Nikola Pašić not to implement the Minority Treaty in the parts of the kingdom which were annexed after the Bucharest Treaty of 1913 was rejected by the Supreme Council and the president of the conference, Georges Clemenceau.[58] Having received Clemenceau's letter, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had no choice but to accept the Minority Treaty. The officials in Belgrade came to the conclusion that not signing the treaty might have serious consequences.[59] Finally, with a declaration on 5 December 1919, the kingdom joined the treaty. In May 1920, a preliminary law was issued which included the texts of the Minority Treaty and the declaration of the kingdom's delegation as well as the letters of Nikola Pašić and Georges Clemenceau.[60] The law concerning the Saint-Germain and Minority Treaties would take effect in 1922.[61]

In the minority treaties, the articles concerning the minorities can be classified into two groups: those which define the rights of all citizens (or residents) including the minorities and those which define only the rights of the minorities.[62] As far as the Minority Treaty signed by the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes is concerned, the first nine articles were similar to the other minority treaties.[63] Article 2 of the treaty gave full assurance for the protection of the lives and freedoms of citizens and foreigners regardless of their religious, ethnic, or language background. All citizens would have the right to practice their religions publicly or privately, as long as they did not violate the public order or morality. Article 7 ensured that all citizens were equal before the law and would enjoy equal civil and political rights regardless of their race, religion, or language. Article 8 stated that citizens who constituted ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities would enjoy the same treatment, and legal and de facto guarantees as other citizens. They had the same rights to establish private charity, religious, and social organizations, and schools and other educational

institutions where they would be free to use their native languages and practice their religions.[64]

According to Article 9, in the towns and districts where the minorities constituted an important part of the population, they would enjoy the help of the government to conduct education in elementary schools in their native languages while the teaching of the official language would be obligatory. However, this article would hold only for the territories which were assigned to Serbia or to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes after 1 January 1913.[65] In other words, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Sandžak were excluded from the implementation of Article 9. Thus, the Albanians, who were the largest minority, were deprived of all their national rights. The Turkish and Bulgarian minorities as well as the Muslims in Sandžak were in the same situation.[66]

With Article 10 of the Minority Treaty, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes agreed that Muslim family and personal issues would be regulated according to the customs of the Muslims. The government would take measures for the nomination of the *Reisül Ulema* and would assure the protection of the mosques, graveyards, and other Muslim religious institutions. It would provide all the necessary facilities and permissions for the already existing religious foundations (vakufs) and religious or Muslim charity organizations, and would not withhold any of the necessary facilities for the establishment of new religious or charity organizations, which were assured for other private organizations of the same kind.[67]

With the exception of the part about the nomination of the *Reisül Ulema*, Article 10 was identical to Article 14 of the Minority Treaty signed by Greece. This article was the only specific regulation concerning the Muslims in the minority protection system created by the Versailles Peace Conference.[68] With the signing of the Minority Treaty, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes became responsible to the League of Nations but not to certain countries. With Article 11 of the Minority Treaty, the government agreed that its responsibilities concerning the rights of the members of the minorities of different races, religions, or languages were of international importance and that they would be put under the guarantee of the League of Nations. In other words, the League of Nations was supposed to function like a watchdog for the implementation of the Minority Treaty, which could not be changed without the consent of the majority of the member countries in the Council of the League of Nations. According to the same article, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes also accepted that every member country had a right to warn the

Council of the League of Nations in the case of the violation or the existence of a threat of violation of any of its responsibilities towards minorities.[69]

In these situations, the council could take measures and give instructions which would be appropriate and efficient for the given conditions. In the case of the divergence of ideas concerning legal or factual matters, this would be considered as an international conflict in character and the State of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes agreed that this conflict would be brought to the Permanent Court of International Justice, if the other side demanded this. Finally, there was no Court of Appeal for the verdicts of the Permanent Court of International Justice.[70] The members of the minorities were also granted the right to turn directly to the Secretary of the League of Nations, although they needed the support of one of the members of the council to continue with the process.[71]

The legal status of the minorities in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was basically regulated by the Minority Treaty, then by the bilateral treaties made with Italy, Romania, and Germany, and finally to a lesser degree by the constitutions and laws.[72] One of the most important questions which had to be solved by the constitution was the structure of the new state. This issue was strictly connected to the kingdom's national question.[73] The radicals and the democrats stressed the idea that one nation should have a unified state.[74]

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Between the alternatives of centralized or decentralized states (unity or federation), centralization would gain the upper hand. The constitutional draft of Stojan Protić, the ideologue of the Radical Party, was drastically different from the so-called Vidovdan Constitution of 1921 in terms of the territorial division of the state, and the relations between the state and the local administrations.[75] His decentralized constitutional draft was very close to a federation.[76] Protić was dealing with the Yugoslav question and the relations between the Serbs and Croats in the name of the Radical Party.[77] However, his constitutional draft did not reflect the ideas of his party, and the constitutional committee would accept the centralized constitutional draft of Nikola Pašić.[78]

The Vidovdan Constitution ignored the national differences and historical traditions of different regions. In the state symbols, only three nations were recognized, and the Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Albanians were not considered as national minorities. This was an important violation of the minority rights but had no consequence. The official language of the state was "Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian," a language which has never existed. The Bosnian Muslims were allowed to keep their identity and distinctiveness only as a religious minority.[79] The Vidovdan Constitution had only one provision concerning the minorities: according to Article 16, the minorities of other races and languages could use their mother tongue in the primary schools, and the use of this right was regulated by the 1929 Law on National Schools which considered it in principle as an issue to be addressed case by case rather than as a right.[80]

On the other hand, the Vidovdan Constitution was quite a liberal constitution for its period in terms of basic human rights, freedoms, and equality of citizens. Despite its deficiencies, it is possible to say that, to a certain degree, it reflected the spirit of the Minority Treaty. At the beginning, it had created a certain hope that the rights of the minorities would be respected.[81] According to Article 4, all citizens were equal before the law, and Article 12 stated that civil and political rights would be enjoyed regardless of religious backgrounds.[82]

After the dictatorship, a new constitution was proclaimed in 1931. The so-called oktroirani ustav (imposed constitution) of 1931 was more centralist and unitarist than the Vidovdan Constitution and paid much less attention to the Minority Treaty.[83] Even the modest existence of the regulations concerning the minorities in the constitution of 1921 would disappear in this new constitution. There was no single provision concerning the minorities in the constitution of 1931.[84] As before, the treatment of the minorities was dependent on the relations between the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and the kin-states of the minorities.[85] The Germans and Hungarians enjoyed more rights than the other minorities.[86]

In Article 3, the "Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian" language was declared as the official language and there was no guarantee for the use of the minority languages.[87] With Article 13, the establishment of all political parties and gymnastic organizations on a regional, racial, and religious basis were banned.[88] This was an open violation of Article 8 of the Minority Treaty.[89] According to Article 16, all public and private schools were obliged to develop a consciousness of citizenship in the spirit of national unity,[90] which constituted another violation of the Minority Treaty.[91]

Despite the fact that there was no mention of shari'ah courts in the Minority Treaty, these courts were the most important body for the implementation of Article 10. In other words, the Minority Treaty created an international basis for the domestic legal framework of the shari'ah courts, which were an important Muslim tradition. According to Article 109 of the Vidovdan Constitution, the state shari'ah courts would decide on the Muslims' family and hereditary issues.[92] The same regulation was taken over by Article 100 of the Constitution of 1931.[93] According to Article 11 of the constitution of 1931, the representatives of the recognized religions could make contact with their religious leaders outside the kingdom if it was necessary according to their religious rules. The way in which this contact would take place was to be determined by law.[94] This regulation shows that the Muslims were granted more rights than in Article 10 of the Minority Treaty, at least on paper.[95]

The shari'ah courts were regulated on the basis of the Vidovdan Constitution by the law of 21 March 1929. According to this law, the judges of the shari'ah courts were not religious officials but members of the state bureaucracy. There were two categories of shari'ah courts: county courts and the Supreme Shari'ah Court, which would function as the high court for the ordinary shari'ah courts. These courts were also in charge of conflicts concerning the vakufs. The autonomy of the vakuf administration within the legal framework of the kingdom was admitted by Article 12 of the Vidovdan Constitution.[96] The constitution of 1931 confirmed this autonomy in Article 11.[97]

The shari'ah courts played a central role in the identity of the Muslims. In the interwar period, for the majority of Muslims, the shari'ah was a part of religion and its implementation had a symbolic meaning for the freedom of Islam in Bosnia.

