



bilig

Türk Dünyası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi
Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkic World

YAZ SUMMER 2024 • SAYI ISSUE 110

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Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkic World

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
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Kıymetli Okurlar,

bilig'in 110. sayısını istifadenize sunmaktan mutluluk duymaktayız. Bu sayımızda yedi araştırma makalesi ve bir kitap eleştirisi yer almaktadır. Birinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan 2020 Karabağ Savaşı'na, Avrasya jeopolitiğinden Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi'ne ve Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı kamu diplomasisine, Rouranların (Juan-Juanlar) kültürel ve toplumsal yapısından Moğollarda payza kullanımına kadar Türk dünyasına yönelik çeşitli konuları ele alan bu çalışmaların ilginizi çekeceğine ve alana katkı sunacağına inanıyoruz.

Yayın Kurulumuz, Türk dünyasına ışık tutan nitelikli çalışmaları gün yüzüne çıkarabilmek için düzenli olarak makale değerlendirme süreçlerini yürütmekle birlikte Web of Science (WoS)'da daha görünür olmak ve etki faktörümüzü artırmak amacıyla titiz çalışmalarına devam etmektedir. Bir önceki sayıda WoS'ta yer alan Türkiye adresli dergilerin kendi aralarındaki iş birliğinin önemine dikkat çekmiştik. Yaptığımız çalıştayın akabinde gelişen editörler arasındaki tecrübe paylaşımı, WoS'taki kayıp atıfları tespit etmemizi, bu eksikleri WoS'a bildirerek bilgilerin tamamlanmasını ve dergimizin atıf oranının artmasını sağlamıştır. Buna göre 646 olarak görünen toplam atıf sayımız 928 olmuş ve 0.83 olan atıf oranımız 1.19'a yükselmiştir. Söz konusu kayıp atıfların en önemli sebebi Türkçe başlıkların WoS sisteminde İngilizce başlıkla eşleştirilememesidir. Makaleler Türkçe yayımlansa bile WoS sistemine İngilizce başlıkla eklendiği için atıflarda yer alan Türkçe başlıklar sisteme dâhil olamamaktadır. Bu nedenle WoS bu konuda kesin bir çözüm bulana kadar dergilerin kendi atıflarını takip etmesi gerekmektedir. Ayrıca yazarların WoS, Dergipark gibi akademik platformlardaki profillerini aktif tutmaları ve ORCID sayfalarını güncellemeleri de çalışmaların görünürlüğü ve katkı sağlaması açısından önem taşımaktadır.



Journal Impact Factor Trend 2023 (jcr.clarivate.com)

Haziran ayında Clarivate tarafından Web of Science Dergileri için 2023 Dergi Atıf Raporu (Journal Citation Report) yayımlanmıştır. Bu rapora göre önceki yıl düşüş gösteren etki faktörümüz tekrar 0.2 seviyesine yükselmiştir. Bu yıl yeni bir uygulama olarak aynı konudaki dergiler farklı indekslerde yer alsa da bir araya getirilerek yeni bir dergi sıralaması yapılmıştır. *bilig*, önceden Alan Araştırmaları-SSCI kategorisinde 84 dergi arasında yer alırken şimdi Alan Araştırmaları kategorisinde bulunan 176 dergiden biri olmuştur. Bu dergiler arasında ise 138. sırada yer almaktadır. Sıralamada yüzde 21.9'luk dilimde bulunduğu için Q4 kategorisi değişmemiştir. Yazarlar ve hakemler olarak sizlerin de desteği ile yüzdelik dilimi 25'in üzerine çıkarmayı ve Q3 kategorisine geçebilmeyi hedefliyoruz.

2024 Yaz sayımızın bilim camiasına hayırlı olması dileğiyle bilime katkı sağlayan özgün çalışmalara ilham kaynağı olmasını temenni ederiz.


Prof. Dr. Fırat PURTAŞ

Yayın Yönetmeni

Dear Readers,

We are pleased to present the 110th issue of *bilig*. This issue includes seven research articles and one book review. We believe that these studies, which deal with various topics related to the Turkic world, from the First World War to the 2020 Karabakh War, from Eurasian geopolitics to the Regional Security Complex and the public diplomacy of the Organization of Turkic States, from the cultural and social structure of the Rourans (Juan-Juans) to the use of “payza” in the Mongols, will attract your attention and contribute to the field.

Our Editorial Board continues its meticulous work in order to be more visible in Web of Science (WoS) and to increase our impact factor, while regularly conducting article evaluation processes in order to investigate qualified studies that focus on the Turkic world. In the previous issue, we drew attention to the importance of cooperation among Turkish journals in WoS. The sharing of experience between editors, which is a result of the workshop we organized, enabled us to identify missing citations in WoS, to complete the information by reporting these deficiencies to WoS and to increase the citation rate of our journal. Accordingly, our total number of citations, which appeared as 646, became 928 and our citation rate, which was 0.83, increased to 1.19. The most important reason for these lost citations is that Turkish titles cannot be matched with English titles in the WoS system. Even if the articles are published in Turkish, since they are added to the WoS system with English titles, the Turkish titles in the citations cannot be included in the system. For this reason, journals should monitor their own citations until WoS finds a definitive solution to this issue. In addition, it is important for authors to keep their profiles active on academic platforms such as WoS and Dergipark and to update their ORCID pages in terms of visibility and contribution of their work.



Journal Impact Factor Trend 2023 (jcr.clarivate.com)

In June, the 2023 Journal Citation Report for Web of Science Journals was published by Clarivate. According to this report, our impact factor, which had declined in the previous year, rose to 0.2 again. As a new practice this year, a new journal ranking was made by bringing together journals on the same subject, even if they are included in different indexes. *bilig*, which was previously among 84 journals in the Field Research-SSCI category, is now one of the 176 journals in the Field Research category. Among these journals, it ranks 138th. The Q4 category has not changed since it is in the 21.9 percentile in the ranking. With your support as authors and reviewers, we aim to increase the percentile above 25 and move to the Q3 category.

We hope that our 2024 Summer issue will be beneficial to the scientific community and inspire original studies that contribute to science.

Prof. Dr. Fırat PURTAŞ

Editor in Chief

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Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

Financial Support of the Kazakhs to Türkiye in the First World War*

Nurzhigit Abdukadyrov**

Bayan Assanova***

Aigerim Akynova****

Abstract

The First World War significantly influenced the destinies of numerous peoples, nations, empires, and states throughout human history. The Ottoman Empire emerged as a major participant in this global conflict, engaging on multiple fronts against the Entente States. During the war, Türkiye conducted various political, military, intelligence, and espionage activities. Among these, the Ottoman Empire incited Muslim populations in the East to join in a religious war against the Entente States. Notably, religious and propaganda efforts were undertaken in Turkestan as part of the Pan-Islamist ideology among the Turkic-Muslim peoples under Russian rule. Conversely, the Turkic-Muslim peoples of Turkestan provided various forms of support to the Turks, including financial assistance from the Kazakhs. This study aims to examine the financial aid extended by the Kazakhs to the Turks during the war, conducting a historical analysis of the

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reasons, development, and outcomes of this support. The analysis delves into the motivations behind Kazakh financial aid to the Turks, its evolution over time, and its impact on the war effort. By exploring these aspects, we gain insights into the complex dynamics of support networks during the First World War.

Keywords

The First World War, The Ottoman State, Turkestan, Pan-Islamism, The Kazakhs, Financial support.

Birinci Dünya Savaşında Kazakların Türkiye'ye Mali Destekleri*

Nurzhigit Abdukadyrov**

Bayan Assanova***

Aigerim Akynova****

Öz

Birinci Dünya Savaşı, insanlık tarihinde birçok halkın ve ulusun, imparatorluğu ve devletin kaderini önemli ölçüde etkilemiştir. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, büyük savaşın ana katılımcılarından biriydi ve İtilaf Devletlerine karşı birçok cephede savaştı. Savaş sırasında Türkiye tarafından çeşitli siyasi, askerî faaliyetler ile casusluk ve istihbarat faaliyetleri yürütüldü. Osmanlı Devleti, Doğu'nun Müslüman halklarını İtilaf Devletlerine karşı cihat başlatmaya teşvik etti. Aynı zamanda Rus İmparatorluğu'nun bünyesinde olan Türkistan'daki Türk-Müslüman halklar arasında Pan-İslamizm ideolojisi çerçevesinde onların da savaşa destek olması için örgütlü hareketler yapılmıştır. Buna karşılık Türkistan'ın Türk-Müslüman halkları Türklere farklı destekler verdiler. Bunlardan biri de Kazakların Türklere mali desteğiydi. Bu çalışmada, savaş sırasında Kazakların Türklere yaptığı mali yardımlar incelenmektedir. Kazaklar arasında Türklere sağlanan mali desteğin nedenleri, gelişimi ve sonuçları hakkında tarihsel bir analiz yapılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Birinci Dünya Savaşı, Osmanlı Devleti, Türkistan, Pan-İslamizm, Kazaklar, maddi yardım.

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Introduction

In the latter part of the 19th century, the local Turkic-Muslim communities of the Steppe and Turkestan General-Governorates, which were subjects of the Russian Empire in Central Asia, maintained close ties with the Ottoman Empire. Linguistic, cultural, and religious affinities between the Ottoman Empire and the peoples of Turkestan became particularly significant, with Pan-Islamism emerging as a central concept. Pan-Islamism aimed to foster mutual cooperation and unity among Turkic peoples based on Islam, with its primary focus on the Ottoman Empire and Turkic populations within Russia. It conceptualized Islamic unity as a political ideology transcending social groups, nationalities, or states (Avşar 167-168).

In recent years, Kazakh historical scholarship has extensively researched the history of Turkic peoples and their unity. The examination of the relationship between the peoples of Turkestan and the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the 20th century holds particular importance. This article centers on Kazakh-Turkish relations during the First World War, delving into the assistance provided by Kazakhs to Türkiye during this period. The article primarily relies on archival documents from Kazakhstan, supplemented by personal accounts and materials from Kazakhs who traveled to Türkiye or undertook pilgrimages. Through this analysis, the article seeks to explore the extent of Kazakh support for Türkiye during the war, drawing upon the insights of both Turkish and Kazakh historians.

Religious propaganda efforts by the Turks in the Turkestan province of the Russian Empire played a significant role in fostering mutual cooperation between Turks and Turkic-Muslim peoples in the region. This collaboration persisted into the early 20th century, cultivating strong relations among Turkic peoples. Muslims from Turkestan making pilgrimages to Mecca were warmly received in Istanbul, fostering deeper religious, cultural, and social ties. The proximity among Turkic peoples, initially rooted in religion, culture, and tradition, gradually evolved towards a political dimension (Alpargu, Mehmet et al. 402-403).

Due to religious and ethnic unity, conditions for political unification among Turkic peoples emerged. Gradually, integration between these peoples was strengthened, influenced in part by the ideology of Pan-Turkism (Landau

20-24), which ran parallel to Pan-Islamism. This integration altered the attitudes and positions of Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Turkmens, and other Turkic peoples in Turkestan towards Türkiye, drawing them closer together over years of mutual communication (Yalçınkaya 12-15). Jadidism, an idea advocating social reforms, particularly in education (Andican 25-26), served as a unifying force between Kazakhs and Turks, evolving into a broader concept encompassing all Turkic societies in Russia.

However, these burgeoning relations between Turks and the peoples of Turkestan faced opposition from Russian authorities. Pan-Islamism, viewed as a political threat, prompted efforts by the Russian government to suppress communication between the Turkestan peoples and Türkiye. Despite such efforts, the Tsarist regime found it challenging to entirely restrict contact between Central Asian Turkic Muslims and the Ottoman State (Abdukadyrov and Muldahmetova 162-164).

Before and during the First World War, Germany played a pivotal role in promoting Pan-Islamism. Allying with the Ottoman Empire, Germany sought to leverage Islamic sentiment to advance its military objectives, particularly in the Caucasus. German diplomats and politicians actively engaged with Muslim populations in the Russian Empire, as evidenced by documents such as ‘The project of revolutionizing the Islamic regions of our enemy’, prepared by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1916. This document outlines strategic and tactical approaches aimed at fomenting liberation movements among Muslim populations in Entente colonies (Kokebayeva 119).

In the period leading up to World War I, the German Empire sought to leverage the influence of the caliphate held by the Ottoman Sultan over Muslims worldwide for its own benefit. To achieve this goal, one of the largest propaganda campaigns in world history was orchestrated. Max Freyer von Oppenheim is credited with originating this propaganda effort (Saritaş 115-117).

Despite the obstacles imposed by the Russian authorities, contacts among Turkic peoples increased over time. Within the population of the Turkestan General-Governorate, many individuals regularly journeyed to Istanbul (Yeşilot and Çelik 84-85). Primarily undertaken for pilgrimage purposes,

these journeys also afforded opportunities for acquainting oneself with Istanbul's societal life and the political culture of the Ottoman state. It can be argued that these experiences solidified the religious pilgrimage and fostered allegiance to the caliphate, thereby centralizing the continuance of political and cultural ties between Turkistan and the Ottoman Empire (Sarinay 7-8).

Upon returning to their homeland, these pilgrims often became mullahs, delving deeply into Islamic traditions while maintaining their connections with Turks, ready to offer assistance when needed. For instance, during the Balkan Wars and the First World War, Turkic peoples in Turkestan provided significant social and financial support to the Ottoman Empire, mobilizing considerable funds.

Among the peoples of Turkestan, the Kazakhs demonstrated notable activities and offered substantial financial and social aid to Türkiye. Such reciprocal social assistance and interactions during the First World War were rare phenomena. At the time, the territory of modern Kazakhstan was part of both the Steppe General-Governorate and the Turkestan General-Governorate of the Russian Empire, with Kazakhs residing in both regions. Despite lacking an independent state, Kazakhs found various means to provide financial assistance, clandestinely sending funds through Turkish citizens residing in the Steppe General-Governorate, via scouts, or with the assistance of embassy personnel. Notably, assistance from Turks who had sought refuge in the region, fleeing Türkiye and acquiring Russian citizenship, proved effective.

“To My Distant Brother”

Despite the relatively modest scale of the assistance provided by Kazakhs during Türkiye's wartime struggles, it left a significant mark. Previously undisclosed, recent research has unveiled the close ties between Kazakhs and Ottoman Turks, elucidated through archival and historical materials. Such instances of social support exemplify the intimacy between these related peoples.

Prior to and during the war, the Ottoman Empire was a rival of Russia, complicating fundraising efforts among Turkestan Kazakhs. Russian authorities tightly regulated such activities, monitoring the arrival and

residency of Turkish citizens in the Kazakh steppes. Concerned about potential anti-authority sentiments, they sought to limit Turkish presence among the local population. Despite these measures, Turkish citizens in Turkestan and the Steppe General-Governorate increased notably, especially during the national liberation uprising of 1916 (Devlet 231).

Initially centered around pilgrimage trips, social contacts expanded into other domains over time. Notably, Kazakh intelligentsia propagandized studying in Istanbul, despite obstacles imposed by Russian colonial authorities. A growing number of Kazakh youths, including A. Gaisin, S. Shanov, D. Kulbayev, and M. Turganbayev, pursued education at Istanbul universities in the early 20th century, underscoring the persistence of Kazakh-Turkish relations (Kongyratbayev et al. 66-67).

Furthermore, it became evident that many poets from Turkestan visited Istanbul during this period, residing there temporarily (Kurnaz 35). This continuous social and cultural connection between the regions persisted through various channels. The presence of Kazakh poets in Istanbul underscored the deep cultural ties between the two peoples, with their works celebrating the affinity and urging mutual support during challenging times.

Among the Kazakh intelligentsia were poets who vividly portrayed the situation in the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, advocating for substantial support. Notably, Magzhan Zhumabayev's poems reflected the hardships faced by Türkiye during the war and subsequent struggle for independence. His poem "To My Distant Brother" became emblematic of the special bond between Turks and Kazakhs, widely disseminated across Kazakh society (Bazarbaev et al. 117-119).

Magzhan Zhumabayev's formative years at the Galiya Madrasa in Ufa provided him with profound knowledge, shaped by Tatar intellectuals educated in Istanbul. These teachers instilled in him a deep love for Islam and Turkic heritage, fostering a strong affinity towards Turkic peoples. The nationalist, Turkic, and Islamic ethos of the Galiya Madrasa profoundly influenced Kazakh, Tatar, and Bashkir youths (Ojaiüly 2-3). It is evident that the perspectives of Kazakh poets like Shakarim Kudaiberdiuly and Magzhan Zhumabayev regarding Türkiye predated the First World War. Their profound understanding of Turkic unity and affinity between Turks

and Kazakhs was disseminated widely among the population, serving as a cornerstone for promoting closeness between the two peoples. As a result, certain Kazakh citizens harbored a distinct affinity for Türkiye, demonstrating readiness to extend social assistance to Turks facing economic hardship on the eve of the war. This sentiment was closely tied to the motto “To My Distant Brother”, as articulated by Magzhan Zhumabayev.

Assistance during the Balkan Wars

The pivotal engagement of the Kazakhs in extending financial aid to the Turks commenced during the Balkan Wars, which preceded the onset of the First World War. Kazakh youth fervently expressed their solidarity with Türkiye during this period. In this war, all people closely aligned with Turkey provided extensive support, albeit on a modest scale; each individual contributed to the best of their ability. In the 1930s, “Yash Turkestan” magazine, under the editorial direction of Mustafa Shokai and published in Berlin, featured numerous articles detailing the Kazakhs’ assistance during the Balkan Wars. One such account recounts the actions of Sadyk Utegenov from the city of Akmeshit (Perovsk) in the Turkestan General-Governorate, who arrived in St. Petersburg carrying two small bags brimming with gold coins.

Upon reaching St. Petersburg, Sadyk Utegenov sought out his compatriot Mustafa Shokai, who was studying there, and entrusted him with delivering the two bags of gold coins to the Ottoman Empire’s embassy. Upon arrival, Sadyk Utegenov, as a token of the affection and empathy of his Turkestan brethren, presented his assistance to the Ottoman ambassador, Permeti Turhan Pasha. Ambassador Turhan Pasha, visibly moved by the gesture, embraced both men and expressed his gratitude. He gratefully accepted the assistance and pledged to ensure its delivery to its intended recipients (Kara 74-75).

Furthermore, during this period, Kazakh students studying in Madinah pooled together 200 lira from their own pockets to aid Ottoman soldiers. As reported in the Kazakh newspaper “Ayqap” during the Balkan Wars, the students handed over the collected funds to Governor Basri Pasha of Madinah, requesting that the assistance be channeled through the International Red Crescent Organization. Although the amount of aid

was modest, its significance lay in demonstrating the Kazakh students' willingness to support Turks during the Balkan Wars (Subhanberdina and Dawitov 287-288).

This circumstance catalyzed the mobilization of young Muslim students studying in Russian universities in support of Türkiye. Kazakh students in St. Petersburg, alongside Bashkir, Uzbek, and Tatar students, actively participated in this endeavor. It is noteworthy that during this period, the number of Turkic-Muslim students in St. Petersburg universities experienced steady growth, indicative of the prevailing strength of Turkic-Muslim ideology both in the country and in Turkestan. A prominent exemplar of this ideological fervor was Mustafa Shokai, a student at the Faculty of Law of St. Petersburg University and a future Kazakh intellectual and public figure. Mustafa Shokai's advocacy for Turkism and his subsequent actions trace back to this period, with the concept of Turkestan's unity emerging as a central tenet of his ideology.

Reflecting on his involvement in providing support for Türkiye during the Balkan War, Mustafa Shokai remarked in his writings: "I studied at St. Petersburg University during the years when Russia was under the influence of reaction. At that time, higher education institutions, especially universities, were directly under the control of the police. Despite the difficulties of the situation, we showed up, organized marches in the streets. The difficulties of Türkiye in the Balkan War fueled the St. Petersburg students' movement. At this point, Russia was neutral. However, it would support the Slavic peoples in the Balkans, despite its neutrality. All this made us, Turkestan students, very excited. In addition, we thought about doing something else. To do this, we – Azerbaijani, Tatar and Turkestan students, separated from the Russians and tried to act on our own". (Shoqai 367). As evidenced, Mustafa Shokai provided a guiding light for those supporting the brotherly people during the Balkan War.

Kazakh youth in St. Petersburg were actively involved in fundraising and offering moral support to Türkiye during the Balkan wars. For instance, Sanzhar Asfendiyarov, a future Kazakh intellectual studying at the Imperial Military Medical Academy in St. Petersburg, recounted in his memoirs: "In the autumn of 1912, during the First Balkan War, a significant movement

took place in St. Petersburg among Kazakh, Tatar, and Uzbek students in support of Turkey” (APRK 811-fund., 20-list., 686-file, 238-240 p.).

Local government agencies in the Ferghana, Zhetysu, and Syrdarya oblasts of the Turkestan General-Governorate received widespread reports during the Balkan wars linking the Turks’ defeat to Russia’s backing of the Slavic peoples of the Balkans under the ideology of Pan Slavism. Consequently, opposition among Turkic peoples in Turkestan against Tsarist Russia’s policies escalated. Notably, initiatives promoting Muslim cooperation among Kazakhs gained traction in certain regions, amplifying resistance against the Russian administration.

In response to this climate, leaflets circulated among Muslims in the Turkestan region urged fundraising efforts in support of Turkish soldiers injured during the conflicts. These leaflets also promised to publish the names of contributors and the amounts donated in a Muslim publication (CSA RK 25-fund., 1-list., 372-file, 22 p.).

Since the outset of the Balkan War, the Tatar newspaper “Vakyt”, based in Orenburg, diligently disseminated information about the conflict to Muslim communities across Russia. Reports of support for Türkiye were widely propagated among the populace, facilitated significantly by the efforts of seasoned journalist Fatih Karimov. Karimov’s investigative work in Istanbul during 1912-1913 yielded a trove of materials related to the Balkan War, which he subsequently shared through newspaper publications (CSA RK 25-fund., 1-list., 372-file, 3 p.). This information significantly impacted Turkic communities in the Orenburg oblast, where Kazakhs played an active role in fundraising efforts to aid wounded Turkish soldiers and bolster the relatively weak Turkish Fleet in contrast to other empires.

In essence, Kazakh assistance to the Turks commenced prior to the First World War, with the Balkan wars serving as a poignant symbol of inter-ethnic unity. This support for the Ottoman Empire by Kazakhs and Turkic peoples of Turkestan during the Balkan wars endured into the First World War.

Assistance During the War (1914-1918)

From the onset of the war, Kazakhs demonstrated their commitment to aiding Türkiye both morally and materially. Financial support was mobilized

across the Steppe and Turkestan General-Governorate, with clandestine efforts organized to ensure the secrecy and security of the assistance provided. Particularly notable was the fervent support shown by Kazakh citizens residing in the uyezds and villages of the Turgay oblast. As early as December 1914, fundraising efforts were underway in the parishes of the Aktobe uyezd within the Turgay oblast. Reports indicated that villages in the Burty volost of Aktobe uyezd actively collected funds among local Kazakhs. Notably, gold, silver coins, and precious metal coins were among the contributions received (CSA RK. 25-fund., 1-list., 378-file, 1 p.).

The management of Aktobe uyezd further reported initiatives spearheaded by the khazirs (imams) of mosques in Karatogay and Aktobe volosts. Figures such as Karabek Baigarakov and Kali Yesenamanov, along with returning pilgrims from Mecca, mobilized local communities to contribute towards assisting Türkiye (CSA RK. 25-fund., 1-list., 378-file, 2 p.). However, these efforts faced opposition from authorities, as evidenced by charges brought against individuals involved, and subsequent protocols questioning the legality of mosques built in their villages by the acting head of the Aktobe uyezd, Captain Svalbard.

Despite such challenges, several Kazakh citizens persisted in their fundraising endeavors. Notable individuals such as Zhangazy Kosayev, Turkmen Kosayev, Turmaniyaz Kosayev, and Zhar Utebaliyev of the Aktobe parish, as well as Karamyrza Bekenbekov from the Karabutak volost, and Aidaraly Torebekov from the Karatogay volost, clandestinely collected funds for Türkiye. Aidaraly Torebekov even went as far as secretly constructing a mosque during winter months. Close relatives of the head of the Batbakty parish also participated in these efforts, contributing by selling meat from their animals in order to bolster financial support (CSA RK. 25-fund., 1-list., 378-file, 3 p.).

In foreign policy, citizens who financially supported Türkiye, which was considered an opponent of the Russian Empire, were persecuted. The decision was made by the Russian authorities to radically block attempts by Muslim peoples in Turkestan to help the Turks and to detain Turkish spies and agitators who organized such an event (CSA RK. 726-fund., 1-list., 8-file, 8 p.). Local citizens from the Ottoman Empire, whose nationality was Turkish, were under control. Since not only Turks were among them, but

also Greeks, Georgians and other representatives of Caucasian nationalities; it was a bit difficult to distinguish the real Turks themselves. It is worth noting that during the war there were many citizens who came from the Ottoman Empire to the inner regions of the Russian Empire. They mostly fled the war and came in search of work.

However, Kazakhs, who collected money among the population in various ways in order to help Turks, were the focus of attention of the authorities and the police. For example, Kazakhs who had ties with Türkiye in Karabutak, Araltobe, Tastybutak, Estemis and Kamsakty parishes of Aktobe uyezd of Turgay oblast were under control. Their contacts with the Greeks and Turks were checked (CSA RK. 25-fund., 1-list., 378-file, 5 p.). At this time, the collected funds were handed over to one or more citizens and sent to Orsk, where they were sent by train to St. Petersburg. In general, the goods exported to foreign countries were often transported abroad by foreign and local citizens traveling abroad through Omsk, Orenburg to St. Petersburg or border posts. In this case, the assistance of foreigners and Turkish citizens was effective. Therefore, citizens from the Ottoman Empire who were in the Russian Empire were under constant control.

In addition to Aktobe uyezd of Turgay oblast, in Kostanay and Irgiz uyezds, comments from the regional management were sent in advance to prevent such collection of money. Because there were a lot of Kazakhs in the parishes and villages of these uyezds, it was quite possible that they were also engaged in such matters (CSA RK. 25-fund., 1-list., 378-file, 6 p.). At this time, the facts of fundraising were observed not only in the Turgay oblast, but also in the neighboring province of the Ural oblast, which was adjacent to it. The main example of this was the movements of Turkish citizens who came to Temir uyezd of the Ural oblast from Karakobda parish of Aktobe uyezd of the Turgay oblast. They lived for some time in Temir county and were engaged in raising funds from local Kazakhs and other Muslim peoples (CSA RK. 25-fund., 1-list., 378-file, 7 p.).

Thus, work on raising funds for the Turkish army was also registered in the Ural oblast. In Temir uyezd and other surrounding parishes, the activities of mullahs were also great in raising funds for Türkiye by local Kazakhs. They deeply advocated Islamism among the people and promoted the need to help peoples whose religion and culture are the same among the people.

In Aktobe uyezd and Temir uyezd, information was recorded about the distribution of religious books brought from Türkiye among the population by a mullah named Mukhammetkaziyev. The work of such citizens was blocked (CSA RK. 25-fund., 1-list., 378-file, 26 p.).

After that, with the idea that Turkish citizens who were among the people might have been involved in such a case, they began to take measures to arrest them. In the course of the implementation of such a measure, doubts arose about the involvement of Turkish citizens living in Syrdarya and Zhetysu oblasts. Indeed, since the first years of the war, Turkish citizens came to Turkestan from the Ottoman Empire and were engaged in espionage and agitator work. Their mission was to turn the Turkic-Muslim peoples of Turkestan towards themselves, and at the same time to drive them against the local Russian authority. Such citizens were considered spies, and measures were taken to prevent their activities. Turkish citizens from the Syrdarya oblast of the Turkestan General-Governorate were arrested and taken under investigation (CSA RK. 145-fund., 1-list., 884-file, 78-80 p.).

At the beginning of the First World War, the Turkestan General-Governorate and the Turko-Muslim peoples of Bukhara and Khiva continued to have relations with the Ottoman Empire, communication between them continued in a very secret manner. Next, the Kazakhs in Turkestan also provided moral support to Turks as well as material assistance. Kazakhs who lived in the Syrdarya and Zhetysu oblasts under the Turkestan General-Governorate had a unique attitude towards the Ottoman State. For example, Kazakhs in Sozak, which belonged to the Syrdarya oblast, collected funds for Turks' achievements in the war.

In general, there were many Turkish citizens in the territory of Syrdarya oblast, and they helped to deliver aid collected from Kazakhs and other nations to Türkiye. They helped send funds. After such activities, the gendarmerie began to take measures to arrest those who might be Turkish citizens collecting funds for aid to Türkiye. During the implementation of this measure, among the Kazakhs in Sozak, Turkish citizens Mahmed Salih, Kamalatdin Ibrahim and Hasan Yahiyaoglu were arrested and taken into custody (Rüstemov 45-47).

After that, pressure on Turkish citizens on the territory of the empire was intensified by the Russian royal authorities. Imperial authorities decided not to allow citizens of states warring against Russia to work (CSA RK. 25-fund., 1-list., 388-file, 3 p.). Because there were many Turkish citizens in the regions belonging to the Turkestan region, they were considered with deep suspicion. For instance, in Shymkent and Aulieta uyezds of Syrdarya oblast, fundraising for Türkiye took place, and it was suspected that Turkish citizens were organizing it all. Indeed, at that time it was not easy to transfer funds collected from the local population across the border or to the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the help of Turkish citizens was very necessary.

If fundraisers for the Ottoman Empire were found among the Turkic-Muslim peoples, they were immediately arrested. When citizens of countries that were at war with Russia were expelled, their property was confiscated for the benefit of the state. On the basis of this instruction, the horses of the Turkish citizens Mevlyud Bayramogly and Shevki Meghushogly, who were arrested in Auliata uyezd, were seized and their property was confiscated (CSA RK. 146-fund., 1-list., 2-file, 15-16 p.). During the war, Auliata uyezd was considered one of the main uyezds of the Turkestan region, and Turkish citizens came and settled here. They were mostly refugees from the war fronts, but they had good relations with the local population (CSA RK. 146-fund., 1-list., 2-file, 9-10 p.).

During the First World War, numerous Turkish citizens migrated to the Turkestan region, including the Zhetysu oblast of the Turkestan Governorate, under varied circumstances (CSA RK. 44-fund., 1-list., 19742-file, 87 p.). They came voluntarily, i.e. for work, and citizens who fled the war. At the same time, those captured as prisoners of war also arrived. Turkish citizens were placed in different districts and were under strict control (CSA RK. 44-fund., 1-list., 19742-file, 81 p.). Local Kazakhs welcomed them very warmly. Mutual underground connections were established. One of the main examples of this is the city of Verny, the center of Zhetysu oblast, and money was collected for aid to Türkiye on behalf of the Kazakhs and Muslims living in this region (CSA RK. 44-fund., 1-list., 4764-file, 1-3 p.).

Assistance to Muslims in Kars during World War I

During the First World War, the most significant assistance provided by the Kazakhs to the Turks, as a fraternal nation, was their support for the Muslims in Kars in 1915. Throughout the conflict, the local population suffered immensely due to military operations in the Caucasus and the adjacent Kars oblast, leading to a severe deterioration in the social conditions of the Turkic-Muslim communities in Kars and its environs. Initial aid efforts were instigated by the Turkic peoples of the Caucasus, with messages of distress disseminated through embassies and consulates.

Despite Kars and its region being part of the Russian Empire before the war, a substantial Turkish presence had historically existed there. The Kars oblast held strategic importance for both the Ottoman Empire and Russia, resulting in intense territorial disputes. As the Kars oblast was under Russian control during this period, authorities did not impede Muslim fundraising efforts.

The primary objective of aiding Muslims in the Kars oblast stemmed from its significant Turkish population. Kazakhs from the Ural, Torgai, and Steppe oblasts coordinated fundraising activities through publications such as the “Kazakh” newspaper. Collected funds, published weekly, were directed to the Muslim Committee in Orenburg. Citizens from all walks of life, including the intelligentsia, actively participated in these efforts (*Qazaq gazeti*, №109, 4 p.).

In the Steppe General-Governorate, fundraising efforts intensified over time, with notable individuals like Khalel Dosmukhamedov, Akhmet Baitursynuly, and his wife Badrisafa Baitursynova actively involved. Funds were meticulously allocated based on a curated list of beneficiaries and were transferred to the Muslim Committee in Orenburg once or twice a week (*Qazaq gazeti*, №112, 4-5 p.).

Financial assistance to Turks in Kars primarily took a religious dimension, reflecting the stated aim of aiding Muslim communities. International organizations monitored support for Turko-Muslim peoples, prompting vigorous efforts from Kazakhs across the Steppe and Turkestan General-Governorates. Over time, financial contributions surged, with significant amounts being sent from the Steppe region, exemplified by the three

thousand rubles dispatched in April 1915 (*Qazaq gazeti*, №119, 7 p.). Over time, the amount of money collected for Muslims in Kars grew. This was because the number of people sending money also increased (*Qazaq gazeti*, №130, 3 p.). Kazakhs from the Steppe region sustained monetary aid to Kars Muslims and their Turkish brethren for six to seven months, with cumulative contributions exceeding a thousand rubles by June 1915 (*Qazaq gazeti*, №135, 6-7 p.). The amount of this money increased even more next month.

Turks in Kars received assistance from Kazakhs in Turkestan, particularly from the Zhetysu oblast, who were aware of the plight of Muslims in Kars and were prepared to offer support. The Muslims of Kapal uyezd organized a fundraiser to aid them. On May 23, 1915, the district head submitted a special report to the regional board on behalf of the residents of Altynemel uyezd within Kapal uyezd. The report indicated the readiness of Kazakhs and representatives of local Tatar, Sart, and other Muslim communities to raise funds for those affected by the war in the Kars oblast (CSA RK. 44-fund., 1-list., 4764-file, 1 p.).

This initiative, initially started by Muslims of Altynemel uyezd, garnered involvement from other settlements. For instance, on June 1, 1915, Kazakhs and Muslim residents of Gavrilov village expressed their support for the cause by signing special documents. All fundraising activities adhered to legal and transparent procedures. A detailed list of Kazakhs and representatives of other Muslim nations from Gavrilov uyezd was compiled, reflecting varying contribution amounts. This underscores the accessibility of assistance, allowing each individual to contribute according to their means (CSA RK. 44-fund., 1-list., 4764-file, 6-7 p.).

In total, Muslim citizens collected 25 rubles and 70 kopeks, with the collected amount and transfer information to be forwarded to the management of Zhetysu oblast. The collected funds were earmarked for delivery to the Kars oblast with the assistance of the Muslim Charitable Organization in Baku, with the primary objective of aiding Muslims in Kars (CSA RK. 44-fund., 1-list., 4764-file, 12-13 p.).

Several conclusions emerged from the analysis of Kazakh aid to Türkiye during the First World War:

- Firstly, Kazakhs who had a profound respect for Turkish culture and Islamic values, particularly those who had undertaken pilgrimages to the Ottoman Empire, organized and supported fundraising efforts. This group aimed to maintain religious and cultural ties with Turks in the future.
- Secondly, fundraising for Türkiye received backing from Kazakh citizens opposed to Russian imperial rule. They envisioned fostering positive relations with the Ottoman Empire and Central Powers to secure future independence from Russian dominance.
- Thirdly, individuals in close contact with Turks, despite not residing in Türkiye, shared similar Turkish principles and maintained strong kinship ties. This often included Kazakhs residing in regions under the Turkestan General-Governorate.
- Fourthly, the attitude towards Turks in Kazakh society underwent a positive transformation over time, influenced by the Turkic ideology promoted by Kazakh poets and writers. The concept of “Turkic unity”, widely advocated from the late 19th to early 20th centuries, contributed to the provision of aid to Türkiye.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the First World War left a profound impact on nations and empires, reshaping political and social landscapes, including within the Ottoman Empire. Despite being part of the Russian Empire at the time, Kazakhs extended significant financial and social assistance to Türkiye during the conflict. While this support did not occur at an international level due to geopolitical constraints, Kazakhs managed to organize aid for the Turks, symbolizing a powerful sense of brotherhood among Turkic people. The solidarity between Kazakhs and Turks during the war exemplified the close ties between Central Asian and Anatolian Turkic communities, reflecting mutual sympathy and love. This relationship underscored the high moral values and humanism shared among these people, reinforced by their religious, linguistic, and cultural affinities.

Moreover, Kazakh assistance to Türkiye had broader implications for the political and social dynamics in Turkestan, Turkey, and Russia during the war. The alignment of Turkic-Muslim peoples in Turkestan, including

Kazakhs, with the Ottoman Empire in its conflict against Russia signaled a distancing from Russian authority. This divergence could have been mitigated if Russian authorities had pursued policies of national equality and considered the aspirations of the people. Despite facing obstacles, Kazakhs successfully fostered diplomatic relations with foreign nations. A significant takeaway is that despite lacking independent statehood at the time, Kazakhs exhibited agency in establishing relationships with Türkiye. This underscores their distinct national identity and independent worldview. In essence, the assistance provided by Kazakhs to Türkiye during the First World War reflects a chapter of shared history and solidarity among Turkic peoples, highlighting their resilience, unity, and pursuit of self-determination.

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The authors' contribution rates in this study are equal. All authors equally contributed to the collection of scientific materials for the article, editing, and translation of the article. All three authors have a profound interest in the history of Turkic peoples. The authors jointly conducted scientific research and collected materials from archives and libraries.

Conflict of Interest Statement

There is no conflict of interest with any institution or person within the scope of this study. There is no conflict of interest between the authors.

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Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

Representation of Turkish Identity and Norms in the Media: 2020 Karabakh War*

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Abstract

The Nagorno-Karabakh issue between Azerbaijan and Armenia became one of the most critical agenda items in the international community again in 2020, resulting in thousands of casualties from both countries due to the conflicts.

This study discusses Türkiye's attitude towards the 2020 Karabakh War in the context of international relations, based on the constructivist theory. It focuses on explaining how the country's national identity, as well as the international norms it adheres to, played a decisive role in its current foreign policy implementation. To do this, news articles related to the 2020 Karabakh War were gathered from Turkish and Azerbaijani news portals and subjected to content analysis.

The analysis findings revealed that both Turkish and Azerbaijani media heavily emphasized messages related to shared identities and norms that play a significant role in shaping the perception and identities of the parties involved in the conflict. Furthermore, the media depicted the war as a matter of national identity and sovereignty.

Keywords

Identity, norm, foreign policy, Karabakh War, Türkiye-Azerbaijan, media.

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Türk Kimlik ve Normlarının Medyada Temsili: 2020 Karabağ Savaşı*

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Öz

Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan arasında yaşanan Dağlık Karabağ sorunu 2020 yılında tekrar uluslararası kamuoyunun en önemli gündem maddelerinden biri hâline gelmiş, yaşanan çatışmalarda her iki ülkeden binlerce kişi yaşamını yitirmiştir. Bu çalışma, uluslararası ilişkiler bağlamında Türkiye'nin 2020 Karabağ Savaşı'yla ilgili medyaya yansıyan tutumunu yapılandırmacılık teorisi ekseninde tartışmakta, ülkenin ulusal kimliğinin yanı sıra bağlı olduğu uluslararası normların mevcut dış politika icrasında ne denli belirleyici unsur olduğunu açıklamaya odaklanmaktadır. Bu noktadan hareketle Türkiye ve Azerbaycan haber portallarında 2020 Karabağ Savaşı'yla ilgili yer alan haberler araştırma kapsamına alınarak içerik analizi yöntemi ile analiz edilmiştir. Analiz bulguları Türk ve Azerbaycan medyasının haber tasarımında çatışmaya dâhil olan tarafların algı ve kimliklerinin şekillenmesinde önemli bir rol oynayan ortak kimlik ve normlarla ilgili iletilere yoğun olarak yer verdiğini ve medyanın savaşı bir ulusal kimlik ve egemenlik meselesi olarak tasvir ettiğini ortaya koymuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Kimlik, norm, dış politika, Karabağ Savaşı, Türkiye-Azerbaycan, medya.

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Introduction

International relations and identity have long been included in academic research domains, with various theoretical studies exploring the international system, relationships between states, and the role of media in shaping the subject. The theoretical framework of this study focuses on constructivism in international relations. Constructivism, which emerged in the United States in the late 1980s (Rosyidin), is an increasingly important social theory aimed at illuminating the main elements of international politics, upon which international relations theories are also built. The term “constructivism” in international relations was first used by international relations scientist Nicolas Onuf from Florida International University in his 1989 study “World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations” (Onuf Rule and rules; Onuf, World of Our Making). Constructivist theory posits that international relations are shaped not only by material factors such as military power or economic resources but also by ideas and norms that shape the behaviors of states and other actors in the international system. The immaterial dimension manifests in the identities, norms, and interests of the actors. Material factors alone have no inherent meaning; what matters is how they are interpreted. States or other actors are akin to rational and conscious individuals, gaining identity through interaction. Constructivist theory characterizes identity as a socially constructed concept shaped by various factors, including media representations. Identity and norms are crucial in constructivist research models, functioning both as dependent and independent variables. As independent variables, they can define the motivations behind actors’ actions. As dependent variables, they are products of social construction (Rosyidin). According to constructivist theory, norms guide actors in choosing actions consistent with widely accepted principles and rules, considering the actors’ identities. Constructivism posits that social structure results from the interaction between actors and structure. Constructivism posits that social structure is the result of social construction generated by the interaction between the actor and the structure.

Constructivism in international relations developed from an understanding inspired by the theory of symbolic interactionism in sociology. International conflicts and cooperation arise from the construction of national identities

within symbolic interaction (Hopf). Assuming that national identity is often unique, citizens of a nation are expected to conform to a specific character or participate in a unique lifestyle that distinguishes them from 'others' beyond their borders. Otherwise, there would be no ontological justification for a nation's existence (Skey). A nation exists within 'a complex of other nation-states' (Billig). Postmodernists contend that constructivism is as much an ontology as it is an epistemology, asserting that theories, in the most literal sense, construct the world (Wendt 49). The epistemology of constructivism is founded on the relationship between structure and actors, which is crucial. Constructivism, by contextualizing Anthony Giddens' structuration theory, emphasizes that the relationship between structure and actors is always a reciprocal and cyclical process. In Giddens' structuration theory, in this cyclical process, actors, actions, and interactions are on one hand constrained by the structural dimension of social reality, while on the other hand, they reproduce this structure (Giddens and Turner 15).

George Herbert Mead, a philosopher and social psychologist representative of symbolic interactionism, enriches constructivist theory by questioning, from an anthropological perspective to what extent every form of human knowledge-seeking is simultaneously an interaction within a social context (Alver 20). He interaction developing in the process of constructing the social structure described by constructivism occurs through symbols and gestures between structure and actor, contributing to the development of social identity through the socialization of individuals. An individual grows up hearing, seeing, and using concepts constructed with language within the social environment they are born into. This form of interaction also marks the beginning of communication. Communication involves assigning meaning to symbols and gestures and interpreting the world through these meanings. The mind can be said to exhibit symbolic behavior. According to Mead's theory of action, individuals cannot be separated from their own social environments. As social beings, the determination of meaning among individuals with whom they interact is possible through the interpretation of symbols and gestures via social interaction (Şenol 25; Alver 20). The communication form emerging from interactions that enable the interpretation of symbols and gestures in symbolic interactionism shapes the mind and molds perceptions on national identity. The mind utilizes indicators of previously learned symbols. In other words, it understands

and responds to reactions by interpreting the symbols it has learned during communication with others. In this context, symbolic interactionism not only analyzes the design of socio-cultural identities and national identities in the media and the positive or negative outcomes of this design from a communication perspective but also addresses questions about how national identities are constructed and perceived.

According to Krotz, media communication can be perceived as a form of symbolic action and a modification of interaction (Alver 37). States can enhance their relationships and modify their policies through the media. National identity has a significant impact on news coverage (Rowling et al.; Shahin; Song et al.). When national identity is at stake, journalists are likely to overlook professional values and frame events to favor the elites of their own nations. News related to foreign policy activates the national identity of journalists and their use of relevant symbols, resulting in news production that mirrors the decisions of policymaking elites. Policymakers are influenced by national identity when designing foreign policy. The news industry can shape collective identities impacting international relations. Media representations of nations, individuals, and groups can either reinforce existing identities or generate public opinion against them, affecting how countries interact. Through language and symbols, the media can support a nationalist agenda or pursue opposing policies, leading to cooperation or tensions between countries.

In the realm of foreign policy, the identities and interests of actors hold significant importance. To accurately analyze issues such as culture, identity, national identity, national interests, security, and state identity within international relations, as well as to evaluate the role of law in international politics and understand how states determine their foreign policy preferences, the constructivist approach serves as a crucial tool. As states become more familiar with and engage in exchanges with one another, they can achieve mutual understanding and resolve any conflicts or issues without resorting to confrontation or war, facilitated by the constructivist approach.

The constructivist theory posits that knowledge and reality derive from social constructs, emphasizing how language and symbols shape social reality. Within this framework, the aim of this study is to examine the foundational principles of constructivist theory in international relations

and to elucidate its explanatory potential alongside its limitations for media analyses. Understanding how the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War was linguistically and culturally represented by the media from a constructivist perspective holds particular significance within the realm of international relations. Media representations are intricately intertwined with societal and ideological contexts. Given the shared ideological inclinations in Turkish and Azerbaijani media, as well as the robust political, military, societal, and strategic ties between the two nations, news coverage aligned with common interests may shape the media's portrayal of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. An examination of the actors, symbols, and discourses present in both Turkish and Azerbaijani media allows for a comparative analysis with foreign media representations, thereby facilitating a deeper understanding of both disparities and similarities.

Within this framework, this study discusses the representation of Turkish identity norms in the media in the context of the 2020 Karabakh War and focuses on explaining the importance of national identities and international norms in the field of international relations. The study aims to contribute to the existing literature on news framing by analyzing news reports published in Türkiye and Azerbaijan regarding the presentation of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War using content analysis methodology. Based on the assumption that the media can frame events within the axis of government-media relations, incorporating its own ideological perspectives, thereby shaping international relations, emphasizing international cooperation, and establishing various norms, the study formulates the following questions: Within the framework of constructivism, to what extent are Türkiye's national identity and adherence to international norms, particularly the constructive role it embraces with the principle of "peace at home, peace in the world," determinative in its active foreign policy stance regarding the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War? Considering Türkiye's deep-rooted historical ties with Azerbaijan, characterized by both physical resemblances (religion, language, culture, and identity) and non-physical similarities (ideals, shared strategic objectives), as well as its sustained political and economic relations based on the concept of "two states, one nation," how does the media approach the conflict within the framework of Türkiye's official policy? What are the dominant frames in the media integrated into national identity?

Historical Background

The historical background of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh can be traced back to the Soviet era when Nagorno-Karabakh was an autonomous region within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. The conflict transcends ethnic groups and involves states, yielding international ramifications. As the Soviet Union collapsed in 1988, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh voted to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia. The ensuing war, which ended in a ceasefire in 1994 mediated by Moscow, resulted in the de facto establishment of a republic under Armenian control in Karabakh. Diplomatic efforts led by the OSCE Minsk Group failed to produce a resolution, and the issue remains unresolved. The complexities of finding a lasting solution stem from entrenched ethnic nationalism in both countries and the involvement of regional actors with geopolitical interests in the region.

The origins of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue can be traced back to the Treaty of Kurekchay in 1805 between Iran and Russia. As a result, the independent Khanate of Karabakh was annexed to the Russian Empire, marking the beginning of a significant influx of Armenians from Russia and Iran into Azerbaijani territories. The tensions between Azerbaijanis and Armenians date back to the first Russian Revolution of 1905. Initially sparked by disturbances in Baku, the unrest spread to Shusha, the site of the first ethnic uprisings in Western Karabakh. The violence escalated, resulting in the massacre of over 10,000 Azerbaijanis in cities such as Baku, Nakhchivan, and Ganja. In May 1918, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and the Democratic Republic of Georgia were established, followed shortly thereafter by the proclamation of the Armenian Democratic Republic in Tiflis. However, this situation was short-lived. While the Azerbaijani army was engaged in suppressing an Armenian uprising in Karabakh, the Red Army entered Baku in 1920, and subsequently, the Bolsheviks seized control of Yerevan, Tbilisi, and the entire Transcaucasus region.

On July 7, 1923, Nagorno-Karabakh was established as an Autonomous Region within Soviet Azerbaijan. In 1988, the region sought to secede from Azerbaijan and requested annexation by Armenia. Following the rejection of this decision, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh decided to unite with the Republic of Armenia, a decision ratified by the Armenian Parliament in

December 1989. Then ethnic conflicts ensued, leading to the declaration of a state of emergency in Baku. This resulted in significant casualties and injuries among civilians. In 1991, the unilateral declaration of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic by the Armenians in the region sparked a full-scale war. In February 1992, the Khojaly massacre occurred, wherein 613 Azerbaijani civilians were killed by Armenian forces. The conflict saw the occupation of Shusha and Lachin by Armenian forces. This resulted in Armenia gaining control over approximately 20% of Azerbaijani territory, including Upper Karabakh and surrounding areas, with one million Azerbaijani citizens becoming refugees. The demographic structure of the region changed drastically, with many Azerbaijanis displaced from their homeland. After the conflict which caused approximately 30,000 deaths, on November 11, 1993, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 884, condemning the attacks on Azerbaijani territories. The resolution demanded the immediate unilateral withdrawal of occupying forces from newly seized regions, particularly Zangilan and the city of Horadiz. A ceasefire agreement was signed on May 12, 1994, with Russia acting as a mediator. During the OSCE Budapest Summit on December 5-6, 1994, the heads of state and government of OSCE participating states established the Minsk Conference co-chairmanship to coordinate mediation efforts within the OSCE framework. The Minsk Group, comprising 17 members including Türkiye, is co-chaired solely by the United States, Russia, and France.

The ceasefire process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in place since 1994, faced its most serious violation in April 2016. Armenian military provocations led to the bombing of densely populated Azerbaijani regions, resulting in significant casualties. The Four-Day War ended with heavy losses for the Armenian army and the recapture of strategic positions by Azerbaijani forces, boosting their morale. Türkiye's support for Azerbaijan during the conflict caused disappointment in Armenia and further strained relations between two countries.

Following its defeat, the Armenian army attacked Tovuz, located along the Azerbaijan-Armenia border, on July 12, 2020, reigniting conflict in the region. The region garnered heightened attention, prompting Türkiye to reiterate its unwavering support for Azerbaijan, its geostrategic partner,

which it categorizes as a fraternal nation within the realms of military and political cooperation. As a NATO member, Türkiye engaged in shuttle diplomacy, acting as a neutral mediator while pushing the OSCE to address the issue on an international platform. High-level contacts between Turkish and Azerbaijani officials intensified, leading to joint military exercises. Aside from Türkiye's national identity, the influence of pro-Azerbaijani sentiment in domestic politics, rising nationalism, cultural and linguistic connections, and the establishment of key joint ventures like the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, and the South Caucasus natural gas pipeline, have all positioned Türkiye as a stakeholder. Türkiye has adopted a foreign policy supportive of Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict. Türkiye's assistance in the political and military domains using unmanned aerial vehicles facilitated the rapid conclusion of the war. In response to the attack launched by Armenian forces on September 27, 2020, Azerbaijan conducted counterattacks with unmanned aerial vehicles, causing significant casualties to the Armenian army and liberating cities like Shusha, Jabrayil, and Agdam from occupation. The victory decisively belongs to Azerbaijan. During the 2020 Karabakh War, Türkiye, as one of the main actors in the region, preferred to shift its foreign and security policy from a line of soft power to a harder stance. Türkiye's policy not only turned the balance in favor of Azerbaijan but also demonstrated to Russia that a game in the region's future could not be established without Türkiye's involvement.

After Soviet Union's dissolution, bilateral relations between Türkiye and Azerbaijan developed rapidly, bolstered by ethnic and cultural similarities as well as mutual support from both societies. At the end of 1991, after the Soviet Union collapsed, Azerbaijan and Armenia declared their independence. Within less than two years, Azerbaijan lost control over the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region and most of the areas that were predominantly Azerbaijani. From the onset of the conflict in 1988, more than one million Azerbaijanis were forced to leave their homes and living areas in Armenia, Karabakh, or the surrounding regions.

During the conflict, Azerbaijan faced isolation internationally, with the U.S., Russia, and even Iran, despite its status as an Islamic state. However, Türkiye stood by Azerbaijan, backing its legitimate claims due to shared cultural, religious, and linguistic ties. Facing strong Armenian advocacy

on international platforms, Türkiye declared its support for Azerbaijan and announced that it would enforce an embargo on Armenia as long as Armenian forces occupied Azerbaijani lands. Türkiye clearly conveyed consistent support Azerbaijan in its Karabakh policy.

Methodology

During war and crises, national media often emphasizes symbols and values tied to the dominant national identity in domestic politics. It is increasingly accepted that countries with close strategic and diplomatic ties will also adhere to these. Based on this premise and guided by constructivist theory, this research aims to analyze the emphasized elements and dominant news frames in publications from news portals with varying ideological perspectives in Türkiye and Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh War. These countries, considered fraternal due to their ethnic and cultural roots, have shared social memories that influence their media portrayals. This study employs content analysis as its primary research method. Content analysis is a technique used to interpret message content such as texts, images, symbols, or audio data (Gheyle and Jacobs). The objective of content analysis is to systematically transform large volumes of data into a highly organized and concise summary (Erlingsson and Brysiewicz 94). In brief, it can be described as an effort to identify and define the intentions, themes, and trends in texts as a whole. There may, and often should, be an anticipated relationship among the variables measured in content analysis (Neuendorf 44). Every content analysis must consider the content and form characteristics of the messages. Content analysis studies aim to guide future academic research within the scope of the topic under consideration and determine the overall trend on the subject (Ültay et. al. 190).

The analysis focuses on the 2020 Karabakh War, which commenced on September 27, 2020, with an Armenian attack on Azerbaijani military positions and civilian settlements. This conflict lasted for 44 days, ending with the Azerbaijani army's response. The study examines news articles published on six of the most followed news portals in Türkiye and Azerbaijan: *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Yeniçağ* from Türkiye, and *Trend*, *AzadlıqRadiosu*, *Azertac* from Azerbaijan. The research is limited to Turkish and Azerbaijani news portals, with the selection criteria based on their ideological perspectives. In the research, news articles related to the war

were selected from a universe of news coverage across six news portals using purposive sampling. The selected articles span a total duration of ten days, covering the initial three days, the middle three days, and the final four days following the war's onset. A total of 717 news articles, published between October 1, 2020, and November 10, 2020, were analyzed.

Based on the questions of the study, the assumptions of the research are as such:

H.1. Türkiye's national identity and adherence to international norms are fundamental in its active foreign policy during the 2020 Karabakh War. Türkiye's independent and peaceful identity is reflected in its mediation role in resolving international conflicts and its membership in various organizations, notably the United Nations.

H.2. The analyzed news portals have covered the 2020 Karabakh War in a manner that aligns with the official foreign policies of their respective governments. Türkiye's official positions and strategies concerning the 2020 Karabakh conflict mirror its national identity and its commitment to international norms.

H.3. In Turkish news portals' coverage of the 2020 Karabakh War, prevalent ideological themes highlighting Azerbaijan's historical ethnic makeup were favored, with visuals reinforcing these symbols.

H.4. Turkish and Azerbaijani news portals' contents primarily rely on the output of national news agencies. Due to limited production from foreign news agencies, the number of news items is restricted. Consequently, the composition of the news content produced is shaped by the interplay between structure and action.

H.5. The news coverage of the 2020 Karabakh War in the analyzed news portals is predominantly influenced by the perspectives of the news actors involved.

Assessment of the Acquired Results

The quantitative and qualitative content analysis findings of the news articles published on the selected portals are presented below.

Quantitative Analysis of the News

Table 1

Number and Proportions of News on the 2020 Karabakh War in News Portals

<i>Cumhuriyet</i>		<i>Milliyet</i>		<i>Yeniçağ</i>		<i>Trend</i>		<i>Azadlıq Radiosu</i>		<i>Azertac</i>	
Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %
58	8.1	112	15.6	125	17.4	159	22.2	29	4	234	32.6
Total 717									100%		

Source: <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr>; <https://www.milliyet.com.tr>; <https://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr>; <https://az.trend.az>; <https://www.azadliq.org>; <https://azertag.az>

Table 1 presents that according to 717 news articles analyzed across six news portals, 32.6% were published on *Azertac*, 22.2% on *Trend*, 17.4% on *Yeniçağ*, 15.6% on *Milliyet*, 8.1% on *Cumhuriyet*, and 4% on *AzadlıqRadiosu*. The highest number of news articles was published on the *Azertac* news portal.

Table 2
Organizations Producing News on the 2020 Karabakh War

Organization Generating News	<i>Cumhuriyet</i>		<i>Milliyet</i>		<i>Yeniçağ</i>		<i>Trend</i>		<i>Azadlıq Radiosu</i>		<i>Azertac</i>	
	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%
Turkish News Agencies	20	34.5	68	60.7	37	29.6	5	3.1	0	0	3	1.3
Russian News Agencies	0	0	0	0	2	1.6	4	2.5	0	0	0	0
Azerbaijani News Agencies	0	0	1	0.9	4	3.2	86	54.1	6	20.7	167	71.4
International Agencies	3	5.2	3	2.7	1	0.8	7	4.4	5	17.2	10	4.3
Social Media Accounts	3	5.2	3	2.7	19	15.2	13	8.2	1	3.4	9	3.8
Self Generated	27	46.6	26	23.2	21	16.8	33	20.8	12	41.3	20	8.5
Mix Generated	5	8.6	11	9.9	41	32.8	11	6.9	5	17.2	25	10.6
Total	58	100	112	100	125	100	159	100	29	100	234	100

According to Table 2 news portals prioritize their own productions. So, *Cumhuriyet* stands out as the news portal that predominantly features its own productions, with 46.6%. Except for *AzadlıqRadiosu*, ranking second, the other five news portals utilize Turkish news agencies (34.5%), followed by a mixture of national news agencies from respective countries. International agencies and social media accounts of political actors are used as sources of news content to a lesser extent, with a minimum rate of 5.2%. According to Table 2, *Milliyet* is the news portal that utilizes Turkish news agencies the most, with 60.7%, while *Azertac*, with 1.3%, is the news portal that utilizes Turkish news agencies the least. This news portal, with 74.4%, prefers to use Azerbaijan news agencies the most as a source.

Table 3

Use of Visuals in News Coverage of the 2020 Karabakh War

Use of Visuals in News	<i>Cumhuriyet</i>		<i>Milliyet</i>		<i>Yeniçağ</i>		<i>Trend</i>		<i>Azadlıq Radiosu</i>		<i>Azertac</i>	
	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %
Color photos	49	71	434	87.3	174	83.7	228	93.8	33	66	679	94.3
Black and White photos	6	8.7	17	3.4	4	1.9	0	0	0	0	1	0.1
Video content	10	14.5	26	5.2	22	10.6	12	4.9	15	30	37	5.1
Graphics	1	1.4	2	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Map Photos	3	4.3	18	3.6	8	3.8	3	1.2	2	4	3	0.4
Total	69	100	497	100	208	100	243	100	50	100	720	100

The use of visuals in news coverage on the 2020 Karabakh War is presented in Table 3. According to this, colored photographs are favored to a greater extent than black and white photographs across all the news portals subjected to analysis. In the sharing of colored photographs, *Azertac* ranks first among news portals with 94.3%, followed by *Trend* with 93.8%, and *Milliyet* ranks third with 87.3%. The use of black and white photographs is highest at *Cumhuriyet* with 8.7%, while *Trend* and *AzadlıqRadiosu* do not include any black and white photographs. Advancements in digital technologies have led to a reduction in the prevalence of black and white photographs within news design, concurrently facilitating an upsurge in the incorporation of video content. The findings indicate that *AzadlıqRadiosu* has notably embraced video content, accounting for 30% of its articles, with *Cumhuriyet* following at 14.5%. Analysis of graphic use across all news portals reveals low incidence, with a notable preference for map photographs delineating the spatial progression of the conflict. *Cumhuriyet* emerges as the frontrunner in this regard, with a utilization rate of 4.3%, while *Azertac* exhibits the lowest adoption rate at 0.4%.

Qualitative Analysis of News

Table 4

Actors Involved in News Coverage of the 2020 Karabakh War

News Actors	<i>Cumhuriyet</i>		<i>Milliyet</i>		<i>Yeniçağ</i>		<i>Trend</i>		<i>Azadlıq Radiosu</i>		<i>Azertac</i>	
	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %
Government Representatives	27	39.1	72	40	62	35.7	113	50	20	40	151	44.7
Military Personnel	16	23.2	40	22.1	37	21.2	30	13.3	8	16	27	8

International Organizations	4	5.8	8	4.4	4	2.2	4	1.8	0	0	2	0.6
NGOs	0	0	6	3.3	4	2.2	10	4.4	1	2	35	10.3
Scientists	6	8.7	4	2.1	7	4	20	8.8	7	14	32	9.5
Public	5	7.2	33	18.2	36	20.7	33	14.6	7	14	60	17.6
Opposition	3	4.3	5	2.8	12	6.9	10	4.4	5	10	10	3
Politicians	6	8.7	9	5	2	1.2	1	0.4	2	4	11	3.2
Popular Figures	2	2.9	4	2.1	10	5.8	5	2.2	0	0	10	3
Total	69	100	181	100	174	100	226	100	50	100	338	100

Table 4 presents the numbers and proportions of news actors utilized in news articles related to the 2020 Karabakh War. Across all news portals, government representatives are the primary news actors, followed by military personnel. Azerbaijani news portals, government representatives are featured more prominently compared to Turkish portals. Among Turkish news portals, *Milliyet* emerges as the most frequent user of government representatives (39.1%), while *Yeniçağ* is identified as the least frequent (35.7%). Among Azerbaijani news portals, *Trend* features government representatives most frequently (50%), while *AzadlıqRadiosu* features them least frequently (40%). Military personnel are predominantly depicted as news actors, with *Cumhuriyet* exhibiting the highest frequency (23.2%),

while *Yeniçağ* demonstrates the lowest frequency (21.3%). Azerbaijani news portals exhibit a lower usage rate of military personnel as news actors compared to Turkish counterparts. The involvement of international organizations and NGOs as news actors is notably limited across all news portals. *Cumhuriyet* notably highlights international organizations at 5.8%, while it does not incorporate any representatives from NGOs. In contrast, *AzadlıqRadiosu*, despite lacking any representation of international organizations as news actors, prominently features representatives from NGOs. Conversely, scientists emerge as the most prominently featured news actors at *AzadlıqRadiosu*, constituting 14% of the total, whereas the general public is predominantly represented in articles on *Yeniçağ*, with 20.7%. Opposition figures are prominently featured at *AzadlıqRadiosu*, comprising a 10%, while politicians are most frequently portrayed on *Cumhuriyet* at 8.7%. Popular figures feature most prominently on *Yeniçağ*, representing 5.8%.

Table 5

Message Contents in News Published on 01-03.10.2020 Regarding the 2020 Karabakh War

Message Contents in News	<i>Cumhuriyet</i>		<i>Milliyet</i>		<i>Yeniçağ</i>		<i>Trend</i>		<i>Azadlıq Radiosu</i>		<i>Azertac</i>	
	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%
Azerbaijan's Independent National Identity and the Legality of the War under International Law	11	20	38	19.5	28	42.4	33	31.4	4	36.3	102	36.4

Armenia's Occupying Identity and the Warrior Norm	7	12.7	34	17.4	10	15.1	18	17.1	0	0	74	26.4
Turkish Identity and Türkiye's Peaceful Norm	15	27.3	35	17.9	14	21.2	24	22.9	3	27.3	61	21.8
The Influence of Armenian Lobbies on the War	1	1.8	7	3.6	0	0	2	1.9	1	9.1	7	2.5
International Norms	18	32.8	80	41	11	16.7	27	25.7	3	27.3	35	12.5
Other	3	5.5	1	0.5	3	4.5	1	1	0	0	1	0.3
Total	55	100	195	100	66	100	105	100	11	100	280	100

Message contents in news published on 01-03.10.2020 regarding the 2020 Karabakh War are presented in Table 5. These indicate a significant emphasis on Azerbaijan's independent national identity and compliance of the war with international law across all news portals and during the early stages of the War. So, *Yeniçağ* features relevant message contents most prominently, with 42.4%, while *Milliyet* exhibits the least emphasis at 19.5% among Turkish news portals. Azerbaijani news portals, on the other hand, prominently feature designs highlighting Azerbaijan's independent national identity and the compliance of the war with international law in nearly half of their news content, portraying the conflict from their perspective to naturally legitimize it for their audience. Regarding message

contents related to Armenia’s occupying identity and warrior norm, *Azertac* features them most prominently at 26.4%, while message contents related to Turkish identity and Türkiye’s peaceful norm are most frequently encountered at *Cumhuriyet* and *AzadlıqRadosu*, both at 27.3%. Message contents concerning the influence of Armenian lobbies are featured at *AzadlıqRadosu* at 9.1%, while *Yeniçağ* does not feature any content on this topic. The table shows that message contents related to international norms (involving participating countries, EU, ECtHR, UN, OSCE Minsk Group, the destructive impact of the war, and achieving a peaceful resolution) are prominently featured across all news portals, with *Cumhuriyet* exhibiting the highest frequency at 32.8%.

Table 6

Message Contents in News Published on 18-20.10.2020 Regarding the War

Message Contents in News	<i>Cumhuriyet</i>		<i>Milliyet</i>		<i>Yeniçağ</i>		<i>Trend</i>		<i>Azadlıq Radosu</i>		<i>Azertac</i>	
	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %	Number	Prop. %
Azerbaijan’s Independent National Identity and the Legality of the War under International Law	14	42.4	20	37	39	37.5	58	44	5	31.2	99	40.2

Armenia's Occupying Identity and the Warrior Norm	11	33.3	13	24	29	27.8	29	22	4	25	71	28.9
Turkish Identity and Türkiye's Peaceful Norm	4	12.1	9	16.6	26	25	35	26.5	4	25	56	22.8
The Influence of Armenian Lobbies on the War	0	0	2	3.7	0	0	1	0.8	0	0	0	0
International Norms	3	9	9	16.6	9	8.6	8	6	3	18.8	20	8.1
Other	1	3	1	1.9	1	1	1	0.8	0	0	0	0
Total	33	100	54	100	104	100	132	100	16	100	246	100

Data on the message contents in news published between 18-20.10.2020, on the 2020 Karabakh War, is presented in Table 6. A comparison between the message contents reveals an increase in the emphasis on Azerbaijan's independent national identity and compliance of the war with international law across all news portals towards the middle of the conflict. Alongside these messages, content regarding Armenia's occupying identity and warrior norm, which contributes to legitimizing the conflict from Azerbaijan's perspective, ranks second among the most frequently used message contents in news. Thirdly, there is a notable emphasis on news concerning Turkish identity and Türkiye's peaceful norm.

Table 7

Message Contents in News Published on 07-10.11.2020 Regarding the War

Message Contents in News	<i>Cumhuriyet</i>		<i>Milliyet</i>		<i>Yeniçağ</i>		<i>Trend</i>		<i>Azadlıq Radiosu</i>		<i>Azertac</i>	
	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%
Azerbaijan's Independent National Identity and the Legality of the War under International Law	11	31.4	27	44.2	29	46	99	47.3	26	53.1	113	54.1
Armenia's Occupying Identity and the Warrior Norm	1	2.9	6	9.8	3	4.8	20	9.6	1	2	23	11
Turkish Identity and Türkiye's Peaceful Norm	8	22.9	15	24.6	17	27	54	25.8	3	6.1	59	28.2
The Influence of Armenian Lobbies on the War	0	0	1	1.6	0	0	2	1	1	2	3	1.5

International Norms	14	40	12	19.7	13	20.6	33	15.8	15	30.6	11	5.2
Other	1	2.9	0	0	1	1.6	1	0.5	3	6.1	0	0
Total	35	100	61	100	63	100	209	100	49	100	209	100

Table 7 delineates the message contents characterizing the concluding phase of the 2020 Karabakh War, disseminated between 07-10.11.2020. Notably, Azerbaijan's independent national identity and the war's adherence to international law persist as prominent thematic elements. Concurrently, there is a discernible proportional augmentation in message contents pertaining to Turkish identity and Türkiye's peaceful norm, alongside an increase in news incorporating international norms. During the specified period, *Azertac* prominently featured message contents concerning Azerbaijan's independent national identity and the war's conformity to international law, accounting for the highest proportion at 54.1%, whereas *Cumhuriyet* exhibited the lowest proportion at 31.4%. Messages on Turkish identity and Türkiye's peaceful norms were predominantly featured on *Azertac*, accounting for 28.2% of the content, whereas messages concerning international norms (involving participating countries, EU, ECHR, UN, OSCE Minsk Group, the destructive effects of war, and peaceful settlement) were chiefly found on *Cumhuriyet*, representing 40% of the total content.

Table 8
Frames of News Coverage on the 2020 Karabakh War

News Circles	<i>Cumhuriyet</i>		<i>Milliyet</i>		<i>Yeniçağ</i>		<i>Trend</i>		<i>Azadlıq Radiosu</i>		<i>Azertac</i>	
	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%
National Identity	2	3	5	3	10	6.4	14	5.2	1	2.6	15	3.7
Peace, Decisive Victory, and Independence	32	47.8	93	56.4	78	50	131	49.1	28	71.8	197	48.4
Unconditional Ceasefire	9	13.4	11	6.7	8	5.1	2	0.7	0	0	1	0.2
Armenia's Unlawful Claims	9	13.4	28	17	17	10.9	48	18	1	2.6	95	23.3
Economy	2	3	4	2.4	3	1.9	15	5.6	0	0	22	5.4
Political, Social and International Support	12	17.9	24	14.5	37	23.7	54	20.2	6	15.4	77	18.9
Other	1	1.5	0	0	3	1.9	3	1.1	3	7.7	0	0
Total	67	100	165	100	156	100	267	100	39	100	407	100

Table 8 presents news coverage frames on the 2020 Karabakh War. The majority of news frames in the news portals revolve around the themes of peace/decisive victory and independence, emphasizing Azerbaijan's justness and strength. In terms of number and proportion, the second most prevalent theme is political/social and international support, followed by Armenia's unlawful claims. This is followed by calls for an unconditional ceasefire. Turkish news portals feature messages of peace, decisive victory, and independence, with rates of 47.8% on *Cumhuriyet*, 56.4% on *Milliyet*, and 50% on *Yeniçağ*. From Azerbaijani portals, *Trend* utilizes these messages at 49.1%, *AzadlıqRadiosu* at 71.8%, and *Azertac* at 48.4%. Themes related to political, social, and international support are featured on *Cumhuriyet* at 17.9%, *Milliyet* at 14.5%, *Yeniçağ* at 23.7%, *Trend* at 20.2%, *AzadlıqRadiosu* at 15.4%, and *Azertac* at 18.9%. Regarding frames concerning Armenia's unlawful claims, *Cumhuriyet* features them at 13.4%, *Milliyet* at 17%, *Yeniçağ* at 10.9%, *Trend* at 18%, *AzadlıqRadiosu* at 2.6%, and *Azertac* at 23.3%. Concerning the theme of an unconditional ceasefire, *Cumhuriyet* features it at 13.4%, *Milliyet* at 6.7%, *Yeniçağ* at 5.1%, *Trend* at 0.7%, and *Azertac* at 0.2%, while no coverage is found on *AzadlıqRadiosu*. News frames focused on an unconditional ceasefire highlight the statements of countries advocating for a ceasefire without considering demands for the return of Azerbaijani territories occupied by Armenia, with news reports noting that these demands are not accepted by Azerbaijan and Türkiye. News portals provide coverage of economic and national identity frames in approximately equal proportions, with the least coverage observed in other categories of news frames.

Table 9
Messages Regarding Culture and Identity in the News

Culture and Identity in the News	<i>Cumhuriyet</i>		<i>Milliyet</i>		<i>Yeniçağ</i>		<i>Trend</i>		<i>Azadlıq Radiosu</i>		<i>Azertac</i>	
	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%	Number	Prop.%
Common Language/ Religion/Historical Background	1	1.6	7	4.9	10	5.9	17	7.3	0	0	23	6.4
Turkish Identity	13	20.3	32	22.5	55	32.5	110	47	9	25	179	50
Solidarity and Fellowship	9	14.1	51	35.9	51	30.2	65	27.8	8	22.2	102	28.5
A Few in One	41	64.1	52	36.7	53	31.3	42	18	19	52.8	54	15
Total	64	100	142	100	169	100	234	100	36	100	358	100

Table 9 depicts the news messages on culture and identity concerning the 2020 Karabakh War. All examined news portals predominantly feature messages containing various elements related to culture and identity, as formulated by researchers. Messages containing multiple elements (common language/ religion/historical background, Turkish identity, solidarity, and brotherhood) are most prevalent on *Cumhuriyet* at 64.1%, followed by *AzadlıqRadiosu* at 52.8%, *Milliyet* at 36.7%, *Yeniçağ* at 31.3%, *Trend* at 18%, and *Azertac* at 15%. Turkish identity-related messages rank second, and solidarity and brotherhood-related messages rank third. The proportion of these messages is found to be *Cumhuriyet* at 14%, *Milliyet* at 35.9%, *Yeniçağ* at 30.2%, *Trend* at 27.8%, *AzadlıqRadiosu* at 22.2%, and *Azertac* at 28.5%.

Conclusion and Discussion

The constructivist theory within international relations underscores the significance of ideas, norms, and identities in influencing the conduct of states and their global consequences. This serves as a valuable tool for elucidating the dynamics of conflict and collaboration in foreign affairs, by accentuating the role of historical and cultural backgrounds. Our analysis illustrates how the constructivist theory in international relations offers insights into the 2020 Karabakh War, portraying it as an outcome of the interplay between historical and cultural identities and narratives that shape the perspectives and behaviors of the involved parties.

This study employs a constructivist lens to examine the portrayal of the 2020 Karabakh War in the media, with a specific focus on identity and normative frameworks. It becomes evident that both Turkish and Azerbaijani media outlets play pivotal roles in shaping the perceptions and identities of the conflict's stakeholders, framing the war as a question of national identity and sovereignty. Particularly noteworthy is the stance taken by the Turkish media, which, influenced by historical and cultural bonds, adopts a discourse in its coverage of the 2020 Karabakh War that aligns with one side, characterizing the conflict as an act of aggression. This finding lends support to our second hypothesis.

The study indicates that news portals predominantly prioritize their own generated news content, with the exception of *AzadlıqRadiosu*, which predominantly sources from Turkish news agencies and media outlets. This data underscores the effective collaboration between Turkish media and their support for Azerbaijani media. Using official social media accounts of political figures as sources by all news portals during the war underscores the significant role of social media in war reporting.

The consistent adherence of media coverage to the official government policies of their respective countries and the framing of issues through the perspectives of news elites aligned with their ideologies, as revealed by the analysis results, also confirms our fifth hypothesis. News portals predominantly featured heads of state, government representatives, and military personnel as news actors, while also incorporating scientists, experts, and representatives of civil society organizations. This approach

aimed not only to garner political support but also to establish credibility by referencing scientific and societal realities.

News messages on war were analyzed in three separate tables: three days at the beginning of the war, three days towards the middle of the war and four days towards the end of the war. In all three tables, considering the content of the news messages, it was observed that in all news portals, Türkiye's peaceful norm was the most common, in the second place, news about Azerbaijan being the strong and justified side in the war, and in the third place, news about Russia being decisive in the war, especially in the last days of the war, were included. The UN Security Council has accepted resolutions in favor of Azerbaijan on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue four times under different numbers: 822, 853, 874, and 884. In contrast to the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, the 2020 conflict has frequently underscored Azerbaijan's strong position with its modern weaponry and trained soldiers. News coverage has extensively featured content regarding the biased behavior of countries such as France, Russia, the United States, and China, as well as international actors like the EU, ECHR, UN, and the OSCE Minsk Group. Reports have been disseminated regarding the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group's mission to produce a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, with criticism directed at the group for allegedly stalling Azerbaijan for 28 years. Throughout the duration of the conflict, the Armenian army has intermittently launched missile attacks on civilian areas in Terter, Ganja, Barda, and Mingachevir, resulting in significant damage. The analysis found that news portals covered reports suggesting Armenia's collaboration with the terrorist organization PKK/YPG. As the operations advanced, it was observed that, in addition to PKK militants, individuals from far-right French groups, volunteers, and mercenaries of Armenian origin from different countries, including Russia, as well as armed militias engaged in the occupation of Crimea, were reportedly participating in combat on the Armenian side. Moreover, news articles have underscored the partial actions of nations such as Russia, France, the United States, China, Iran, along with international entities like the EU, OSCE Minsk Group, and the ECHR amid the ongoing conflict. In this context, our first and second hypotheses were also confirmed.

During the ceasefire-focused communications, Armenia, France, Russia, and the United States have called for a ceasefire without mentioning the return of Azerbaijani territories under occupation, yet their demands were not accepted. There were reports indicating numerous citizens in Türkiye expressing their willingness to volunteer for the Azerbaijani army. Politicians and NGOs have frequently voiced their support for Azerbaijan on various platforms.

The analysis of all examined news portals revealed the predominant use of frames portraying peace/decisive victory and independence, emphasizing Azerbaijan's just and strong position. There has been considerable coverage of Armenia's unlawful claims. Throughout the war, Armenia has persistently disseminated false information on social media platforms, claiming that Armenia was actually at war with the Republic of Türkiye rather than Azerbaijan, attempting to mislead the international public opinion. The Turkish Ministry of National Defense refuted claims made by Armenian officials on their official accounts regarding the involvement of Turkish aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and armed drones (UCAVs) in operations in Armenia. Images showing the Azerbaijani armed forces possessing the capabilities to achieve victory independently were presented to the public via satellite imagery.

In scrutinizing cultural and identity-related narratives within news coverage, it became apparent that alongside variables identified within the "multiple identities" category (inclusive of shared language, religion, historical background, Turkish identity, solidarity, and fraternity), there were also discussions concerning Türkiye's economic partnership with Azerbaijan and assertions about Turkish military involvement using F-16s. Certain news pieces were presented in the form of one or more sentences accompanied by photographs, such as the report on "Pashinyan's meeting with Putin." While news outlets prominently featured narratives centered on solidarity and fraternity, they allocated comparatively less space to narratives pertaining to shared language, religion, and historical background.

The findings concluded that both Turkish and Azerbaijani media outlets, during the 2020 Karabakh War, strategically sought to shape public opinion in support of Azerbaijan by incorporating Turkish identities and norms into their narratives, thereby aligning themselves with official foreign policies of their respective governments. Common cultural and identity norms are determinants in crafting and framing news narratives concerning the conflict.

In conclusion, comparing the findings derived from the constructivist theory perspective with those to be obtained from various theoretical perspectives by different researchers and analyzing the impact of these perspectives on media representations is expected on a global scale to contribute to the development of a multidimensional scientific understanding of the subject. Furthermore, it is anticipated that the gleaned outcomes will furnish instructive data for forthcoming researchers in conducting comparative analyses of the depiction of the 2020 Karabakh War across varied media platforms (including newspapers, television, etc.). The constraints of this study are poised to spark further scholarly exploration. Carrying out a similar study centered on American and European media would elucidate how media entities from nations professing allegiance to Western norms but unmistakably adopted partisan stances in the 2020 Karabakh War (whilst also holding membership in international organizations) framed the conflict and constructed a societal narrative through linguistic and symbolic constructs. The findings posit that engaging in discourse on media within normative theories of international relations and transparently disseminating research outcomes will academically contribute to addressing acute structural challenges within the news ecosystem. Independent investigation, bolstered by autonomous funding, and the augmentation/advancement of the authorial and editorial network as a perpetual norm through bilateral, regional, and international partnerships, will elevate the scholarly caliber of the discipline.

Contribution Rate Statement

The authors' contribution rates in this study are as follows: Betül Pazarbaşı 80%; Selma Koç Akgül 10%, Sehavet Neciyev 10%.

Conflict of Interest Statement

There is no conflict of interest with any institution or person within the scope of this study. There is no conflict of interest between the authors.

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Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

Moğollarda Otorite Tableti Olarak Payza ve Kullanımı*

Derya Coşkun**

Öz

Moğol İmparatorları askerî yetkililer başta olmak üzere elçi, haberci gibi uluslararası platformda hareket hâlinde olan kişilere gerek görevleri dolayısıyla gerekse seyahatleri sırasında rahat ve hızlı hareket etmelerini sağlamak amacıyla payza adında bir künye hazırlamışlardır. Kişinin görevi ve yetkilerini içeren bu tabletler, taşıyan kişiye kolay erzak temini ve binek hayvanı tahsisi başta olmak üzere farklı birçok imtiyazlar sunmuştur. Payzalar, sokağa çıkma yasağı uygulamaları, resmî yazışmalar ve posta teşkilatı gibi işlerde faal bir şekilde kullanılmıştır. Tarihinin Hunlardan başladığı tahmin edilen bu tabletlerin Kitan ve Çinliler tarafından da kullanıldıkları bilinmektedir. Öyle ki Moğol payzalarında rastlanan bu etki, Çin ve Uygur yazılarının yoğun bir şekilde kullanılmasıyla fark edilir durumdadır. Çalışmada bu terimin Çince, Farsça ve Batılı kaynaklar çerçevesinde kullanımı, türleri ve örneklerine yer verilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Payza, Çin Kaynakları, Uygur Yazısı, Moğol İmparatorluğu, Posta Teşkilatı.

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Tablet of Authority in Mongols: Paiza and Its Usage^{*}

Derya Coşkun^{**}

Abstract

The Mongol Emperors had a tablet called paiza prepared for military officials, messengers, and others who travelled on an international scale in order to enable them to move easily and quickly both for their duties and their travels. Indicating the duties and authorizations of the bearer, these tablets offered many privileges to the bearer, such as easy supply of provisions and the allocation of riding-animals. Paizas were actively used in curfew practices, official correspondence, and postal organization. It is known that these tablets, whose history is estimated to begin with the Huns, were also used by the Khitan and Chinese. In fact, this influence, which is encountered in Mongolian paizas, is noticeable with the intensive use of Chinese and Uyghur writings. The present study discusses the types and examples of paizas, and the use of this term in Chinese, Persian, and Western sources.