The shari'ah courts played a central role in the identity of the Muslims. In the interwar period, for the majority of Muslims, the shari'ah was a part of religion and its implementation had a symbolic meaning for the freedom of Islam in Bosnia.[98] These courts were considered by the Muslims as an important legacy inherited from the previous periods through religious education, tradition, and customs.[99] Except for some individual critics, there was no political or religious trend among the Muslims which was against the implementation of shari'ah law. Most of the time, the Muslim press, regardless of its political orientation, would respond jointly to the critics of the shari'ah courts.[100] The Muslim religious leaders and politicians were both in favor of keeping shari'ah

law. Thus, shari'ah law was considered as a *ius singulare*[101] for the Muslims of Yugoslavia.[102]

From the very outset of their political activities, the Muslims made demands concerning the shari'ah courts and vakufs.[103] These demands were more stringent than those rights defined in Article 10 of the Minority Treaty. As early as 1919, in the program of the Muslim party (Yugoslav Muslim Organization, JMO), which was published in *Vrijeme* (8 January 1919), the Muslims had asked for constitutional regulation for the equality of Islam with other religions. They also demanded a constitutional guarantee for autonomy in religious, vakuf, and educational (*mearif*) affairs, and for freedom in their relations with the caliphate in Istanbul like the one the Catholics had in their relations with the Vatican. Special emphasis was put on the constitutional regulation of the shari'ah courts.[104] In addition to the Minority Treaty, the political efforts of the JMO and Džemijet (the political party of the Turks and Albanians) as the strongest Muslim parties, also contributed significantly to sha'riah law being protected by constitutional guarantee.[105]

From a legal perspective, with the Minority Treaty, the Bosnian Muslims gained individual and collective protection at the international level (Articles 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10).[106] The famous Article 10 of the Minority Treaty did not meet all the demands of the Muslim religious and political elite, but it provided an international basis for the domestic regulation of Muslim family and personal issues according to their customs. More importantly, for the first time, with Article 11, the rights of the Muslims were put under the control of an international organization.

All these would deepen the feeling of distinctiveness of the Bosnian Muslims and contribute to their national development despite the fact that they were recognized as a religious minority by the Minority Treaty. The pressure on the Muslims and their suffering, particularly in the early years of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, show that the system of international protection did not produce the expected results.[107] However, the Minority Treaty put a certain pressure on the government in Belgrade which was particularly sensitive towards French public opinion.

The book of the French journalist Charles Rivet, *Chez les Slaves libérés. en Yougoslavie [Among the Liberated Slavs: In Yugoslavia]* (Paris: Librairie académique, 1919) was banned by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the kingdom on the grounds that it was biased and did not reflect reality. However,

this book was in circulation among the delegates of the Peace Conference along with some other propaganda material.[108] Rivet's sharp criticism of the regime of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and particularly the complaints of the *Reisül Ulema* Džemaludin Čaušević about the conditions of the Muslims, disturbed the Serbian nationalists and the government in Belgrade, which considered them detrimental to the kingdom's international image. In the spring of 1919, Čaušević, in his interview with Charles Rivet for the journal *Temps,* complained about the atrocities committed against the Muslims and asked for protection from France.[109] The state officials put pressure on Čaušević to withdraw his statement but he did not give way.[110]

The Minority Treaty created mixed reactions among the Bosnian Muslims. The strongest Muslim party, the JMO, did not take a clear position towards the Minority Treaty. However, some sharp criticism would come from the opposition. Šukrija Kurtović, a pro Serb Muslim publicist and politician, stated that the Muslims were not and should not be a minority, and claimed that their status was now worse than before. According to another Muslim intellectual, Muhamed Hadžić, the Muslims did not need Muslim customs and shari'ah courts, but civil courts and total integration into the national and social reality. The Muslim and non-Muslim critics of Article 10 of the Minority Treaty stressed that this article was an obstacle to the integration of the Muslim community into the "nation with three names" and would lead to their isolation.[111]

The Minority Treaty created mixed reactions among the Bosnian Muslims. The strongest Muslim party, the JMO, did not take a clear position towards the Minority Treaty. However, some sharp criticism would come from the opposition.

In October 1920, some prominent Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina received a brochure entitled "The Saint-Germain Treaty is verified!" with the signature of Jusuf Kazazić, from Mostar. The brochure stated that Belgrade did not keep its promises and pointed to the conditions under which the Muslims were suffering. It stressed that the Saint-Germain Treaty had considered the Muslims as a religious minority and was a guarantee for their religious and material existence. It announced that the people of Mostar had decided to publish the political journal Samoodređenje (Self-determination) which would seek total and unlimited national self-determination within the domestic structure of the state. Furthermore, the brochure defended the rights of the landowners on the basis of the Saint-Germain Treaty. It stated

that the aim of the agrarian reform was to destroy the Muslims in the cities and that this violated the Saint-Germain Treaty. A petition would be submitted to the League of Nations through the mediation of France and Britain. Ironically, the brochure stated that the Muslims could also claim that they were a "racial minority" since they were called by the Serbs "Asiatic people" who should be expelled to Asia.[112]

In the eyes of the government officials, application to the League of Nations through the foreign powers on the basis of the Saint-Germain Treaty might cause foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and was considered treason. Therefore, an investigation was started into the brochure issue.[113] Furthermore, the discussions among the Muslims on whether they should obtain foreign help concerning the agrarian reform on the basis of the Saint-Germain Treaty, as well as the statements of Mehmed Spaho, the leader of the JMO, on the subject, were scrutinized by the police.[114] The pressure of the government on the Muslims and their organizations explains the cautious approach of the JMO and its leader to the Minority Treaty.

Conclusion

Since the Berlin Treaty, every single international treaty concerning the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnia and Herzegovina had important consequences for the national development of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian society. The complicated international status of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Berlin Treaty was of great importance for the political developments in these provinces. The occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian Empire was supposed to be temporary and the country was still under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. This encouraged the Muslim opposition against the Austro-Hungarian government. The Istanbul (Yenipazar) Convention of 1879 not only confirmed the Ottoman sovereignty in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also regulated the rights of the Bosnian Muslims.

The Berlin Treaty and Istanbul Convention provided a very suitable basis for the national development of the Muslims. The Ottoman government was following a pan-Islamic policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina and the leader of the Muslim movement, Džabić, was in contact with the Ottoman government. The Ottoman officials encouraged the Muslims to protect their rights deriving from the Istanbul Convention. In the years to come, some of the rights provided by the Istanbul Convention would turn into the political demands of the Bosnian Muslims.

Despite the fact that the pan-Islamic policy of the Ottoman government paved the way for the spread of the Muslim opposition, the domestic dynamics constituted the main factor behind this opposition. The industrialization and bureaucratization process during the Austro-Hungarian period triggered the conflicts within the Muslim elite and between the Muslim elite, on the one side, and the Austro-Hungarian government and the elites of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, on the other. These conflicts would be decisive in the national development of the Bosnian Muslims.