Keywords

Paiza, China Resources, Uyghur Script, Mongol Empire, Postal Service.

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Giriş

Habercilere, posta memurlarına ve askerî yetkililere kimlik belgesi niteliğinde verilen tabletler (Emîn 78-79); *Çince paizi* 牌子 (Doerfer 239-241), Farsça *pāiza* • پایز (İbn Bibî 454), Moğolca *gerege* Гэрэгэ, Пайз (Cleaves 255-256) olarak adlandırılmakta olup hükümdar ya da imparator tarafından verilen bir itimat ve yetki levhası olarak bilinmektedir (Samoiloviç 62-63; Bayasakh 112). Veriliş amaçlarına göre kategorize edilen bu tabletlerin bilinen ortak özelliği, resmi bir iş için verilmiş olmasıdır. Payza, Çin dilindeki *p'ai-tse* (Doerfer I 239; Vér 46; Atwood 89-200; Morgan 91) sözcüğünden türemiş olup beyaz levha, belge, nişan anlamlarına gelmektedir¹. Payza'nın *Payd-zı* sözcüğü ile özdeşleştirildiği hatta Çin dilindeki *Payd-zı* sözcüğü ile de aynı olduğu ileri sürülmektedir (Samoiloviç 62-63). Bunun yanı sıra, kelimeyi *Bayzal/Baysa* olarak nitelendirip tabletin, Çinliler-Moğollar ve Türkler üçgeninde yayılım gösterdiğini (Ortekin 67), *Tuva Pograniçınıy Stolb* şeklinde ifade edildiğini savunanlar da bulunmaktadır (Özyetgin 15). Payza, Rusça Tavro (Тавро) kelimesiyle de ilişkilendirilmektedir. Tavro; *sahiplerinin atlarını ve sığırlarını diğer hayvanlardan ayırt etmek için hayvanların derilerine veya boynuzlarının üzerine vurdukları işaret/damga, okuma yazma bilmeyenlerde elle yapılan bir boy işareti* olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Asyalılar arasında at üzerinde geleneksel kabul edilen bir işaret mahiyetinde olan Tavro'nun değişik geometrik şekiller ve çizgilerden oluştuğu göz önüne alındığında Payza ile benzer yanları olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır. Kelime köken itibarıyla de Türkler ve Moğollara atfedilmekte (*Tolkoviy Slovar Jivago Velikoruskago Yazıka Vladimira Dalya* 395; Yegorova 644) ise de Çinlilerden Moğollara intikal etmiş olduğunu savunan araştırmacılar da bulunmaktadır (Vér 46; Doerfer I 239; Spuler 318; Buell 209; Silverstein, 143). Payza ile ilgili birinci elden kaynaklara T'ang Hanedanlığı zamanında rastlanması da bu savı güçlendirmektedir (Doerfer 239; Özyetgin 180). Daha çok Shato Tarhanlık fermanlarıyla ilişkilendirilerek Kitanlar'la bağlantısı olduğunu ileri sürenler de vardır (Cortepeter 254).

Genel itibarı ile devlet adamlarına, komutanlara, elçilere, muhbirlere ve güven teskin eden kişilere de verilen Payzalar; emir, beyan ve iltimasların yazılı olduğu hoşgörü ve himaye alameti olarak tanımlanmaktadır (Emîn 78-79; Kazvîni, *Târih-i Gûzîde* 755; Kulî Hân I 2117; Nefîsî I 170; Zengûyî 220-222; Baron 198-200; Aksarayî 105; Dehkhodâ IV 4625).

Payzanın Tarihi Kökeni ve Kullanımına Dair Bazı Tespitler

Payzanın ilk kullanılmaya başlandığı dönemin Hunlar zamanında olduğu tahmin edilmektedir. Zira Hunlar'da *payza* ve *fu-chieh* benzeri bir itimat levhasının kullanımı söz konusudur. Hsi-yu'ya² gitmiş olan Hun temsilci heyetinin *ch'an-yu*'den bir itimat belgesi taşıdığı, bu belge dolayısıyla kendilerine dokunulmadığı ve kendilerine yol boyunca yiyecek sağlandığı bilgisi³ Hunlarda hem itimat levhası hem de posta teşkilatı hizmetlerinin varlığına işaret etmektedir (Obrusanszky 112). Hsi-yu'ya giden Hun temsilcileri dikkate alındığında itimat levhası kullanımının merkezle sınırlı kalmayıp batıdaki devletlerde de kullanıldığı görülmektedir. Bu devletlerden biri de hiç şüphesiz Avrupa Hun İmparatorluğu'dur (Cerci 81-82). Hunların posta sistemi ve payza kullanımlarına dair bilgiler destanlar ışığında da aydınlatılmaktadır. Oğuz Kağan destanında Oğuz Kağan elde ettiği ganimetleri yurduna götürmesi için görevlendirdiği kişilere altın uçlu iki ok ve yay vermiştir. Ellerindeki ok ve yayı gören halk, geçtikleri topraklarda onlara ve hayvanlarına yiyecek ve içecek vermişlerdir (Togan 27, 90; Ögel 227). Bu olay ok ve yayın Payza değerinde bir levha olduğunun en açık göstergesidir.

Payzanın kelime olarak anlamlandırılması Liao 遼 hanedanı zamanına tekabül etmektedir. MS I. yüzyılda kraliyet ailesiyle seyahat edildiğine dair altın bir tabletin varlığı bilinmektedir (Philostratus V-IX, 119; Priaux 1-4; Mead 28-29, 53-54; Silverstein 143). Batıdan doğuya doğru değişim ve gelişim gösteren Payza, Kitanlarla beraber kendine özgü bir yapı kazanmış sonraki dönemdeki Moğol payzalarına örnek teşkil etmiştir. Moğol payzalarının Kitan üsluplu olması, bu etkileşimin bir sonucudur (Wittfogel-Sheng 168-169; Allsen 237-276; Morgan 94).

Tang hanedanlığı (618-907) zamanında payza benzeri levhalarının *chieh* modelinde olduğu görülmektedir. Tang yasalarında *fu* adlı itimat alametlerine rastlanırken (Togan 20) payza ifadesine rastlanmaması payzanın kullanımıyla ilgili bazı şüpheleri de beraberinde getirmektedir. Zira Çin'de kullanılan levha ve görev kimliklerinin *chiehler* şeklinde iki parçalı olması Tang'ların kullandığı levhaların payza olmadığını göstermektedir. Payza adına Tang hanedanlığının son dönemlerinde rastlanması Kitan ya da Sha-to etkisinin bir sonucu olsa gerektir. Çin'deki askerî sisteme ait olan payzaya benzer levhalar *fu*, posta teşkilatında kullanılan payzalar ise *chieh*

olduğundan farklılık göstermektedir (Falkenhausen 83; Kan 91-98; Ch'ien 25, 130-132; Shih-Ti Hung 93-94; Bumbacher 13-25).

Payza, bir taltif vazifesi olarak Karahanlılarda da kullanılmıştır (Tüsi 108; Gaffârî-yi Kâşânî 9; Bâkirî 48-49; Emîn 78-79; Marshall 46; Genç 154). Selçuklulardaki payza kullanımı ise Moğol dönemine denk gelmektedir. Moğol Hanları Selçuklu hükümdarlarına payza vermek suretiyle onlara yönetim hakkı tanımışlardır. Moğollarda kullanılan payzalar emir, vali ve komutanlara verilmek üzere şahsa özel yapılmıştır (Emîn 78-79).

Moğol İdare Sisteminde Payza ve Veriliş Amaçlarına Göre Türleri

Moğollar siyasi hayatları boyunca haberleşme ve istihbarat teşkilatına büyük ölçüde önem vermişlerdir. Haberleşmeyi sağlamak adına önceleri tacir ve elçileri kullanan Moğollar⁴, kazandıkları tecrübeler vasıtasıyla *Yam* adında bir istihbarat ağı kurmuşlardır (Delibalta 10-11). Haberleşmenin uygun koşullarda sağlanması elçilerin sorumluluğunda olduğu gibi onların can güvenliklerinin sağlanması da devletin görevleri arasında sayılmıştır. Bu nedenle de elçilerin seyahat sırasında güvenliklerini sağlamak ve ne amaçla seyahat ettiklerini ortaya koymak için payza adında künyeler hazırlamışlardır (Chambers 61-62; Berber 8; Vladimirovich 79).

Moğol payzalarının ana maddesi ağaç, demir, gümüş ve altın olup bu maddeler payzayı taşıyacak kişinin statüsüne göre değişkenlik göstermektedir (Cüveynî 169; Morgan 91; Silverstein 142-143; Yakubovsky 81; Atwood 434; Marshall 46; Özdemir 223). Payzalar kronolojik olarak incelendiğinde en eski payza türlerinin kaplan işlemeli olduğu göze çarpmaktadır. Yazılı kaynaklarda ismi geçen ve 1270 yılına kadar kullanımda olduğu öngörülen *haiqing pai* (海青牌) adlı payza, bu türe örnek teşkil etmektedir. 1270 yılından itibaren ise Yuan Hanedanı sahasında kullanılan *chengy paizi* (成员牌子) adlı payzanın üzerindeki yazılar, *P'ags-pa alfabeti*⁵ ile oluşturulmuştur. 1277'den sonra payzaların altından ziyade demirden yapıldığı görülmektedir (Vér 46; Dang 38-45). Payzaların veriliş şekilleri incelendiğinde askerî ve idarî sahada aşağıda yer alan tablodaki gibi bir hiyerarşi olduğu görülmektedir.

Tablo 1

Payzaların Veriliş Şekilleri

Binbaşlıları	Gümüş Payza
Ordu Komutanı	Altın Payza
Darugaçi	Altın Kaplanlı Payza

Kaynak: Meng Ta pei lu ve Hei Ta shi lu 131; Uzunçarşılı 200-204.

Moğol otorite levhalarının Cengiz Han zamanından itibaren kullanıldığı bilinmektedir (Atwood 89, 258; Vér 46; Cüveynî 169). Cengiz Han'ın elçisi Liu Zhunglu, Taocu keşiş Changchun K'yi çağırarak için Orta Asya'dan ayrılırken yanına altın bir tablet almıştır (Li Zichang 黎子昌 19-20; Waley 48). Cengiz Han ve Ögeday zamanlarında payza kullanımı ile ilgili herhangi bir sorun yaşanmazken Ögeday'ın ölümünden Güyük'ün başa geçiş sürecine kadar ortaya çıkan otorite boşluğundan istifade eden hanedan mensupları keyfi biçimde payzalar bastırmışlardır (Marco Polo 12). Bu nedenle Güyük, hükümdar olur olmaz⁶ ilk iş, payza bastırmaya yönelik suistimallere karşı tedbirler almış, ilk reformlar onun zamanında gerçekleşmiştir (Silverstein 146-148). Bu reformlar; payza dağıtımının kısıtlanması, önceden verilen gereksiz payzaların toplatılması şeklinde gerçekleşmiştir (Cüveynî 454). Mengü Han'ın hükümdarlığı döneminde Emir Argun'a ve Emir Mahmud'a, Herât'ın idaresinden sorumlu Şemseddin Muhammed Kert'e aslan başlı payza verdiği (Mîrhând V 182; Cüveynî 430; Ebu'l Ferec II 547; Jackson 84; Lane 461; Uzunçarşılı 202-203; Spuler 319) ve payzaya yönelik reformları da sürdürdüğü görülmektedir. Mengü Han Cengiz Han zamanından itibaren verilmiş olan tüm payzaları toplatmış, tacirlerin kolay yollardan payza edinmelerinin önünü kesmiş, payza kullanımını yüksek dereceli memur ve resmî görevliler dâhilinde sınırlamıştır. Payza sahiplerinin binek hayvanı ve erzak kullanımına yönelik sahip oldukları imtiyazlara kısıtlamalar getirilmiş (Cüveynî 496; Allsen 80,160; Morgan II 380), bu kısıtlamalar Kubilay Han zamanında da devam etmiştir (Atwood 259; Vér 48-49; Silverstein 151-152; Cüveynî 420). Fakat en radikal reformlar İlhanlı hükümdarı Gazan Han zamanında gerçekleşmiştir ki payzaların öncelikle sadece görevde bulunduğu süre dâhilinde kullanılmasına karar kılınmış, kadınlar ile şehzadelerin payza verme yetkileri ellerinden alınmış, payzayı taşıyacak olan kişinin isminin yazılması zorunlu hâle getirilmiştir. Böylece kimse birbirinin

payzasını kullanma yanlısına düşmemiştir. Gazan Han'ın bu reformu, keyfi verilen payzaların devlet ekonomisine yük olmasının da önüne geçmiştir (Atwood 199; Spuler 319; Yuvalı 115).

Payzalar, gerek yapım maddesi gerekse üzerindeki yazılar hususunda çeşitlilik göstermektedir. Payzaların boyutları avuç içi büyüklüğündedir. Payzalar arasında en değerli olan yüzeyinde aslan başının tasvir edildiği türlerdi (Cüveynî 13). Kubilay Han zamanında yüzbaşı olanların payzası, 20 ons ağırlığında gümüş bir tablet şeklindeydi. Bu tabletlerin üzerinde, *Büyük Tanrı'nın kudreti ve bizim imparatorumuza olan lütfu ile Hakan'ın adı muzaffer ve muhterem olsun. Buradaki emre her kim itaat etmezse cezası ölümdür*, şeklinde bir ibare bulunmaktaydı. Ordu komutanına ait olan payzalar, 50 ons ağırlığında olmakla beraber üzerinde güneş ve ay resimleri bulunmaktaydı (D'ohsson 241; Spuler 318-319). Payzaların yapımıyla özel kuyumcular ilgilenmekte (İbn Bibî 178; Yazıcızâde 610; Uzunçarşılı 205; Kaymaz 97; Kaya 297) yapımı biten payza hazine dairesinde muhafaza edilmekteydi. Bu tabletlerin manevi değeri kadar maddi değerinin de yüksek olması sıkıca korunmasını zorunlu hâle getirdi (Spuler 318; Müneccimbaşı II 89).

Payzalar, kişiyi onurlandırmak, tasdik ve taltif etmek için de kullanılmaktaydı. Payza, siyasi anlamda tasdiklenmek amacı taşıdığından Moğol Devleti'ne uzak eyaletlerde bulunan idari ve mali yetkililer, tabi devletlerin yönetici kadroları Han değiştiğinde payzalarını da yenilemek zorundaydılar. Ögeday Han, I. Alaeddin Keykubad'a altın ve gümüş levhalı payza yollamış sonraki süreçte hükümdar olan Rükneddin Kılıç Arslan'a da aslan başlı payza verilmişti. Payza kime gönderildiyse o kişi tarafından ayağa kalkmak suretiyle öpülerek başa konulmalıydı. Bu bir saygı alameti olmakla beraber her kim ki bu saygıyı göstermezse payza kişiden alınarak hazineye gönderilmekteydi. Hülagü Han'ın Selçuklu hükümdarı İzzeddin Keykavus'un itimsizliği nedeniyle elindeki payzayı alarak hazineye göndermesi bu duruma örnek teşkil etmektedir. Payzaların kullanım süreleri uzun soluklu olabiliyordu. Öyle ki 1243 Köseadağ Savaşı'ndan sonra Moğol kuvvetleri Sivas önlerine geldiklerinde Sivas kadısı Necmeddîn Kırşehirî'nin, kendisine Cengiz Han tarafından verilen payzayı göstererek şehri katliamdan kurtarması bu durumu açıklar niteliktedir. Hülagü Han, Moğolların lehine siyaset izleyen Fars Atabegi Ebû Bekr b. Sa'd'a itaatinden dolayı payza vermiştir (Şebânkâreî

185). Meyyâfârikîn hâkimi Melik Eşref ise Moğolların gönderdiği Şahneyi kovarak kendisine payza gönderilmiş olan papazı da öldürmüş (İbnü'l İbrî 37) sonucunda da Meyyâfârikîn kuşatılmıştır.

İlhanlı Devleti'nde de payza kullanıldığı görülmektedir. Marco Polo seyahatnamesinde Geyhatu'nun onlara beş parmak eninde ve bir dirsek boyundan daha uzun üç tane altın plaka verdiğini, Kubilay Han'ın da her türlü destek ve yardım alabilmeleri için plakalar üzerine yazı kazdığını kaydetmektedir (Marco Polo 18). Yabancı elçilere payza ve at kullanma hakkı verilmişti. Geyhatu Han'ın Nasturî patriği seçilen Mar Yahballaha'ya altın bir payza vermesi bu duruma örnek teşkil etmektedir (Olbricht 63-64; Budge 60, 75).

Payza çeşitleri bakımından iki gruba ayrılmıştı. Birincisi altın, gümüş, bakır, bronz ve tahtadan yapılmış olan levhalar; diğeri ise 37,9 cm boyunda tanrı ile hükümdarın adlarının işlenmiş olduğu aslan başlı levhalardı. Bu payza türüne *Payze-i Serşîr* denilmekte olup diğeri nazaran daha muteber kabul edilmekteydi (Atwoot 139; Yakubovskiy 82; Uzunçarşılı 204; Gündegül 922). Moğol halkı ondalık sistem bazında arban (on), jaun (yüz) ve mingan (bin) olarak teşkilatlandırılmış bu grupların başındaki kişilere de payza verilmiştir (Herevî 41; Marco Polo 78; Dehkhodâ IV 4625; Lessing 49, 539, 853; Atwoot 139; İbnü'l-İbri 37; Matsui-Gang 71; Yong-Peng 382; Wilkinson 863; Yakubovskiy 82; Temir, 225).

Moğol payzaları verilmiş amaçları çerçevesinde üç çeşittir. Bunlardan biri posta teşkilatında görev yapan memura (Cleaves 71-72), ikincisi yönetici, komutan ve güvenliği sağlayan birinci derece rütbelilere, üçüncü olarak da devriye gezen güvenlik gücü ve gece seyahati yapan kişilere verilen payza türleriydi (Spuler 319-320; Dang 46; Vér 46).

Posta Tabletleri Olarak Kullanılan Payzalar

Üç gruba ayrılan bu tablet türünün ilkinin; *Chengyi Paizi* (hükûmetin hizmet sonrası ağı olan Yam kullanımına izin veren tablet) oluşturmaktaydı (Olbricht 33, 64; Doerfer 110-118; Farquar 218-220). Bu tableti taşıyan kişiler seyahat hakkına sahip olmakla beraber at ve erzak talebinde bulunabiliyorlardı (Jingshi dadian 經世大典 1-6b; Hosung Shim 110; Silverstein 142-147; Atwood 368; Marshall 46). Acil askerî işler için *Jinzi Yuanfu* (金资源负) altın yazıtlı yuvarlak tabletler kullanılmaktaydı.

Gümüş yuvarlak tabletler imparatorluk bünyesinde korunmakta Moğol yetkilileri tarafından denetlenmekteydi (Farquar 70b-71a; YS 101, 2583; *Moğolların Gizli Tarihcesi* 249; Yakubovskiy 81-82). Yuan dönemine ait olduğu tahmin edilen bu tabletlerdeki süslemeler, *Haiqing* (şahin) yerine Phags-pa yazısı ile yapılmıştır (Dayuhan shunegezheng guochao dianzhang 大于函数呢个正果朝典章 29). Moğollar şahin tabletleri kullanmadan önce kaplan başlı posta tabletleri kullanmışlardır. Birinci sınıf memura kaplanların dövuşü olarak adlandırılan, karşılıklı duran iki kaplan figürlü tabletler verilmiştir. Tabletlerin üzerinde Çince; *Bağışlanmış İmparatorluk fermanı*. *Bu tabletin taşıyıcısı kendi takdirine göre hareket etmelidir* ifadesi yer almaktaydı. Sonrasında da *Çingis'in İmparatorluk fermanı Bağışlanmış cennet*. *Acil tarafından* ifadesinin yer aldığı altın düz tabletler kullanılmıştır. En son olarak da gümüş tabletler kullanılmıştır (Meng Ta pei lu ve Hei Ta shi lu 16, 79).

1277'den sonra Yuan Hanedanlığına ait posta tabletleri yuvarlak biçimde Phags-pa yazısı ile süslenerek demirden yapılmıştır (YS 9: 192; YS 103, 2629-2630; Poppe 4-9,14-15). Haberciler önemli işlerde altın yazılı yuvarlak tabletler kullanmışlar, küçük işler için kraliyet mührü olan kararnamelere ihtiyaç duymuşlardır. Sadece acil olan askerî işler söz konusu olduğunda yerel prens, prenses veya imparatorun damadı gümüş yazıları bulunan yuvarlak tablet kullanabilmişlerdir. Diğer zamanlarda ise kraliyet mührü bulunan bir ferman yeterli olmuştur (Dang 38-41).

Resmî Pozisyonları Belirtmek Amacıyla Kullanılan Payzalar

Komutan ve askerler tarafından resmî işler için kullanılan bu tabletler, Myriarchlar, Chiliarchlar ve Centurionlar üst, orta ve alt olmak üzere üç farklı kategoride incelenmekteydi. Myriarch, altundan yapılmış çömelen bir kaplan figürü bulunan tabletlere sahipti. Tabletın alt ve üst kısımlarında iki ya da üç adet olmak üzere parlayan inciler yer almaktaydı. Chiliarch, basit altın bir tablet kullanırken Centurionlar, gümüş bir tablet taşımaktaydılar (YS 98: 2507-2508). Tabletlerde ortaya çıkan bu farklılık statüyle doğru orantılıydı (Avirmed 119). Genel olarak üçüncü derece subay bir kaplan tableti, dördüncü ve beşinci derece subay düz altın bir tablet, altıncı ve yedinci sınıf bir subay düz gümüş bir tablet kullanabilirdi (YS 91: 2310-2312; Dayuhan shunegezheng guochao dianzhang 大于函数呢个正果朝典章 9: 3a-4b). Tableti kullanan kişinin vefatı durumunda da tablet, devlet

hazinesine iade edilmek zorundaydı (Dayuhan shunegezheng guochao dianzhang 大于函数呢个正果朝典章 9-10; YS 19: 402). Elçilere durumlarını iyileştirmek maksadıyla verilen altın tabletler, elçi geri dönüş yaptığıında istenmekteydi (YS 12: 242; 19: 402).

Phags-pa yazısından önce tablet üzerine oyulan resmî yazılar Uygur alfabesiyle hazırlanmaktaydı. Genellikle dikdörtgen şeklinde ve sade olan bu tabletler Yuan askerleri, düz gümüş tabletler de yüzbaşı tarafından kullanılmaktaydı (YS 10: 203; Ölmez 1-18). Tatarlarda maaş sistemi yoktu. Onlara altın kaplan başlı, sade altın ve sade gümüş tabletler verilmekteydi (Dang 42).

Sokağa Çıkma Yasağında Kullanılan Payzalar

Sokağa çıkma yasağı kararnamesi çerçevesinde gece seyahati yapmak zorunda olan ve devriye atmak zorunda olan askerler için özel tabletler hazırlanmaktaydı. Tableti kullanan kişi ve görevliler işleri bittikten sonra tableti iade etmek zorundaydılar. Posta hizmeti sebebiyle payza sahibi kişiler de bu süreçte rahat seyahat edebiliyorlardı (Jingshi dadian 經世大典 1/ 6b-7b; 5/15a-b).

Sokağa çıkma yasağı: *İlk Geng'in üç Dian'ında zili durdurun ve insanların hareket etmesini yasaklayın. Beşinci Geng'in üçüncü Dian'ında zili çalarak insanların yürütmesine izin verin. Bu kurala aykırı hareket eden 27 kez dövülür. Kişi dayak yemek yerine ödeme yapabilir. Acil resmî bir görevi yerine getirenlerin, ailesi hastalık ölüm ve doğumla karşılaşanların geceleri hareket etmesine izin verilir. Sokağa çıkma yasağına aykırı hareket edenler tutuklanma durumunda direnen ya da gece devriye memurunu yaralayanlar 107 kez darp edilecektir* (Dayuhan shunegezheng guochao dianzhang 大于函数呢个正果朝典章 57: 16a-b; Jingshi dadian 經世大典 72b-73a).

1264 yılından beri sokağa çıkma yasağını okçular ve askerler yürütmekteydiler. Onların kullandığı tabletler çoğunlukla bakırdan yapılırdı. Posta tabletlerinden farklılık gösteren bu tabletlerin seri numaraları imparatorluk tarafından değil yerel yönetim tarafından tayin edilmekteydi (Jingshi dadian 經世大典 II: 14a; Dayuhan shunegezheng guochao dianzhang 大于函数呢个正果朝典章 57: 16a; Jingshi dadian 經世大典 72b-73a; YS 85: 2149; Dang 44).

Moğolların Kullandıkları Payzalara Dair Örnekler


Moğol payzaları, üzerinde farklı birçok yazı türünün olduğu, başta Kitanlar olmak üzere Çinlilerden de etkilenerek hazırlanmıştır. Üzerlerinde Uygurca, Moğolca ve Çince ifadelerin yer aldığı Moğol payzaları kozmopolit bir dil yapısına sahip olarak hazırlanmıştır. Payzada yer alan ifadeler emir niteliğindedir. XIII. yüzyıla ait olduğu bilinen ve Minusinsk bölgesinde bulunan payzanın üzerinde ölümsüz göğün gücüyle Hanın adı kutlu olsun. Saygı göstermeyen suçlu sayılsın ve ölsün anlamına gelen Moğolca tabirler bu durumu örnekler niteliktedir (Rifat 38-39).



Tablet 1. Sibirya Yenisey Vadisinde bulunan Tablet (Poppe VII; Samoiloviç 53-65).

1846 yılında Sibirya Yenisey Vadisi'nde bulunan bu tablet, dikdörtgen görünümlüdür. Tabletin kenarlarında oyularak hazırlanmış Çince *Xuanzi Sishi'er hao* (轩子四十二号) ifadesi yerleştirilmiştir. Tablet gümüş olmasına

rağmen oyuntular yıldızlı bir şekilde hazırlanmıştır. Tablet önyüzünde üç, arka yüzünde iki satır olmak üzere Moğolca beş satırdan oluşmaktadır. Tabletlin üzerinde; *Ebedî cennetin gücüyle İmparatorun adı kutsal kalsın. İtaat etmeyen suçlu olacağından ölecektir* ifadesi yer almaktadır (Poppe 56; Dang 32; Bayasakh 111).



Tablet 2. Dinyeper Vadisinde bulunan Tablet (Dang 47).

1848'de Zaporozskaja Seç yakınlarında bulunan tablet, dikdörtgen şeklinde olup Uygur alfabesiyle yazılmıştır. 1362-1369 yılları arasında Altın Orda Devleti hükümdarı Abdullah Han tarafından verilmiş gümüş olan bu payzanın üst kısmında oyulmuş stilize bir kaplan başı vardır. Kaplan başının hemen altında temsili iki küçük kuş bulunmaktadır. Yazılar, tabletin her iki tarafında iki satır şeklinde yer almaktadır.

Mönhe T(e)ngri yin hüçüdür,
Yehe suu, zali yin igegendür,
Abdullah yin c(a)rl(i)g he nülü
Bişüre hü hümün algahu ühühü

*Bengü Tanrı'nın gücünde,
uhu deha becerinin yardımıyla
Abdullah'ın yarlığına kim,
heyecanlanmazsa o kişi ölü.*

Tablette yazan bu ifadeler kesin bir hükümle fermana uyma zorunluluğunu, uymayan kişinin akıbetinin ölüm olacağını ortaya koymaktadır. 1853 yılında üzerinde *Phags-pa* alfabesiyle yazılmış olan dikdörtgen şeklinde bir tablet daha bulunmuştur. Tablette Çince seri numaralar yer almakta olup bunlar net olmadığından okunamamıştır (Dang 32).



Tablet 3. Doğu Sibiryâ'da bulunan Tablet (Poppe IX).

1881 yılında Doğu Sibiryâ'da yine *Phags-pa* alfabesiyle yazılmış bu tablet, demirden yapılmış yuvarlak şekillidir. Üst kısmında oyulmuş bir kaplan silüeti, onun üst kısmında da lehimlenmiş bir halka bulunmaktadır. Tablet demirden olmasına rağmen yazının beş satırı gümüş işlemelidir. Tablet üzerindeki yazı; *Ebedî cennetin gücü adına. İmparatorun bu fermanına saygı duymayan suçlu sayılacaktır* şeklindedir (Poppe 58; Dang 32-33).



Tablet 4. XIX. Yüzyıl sonlarında bulunan bir tablet (Spitsın 135).

XIX. yüzyılın sonlarında Gürcistan'ın Nijniy Novgorod kentinde bir koleksiyoncu tarafından alınan bu gümüş tablet, Altın Orda Han'ı Gıyaseddin Muhammed (Özbek Han) zamanında yapılmıştır. Tablet Moskova Devlet Tarih Müzesi'nde sergilenmektedir (Dang 33). 1916'da Çinli araştırmacı Loxinyu (罗欣玉), *Yuan Guoshu pai* adını verdiği Phags-pa alfabesiyle yazılmış dikdörtgen bir tablet yayınlamıştır. Tabletın üst kısmı kaplama ile süslenmiş olup yuvarlak bir deliği bulunmaktadır. Yine üst kısımda Phags-pa çizgisi vardır. Pellilot çalışmasında bunu *gay-gon-dzin-lü* şeklinde yazarken telaffuzunun da *kai-kouan-tsing-lu* olabileceğini düşünüp kelimeyi Çince olarak değerlendirmiştir (Rotours 27). Yuan hanedanlığına ait olduğu tahmin edilen bu tabletteki yazılar diğer yazılardan oldukça farklı olduğundan araştırmacılar arasında fikir birliğinin sağlanamadığı görülmektedir (Dang 33).



Tablet 5. Yuan Hanedanlığı'na ait bir tablet.

1925 yılında Çinli bilim adamı Ke Shaomin'in satın aldığı Yuan hanedanlığına ait olan bu yuvarlak tablet, bakırdan yapılmış olup 10 x 13 cm ölçülerindedir. Tablet üzerinde Moğolca, Çince, Arapça ve Farsça yazılar bulunmaktadır; ön yüzünde ise Çince yazılar yer almaktadır. Tablet ortasında Çince karakterlerle "ling (玲)" yazmaktadır. Sağ tarafta ise Çince *Xubufangjianguanwei* (虚补方间官微); sol taraftaki başka bir satırda ise *Jiedai Weiraozhe Zhizui* (接待围绕着之最) yazan iki satırlık bir cümle bulunmaktadır. Tablette, *rol yapanlardan sakının, kötülere engelle, bu tableti vermek yasaktır. Buna karşı hareket eden cezalandırılacaktır* ifadeleri yer almaktadır. Tablet ön yüz sağ kenarında Çince yazılmış bir seri numara (*Di zi wushi hao*) vardır. Tablet diğer yüzünde soldaki iki satırda Arapça-Farsça, sağdaki iki satırda Uygur Alfabetiyle Moğolca yazılar yer almaktadır. Farsça olanın tercümesi; *gece dolaşma yetkisi veren tablet* (Rachewiltz 417), Moğolca tarafta da *Kötülerden sakının* (Poppe 57) ifadeleri yer almaktadır. Üst kısmında süslemeler bulunan tabletin ön yüzünde ters çevrilmiş bir nilüfer yaprağı resmi vardır. Arka yüzündeki resim ile beraber nilüfer yaprağı iki ayrı figürü temsil etmektedir. Dış kısım nilüfer yaprağı, orta kısım ise savaşçı ya da bir hayvanı anımsatır şekilde düzenlenmiştir. Bu figürün bir başı ve iki kolunun olması onun nilüfer ya da şahin olma ihtimalini çürütmektedir. Figürün güç temsilini arttırmak için de burnu, gözleri ve kolları abartılı


bir biçimde aktarılmıştır. Tabletteki Farsça yazıt bu tabletin gece devriyesi atan bir kolluk gücünün izin belgesi olduğunu gösterir niteliktedir. Ters yüzündeki süslemeler ise karışık olmakla beraber orada bir şahin resmi olduğu tahmin edilmektedir. Muhtemelen bu tablet, Yuan hanedanlığına ait posta sistemi için kullanılmıştır (Haneda, *Genchō ekiden zakkō* 利田亨: 元朝驛傳 100-101). Tablet Ulanbator Ulusal Moğol Tarihi Müzesine aittir (Edward 6).



Tablet 6. Kuzey Hebei’de bulunan tablet
(Haneda, *Une tablette du décret* 85-91).

1934’te Kuzey Hebei’de bakırdan yapılmış dikdörtgen şeklinde olan bu tablet, 6,5 x 22 cm ölçülerinde olup üst kısmında bir delik yer almaktadır. Bu tableti diğerlerinden ayıran özellik herhangi bir süslemeye sahip olmamasıydı. Ön yüzündeki ifadeler Çince olarak üç satır şeklinde yaldızlı olarak hazırlanmıştır. Payzada *Tianci Chengjishi huangdi shengzhi tao* (天賜

成绩是皇帝圣旨淘) *Cennetin başışladıđı İmparator Cingis'in İmparatorluk fermarı* ifadesi yer almaktadır. Ters yüzünde de Çince *Zou ma* (走馬) (*Ata binmek*) yazmaktadır. Bu tablet, Japonyadaki Kyoto Üniversitesinde himaye edilmektedir (Haneda, *Chingisu kôtei seishi hai* 成吉思皇帝聖旨牌 132).



Tablet 7. 1962 yılında Yangzhou'da bulunan tablet (Poppe X).


1962'de Güney Jiangsu'da bulunan Yangzhou (揚州) eyaletinde Yuan hanedanlığına ait olduđu düşünölen yuvarlak bir tablet bulunmuştur. *Yang-chou* olarak adlandırılan bu tabletin üzerinde Çince, 'Phags-pa harfli, Moğolca ve Farsça yazılara rastlanılmıştır. Çince yazının bulunduğu bölümde *Kontrol Altına Alma Komisyonu ve Askerî Kumanda Şefliđi, ivedi resmî mesele ve gece seyahati için geçerlidir* ifadeleri yer alırken Moğolca ve 'Phags-pa alfabesi ile oluşturulan satırda ise *seyahat etme yetkisi veren tablet* yazmaktadır. Bu payzada ayrıca *Xuan zi shi hao* (軒子十号) yazan bir seri numarası da bulunmaktadır (YS 92; Rachewiltz 413-417). Tablet şekil bakımından yuvarlaktır. Üst kısmında takılmasını kolaylaştıracı bir delik bulunmaktadır. Tablet, 17 x 14 cm ölçülerindedir. 1355 yılı sonrasına ait olduđu (Cai Meibiao 蔡美彪 131; Rachewitz 416-417) düşünölen tablette, küçük karakterlerle *Gongwu Jisu* (aceyleyle resmî iş), sağındaki *Chi ci yexing* (痴慈夜行) ifadesi de gece *bunu tutarak seyahat edin* yazmaktadır (Dang 35).

1965'te Lanzhou Gansu'da 11,7 x 18 cm ölçülerindeki yuvarlak tabletin ağırlığı, 249 gramdır. Gümüş işlemeli olan bu tabletin üzerinde beş satırdan oluşan Phags-pa Mongol mevcuttu (Dang 36).



Tablet 8. Ukrayna'da bulunan tablet (Mümküev 185-215).

1967'de Ukrayna'nın Simperobol yakınlarında bir tablet bulunmuştur. 29,7 cm uzunluğunda 8,8 cm genişliğinde olmakla beraber en üstte 2.4 cm çapında bir gömme halkaya sahip olan bu tabletin Altın Orda hanı Kildibek Han (1360-1362) zamanında yapıldığı tahmin edilmektedir. Tablette bulut, ay ve çiçeklerden oluşan süslemeler bulunmaktadır (Mümküev 206-207; Dang 36).



Tablet 9. İç Moğolistan'da bulunan tablet (Dang 55).

1985 yılında İç Moğolistan'daki Ke'er'gin Youyi Zhongqi'de bulunan tablet, Yuan hanedanlığı zamanına aittir. Tablet yuvarlak ve bakır olmakla beraber 16,3 cm yüksekliğinde 11,3 cm genişliğinde, 0,6 cm de kalınlığındadır. 725 gram ağırlığında olan tabletin üst tarafında bir yüzük bulunmaktadır. Yüzüğün altında küçük güneş ile ay ve Phags-pada beş anlamına gelen bir kelime oyulmuştur. Gövdenin büyük kısmı yuvarlaktır. Kenarlarında oyulmuş süslemeleri olan bu tabletin ön yüzünde bulutlar arka yüzünde de çim vardır. Ön yüzünün ortasında yer alan yazıtta Yuan (元) ifadesi yer almaktadır. Sol tarafta Tibetçe bir çizgi, *gece devriyesi için tablet* yer alırken sağ tarafta Çince seri numarası ve tabletin adı; *tian zi shi'er hao yexun pai* (天子十二號夜巡牌) (gece devriyesi için) yazmaktadır. Bu tablette beş farklı dil kullanılmıştır. Önyüzün ortasında Moğolca bir satır vardır. Sol taraftaki yazı da Uygur alfabesiyle Moğolca yazılmıştır. Her ikisi de *devriye tableti* anlamına gelmektedir. Sağ tarafta Farsça ve Arapça harflerle; *Gece devriyesi tablet yazmaktadır* (Hao Sumin 郝蘇民 & Liu Wenxing 刘文星 71-72). Tabletteki kozmopolit dil silsilesine bakıldığında şimdiye kadarki hiçbir tablette bu kadar çok dilin kullanılmadığı görülmektedir.



Tablet 10. 1990'da ortaya çıkan tablet (Dang 53).

1990 yılında Yuan Hanedanlığı'na ait olduğu tahmin edilen yuvarlak tabletin ön yüzünde Phags-pa, solda Uygur alfabesiyle Moğolca bir satır yer almaktadır. Her ikisinde de Çince *bensheng xunpai* (本省荀派) (eyalet idaresinin devriye tableti) yazmaktadır. Sağındaki Çince karakter *sheng fu xupani* (生父徐怕你) şeklinde olup *eyalet hükümetinin devriye tableti* ifadesi yer almaktadır. Sol tarafta *zhizheng er' shiwu nian yue ri* (至正二十五年月日) (gün, ay, Zhizgen'in 25. Yılı) yazmaktadır. 25. yıldan kasıt 1365 olmalıdır. Tabletın sağında bulunan seri numarası; *tian zi nianliu hao* (天子廿六号) idi (Dang 36-37).

1993'te de 18 x 11,5 cm ölçülerinde (Berger – Bartholomew, 32; Edward 2-37) bir tablet bulundu. 1999'dan beri de İç Moğolistan Kültürel Dayanaklar Enstitüsü'nde, üzerinde Phags-pa yazısı bulunan dikdörtgen gümüş bir tabletin varlığı bilinmektedir. 29 x 8 cm ölçülerinde olan bu tabletin kenarında Çince seri numara olarak; *Ding zi bāshí hào* (丁字八十号) (Ding 80) kazınmıştır. Çin'de bulunan ilk tablettir (Dang 37). 2000 yılı ortalarında da Moğol Üniversitesi Moğol Kültürü Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, üzerinde Phags-pa alfabesi bulunan dikdörtgen şeklinde altın bir tablete rastlandı. Bu altın tablet, İç Moğolistan'ın Xing'an Meng bölgesinde keşfedildi. Tablet 25,7 x 8 cm ölçülerinde ve 0,1 cm kalınlığındadır. Üstte çapı 2 cm olan kalıp olarak yerleştirilmiş bir delik, kenarında Çince yazılmış *zhang zi jiushiliu hao* (长子九十六号) seri numaralar bulunmaktadır (Çang

96). Beş satırdan oluşan yazıt, diğer Phags-pa'lı tabletlerle aynı minvaldedir. Tablet altın ve gümüş alaşımından yapılmış olup altın içeriği % 58,44'dür. Bu nedenle 350 gr ağırlığındadır. Aynı boyutta yapılmış gümüş bir tableten daha ağır durumdadır. Bu tablet, şimdiye kadar keşfedilen altın gümüş karışımı ilk tablettir (Hou Feng 2000).