After the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottomans and the Austro-Hungarians signed a protocol in 1909 on the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandžak Novipazar. The conditions of the Muslims did not change drastically with this protocol, but it created an appropriate political climate for the Austrians to grant religious autonomy to the Muslims in 1909, to promulgate a constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to open the Bosnian Assembly in 1910. Religious autonomy was an important landmark in the national development of the Bosnian Muslims since it drastically deepened their feeling of distinctiveness. Furthermore, in the Bosnian Assembly, the Muslims were represented as a separate group. The Istanbul Treaty signed between the Ottoman Empire and Serbia after the Balkan Wars, on 14 March 1914, respected the Muslim rituals and customs; however, it could not be implemented since the parties were on opposing sides during the First World War.

The roots of Article 10 of the Minority Treaty can be traced back to the last quarter of the 19th century. A comparison with the 1879, 1909, and 1914 regulations shows that the Minority Treaty of 1919 included lesser obligations in terms of the protection of minorities.[115] However, the Minority Treaty stimulated the national development of the Bosnian Muslims which had already started during the Austro-Hungarian period. With this treaty, the Muslims could confirm their identity and distinctiveness only as a religious minority; in those years, however, there was a strong interconnection between religion and nationhood in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

More importantly, for the first time in their history, an international organization provided a guarantee for the customs and the distinctive identity of the Bosnian Muslims. The government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which wanted to create Serbs or Yugoslavs out of the Muslims, had to recognize them as a minority.[116] Moreover, the international protection came in a period in which the Muslims were in desperate need of it.

However, the Bosnian Muslims faced atrocities particularly during the kingdom's early years and the government was slow to take the necessary measures to stop them. Despite the fact that the minority protection system of the League of Nations could not prevent the suppression of Muslims, it put a certain international pressure on the government and, added to this, Belgrade was particularly sensitive towards French public opinion. In other words, the conditions of the Muslims could have been worse without the Minority Treaty.

Finally, the Istanbul Convention of 1879, the Protocol of 1909 between the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the Istanbul Treaty of 1914, and the Minority Treaty of 1919, which regulated the rights of Muslims, underlined the Muslimhood (Muslimanstvo) of the Bosnian Muslims. The Berlin Treaty of 1878 created disappointment and anger among the Bosnian Muslims against the Ottomans and strengthened their Bosniakhood (Bošnjaštvo). The Protocol of 1909, which marked the end of Ottoman sovereignty in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was another disappointment for the Bosnian Muslims: it not only underlined the Muslimhood of the Bosnian Muslims by defining the rights of Muslims, but also contributed to their Bosniakhood by severing their links with the Ottoman Empire indefinitely. However, the political conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the decades to come pushed Muslimhood as the identity of the Bosnian Muslims to the forefront.

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105 Karčić, Šerijatski *sudovi*, p. 152.

106 Jahić, *Islamska zajednica*, pp. 122–123.

107 In contrast to the Albanians, the Bosnian Muslims did not submit a petition to the League of Nations concerning the violation of the Minority Treaty.

108 Fikret Karčić, "Stogodišnjica ugovora o zaštiti manjina iz Saint-Germaina," *Takvim* (2019), p. 168.

109 In this interview, Čaušević stated that until the spring of 1919, thousands of Muslims were killed. See Enes Karić, *Mehmed Džemaludin* Čaušević, Sarajevo: Dobra Knjiga, 2008, p. 131.

110 Jahić, *Islamska zajednica*, p. 101.

111 Ibid., pp. 125-127.

112 "San-žermenski ugovor verificiran!", Arhiv Jugoslavije (The Archive of Yugoslavia). Fond: Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova KJ. Br. fonda:14. Kabinet i upravno odeljenje. Razni materijali kabineta i upravnog odeljenja. Gd.1919-1924, 1926, 1929-1934,1936- 1940.Br. fascikle: 3.

113 Policijska direkcija za Bosnu I Hercegovinu. Broj: 351, pres. 12. Marta 1921 god. (to Predsetništvu Zemalske Vlade),1-2. Arhiv Jugoslavije (The Archive of Yugoslavia). Fond: Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova KJ. Br. fonda:14. Kabinet i upravno odeljenje. Razni materijali kabineta i upravnog odeljenja. Gd.1919-1924, 1926, 1929-1934,1936-1940. Br. fascikle: 3.

114 In his meeting with the members of the Association of Landowners (*Udruženje zemljoposednika*) on 7 September 1921, Mehmet Spaho stated that an action on the basis of the Saint-Germain Treaty would be too early and that they should wait for the appropriate moment. On another occasion, Spaho stated that the Muslims could protect their rights through legal means and that there was no need to talk about the Saint-Germain Treaty. Ibid., pp. 6–8.

115 Degan, "Međunarodnopravno uređenje," p. 93.

116 Ibid., p. 103.

ARTICLE

CREATING A DISTINCTIVE "OTHER": THE PERCEPTION OF TURKS AS ASIATIC OR MONGOL IN U.S. MAINSTREAM MEDIA DURING THE COLD WAR

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Abstract

This article explores how Turks were portrayed as descendants of Asiatic or Mongolian heritage in American mainstream media during the Cold War era. It begins by discussing the broader Western view of Turks as historically Asiatic and nomadic people, then delves into how American print publications, including news outlets and magazines, contributed to this perception. Generally, in the West, Turks were often imagined as Asiatic nomads, a characterization that was also linked to notions of barbarism and violence. In the U.S., there was a tendency to depict Turks as fierce and combative, aligning with the broader trend of portraying them as violent. However, there were instances where Turks were praised, particularly in contexts such as their significant contributions during the Korean War as part of the Southern effort which saw Turkish and Western interests align. Through analysis, this study concludes that Turks in American media were often depicted as Asiatic or Mongolian along four main themes: as formidable warriors, racially Asiatic, geographically Asiatic, and as part of Eastern/Asiatic civilization (by contrasting them with Western civilization). The article concludes that the U.S. largely followed the European trend of viewing Turks as part of Asiatic civilization and descent.

Keywords

U.S. mainstream media, Asiatic/Mongolian, Cold War, Western imaginary, American perceptions

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Introduction

The American imagination regarding Turks/Türkiye rested upon the European construction of the Turkish image for centuries.

The Western world has been intrigued by the Turks since the 11th century when they initially encountered them in Anatolia. This encounter sparked numerous Western accounts, including chronicles, travelogues, medieval texts, and modern textbooks, all attempting to comprehend the origins and history of this unique nomadic group. What made the Turks stand out was their distinct ethnic background compared to those of Indo-European descent (Anglo-Saxons, Franks, Germans, etc.), as well as their adherence to Islam. The U.S. was not an exception. The American imagination regarding Turks/Türkiye rested upon the European construction of the Turkish image for centuries. Even as they formed their own opinions about Turks, Americans continued to hold remnants of European influence in their mindset, perceiving Turks as Asiatic, barbaric, violent, and Muslim, qualities that seemed contrary to what constitutes being "American".

The Cold War added an additional dimension to America's perception of Turks. When the Cold War began, the American perception of Turks had already been influenced by the pejorative framing previously mentioned. Turks were often viewed as cruel, barbaric, and almost outside the realm of civilization. In this regard, the U.S. followed the European trend of associating the Turkish nation with negative connotations before the Cold War era. This study aims to uncover the Asiatic traits associated with Turks in U.S. mainstream media during the Cold War. In a related manner, the following section assesses these traits by referencing various media outlets that were published during the specified period.

The connotation of Turks as Asiatic inherently combines barbaric and violent qualities, and this association is not unique to the American imaginary. Hence, this study problematizes how Americans perceived Turks as Asians/Mongolians during the Cold War and accordingly focuses on selected American mainstream media in which Turks are portrayed as Asians. However, since Americans inherited this perception, the study begins with the European imaginary before turning attention to the American one.

Turks in the European Imaginary

The European perspective was influenced by the Umayyad rule over the Iberian Peninsula as the European worldview was primarily structured around religious identities during the Middle Ages. Consequently, the Turks were not seen as

drastically distinct from the Umayyads since Europeans were already acquainted with other "foreign" Asiatic Muslim communities. Despite centuries of military campaigns, Europeans were unable to control the Iberian Peninsula fully.[1]

Yet, Europe remained perplexed about the origins of the Turks despite their many encounters with them. Since their first encounter during the 11th century with Turkish raids to the Asia Minor, some believed that Turks were the descendants of Trojans, specifically the Teucri, considering them honorable heirs of the Trojan lineage. This viewpoint was supported by Pope Pius II (also known as Aeneas Piccolimini) who stated,

> The Turkish people are Scythic [Scythians] and barbarian: whose origin and progress... not to be completely alien to us... [as] they have dispersed the Latins and the Christians... They are cruel and ignoble people, and being ardent in every manner of luxury, they eat those things that others would abhor... and neither would they abstain themselves from the excretions of the immature parts of the body.[2]

He also asserted that the Turks had migrated from eastern Scythia, conquering regions like Cappadocia, Pontus, Bithynia, and most of Asia Minor. After crossing the Hellespont, they extended their dominion over much of Greece and expanded their influence as far as the renowned rivers Save and Danube. Pope Pius II characterized them as crude and ruthless, believing that they were seeking vengeance for their ancestors.

The *Turcarum* thesis, as it became known, posited that Turks were connected to ancient barbarian tribes through a fabricated Trojan lineage. According to this narrative, Mehmed II, with his supposed Trojan ancestry, sought retribution by systematically conquering Greek territories.

This claim was not unique to Pope Pius II. *De Origine Turcarum* (On the Origins of the Turks) by Theodore Gaza, written for Francesco Filelfo, delved into the anthropological study of the Turks' origins. The *Turcarum* thesis, as it became known, posited that Turks were connected to ancient barbarian tribes through a fabricated Trojan lineage. According to this narrative, Mehmed II, with his supposed Trojan ancestry, sought retribution by systematically conquering Greek territories.

Similarly, Salutati proposed that Turks were descendants of the Romans, specifically tracing their lineage to an individual named Turchot, considered a Trojan figure. The link between Turks and the esteemed Romans was established

through this lineage narrative. Turchot was considered a Trojan, connecting Turks with the noble Romans.

> It is astonishing how the leaders cultivate their men in the art of war; ten- or twelve- year-old boys are seized for military service. Through hunting and labors they inure and harden them, and through running, leaping and this daily training and experience they become vigorous. They eat coarse food and heavy black bread with many kinds of grains mixed into it; whatever delicate foods they eat are acquired by the sweat of hunting. They are so well trained that they live contentedly with only one set of clothing and on bread alone. Remarkably tolerant of cold and heat, they endure rain and snow without complaint.[3]

Similarly, Aeneas Piccolomini, a famous humanist who later became Pope Pius II, held a strong belief that the Turks were descendants of the Trojans rather than the rugged Scythians. This conviction was expressed in numerous texts, with his primary source of influence being the *Liber de familia Autumanorum id est Turchorum* (A Book about the Family of the Ottomans, That Is, the Turks) from 1456, authored by the Greek scholar Nicholas Sagundinus. Consequently, Aeneas's accounts were deemed unreliable and inconsistent as they relied solely on one source. He believed that the Scythians were the ancestors of the Huns, who shared a common heritage with the Turkic people. Aeneas described the Turkic people as "fierce and ignominious," engaging in various sexual perversions and frequenting brothels. He also mentioned their consumption of detestable foods such as mare's flesh, wolves, vultures, and even more horrifyingly, aborted human fetuses.[4]

These conflicting statements regarding the origins of Turks, whether they were believed to have descended from Scythians or Trojans, demonstrate the difficulty in pinpointing Aeneas's precise stance on the Turkish lineage.

Yet, some argued against the notion of Turks being of Trojan descent, citing the Trojans' appreciation for literature as evidence to the contrary. Conversely, certain humanists drew parallels between the invasions of the Goths and Vandals in late antiquity and the eventual fall of Constantinople. Donato Acciaiuoli expressing this perspective, stated,

> Did not our ancestors often experience this devastation in Italy? The destruction of the people? The overthrow of all Europe? I have learned of the savagery of the Goths, the Vandals and other barbarian peoples who devastated Italy through the chronicles of the ancients, and I reckon a similar calamity would have befallen Italy, had not Hunyadi thwarted

> it, who seems not so much to have been born to check the audacity of the Turks, as to have been given by divine favor to the Christian people.[5]

Humanists, in a way, revived the ancient contrast between European civility and Asian barbarism by imbuing it with cultural significance. Giannozzo Manetti, in his oration to Calixtus III, drew parallels between Cicero's speech "Pro lege Manilia" (On the Manilian Law) and the challenges Europe faced due to the Turkish threat. He likened Mithridates's assaults on Rome in 66 BCE to the actions of Mehmed II, using rhetoric that emphasized the menacing nature of threats originating from Asia.[6] George of Trebizond explored the concept of Asia versus Europe in his work "Ad defendenda pro Europa Hellesponti claustra" (To Defend the Barriers of Hellespont for Europe) from 1452. He emphasized the Greek identity as fundamentally Western and positioned Greece as a stronghold of Europe against the perceived barbarian threat originating from Asia.[7]

The Turks were seen in stark contrast to Western civilization due to their Muslim and Asiatic identity. They were viewed differently from the Umayyads, being considered fiercer and more violent, largely due to their ethnic ties to the Mongols, who were known as one of the most threatening nomadic forces in history, devastating many regions and reaching Eastern Europe. Consequently, the rising threat posed by the Turks to the Byzantines was a military concern that had the potential to endanger all of Christendom within a short period.

The Image of the Turks in the U.S. Prior to the Cold War

In the eyes of Europeans, the perceived barbarism, violence, and tyrannical characteristics of Turkish culture were believed to stem from their religious, geographical, and cultural differences. These factors contributed to the portrayal of Turks as a formidable and dangerous force, posing a significant challenge to the stability and security of European territories. Before the onset of the Cold War, the U.S. adopted this prevailing trend in framing Turks through the lens of stereotypes. This period also marked the beginning of a strong alliance between Türkiye and the U.S., albeit with fluctuations over time. Yet, mainstream media in the U.S. depicted Turks as barbaric, violent, and backward, perpetuating negative perceptions about the Turkish community.

There is a scarcity of literature documenting American perceptions of Turks and the Ottoman Empire from the early 19th century, when bilateral relations commenced, until the onset of the Cold War. However, the existing knowledge suggests that Turks were commonly referred to as the "Terrible Turks," a term carrying a pejorative connotation that portrayed them as violent and barbaric.

Early publications in the U.S. often highlighted the exotic qualities of Turks alongside their perceived viciousness.[8]

Although the establishment of a secular republic in Türkiye following World War I brought about some positive associations regarding Turkish identity, the negative attributions from earlier times persisted during the interwar period and the World War II years.[9] These negative stereotypes continued to shape American perceptions of Turks and the Ottoman Empire, contributing to a persistent image of Turks as "Terrible Turks."