Sonuç

Tarihte Hunlar başta olmak üzere birçok devlet tarafından kullanılan payza, sahip olduğu kozmopolit kullanım sahası dolayısıyla çeşitli dillerde anlamlar kazanmıştır. Kitanlar ve Çinliler tarafından da kullanılan payzaların kullanma yetkisi taşıyan kişiye gerek seyahat, gerek erzak gerekse gittiği ülkelerde rahat hareket etme imkânı sağladığı anlaşılmaktadır. Farklı şekil ve boyutlarda boyuna asılan bir künye şeklinde olan ve taşıyan kişinin kimlik kartı olarak değerlendirilen payzalar, her ne kadar işleri kolaylaştırıcı bir etkiye sahip olsalar da zaman zaman amaç dışı kullanılmışlardır. Özellikle otorite boşluğuna bağlı keyfi olarak dağıtılan payzalar, suistimalleri de beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu nedenle Moğol Hanları, amacı dışında kullanılan payzaların etki alanlarını azaltmak adına bazı reformlar uygulamışlardır. Bu reformlar, kişinin ismine özel payza yapımı, önceden sayısız dağıtılan payzaların toplatılması ve kullanım sürelerinin kısıtlanması şeklinde kendini göstermiştir. Yuan Hanedanlığı ve Altın Orda Devletleri'nde daha yoğun bir şekilde kullanıldığı anlaşılan payzalar, kişinin statüsü ve kullanım alanlarına uygun olarak hiyerarşik bir düzenleme ile farklı metaryellerden yapılmıştır. XIX. XX. ve XXI. yüzyıllardaki araştırmalarda Moğollara ait birçok payza bulunmuş, bu payzaların farklı şekil ve boyutta oldukları ortaya çıkartılmıştır. Üzerlerinde Uygur, Moğol ve Çin dilleriyle yazılmış oyuntular bulunan bu payzalar, aslan, pars gibi hayvanların yanı sıra bulut, güneş, nilüfer gibi görsellerle de süslenmiştir. Bu nedenle payzalar sadece idari bir malzeme olarak görülmemiş maddi değerinin yanında manevi ve sanatsal bir değer olarak kabul edilmiştir.

Çıkar Çatışması Beyanı

Çalışma kapsamında herhangi bir kurum veya kişi ile çıkar çatışması bulunmamaktadır

Açıklamalar

- 1 Sha-t'olarda tarhanlıkla da alakalı *paizab* şeklinde bir kavram olduğu bilinmektedir (Kafesoğlu 234).
- 2 Hsi-yü, 36 memleketten ibaret olup sonraki süreçte 50 ayrı krallığa bölünmüş bir coğrafyadır. Hsiung-nuların batısında, Wu-sunların güneyinde bulunan bu yer, kuzey güney ekseninde dağlarla çevrili olup ortasından bir nehir geçmektedir. Doğuda sınır Yü-men-kuan'dan başlayıp batıda Ts'ung-ling dağları ile çevrelenmektedir (Wei-ming Tu 1; Eberhard 137-142).
- 3 Hsiung-nuların Yuehchihlere saldırıları sonucunda Shan-yu'den batıya doğru giden bir elçinin üzerinde itimat alameti olan bir levha taşıdığı ve bununla hem erzak sorunu yaşamadığı hem de güvenli bir şekilde seyahat ettiği görülmektedir (Hulseve 58).
- 4 Ögeday'ın Erzurum'dan Karakorum'a giden Ömer Kazvinî adlı bir tüccara Alaeddin Keykubad hakkında bilgi edinmek amacıyla sorular sorması, ona bir altın iki de gümüş olmak üzere payza vermesi ile Körgöz'e vermiş olduğu payza bu duruma örnek teşkil etmektedir (Reşidüddin 485; Mîrhând 187; Âştîyânî 168-169).
- 5 'Phags-pa alfabesi, Kubilay Han zamanında birden fazla dil kullanımının önüne geçmek amacıyla keşiş 'P'ags-pa tarafından Moğolca ve Çince başta olmak üzere imparatorlukta diğer dilleri de ortak şekilde kapsayacak şekilde hazırlanmış olup 1269 yılında resmî yazı sistemi olarak kabul edilmiştir (Beckwith 165; Vernadsky 161-162).
- 6 Güyük Han, başa geçince ilk olarak Rum sultanının kardeşi ve Halep hâkimine payza vermişti (Şebânkârî 254; Tetevî 3897).

Kısaltmalar

YS: Yuan Tarihi (Lian Song).

HJAS: The Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies

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Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

Rethinking Eurasian Geopolitics: Assessing Türkiye's Influence and the Organization of Turkic States' Impact*

Çağatay Özdemir**

Abstract

This study examines power shifts in the Eurasian Region in the 21st century using traditional geopolitical approaches. These approaches center on the geographical factors that drive the expansion of borders, considering the control exerted by states over geographical areas. The study uses qualitative research methods to evaluate the position of Türkiye, which has gained an active role in global politics with its developing political and economic power within ever-changing Eurasian geopolitics. Composed of three parts, the study examines geopolitical ruptures in Eurasia during the Cold War. It delves into the areas of dominance held by the United States (U.S.), China, and Russia, which came to the forefront during discussions of the unipolar world order in the international system after the end of the Cold War. Simultaneously, the study explores a shift in actors within the international system, as well as changes among global and regional powers. The focus of the study is on issues such as Türkiye's political presence, security phenomena, economic developments, energy investments, and diversity in Eurasia, wherein Türkiye's presence and influence in Eurasia following its position shifting from a regional actor to a global actor, are revealed. While Türkiye's presence in the region constitutes the

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main focus of the study, the effect of the Organization of Turkic States on Eurasian geopolitics is also examined.

Keywords

Eurasia, Türkiye, Geopolitics, Balance of Power, Organization of Turkic States.

Avrasya Jeopolitiğini Yeniden Düşünmek: Türkiye'nin Nüfuzunu ve Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı'nın Etkisini Değerlendirmek*

Çağatay Özdemir**

Öz

Bu çalışmada devletlerin coğrafi alanlar üzerinde denetimiyle, sınırlarının genişlemesi için gerekli olan coğrafi sebepler üzerine odaklanan geleneksel jeopolitik yaklaşımlar merkeze alınarak Avrasya Bölgesinde 20. yy. sonrası yaşanan güç değişimleri incelenmiştir. Çalışmada nitel araştırma yöntemleri kullanılmış, gelişen siyasi ve ekonomik gücüyle küresel siyasette etkin rol kazanan Türkiye'nin konumunun, değişen Avrasya jeopolitiği içerisinde değerlendirilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Üç bölümden oluşan çalışmada Soğuk Savaş döneminde Avrasya'daki jeopolitik kırılmalar, Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesiyle uluslararası sistemde tek kutuplu dünya düzeni tartışmalarıyla öne çıkan Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ve Çin ile Rusya'nın Avrasya üzerindeki hâkimiyet alanları ele alınırken aynı zamanda uluslararası sistemdeki aktör değişimleri ile küresel ve bölgesel güçler temellendirilmiş ve bölgesel bir aktör olan Türkiye'nin küresel bir oyuncu olmasıyla Avrasya'daki varlığı ve etki alanı ortaya konulmuş, Türkiye'nin Avrasya'daki siyasal varlığı, güvenlik olguları, ekonomik gelişmeler, enerji yatırımları ve çeşitliliği gibi konulara odaklanılmıştır. Türkiye'nin bölgedeki varlığı çalışmanın ana eksenini oluştururken Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı'nın Avrasya Jeopolitiğine etkileri de incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Avrasya, Türkiye, Jeopolitik, Güç Dengesi, Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı.

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Introduction

Throughout history there has always been a myriad of factors that establish the position of states in the international system. One of them is their capability to make sense of the geography in which they are located and states have always made efforts to design their policies within the boundaries of their geography. As of the 20th century, the power struggle among Europe's major states, and the conflicts arising from their colonial competitions, have laid the groundwork for the emergence of geopolitics as a distinct field.

This study aims to analyze the position of Türkiye, which has gained an influential role in global politics, within the framework of the ever-changing Eurasian geopolitics. It establishes a hypothetical framework, dealing with how Türkiye is positioned within the international system in the context of the geopolitical theories of Eurasia. In particular, this work offers a discussion over the process in which the dynamics of the Cold War era were shaped in the light of geopolitical theories. The academic discussions concerning the geopolitical approaches of the states have mainly focused on how and for what purpose geography is valued. In his theory that attaches priority to seas, Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that powers that dominate oceans and open seas would be more influential over global politics (Mahan 30). On the other hand, Halford Mackinder, Nicholas Spykman, and George Kennan place Eurasian geopolitics at the heart of their studies. In addition, German geopolitical thinkers such as Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer, while carrying out studies that dealt with Eurasia through Russian geography, built the geopolitical approach of Nazism with concepts such as "lebensraum" and "organic state" (Strausz-Hupé 40-138; Haushofer 33-36).

In the context of the subject of this study, the geopolitical standpoints of Mackinder, Spykman, and Kennan were used as a basis for the construction of the historical and theoretical basis. The study also covers the geopolitical approaches of Zbigniew Brzezinski and Alexandr Dugin to gain insight into the geopolitical approaches of the time that followed the end of the Cold War.

The study adopts qualitative research methods using an analysis of documents as a data collection method. Focusing on conventional geopolitical

approaches, the study reviews the shift in power that arose in Eurasia following the 20th century. While Türkiye's presence in Eurasia constitutes the main focus of the study, the effects of the Organization of Turkic States on Eurasian geopolitics are also examined. Taking this perspective into consideration a literature review was conducted as part of this study and data was analyzed in line with the stated purpose.

Understanding the Geopolitical Position of Eurasia in the 20th Century

There is a general consensus that it was Rudolf Kjellén who first described the term geopolitics in 1899 as it refers to politics linked to geographic space. Denoting various schools and frames of thought in itself, this phrase is a phenomenon conceptualized by ancient Greek thinkers in semantic terms. In ancient Greek, "ge" means land and "politike" means policy, and the term geopolitics was created by combining these two words (Agnew 6). While geopolitics refers to the interaction of human and physical geography with domestic and international policies, it arose from how states define their position within the global system in the context of powerhouses (Toklu 46).

Geopolitics is a geographic term; however, it influences many disciplines in terms of its meaning and quality. There is no universal definition for it as it covers a variety of fields (Tuathail 49). In the context of international relations, geopolitics is a geographic analysis of a space with focus on spatial components (Sideway 225). The influence of geography on politics is not a new concept. Studies over geopolitics date back to the 19th century and the studies of the scientists interested in geography and politics such as Mackinder, Mahan, and Haushofer have been instrumental in molding conventional views of geopolitics. In conventional geopolitical terms, a state is described on an axis as a consequence of positive and adverse effects associated with its geographical location and alliance relations (Flint 20-26). Conventional theories of geopolitics consist of land, air, marine, and rimland dominance. In literature, there is a wide range of conceptualization and descriptions over geopolitics. Within this context, this article progresses with a focus on the Eurasian region, anchored in the framework of classical geopolitical theories.

Growing means of transportation brought about by technological developments has caused a shift in paradigms. Niall Ferguson highlights that

the world became smaller and more controllable together with the advent of railway networks, steamboats, and telegraph lines. Such developments brought the geopolitical position of Eurasia in the international system into question once again and made the concept of geopolitics an area of power struggle among states (Agnew 5-10; Ferguson 172).




Figure 1. Pivot Area (Heartland) (Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot” 435)

As it can be noted from Figure 1, Mackinder argues that the geographical space that covers the Russian Empire and Mongolia offers a huge potential in population and agricultural produce and argues that Eurasia would create a revolution in human relations with wider geographical realities, and that this territory should be referred to as “the heartland of the continent” (Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals* 55; Alcenat and Scott 2008). Mackinder described the geopolitical position of Eurasia, which he called “heartland,” as “whoever rules East Europe commands the Heartland; whoever rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; whoever rules the World-Island commands the World” (Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals* 106).

Spykman developed the theory of “rimland” in response to the theory of heartland by Mackinder. Highlighted in Figure 2, he described the region situated in the rimland of Eurasia as a buffer zone between the mainland

and marginal seas, and argued that the rimland serves as a vast buffer zone between the naval power and the land power, and further underlined that any motto pertinent for the power politics of the old world order had to be: “whoever rules the Rimland commands Eurasia, and whoever rules Eurasia commands the world” (Spykman 41-43).




Figure 2. Heartlands and Rimlands (Mitchell 412)

Spykman predicated the rimland, which is referred to as the internal crescent by Mackinder, on the basis of his geopolitical approach, and viewed the Soviet Union as the biggest threat to the U.S. interests in Eurasia. While advising the U.S. to prevent another influential power from dominating the rimland, Spykman argued that the policies to prevent the Soviet Union from exercising power in Eurasia would play a key role in regional influence. More so in the absence of cooperation being established between the U.S. and the Soviet Union following the end of World War II (Erol and Oğuz 78). It is possible to say that Spykman’s rimland approach towards Eurasia directly influenced the geopolitical foundation of the containment policy.

Kennan pointed out that the mainstay of any policy to be adopted by the U.S. against the Soviet Union must be the long-term, patient, and strict containment of Russia’s expansionist policy. He further noted that the pressure leveled by the Soviet Union at the institutions of the Western world can be responded to with a masterful and cautionary force to be imposed by various political and geographical instruments (Kennan 861-862). In the context of Eurasia, the U.S. developed a containment policy based on

the theory of rimland, trying to restrict the influence of the Soviet Union across the region.

On September 8, 1954, the U.S., France, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Pakistan, and Thailand founded the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization known as SEATO or Manilla Pact (Armaoğlu 460). In the same vein, Türkiye and Iraq entered into the Baghdad Pact on February 24, 1955, which was later joined by the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Iran respectively (Armaoğlu 526-527). The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979 caused the U.S. to revise its containment policy. While the U.S. backed the resistance movement in Afghanistan and exerted efforts to cause the Soviet Union to fail and get out of Afghanistan, it also revised its containment policy in order to cover the Persian Gulf (Erol and Oğuz 79). As for another aspect of the Cold War, the invasion of Afghanistan was going to constitute the implementation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, through a swift and full-fledged military response, as the domination of capitalism in a socialist state was viewed as a threat to the entire socialist regime. In his speech delivered in the Congress in 1980, U.S. President Jimmy Carter announced that the U.S. would take any measure necessary including military force against any external interference in the Persian Gulf (U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian 50). As a result, the power struggle over the Eurasian geopolitics at the time of the Cold War was built on the geographical advantage of the Soviet Union and the containment policy of the U.S. based on the concept of rimland.

Actors of Eurasian Geopolitics following the Cold War

U.S.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, the U.S.' main objective for Central Asia was to earn the trust of the states in the region, achieve stability, and grow in capacity in order to counter any revival of Russian influence (Maynes 121). It was argued that the U.S. needs to have a military presence in Central Asia. As a matter of fact, it is known that the goal of eliminating regional destabilizing factors including extremist terrorist organizations cannot be achieved only through financial aid delivered to the states in the region (Erhan 133). The collapse of the Soviet Union gave rise to both new opportunities and new tests for the U.S.

in Central Asia. It meant the end of the efforts to keep the U.S. away from Eurasia from the standpoint of geopolitics. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has had the chance to influence a vast geographic territory ranging from the Persian Gulf, which makes up the southern border of Eurasia, to former Soviet republics (Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard* 175-176).

The U.S. laid out the foundation of its geopolitics for the region under the Silk Road Strategy Act. The act covers issues such as improving and strengthening independence, sovereignty, democratic governance, and respect for human rights and promoting the commercial interests and investments of the U.S. across the region (U.S. Congress).

The U.S. built its Central Asia policy on an economic basis as part of the Silk Road Strategy Act. From a geopolitical perspective, it is safe to say that the U.S. is focused on its commercial interests and uninterrupted supply of energy. This mindset is mirrored in a document titled “A National Security Strategy for a New Century” released in 1999 by President Clinton’s Administration. The document underlines how the U.S. backs the declaration of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, based on the pipeline agreement between Baku, Tbilisi, and Ceyhan, and how the pipeline would create major gains for the region as well as the U.S. Furthermore, it was reported that the aforementioned agreements would serve the independence and economic prosperity of the Caspian states (White House 34). Prior to the Afghan War, which started in 2001, the U.S. had built its Eurasian geopolitics on the politically and financially stable and robust characteristics of the Central Asian countries. It was argued that the countries in the region would grow more resilient to Russia’s policies, which were intended to expand its sphere of influence, while providing new opportunities for the commercial interests of the United States.

The terrorist attack against the U.S. on September 11, 2001 was a breaking point for the international system. The military campaigns launched by the U.S. against Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 made significant impacts across the region and the rest of the world. The geopolitical standpoint of the U.S. for Eurasia and the relations with the Central Asian countries underwent substantial transformation. While Maynes argued that the U.S. administration’s growing interest in the region was “natural,” he also noted that the U.S. fears that the Central Asian countries – unless

directed correctly – will, knowingly or unintentionally, turn into a haven for the terrorists who carried out the attacks against the Pentagon and World Trade Center (Maynes 121). In the aftermath of September 11, the Bush Administration described the U.S. policy on Central Asia based on three goals that complemented one another: achieving regional security, domestic reforms, and energy supply (Nichol 29). The U.S. had the chance to carry out military operations in various parts of the world based on the motto of counter terrorism, developing mutual relations with many countries along the way. Some Central Asian countries are among those that the U.S. has enjoyed close cooperation with (Erhan 143). In addition to good relations with the Central Asian countries, the U.S. improved its geopolitical might, directly consolidating its military and political presence in the region.

The U.S. deployed 3000 troops on air bases in Kyrgyzstan and 1000 troops in Uzbekistan, for the war in Afghanistan. In addition to its military presence, the U.S. provided \$580 million in aid to the region in the fiscal year 2002 (Maynes 122-123). In an effort to boost its political influence over Central Asian countries, the U.S. Administration has assigned experienced figures to diplomatic positions in the region and intensified contacts of the high-level Congress members with the region (Maynes 123). From the geopolitical point of view, the influence of the U.S. in Central Asia following the Cold War is considered important for its global vision too (Tuathail and Agnew 78-79).

One can infer from the U.S.' geopolitics that its regional presence would not be confined to the war in Afghanistan. For instance, U.S. Caspian Representative Elizabeth Jones laid out the perspective when she said: "We rely on Central Asian Governments for the security and well-being of our military troops and collection of intelligence, and the U.S. will not get out of Central Asia after securing peace in Afghanistan" (Nichol 30). Similarly, the strategic deployment of the U.S. in Central Asia will still be relevant in the context of counter terrorism. Because military bases located in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, as well as Pakistan, are of great importance in the fight against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (Menon 189). Central Asian governments also view the U.S.' strategic presence in the region as a stabilizing force and safeguard against Russia and other threats (Menon 191). While the mutual relationship boosted the geopolitical power

of the U.S. in Central Asia, it also laid the groundwork for the creation of circumstances for stability and peace for the countries in the region. The U.S. presence particularly in Central Asia enabled the U.S. administration to gain power in global politics, playing a part in Eurasian geopolitics. To this end, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Blake stated on November 18, 2009 that the Obama Administration attached great priority to establishing partnerships and improving the political presence of the United States in Central Asia (Nichol 30).

As a result, the post-Cold War and economic-based geopolitics of the U.S. for Central Asia underwent major transformations in the aftermath of September 11. The U.S. has had the opportunity to influence Eurasian geopolitics by boosting its military, political, and economic presence in the region. This is intended to prevent Russia from regaining strength to influence the region, especially through the close relations with the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia.

China

China's geopolitics is built on securing land borders and improving its influence on Eurasia (Schreer 504). In recent years, China has signed agreements to resolve border disputes with many countries, including Russia, the Central Asian Republics, Vietnam, North Korea, and Mongolia (Schreer 504). In addition, China intends to grow into the most influential strategic actor in Eurasia through the Belt and Road Initiative and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The Belt and Road Initiative is a project intended to improve the means of transportation between China and the rest of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. Launched in 2013, the initiative covers over 65 countries that make up over 62 percent of the global population and offers a great potential for economic transformation (Bird et al. 2). Additionally, China has spent approximately \$1 trillion so far to implement the Belt and Road Initiative, and experts forecast that the expenditures could exceed \$8 trillion (McBride et al.). While the Belt and Road Initiative offers a great economic potential, it also provides major insights into the geopolitics of China for Eurasia.

Through his vision, Chinese President Xi Jinping intends to create a vast network of railways, energy pipelines, and highways that would

link Pakistan, India, and the rest of Southeast Asia via the former Soviet Republics. According to Xi, an international network of this scale will expand the global use of China's currency and put an end to the bottleneck in Asia's link with the rest of the world (McBride et al.). Making efforts to develop means of railroad and highway transportation across Asia, China aims at keeping the energy supply provided through Central Asia and the Middle East away from the military presence of the U.S. (McBride et al.). It tries to score major gains across the globe through the ties forged based on economic relations and improve its influence on geopolitics in Eurasia. China exploits the economic relations with other countries as an element of pressure when it comes to matters that are crucial for its homeland security and interests including those relating to Taiwan and Uyghurs.

The instruments that China exploits to gain power for geopolitics in Eurasia are not confined to foreign debt as it intends to forge more comprehensive relations with the countries in the region. Pantucci argues that sales of weapons from China to Central Asian states is an important example for the Belt and Road Initiative. Similarly, through the Digital Silk Road, which represents the cyber and digital dimension of the Initiative, China is making substantial investments and projects in the Belt and Road Initiative area through major technology companies like Huawei, ZTE, and Hikvision (Pantucci 68). As China grows into the main supplier of security and defense technologies in the region, one can expect an increase in the dependence of Central Asian countries on China for their national security.

SCO is another initiative that China has attached importance to for the Eurasian geopolitics. China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan laid the foundations of the SCO, entering into the "Agreement on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area" in 1996 and the "Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas" in 1997. In 2001, the SCO grew into an international organization when it was joined by Uzbekistan in addition to the countries known as the Shanghai Five (Bailes and Dunay 4). China was concerned about settling issues with its neighbors and strengthening regional cooperation while the founding declaration of the organization refers to many goals to be achieved (Shanghai Cooperation Organization).

Pantucci argues that China's security operations in Central Asia are analyzed based on SCO as it is the very first regional security organization joined by China other than the United Nations and situated in the heart of Central Asia considering the geographical location of the member states (Pantucci 61). In addition to the reports, the presence of the organization serves a more complicated purpose than regional security for China. Through SCO, China develops relations with the member states through regional buy-ins, and enjoys an international network where it can test its foreign policy instruments (Pantucci 62). China tries to respond to two crucial needs through regional security, as having a dominant geopolitical influence in Eurasia is the key to achieve its foreign policy objectives given its vision to grow into a global powerhouse: Access to the region to improve the Belt and Road Initiative and to gain natural resources in what Mackinder calls the heartland (Hynek 85).

Mackinder developed his theory based on the argument that Eurasia has grown into a central region with its means of transportation such as railways and air travel. China lays out a similar geopolitical perspective as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, intending to improve the links of transportation among the Eurasian countries. Achieving regional security and cooperation through SCO, China would like to position itself as a power that secures peace and stability for the Eurasian geopolitics.

Russian Federation

In the aftermath of the Cold War, Russia found itself, as an heir to the collapsed Soviet Union, in an international environment with new geopolitical challenges. Nevertheless, Russia continues to be a major geopolitical power despite the waning state apparatus and ongoing problems. Russia's presence had a substantial impact on the states that gained independence from the Soviet Union (Brzezinski, *Out of Control* 44). The Central Asian states wanted the Soviet Union to maintain its presence to a certain extent because of their lack of organizational infrastructure and potential political and economic uncertainties that may be caused by transition (Okur 46). From the perspective of global politics, Brzezinski argues that the Central Asian states that gained independence cause a major withdrawal in the south-eastern border of Russia and draws the attention of non-regional

powers because of its diverse set of underground resources (Brzezinski, *Out of Control* 93).

Adopting the Near Abroad Doctrine and Eurasianism, Russia tried responding to the challenges, taking into account the geopolitical transformation of the international system. In an article he penned, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev laid out the outline of the doctrine and geopolitical objectives. Kozyrev argued that Russia cannot afford to withdraw from the areas of conflict in the former Soviet Union territories unlike the U.S. That is why Kozyrev demands the U.S. to keep its military presence away from the region and the Western states to provide the support requested in his reference to the developments in Tajikistan and Georgia (Kozyrev 68). Russia wanted to maintain its presence and influence in the former Soviet Republics despite the potential instability and conflicts in the region. Given its new foreign policy doctrine, Russia argues that it is crucially important for the domestic interests of the former Soviet Republics. In this sense, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Baltic states are viewed as territories on which crucial interests of Russia are focused (Litera 45).

Kozyrev highlights the effect of the CIS member states on Russia's foreign policy. He noted that Russia backs the sovereignty and independence of the former Soviet Republics and Russia and CIS member states need close cooperation among themselves (Kozyrev 68-69). Russia concluded that it needs to maintain its military presence in the region called "near abroad" given the strategic interests in the former Soviet states and potential threats facing them (Litera 45). As a result, an aspect of the security policy for the near abroad is built on humanitarian safety. The rights of the Russian population residing in the former Soviet Republics and the arduous challenges facing them during the Cold War are considered as relevant by Russia (Kozyrev 69). Safeguarding the rights of the Russian population residing in the near abroad and access to dual citizenship are some of the priorities in Russia's near abroad doctrine (Litera 45). From the geopolitical standpoint, Russia has made efforts to maintain its influence over the former Soviet Republics in political and economic terms through international organizations and the relations with the Russian population in those republics in cultural and humanitarian terms. Since the 1990s, Russia has been consistently working

on regional integration and this includes the establishment of international organizations such as the CIS, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Huasheng). One of the reasons behind the policy is that potential conflicts with the Islamic states located throughout the southern border are a matter of concern (Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard* 95).

Eurasianism is one of the key components that molds Russia's Near Abroad Doctrine and Eurasian geopolitics. Redefining the Russian identity in the imperialist context, Eurasianism offers a cultural and ideological framework for the Russian influence in Central Asia to grow (Okur 52).

Dugin argues that Russia will drive itself and all the peoples in Eurasia into a disaster unless it re-establishes its political, commercial, and strategic influence over the former Soviet states (Dugin 10). While analyzing Eurasian geopolitics, Dugin also attempts to outline the roadmap that Russia should follow. He analyzes the Cold War through the lens of geopolitical science's sea power-land power dichotomy by comparing the United States' influence over the rimland regions with the Soviet Union's dominance over the heartland (Dugin 51). He also describes Eurasian geopolitics as an approach that goes beyond geographical imagination, taking into account both the geopolitical reality and positions of the states in the balance of power and their economic needs (Dugin 54).

Unlike the Eurasian thinkers of the 1920s, Dugin does not view it as a matter of East-West contrast in a reductive and romantic way. Dugin argues that Russia should forge alliances: in Europe with Germany to which it attaches particular importance, in Asia with Japan whose Pan-Asia ideology it admires, and with Shiite Iran whose revolutionary spirit and mysticism it emphasizes in the Islamic geography. Dugin also argues that Russia should achieve its objectives, targeting the U.S. and international organizations and corporations that make up the liberal world order. One can infer from Dugin's views on Central Asia and the trend of Eurasianism that Central Asia is primarily viewed as a geopolitical location that opens out to the Indian Ocean, which is an objective to be achieved for the heartland (Dugin 181). Billed as a large piece of the Eurasian continent geographically, Central Asia is also viewed as being within the context of Eurasianism through its ethnic distribution.

As a result, Russia dealt with Eurasian geopolitics based on the Near Abroad Doctrine and Eurasianism following the Cold War. As part of the Near Abroad Doctrine, Russia tried to maintain its regional policies through various instruments, considering the former Soviet republics a part of its own national and security interests. Attaching particular importance to the Russian population residing in the former Soviet Republics, the Russian foreign policy considers it an instrument of sustaining the relations with the near abroad at the level cultural and humanitarian interaction and a means of intervention.

Türkiye's Strategy on Eurasia and the Organization of Turkic States

Türkiye's Multilateral Strategy on Eurasia

Türkiye adopts an inclusive and cooperative perspective on relations with the region, developing a comprehensive understanding including politics, economy, transportation, and energy. Incorporating soft and hard power into its foreign policy, Türkiye has developed a Eurasian strategy based on the relations with the Turkic Republics in Central Asia.

While the bipolar world was undergoing transformation following the Cold War, Türkiye enjoyed new geopolitical opportunities relating to being in Central Asia's near abroad. The independence of the Central Asian Republics provided the Turkish foreign policy with a new context. Relying on shared language, history, and culture with the Central Asian states, Türkiye tried to develop relations with them based on common interests and cooperation (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Relations with").

Türkiye has made efforts to build cooperation and relations with the Central Asian countries in a wide spectrum based on its inclusive policy. Purtaş argues (21): "Türkiye has strengthened the Turkic world, establishing partnerships with the Turkic states based on equality and respect for their sovereignty." Türkiye adopts a policy that pays attention to regional vulnerabilities of Russia in its relations with the Turkic states, avoiding any conflict with the interests of Russia while taking the regional concerns of Russia into account, and has developed multilateral and comprehensive relations with the Turkic states through policies that add to regional stability and peace (Purtaş 20). As pointed out by Yüce, a variety of major variables have all been influential over the establishment of Ankara administration's relations

with the Central Asian Republics. These include shared human and cultural unity, the regional geopolitics, dynamics of relations between Russia and the countries in the region, and the ongoing nature of building domestic and foreign policies on the part of the countries in question (Yüce 11).

As Türkiye repositioned itself in both domestic and foreign policies during the Cold War, there were times when the country could not put its foreign policy objectives into practice. This is particularly clear to see in Türkiye's relations with the Central Asian Republics. However, Türkiye has become an actor with more influence in regional and global terms as a result of political and economic transformation. The shift in the position of Türkiye has paved the way for the re-establishment of good relations with the countries in the region on a reasonable basis. The fact that currently all of the bilateral relations are based on strategic cooperation is one of the clearest examples of the prevailing situation (Yüce 12).

Türkiye has amplified political, economic, and cultural cooperation with Central Asia while building partnerships intended to improve the military capacity of the countries in the region. It has also solidified its geopolitical influence over Caucasus and Central Asia through the relations based on military technology and capacity building. Signed by and between the Republic of Türkiye and the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance is of capital importance. The agreement describes the relations between two countries as a strategic partnership and includes major commitments in military terms.

As a result of the aforementioned agreement, Türkiye demonstrated significant resolve by adopting the concept of "Two States, One Nation" in its approach to Azerbaijan, thereby implementing a document that will contribute to regional stability. In addition, Türkiye and Azerbaijan have amplified their cooperation in military and defense industries and exchanged a great deal of experience and know-how through joint military drills. The Joint Air Defense Drill of Türkiye and Azerbaijan has been conducted since 2013 in Türkiye under the title of TURAZ Falcon and of TURAZ Eagle in Azerbaijan. In addition, Türkiye and Azerbaijan were joined by Georgia to conduct a military drill called "Caucasus Eagle" back in 2012 (Aslanlı 5-7).

The strategic and military cooperation between Türkiye and Azerbaijan played a major role in the victory won in the Second 44 Day-Long Karabakh War in 2020. The delivery of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles and TRG-300 rockets to Azerbaijan is billed as a major factor that shifted the course of the war (Gök 131). It is also argued that the exchange of experience and know-how by Türkiye with Azerbaijan, which has been around for years now, played a major role in coming out victorious as the former is equipped with an army experienced in defense and technology (Gök 132).

In addition to its robust and experienced army, Türkiye is billed as a major military power by neighboring countries and Central Asia thanks to its burgeoning defense industry. This both improves Türkiye's geopolitical influence on Eurasia and helps Türkiye enjoy the position of a reliable and strategic partner in geopolitical analyses of the Central Asian countries. The Middle Corridor Initiative serves as a major aspect of Türkiye's geopolitics on Eurasia. This initiative of transportation and shipment is primarily intended to reduce the distance between Türkiye and Central Asian Republics and improve Türkiye's position in Eurasian politics in a win-win mode. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2022) reported: Originating in Türkiye and going through the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, and opening out to Central Asia and China, the Trans-Caspian East-West Middle Corridor constitutes one of the key components of the revival of the historical Silk Road. The Middle Corridor originates in Türkiye and goes through Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan respectively through railways and highways before culminating in China (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Türkiye's Multilateral").

Given its geographical location and economic capacity, Türkiye stands out as one of the best options for economic and commercial partnerships in Central Asia and Middle East. Türkiye is clearly situated at a crucial location considering the strategic routes ranging from East to West which the Middle Corridor moves through (Canlı 5). The cooperative foundation of Türkiye's foreign policy is evident in its approach to regional transportation projects. Türkiye has strategically developed its own multilateral transportation strategy, emphasizing collaboration and interconnectedness. In this context,

Türkiye is increasingly seen as a key player and potential competitor to China's Belt and Road Initiative, showcasing its growing influence in regional infrastructure development (Toprak 26).

Türkiye intends to add to the regional development and prosperity through the Middle Corridor. Once the Middle Corridor is put to effective use, the Central Asian countries will arguably enjoy major economic gains thanks to the great trade volume between Europe and China. In addition, it is reported that infrastructure investments to be made in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan and efforts to facilitate international trade as part of the project will help the Trans-Caspian cooperation grow and expand (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Relations with"). President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2022) laid out the strategic relevance of Türkiye's multilateral transportation policy as follows: "Improving the transportation links of the Central Asian countries with neighbors is our common interest. Türkiye promotes multi-modal transportation corridors and backs the revival of the modern Silk Road that links Asia to Europe. To this end, I attach capital importance to the Trans-Caspian East-West-Middle Corridor Initiative and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, which is the backbone of the middle corridor."

Under the Middle Corridor Project, Türkiye aims at improving the relations with the Central Asian countries based on cooperation and prosperity, and by solidifying its strategic influence over Eurasian geopolitics. With this goal in mind, Türkiye develops policies in consideration of the strategic importance of not only multilateral transportation projects but also energy lines.

The Southern Gas Corridor covers four projects: the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP), Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), South Caucasus Pipeline, and the Shah Deniz Stage II Development Project. In addition, the Southern Gas Corridor is intended to boost the energy supply from the Caspian Sea to Europe and diversify the routes of energy (TANAP). The Southern Gas Corridor made it to Europe upon the completion of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline in late 2020. Crossing into the lands of Türkiye, TANAP is the key segment of the Southern Gas Corridor. This is how Türkiye has taken its input for the security of regional energy supply one step further (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Relations with"). It is the

Southern Gas Corridor that has enabled Türkiye to secure the global and regional energy supply through the diversification of resources and routes, which is one of the key instruments in Türkiye's energy policy. Türkiye not only adds to stability and security in Eurasia but also contributes to the economic development of the Caspian region in particular.

The Southern Gas Corridor also serves the foreign policy objectives of Türkiye and its perspective on Eurasian geopolitics. In an address dating back to 2015, President Erdoğan said that not only Shah Deniz gas but also peace would be brought to Europe under TANAP. Pointing to the strong ties to be established between Europe and the Caspian region as part of the Southern Gas Corridor, he noted that the whole of Eurasia is in need of this project.

Türkiye designs its energy policy considering all of Eurasia on the East to West axis. Diversifying the energy supply between Europe and Asia and sustaining the supply in a secure flow make up the strategic position of Türkiye and help the country influence various aspects of the Eurasian geopolitics.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, Türkiye exercised its soft power, incorporating cultural and historical elements into the political, security, and economic aspects of its foreign policy for the Caucasus and Central Asia. Harnessing shared history, language, and culture, Türkiye takes notice of significant ties with the former Soviet republics that try to forge their national identity. International organizations have established development programs for the countries that gained independence in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. To this end, Türkiye founded the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency in 1992 to forge robust partnerships with the Central Asian countries, especially the Turkic Republics.

As Türkiye grew into a more influential actor in regional and global politics, thanks to its stable political structure and robust economy starting from the 2000s, the country diversified its soft power instruments for Eurasian geopolitics with a focus on Central Asia. Ekşi argues that Türkiye exercises its soft power for the Turkic world based on a strategy developed in line with “unity in language, thought, and business” coined by İsmail Gaspıralı (Ekşi 11). Türkiye founded the Yunus Emre Institute (YEI) in 2007, the

Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) in 2010 and the Turkish Maarif Foundation in 2016 in an effort, among others, to improve the ties with the Eurasian countries based on shared language, history and culture.

Founded in 2007 in an effort to strengthen Türkiye's ties with Eurasia, the YEI aims at promoting Türkiye's history and cultural elements, providing courses on Turkish language and culture, and improving cultural interaction with other countries and developing international relations (YEI). The YTB, on the other hand, was founded in 2010 to take actions for related communities abroad and international students based in Türkiye (YTB). The Türkiye Maarif Foundation was also established as an international instrument of education introduced by Türkiye with a focus on cultural interaction (Türkiye Maarif Foundation). The framework of the soft power and public diplomacy drawn up by Türkiye within the body of the aforementioned organizations are built on the ancient history of Türkiye, its unique culture, and the Turkish language. In the same vein, Ahmad Yasawi International Turkish-Kazakh University and Kyrgyzstan-Türkiye Manas University were founded to improve the friendship and solidarity between Türkiye and the Turkic Republics.

Operating in Central Asia, these organizations strengthen the ties between Türkiye and Central Asian countries, forge new ones, and add to the political and strategic influence of Türkiye over the region. Türkiye has been building cultural and humanitarian aspects of its Eurasian geopolitics based on shared heritage and values.

Impact of the Organization of Turkic States on Eurasian Geopolitics

The Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States was launched by Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan under the Nakhchivan Agreement of October 3, 2009 and the İstanbul Declaration of September 16, 2010. The organization has been joined by Uzbekistan as a full member and by Hungary, Turkmenistan, and the TRNC as observers (Organization of Turkic States). Also known as the Turkic Council, the organization was renamed as the Organization of Turkic States at the İstanbul Summit held in 2021. Yüce argues that the renaming also points to a shift in paradigm. This is because the phrases Turkic states and Turkic world were mentioned in OTS'

official documents for the first time (Yüce 13). In his address delivered at the 8th Summit of the Turkic Council held in 2021, President Erdoğan laid out the change in question: “We renamed the Council as the Organization of Turkic States, which has made progress in institutionalization and improved its reputation across the region and beyond. It goes without saying that the renaming needs to be put into effect, and not remain only on paper. We need to make better use of our organization to engage consultations over the issues and opportunities that concern our countries and region.”

The good relations and cooperation among the member states have played a major role in helping the Organization grow into an influential regional actor in nearly 13 years. Purtaş argues that the most evident traits of OTS, which was founded by the states that share the idea of the Turkic world, are transparent diplomacy and multilateral foreign policy and OTS predicates the national interests of the member states on cooperation and rolls out mechanisms of dialogue with regional and global actors, growing into a self-improving body (Purtaş 9). Additionally, OTS, which includes TÜRKSOY, TURKPA, the Turkic Academy and the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation as its affiliates, contributes to the improvement of cooperation in the Turkic world on a vertical axis while spreading it to a vast realm on a horizontal axis, through actions in many aspects, especially culture and science.

The capacity to exert shared political will is also developing within the institutionalization of the OTS. In this sense, the will laid out by the member states in the development of the “Turkic World Vision – 2040” and “2022-2026 Strategic Road Map of the Organization of Turkic States” constitutes the key essence of developing a shared policy. Developing a vision and a strategy in line with certain objectives points to the fact that, in political terms, the member states have built a common ground (Topsakal and Zengin 20). Similarly, Yüce argues that the shared political will of the Turkic states is a rising geopolitical power in Eurasia (Yüce 13). It is safe to say that cooperation and partnership to be developed by the OTS in years to come in political, commercial, and cultural forms, will expedite the transformation of the Eurasian geopolitics.

From a geographical point of view, the Turkic world covers a territory with shared history, culture, and language, going beyond physical borders.

Ranging from Hungary to the depths of Asia, the Organization of Turkic States is a major actor of Eurasian geopolitics. Inaugurated among the member states based on culture and Turkic language, cooperation, and friendly relations have grown in size and strength to cover politics, security, and economy under the umbrella of the OTS. In this sense, the OTS is considered a joint survival effort of the member states against uncertainties such as migration, food crisis, and climate change that make up the new aspects of conventional and hybrid wars and security concerns that have arisen in the near abroad (Purtaş 28). The OTS is viewed as a solution developed to counter the challenges facing the Turkic world against the efforts of external interference in Central Asia.

As a result, the more influence OTS has in regional and global politics, the more geopolitically important it will be. As an organization that lies in a heartland coined by Mackinder, the OTS has the potential to grow into one of the decisive actors for global politics. The OTS has become a crucial mechanism for actors in Central Asia and neighboring territories in terms of stability and prosperity. The rupture in Eurasian geopolitics arose as a consequence of the partnership cautiously built by the OTS based on mutual interests and in line with a realistic understanding (Purtaş 30). Rising over this historical and robust groundwork, the OTS displays its ambition to carve out an important foothold in geopolitical equilibrium over a vast geographical area through its vision for the future and the joint will demonstrated at the time of the Karabakh War and the Cyprus issue.

Conclusion

Named as a heartland by Mackinder, Eurasia is geopolitically viewed as a key region for global dominance. Spykman highlights the territory between Eurasia and marginal seas, placing the focus on the rimland for geopolitical dominance. The Soviet Union, which was equipped with major underground resources on the vast territory of Eurasia, and the U.S., which adopted a containment policy developed by Kennan with inspiration from Spykman's rimland theory, entered into a geopolitical battle during the Cold War. The bipolar global system came to an end following the Cold War while major powers maintained their interest in Eurasian geopolitics. The U.S. took actions with economic and commercial interests in mind starting in the 1990s and brought its physical presence along with its military and

political might to the region in the aftermath of September 11 with the Afghan War. On the other hand, China has grown into a major actor for Eurasian geopolitics through the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in terms of economic well-being and security.