The Turkish image in the U.S. during the 19th and early 20th centuries was largely negative, influenced by initial impressions formed during American initiatives in the Maghrib region and missionary activities within the Ottoman territory. Bilateral relations between the U.S. and the southwestern region of the Ottoman Empire began in the 18th century, shaping Americans' perceptions of Turks through their interactions with Berber and Arab people. These groups maintained their own diplomatic relations within the divided administration of Tripoli, Tunisia, and Algeria, often without the oversight of Istanbul.[10]

For Americans, the term "Turk" encompassed not just an ethnicity but also served as a broader identity representing the Muslim community as a whole. Consequently, American perceptions influenced Europeans as well, particularly through the dissemination of long-standing American captivity stories that portrayed barbaric experiences of Christians at the hands of Muslims.[11] This contributed to a negative stereotype of Turks and Muslims in the American imagination and, to some extent, in the European perception as well.

For Americans, the term "Turk" encompassed not just an ethnicity but also served as a broader identity representing the Muslim community as a whole.

The missionary activities of American-based Protestant groups in the Ottoman territories also played a significant role in shaping American perceptions. One such organization, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) based in Boston, had a considerable impact on Ottoman domestic affairs through its extensive missionary endeavors.[12] These activities were successful in influencing ethnic and religious minorities within the Ottoman state, with Armenian propaganda in the 19th century being closely associated with American missionaries.[13] Missionary activities may also have played a role in promoting anti-Turkish sentiments in the U.S. by highlighting the Armenian

question,[14] and this contributing to the prevailing negative images of Turks throughout the U.S. from the late 19th century onwards.

The missionary endeavors contributed to miscommunication, which, in turn, fostered hostility towards the Turkish out-group, which continued into the Cold War period. An example of this is the story recounted by Stavros and published in 1982 in *Time magazine*. "During World War I, Stavros [the protagonist] has magnificent visions of a Greater Greece, when the wicked Turks will be laid low as the profits in rugs soar skyward."[15]

The negative portrayal of Turks was also perpetuated by the stories circulating in the U.S. about the events of 1915.[16] Related to this, Turks were often depicted as despotic, imposters, and heathens, and believing in an antithesis of the true religion, i.e., Christianity.[17] The reports by American missionaries reflected these negative perceptions, with the general overview of bilateral relations influencing the tone of their reports. When cooperation between the U.S. and Türkiye increased, the missionaries' reports tended to portray a more positive image, while periods of tension led to more negative depictions.[18]

The Turkish-American population living in the U.S. also played a role in shaping the American image of Turks. As Turks migrated to the U.S., their presence contributed to a gradual shift towards a more positive perception among the American public.

The interaction and integration of Turkish immigrants into American society provided Americans with a more nuanced understanding of Turkish culture, traditions, and values.

The interaction and integration of Turkish immigrants into American society provided Americans with a more nuanced understanding of Turkish culture, traditions, and values. This firsthand experience of Turks as neighbors, colleagues, and friends helped dispel some of the negative stereotypes and misconceptions that had previously prevailed.[19]

Additionally, the contributions of Turkish-Americans to various aspects of American life, such as business, academia, arts, and sports, further enhanced the positive image of Turks in the eyes of the American public. Over time, the Turkish image in America evolved from a negative or neutral one to a more positive and multifaceted one, reflecting the diverse and vibrant Turkish-American community.

Two instances during the Great War exemplify this improvement. The first instance is related to the Turkish leatherworkers in Peabody, Massachusetts,

who, at first, were affected by the negative notions associated with Turks at that time. Despite this, they actively engaged with the American community, which helped to alleviate prejudice and improve mutual understanding.[20] Similarly, the activities of the Turkish community in the Chicago area also played a role in enhancing the representation of Türkiye in the minds of Americans.[21] Through their involvement in various cultural, social, and economic activities, Turkish immigrants contributed positively to their local communities. This engagement helped to counter negative stereotypes and promote a more favorable perception of Türkiye and its people among Americans.

However, negative connotations were challenging to overcome, especially given Türkiye's neutral stance during World War II. Türkiye's refusal to side with either the Allies or the Axis powers added to the existing distrust among the former, notably the British. This was significant as the U.S. had taken a leading role in the offensive against Nazi Germany after the attack on Pearl Harbor 1941. Türkiye's neutrality was viewed with suspicion by some Allies, leading to a sense of unease and lack of full trust, particularly from those who were actively engaged in combat against the Axis powers.[22]

Turks as Asiatic/Mongolian in the U.S. Mainstream Media during the Cold War

Throughout the centuries, Americans have similarly portrayed Turks based on their Asiatic origins. When discussing uncivilized Eastern invasions into Europe, Turks are often mentioned in the same breath as the Mongols, the Moors, and other Eastern "invaders" seen as threats to Western civilization.

As previously mentioned, Americans' initial interaction with Turks can be traced back to the 19th century when the U.S. aimed to enhance its economic presence in the Levant region. After then, Americans formed a specific perception of Turks, primarily influenced by various cultural elements. Being predominantly Muslim, having migrated from the Asian steppes, and often thought to be descendants of Mongols who traversed Asia and Europe from the 13th century onward, Turks were viewed as a warlike nation originating from a distinct cultural background, positioned in contrast to Western civilization and its foundational values.

It was believed that Turks' imperial history was marked by a series of terrible events and barbaric massacres committed to ethnic minorities within the empire's territory. The British policy that allowed the Ottoman Empire to get away with the so-called Bulgarian massacres was mocked by Lawrence Housman from *The Atlantic*,

> [The] Turkish policy of Lord Beaconsfield [then prime minister] was being violently denounced…and the Bulgarian massacres charged against the Turkish bashibazouks, had become a bone of contention between the Liberal and Tony parties. The question was: If you were a bird, what bird would you be, what would you do and where would you locate yourself?... And this is how Alfred Housman [an English poet and scholar] tackled the problem…:
> 'Oh, what should I be but a turkey?
> And what should I have but a wattle—
> …
> A wattle to change like an opal?
> My looks should be gloomy and murky;
> My tail should be lively and perky:
> And my home should be Constantinople.
>
> An Ottoman ('cos I am called so)
> My throne and my footstool should be;
> …
> I would laugh at the onsets of Russia,
> My protectors would certainly crush her.[23]

While highlighting instances of Turkish violence targeting Bulgarians within the empire, Housman also criticized the European powers, especially Britain's policy towards the Ottomans under Lord Beaconsfield's government, for overlooking the so-called Turkish atrocities and supporting the empire against the Russians as needed. Additionally, these incidents also involved instances of cruelty towards their own people. Lesley Blanch from *Vogue* argued,

> Nowhere are extremes more striking than in the life once lived with the Sultan's palace, Topkapi Sarai, the Vieux Serail or Seraglio, as it is generally known…From murder to tulip festival, all had been foreseen… Sultan İbrahim [once] drowned his entire harem, three hundred strong, in order to have the refreshing experience of forming a new one, overnight… by the 1850's there were few such drownings, though decapitulations were still sometimes practiced in the grand harems.[24]

Within this context, it can be argued that in American popular discourse, a Turk was often perceived as significantly different from an American. There was a persistent feeling of belonging to a specific culture among Americans, who reverted back to a sense of normality when considering themselves as opposed to a Mexican or a Turk.[25] Such discourse highlights the shared cultural domain

that Americans experienced in their daily lives, which they didn't necessarily share with Turks on a daily basis. For example, music is deeply embedded in cultural frameworks as a form of communication. Thus, the interest of Türkiye's Ambassador to the U.S. Mehmet Munir Ertegün's son, Ahmet Ertegün, in jazz is seen as a "crisis in diplomacy" as jazz and blues are viewed as "un-Turkish" and resonate with Americanness during the early phase of the Cold War.[26]

Even when texts declared the similarity of Turkish and American aspirations in terms of science and progress, this similarity was emphasized within the context of the differences between the two societies. In a letter to the editorial of *Time*, for example, an American citizen writing from Istanbul explained the Turkish reaction to the *Apollo 11* mission, emphasizing a shared sense of humanity's unity and progress, and emphasizing the fact that "what were our thoughts American and Turkish alike? Simply, might all mankind be united at last [despite differences]."[27] In other words, Turkish aspirations were thought to align with the trait of progressive liberal capitalism, which is characteristic of the protagonist American society.[28]

However, despite these shared aspirations, there were still differences that defined Turks in various aspects. Turks' Asian quality was just one example that signaled a diverse identity within the Turkish out-group. Accordingly, the portrayal of Turks' Asiatic characteristics by the American mainstream media during the Cold War can be divided into four main categories: Turks depicted as fierce warriors; Turks identified with their geographical Asiatic origins; Turks associated with their ethnic Asiatic heritage; and Turks positioned in opposition to Western civilization.

Turks were recognized for their skill as fighters, with their strength believed by Americans to stem from their Asiatic roots. Originating as fierce and aggressive nomads from Central Asia, they naturally excelled as warriors, giving them a military advantage.

Turks as Fierce Warriors

Turks were recognized for their skill as fighters, with their strength believed by Americans to stem from their Asiatic roots. Originating as fierce and aggressive nomads from Central Asia, they naturally excelled as warriors, giving them a military advantage.

Particularly during the Korean War, when Türkiye deployed its brigades to support the South against the Communist North, the effectiveness of Turkish fighters on the battlefield was highlighted in the opinion pieces about the war.

> The first Turks swept across Asia to become a military aristocracy and then found the Seljuk dynasty. They were a horde of lean, hawk-faced men, with black slit eyes, ferocious warriors. And today, those who have fought beside the magnificent Turkish brigade in Korea know the breed has remained uncorrupted.[29]

Similarly, Turks' traditions were scrutinized based on civilizational and so-called ethnic traits in order to comprehend this distinct group of people, viewed as fundamentally different from American culture. An article in the *Christian Science Monitor* characterized Turks as follows: "The nation [Turks], which is Asiatic, has received its traditions from three main sources: self-reliant, bellicose, horse-riding tribal ancestors, Moslem religion and half a millennium of imperial power."[30]

This specific trait was correlated with Turks' geographical origins, religious beliefs, and their historical imperial legacy, all articulated as characteristics stemming from cultural affiliations. Thus, Americans continued to perceive Turks as nomadic people and this perception affected how Americans understood the Turkish approach to urbanization. Accordingly, "It has been said that the Turk remains a nomad at heart and that his cities are but the dwelling of a night."[31]

From the assigned characteristics, it becomes clear that Turks were seen as naturally contentious as a nation. This trait was believed to originate from both their geographical and ethnic origins, purportedly as descendants of Mongols. An article in the *L.A. Times* concluded, "Asker means soldier and is pronounced exactly like Oscar. He is a peasant lad of old Anatolian stock, often with slightly Mongolian features that testify of nomadic ancestors from Central Asia."[32]

Turks as Geographically Asiatic

Within the context of the Cold War, Türkiye's firm alliance with the West and particularly with the U.S. presented a contrast: it was a nation that stood as a Western ally, while possessing cultural characteristics associated with Eastern or Asiatic origins stemming from geographic position. Their ferocious quality resulted from the harsh Central Asian environment, which was often reminded through their social practices. As Lesley Blanch stated, "…these *mangals* [charcoal brazier] and the *semovers* [samovars] ... remind us that here are many Asiatic roots, the Asia of the steppes, of the Mongols; contrast again."[33] Indeed, Türkiye's geographical location between Europe and Asia further reinforced such assumptions: "Part of Istanbul may be in Europe, but anywhere in Türkiye one is in Asia, among Asiatics."[34]

Historically also Turks were positioned in the Eastern Mediterranean region as part of the Asian continent. Based on this perception, Western governments, including American policymakers, positioned Türkiye as part of the southeastern flank of the containment policy towards the Soviet Union. In a 1955 article in the *L.A. Times*, the geopolitical proximity of Cyprus to Türkiye, seen as an Asiatic nation, was articulated as follows: "Cyprus is a British crown colony which lies just south of Asiatic Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean."[35]

Within the same framework, during the Cold War, American foreign policy viewed Türkiye as a stronghold in the Near East region that needed to be reinforced in response to the Soviet threat from the north. This perspective led to Türkiye's inclusion in the Marshall Plan under the Truman administration. Tom Twitty from the *New York Herald Tribune* summarized this stance with the following sentence: "The immediate problems which Mr. Truman will discuss in detail are those of preventing the collapse of Greece and of strengthening Türkiye, both Near Eastern outposts of Western civilization facing a wall of Communism."[36]

Furthermore, the positioning of Turks as Asiatic inherently attributed to them characteristics contrary to Western culture and civilization. Turks' nomadic and Asiatic traits were perceived as diametrically opposed to the thousands of years of Western civilization founded on urban settlements, architectural marvels, and the birth of primitive forms of democracy. Therefore, since the earliest encounters between Turks and the West in the 11th century, Turks were viewed as a significant threat, first, to Christendom and, later, to Western civilization. This entrenched understanding was also evident in the American mainstream media. In an article in the Atlantic Daily, N.R. Danielian wrote,

> The Roman Empire in the Mediterranean basin, and Byzantium of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, had stood guard at the gates of Europe protecting the established values of Western civilization, its legal codes, its Christian and humanistic values inherited from the ancient world, against the attacks of the Persians, the Tatars, the Turks, the Mongols and the Moors.[37]

Likewise, areas where the West encountered Turks were often portrayed as crossroads of diverse civilizations, with Turks symbolizing the entirety of the East, juxtaposed against the seemingly radically different West. Thus, Mediterranean ports were presented as melting pots of two distinct axiologies, East and West: "This is a spot [Venice] where the Orient of the Turks and Mongols blends extensively with Europe."[38]

Turks as Racially Asiatic

Turks were viewed not just as Asiatic in a geographical sense but also in an anthropological sense. Their descent from the feared Mongols, who had a significant impact on the world during the High Middle Ages, set them apart ethnically from Americans and other Western nations. In an article in the *Chicago Tribune*, Percy Wood made a comparison between the Greek and Turkish nations on the basis of their anthropological origins in order to indicate a significant difference in Cyprus as "Turks being Moslems and Greeks are Greek Orthodox"[39] and hence "... Greeks are Aryan, Turks purely Asiatic."[40] Similarly Ron Grossman from the same newspaper noted an enmity on the island, highlighting the Turks' distinctiveness due to their different racial background by quoting from a Chinese translator, John Kuo, who helped him interview famous Macedonian bagpipe virtuoso Ljupco Milenkovski. Kuo said to him that because of his Asiatic features and having knowledge of Macedonian language "they [local people] decided I must be a Turk, because, so many of their songs commemorate the centuries when that Asian people occupied their land."[41] Turks' ethnic background was linked to certain nations on the European continent as well: "The Turks, who originated in Central Asia, are related ethnically to the Finns, Estonians, and Hungarians Magyars."[42]

Turks were viewed not just as Asiatic in a geographical sense but also in an anthropological sense. Their descent from the feared Mongols, who had a significant impact on the world during the High Middle Ages, set them apart ethnically from Americans and other Western nations.