Türkiye designs its geopolitical perspective on Eurasia based on the theory of heartland coined by Mackinder. It has managed to grow into a major actor in Central Asia, amplifying the economic, cultural, and military relations with the countries in the region based on its multilateral foreign policy. It is safe to argue that Türkiye will strike a balance among other powers in Eurasia through its growing efficacy and influence and forge its own position in the global system. Türkiye intends to maintain its presence in Eurasia within an institutional framework and grow into a permanent actor in maintaining geopolitical equilibrium of the region.

In addition, the influence of the geopolitical perspective of Türkiye on Eurasia is clear to see in the regional presence of the Organization of Turkic States. Founded on shared historical and cultural ties, the Organization displays substantial harmony with the geopolitical perspective of Türkiye. Over the landmass of Eurasia, the OTS will further boost its geopolitical influence across the region in line with the capabilities of the member states to build common political, economic, and military structures. From this point of view, one can argue that the achievement of the geopolitical objectives by Türkiye and the Eurasian vision of the OTS members will feed one another.

Conflict of Interest Statement

There is no conflict of interest with any institution or person within the scope of this study.

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Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

Crafting a Brand from Tradition: An Innovative Public Diplomacy Strategy for the Organization of Turkic States*

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Yunhee Kim***

Abstract

This paper explores the potential of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in leveraging Public Diplomacy to bolster its international stature, proposing the development of a unique brand, “Yurt Yeli.” Drawing parallels with South Korea’s successful Hallyu (Korean Wave) initiative, the paper suggests that the OTS can similarly utilize Yurt Yeli to harness the power of Public Diplomacy. The analysis begins with an in-depth look at Hallyu, providing a framework for understanding its effectiveness in public diplomacy. It then delves into the conceptualization and potential implementation of Yurt Yeli, tailored to resonate with the Turkic World’s unique cultural heritage and values. Given the OTS’s role as a representative of the Turkic World on the global stage, the paper underscores its vast potential in employing Public Diplomacy strategies to enhance its international visibility and influence. The comparison between Hallyu and the proposed Yurt Yeli offers insights into how cultural elements can be transformed into powerful tools for diplomatic engagement and global presence enhancement.

Keywords

OTS, Turkic World, Yurt Yeli, Hallyu, Public Diplomacy, Soft Power, Korean Wave.

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Gelenekten Marka Oluşturmak: Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı İçin Yenilikçi Bir Kamu Diplomasisi Stratejisi*

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Öz

Bu çalışma, Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı'nın (TDT) uluslararası alanda etkinliğini artırmak için kamu diplomasisini nasıl kullanabileceğini ele almakta ve bu bağlamda "Yurt Yeli" adında yeni bir kamu diplomasisi markası oluşturulmasını önermektedir. Çalışmada TDT'nin Güney Kore'nin Hallyu (Kore Dalgası) stratejisinden esinlenerek kamu diplomasisinde yeni bir söylem, Yurt Yeli, inşa edebileceği vurgulanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda çalışmada, Hallyu detaylı bir şekilde incelenmiş ve Güney Kore'nin kamu diplomasisi etkinliğini anlamak için bir çerçeve sunulmuştur. Sonrasında, Türk Dünyası'nın eşsiz kültürel mirasını ve değerlerini yansıtacak biçimde tasarlanmış olan Yurt Yeli'nin kavramsallaştırılması ve potansiyel uygulamasına odaklanılmıştır. TDT'nin, Türk Dünyası'nı uluslararası düzeyde temsil eden bir örgüt olarak, kamu diplomasisi stratejilerini kullanarak uluslararası görünürlüğünü ve etkisini artırmak için geniş bir potansiyele sahip olduğu vurgulanmaktadır. Ayrıca çalışmada Hallyu ile önerilen Yurt Yeli'nin karşılaştırılması, kültürel unsurların diplomatik angajman araçlarına ve küresel etki alanlarını genişletme stratejilerine nasıl dönüştürülebileceği konusunda derinlemesine bir bakış açısı sunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

TDT, Türk Dünyası, Yurt Yeli, Hallyu, Kamu Diplomasisi, Yumuşak Güç, Kore Dalgası.

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Introduction

The “Turkic World Vision–2040” paper was embraced by the Heads of States of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) during the momentous Istanbul Summit led by H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of the Republic of Türkiye, on November 12, 2021. This vision paper signifies a noteworthy commitment for the organization, representing a genuine pledge for the next two decades. The vision paper outlines numerous crucial objectives established by member states, with some of the most notable ones being the promotion of Turkic culture, values, traditions, art, and heritage on a global scale. These objectives are to be achieved through collaborative endeavors among the Turkic Cooperation Organizations (TURKSOY, Turkic Academy, Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation and TURKPA), working in conjunction with pertinent international bodies. Furthermore, in the paper, under the title of “Person to Person Cooperation,” it is emphasized that there should be efforts to promote the shared Turkic heritage of eminent scientists, poets, thinkers, and artists. Additionally, it highlights the importance of preserving Member States’ traditions, customs, folklore, and acknowledging the role of the Turkic world in intercultural dialogue. Furthermore, the vision paper suggests the organization of annual collaborative events such as film festivals, music and art events, and other cultural activities (Purtaş). The aim is to unite the diverse peoples within the Turkic world, fostering a sense of togetherness and mutual understanding. As these encapsulate the goals set for the Turkic World by the OTS, particularly the objective to “Promote the Turkic culture, values, traditions, art, and heritage across the world,” the question naturally arises: what formula would be the most effective for accomplishing them? The South Korean government has been promoting its culture and entertainment industry through *Hallyu* to the world to introduce South Korea. During Moon Jae-in’s presidency, the *Hallyu* Content Cooperation Division was established, which aimed to enhance the impact of K-culture diffusion through an interagency promotion plan.

In December 2019, COVID-19 emerged in Wuhan, China, becoming a global pandemic that severely impacted many countries and caused a lasting economic downturn (Duran). Contrary to the global pandemic (Pirinççi and Demirtaş), *Hallyu*-related industries thrived during COVID-19,

expanding their reach by leveraging the popularity of the Korean language and K-foods, following the success of K-movies and K-music. In 2020, the copyright trade balance also recorded a surplus (S. E. Lee). Public diplomacy policies have been shifting towards values and norms that international society requires, focusing on cooperation and solidarity. A 2021 survey by South Korea's Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism revealed an increase in the competitive power of Hallyu content, indicating growth in the consumption and scale of K-content (KOCCA, "The Analysis"). Hallyu fandom worldwide has been captivated by K-movies and K-music, such as "Parasite," "Squid Game," "BTS," and "Black Pink," providing an opportunity to share South Korean soft power and raise awareness of South Korea among the international public and generating economic income through fandom.

In other words, it can be said that *Hallyu* is a success story of South Korea based on public diplomacy practice (Beasley and Erfani). This study's main aim is to formulate South Korea's public diplomacy success in the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). First and foremost, like *Hallyu* of South Korea, the public diplomacy brand for the OTS has chosen *Yurt Yeli*. Apart from *Yurt Yeli's* meaning, homeland wind in English, which is almost the same in all Turkic languages (Koraş, 2014), one would wonder why this study suggests that *Yurt Yeli* be the brand of the OTS' public diplomacy. As *Hallyu*, in other words, *Korean Wave* resembles the South Korea-oriented approach and defines the expansion waves of South Korean pop culture and K-culture content towards the World; thus, *Yurt Yeli* will blow from the very heart of Turkestan geography to the globe. Furthermore, *Yurt Yeli* is the most suitable name for the public diplomacy brand as it has a strong cultural resonance and signifies a sense of belonging and identity in the Turkic world. The name *Yurt Yeli* also suggests the idea of a cultural wind blowing from the homeland and spreading throughout the world, just like the *Hallyu* – Korean wave – does. Furthermore, by adopting *Yurt Yeli* as the public diplomacy brand, the OTS can leverage the power of public diplomacy to promote a positive image of the Turkic World and to enhance its soft power on the global stage.

This promotion could involve showcasing the music, television dramas/ movies, food, and fashion that are components of the *Yurt Yeli* subculture

and highlighting how they reflect the Turkestan region's rich cultural heritage and contemporary identity. In other words, *Yurt Yeli*, being a brand of public diplomacy, could exhibit the exceptional cultural legacy and modern-day identity of the Turkic World to the global audience. By promoting *Yurt Yeli*, the OTS can leverage the power of public diplomacy to build bridges with other cultures, enhance its soft power, and promote cross-cultural understanding. In addition, *Yurt Yeli* can also help to stimulate economic growth by creating new opportunities for cultural exchange, tourism, and trade. If implemented efficiently, by tapping into the popularity of *Yurt Yeli*, the Turkic World can attract new audiences and consumers from around the world and showcase its unique cultural offerings and *Yurt Yeli* might become a significant cultural export from the region. This paper does not focus on adopting or emulating the Hallyu phenomenon for the Turkic World. Instead, its primary objective is to present the institutionalization and implementation formula of a successful public diplomacy brand, which could similarly be effective for the OTS. Therefore, critiques directed at Hallyu and its potential negative impacts on society are not relevant to this study. Since the *Hallyu* is the inspiration of the *Yurt Yeli*; in this study, from *Hallyu*'s meaning to state-level policies will be examined in detail. After shedding light on the *Hallyu*, *Yurt Yeli*'s potential and efficient way of formulation for the OTS will be discussed.

The Concept of *Hallyu*

Hallyu (한류 in Korean), also known as *the Korean Wave*, can have different interpretations depending on the perspective of the Korean government and scholars. According to the Encyclopedia of Korean Culture, which operates under the Ministry of Education's Academy of Korean Studies, *Hallyu* is defined as a cultural phenomenon where Korean mass culture elements are disseminated to foreign countries centering on Asia and garnered great popularity (*Encyclopedia of Korean Culture*). Scholars have viewed *Hallyu* as a term encompassing a broad range of Korean popular culture, with the widespread consumption of Korean popular culture overseas (Choe 3; Park 17). It is stated that *Hallyu* is the varied and uneven reception process of South Korean culture/media products and images in Asia and forms of media and cultural representations in the transborder flows of South Korean popular culture in South Korea (K. Lee 175). Lee and Kim further suggested

that Hallyu was initially a means of cultural exchange through media but has now come to represent all activities based on Korean culture (124-125). It has evolved to lead new trends in fostering cultural brands as a nation or industrial branding of Korea.

The various understandings of Hallyu can be traced back to its origins. The term Hallyu first gained prominence in 1997 when a Korean drama titled ‘What is Love?’ became popular in China (Kim and Akilli). While Korean dramas had already been exported to Hong Kong and Taiwan in 1993, they had not garnered as much attention as they did in China (Jin). The spread of Hallyu was boosted by the official launch of K-music in Taiwan and China in 1998, which helped it gain popularity in Chinese-speaking countries and in Japan, Vietnam, and other Asian countries. The phenomenon was influenced by both domestic and international factors, such as Korea’s promotion of international exchanges after the 1996 Asian Games and the popularity of J-pop, J-drama, and Hong Kong movies in Asia around the same time (Jang). In China, the term Hallyu was initially referred to as 韓迷 or 哈韓族, which meant that Chinese people were enthusiastic about Korean popular music. Later, during the mid-1990s, the terms 韓朝 and 韓風 were added to the mix. The term Hallyu, combined with the Japanese word 流 (ryu), gained widespread popularity in the late 1990s (Lee and An). It was later adopted by the Korean Ministry of Culture and Tourism when they distributed a publicity Compact Disc (CD) to China under the name ‘韓流 – Song from Korea’ in 1999 (S. E. Lee).

Hallyu has first introduced to the world approximately two decades ago, and since then it has undergone a transition from Hallyu 1.0 to what is now known as New Hallyu (신한류). According to Table 1 provided below, Hallyu initially began with Hallyu 1.0 which focused on K-dramas. It then gradually progressed through Hallyu 2.0 which centered around a few idol stars, and Hallyu 3.0 which aimed to globalize Hallyu in a serious manner. Finally, in 2020, the Korean government designated it as the first year of New Hallyu (K-culture) and developed ‘the strategy for boosting new Hallyu promotion policy’ as a long-term plan with objectives such as diversification of Hallyu content, leading Hallyu-related industries, and establishing a foundation for sustainable Hallyu diffusion. The meaning of New Hallyu is to pursue lasting and widespread effects of Hallyu by discovering Hallyu content in

all areas of Korean culture, strengthening Hallyu-related industries such as services and consumer goods, and promoting intercultural exchange. This approach differs from the previous Hallyu strategy.

Table 1

The classification of Hallyu

	Hallyu 1.0	Hallyu 2.0	Hallyu 3.0	New Hallyu (K-culture)
Period	1997~ the mid of 2000s	The mid of 2000s ~ the early 2010s	The early 2010s~2019	2020 onwards
Character	The beginning of Hallyu, centering on media contents	Diffusion of Hallyu Centering on idol stars	Hallyu globalization	Hallyu diversification and globalization through online communication
The field of K-contents	K-drama	K-pop	K-culture	K-culture and its related industry
Target country	Asia	Asia, Central, and South America, the Middle East, and some parts of the Americas	The whole world	The whole world with diffusion strategically
Consumer	A few Hallyu lovers	In teens and twenties	Cosmopolitan	Cosmopolitan with a customized approach

Source: *The Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism (2020)*

The Trend of Hallyu Contents

The Hallyu contents (so-called K-contents) are diversified with the march of time in accordance with catching popularity in all countries of the world. As noted above, the Hallyu contents varied and diversified; it showed that Hallyu has progressed and developed (Lee and Kim). In the early 2000s, during *Hallyu 1.0*, K-drama drew keen attention to East and Southeast Asia after ‘Winter Sonata (겨울연가)’ was broadcast in Japan. After the 1990s, Japan encountered stagnation across the country; however, South Korea showed great improvement in the cultural industry. Around the same time, China was in high demand in popular culture by virtue of economic revival, so it was a suitable time to export the Hallyu content to China (KOCCA, “Contents”). Not only that, K-drama dispersed to the Middle East by becoming the popularity of ‘Jewel in Palace (대장금)’, and later more K-dramas such as ‘Jumong’ and ‘Queen Sunduk (순덕여왕)’ were aired with sharing common feelings based on Korean cultures in the dramas.




Figure 1. The popularity of Hallyu contents in chronological order (G. H. Lee)

Hallyu gained attention through K-pop during the Hallyu 2.0 era. Kwon Bo-ah (BoA), a Korean singer, initiated a localization strategy in 2001, and a few years later, the boy band TVXQ dominated the Oricon single chart in 2007 and 2008. This motivated other Korean singers, including Big Bang, Kara, and Girls’ Generation, to enter the Japanese record market. Later, Wonder Girls and Rain also made strides in the American market. Although K-pop attempted to establish its presence in overseas markets, it was only able to gain popularity in the Asian market. However, that changed with Psy’s music video, which set a record for views on YouTube in 2012. His song “Gangnam Style” reached second on the Billboard charts and prompted

people worldwide to imitate his signature horse-riding dance moves (G. H. Lee). According to the New York Times, the song satirizes the hypocrisy and superficiality of the nouveau riche and highlights inequality and capitalism's problems (Young and Kim). This created an emotional connection with listeners, and BTS subsequently formed fandoms, also known as ARMYs, worldwide to build on their success.

Starting in 2015, Hallyu confronted unexpected problems with international politics, including a strong aversion towards Japan and a law that bans Korean culture in China. Around the same time, the Hallyu contents are also in a state of flux extensively and rapidly through global media platforms, especially Over the Top (OTT) such as Netflix and YouTube, amid relying on Korea's traditional media distribution channel (Noh). Consequently, *Hallyu* content, including K-movies, K-drama, and K-music, easily gave off their charm to the world with the assistance of OTT. In the period of Hallyu 3.0, the success strategy of "BTS" is the direct communication method of storytelling with its fans online by using Social Network Service (SNS). "BTS" reflects its members' message containing hope and happiness in their songs; thus, its ARMY empathizes with all their songs based on their experiences. "Black Pink", moreover, is a K-pop girl band that also expands its activities and increases its awareness through YouTube with differentiated plans focusing on music videos that put much work into its members' visual images that target the young generation. On this account, Black Pink's channel on YouTube broke through over eight million subscribers, as well as recording more than one hundred million views.

Not only that, K-movies and K-dramas have faced a period of prosperity since the New Hallyu (K-culture) period although there were many restrictions and limitations due to the COVID-19 pandemic. As for K-movies, it was completely for the domestic market as most movies from the US and Hong Kong dominated the global market; after that time, K-movies enabled export abroad from the early 2000s (KOFICE, "Hallyu Now"). The Hallyu now trend shifted in earnest to an online platform has benefited. "Parasite," for example, overcame the translation barrier owing to Netflix, which set a place for introducing movies and dramas from non-English speaking countries. Netflix users got used to utilizing the subtitle function when they enjoy non-English-based content. Thus, audiences from English-speaking countries

were immersed in Korean movies, as mentioned by CJ Vice-President Lee Mi-Kyung, who took charge of the investment and distribution of *Parasite* (Min). In the case of “*Squid Game*,” as of 2021, the movie has officially reached more than 111 million viewers, beating the record of Netflix (Burke). When the K-movies caught popularity, more global audiences had a common understanding through *Hallyu* content. In this connection, the movie review by *Variety*, American entertainment media, commented that “[I]t’s worth noting that much of “*Squid Game*’s” nostalgic visual palette is drawn specifically from Korean culture, an element about which a white American critic lacks a granular understanding” (D’Addario). It shows that *Hallyu* contents are crucial for diffusing Korean culture to the world.

The Mechanism of Hallyu with the Korean Government

The Korean government established the Hallyu Content Cooperation Division (HCCD) under the umbrella of the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism (MCST) in 2020 for the first time during the Moon Jae-in administration so as to support the constant diffusion of *Hallyu* led by the public. Prior to the division, *Hallyu*-related projects were operated by the government department and agencies sporadically. Since the foundation of HCCD, *Hallyu* management through the government has shown clearer and more specific. The HCCD aims to examine the status of *Hallyu*, which dispersed *Hallyu* projects among inside and outside government departments, and to organize *Hallyu* systematically by supporting the public with a private-public partnership. Furthermore, it contributes to the spread of Korean culture as well as the mutual growth of *Hallyu*-related industry through *Hallyu*-based cultural exchange projects, *Hallyu* market research, *Hallyu* export support, shaping master plans for supporting *Hallyu*, and others (Policy Briefing 2020). Before establishing the Division, the *Hallyu* received support from different temporary organizations as the completely responsible department for *Hallyu* did not exist. The following organizations, for instance, assist *Hallyu*-affiliated works to shape policies for *Hallyu* promotion and leads cooperation between relevant Ministries and the private sector: the association of *Hallyu* culture promotion (한류문화진흥위원회) under the MCST in 2012 and 2013, the *Hallyu* 3.0 committee (*Hallyu* 3.0 위원회) as a private advisory body in 2014, and *Hallyu* planning group (한류기획단) as a private-public consultative group from 2015 to 2017.

The MCST enacted the International Culture Exchange Promotion Act in 2017. The ‘international cultural exchange’ in the Act defines “international cooperation and activities provided or performed to enhance mutual understanding of culture (referring to culture in a broad sense encompassing art, tourism, sports, etc.) among countries in relevant fields, such as culture, art, tourism, and sports” under the purpose of “contributing to improving mutual understanding of culture among countries by establishing a foundation for international cultural exchanges, as well as to developing global culture by enhancing the diversity and creativity of Korean culture, by prescribing matters necessary to promote international cultural exchanges” (KLRI). One year later, the MCST pushed ahead with the first Comprehensive Plans for International Culture Promotion (2018-2022) as a primary medium – and long-term official plan in accordance with the Act. The chief aim of the plans is to depart from the usual way of one-off and fragmentary international cultural exchange and build a basic framework that is systematic and sustainable; thereby, it proposes a vision of international cultural exchange that sympathizes and cooperates with the world, including specific policy purposes and strategies (MCST, “The First”). Moreover, the plans lay out international cultural exchange aid projects through the Korean Foundation for International Cultural Exchange (KOFICE, “Information of KOFICE”) that a dedicated government institute devoted to international cultural exchange in 2018. The foundation has been publishing a report on the study of the real state of Hallyu status abroad since 2012 so as to grasp the level of awareness of Korea and favorability through K-contents. It employs the following activities to stimulate cultural exchange across national boundaries that are bilateral exchange events, global networking, research and studies, and professional training programs. By connecting people and exchanging cultures around the world, KOFICE aims to serve as a platform for “win-win cultural development” by connecting Korea and the world through culture (KOFICE, “Information of KOFICE”).

Besides the HCCD, the MCST works with different agencies, for a typical example, the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA, “The Report List of KOCCA”). The KOCCA was founded as an affiliated special corporation of the MCST in 2009 that consolidates five existing organizations, such as the Korea Game Agency and the Korean Broadcasting, for the purpose of directing and forging overall support for the content industry in Korea such as research on policy and systems, technical development, management

support for overseas expansion, contents development support for the cultural industry. Not only that, recently, KOCCA as published its research on the actual condition of K-pop, K-animation, K-cartoon, K-game, and K-webtoon, focusing on users all over the world (“The Report List of KOCCA”). Furthermore, diverse Korean government agencies also endeavor to spread Hallyu as a part of cultural soft power. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) runs projects of Hallyu diffusion to boost the interest and attraction of Korea, whereby constructing an environment that the Korean public and companies welcome in the international society based on revving up its comprehensive attractions. The MFA coordinates Korea’s public diplomacy with a vision of “fascinating the world with Korea’s charm”, whereupon it deploys Korea’s soft power as a part of its public diplomacy strategy to attain one of its goals, ‘share Korean culture’ (MOFA, “Introduction of the Public Diplomacy”). The Public Diplomacy Bureau under the MFA manages its affairs in culture, policy, and digital-related realms (MOFA, “Introduction of the Public Diplomacy”). Thus, the MFA goes over the present condition of Hallyu over the world, publishing ‘the Current Status of Global Village Hallyu (지구촌 한류현황)’ annually to fathom the ripple effects of Hallyu, the number of Hallyu clubs, Hallyu popular contents that show different geography. The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs also not only supports the Hallyu club activities based on the K-Lover infrastructure project but also carries out cooperative projects with the relative authorities, quasi-government agencies, broadcasting stations, and others to enhance a better understanding of Korea (MOFA, “Diffusion of Hallyu”). Such efforts led to public diplomacy by means of different types of programs by the MFA. Furthermore, the rest of the Korean government agencies and departments adopt diverse Korean soft power-related projects and programs and connect to overseas expansion and extension of trade. For instance, the Korean Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy has been holding the ‘Hallyu exhibition’ annually abroad since 2010 in order to make headway into the foreign market with promising Korean companies in the consumer goods and service sector in conjunction with Hallyu (MOTIE, “Promising Companies”). The exhibition provides performances of Korean celebrities appointed as goodwill ambassadors and sets a place for experiencing firsthand K-beauty, K-foods, K-pop, and others.

The Policies for Hallyu as a Bridge to Achieve Cultural Powerhouse in Korea

As reviewed earlier, *Hallyu* is a medium to introduce Korea with its culture to foreign countries. It has already been shown; for example, the Japanese who watched the “Winter Sonata” cast away prejudices and stereotypes of Korea in the early 2000s. The K-drama plays a role as a bridge between Korea and Japan via comprehension of each other’s cultures that were previously fraught with misunderstanding and distorted views. The fruitful results stem from the Korean government’s constant support for its cultural industry. The Korean government made much effort to maintain the continuity of the Hallyu policy when we look through the previous administrations. The government constantly attempts to figure out the present condition through the *Hallyu* industry and specialists, operating advisory programs to suggest better Hallyu policies. There were several advisory committees for accomplishing its purpose; for instance, the advisory committee for Hallyu policy under the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the advisory committee for promoting Hallyu culture under the Lee Myung-bak administration, the expert committee of cultural industry affiliated with the cultural enrichment board under the Park Geun-hye administration, and Hallyu cooperation committee under the Moon Jae-in administration (Jun 159).

The Hallyu policies have been detailed in accordance with the change of government. The Korean government has been supporting Hallyu due to the expectation of a growth engine for its economy from the Kim Young-sam administration (Cha 22). In the next government, under the Kim Dae-jung administration, the Korean idol/Hallyu Star system was introduced in the field of K-pop and carried out the Cultural Industry Policy in earnest that the previous administration had planned out. Thus, the Korean government took popular culture as an alternative to promote export to pass through the IMF crisis. The then-major entertainment companies – SM, YG, and JYP – had also sponsored, according to the government policy to shore up the culture industry in Korea to grant competitive power in the global market (Ju 19-20). As Figure 2 explains below, the full-scale *Hallyu*-related projects endeavored with bilateral cultural exchange in response to the anti-*Hallyu* movement in the early 2000s, but it did not draw public attention. During the Lee Myung-bak administration, the Korean government established the National Brand Committee to focus on improving its

image on the international stage. It was the first attempt for the Korean government to deploy Hallyu to bolster the national status which led to raised exports and vitalized foreign tourism domestically. By extension, the Park Geun-hye administration utilized the cultural industry for job creation that connects to shared growth of the manufacturing and service industry including education, medical care, and tourism. To fulfill the policy, the Park administration developed a framework of a belt for integrated culture and creation and established K-experience, K-culture valley, culture creation academy, and others (Jun 160, 163).




Figure 2. The characters of Hallyu policies according to administration changes (KOCCA, “Study on the Strategy of New Hallyu”)

In line with publicizing Korea through its culture, the Korean government officially recognized the significance of public diplomacy with soft power in 2010. The government designated the Minister of Public Diplomacy the next year and established the public diplomacy division under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the following year. In 2016, Korea enacted the law of public diplomacy to gain a foothold in carrying out and framing its policy by the MFA alone or through cooperation between local governments and the private sector. As of 2023, the MFA laid the second master plan for Korea’s public diplomacy (2023-2027) after the previous master plan for five years, from 2017 to 2021. Besides this, MFA drew up comprehensive implementation plans every year from 2020 with all Korean government ministries, affiliated government organizations, and local governments.

The Hallyu policies are expanded and combined with public diplomacy. The current President, Yoon Suk-yeol, plans to disperse the attraction all over the world; more specifically, his national political agenda in the contents field is ‘the proliferation of the Hallyu (so-called K-contents)’s attraction to the world’. Pursuant to Yoon’s policy decision, the MCST drew up a budget for the contents field of around 974 billion dollars, which accounts for 14.5 percent of the total of the Minister, to fulfill four practical strategies (*Hallyu* contents foundation construction, intensively fostering Hallyu contents representative fields, giving off charms of *Hallyu* contents, and cultivating new markets of Hallyu contents) and fourteen specific plans that are related to the strategies (MCST, “The Yoon administration”). By extension, in the same year, the MCST also plans to run a course of study on training content exports and marketing professional personnel under the catchphrase of ‘Content Connects the World’ to continuously support overseas expansion with the KOCCA (MCST, “The Ministry of Culture, Sports”). The government’s efforts act on Korea in terms of promoting Korea’s image on the global stage as the result of public diplomacy and improving its economic effect in the domestic economy.

Conquering the Hearts and Minds with *Yurt Yeli*

Hallyu, also known as the Korean Wave, has been instrumental in promoting South Korea’s soft power and improving the country’s reputation and branding on a global scale. The utilization of Hallyu to maximize the nation’s soft power has become a crucial policy objective for enhancing the country’s power and influence in the international arena. The idea of Soft Power, introduced by Joseph S. Nye (*Bound to Lead*), refers to the ability to attract people through charisma and persuasion, in contrast to Hard Power, such as military might (Akilli 130). On the other hand, public diplomacy (Gilboa 55-77; Melissen 542-561; Nye, *Soft Power* 100; Akilli 166; Snow and Cull) is a strategy used by countries to engage with foreign audiences and promote their national interests, values, and culture. It involves the exchange of information and ideas between countries with the aim of fostering mutual understanding and building relationships (Kerr and Wiseman). Public diplomacy includes a range of activities such as cultural diplomacy, educational exchanges, and digital diplomacy (Akilli 14). It is a way to enhance a country’s soft power and improve its image and reputation abroad. The practice of public diplomacy

has gained increasing importance in the context of globalization (Kan) and the growing interconnectedness of the world (Melissen 545). In today's world, countries are increasingly dependent on each other, and the need for mutual understanding and cooperation has become more urgent. Public diplomacy builds trust and fosters collaboration between countries, especially in mutual interest and concern areas. As such, public diplomacy is becoming an essential tool for countries to manage their international relations and promote their interests in the global arena (Akıllı 167).

Hallyu's success as a public diplomacy tool can be attributed to its ability to connect with people on a personal and emotional level. It has helped to break down cultural barriers and promote understanding between South Korea and other countries. By sharing its cultural heritage with the world, South Korea has promoted its soft power and built relationships with foreign audiences. As such, Hallyu has become an essential part of South Korea's public diplomacy strategy.

As mentioned earlier, the South Korean government has spent 20 years experimenting and refining Hallyu, and its triumph has exceeded the initial predictions. *Yurt Yeli* will adopt the formulation proposed in this study, which focuses on the latest version of the Korean Wave, known as the New Hallyu.

Table 2
Comparison of *Hallyu* and *Yurt Yeli*

	New Hallyu (K-culture)	Yurt Yeli
Period	2020 onwards	2023 onwards
Character	Hallyu diversification and globalization through online communication	Social media, official websites, mainstream media
The field of K-contents	K-culture and its related industry	Yurt culture and its related industry
Target country	The whole world with diffusion strategically	The whole world
Consumer	Cosmopolitan with a customized approach	Boosted by tradition yet inclusive of international diversity.

Steps need to be taken to formulate Hallyu for the Turkic world and construct the success of Hallyu in the region through the *Yurt Yeli* subculture. As a unique fusion of Turkic World cultural elements, *Yurt Yeli* could gain popularity across the region and has the potential to serve as a model for creating successful cultural exports from the Turkestan region to the rest of the world. One of the key factors that will contribute to the success of Yurt Yeli is the way in which it has been adapted to Anatolia and Turkestan region cultural norms and values. Similarly, the Yurt Yeli subculture represents a local adaptation of Hallyu that reflects the unique cultural identity and values of the Turkic World. By embracing Turkic World's cultural traditions and values, Yurt Yeli will be able to resonate with audiences across the region and will gain a dedicated following. To ensure the success of Hallyu in the Turkic World, the Yurt Yeli model comprises various measures such as integrating Turkic cultural traditions and values into Yurt Yeli content, promoting cross-cultural exchange and collaboration, and utilizing digital technologies to expand its global reach. By adapting Yurt Yeli content to Turkic cultural norms and values, it is possible to create content that resonates with audiences and reflects Turkic World's unique cultural identity. Furthermore, promoting cross-cultural exchange and collaboration through Turkic cultural industries can help create content that reflects cultural elements and resonates with audiences in the region and beyond. Moreover, with the advent of digital technologies, it has become easier than ever to reach global audiences with cultural content. By embracing digital technologies and using them to promote Yurt Yeli content, a wider audience can be reached, and the cultural richness of the Turkic World can be promoted to the rest of the world. To facilitate these steps in Yurt Yeli, certain key elements must be established. Firstly, it's essential to institutionalize Yurt Yeli within the OTS. Following this, the establishment of dedicated music, drama/movie, food, fashion, and beauty industries under the Yurt Yeli brand is crucial for the OTS, mirroring the successful model that Hallyu has adeptly implemented over the past two decades.

The Institutionalization of the Yurt Yeli

The institutionalization of the Yurt Yeli brand entails the formal and systematic integration of Yurt Yeli into the organizational structure

and processes of the OTS. This necessitates the establishment of official departments, frameworks, and protocols specifically dedicated to Yurt Yeli within the OTS.

As a public diplomacy brand, the integration of Yurt Yeli into the OTS's organizational structure and processes encompasses various essential elements. The cornerstone of this effort is the establishment of a specialized organizational unit or department entrusted with overseeing and executing Yurt Yeli initiatives. As the Korean government established the Hallyu Content Cooperation Division (HCCD) under the umbrella of the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism (MCST); this unit acts as a central hub for the coordination and implementation of a diverse range of Yurt Yeli programs and activities. TURKSOY holds the potential to spearhead the adoption of Yurt Yeli as the public diplomacy brand of OTS, assuming a role akin to the UNESCO of the Turkic World.

An integral facet of the institutionalization process involves the development of policies. These policies go beyond managing the promotion, development, and sustainability of Yurt Yeli; they are crafted to align seamlessly with the broader goals and mission of the OTS. As emphasized in the 2040 Vision document, the focus is on “promoting Turkish culture, values, traditions, art, and heritage worldwide through the joint efforts of Turkish Cooperation Organizations in cooperation with relevant international organizations”; these policies serve as a guiding framework in decision-making processes, ensuring that Yurt Yeli initiatives are aligned with the organization's overall goals.

The allocation of dedicated financial resources by the Office of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination (OTS) is a pivotal component in the institutionalization of Yurt Yeli, underscoring the importance and commitment to the successful implementation of its initiatives. This allocation is crucial for providing the necessary support for Yurt Yeli's diverse programs, projects, and promotional activities. Furthermore, the expansion of Yurt Yeli's reach, and impact is heavily reliant on the establishment of collaborative partnerships. By forging alliances with key stakeholders both within and beyond the OTS, Yurt Yeli can leverage shared resources, expertise, and networks, notably with organizations such as TURKSOY,

the Turkish Academy, the Turkish Culture and Heritage Foundation, and TURKPA, thereby amplifying its influence and effectiveness.

Additionally, the implementation of education and training programs is an integral part of the institutionalization process, ensuring that stakeholders, including staff and collaborators, are well-versed in Yurt Yeli's goals, values, and strategies. This comprehensive understanding is vital for the effective execution of the initiative. Moreover, the OTS's deployment of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms is essential for assessing the progress and impact of Yurt Yeli. These periodic evaluations provide valuable insights, enabling necessary adjustments and improvements to enhance the overall effectiveness of the programs.

Lastly, a critical element in Yurt Yeli's success lies in the creation of a harmonious and recognizable brand identity. To achieve this, the implementation of strategic branding and communication efforts is necessary to bolster Yurt Yeli's visibility and significance on a global scale. These efforts are aimed at positioning Yurt Yeli as a distinguished and prominent entity within the broad cultural landscape, thereby furthering its mission and objectives. The ultimate critical step in the institutionalization process entails the seamless integration of Yurt Yeli with existing initiatives within the OTS. This integration fosters synergy and maximizes the collective impact of these efforts, including events such as state leaders' summits, the World Nomad Games, and TURKSOY's initiatives. By institutionalizing Yurt Yeli, the OTS can effectively advance its commitment to promoting Turkish culture, values, and heritage on a global scale. This initiative aims to establish a sustainable framework for the long-term success of Yurt Yeli endeavors. Collaborations with organizations like TURKSOY, the Turkish Academy, the Turkish Culture and Heritage Foundation, and TURKPA not only emphasize but also broaden this commitment.

Essential Key Elements for *Yurt Yeli* Subculture

In addition to establishing a responsible directive structure in the OTS, such as the Korean government's establishment of the HCCD under MCST, the following elements are vital to be constructed for Yurt Yeli:

Yurt Yeli's Music Genre-Turku: To promote the cultural richness of the Turkic world, it is important to create a new genre of music that combines

traditional Turkic music with modern influences blends different genres. This new genre can be named *Turku* and can showcase the diversity of music styles within the Turkic world, highlighting the unique sounds of each region and nation. There are numerous talented music groups and artists in the Turkic world that can be utilized to develop the music aspect of *Yurt Yeli* within the region. Here are a few instances:

- *Ordo Sakhma*: A popular ensemble that combines traditional Kyrgyz music with contemporary elements, aiming to bring Kyrgyz folk music to a wider audience. They have a unique sound that reflects the Turkestan region's cultural heritage and could be a great inspiration for a new genre of music that blends traditional Turkic sounds.
- *Sultans of the Dance*: Sultans of the Dance is a Turkish group that combines traditional Turkish music with modern dance beats. They have become popular in Türkiye and other parts of the world and could be a great inspiration for a new genre of dance music that reflects the energy and vibrancy of the Turkic world.
- *Sevda Alekberzade*: Sevda Alekberzade is an Azerbaijani singer who is known for her powerful voice and unique style. She could be a great inspiration for a new generation of Turkic singers who want to blend traditional sounds with modern influences like jazz. Just like Hallyu Stars, Yurt Yeli Stars can be trained through the Turkic music industry.

To apply the *Hallyu Star* formula in the Turkic world, OTS could concentrate on cultivating and endorsing fresh talents from different regions and utilize social media platforms to increase their fan base. Additionally, OTS could establish novel music shows and contests that highlight the most promising emerging talents from across the Turkic world and offer them chances to collaborate with established producers and stars. Lastly, developing a robust brand identity and marketing plan that appeals to youth globally, using digital marketing techniques and social media influencers to create awareness and interest in the new wave of Turkic music. The OTS could also host music festivals and concerts that showcase the unique sounds of the Turkic world and collaborate with artists and producers from around the world to create a truly global sound. Social media platforms could be

used to promote and share this music with a global audience, just like how K-Pop became successful with the help of social media.

Yurt Yeli's Dramas/Movies: In addition to the music industry, OTS could also focus on developing the drama and movie sectors that Yurt Yeli can promote. Through these mediums, Turkic filmmakers and actors can showcase their skills and narrate stories that resonate with global audiences. By creating a new genre of dramas and movies that explore the fascinating history, culture, and folklore of the Turkic world, can generate interest in the region. These productions could be produced with high production values, captivating storytelling, and talented actors, similar to the success of K-Dramas and movies. Türkiye has the potential to take the lead in these efforts, as demonstrated by the triumph of shows like “Muhteşem Yüzyıl” and “Diriliş Ertuğrul,” which highlight the country’s rich heritage and culture. Furthermore, other Turkic countries could create their unique productions that showcase their history, culture, and folklore. For instance, Uzbekistan could create films that depict the Silk Road era, while Kazakhstan could explore its nomadic traditions in its productions. Such efforts can foster greater appreciation and understanding of the diverse cultures of the Turkic world.

Yurt Yeli's Fashion and Beauty Trends: In addition to music and dramas/movies, the fashion and beauty industry can also play a significant role in promoting the cultural identity of the Turkic world through *Yurt Yeli*. Fashion and beauty trends reflect the values, history, and cultural heritage of a region. Therefore, highlighting the unique fashion and beauty trends of the Turkic world can help promote the region’s distinctiveness. The Turkic world has a rich history of textile and clothing production. The traditional costumes of the Turkic people vary greatly, from the embroidered kaftans of the Ottoman Empire to the intricate patterns of Central Asian textiles. These costumes often feature vibrant colors, intricate details, and unique designs that reflect the region’s cultural diversity. By showcasing these traditional costumes, fashion designers can draw inspiration from the rich cultural heritage of the Turkic world and create modern interpretations that appeal to global audiences. Similarly, the beauty industry can also draw inspiration from the Turkic world’s rich cultural traditions. Beauty practices and rituals have been passed down through generations, and they

reflect the cultural values and beliefs of the region. In summary, promoting the fashion and beauty trends of the Turkic world can help showcase the region's cultural richness and distinctiveness. By drawing inspiration from traditional costumes and beauty practices, designers and beauty brands can create modern interpretations that appeal to global audiences while staying true to the region's cultural heritage.

Yurt Yeli's Gastrodiplomacy Aspect-Aş: Food is an essential part of any culture, and the Turkic world has a rich culinary heritage that is worth promoting through Yurt Yeli as *Aş*. Turkic cuisine is diverse, with unique flavors and ingredients that reflect the region's history and cultural traditions. By promoting the diverse cuisine of the Turkic world, Yurt Yeli can showcase the region's cultural richness and distinctiveness. Turkic cuisine is characterized by its use of spices, herbs, and fresh ingredients. Each region has its own unique dishes and cooking methods, which have been passed down through generations. For example, in Central Asia, traditional dishes such as *Plov*, *Lagman*, *Samsa*, and *Mantı* are popular. In Türkiye, dishes such as kebab, baklava, and Turkish delight are famous worldwide. In other words, *Yurt Yeli* can assist in highlighting the cultural wealth and uniqueness of a region by presenting its authentic cuisine. Chefs and food bloggers can create modern interpretations of traditional dishes that appeal to global audiences while staying true to the region's cultural heritage. Additionally, Yurt Yeli can promote local food markets and restaurants, which can aid in supporting the local economy and preserving traditional cooking methods.

Conclusion

First and foremost, it is crucial to underscore that Yurt Yeli is not a mere replication of the Hallyu phenomenon tailored for the Turkic World. Instead, it represents a strategic initiative for the OTS to formalize and embody public diplomacy, mirroring the successful model that South Korea has adeptly employed over the years. While the OTS faces unique challenges (Ataman), not only due to its decentralized structure but also in reconciling the diverse array of values within the Turkic World, Yurt Yeli seeks to navigate these challenges by promoting a standardized set of shared values.