Still, however, Americans insisted that "Türkiye remains in truth Asian with its principal population and area on that continent."[43] Originating from the steppes of Central Asia, even their successful efforts to establish settlements in the West did not automatically categorize Turks as European. Rather, their origins continued to be emphasized, as Edmund Fuller from the *Wall Street Journal* noted, "The people we know as Turks, who have complicated ethnic links to Huns, Mongols, Finns, and modern Hungarians, were initially a part of successive waves through several centuries, of Asiatic nomadic peoples who pressed relentlessly from the edge of China across Turkestan and the Eurasian Steppes into the Middle East and the marches of Europe."[44] It was, thus, strongly believed that the Turks came from Central Asia, and were related closely to the Mongols and Manchus of

North China, and to the Finns and Hungarians of Europe.[45] Regardless of any similarities they might have shared with nations on the European continent, Turks historically were and would continue to be seen as Asiatic or Eastern. "The original Turks," the Chicago Tribune claimed were Mongol people.[46]

Conclusion

Throughout the centuries, the Americans have portrayed Turks based on their Asiatic origin in alignment with the prevalent image of the Turk in the Western imagination. Texts exemplifying this perspective share a common theme of identifying Turks with their Asiatic roots in an anthropological sense. While Turks were sometimes seen as part of Western civilization, particularly when referring to uncivilized Eastern attacks on Europe, they were often associated in the same context with other Eastern "invaders" such as the Mongols and Moors, who were perceived as threats to Western civilization. Authors frequently emphasized Turks' Asiatic origin, considering both their geographical origins and physical characteristics, and highlighted Türkiye's connections to its Asiatic roots despite its geographic proximity to Europe.

American media sources are not alone in portraying Turks in this way: they largely inherited this perspective from Europe. Previous accounts of Turks, their origins, and manners had been making their way into European literature for centuries when Americans first encountered Turks in the Levant. The Americans were naturally heavily influenced by these narratives and continued to build upon them: they saw these established "characteristics" of the Turks as useful in the context of the Cold War, a war against a violent, Eastern rival, namely the Soviet Union.

American authors portrayed Turks as nomadic people from the steppes, contrasting them with settled urban populations. Mainstream media in the U.S. often used Turks and Mongols interchangeably, reinforcing the negative association of Turks with their Asiatic/Mongol heritage. This portrayal contributed to shaping the aspect of American collective values whereby Turks, negatively identified as Asiatic/Mongol, were juxtaposed against Americans, positively associated with Anglo-Saxon qualities. Being identified as Asiatic/Mongol became one of the key identifiers of Turkish identity in American media during the Cold War era.

Endnotes

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BOOK REVIEW

THE FUTURE OF GEOGRAPHY: HOW POWER AND POLITICS IN SPACE WILL CHANGE OUR WORLD

By Tim Marshall
Elliot & Thomson, Hardback, 2023, 255 pages, ISBN: 9781783966875

Since the 1960s, when space emerged as the "final frontier", competition and cooperation in astro-geopolitics have become influential topics in the geopolitical competition. Marked by the general conditions dominating world politics, space has become a domain influenced by the geopolitical order on Earth. Humanity's story in this final frontier has sometimes been shaped by success stories as in the cases of Yuri Gagarin and Neil Armstrong, sometimes by cases of cooperation based on the Outer Space Treaty, and other times by interest and competition in arms races, space mining, and for achieving geopolitical control. At the precipice of an emerging multipolar order, where numerous actors vie for their shares in this seemingly boundless yet inherently constrained environment of human biology. Tim Marshall's *The Future of Geography: How Power and Politics in Space Will Change Our World* provide a striking, easy-to-read, timely, and detailed guide to understanding how geopolitics has shaped this exotic and harsh domain.

Starting with an exploration of the early interactions between humanity and celestial objects and systems, the book delves into how space has fascinated and influenced civilizations. Once considered a mythical and inaccessible domain, space has gradually become more tangible with advances in scientific knowledge and technological prowess. The book offers a clear historical perspective, particularly focusing on the competition between Cold War rivals, namely the United States and Soviet Union. *The Future of Geography* provides well-defined explanations of important concepts such as Lagrange Points and significant agreements like the Artemis Accords. This accessibility makes it an easy-to-read guide for individuals who are not specialized in the topic, offering a pathway to understanding complex concepts.

Tim Marshall divides the book into three parts comprising a total of ten chapters. The book begins with an introduction underscoring the importance of space in communication and our daily livelihoods, reflecting the author's individual experiences, and providing a brief introduction to the concept of space exploration. The first part consists of two chapters. The first chapter delves into how space and celestial objects have influenced humanity and different civilizations, from Ancient Greece to Islamic civilizations and the Chinese civilization, in areas such as astrology, philosophy, and mathematics. The second chapter focuses on the Cold War era and the period of space races, beginning with the initial mathematical and physical calculations by pioneers like Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Robert Goddard, and Hermann Oberth. The chapter then progresses to explore the narrative of the Cold War Space Programs as developed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The second part of the book is titled "Right Here, Right Now" and focuses on current developments in a period defined as the "Era of Astropolitics". The third chapter which is also named as "The Era of Astropolitics" delves into this concept by applying the classical geopolitical theories of Alfred T. Mahan and Harold Mackinder. The author illustrates how states vie for control over certain checkpoints in orbital and lunar space. Titled "Outlaws", the fourth chapter explains efforts towards the creation of a global governance structure, starting from the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Moon Treaty of 1979. The chapter explores the gaps within these agreements, creating grey zones for operation. It also discusses the proliferation of anti-satellite technologies and rising tensions between China, Russia, and the U.S., while introducing the growing influence of non-state actors, primarily multinational companies, in space. In the fifth chapter, titled "China: The Long March... Into Space", the book delves deeper into China's recent space endeavors. It begins with an overview of China's initial perspectives on space and its increasing challenge to U.S.-led space dominance. The chapter further explores China's International Space Station Program and its defiance of the Artemis Accords. The sixth chapter focuses on the United States, highlighting challenges in its space program after the space shuttle program. It discusses U.S. efforts to return to the Moon and reach Mars, alongside the increased privatization and militarization of the U.S. Space Program. Titled "Russia in a Retrograde", the seventh chapter examines setbacks in the Russian Space Program following the death of Sergei Korolev. It discusses rising tensions between the U.S. and Russia, decreased space-related cooperation with Russia post the war in Ukraine, and Russian collaboration

with China. It also explores Russia's homegrown revival attempts, hampered by the structural weaknesses of the Russian state. The last chapter of this section, titled "Fellow Travellers", focuses on other significant actors participating in the space race. It discusses the roles of the EU, Japan, India, Israel, the UAE, and the African Union in competing and cooperating with major powers.

The last part of the book is named "Future Past" and begins with chapter nine titled "Space Wars", focusing on the potential violent outcomes of rising geopolitical competition and arms races in space. The chapter begins with a war scenario between China and the U.S. resulting from accidental escalation in space. It then shifts focus to potential strategies for reducing arms races and overcoming challenges in building trust and deterrence. The final chapter, titled "Tomorrow's World", concentrates on current developments in manned space flights and the possible future of exploratory projects by humanity to advance further in this final frontier.

The Future of Geography, written by a career journalist, provides a multidisciplinary and interesting look at humanity's relationship with and vision of outer space. Marshall provides a valuable, accessible contribution to understanding current dynamics and the geopolitical situation in outer space. His articulate, clear, and professional prose allows readers to understand and consolidate complex existing literature combined with important up-to-date developments from the media and firsthand resources. The book generates interest in space in conjunction with politics, science, economics, and other interdisciplinary fields.

Marshall provides diverse perspectives from state leaders, notable figures from various countries' space programs, and private company CEOs. The inclusion of Russian and Chinese ambitions and perspectives on both the outer space and current environment gives the reader a chance to understand and compare rival perspectives towards a field that is mostly dominated by the West and especially the United States. Marshall has worked as a reporter in various countries and corresponded from multiple conflict zones, and, as a result, his professional knowledge and insight on conflict contribute to a well-structured and coherent narration of geopolitical conflicts and trends. The use of existing and current news and firsthand documents has helped him substantiate his arguments about rising geopolitical rivalry and arms races in outer space.

Notwithstanding the book's numerous strengths, certain improvements could be made towards boosting its academic merits. The book's selected bibliography mostly consists of online resources and recent news articles. While this is a merit for making the research up-to-date, a more diverse and comprehensive use of various resources to improve our understanding of the existing conceptual framework in outer space. Additionally, closer attention could have been paid to in-text referencing in order to facilitate access to the sources and additional knowledge on the topics. What is more, more information and background could have been provided on existing theoretical approaches to space and astro-geopolitics, alongside a more coherent discussion of militarization and arms control trends, and more detailed, nuanced, and structuralized information about private companies and their role and economic activities in space. A comparison of different countries' visions and programs for outer space would have enhanced the resonance of the conclusion and aided the methodology.

The Future of Geography: How Power and Politics in Space Will Change Our World be a timely and thought-provoking examination of the evolving geopolitics of space, offering readers a nuanced understanding of the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead. The book is an essential read for anyone seeking to navigate the complex intersection of power, geopolitics, and exploration beyond Earth's atmosphere.

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BOOK REVIEW

MIGRATION STUDIES: EURASIAN PERSPECTIVES

By Merve Hazer Yiğit Uyar, Apak Kerem Altıntop & Yaşar Onay (eds.)
Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2023, 426 pages, ISBN: 978-605-399-638-5

Migration Studies: Eurasian Perspectives is a rich, learned, and well-organized account of the mixed migration concept that takes data and regional diversification and non-Western thinking into consideration. Written by young researchers and early-career academics in the Eurasian region, the book is based on field research and many years of study, including different cases from Eurasia and various parts of the world. By highlighting migration data, mobility, and the exclusionary policy of the West, the book has a critical view on migration concepts such as migrant status and the western-oriented studies.

The book's focal point is that it allows us to think about migration as a phenomenon that deals with many dimensions and statuses, as opposed to thinking about international migration as one-dimensional and status-based. In this sense, migration can be considered as forced migration due to economic considerations or violence, or voluntary migration, which includes the individual motivation of immigrants to improve their living standards. The book proposes the concept of "mixed migration," which allows us to think about these aspects that mentioned above. In short, the authors propose that an immigrant who is considered a refugee is also a voluntary immigrant who wants to change their life.

The book's second important point is that it criticizes the definitions and practices of migration flows that are exclusively discussed according to a Western-centered understanding. For example, the authors question why Europe and the West, which want to stop immigrant flows from the Middle East, Africa, or Asia, developed practices for the temporary protection of Ukrainian refugees and,

therefore, securitize some immigrant flows while granting passage permits to others. The book focuses on the Eurasian region, examining and reflecting on the immigrant mobilization in this region, and criticizing the studies that look at the phenomenon of migration from only one point of view. As a matter of fact, the quantitative data, which is the third focal point of *Migration Studies* presents arguments that justify the criticism against Western-centered migration studies: a highly significant part of migration and immigrant mobility actually takes place between countries in other regions - not towards the West. In this sense, the book reveals the fact that while the Western world actually talks and discusses immigration extensively, it does not share the same amount of responsibility and burden of migration with non-western world.

Migration Studies is composed of three sections and a total of 17 chapters. The first section includes economy-oriented studies under the title "Human Stock and Economy." Chapter 1 is an introduction that presents the general purpose of the book, putting forward the concept of mixed migration and the Eurasian perspective. Chapter 2 examines how Afghan immigrants in Iran and Türkiye are employed precariously in the informal labor market. Consistent with the book's main theme, the chapter refers to the West's restrictive border policies, and deportation and neoliberal labor regimes. In Chapter 4, the migration industry is discussed in relation to European budgets allocated to border security. The chapter exposes how migration industry prevents immigrants from Eurasia heading to Europe.

The second section is titled "Civil Society and Security." Chapter 6 examines how each immigrant group believes that despite their shared statuses, for example, refugees or asylum seekers, they do not face the same treatment or solidarity; on the contrary, they believe they are in competition with one other. Solidarity, the author claim, only occurs between immigrant groups that share and manifest the same ethnic or religious identity and care about it, and this gives rise to the encouraging idea that the multidimensional migration and immigration concepts that are put forward in the book can find their equivalents in civil society. Chapter 7 examines European values and Europe's security dilemma, and specifically looks at irregular migration flows towards Europe and border practices towards refugees that are incompatible with European values. Chapter 8 seeks an answer to the question "Which European values and immigration policies are contradictory?" by a discursive comparison of two European countries on a government basis. Apparently, contrary to the

discourse that leaves the door open to refugees and argues that the European identity is enriched by refugees, discourses that see a multicultural Europe as threatening to Europe's Christian identity actually shape European immigration policies.

On the other hand, a study of the example of Georgia, a country in Asia, might change our perceptions that security concerns are related to forced migration. The said study, presented in Chapter 9, evaluates the concept of forced migration due to conflicts as the driving force of migration and puts forward the search for a safer region as a factor that attracts migrants to move. In connection with the main theme of the study, Chapter 9 tries to explain that migration includes multidimensional and directional mixed migration elements. Speaking of the multidimensionality of migration or the motivating factors for migration, it is worth noting the transformative effect of migration. Examining the state-civil society duality that, in general, is noteworthy in Eurasia, Chapter 10 emphasizes the dominant character of the state in Türkiye and, With the support of the international community, Türkiye has showcased the active role civil society has played in the refugee crisis, even though the dominant role of the state has consistently remained at the forefront. It is, thus, revealed how migration also mobilizes civil society and transforms it as an agent.

The third section is titled "Migration Politics and Policies" and examines how, in what way, and by whom migration is managed. In this context, it is understood that even if the issue is transnational migration, it is still related to assimilation or exclusionary migration policies connected to the nation state and nation-building (Chapter 12). The focus country in this section is Türkiye. Chapter 13 examines how although Türkiye hosts a significant proportion of Syrian and other immigrants, right-wing parties in particular have developed anti-immigrant rhetoric and are trying to argue that Türkiye should stop the flow of immigrants and send the refugees back to their countries. Thus, immigration and immigrants are politicized along the lines of nationalist discourses. Rather than addressing a migration management that is politicized, Chapter 16 examines how at least some Syrians have become naturalized Turkish citizens and are understood to reside in Türkiye permanently, in a way that is compatible with the history of Türkiye's migration policies. Chapter 17 reveals how when we consider mass migration flows such as Syrians, migration management, which is generally organized within the scope of temporary protection in Türkiye

has been shaped by European countries as preventative migration management outside their borders in order to keep immigrants in Türkiye.

Migration Studies: Eurasian Perspectives achieves several important points. First, the book makes us rethink our focus on generally accepted concepts of migration. It exposes the fact that we need to consider being a refugee and an irregular immigrant, or being a forced immigrant and a voluntary immigrant, together. It provides a significant starting point for understanding and unpacking the concept of mixed migration. Second, it examines migration and immigrants from different geographies, and offers accounts of the experiences of these different domains. The book presents a strong objection to conventional Western-centered interpretations. Third, the chapters brought together under the themes of economy, civil society, security, and migration management are not disconnected from each other, but are organized in parallel with the book's main concept of mixed migration One of the book's only weak points is that the quantitative data consists exclusively of raw data on numbers of refugees, their mobility, etc. In order to present readers with in-depth and contextual quantitative analysis well, big data analysis is required too. Overall, Migration Studies: Eurasian Perspectives offers clear, critical, and comprehensive research for readers both inside and outside the field and will hopefully prove to be inspiring for future work in migration studies.

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