It is noteworthy to acknowledge the ongoing criticisms directed towards K-Pop, a pivotal component of Hallyu, citing concerns about its potential negative societal impacts. In contrast, Yurt Yeli aspires to serve as a unifying concept for the Turkic States, facilitating the exportation of their local, cultural, and societal values to the global stage. Essentially, Yurt Yeli functions as a distinctive brand for the Turkic World and the OTS, positioned to showcase the beauty and richness of Turkic societies internationally. The ultimate goal is to establish Yurt Yeli as an institutionalized public diplomacy tool for the OTS, fostering a positive and authentic representation of the Turkic World on the global stage.

While the objectives of Yurt Yeli are clear, and it carries a distinct essence deeply rooted in the Turkic World, drawing inspiration from Hallyu, certain questions may emerge. Notably, South Korea stands out with its political, social, economic, and cultural unity and homogeneity, presenting a sharp contrast to the Turkic World, which is yet to achieve a consistent political, economic, and social structure. The rich tapestry of Turkic culture, shaped over millennia, has undergone diverse transformations in different states, prompting the question, “Which Turkic culture?” Yurt Yeli distinctly centers around the common identity, culture, and norms of the Turkic World, as exemplified by the OTS.

Hallyu experienced ups and downs on its journey from Hallyu 1.0 to the New Hallyu era (Kim and Akıllı). Despite its waves reaching the shores of the US and Europe, it had limited influence in the Asian region. Nevertheless, it faced political bans and restrictions from neighboring countries. Today, with the New Hallyu era, internet-based platforms and social media have been harnessed effectively to conquer the minds and hearts of millions around the world through K-fandom. As mentioned earlier, in 2020, the Korean government established the Hallyu Content Cooperation Division (HCCD) under the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism (MCST) umbrella, and the OTS should do the same for Yurt Yeli.

The HCCD has the objective of assessing the state of Hallyu, which involves a wide range of Hallyu initiatives across both government and private sectors, and of arranging Hallyu in a structured way by assisting the public with a public-private partnership. Additionally, it fosters the dissemination of Korean culture and the mutual development of Hallyu-related industries

by means of cultural exchange projects based on Hallyu, research into Hallyu markets, aid for the exportation of Hallyu, the formulation of plans to support Hallyu, and other related activities. In other words, the establishment of a counterpart in the OTS will institutionalize Yurt Yeli, and this is vital for its future, given that the HCCD is the key actor in institutionalizing Hallyu.

Overall, the Yurt Yeli model for constructing the success of Hallyu in the Turkic World represents a promising approach to public diplomacy and soft power. By promoting cross-cultural exchange and collaboration, embracing local cultural traditions and values, and leveraging digital technologies, it is possible to create cultural content that resonates with audiences around the world and promotes greater cross-cultural understanding and cooperation. By adapting these elements to the Turkic world, it can be possible to establish a new cultural phenomenon that reflects the richness and diversity of the Turkestan region and resonates with audiences around the world.

As previously detailed, Yurt Yeli has the potential to be a groundbreaking initiative not just in the Turkic world but globally. In order to ensure its success, it is crucial to establish a dedicated institution or division within the official structure of the OTS to oversee Yurt Yeli operations. Once a solid foundation is established, it is important to develop key elements such as a Yurt Yeli-style music genre, dramas/movies, food, fashion, and beauty trends, similar to the way South Korea developed these elements for Hallyu. By building upon the rich cultural heritage of the Turkestan region with strong institutional support from the OTS, Yurt Yeli can showcase the cultural wealth and uniqueness of the region. Through Yurt Yeli, the OTS has the potential to wield public diplomacy effectively, positioning itself as a supranational organization with significant influence in the international system. In the midst of pandemics, wars, and disasters that have claimed thousands of lives, the need for soft power in world politics has never been greater. By leveraging the power of Yurt Yeli, the OTS can promote Turkestan's cultural richness and take a leading role in the international system. Turkestan was once a center of science and prosperity, and through Yurt Yeli, the OTS has the opportunity to send a message of hope and positivity from the heart of the region to the world. Ultimately, Yurt Yeli

will be a source of inspiration and pride for the Turkic people, blowing from the very heart of Turkestan and reaching all corners of the globe.

Contribution Rate Statement

The authors' contribution rates in this study are as follows: Erman Akıllı 75%, Yunhee Kim 25%. The organization of the article, the development of the "Yurtyeli" concept, the writing of the entire article except for the "Hallyu" section mentioned above, and the language editing of the text were carried out by Erman Akıllı, while the information and creation of tables/figures related to the Hallyu concept was carried out by Yunhee Kim.

Conflict of Interest Statement

There is no conflict of interest with any institution or person within the scope of this study. There is no conflict of interest between the authors.

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Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

Post-Soviet Regional Security Complex Revisited: Is Central Asia Still A Subcomplex?*

Ömer Faruk Kocatepe**
Mehmet Şahin***

Abstract

In this study, Central Asia is addressed within the framework of the Regional Security Complex Theory. In the Regional Security Complex theory developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Central Asia is defined as a sub-complex that constitutes the Post-Soviet Regional Security Complex but claims that it can become a separate complex under certain conditions. Twenty years after their pioneering study, the continuities and changes in the region have necessitated an analysis of where the authors' claim stands. Therefore, in this study, the areas that need to be revised in the original work and the transformations have been evaluated. The study emphasizes the importance of political security in the region's transformation into a separate complex, but attempts to demonstrate that it cannot yet be considered a separate complex.

Keywords

Regional Security Complex Theory, Central Asia, political security, regional cooperation, securitization.

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Post-Sovyet Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksini Yeniden Ele Almak: Orta Asya Hâlâ Bir Alt Kompleks mi?*

Ömer Faruk Kocatepe**

Mehmet Şahin***

Öz

Bu çalışmada, Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi Teorisi kapsamında Orta Asya ele alınmıştır. Barry Buzan ve Ole Wæver tarafından geliştirilen Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi teorisinde, Orta Asya, Post-Sovyet Bölgesel Kompleksini oluşturan bir alt kompleks olarak tanımlanmakla birlikte belli şartlar gerçekleştiğinde ayrı bir komplekse dönüşebileceğini iddia etmiştir. 20 yılın ardından bölgedeki devam ve değişimler yazarların bu iddiasında nereye geldiğini analiz etme ihtiyacını doğurmuştur. Bu bakımdan bu çalışmada, orijinal çalışmanın revize edilmesi gereken yerleri ve dönüşümler değerlendirilmiştir. Çalışma, bölgenin ayrı bir komplekse dönüşmesinde siyasi güvenliğin önemini vurgulamakta ancak henüz ayrı bir kompleks olarak değerlendirilemeyeceği gösterilmeye çalışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi Teorisi, Orta Asya, siyasi güvenlik, bölgesel iş birliği, güvenikleştirme.

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Introduction

There are two competing ideas on the transition of the international system after the Cold War. According to one view, the notion of the USA assuming a unipolar leadership role emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union (Wohlforth; Yalçın and İlhan), while another view argues that the international system has evolved into a multipolar order (Acharya; Efeğil and Musaoğlu). The main premise of the unipolar view is the idea that the USA has become the sole dominant power in the world as the winner of the Cold War. On the other hand, the decline of US hegemony, the rise of China, and the resurgence of Russia have brought to light the idea of multipolarity, especially after the mid-2000s. Therefore, it can be argued that the main reasons for the emergence of different opinions in the literature lie in the ongoing differentiation of power balances among regions. As a matter of fact, although the definition of the 21st century has changed over time in international level, competition and power relations persist at the regional level. For instance, although the USA is the world's largest military and economic power, its influence in Central Asia is limited. In contrast, China has become the dominant state in Asia, even without attaining global power status.

With the end of the Cold War, change in the balance of power was not the only significant transformation. Security understandings and approaches in the changing international landscape also entered a new era. With the emergence of the New World Order, less emphasis was placed on military power, whereas more attention was given to economic and political power in addressing the security problems between states. During this period, policymakers, strategists, and academics started to develop new theoretical approaches to this new phase. Specifically, proponents of Social Constructivism and the Copenhagen School argued that realism has become insufficient in explaining the international environment, as it adopted either a systemic-level or state-level analytical perspective. Instead, they posited the need for an intermediate level to comprehend the post-Cold War era, which encompasses both interregional and intra-regional conflicts within the security domain. Accordingly, it has been argued that the international relations literature, which has predominantly focused on state and system-level analysis since the 1960s, has proven inadequate in this new era. As a

result of this, the idea of a “security complex” (Buzan) was first put forward as an alternative approach by Buzan in the 1980s. The idea was further developed by him and Ole Wæver and formulated as “Regional Security Complex Theory” in the following years.

Regional Security Complex Theory gained weight in the post-Cold War period and emerged clearly in the book “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security” written by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver in 2003 (Buzan and Wæver). Due to the changes in the international system experienced in this period, the diversification of security perceptions after the Cold War, and thus the insufficient levels of analysis, regional divergences became more evident. In this respect, the Regional Security Complex Theory aimed to explain the complex situation in the post-Soviet geography and the Central Asia¹, as in many parts of the world.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, which changed the international system, directly affected the geopolitical landscape of Central Asia and created a power vacuum. The transition to the nation-state model and the integration process of the five Central Asian countries, which gained independence from the Soviets, encountered several problems. Despite explorations of alternative approaches both within and outside the region to manage the integration into the global system, the desired outcomes were not achieved. This was mainly due to a range of problems and conflicts within the region, such as nation-building, economic dependency, radicalization, political stability, and border disputes. More importantly, the aforementioned power vacuum has attracted the attention of non-regional actors, including the USA and China. Therefore, these republics faced a new set of security problems in order to protect their national security and ensure their continuity (Birdiqli 124). Nevertheless, they also faced the risk of failing to maintain order because of their limited resources to become a functioning state such as lack of sufficient capacity, the absence of military units to ensure their security, internal political challenges, and territorial disputes.

The policies implemented during the Soviet period lay based on the aforementioned problems. Particularly, the demography policies of the Soviet Union aimed to live nations as a single intertwined people instead of separate nations. This policy is the expression of the Soviets’ assimilation policy towards the region. In addition, the policies implemented during

the Stalin era to increase the Slavic population in the region and to change the demographics in favor of the Soviets constitute the basis of some contemporary problems. Likewise, the border problems, which were implemented in this period and separated by sharp and intricate lines after the USSR, constitute another dimension of the structural disorder of the region.

In this regard, this study aims to examine the changing security perceptions of the Central Asia through the Regional Security Complex Theory of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. In their original work in 2003, Buzan and Wæver linked whether Central Asia should be considered a regional security complex or a subcomplex in the post-Soviet geography to certain conditions that may change over time (Buzan and Wæver 428). They claimed that if Russia weakens, no other foreign power intervenes, and they pose more threats to each other, then it will transform into a separate regional security complex. Alternatively, the US stood by the possibility of its continued presence in the bases in the region and the decline of Russian hegemony, in which case it would be expected to turn into a different regional security complex (Buzan and Wæver 429). The transformation of the region into a new great game between the USA and Russia would also lead to its separation from the post-Soviet regional complex. However, they wrote that this situation was out of possibility because it did not happen according to them.

In this study, the processes that are effective in the transformation of Central Asia into a separate regional security complex or not in the 20-year period will be discussed. It is worth examining the changing dynamics of Central Asia because the authors put forth that the internal dynamics of this subcomplex were still forming in 2003 (Buzan and Wæver 423). Yet, there are surprisingly few studies in the literature on this topic. Kaya (68) and Troitskiy (9) claimed that Central Asia formed a separate security complex owing to external influences, while Akkaya (183) concluded that it still continues as a post-Soviet subcomplex. Unlike the aforementioned studies, Central Asia's struggle to transform into a Sino-centered regional complex instead of Russia (Zengin and Topsakal) also takes place in the literature.

This study will focus on which transformations affect this subcomplex in the time passed from the original work of Buzan and Wæver, and new possible projections will be put forward. The forthcoming paper will

demonstrate the transformation of securitization processes, the evolution of enmity and amity patterns, and the interactions within the Central Asian Subcomplex, particularly following the Color Revolutions. It will be argued that the Central Asian Regional Security Subcomplex diverges from other subcomplexes within the post-Soviet region by delineating a distinct security sphere molded by the securitization of the political sector. Additionally, the shortcomings of the original study of Buzan and Wæver and changing patterns of the post-Soviet space will be addressed. The first two sections will survey the Regional Security Complex Theory and Central Asia from the seminal book of Buzan and Wæver. The third section will elaborate on the shortcomings and changing dynamics of the original work since 2003, specifically focusing on the interactions presented within the framework of the four-level analysis. Finally, the place of the Central Asian Complex and future projections will be demonstrated. The main contribution to Central Asian studies is that, unlike conventional wisdom, it highlights cooperation in border disputes and common securitization processes in the political sector.

The regional security complex theory

The Regional Security Complex Theory is significant for understanding the international system that began to emerge in the last period of the Cold War and changed with the end of the bipolar structure. The issue of regional security became significant with the emergence of new states in the international system owing to the decolonization process in Africa in the 1960s and its significance further increased after the Cold War (Kaya 57). As mentioned above, the concept of the Regional Security Complex was first introduced by Barry Buzan in his book “People, State, and Fear” published in 1983. He defined the security complex as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together so closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” (Buzan 106). Barry Buzan later incorporated the Regional Security Complex along with the “securitization” concept, the other pillar of the Copenhagen School, in his book “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security”, which he co-authored with Ole Wæver in 2003. In this book, they defined it as “a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be

analysed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan and Wæver 44). In this respect, states with a high level of interaction, form a security complex, while the interaction of those outside the complex is relatively low (Güngör 161).

According to Buzan, all states in the international system are interdependent with each other in regards to security. However, due to the fact that threats and insecurities are more related to proximity, the degree of dependence of states close to each other cannot be the same as states far from each other. In this respect, the regional security complex is based on variables, such as intense conflict-cooperation dynamics in which two or more states are mutually affected, geographical and historical proximity, and geopolitical rivalry relations. In other words, it refers to a structure in which elements located in regions with geographically similar characteristics create conflict and cooperation in the context of common security issues. In this respect, Regional Security Complexes are determined by power relations and patterns of amity and enmity (Buzan and Wæver 49). While power relations indicate the balance of power in the region, patterns of amity and enmity represent socially constructed relations from a Wendtian perspective. At this point, it can be regarded as a combination of realism and constructivism.

There are several security complexes in the international system for the Regional Security Complex Theory. Political, geographical, economic, historical, strategic, or cultural factors may bring a group of states together and enable these security complexes to form and interact with one another. It is argued that the main factor in the formation of complexes is the common threat perception (Buzan 106) and that anarchy and geographical proximities are the phenomena that create regional complexes. According to Buzan, states located around the world are dependent on each other for security. Geographical proximity is an important factor in the formation of this dependence. Countries that are geographically close to each other have a higher level of dependency than those far away. When close-range threats are compared with long-range threats, it emerges that close-range threats are more effective in terms of their results (Buzan 106–10).

Therefore, according to the RSCT, four factors are sought for a security complex to form: “(i) Consist of two or more states, (ii) these states form a geographically coherent region, (iii) create a positive or negative security

interdependence, and (iv) develop a deep and long-term, if not permanent, security interdependence” (Buzan et al. 15).

The theory gives a new perspective on regional security. It also presents the issue of security interdependence as the pioneering element in the formation of complexes. The security of the states located in the same region and the security of other actors are positively or negatively dependent on each other. Positive interdependence implies that the situation in which a state in the region feels threatened and has security concerns will directly cause other states to feel threatened. In this context, each state has to establish direct relations with each other to ensure intra-regional security. Negative interdependence indicates that the securitization processes of states within a complex are formed as a result of hostile relations with each other. On the one hand, if the securitization policies of the states are taken into consideration, the security dilemmas of developing regional cooperation and resorting to alliance-style organizations to gain or maintain their interests in a region in the globalizing system create a regional security complex. On the other hand, the unending conflict and the alliances shaped by it also form complexes. In this respect, regional security complexes take place in three spectrums in accordance with their formation types: conflict formation, security regime, and security community (Buzan and Wæver 53). The three types of complex formations represent the Wendtian perspective on social structures. Conflict formations align with the Hobbesian view, security regimes with the Lockean perspective, and security communities embody Kantian structures. These three categories of communities form a spectrum ranging from extreme violence on one end to a well-defined set of rules on the other.

According to their types, security complexes are divided into four categories based on power distributions: Standard, Centred (Super Power, Great Power, Regional Power, Institutional), Great Power, and Super complexes (Buzan and Wæver 62). While Standard complexes are shaped by regional powers, Centred complexes are formed around a superpower or great power. Great Power and Supercomplexes are complexes with more than one great power. Great Powers play a crucial role in Regional Security Complexes. According to Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, regional powers are the main influencers of Regional Security Complexes’ security policy directions

(Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll 741). Regional powers' roles and orientations are the determiners of the regional security order, which Buzan and Wæver describe as formation type. Unlike Buzan and Wæver, Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll group five formation types: Hegemonic security, power restraining power, concert, security community, and unstructured (Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll 733). However, for the purpose of evaluating the seminal work of Buzan and Wæver, this article adheres to the original typology of formations.

Amable (2) also emphasizes the impact of great powers on the formation processes of Regional Security Complexes. In contrast to the predominant focus of the mainstream literature on the Regional Security Complex Theory, which concentrates on established complexes, Amable illustrates how adjacent great powers contribute to altering the complex's structure. This perspective firmly asserts that Regional Security Complexes are not inherently self-transformative entities; rather, they are molded by the dynamics of great power competitions, collaborations, and rule-setting.

From this point of view, the formation of a security complex or subcomplex is the result of the interaction of the four levels of analysis. Securitization of each state regarding vulnerability and their relations with other states in the complex constitute the first and second levels, respectively. Thirdly, the relations of the security complex with other complexes, and finally the relation of global powers to the complex reveals the characteristics of a region. In addition, there are subcomplexes embedded within a Regional Security Complex.

The reasons why Buzan and Wæver classify Central Asia as a subcomplex within the post-Soviet security complex will be summarized, and their claim that Central Asia is a separate regional security complex will be explained in the next section.

Post-Soviet regional complex and Central Asia subcomplex

Buzan and Wæver define post-Soviet geography as a Russia-centred complex consisting of four subcomplexes: “the Baltic states, the Western group of states, the Caucasus, and Central Asia” (Buzan and Wæver 397) due to the fact that Russia is the sole actor in the balance of power in the post-Soviet space. On the other hand, the relationship among each of the subcomplexes is limited or negligible. For example, Russia plays a significant role in the

securitization processes of both the Baltics and Central Asia. However, the interaction between the Baltics and Central Asian states is limited, and each region does not play a significant role in the formation of a complex. Therefore, the relationships of each Russia-centred subcomplex at the four levels of analysis differ from each other.

In their analysis in the book of *Regional Security Complexes* in 2003, Buzan and Wæver evaluated the post-Soviet complex as a “conflict formation” that Central Asia and the Caucasus were relatively high conflict zones (Buzan and Wæver 398). However, their analysis becomes somewhat unclear when delving into the specifics of their work. Their assertions are rooted in the premise that states have achieved independence. Consequently, they argue that Regional Security Complexes emerged or were immediately engulfed in hostility as a result (Buzan and Wæver 398). Within this framework, Central Asia, being a recently independent region, is perceived to carry a heightened risk of conflict. However, pinpointing instances of conflict formation in the section dedicated to the examination of Central Asia proves to be challenging. While they claimed that the conflicts occurred between the states in the Caucasus, non-state actors were securitized in Central Asia. Yet, they see Central Asia only as a potential conflict zone because of the competition among the newly independent states. At this point, especially considering the possibility of Uzbekistan’s efforts to establish hegemony in the region, they included the idea that Russian hegemony may decrease over time. That is to say, their assertion regarding conflict formation in Central Asia remains primarily as an abstract model.

However, they emphasized that the main security issue of Central Asian states is domestic security. Accordingly, regime security is the primary security concern of all states in Central Asia. In addition, the activities of radical groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, especially in the Fergana region, led to further securitization by the countries in the region after 9/11. At this point, Buzan and Wæver claimed that Russia played an important role in securitizing terrorism and putting it on the agenda of international organizations, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Buzan and Wæver 410). Finally, transboundary problems such as drug trafficking and organized crime constitute the top agenda of the countries in the region. On the other hand, except for the Fergana

region, there are no border and territorial problems between the countries in the region. Since there was no struggle between the states, there was no blocking or alliance either (Buzan and Wæver 426). As a result, Central Asia did not become the scene of power competition.

Regarding inter-regional relations, Buzan and Wæver assert that, contrary to expectation of a new great game in Central Asia, such a game did not materialize after the Cold War. The authors emphasized Russia's eagerness to increase its penetration in the region through the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), while GUAM² was considered a countervailing force against Russia. Although GUAM lacked the capacity to balance the Russia, the authors considered it crucial for predicting the future of the region. This was because the possibility of US penetration into the region, facilitated by its cooperation with regional power Uzbekistan in the war on terror, created an opportunity for the region to move away from the Russia-centred complex. However, this anticipated shift ultimately did not transpire due to the absence of intra-regional competition and Uzbekistan's subsequent distancing from the US. It was noted that with the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China accepted Russian domination in Central Asia, and it was argued that the interaction of the region with other complexes, in general, remained limited (Buzan and Wæver 431–32). As a result, the region transformed into neither Great Power Complex nor Supercomplexes.

Last but not least, regarding the interaction among the four levels of analysis that culminate in the formation of a regional security complex, Buzan and Wæver posit that, within the post-Soviet Regional Security Complex, all states except Russia engage in interactions across the domestic and regional tiers (Buzan and Wæver 435). As evidenced, the authors emphasize that as of 2003, the inter-regional interactions within Central Asia were notably constrained, categorizing it as a sub-complex within the broader Russia-centered complex.

Considering the changing landscape of international politics, the original study of Buzan and Wæver needs to be reevaluated after two decades. Additionally, it has some minor disputed evaluations. This leads us to address two issues regarding the Security Complex of Central Asia. First, the shortcomings of the original text of Buzan and Wæver need to be

reevaluated. Second, the changing patterns of power distribution, as well as enmity and amity in the region over the past two decades, have to be analyzed to understand how the security complex of Central Asia evolved throughout the 2010s and 2020s. The following section will elaborate on these two issues.

Central Asia: Mumpsimus and changing patterns

As has been demonstrated, Buzan and Wæver's seminal work on Regional Security Complex Theory guided IR scholars not only in contemporary security studies but also in area studies. Their ingenious model indeed shed light on the developments taking place not only in Central Asia but all over the world in the early 2000s. Still, there are some shortcomings in their ideas about Central Asia. This situation causes some issues to be problematic from the beginning in the analysis of Central Asia.

First and foremost, the assertion that the region constitutes a conflict formation is questionable, particularly in terms of intra-state conflicts. While there are evident border disputes, the authors themselves acknowledge that actual conflict within Central Asia remains minimal. This is mainly due to the fact that the amity and enmity relations are very recent and unconventional in Central Asia. The region is essentially post-colonial, and as the authors already elaborated, at least some identities are artificial, created by the Soviet Union. As stated in the literature, Central Asia is a region that took its present form after the 1930s, within the framework of the "Divide and Rule" policies under the Soviet Union (Carrère d'Encausse 177–78). In fact, the territories that make up contemporary Kazakhstan was known as the "Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic" between 1920-1925. Therefore, the development of any enmity or conflict among the countries in Central Asia is neither in the historical narrative nor in the post-independence period.

These two features have given rise to unconventional practices in the hierarchy of securitization within the region. The most evident manifestation is observed in border-related issues. Contrary to public expectations, the ruling elites tend to downplay discourses regarding border disputes (Nourzhanov 99). Traditional security concerns like border disputes and water management are scarcely addressed by these elites. Instead, their emphasis lies on non-

state actors, specifically separatism, extremism, and organized crime, when participating in diplomatic discussions and international platforms such as the SCO or the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Furthermore, the narratives of threat are significantly influenced by great power intervention (Nourzhanov 90; Koch 19) due to these states' recent attainment of independence. This discourse of securitization is essentially intertwined with the securitization of non-state actors. The foremost goal of Central Asian leaders is to uphold political stability. Nonetheless, non-state actors supported by the United States are perceived as sources of destabilization. Consequently, the region's paramount concern revolves around either non-state actors or intervention by major powers. To put it differently, enmity patterns are shaped by external powers and non-state actors, while amicable relations remain in their infancy, primarily evident in intra-regional dynamics and, conceivably, among perceived non-aggressive states such as China and Türkiye through the SCO and OTS platforms.

The second shortcoming, linked to the previous point, involves the assertion of hegemonic attitudes among local powers. Although along with some scholars of that period (Luong and Weinthal 62), Buzan and Wæver claimed that Uzbekistan aimed to become a regional hegemon (Buzan and Wæver 425), it is hard to find convincing evidence to prove this argument. Clearly, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were the promising hegemonic candidates in Central Asia regarding their relative capacities. Yet, referring to their military expenditures (The World Bank) and policy priorities, neither of them seems to be attempted hegemonic ambitions in the region. Unlike the expectations, Uzbekistan focused on internal consolidation and economic stability throughout the 1990s. It sought self-reliance in international politics (Fazendeiro 4), with no territorial claims in the neighborhood reinforced by strict border controls (D. R. Spechler and M. C. Spechler 160). Therefore, as a newly independent state, the top agenda of Uzbek Foreign Policy has been domestic security consolidants rather than international penetration. In the end, Uzbekistan did not form an alliance to balance Kazakhstan or another regional actor either. Therefore, neither internal nor external balance attempts were seen in the Uzbek government throughout the 1990s.

Due to these two factors, Central Asia appears to resemble more of a security regime. The securitization processes within all Central Asian states share

similarities, leading to a sense of security interdependence among them. These states predominantly securitize political security and accord lesser significance to military security. Moreover, their security concerns exhibit a mutual reliance for two main reasons. Firstly, the fear of a domino effect, exemplified by the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, compels the elites to align with one another and address territorial disputes collectively. This dynamic prompts a sense of cooperation among Central Asian states. Secondly, as demonstrated by the 2022 Kazakh unrest, Russia is still perceived as the primary stabilizing force by Central Asian elites. This reaffirms the notion that the region remains predominantly under the influence of a Russia-centered security complex. As a result of these considerations, Central Asia's characteristics and security dynamics align more closely with those of a security regime. In this regard, it is more open to transforming into a security community in the future. This leads us to elaborate on the changing patterns in Central Asia since 2003. Over the two decades, significant transformations occurred at domestic, regional, and interregional levels. That is to say, the gap between the inter-regional and intra-regional relations widened, which makes a regional security complex more prominent.

The inter-regional dynamics of the Central Asian sub-complex have undergone changes in two significant aspects, culminating in the consolidation of Russian influence in the region rather than a competition among Great Powers. Primarily, the presence of the United States dwindled by the mid-2010s. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Uzbekistan emerged as a key partner of the US in the region, primarily due to their joint efforts in the war on terror. However, Uzbekistan's alignment with the US ceased in 2005. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the US pursued a policy of "democratization" in Central Asia. However, this democratization approach was often interpreted as an attempt to replace incumbent leaders with pro-American figures rather than actively supporting democratic institutionalization (Nogayeva 195). Even amidst its counterterrorism initiatives, Uzbekistan wasn't an exception to this trend. The US efforts to influence the Uzbek government led to the Andijan events in 2005, perceived by Tashkent as an endeavor to incite a color revolution. These events led to a significant deterioration in US-Uzbek relations. Consequently, the US military base in Uzbekistan was promptly closed, and American troops were withdrawn. Similarly, Kyrgyzstan shut down the US military base at Manas

in 2014. This resulted in the absence of any remaining US bases in the region. As a consequence, the limited scope of US influence within Central Asia lost effectiveness. Consequently, the potential for transforming the Russia-centered complex was substantially weakened. More importantly, a possible New Great Game has become a reference object of securitization not only for Russia but also for the local governments.

In contrast to the decline of US influence, relations with China and Türkiye have developed and evolved over time. However, this development has not occurred in opposition to Russia, but rather in alignment with Russia's interests. Türkiye's relationship with Turkic states is primarily based on cultural diplomacy (Purtaş 97). Although the cooperation between Turkic states and Türkiye has the potential to transform into an alliance via the OTS, the existence of CIS and Collective Security Treaty Organization keeps posing limits for further integration (Kocatepe). Similarly, the strengthening of Sino-Russian ties has become more pronounced, especially since 2018 when China's Belt and Road Initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union became interconnected. As Buzan and Wæver asserted in 2003 that the two great powers keep acting jointly in the region against the US unipolarity (Buzan and Wæver 431). This institutional cooperation between these two powers has solidified the existing power dynamics in the region, ensuring Russian security and progressively isolating the region from global affairs while drawing it closer to Russia post-2005. Despite numerous analyses suggesting that the post-Cold War era has ushered in a New Great Game in Central Asia (Scott; Menon), the withdrawal of US military presence after 2005, decreased EU engagement, and, in stark contrast, the enduring Russian military presence in the region lead us to conclude that the likelihood of the New Great Game claims materializing in the near future is slim. Throughout the past two decades, political, economic, and military collaborations have been institutionally established either through Russia's actions or via Sino-Russian collaborations, as seen in the cases of CSTO and SCO. Cultural cooperation, on the other hand, has been institutionalized by Türkiye through the OTS. Significantly, the absence of intra-regional competition negates the opportunity and necessity for external actors to deeply penetrate the region. Consequently, it's challenging to assert that the region has truly become a backdrop for a new great game.

Intra-regional relations, on the other hand, started to become more visible both in securitization and desecuritization processes. The relationships among the five Central Asian states have relatively heightened since 2003. As a matter of fact, although the Central Asian states did not interact with each other too much, nor did they see each other as rivals from the very beginning. Notably, a significant development in this context is the desecuritization of border disputes. With the exception of the Tajik-Kyrgyz clashes in 2022, the five Central Asian states have largely refrained from engaging in direct state-to-state conflicts. For instance, the border issue between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was amicably resolved through mutual agreement in November 2022. Instead of viewing each other as immediate security threats, these states have securitized primarily in the political and societal sectors, concentrating on non-state actors. To address their cross-border disputes, they have internationalized their security concerns through institutions like the CIS and the SCO, particularly after 2005, thereby fostering opportunities for cooperation. This cooperative approach has also been echoed within the OST, where the same shared concerns have been addressed. Another pivotal development was the leadership transition in Uzbekistan. Mirziyoyev's initiative has been paving strong regional cooperation in Central Asia (Patnaik 155). As an illustration, the two biggest states, namely Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, signed an alliance treaty in 2022 to enhance regional security. Therefore, the collaboration of Central Asian states has been increasing against non-state actors. In other words, the Central Asian states have started to get closer to each other, albeit late.

Finally, same reference objects of securitization are evident in all Central Asian states. The most prominent is the political security sector. The Kyrgyz revolutions of 2005 and 2010, along with the Andijan event, served to reinforce the securitization of political stability by governments. Notably, while regime preservation has always been a paramount concern for leaders, it didn't ascend to the top of their agendas until 2005. This pivotal year marked the emergence of a prevailing sentiment in Central Asia that the securitization of democratic processes posed a considerable threat to the survival of regimes in the region. The year 2005 marked the emergence of a widespread perception in Central Asia that the securitization of democracy posed a significant risk to the survival of regimes in the region owing to the Tulip Revolution of Kyrgyzstan and events in Uzbekistan (Nourzhanov 92).

This led the five Central Asian states to cooperate against domestic threats. As a result, the first local regionalization efforts defined as “protective integration” began to be visible (Allison 188) owing to the securitization of the political sector.

Therefore, the Central Asia subcomplex engaged less and less with other actors after 2003. This means that the four levels of interactions of the Complex have become more straight and compact: A higher level of interaction among each other as well as Russia but less engagement at global and inter-regional levels. More importantly, changes at all levels are fundamentally related to political securitization in one way or another. Therefore, the main security dynamic of the region is regime survival.

On the other hand, it is hard to assert that the region has completely transformed. As has been mentioned, Russian unipolarity is the decisive structural character of the Complex and consolidated throughout the 2010s, despite the penetration efforts of the USA and China. Central Asian countries are still strongly reliant on Russia for infrastructure, trade contacts, labor employment, and global commerce and energy links (Uslu 31). Another continuity takes place in the political sector, which is the securitization of non-state actors, namely extremism, separatism, and organized crime. In the end, extremism still exists in the region. The transformation of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan into Daesh is the most prominent example of this. Thus, the main pillars of the Central Asian subcomplex maintain the balance of power and patterns of amity and enmity in the region. In this regard, the following section will examine the implications of the changing patterns in the Central Asia subcomplex and discuss them in the context of Buzan and Wæver’s projections.

From subcomplex to separate complex?

Referring back to the introduction of the article, Buzan and Wæver assessed Central Asia as a potential separate complex, contingent upon either the decline of Russian hegemony or US presence in the region. The internal dynamics of the region, which had not yet settled into place at that time, had increased this possibility. Now, over 30 years after gaining independence, both rivalry between great powers and the internal dynamics in Central Asia have begun to gain some evidence.

Firstly, Russia is still the most important actor in the region, whereas the US influence deteriorated, particularly after 2005. Therefore, the polarity structure of the complex has not changed. Russia is the only country with military deployment in the region, while the US troops withdrew in 2014, and China has only one post in Tajikistan. Russian military presence is considered the maintenance of political stability by the local leaders against separatism and social turmoil. This makes the complex still a Russia-centred Great Power System.

Secondly, the main subject matter of the complex has become political security. While territorial disputes (military security), ethnic minorities (societal security), and economic independence (economic security) were desecuritized in 30 years, all five republics in the complex put regime survival forward. From this point of view, it can be asserted that if Central Asia separates from Post-Soviet Regional Complex in the future, political securitization would be the main pillar of the new complex.

Thirdly, the complex is characterized by a focus on improving cooperation among states rather than regional rivalry. No state within the complex sought hegemony, which prevented the formation of alliances against each other. Until recently, cooperation and alliances primarily occurred through Russian-led international institutions such as the CIS or SCO, with the aim of collaborating against non-state actors rather than each other. The Uzbek-Kazakh rapprochement can be seen as a pioneering example of local cooperation, which also aims to address issues of terrorism, separatism, and organized crime. The spillover effect of this bilateral cooperation is expected to lead to further cooperative efforts against terrorism and coup attempts.

These three developments have become defining features of the Central Asia Subcomplex within the Post-Soviet Regional Security Complex. The processes of securitization and desecuritization, as well as the formation of alliances, are more discernible in 2023 compared to 2003. This indicates the emergence of a more distinct area within the post-Soviet space. However, it is premature to assert that Central Asia is a separate Regional Security Complex, given the continued influence of Russia in the region. Although Buzan and Wæver suggested that a potential decline of Russian influence could lead to the region's separation, they also considered such a scenario as unlikely. Thus, a possible "New Great Game" scenario, which

is highly discussed and advocated by some scholars, should be considered. Nevertheless, the combination of the waning influence of the US and the continued Russian military presence in the region leads us to the conclusion that the likelihood of these New Great Game assertions materializing in the foreseeable future is rather slim. Therefore, we concur with their assessment that Central Asia remains a subcomplex of the Post-Soviet Regional Security Complex, albeit with the possibility of forming another complex, albeit to a lesser extent.

Conclusion and Future Projections

Central Asia is still a subcomplex 20 years after the seminal study of Buzan and Wæver. Yet, the subcomplex has some characteristics compared to 2003. We assert that political securitization is the catalyst for complex formation in Central Asia. We also argue that except for the Tajik Civil War, the region is stable, which makes it a security region. Still, the securitization of politics may transform it into a security community in the future thanks to improving cooperation of states against non-state actors. Most significantly, the presence of Russia in the region, coupled with its relative isolation from other geopolitical complexes, serves as a key deterrent against the fragmentation of the existing complex.

This raises the question of what are the future projections for the region. As Buzan and Wæver already asserted that if Russian hegemony declines, the region would form another regional security complex. The Russo-Ukrainian War may inspire future predictions, if not solely determines. A possible defeat to Russia or a longer-than-expected war may lead it to act more indifferently or reluctant towards Central Asia. An alternative scenario, such as rising US hegemony or Chinese penetration, is less likely to stage. Therefore, the region will either keep being Russia-centred Great Power Complex or, less probably, transform into a Standard Complex. In case the region divides from Russia, the new security complex has the potential to be a security community thanks to increasing cooperation against non-state actors as a result of prioritizing political security. However, the continuation of the current situation is not an obstacle to cooperation, and political securitization strengthens the possibility of a further increase in bilateral relations.

In conclusion, Central Asia continues to be one of the four subcomplexes within the Post-Soviet Regional Security Complex. This can primarily be attributed to the power distribution favoring Russia and its enduring influence in the region. However, regional cooperation has been advancing in countering non-state actors through the securitization of the political sector. This progress has the potential to transform the region from a security region into a security community.

Contribution Rate Statement

The authors' contribution rates in this study are equal.

Conflict of Interest Statement

There is no conflict of interest with any institution or person within the scope of this study. There is no conflict of interest between the authors.

Notes

- 1 According to Buzan and Wæver, Central Asia, refers to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
- 2 A union of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. It became GUUAM with the inclusion of Uzbekistan in 1999, and again GUAM with its abandonment in 2002.

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Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

Rouranlarda (Juan-Juanlarda) Kültürel ve Toplumsal Yapı*

Kürşat Yıldırım**

Elvin Yıldırım***

Öz

Rouran (Juan-juan) halkı V. yüzyılın başlarında bugünkü Moğolistan bozkırlarında büyük bir kağanlık kurdu. Yaklaşık 150 yıl yaşayan bu devlet, Asya Hunlarının mirasını sürdürdü. Rouranların tarihi üzerine bazı çalışmalar yapılmıştır. Bu çalışmamızda ise onların devletlerini kuruluş süreci, yazısı, dini, hayat tarzı ve toplum yapısı üzerine daha önce az değinilen hususlara dayanarak bazı değerlendirmeler yapmak istedik. Ayrıca yakınlarda Khüis Tolgoi Yazıtı'nı Rouranlara atfeden araştırmacılar çıkınca bazı yeni notlar çıkardık. Buna göre şu konuları ele aldık: i) Rouranların atasının devletin temellerini atma süreci hakkında genelde yapılan "kaçaklar hareketi" değerlendirmesine katılmıyoruz; bozkır gelenekleri dâhilinde ve boy sistemi içinde bir devlet kurma süreci başlamıştır. ii) Rouranlar Çin, Sogd ve Brahmi (eğer Khüis Tolgoi kendilerine aitse) yazıları kullanmışlardır. iii) Rouran idarecileri tek tanrılı bir dine ve Şamanizm'e inanmakla birlikte diğer bozkırlı halklar gibi yöneticiler düzeyinde Buda dinine az da olsa ilgi göstermişlerdir. iv) Rouranlara yönelik Çinlilerin bakış açıları diğer bozkırlı halklara olandan farklı değildir ama Çinliler özellikle onların temiz olmadıkları üzerinde durmaktadırlar. v) Rouranlar geleneksel konar-göçer kültürü devam ettirmektedirler. vi) Diğer bozkırlılarda olduğu gibi Rouran toplumunda da kendine has bir toplumsal yapı ve bir tabakalaşma mevcuttur.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Rouran (Juan-juan), yazı, din, toplum yapısı, kültür, Çin kaynakları.

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Cultural and Social Structure in the Rourans (Juan-juans)*

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Abstract

The Rouran (Juan-juan) people established a great khanate in the steppes of present-day Mongolia at the beginning of the 5th century. This state, which lived for about 150 years, continued the legacy of the Asian Huns. Some studies have been conducted on the history of the Rourans. In this study, we wanted to make some evaluations on the process of the establishment of their state, writing, religion, lifestyle and social structure based on previously little-mentioned aspects. Additionally, with the emergence of researchers attributing the Khüis Tolgoi Inscription to the Rouran, we have made some new observations. We have examined these topics: i) We do not agree with the general evaluation of the “deserter movement” regarding the process of establishing the foundations of the Rouran state by ancestor of the Rourans, Rourans started the process of establishing a state within the scope of steppe traditions and clan system. ii) The Rouran used Chinese, Sogd and Brahmi scripts (if it is belonging to Rouran) iii) Although the Rouran rulers believed in a monotheistic religion and shamanism, they were interested in Buddha religion, like other steppe peoples iv) The Chinese viewpoint towards the Rouran is not different from that of other steppe peoples, but the Chinese especially emphasize that they are not clean v) Rourans also maintain the traditional nomadic culture. vi) There is a unique structure and a stratification in Rouran society, as in other steppes.

Keywords

Rouran (Juan-juan), script, religion, society structure, culture, Chinese sources.

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Giriş

Türk ve Moğol tarihinin en dikkate değer topluluklarından biri olan Rouranlar (Juanjuanlar) yayıldıkları sahalar ve tesirleri itibariyle ayrıntılı araştırmalara konu olmayı hak etmektedirler. Türklüğün esasen Töles (Gaoche) boyları hâlinde bölük pörçük yaşadığı çağlarından biri olan V. yüzyılın başı ile VI. yüzyılın ilk yarısında Türklerin kutsal merkezinde, bugünkü Moğolistan'ın Orhun Vadisi'nde hâkim olan bu halk, bölgedeki bütün boy ve topluluklar üzerinde hüküm sürmüş ve VI. yüzyılın ortasında tarihten tamamen silinerek bir daha hiç zikredilmemiştir. Çok geniş bir sahada kudretli bir devlet kuran Rouranların tarihte iz bırakmamaları mümkün değildir. Bozkırların kültürel ve etnik şekillenmesinde önemli etkileri olduğu bir hakikattir. Dağınık kütleler hâlinde yaşayan Türkler ve nihayetinde Gök-Türkler, elbette ki yaklaşık yüz elli yıl tebaası oldukları bir güçten az ya da çok etkilenmiştir. Bu tesirlerin bilinebilmesi, bölgedeki etnik tasniflerin yapılabilmesi ve Türk ve Moğol tarihinin bu karanlık devresinin etraflıca öğrenilmesi için Rouranların kültürünü çok iyi anlamak lâzımdır. Daha önce Türkiye'de Rouran tarihine temas eden bir kitap yazılmıştı¹ ancak yer ve bağlam bakımından Rouranların kültürü üzerine çok az bilgi verilmişti. Bu makalemizde ise tamamen kültür üzerine bir araştırma yapmak istedik.

Kültür, insanın insan tarafından kurulmuş ve oluşturulmuş çevresini ifade eder. Maddi ve manevi olmak üzere iki türü vardır. Kültürün sınırları siyasi sınırlardan geniş olabilir. Kültür birliğinin içten, aşağıdan, halktan gelen bütünleştirici bir karakteri vardır (Kurtkan Bilgiseven 15, 17). Bu bakımdan Rouran kültürünün maddi ve manevi unsurları, sadece belli bir döneme, devlete ve coğrafyaya değil, bütün Türk tarihine ışık tutacak bazı özellikler gösterir. Makalemizde “Bozkır Kültürü” çerçevesinde Asya Hunlarının mirası olan geleneksel bozkır sahasını tek bir kağıtlık çatısı altında toplayan Rouranların kültürünün maddi ve manevi unsurlarını bir problem olarak ele almaya gayret ettik. Tarihi üzerine bazı çalışmalar yapılan bu halkın kültürü üzerine bilgiler ve tahliller azdır. Bu münasebetle Rouranlardaki yazı, din, bozkır kültürü, toplum yapısı gibi konular hakkında Çin ana kaynaklarına dayanarak değerlendirmeler yapmak ve bu vesileyle Türk kültür tarihi araştırmalarına bir katkı sağlamak istiyoruz.

Devlet Geleneği

Çeşitli Çin kaynaklarından edindiğimiz bilgilere göre Tuoba (Tabgaç) Türkleri Çin'in kuzeyinde, Gobi Çölü'nün ardındaki çorak topraklardaki boyları boyunduruğa almak için askerî harekât yürütürlerken Tabgaç Hükümdarı Liwei'yin (saltanatı 220-277) idaresinin sonlarına doğru, atlı birlikler tuhaf birini ele geçirdiler. Bu kişinin saçları çok seyrekli veya keldi ve gerçek adını unutmuştu. Tabgaç hükümdarı bunun üzerine onun adını yazıp "Mugülü" dedi. "Mugülü", Tabgaç dilinde "başı kel" demektir. Tabgaç idaresine giren Mugülü zaman geçtikçe güçlendi; artık bir köle değil, atlı birlik askeriydi. Tabgaç Hükümdarı Yilu (saltanatı 295-316) zamanında, çok geçmeden hakkında idam cezası kararı verildi, kuzeydeki büyük çöle kaçarak dağların, derelerin arasına gizlendi ve kaçak olarak gizlenen yüzden fazla adamı etrafında toplayıp birleştirdi (Wei Shu 2289; Tong Dian 5378). Daha önce Rouranların bu erken dönemleri üzerine bazı değerlendirmeler yapılmıştır (Yıldırım, *Bozkırın Yitik* 53-56, 60, 70-72). Rouranların atası olan esir kişi Tabgaç toplumu içerisinde yaşamış, devlet idaresinde yüksek mevkilere gelmiş ve bir müddet sonra işlediği bir suç sebebiyle kaçıp çeşitli insanları etrafında toplayarak bir devlet yapılanmasına girişmişti. Bu durumu Türk tarihi boyunca emsallerine nadir rastlanacak bir şekilde "dağa çıkıp" devlet kurma teşebbüsü olarak değerlendirmek lazımdır. Mesela Kül Tigin Yazıtı'nda (Doğu/12-13), Gök-Türklerin devleti tekrar kurmaları şöyle anlatılır: "Babam kağan on yedi erle dışarı çıkmış. Dışarı yürüyor diye ses işitip şehirdeki dağa çıkmış, dağdaki inmiş, toparlanıp yetmiş er olmuş..." (Ergin 13). Tabgaçların kuzeye doğru genişleme sürecinde ele geçirdikleri bu köle çok büyük bir ihtimalle mağlup ettikleri bir halka mensuptu. Bozkırda mağlup olup her şeyini kaybedenlerin ve tekrar toparlanıp çoğalanların hikâyesine tarih kayıtlarında çokça rastlanır. Gök-Türklerin köken efsanelerinden birinde halkı komşu bir güç tarafından tamamen katledilen küçük bir çocuğun, bir dişi kurt tarafından kurtarılması ve Türklerin bu çocuktan tekrar türemeleri anlatılmaktadır. Bu durum tarih boyunca acımasızca uygulanan bozkırdaki boy mücadelelerini yansıtmaktadır. Cengiz Han henüz Temuçin adlı küçük bir çocukken babası Tatarlar tarafından zehirlenmiş, bunun ardından bütün halkını ve varlığını yitirmişti. Anası onu yabancı soğanlarla, bitki kökleriyle besleyip büyütmişti. Bununla birlikte Mugülü'nün hareketini bir "kaçaklar hareketi" olarak değerlendiren, onun temelde dışlanmış ve serbest hareket etmek isteyen çeşitli boylardan

yerlileri idaresi altında toplamış olduğunu düşünen araştırmacılar da vardır (Drobışev 26) ki buna katılmak mümkün değildir. Nitekim bozkırda boylar olağanüstü vasıflarla donanmış karizmatik liderlik gösteren bir kaçağın peşinden kolay kolay gitmez. Üstelik Wei Shu'daki bir diğer kayda göre ise Mugülü bu adamları Töles Hetulin boyu altında toplamıştı (Wei Shu 2289). Bozkırda boylar kut sahibi olan, soyluluk taşıyan beyin idaresi altında toplanır. Yine bu teşkilatlanma boy disiplini içerisinde, sistemli olur. Bozkırda kaçaklarla devlet kurulmaz. Bu ise Mugülü'nün karanlık geçmişte, Tabgaçlar tarafından esir edilmeden önce bir bey olduğuna delalet eder. Öte yandan, Rouran Kağanı Anagui 520'de Tabgaç İmparatoru Yuan Xu'nun huzuruna çıkıp “kulunuzun ataları Ulu Tuoba (Tabgaç)lardan gelmez” demiş ve imparator da “biz artık bunu biliyoruz” (Wei Shu 2299; Bei Shi 3259) diye cevap vererek bu durumu onaylamıştır. Mugülü'nün ölüm cezasıyla karşılaşarak bozkıra kaçtığı vakitlerde kendi boyundan koptuğuna dair yorumlarda (Klyastorniy ve Savinov 55 vd.) ise haklılık payı vardır. Onun Töles Hetulin boyu altında insanları teşkilatlandırdığı kaydı, Tabgaçlara esir düşmeden önceki boyu ile ilgili bir fikir verebilir mi? Bundan şimdilik emin değiliz. Kaldı ki Türk tarihinde devleti kuran sülale/boy dışında başka bir sülale/boydan bir beyin devletin başına geçtiği durumlar olmuştur. Mesela 795'te Uygur Kağanlığı'nın başına geçen Tengride Ülüg Bulmuş Alp Kutluk Ulug Bilge Kağan, kağanlığı kuran Yağlakar ailesinden değil, Ediz boyundandı (Yıldırım, *Uygur Kağanlığı* 70). Nihayetinde Rouranların köklü bir devlet kültürünü devam ettirdiği, bir “kaçaklar hareketi” neticesinde kurulan bir siyasi yapı olmadığı kanaatindeyiz.

Yazı

Rouran'ların dili üzerine daha önce bazı değerlendirmeler yapılmış, onların dilinin Türkçe olabileceği üzerinde durulmuş, bununla beraber onların kendilerine ait herhangi bir yazılarının bulunmadığı söylenmişti.²

Rouranlar yabancı yazılar kullanmışlar mıydı? Onlara atfedilebilecek yabancı dilde yazılar var mıydı? Bu konuda bazı bilgiler vardır. Onlarla ilgili Çin kaynaklarında “ordu nizamında yazıyla kayıt tutma yoktu. Generaller ve komutanlar koyun tezeğiyle ordudaki askeri sayar ve sonra ağaca hakkederdiler” (Wei Shu 2290; Bei Shi 3250; Tong Dian 5378) denilmektedir. Buna karşılık 492-493'te Shen Yue tarafından yazılan hanedan tarihi Song Shu'daki kayda göre “Yazı bilmezlerdi, işleri ağaca hakkederdiler, sonraları yavaş yavaş yazıyı

bildiler, bugüne gelindiğinde hayli okuryazarları (bilginleri) vardır” (2357). *Song Shu*'daki bu kayıttan onların hangi yazıyı bildiklerini öğrenmek zordur. Ancak bunun Çin yazısı olması galip bir ihtimaldir. Bei Shi'daki bir kayda göre Anagui kendisine gönderilen Çinli elçi Qun Yutan'ı alıkoymuş, onu en yakınında tutmuştu. Qun Yutan da kağana Çin devlet düzeninin nasıl olduğunu öğretmişti (*Bei Shi* 3265). Bu esnada Çince yazı kullanılmış olabilir. Nitekim Ye. İ. Kışanov'a göre Anagui'nin sekreteri olan bu kişinin dış politika yazışmaları Çince olmalıydı. Üstelik Kışanov Rouranların Kuzey Çin ile ilişkilerini geleneksel Çin diplomasisi çerçevesinde yürüttüklerini düşünmektedir (113).

Rouranların kullandığı bir diğer yazının Sogd yazısı olduğu öne sürülmektedir. Moğol araştırmacılardan L. Çuluunbaatar Moğollar arasında Sogd yazısının yayılmasının, Rouran Kağanlığı zamanda görüldüğünü (Çuluunbaatar 47); Ts. Şagdarsüren ise Moğolların yazılarını Uygurlardan değil, VI.-VII. yüzyıllarda Uygurlarla beraber Sogdlardan aldıklarını ve hatta Uygurlardan bir yüz yıl önce bu yazıyla tanıştıklarını (Şagdarsüren 25) düşünmektedirler. Bununla birlikte Sogd yazısından türetildiği söylenen Uygur yazısının Moğol İmparatorluğu devrinde görülmeye başlandığı genel olarak kabul edilir.

Bazı araştırmacılar, yakınlarda üzerinde yeni çalışmalar yapılan Khüis Tolgoi Yazıtı vesilesiyle Rouran döneminde Brahmi yazısının kullanıldığını düşünmektedirler. 1967 yılında Moğolistan'daki Bulgan aymagda L. Luvsanbaldan, U. Zagdsüren, D. Tsend gibi bilim insanlarının bulunduğu 140 cm uzunluğundaki bir taş yazıt bilim dünyasının ilgisini çekti. 1972'de Moğol bilim insanı M. Şinekhüü yazıtı yerinde inceleyerek bunun V.-VII. yüzyıllara, Rouran dönemine ait Türkçe olmayan, Brahmi harfli Hint dinine ait bir yazıt olduğunu bildirdi ve bunun eski Moğolca olup olmadığını sorguladı. Ayrıca yine 1972'de M. Şinekhüü ve D. Tseveendorj yazıtın yakınlarında üzerinde birkaç yazı bulunan bir heykel buldular (Tömörtogoo vd. 140-141). Yazıtı 1975'te D. Navaan, Ulaanbaatar'daki tarih müzesine getirdi. Khüis Tolgoi Yazıtı 2019'da Moğolistan Meclisine taşındı. Bazı araştırmacılara göre yazıtın dili, bir Moğol dil ailesine aittir ancak Rouran veya Tuoba devlet diline mi yoksa o esnada Tula vadisine hâkim olan boyun diline mi ait olduğu belli değildir (Maue ve Ölmez 79). Öte yandan bu yazıtta adı geçen Niri Kağan'ın Sogdça yazıtı Uygur Özerk Bölgesi'nde,

İli'deki Mongolküre'de bulunmuştur. Burada insan heykeli üzerine oyma yöntemiyle yazılmış bir yazıt bulunmaktadır (Alyılmaz, “Eski Türkler” 6); yazıtta Mukan Kağan'ın torunu Niri Kağan'ın tavşan yılında (595) büyük kağan olduğu kaydedilmektedir.³ A. Vovin'e göre ise yazıt Moğolca “Rouran dili”ndedir ve 604-620 yıllarına tarihlenir.⁴

Yazıttaki Niri Kağan'ın 595-604 yıllarında iktidar mücadelesi yürüten, nihayetinde Tölesler tarafından öldürülen Niri (Çin kaynaklarında Niri 泥利) olması çok büyük bir ihtimaldir. Kendisi kudretli Mukan Kağan'ın torunuydu. Niri otağını yukarıda zikredilen Mongolküre'de kurmuş, yazıtını da orada diktirmişti. Peki, Khüis Tolgoi Yazıtı'nı diktiren kimdi? Yapılan son değerlendirmelere bir göz atalım. T. Ōsawa, Khüis Tolgoi Yazıtı'nın Taspar Kağan'ın oğlu olup babasının ölümünden sonra iktidar mücadeleleri yürüten, Tula Irmağı kıyılarına yerleşen ve Sui Shu'da “Anla” ve Bugut Yazıtı'nda “Umna” olarak geçen kişi tarafından diktirildiğini düşünmektedir (Ōsawa, Birinci Eski Türk Kağanlığı'nda 69-70). É. de la Vaissière'ye göre de yazıtı diktiren Uygur İlteberi *Pusa* idi, bu *Bodhisattva*'nın karşılığıydı, onun Buda dininde olduğunu gösteriyordu. Khüis Tolgoi'daki bu kişi ölmüş ve Buda olmuştu. 20 yıl önce Niri Kağan'ın mağlup edilmesinde büyük bir rol oynamış olmalıydı. Araştırmacıya göre Khüis Tolgoi Yazıtı, kuzeyde Töles boyları arasında Uygurların başa geçişini gösteriyordu. Brahmi yazısının ve bir Moğol dilinin seçilmesi Türk kağanlarının epigrafik tercihlerinden açık bir uzaklaşma ve Rouran Kağanlığı'nın saygınlığına geri dönme çabasıyla açıklanabilirdi (La Vaissière 315-319). Napıl Bazilhan, Gök-Türk kağanlarıyla Moğollar arasında kan bağıyla akrabalık kurulduğundan kağanların Brahmi harfli böyle bir yazıt diktirdiği düşüncesindedir.⁵ R. Mönkhtulga ise Doğuz Oğuzların merkezinin uzağında olmayan yazıt alanıyla ilgili Pugu boyu üzerinde durmaktadır.⁶

Yazıt Rouranlara mı ait? Öncelikle bunu diktiren kişinin kimliğini tespit etmek şimdilik zordur. Ōsawa'nın Umna Kağan üzerinde durması kronolojik olarak biraz zorlamadır, yazıtta Mukan'ın torunu Niri geçmektedir. Vaissière'nin Pusa üzerinde durması ise bir tahmindir, nitekim Pusa = Bodhisattva şeklinde bir eşleştirme sadece bir yorumdur. Pusa'nın siyasi ve askerî faaliyetleri⁷ dışında kendisiyle ilgili hiçbir bilgiye sahip değiliz; ayrıca yazarın Tula kıyısında yazıt dikenlerin “Rouran Kağanlığı'nın saygınlığına geri dönme çabası”nda olduklarına dair yorum, bozkır tarihinin gerçeklerine

uygun değildir ve hatta Rouran gibi tamamen kılıçtan geçirilen ve eski azılı düşman olan bir halkın sahip çıkılacak bir geleneği olması da pek mümkün değildir. Öte yandan Gök-Türk Kağanlığı kurulduktan sonra Rouranların bütün idarecilerinin öldürüldüğü, 555 yılında ise son Rouran Kağanı ve onun altındaki 3 bin küsur adamın Gök-Türkler tarafından tamamen katledildiği ve onların küçük çocuklarının ise köle yapıldığı (*Bei Shi* 3267) Çin kaynaklarında çok açık bir şekilde kaydedilmektedir. Bu tarihlerden sonra ortada bir hanedan ailesi, boy beyi vb. kalmamıştır. Onların köle çocuklarının böyle işe girmesi düşünülemez. Yazıtları kağanlar diktirir kanaatindeyiz. Dolayısıyla Khüis Tolgoi Yazıtı'nın Rouranlar tarafından diktirilmesi biraz zor gibi görünmektedir. Bunun Rouran döneminden kalmış olması da pek muhtemel değildir. Yazıtta “Türklerin Kağanı” gibi ifadeler vardır. Dilinin Rouran diline ait olmasıyla ilgili bilimsel çalışmalar ise devam etmektedir.

Yazıtın dilinin, Orhun Yazıtları'nın dilinden farklı olması bir Rouran ihtimalini doğurmaktadır, ancak bu sadece dile getirilmesi gereken bir gelişmedir. Yazıtın bir boyun kendi lehçesinde yazılmış olması da imkânsız değildir. Son tahlilde, eğer böyleyse Rouranların Brahmi yazısını da kullandığı düşünülebilir. Nitekim birazdan temas edeceğimiz gibi Rouran idareci sınıfı galiba Buda dinine ilgi göstermişti, bu yüzden Brahmi harfli böyle bir yoğun dini motifli bir yazıtın ortaya çıkması çok az da olsa ihtimal dâhilindedir.

Din

İbrahim Kafesoğlu'na göre eski bozkırlı Türklerin inançlarının üç temeli vardı: Tabiat kuvvetlerine inanma, atalar kültü ve Gök-Tanrı dini (Kafesoğlu 302-314). Bu inanç esasları bozkır sahasındaki diğer boy ve topluluklar için de büyük ölçüde geçerlidir. Bozkırlılar genelde tek Tanrı'ya inanırlar. Bunun yanında modern araştırmacıların Şaman dini, Şamanizm gibi adlar verdikleri pratikler de vardır; kimileri bunu din olarak kabul eder, kimileri günlük hayattaki pratiklerin bütünü olarak değerlendirir ve kimileri ise bunu şifa verme-büyü yapma faaliyetlerine indirger. Bütün bu görüşlerin haklı olduğu yönler vardır. Mesela eski Kırgızlarla ilgili Çin kayıtlarında onların büyücülerine “kam” dedikleri kaydedilmektedir (Yıldırım, Yeni Tang Kitabı'ndaki 50). Peki, Rouranlar hangi dine inanıyordu? Bu konuda kaynaklar susarsa, onların hayat tarzları ve yaşayışları hakkındaki

ayrıntılardan yola çıkarak günlük teorik bilgilerle onların da eski bozkır dinine mensup olduğunu düşünebiliriz. Onlar da tek Tanrı'ya tapar, atalara büyük saygı gösterir, tabiat kuvvetlerine inanırlardı; ayrıca Şaman pratiklerini de yürütürlerdi.

Rouran inancında atalara saygı gösterisine örnekler verilebilir. Onlara atfedilen bazı arkeolojik kalıntılar da vardır. Moğolistan'da, Ulaanbaatar yakınlarındaki bugünkü Khustai Vadisi'nde yer alan "Öngüt" anıt alanı, Moğol arkeolog D. Bayar'a göre Rouranlara ait olabilir. Tula Irmağı kıyısında yer alıp, "Öngüt" adı verilen bu anıt alanı kompleks bir mimariye sahiptir, sur ve hendekle çevrilidir, köşeleri yuvarlatılmış dörtgen alandadır. İçeri yerleşimde dört büyük levhadan oluşan bir taş kutu-sunak vardır ve alanda taş heykeller ve balbal taşları bulunur. Zamanla yok olmuş ahşap bir odanın varlığı düşünülür. Bayar'ın düşüncesine göre Öngüt anıt alanı eski Türk anıt alanlarından daha ilkelidir, Türk anıt alanlarındaki yazıt geleneği burada henüz yoktur ve bu yüzden bu alan Türk döneminden önceye tarihlendirilmelidir (Tivanenko, 67). Meşhur arkeolog Bayar'ın tecrübelerini göz önünde bulundurmanız lazımdır ancak Töles boylarının yoğunlaştığı Tula kıyılarında Rouran kağanlarının anısına bir anıt alanı oluşturulduğunu söylemek için daha çok belgeye ihtiyacımız vardır.

Rouranlarda Şamanlığa dair çok açık bir kayıt vardır. Buna göre Chounu, Rouran Kağanı olduktan sonra Zuhui adında bir oğlu aniden kayboldu. Çok üzülen kağan onu bulabilmek için her yola başvurdu. Shidouhundiwan adında yirmili yaşlarda bir kadın vardı. Büyü ve tabiatüstü varlıklar ile hastalıkları iyileştiren bir Şamandı. Bu kadın önceleri Chounu'nun itimadını kazanmıştı, otağa girip çıkıyordu. Bu, çocuğun göğün üstünde olduğunu söyledi. Bir gece Zuhui adındaki çocuk aniden otağın ortasında görüldü, kağan onun göğün üstünden geldiğine inandı. Chounu ve ailesi herkes çocuğa sarıldılar, herkes çok mutlu oldu. Chounu, Rouranları toplayıp Shidouhundiwan'ı kutsal kadın ilân etti ve onu eş olarak alıp Hatun yaptı. Kağan bu güzel kadını hep yanında tuttu, onu çok sevdi, onun her sözüne inandı ve her dediğini yaptı. Bu yüzden kağanın idaresindeki memleket karmaşa içine düştü. Böylece yıllar geçti, Zuhui büyüyünce annesine şöyle dedi: "*Ben hep Shidouhundiwan'ın evindeydim, göğün üstünde değil. Göğün üstündeki onun dinidir*". Çocuk ve annesi durumu kağana söyledilerse de kağan şöyle dedi: "*Shidouhundiwan, uzaktaki işleri aynaya bakar gibi*

görebiliyor, inanmamak mümkün değil, iftira etmeye gerek yok”. Büyücü kadın bu durumdan çok korktu ve kağanı çocuğun üstüne saldırtıp öldürttü. 520 yılında ise Chounu'nun anası, büyücü kadını vurdurarak öldürttü (Wei Shu 2298; Bei Shi 3258; Yıldırım, Bozkırın Yitik 37 vd.). Bu kayıttan anlaşılacağı gibi toplumda etkili olan ve hatta zaman zaman devleti, idarecileri yönlendiren bir Şaman figürü vardır. Zuhui adlı çocuğun göğün üstündeki dinden bahsetmesi de manidardır. Bahaeddin Ögel'e göre Türkler göğe daha fazla önem veriyorlardı. Tek bir gök yoktu, gökler vardı ve yeri ve göğü yaratan Tanrı bütün göklerin üstünde ve kendi göğündeydi (Ögel, Dünden Bugüne 698-705). Bir diğer konu aynı kağan Chounu'nun 511 yılının IX. ayında, shamen (沙門) unvanlı Hongxuan'i Wei sarayına elçi olarak göndermesi ve inci bezeli heykel (veya inci gibi eşyalar) sunmasıdır (Wei Shu 2297). Ramstedt, shamen (沙門)'in, askerî komiser veya müfettişlik vazifesi yapan bir memuriyet unvanı olduğunu söylemektedir (63-64). Buna karşılık gönderilen elçinin Çin kaynaklarındaki shamen (沙門) unvanı Şaman olabilir mi? Bu ihtimal daha önce dile getirilmişti (Yıldırım, Bozkırın Yitik 82). Şamanizm üzerine dünyanın en önde gelen araştırmacısı Mircea Eliade, Şaman sözünün Buda dininin bozkırlarda yayılmasıyla Sanskrit *śramaṇa* sözünden kaynaklandığını ileri sürmektedir. Mesela bir Tohar metninde söz *šamāne* olarak geçmektedir (Eliade 495-496). Şaman sözünü bozkırlıların ilk kez ne zaman kullanmaya başladıklarını tespit etmek çok zordur. 511 yılında Rouranların gönderdikleri elçi bozkır dünyasındaki bir *šaman* mı yoksa bir Budacı *śramaṇa* mı idi? Chounu 508'de kağan oldu. Kendisinin Şaman kadın Shidouhundiwan'ın etkisine ne zaman girdiğini bilmiyor ancak, 511'de bu Şamanın devlet idaresinde etkili olduğu düşünülebilir, dolayısıyla gönderilen elçinin de bunun gibi “şaman” unvanlı olması mümkündür. Öte yandan gönderilen hediye inci bezeli bir heykel⁸ olabilir; ancak bunun bir Buda heykeli olduğuna yönelik nasıl hüküm verebiliriz? Bazı araştırmacılar bunun mutlaka bir Buda heykeli olduğunu düşünmektedir (Drobişev 30). Eğer böyle ise gönderilen elçi bir *šaman* değil ama Budacı bir *śramaṇa* olabilir. Bu durumda Rouran idarecileri arasına Buda dininin girdiği yorumu yapılabilir ancak bu durumda da ihtiyatlı olmak gerekir, çünkü Tivanenko gibi araştırmacılara göre Rouran “şaman ülkesi”ne Buda dininin nüfuzu, Şaman kadın Shidouhundiwan'ın ölümünden (520'de öldürülmüştü) sonra meydana gelmişti. Araştırmacıya göre bundan sonra Rouranlar arasında Tarım Havzası'ndaki Hoten,

Karaşar, Kaşgar şehir devletlerinden gelen yeni öğretiler yayıldı. Sanskrit dili o esnada bozkırlarda popülerdi (Tivanenko 66). Yine Tivanenko'ya göre Rouranlarda Buda dininin varlığına dair bazı arkeolojik kalıntılar da vardır. N. Ser-Ojav, Arjalgalant sumda, “taş adam” (Моғолca: lovkh, ловх) olarak adlandırılan bir heykelden bahsetmektedir. Yerli halk bu heykel karşısında eğilmektedir. Gonçig-İşvanjil gibi bazı lamalar, Tibetçe “lokha noyoyen’-ni bsans şes-bya-bya bşugs-so” (Лоха ноёень-ни бсанс шэс-бя-бя бшугс-со) gibi metinler yazmışlardır. Buna göre Sanskritçe “lukha” yani “insan” veya “Buda” sözü vardır. Bu yüzden yazara göre bu taş heykel muhtemelen bir Hintli keşişe aittir ve galiba Rouran (veya Gök-Türk) (V-VII. yy) çağına tarihlenmektedir (Tivanenko 67). Buna karşılık bu örneğe de ihtiyatla yaklaşmak gerekir. Lama Budacılığına inanan Moğolların, kutsal addettikleri taş heykel, balbal, yazıt gibi kalıntılara mavi çarput bağlayarak dua etme gelenekleri vardır. Bir taş heykele “lovkh” denilmesi ve bunun Sanskritçe “adam” veya “Buda” anlamına gelmesi, “ters bir kronoloji”den kaynaklanıyor olabilir, yani bu kalıntıyı bölge insanının, ilgisi olmasa da bir Buda heykeli olarak benimsemesi gayet mümkündür. Mesela Şiveet Ulaan anıt alanındaki heykellerin de bölge insanı tarafından taşındığı, çeşitli pratiklerde kullanıldığı ve nihayetinde yetkililer tarafından tekrar anıt alanında toplandığı bilinen bir hadisedir. Yine de Rouranlarda, tıpkı halefleri Gök-Türklerde olduğu gibi, Buda dinine doğru bazı meyillerin olduğuna dair işaretler vardır. Geleneksel bozkır devletleri, Çin’den gelen veya uğradıkları takibatla kaçan Buda rahiplerini zaman zaman himaye etmişlerdir. Bunun en açık örneği Taspar Kağan zamanında görülmektedir⁹. Eğer Khüis Tolgoi Yazıtı’nın Rouranlara ait olduğu kesinleşirse, yazıttaki Bodhisattva, yeniden doğma gibi öğeler vesilesiyle (Avirmed 85) onların bazı Buda dini geleneklerine sahip oldukları görülecektir. Rouran topraklarına seyahat eden bazı Budacı keşişler olmuştur. Mesela Kuzey Hindistan’daki Udyānalı keşiş Narendrayaśas 552 yılında Rouran topraklarında seyahat etmiş ancak Gök-Türklerin hareketine denk geldiği için ülkesine geri dönmüştü (*Foguang Da Cidian* 3027).

Rouranlarla ilgili Çin kaynaklarında olağanüstü güçlere sahip, rüzgâra ve kara hükmeden insanlardan (Şamanlardan?) bahsedilmektedir: “Bu ülke yeteneklilerin Gök’e kurban kesmesi/Gök’e tapınmasıyla rüzgâra ve kara hükmedebilir, önde güneşli açık hava karşılar, arkada çamur akıp gider, bu yüzden onların savaşlarda yenilmelerinde kovalamak mümkün olmaz.

Denir ki, Çin’de bu iş olsa, güneş bulutlarla kaplanır, yağmur yağmaz, bunun sebebi sorulduğunda ılıman havadan derler” (*Liang Shu* 817). Türk tarihiyle ilgili kaynaklar ile destan ve efsanelerde bu tür olağanüstü güçleri olan insanlardan bahsedilir. Bunlar belki de Şaman idiler. Benzer kişiler aynı dönemde Yuebanlar arasında zikredilmektedir: “Yine denir ki Yuebanların ülkesinde büyük bir yetenek vardır, Ruanruanlar gelip yağma ve talan yaptıklarında bu yetenek sağanak yağmur yağdırabilir, büyük kar fırtınası çıkarabilir ve sel oluşturabilir” (*Wei Shu* 2269). Böylece işgal için gelen Rouranlar büyük kayıplar veriyorlardı. Bilindiği gibi Gök-Türklerin atalarından birinin de bu tür yeteneklerinden bahsedilmektedir. Gök-Türklerin menşe efsanesine göre onların ataları Hunların kuzeyindeki Suo Devleti’nden gelmemiş. Bu devletin başında 17 erkek kardeşi olan Abangbu varmış, kardeşler dışı kurttan gelmemiş. Devlet saldırıya uğrayıp yıkılmış. Kardeşlerden biri Nizhinishidou imiş, o farklı yeteneklere ve tabiata sahipmiş, rüzgâr estirebiliyor ve yağmur yağdırabiliyormuş (*Zhou Shu* 908). Kaynaklardaki bu anlatılanlar bir kişinin devlet ve askerlikle ilgili faaliyetleridir, kişisel bir büyü işi değil; nihayetinde toplumun, halkının bir kısmının canı söz konusudur. Dolayısıyla teorik olarak bu tür güçlere sahip olanların veya benzer işleri yürüten Şamanların Rouran Kağanlığı’nda devlet işlerinde etkili olabilecekleri de düşünülebilir. Nitekim geçmişte bu durumun mevcudiyetini gösteren bazı tarih kayıtları da vardır. Cüveynî’nin (ölm. 1283) *Tarih-i Cihan Güşâ’sına* göre yazarın döneminde dahi İdikut Uygurlarında devlet adamları Şamanlara inanır, önemli bir işe başlamadan önce onlara danışır ve onların olumlu görüşünü almadan işe başlamazlardı (Alaaddin Ata Melik Cüveynî 104).

Bozkır Kültürü

Rouranların hayat tarzlarıyla ilgili Çin kaynaklarında kaydedilenler, diğer bozkır halklarına dair anlatılanlarla benzerlik gösterir:

i) Keçe çadırlarda yaşam, su ve ot kaynaklarına göre göç etme: “Onların şehirlerinin etrafını çeviren surları yoktu, suyun ve otun arkasından gidip hayvanlarını yetiştirirler ve çadırlarda yaşarlardı” (*Liang Shu* 817); “yaşadıkları topraklarda hava erken soğurdu. Keçe bezden yapılmış çadırlarda yaşarlardı” (*Nan Qi Shu* 1023); “Rouranların yaşadıkları şehirlerin etrafında surlar yoktu, suyun ve otun peşinden giderek hayvanlarını yetiştirirler, taşınıp göçtükleri yere evleri olan keçe çadırlarını götürürlerdi” (*Song Shu* 2357). Bu

kayıtlar bütün eski bozkırlılar için klasik ifadelerdir. Rouranlarla ilgili *Liang Shu*'daki bir kayıta şöyle denilmektedir: “Tianjian saltanat devresinde (502-519) (Rouranlar) Dinglingleri mağlup etmeye başladılar, eski topraklarına döndüler. Bir surlu şehir inşa etmeye başladılar, buna Mumo 木末 şehri (城) adını verdiler” (*Liang Shu* 817). Bu şehrin nerede olduğu bilinmemektedir, buna atfedilebilecek bir harabe yoktur. Bununla beraber biz bunun Gök-Türk ve Uygur dönemlerindeki diğer örneklerde olduğu gibi esasen askeri maksatlarla kurulmuş bir tür garnizon olduğunu düşünüyoruz.

ii) Çin'e hayranlık duyma iddiası: Çin kaynakları bozkırlıların daima Çin'e hayranlık duyduklarını yazarlar. Hunlar döneminden beri bozkırdaki devlet adamları bu şekilde tasvir edilir. Modu'nun oğlu devletinin bütün kudretine rağmen Çin'e özeniyordu. Rouranlarda da benzer durum görülür. Mesela 477'de Tuoba (Tabgaç) sarayına gönderilen *Biba* adlı elçi altınlara, yeşim taşlarına, işlemeli eşyalara, daha önce hiç görmediği şeylere bakıp şöyle der: “Büyük devlet müreffeh ve güzeldir, bir ömrümde görülmemiş şeyler” (*Wei Shu* 2296). Son kağan Anagui, kendisine gelen elçi Qun Yutan'ı alıkoyup onu en yakınında tuttu. Anagui “Çin'e hayran olduğundan” memuriyet unvanları ihdas etti (*Bei Shi* 3265). Çinliler bozkırlıların hep kendilerinden bir şey öğrendiklerine inanırlar. Kağanlığı kuran Shelun ile ilgili ifadeler de böyledir: “Taizu, başkâtip (veya imparatorluk sekreteri) unvanlı Cui Xuanbo'ya şöyle dedi: Rouran halkı eskiden aptal olarak adlandırılırdı, her geldiklerinde yağma ve talan yaparlardı. Bugün Shelun Çin'i öğrendi, savaş ve cephe nizamını kurdu...” (*Wei Shu* 2291). Buna göre Çin'e hayran bozkırlılar, devlet kurmayı dahi Çin'den öğrenmişlerdi.

iii) Açgözlülük, ahlaksızlık, pislik yakıştırmaları: Çinliler bozkırlıları daima açgözlü, sürekli kendilerinden bir şeyler koparan insanlar olarak görür ve onları Çin değer yargılarına uymadıkları gerekçesiyle ahlaksızlıkla, doğru olmamakla vb. itham ederlerdi. Tabgaç İmparatoru Xianwen (saltanatı 466-471) onlar için şöyle diyordu: “Rouranlar hayvanlar gibidir, açgözlüdürler ve ahlaksızdırlar” (*Wei Shu* 2296). Diğer bozkırlılar gibi Rouranlara da “açgözlü” denilmesinin sebebi, onların yaptıkları yağma seferleri veya Çin'den aldıkları hediyelerden (veya vergilerden) sürekli daha çok istemeleridir. Mesela *Wei Shu*'nun 35. cildinde Rouranlar için şöyle kaydedilmektedir: “Sonbaharda sürüleriyle hep birlikte toplanırlar, soğuktan kaçınmak için güneydeki ılıman topraklara göçerler, yağma yapmak için” (*Wei Shu* 818). Konar-

göçerlerin yağmacı, asalak bozkırlılar oldukları tahayyülünü esasen modern araştırmacılar üretmişlerdir. Beckwith'e göre stereotip olan bu anlayış aşırı taraflı olan Çin kaynaklarının çarpıtmalarına dayanmaktadır. Bu kaynakların ön yargıları ve iç çelişkileri veya aynı kaynaklarda görülen ve bu bakış açısıyla çelişen daha güvenilir bilgiler göz önünde bulundurulmamaktadır (Beckwith 270-271). Konar-göçerlerin hayat tarzlarının kendilerini fakirleştirdiği, ihtiyaçlarını karşılayamadıkları ve bu nedenle yerleşik çiftçi ve zengin halkları yağmalayıp ihtiyaç duydukları, istedikleri her şeyi elde ettikleri yönündeki düşünceler konar-göçerlere bugünkü araştırmacılar tarafından biçilen “yağmacı”, “açgözlü barbar” modeliyle ilgilidir (Beckwith xxiv). Bu tür düşüncelere göre konar-göçer ekonomisi kendi kendisine yetmez, yerleşik dünyaya bağımlıdır. Konar-göçerlerin hayat tarzları yerleşik çiftçilerden yağmalananlar üzerine kuruludur¹⁰. İbrahim Kafesoğlu'na göre ise konar-göçerlerin kültürü at üzerinde kurulmuş olsa da yalnızca attan ibaret değildir, demir de bunun bir parçasıdır. At ve demir bozkır kültürünün iki temel unsurudur. Doğal olarak farklı bir hukuk anlayışına sahiptir. Başlı başına bir kültür tipi olduğu için din, düşünce, ahlak yönlerinden de tamamlanarak bir manevi değerler birliği meydana getirmiştir. Tarım yapılamayan ancak geniş otlakları bulunan konar-göçerler mecburen hayvancılık yoluna gitmişlerdir (Kafesoğlu 33, 214). Kaldı ki, konar-göçerlerin kısıtlı da olsa tarımla meşgul oldukları bilinmektedir. Arkeolojik kazılar neticesinde Hunlar ve Gök-Türkler dönemlerinde bozkır sahasında çeşitli sulama kanalları, saban demirleri, oraklar, tahıl ambarları vb. bulunmuştur (Ögel, *İslâmiyetten Önce Türk Kültürü* 88-89). Rouranların da tarımla uğraştıklarına yönelik açık bir Çin kaydı vardır: “Rouran toprağı Mebei¹¹, yüksek ve soğuk, alçaklık değildir, meralar ve sulak alanlar en iyisidir. Yazları kuzey bölgelerinde yaşarlar, hayvanlarını güderler, sürüler ayrı ayrı otlar, tahıl ekilir” (*Wei Shu* 817-818). Yine “522 yılının XII. ayında Rouran Kağanı Anagui, Tuoba (Tabgaç) İmparatoru'na tezkere sunarak tarım yapmak üzere tahıl vermesini istihdam etti. *Tabgaç Hükümdarı da ona 10.000 tan tahıl verilmesini emretti*”¹². Kayıtta çok açık bir şekilde “tarım yapmak üzere” (“以為田種”) ifadesi bulunmaktadır. Bunun Rouranlarda tarımın varlığına dair bir delil olduğu görülmektedir. Kıçanov da bu kaydı aynı yönde yorumlamıştır (Kıçanov 112). Bazı arkeolojik çalışmalar da bu tarih kaydını doğrulamaktadır. Moğol arkeolog N. Ser-Ojav, Rouranlardaki tarım faaliyetlerinden bahsetmektedir.

Rouranlara yönelik ahlaksızlık ithamı ise Çin felsefesindeki “yi” (義) ile alakalıdır. Yi, “etik”, “uygun”, “iyi”, “ilke” gibi anlamlara sahiptir (*Ci Yuan* 2496). Çinliler için kendi pratikleri bu sıfatlara haiz, bozkırlılarınki değildir. Mesela MÖ 174 yılında Hun Chanyu’su olan Jiyu döneminde gelen Çinli elçi konuşmaları arasında Hunlarda baba-oğulun aynı çadırda oturduklarını, baba ölünce oğulların analıklarıyla evlendiğini, Hunların başlık ve kuşak takmadıklarını, saray ritüellerini bilmediklerini vb. söylüyordu (Han Shu 3760). Çinlilere göre böyle davranmayanlar “yi”ye uymamış oluyorlardı. Halbuki Kafesoğlu’na göre “barbar konar-göçer” ve “yerleşik çiftçiler” gibi bir medeniyet kademelendirmesi ilmi gerçeklere uygun değildir. Her kültür ve yaşayış tarzı kendi içinde tutarlı bir bütündür; aralarında “kültür değeri” bakımından bir fark yoktur (Kafesoğlu 33).

Çin kaynaklarında Rouranların kültürüne dair diğer konar-göçerlerden farklı olarak “pislik” üzerinde durulmaktadır. Su kaynaklarının kısıtlı olması sebebiyle konar-göçerlerin temizlikleri üzerine ana kaynaklarda bazı kayıtlara rastlanmaktadır. Bununla birlikte bir kaynakta çok açık bir şekilde Rouranların “pis” olduğunun vurgulanması dikkat çekicidir: “Yuebanlar Ruanruanlarla iyi ilişkiler kurdular, onların hükümdarı binlerce kişiyi toplayıp Ruanruan ülkesine girmeye niyetlendi, Datun ile yüz yüze görüşmek istediğinde. Onların sınırlarından içeri 100 kusunur li girdiğinde, onların boylarında insanların elbiselerini temizlemediklerini, saçlarını bağlamadıklarını, ellerini yıkamadıklarını, kadınların eşyaları (kap kacakları) yaladığını gördüler, hükümdar dönüp kendisini takip eden tebaasına şöyle dedi: “Sizler beni kandırıp bu köpek ülkesinin içine soktunuz!”. Böylece derhal geri döndü. Aralarında düşmanlık arttı” (*Wei Shu* 2268-2269). Burada Yuebanlar ile ilgili bir bahiste Rouranların pis oluşlarının dile getirilmesi, kayıt tutan Çinlilerin karşıt bir durumu ifade gayretiyle alakalı olmalıdır. Nitekim Yuebanlar hakkında *Wei Shu*’da şöyle denilir: “Onların gelenek görenekleri, dili Gaoche’larınki ile aynıdır, sadece bunların halkı Hu’lar arasında (en) temizdir. Adetlerinde saç kaş seviyesinde kesilir, krem sürülerek (düzeltilir), pırıl pırıl parlar, günde üç kez yıkanır, ondan sonra yer içerler” (2268). Öte yandan *Bei Shi*’de ise Gaoche’ların temiz olmadıkları vurgulanır (3271). Rouranların pisliğini dile getiren kaydı andıracak bir şekilde Wilhelm Radlov da Altaylıları görünce hayretler içinde kalmıştı. O, 1860-1863 yıllarında çıktığı saha araştırmalarının notlarında şöyle yazmaktadır: “Erkek ve kadınlar, iç çamaşırlarını ancak kullanılamayacak

hale geldikten sonra çıkarırlar, bunlar yağlanarak eski rengi tanınmayacak bir hale gelir ve vücutlarında çürür”; “... buzağı ve koyun postu olup, gelenlerin oturmasına yarar. Uzun müddet kullanıldığı için bunlar hemen tamamıyla yıpranmış ve bundan başka kir ve yağa bulaşmıştır, çünkü üzerinde oturanlar elleriyle yemek yedikten sonra mezkur deriyi ellerini temizlemek için peçete yerine kullanırlar”; “(Altaylılarda) elbise, ev eşyası, tabak, kazan, yatak ve nihayet bütün yurt öyle bir pislik içinde yüzer ki, insanın midesi bulanır... Hatta itikada göre kir ve pislikten selâmet beklenir, temizlik tehlikeli sayılır” (Radloff 278, 284, 315).

Toplumsal Yapı

Rouran Kağanlığı'nı kuran Shelun, devleti ve toplumu askeri esaslara göre teşkilatlandırdı: “*Shelun bundan sonra kuzeye Ruoluo Irmağına göçtü ve askerî düzeni kurmaya başladı. Buna göre ordu (jun 軍) 1.000 kişi oldu ve bir generalin (jiangjun 將軍) idaresine verildi. Zhang 璋 100 kişi oldu ve bir komutana (shuai 帥) teslim edildi*” (Wei Shu 2290; Bei Shi 3250; Tong Dian 5378). N. N. Kradin, Rouran Kağanlığı'nın toplum teşkilatının “askerî hiyerarşi” ilkelerine göre tesis edildiğini (84), Kıçanov ise nüfusun “halk” ve “görevliler-elitler” olarak ikiye ayrıldığını düşünmektedir (113). Bozkırda belli bir soyluluğun var olduğu muhakkaktır. Yabancıların toplum yapısı hakkında tafsilatlı bilgiler veren Çinlilerin bozkırdaki Türkler için yazdıklarından “hayatları çok sadedir”, “herkes askerdir”, “herkes eşittir” gibi neticeler çıkarılabilir. Bu yüzdendir ki eski Türklerin edebî ürünlerinde en baştaki kağandan en alttaki ere kadar her birey kendisini bulmaktadır denebilir (Soysal 48); fakat bir farklılaşma olduğu da hakikattir. Nitekim Faruk Sümer'in “destanların bütün kahramanları ve başlıca şahsiyetleri asilzade sınıfına mensup kimseler, yani beylerdir. Sahne çok defa beylerin zengin dekorlu ordalarıdır. Sahnedeki başlıca şahsiyetler arasında el halkından kişiler yoktur. Hatta halkın herhangi bir hareket ve davranışından bahsedilmez” (418) şeklindeki tespitini iyi değerlendirmek gerekmektedir. “Alplık” ile “beylik”i birleştirme, karizmatik şahsiyeti öne çıkarma ve beyliği ancak yiğitlikle mümkün görme destanlarımızın esaslarındandır. Bu durumu kendi “sosyal teori”sine oturtmaya çalışan Şerif Mardin'e göre ise eski Türklerde tepede bir han veya aşiret başkanının, onun altında aristokrat bir tabakanın (beyler), son olarak da alt sınıfların veya halkın yer aldığı basit bir “tabakalaşma” düzeni vardır (82). Buna karşılık

Orhan Türkdoğan'ın tanımlaması bozkırdaki sosyal bünye için galiba en uygun düşenidir; ona göre bütün eski Türk toplumlarında kesin çizgilerle belirlenmiş bir sınıflaşma ve buna dayanan bir sınıf şuurundan söz açılmaz; ancak sosyal *tabakalaşma* ve *sıralaşma* (*rank*) mevcuttur (12). Dede Korkut Destanları'nda mecliste herkesin oturacağı yerin belli olması bir "orun" meselesidir, orun ise cesaretle, yiğitlikle ve "verme" ile elde edilir. Bu konuda en mühim tespitler Abdülkadir İnan'a aittir (İnan 241-254). Yine toplumda farklı statüde insanların olması gayet tabiidir. Rouran Kağanlığı, eski Hun gelenekleri üzerine kurulmuştu, dolayısıyla toplum yapısı da benzerdi, onlarda da böyle bir tabakalaşma ve sıralaşma elbette ki olacaktır. Buna belki de "devletli" konar-göçer toplum yapısı adı verilebilir.

Sonuç

M.S. X. yüzyıla kadarki geleneksel Türk devlet merkezi olan Orhun'da yaklaşık 150 yıl hüküm süren Rouranlar, Hunlardan Gök-Türklere uzanan köprü'nün en önemli ayağıdır. Gök-Türklere uzanan ve günümüze kadar gelen kültürün Hunlardan gelen unsurları önemli ölçüde Rouranlar tarafından aktarılmıştır denilebilir. Dolayısıyla Rouran Kültürü'nü çeşitli yönleriyle incelemek, Türk kültür tarihimizdeki bazı meselelerin daha iyi anlaşılmasını sağlayacaktır. Makalemizde ulaştığımız bazı neticeleri şu şekilde özetleyebiliriz:

Rouranlar büyük bir devlet geleneği mirası üzerine oturmuşlardır. Kimi modern araştırmacıların düşündüğü gibi, imparatorluk boyutundaki Rouran Kağanlığı'nın, nesebi bilinmeyen ve Tabgaçlardan kaçan birinin askerî mekanizması altında toplanan diğer kaçaklarla kurduğu bir yapı olması pek mümkün değildir. Kaçaklar devlet kurmaz, eşkıyalık yaparlar diye düşünüyoruz. Bozkırda yenilip her şeyini kaybedenlerin tekrar toparlanıp çoğalanların hikâyesi ise olmuştur ve yaygındır. Üstelik bozkırlıların, soyu soppu belli olmayan birinin peşine düşüp devlet kurması pek mümkün görünmemektedir. Bozkır kültüründe, idare etme yetkisini Tanrı'dan alan soylu hanedanların kurdukları devletler görülür. Rouranların devlet kuruculuğundaki bu özellik, bozkır kültüründeki daimi bir özelliği göstermesi bakımından önemlidir.

Eski tarihimizdeki büyük bozkır devletlerinin kullandıkları yazılar üzerine genel kabul gören düşünceler hâlâ yoktur. Bunun en önemli sebebi, Gök-

Türklerden önceki Türklerden kalan bir yazının bulunmayışıdır. Bilindiği gibi Gök-Türkler döneminden Sogd, Çin, Türk yazısıyla abideler vardır. Buna karşılık Rouranlarda Çin, Sogd ve son bilimsel gelişmeler çerçevesinde Khüis Tolgoi Yazıtı vesilesiyle Brahmi yazısının kullanıldığı düşünülmektedir. Araştırmamızda yazıtı diktiren kişinin kimliği üzerine yapılan yorumları eleştirerek kesin bir hüküm vermenin zor olacağını belirttik ancak yazıtta zikredilen Niri Kağan'ın 595-604 yıllarında iktidar mücadelesi yürüten, nihayetinde Tölesler tarafından öldürülen Niri olduğu düşüncesinden hareketle, Khüis Tolgoi Yazıtı'nın Rouranlar tarafından diktirilmesinin düşük bir ihtimal olduğu kanaatindeyiz. Üstelik Rouran idarecileri 555 yılında tamamen öldürüldüler, yazıtı dikecek bir Rouran beyi kalmadı. Yazıtın Rouran Kağanlığı döneminden kalmış olması da pek mümkün değildir. Rouranların Sogd yazısını kullandıklarına dair düşünceler sadece bir tahmindir kanaatindeyiz. Belli durumlarda, bilhassa Çinli danışmanlar eliyle Çin yazısı kullanmış olmaları ise kaynakların şahitliğinde gayet mümkündür.

Rouranların diğer bozkırlılar gibi, geleneksel bozkır dinine inandığı en başta kabul edilebilir. Bu ise tek bir Tanrı'ya inanma, "Şamanlık", atalara saygı pratikleri vb.'den müteşekkil bir din idi. Buda dininin de Rouranlar arasında, en azından idareci tabakada ilgi gördüğü anlaşılmaktadır. Araştırmamızda bu iki dinin varlığına dair Çin kaynaklarındaki bilgilerden ve arkeolojik eserlerden veriler sunup yeni değerlendirmeler yapmaya çalıştık.

Bozkırlılar hakkında Çin kaynaklarındaki ifadelerden yola çıkarak edinilen önyargılar tarih literatüründe yaygındır. Araştırmamızda Rouranların kültürü özelinde bu konuda bir katkı sağlamak istedik. Konar-göçer kültürde şehre ihtiyaç yoktur, bunun iktisadi bir gerekliliği de bulunmamaktadır. Çin kaynaklarında zikredilen ve Rouranlara ait olduğu kaydedilen bir şehrin ise daha sonraki örnekleri gibi bir garnizon olması gerekir. Bozkırlılara yöneltilen "aç gözlülük", "pis olma", "ahlaksızlık" ithamları ise büyük oranda Çin düşüncesinden ve yine Çince işaretleri değerlendiren modern araştırmacıların önyargılarından kaynaklanmaktadır.

Araştırmamızda son ele aldığımız husus, Rouranlar özelinde bozkır toplum yapısıdır. Rouranlar da diğer bütün eski Türk ve Moğol toplumları gibi asker-toplum karakterli, soyluluğa önem veren, "sınıflaşmanın" değil ama "sıralaşmanın" görüldüğü bir toplumdur.

Destek ve Teşekkür Beyanı

Bu makale İstanbul Üniversitesi, Bilimsel Araştırma Projeleri Birimi tarafından desteklenen SBA-2023-39926 numaralı ve “Rouranlarda Yazı, Din, Toplum” başlıklı proje çerçevesinde üretilmiştir. Bilimsel Araştırma Projeleri Birimi’ne teşekkür ederiz.

Katkı Oranı Beyanı

Yazarların çalışmadaki katkı oranları eşittir.

Çıkar Çatışması Beyanı

Çalışma kapsamında herhangi bir kurum veya kişi ile çıkar çatışması bulunmamaktadır. Yazarlar arasında herhangi bir çıkar çatışması söz konusu değildir.

Açıklamalar

- 1 bk. (Yıldırım, *Bozkırın Yitik*).
- 2 bk. (Yıldırım, “Juan-juan’ların Dili Üzerine-I” 141-148; Yıldırım, “Juan-juan’ların Dili Üzerine-II” 109-118). Eski Türklerde ve diğer bozkırlılarda kullanılan yabancı yazılar üzerine yapılan ayrıntılı bir değerlendirme için bk. (Alyılmaz, “Eski Türkler”).
- 3 bz. (Ösawa, “Historical Significance”).
- 4 bk. (Vovin, “A Sketch” 163). Yazıtın son yapılan İngilizce tercümelerinin (Maue ve Ölmez, 88; Vovin, “An Interpretation” 311; Vovin, “A Sketch” 192) Türkçesi şöyledir: “1-3. Yazıtların Kağanı öldü ve yeni bir Bodhisattva olarak yeniden doğan yeni bir kağan Buda bilgisini bilir, ve söz verir... ülkenin Anaqay, beyleri, boyları durup birlikte dinlediler... 4. Yazıt taşlarına bakıp, Tupa (halkı) günahlarını yok ettiler ve kurtulmuşlara katıldılar 5. ... kağanın eşleri, küçük kardeşleri ve Türklerin kağanı, Niri Kağan 6. Kaideye taptılar, ve ülkenin erkinleri ve toplayıcıları... 7. yeterlidir ve kağanın hakimiyet yıllarının farkına varanlar parlıyordu, ve onun itimat ettiği Tupa 8. sürdü... kurtuluşa hazır bulunanlar... yeni bir Bodhisattva olarak doğmuş olan kağan 9-11. yap... yazıtı... Tupa Kağanı yeniden doğmuştu. Kağanın ülkesinde, (onlar) Türklerin Kağanı, Niri Kağan’ı takip ettiler ve... (O) onları (yönetti). Özgür insanlar olarak mutluymuş, yazıt... memur yazdı...”.
- 5 bk. (Bazilhan, Khüis Tolgoi Biçigt 66’dan aktaran Avirmed 87).
- 6 bk. (Mönkhtulga, Khüis Tolgoi Biçeesiin 160’dan aktaran Avirmed 86).
- 7 bk. (Yıldırım, “Uygur Kağanlığı” 14-15).
- 8 Tercüme bu yönde yapanlar vardır. bk. (Biçurin, *Sobraniye* C. I, 200; Taskin, 279).

- 9 Bunun için bk. (Yıldırım, “Taspar Kagan” 37-52).
- 10 Bu görüşler için bk. (Khazanov).
- 11 Gobi'nin kuzey kısmı.
- 12 *Wei Shu* 2302: “阿那瓌上表乞粟以為田種詔給萬石”.
- 13 bk. (Ser-Ojav 17'den aktaran Drobişev 27).

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Yayın Değerlendirme / Book Reviews

Başak Kuzakçı. *Soğdlar ve Türkler: İpek Yolu'nun Tüccarları ve Hâkimleri.* Vakıfbank Kültür Yayınları, 2023.*

Buket Nur Kırmızıgül Şimşek**

İranî halklardan biri olan Soğdlar, Eski Türklerle sıkı ticari, kültürel, dinî temaslar içinde olmuş ve İslam öncesi Türk devlet ve topluluklarına derinden tesir etmiş bir halktır. 10. yüzyıldan itibaren tarih sahnesinden kaybolan bu halk, bilhassa ticari etkinlikleri ile tanınmıştır. Eski Türklerin çeşitli dinleri benimsemesinden, Uygur alfabesinin kullanılmasına kadar tarihimizde yer etmişlerdir. Bu nedenle geçmişte Türklerle iç içe yaşamış Soğdların dili, kültürü ve tarihi üzerine yapılan araştırmalar, Türkoloji çalışmaları için de önem arz etmektedir.

A. Grünwedel başkanlığındaki Alman heyeti, 1902-1903 yıllarında keşif mahiyetindeki ilk Turfan seferinden sandıklar dolusu yazma ile döner. Daha sonra A. von Le Coq başkanlığında ikinci bir Turfan seferi başlatılır. 1904-1907 yılları arasında süren bu seferde ise Uygurca, Çince, Soğdca gibi dillerde pek çok el yazması eser ele geçirilir¹. F. W. K. Müller, Orta Asya'ya yapılan Alman Turfan Seferleri'nde bulunup getirilmiş bu el yazmalarının teşhis ve tasnifi ile görevlendirilir. Soğd dili ve tarihi üzerine yapılan çalışmaların başlangıcı, Turfan keşif seferlerinden sonra Müller'in 20. yüzyılın başında neşrettiği yayınlarıyla başlar. Günümüzde özellikle İngiltere, Almanya, Japonya, Rusya, Fransa, İran ve Özbekistan'da Soğdoloji çalışmaları yoğun bir şekilde devam etmektedir.

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Ülkemizde ise bu alandaki çalışmalar parmakla sayılacak kadar azdır. Bugüne dek Soğd dili üzerine yazılan makale boyutundaki çalışmalar, daha ziyade Türkçedeki Soğdca alıntılar veya Soğdca aracılığıyla gelen alıntılar üzerine, Soğdlar ve Soğd dili² hakkında genel bilgi veren yazılardır. Filoloji dışında tarih alanında da Soğd çalışmaları eksik kalmış ve makale sınırları içinde birkaç çalışmanın yanı sıra, yalnızca 2019 yılında Türk-Soğd ilişkileri üzerine iki yüksek lisans tezi hazırlanmıştır. Bu konu, 2022 yılında ise nihayet doktora boyutunda bir çalışma ile, Ahmet Taşağıl danışmanlığında Başak Kuzakçı tarafından ele alınmıştır: *Soğd Türk İlişkileri (V.-VIII. Yüzyıllar)*. Bu sayede Türkiye’de Soğd çalışmaları için elzem olan bir ilk adım atılmış olmuştur. Burada tanıtılacak olan eser ise Başak Kuzakçı’nın bu doktora çalışmasının gözden geçirilerek ve güncellenerek kitaplaştırılmış hâlidir.

Eldeki eserin ilk bölümünde (ss. 19-41) çalışmaya esas teşkil eden birincil kaynaklar hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. Bu kaynaklardan ilki bizzat Soğdlar tarafından yazılmış, bugüne ulaşan Soğdca belgelerdir. MS 4. yüzyıla tarihlendirilen, “Eski Mektuplar” (Ancient Letters) olarak literatürde bilinen sekiz mektup, hem Soğdların ticareti ve sosyo-kültürel yapısıyla ilgili ilk elden bilgi verir hem de 4. yüzyılda Türk-Soğd ilişkilerine dair ipuçları barındırır. Dunhuang’da bulunan bu mektuplar Soğdların anavatanındaki yakınlarına gönderilmek üzere yazılmış, fakat dönemin siyasi karışıklığı içinde adreslerine ulaşamamıştır. Doğrudan Soğdlardan kalan ve çalışmada incelenen diğer belgeler ise Mug Dağı Belgeleri’dir. Tacikistan’daki Mug Dağı’nda, bir kale kalıntısı içinde bulunan bu belgeler, 8. yüzyıla ait olup bölgede Arap fetihlerinin gerçekleştirildiği döneme dair birincil kaynak değerindedir. Ağırlıklı olarak Pencikent’in son hükümdarı Devaşiç’in idari, ekonomik ve diplomatik yazışmalarından oluşan bu sivil belgelerin sayısı yaklaşık 80 civarındadır. Kuzakçı çalışmasının ilerleyen bölümlerinde, bu belgelerden özellikle Türk-Soğd ilişkileriyle ilgili olanları seçmiş ve bizzat kendisi okuyup tercüme ve tahlil etmiştir.

Soğdca birincil kaynakların tanıtımından sonra “Komşularının Gözüyle Soğdlar” başlığı altında, Soğdlar ve Soğdya hakkında bilgi veren, diğer halklar tarafından oluşturulmuş dönem kaynaklarından bahsedilmiştir. Bunlar; Persçe, Grekçe, Çince ve Arapça kaynaklardır. Bunlar içinde en iyi korunmaların Çin yıllıkları olduğu belirtilir. Çin yıllıklarında özellikle Soğdların ticari yetenekleri üzerine bilgiler bulunur. Soğdya üzerine ayrıntılı bilgile-

rin elde edildiği, incelenen döneme ait doğrudan kaynakların bir kısmı ise Araplar tarafından oluşturulmuştur. Bunlar İslam coğrafyacılarının ilerleyen Arap fetihleri neticesinde kaleme aldığı, yeni bölgelerin coğrafyası, şehirleri ve toplumu hakkında detaylı bilgiler veren fütuhât ve coğrafya türünde eserlerdir. Bu eserlerde, “Maveraünnehir” olarak ifade edilen Soğdya bölgesindeki şehirlerle ilgili oldukça ayrıntılı bilgiler yer alır. Soğd şehirleri hakkındaki bu detaylı anlatımlar çalışmaya dâhil edilmiştir.

Kitabın “Orta Asya'nın Sıra Dışı Halkı Soğdlar” adlı ikinci ana bölümünde (ss. 43-100) öncelikle Ahameniş döneminden Arap hâkimiyetine kadar olan süreçte Soğdya tarihi özetlenmiştir. Bu süreçte en önemli hadiselerden biri MÖ 130'larda başlayan Çin'le elçilik ilişkileridir. Çin ile temasların artması İpek Yolu'nun oluşması ile neticelenmiştir. 5. yüzyılda ise Soğdya bölgesini Akhunlar ele geçirir. Daha sonrasında Köktürklerle başlayan Soğdya'daki ve İpek Yolu'ndaki Türk hâkimiyeti, Soğd kentlerinin ve ticaretinin gelişmesinde özel bir yere sahip olmuştur. Bölgeye ilk ciddi Arap akınları ise 665-667'de başlar. Kuzakçı, Soğd şehirlerinin Araplar tarafından kesin olarak fethinin özellikle Kuteybe b. Müslim zamanında uygulanan sistemle gerçekleştiğini belirtir.

Eserde, Soğdya tarihinin incelendiği bu bölümden sonra Soğdların dili, edebî eserleri, yazı sistemleri ve Türklerin Soğd yazısını benimsemeleri konularına kısaca temas edilmiştir. Türklerin Soğd yazı sistemini benimseyip uyarlamalarında, özellikle Yedisu'da 6. yüzyıldan itibaren artan Soğd nüfusu ve bu bölgede oluşan Türk-Soğd ortak kültürel yaşamının etkili olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Bundan sonra Soğdların benimsedikleri Zerdüşlük, Budizm, Maniheizm ve Hristiyanlık dinleri ele alınır. Eserde, Soğd toplumunda bu kadar çeşitli dinin benimsenmesindeki etkenlerden biri olarak Soğdya'da merkeziyetsiz, her biri bağımsız şehir devletlerinden oluşan bir yönetim biçimine sahip olunması üzerinde ayrıca durulmuştur.

Elbette Soğdların birden çok dinî inanca sahip olması, onların İpek Yolu boyunca pek çok farklı toplum ve kültürle temaslarından da kaynaklanır. Soğdlar dinî inançlarındaki çeşitliliğin yanında farklı dillerdeki becerileriyle de dikkat çeker. Bu çok dillilikleri onların okuryazarlık ve metin tercümelelerinde öne çıkmalarını sağlar. Budist ve Hristiyan metinlerin Çinceye çevrilmesinde Soğdların önemli bir payı olmuştur. Bunun dışında Çin sarayında ve Türk Kağanlığı'nda Soğdlar politik ve ticari alanlarda tercüman ve elçi

olarak yer almışlardır. Bu özellikleri sayesinde sadece emtia alışverişi değil, toplumlar arasında kültür alışverişini sağlayarak Orta Asya toplumlarının gelişmesine katkıda bulunmuşlardır. Bu bakımdan Soğdya siyasi olarak bağımsız bir imparatorluk hâline gelmese de Soğdlar âdeta bir ticaret imparatorluğu vücuda getirmişler ve kültür taşıyıcıları olmuşlardır. Kuzakçı, bu durumu “entelektüel bir imparatorluk” olarak adlandırmakta ve Soğdların Orta Asya halkları içinde siyasi bir güç olarak değil, fakat daha ziyade okuma yazma, din, ticaret, diplomasi, tercümanlık gibi alanlarda kültürel bakımdan temayüz ettiklerini belirtmektedir.

Çalışmada, Soğdların iktisadi başarısının temelinde, tarım ile kısa ve uzak mesafe ticaretlerinin yer aldığı hususu ifade edilir. Verimli nehir havzalarında konumlanan Soğd yerleşimlerinde tarım, temel bir faaliyet olarak ön plandadır. Soğdlar, Soğdya dışında doğuda ve kuzeydoğuda Çaç (Taşkent), Otrar, Yedisu ve Çin’de ticaret kolonileri oluşturmuşlardır. Eserde bu koloni bölgeleri ile Soğdların yalnızca ticaret ağlarını genişletmediği, aynı zamanda kendilerine yeni tarım arazileri de oluşturdukları belirtilir. Ayrıca bozkırdaki kolonizasyon faaliyetleri sonucu Soğdlar, konargöçer halklarla yerleşiklerin bir arada yaşadığı temas noktaları oluşturmuşlardır. Kuzeydeki bu bölgeleri birleştiren ve kültürel yayılmalarına ön ayak olan ortamı ise yeni şehirler kurarak Türk Kağanlığı sağlamıştır. Bunun dışında Çin’deki Soğd kolonizasyonunun izlerine de Turfan ve Dunhuang’da bulunan pek çok resmî ve özel belgede rastlamak mümkündür.

Kitabın “Orta Asya’nın Tüccar Milleti” adlı üçüncü bölümünde (ss. 101-142) Soğd ticaretinin işleyişine etki eden, toplumsal yapıdan hukuk sistemlerine ve kervanların yapısından Soğdların kullandıkları çeşitli mübadele araçlarına kadar her unsur üzerinde ayrı ayrı durulmuştur. Soğd hukuku ve sosyal düzenine dair bilgiler Soğdların kendi kaynaklarından; içinde satış, kiralama, evlilik sözleşmesi ve köle satışı gibi çeşitli belgelerin yer aldığı Mug Dağı Belgeleri’nden elde edilebilmektedir. Çalışmada bu belgelerin incelenmesiyle Soğd toplum yapısına dair sonuçlara ulaşılmıştır. Söz konusu belgeler içinde A-13 belgesinden yola çıkılarak halkın 150 gümüş drahmi vergi ödemekle yükümlü olduğu ve bu verginin aslında Pencikent’teki köprünün geçiş ücreti olarak alındığı belirtilmektedir. Fakat bu hususta ihtiyatlı olunması gerekir. Doktora tezinde Mug Dağı Belgeleri’ni pek çok düzeltmeyle yeniden işleyen Alisher Begmatov, söz konusu belgede *yttkuy* şeklinde geçen

sözcüğün anlamlandırılmasının tartışmalı olduğunu belirtir. Buna göre ilgili sözcüğü daha önce Livşic ve Grenet & de la Vaissière “köprü” şeklinde anlamlandırmıştır. Bogolyubov ve Smirnova neşrinde ise Türkçe *ıdgu* (<*ıd-* “göndermek” fiilinden) “gönderilmiş” şeklinde “elçi” anlamında bir farazi kelime var sayılmıştır. Begmatov, daha çok bir isim veya unvan olması gereken bu sözcüğü, *Edgü* biçiminde Türkçe bir isim olarak ele alır. Dolayısıyla bu 150 gümüş drahmi, köprü için değil fakat *Edgü* isminde birine yapılan ödeme olabilir³. Bu nedenle söz konusu sözcüğün tercümesinin literatürde tartışmalı olduğunu ve bu belge üzerine yapılan yorumlarda dikkatli olunması gerektiğini belirtmeliyiz.

Uzun mesafeli ticaretlerinde Sâsâni ve Çin modelindeki sikkelerin yanında Soğdların aynı zamanda barter (takas) sistemini ve bu noktada özellikle ipeği kullandıkları ifade edilir. Soğd ticaretinin asıl ayırt edici özelliği Çin ipeğini sürekli Batı'ya taşımaları olmuştur. Kitapta Soğd tarihini derinden etkileyen An-Luşan isyanının, ipek ticaretini de sekteye uğrattığı ve bu süreçte Batı pazarında Çin ipeğinin yerini İran ipeğinin aldığı belirtilir. İpeğin yanında Soğdlar kazanç getirebilecek her türlü ticaretle iştigal etmiştir. Örneğin Türklerin Çin'e gönderdikleri asıl ürünler kürk ve atlardır. Soğdlar bu ticarete de aktif olarak katılmış ve özellikle Ordos'a yerleşmelerinin asıl sebebinin buradaki at yetiştiriciliği ve ticareti olduğu vurgulanmıştır.

Çalışmanın buraya kadar bahsedilen ilk üç ana bölümünde Soğdlara dair kaynaklar ve daha sonra Soğdya, Soğd dili, inançları, idari ve toplumsal yapısı, şehir yapıları, kolonileri ve ticaret sistemleri derinlemesine işlenmiştir. Bu sayede okuyucu bugün mevcut olmayan Soğd halkı hakkında detaylı bir bilgi sahibi olmaktadır. Bu bölümlerle Soğd toplumunun farklı boyutlarıyla anlaşılması sağlandıktan sonra, kalan üç bölümde ise 5.-8. yüzyıllar arasında Türk-Soğd ilişkileri doğrudan kaynaklar üzerinden ele alınmıştır.

Bu amaçla üzerinde durulan ilk konu, dördüncü bölümde (ss. 143-189) işlenen Soğd-Hun münasebetleridir. Burada öncelikle 4. yüzyılda Kidarit Hunlarının hâkimiyetine geçen Soğdya'da nüfus artışı ile beraber kentsel büyüme ve yeni şehir yapılanmalarının ortaya çıktığına dikkat çekilmektedir. Kuzakçı'nın bu konudaki en önemli değerlendirmelerinden biri, Hunların bölgedeki varlığının yıkım yarattığına dair yaygın kanaatin aksine, Hun egemenliği ile bu coğrafyada siyasi istikrarın sağlandığı; demografik ve ekonomik açıdan göze çarpan hızlı bir gelişme ile sonuçlandığı şeklindedir.

Hun egemenliğinin en başat etkisi, Baktirya'nın gerisinde kalan Soğdya'nın genişlemesi ve ticarete daha ön plana geçmesi olmuştur denebilir.

Çalışmada Hunlar hakkında bilgi veren Çin, Bizans ve Ermeni kayıtları gibi kaynaklar incelenmiş ve ayrıca Soğd metinlerinde geçen *xwn* “Hun” adı ile ilgili tanıklar verilmiştir. Buna göre *xwn* ismi ile Soğd kaynaklarında üç yerde karşılaşılır. İki Eski Mektuplar'dan “2 numaralı mektup” ve “parçalı mektup”ta yer alır. Diğer kaynak ise İndus Vadisi Yazıtları'dır. Özellikle 2 numaralı mektupta Hunlarla ilgili verilen bilgiler ve *xwn* yazımı tarih çalışmaları için çok kıymetlidir, çünkü Avrupa Hunları ile Çin yıllıklarında bahsedilen Xiognu arasındaki ilişkinin kurulmasını sağlayan iki kaynaktan biridir. Başak Kuzakçı, bu Hun-Xiognu bağlantısına karşı çıkan görüşlere de çalışmasında yer verir. Fakat bu karşı iddialarda Avrupa-merkezci yaklaşımın tesiriyle bu ilişkinin bilinçli olarak görmezden gelindiğine dikkat çeker.

Türk-Soğd ilişkilerinin ele alındığı bir diğer bölüm olan beşinci bölümde (ss. 191-233), bu ilişkinin farklı bir boyutu olan Türk Kağanlığı ile ilişkiler mercek altına alınır. Hun boylarının bölgeye gelmesi ile Soğdya'da başlayan istikrar ortamı daha sonra Türk Kağanlığı'nın hâkimiyetinde devam etmiştir. 540'larda Türk Kağanlığı birdenbire bir güç olarak yükselmiş ve 560'ta İstemi Yabgu, Sâsânilerle ittifakı neticesinde Akhunları ortadan kaldırmıştır. Böylece Soğdya'da Türk Kağanlığı'nın hâkimiyeti başlar. Soğd coğrafyasının fethi ile Türk-Soğd toplumlarının kaynaşması daha da ilerlemiştir. Çalışmada, bu kaynaşmanın izleri tarihî, nümizmatik, arkeolojik veriler ve ikonografik örnekler üzerinden gözler önüne seriliyor.

Öte yandan Soğdlar Türk Kağanlığı'na ticaret, çeviri, diplomatik ilişkiler ve yönetim alanlarında hizmetlerde bulunmuşlardır. Soğdların en kayda değer katkılarından biri ise Soğd yazı sisteminin Türkçeye uyarlanmasıdır. Üstelik eldeki verilerden anlaşıldığı üzere Soğdca, Birinci Türk Kağanlığı'nda resmî dil olarak kullanılmış olmalıdır. Soğdların ayrıca Türk Kağanlığı ile Çin arasındaki ticarete de aktif bir rol aldığı ifade edilmiştir. Buna göre Türkler daha ziyade küçük ve orta boyutta ticaretle uğraşırken, Çin ve Türk Kağanlığı arasındaki büyük ölçekli ticaretin sorumluluğunu Soğdlar üstlenmiştir. Mukan Kağan döneminde Çin'den vergi olarak alınan ipek ruloları, Soğdların önerisiyle ve girişimiyle Batı pazarlarında satılmış ve vergiyle elde edilen gelirden ayrıca kâr elde edilmiştir. Çalışmada Soğdların ticarete başarılı olmalarının bir sebebinin Türk Kağanlığı'nın genişleyen sınırları içinde

güvenli ve istikrarlı bir ortam bulmaları olduğu özellikle belirtilir. Aynı zamanda Soğdlar diplomatik ilişkilerin vazgeçilmez bir parçası hâline gelerek birdenbire siyaset sahnesinde de ön plana çıkmışlardır. Bu durumda Türkler ve Soğdlar arasında karşılıklı birbirine fayda sağlayan ortak bir yaşam oluştuğunu görüyoruz. Kitabın başlığı; tam da bu ortak çıkarlara veya diğer bir deyişle ortak yaşama göre Türklerin ve Soğdların üstlendiği rolü özetlemektedir. Yazar, ayrıca Türkler ve Soğdlar arasındaki temasların, 6. yüzyıldan itibaren kaynaklardan takip edilebilen bu Türk-Soğd kaynaşmasından çok daha önce başlamış olması gerektiğini düşünmektedir.

Çalışmada Türk Kağanlığı döneminde bir aradaki Türk-Soğd toplumu ve Kuzey Çin'deki etkinliklerini göstermek amacıyla, An Luşan isyanına özel bir yer verilmiştir. Babası Soğd, annesi ise Türk olan An Luşan, Kuzeydoğu Çin'in tüm ordularını kontrol edecek derecede yükselmiştir. Kitapta, Çin yönetimini ciddi anlamda sarsan An Luşan isyanının, sadece askerî nitelikte bir isyan olamayacağı ifade edilmiş ve bunun Türk-Soğd karma ortamında başladığı ve hem askerî hem de ticari boyuta sahip bir arka planı olduğu kanaatine varılmıştır. Eserde dikkat çekilen durumlardan biri de bu isyandan sonra Çin'de ortaya çıkan yabancı düşmanlığı neticesinde Soğdların kimliklerini, kökenlerini gösteren aile adlarını gizlemek zorunda kalmalarıdır. Bu durum ise maalesef Çin kaynaklarında Soğdlara dair bilgilerin hızla azalmasına ve araştırmacılar açısından 8. yüzyılın sonlarından itibaren Çin'deki Soğdlar hakkında bilgi edinmenin imkânsız hâle gelmesine neden olmuştur.

Bir sonraki alt bölümde Türk Kağanlığı döneminde Türk-Soğd ilişkileri, Soğdca kaynaklar üzerinden incelenmiştir. Bu kaynaklardan ilki Soğdca yazılan fakat Batı Türk Kağanlığı'na ait Mongolküre Yazıtı'dır. Nili Kağan'ın anısına dikilen bu taş heykel yazıt, hem erken Batı Türk Kağanlığı'nın tarihine dair çok kıymetli bilgilerin elde edilmesi hem de Soğdca yazılmış olması bakımından önemlidir. Bu sayede 6. yüzyılda sadece Doğu Türk Kağanlığı'nda değil, Batı Türk Kağanlığı'nda da resmî dil olarak Soğdcanın kullanıldığı anlaşılmaktadır⁴.

Türk Kağanlığı'yla ilişkilere dair bilgi edinilebilecek diğer Soğdca kaynaklar ise Mug Dağı Belgeleri içinde yer alır. Yazar bu belgelerin kronolojisinin net olmadığını belirtir ve bunlardan Türklerle ilgili bahisler olan belgeleri tahminî bir kronolojik sırada ele alır. İlgili mektuplardan genel olarak Devaştıç'ın Türk kağanına ulaşmak için elçiler gönderdiği, Arap akınlarına

karşı Türklerden yardım beklendiği fakat kağana ulaşamadığı anlaşılır. Bu noktada çevirisi yapılan belgelerin transliterasyonlarında filolojik bakış açısıyla göze çarpan birkaç hususa değinmeliyiz. Çalışmada *gimel* (γ) ve söz başındaki *elif* (') harflerinin gösteriminde dizgi hatası bulunduğunu belirtmek gerekir. Öncelikle transliterasyon sisteminde <γ> şeklinde gösterilen *gimel* harfi, <y> *ye* harfi ile karışmaktadır. Bir diğer dizgi hatası ise /a, e/ seslerinin gösterimi için kullanılan *elif* harfini temsil eden (') biçimindeki gösterimin, söz-başında (') şeklinde *ayn* sesinin temsili ile karışmasıdır. Bu şekilde *gimel*'in *ye* ile yazılmasının neden olacağı karışıklığa, Mongolküre Yazıtı 6. satırdan şu iki kelime örnek verilebilir: *mwx'n x'y'n npyšn βyy ... p'y x'y'n* (s. 214) şeklinde verilen kısımda doğru gösterim *x'y'n* “Kağan” ve *βyy* “Tanrı” biçiminde olmalıdır. Bir diğer örnek; 2 numaralı mektupta *s'r swydyk* “yt” (s. 158) biçiminde verilen transliterasyon, *s'r swydyk* “yt” şeklinde olmalıdır. Burada olması gereken “y” “gelmek” fiili, “y” “almak” fiili ile karışabilir. İkinci baskıda söz konusu işaretler bu yönde düzeltilmelidir.

İncelenen çalışmanın son ana bölümü olan altıncı bölümde (ss. 235-254), Türk-Soğd etkileşimi sikkeler üzerinden ele alınmaktadır. Bu konu, önce Soğdyada dolaşımında bulunmuş olan Hun sikkeleri ve sonra Türk sikkeleri olarak iki başlıkta incelenir. Soğd coğrafyasındaki siyasi gelişmelere paralel olarak sikkelerdeki ikonografinin de değiştiği gözlenmiştir. Türk-Soğd temaslarının en belirgin maddi delillerinden biri olan sikkelerin, aynı zamanda Türk devletlerinin tarihini de aydınlattığı vurgulanmıştır. Söz konusu nümizmatik veriler, bölgenin sosyo-kültürel ve siyasi paradigmalardaki değişimleri izlememizi sağlamaktadır.

Soğd toplumuna çok yönlü bir bakış açısı sunan bu kitapta, Soğd ticaretinin yapısı ve başarısının sebepleri detaylıca irdelenmiştir. Buna göre bu başarıda Hun ve daha sonra Türk hâkimiyetinin de katkısı olduğu aşikârdır. Bu süreçte Soğdların sadece ticari ürünleri değil aynı zamanda kültürel ürünleri de mübadele ettikleri bilhassa ortaya konmuştur. Eserde ayrıca Türk-Soğd ilişkileri bütüncül bir yaklaşımla ele alınmış ve döneme ait birincil kaynakların tanıklığında veriler analiz edilmiştir. Yazar araştırmasında bu kaynaklar içinde özellikle Soğdların kendi oluşturdukları Soğdca metinleri bizzat okuyup incelemiştir. Eski Türk dili, tarihi ve kültürü için tartışılmaz bir öneme sahip Soğdlarla ilgili böyle kapsamlı ve öncü bir çalışmanın gerçekleştirilmiş olması oldukça sevindiricidir. Gelecek araştırmalar için yol açıcı nitelikteki

bu çalışmasından dolayı Başak Kuzakçı'ya teşekkür ediyor ve kendisini kutluyoruz.

Açıklamalar

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Düzeltilme / Erratum

2024 yılı 109. sayıda yayımlanan 4. sıradaki “Yükseköğretim Öğrencilerinin Öğrenme Tutumları: Türk Cumhuriyetleri Arasında CHAID Analizine Dayalı Bir Karşılaştırma” başlıklı makale ile ilgili yapılan düzeltmeler aşağıdaki gibidir.

Düzeltilme Açıklaması

2024 yılı 109. sayıda yayımlanan; “Yükseköğretim Öğrencilerinin Öğrenme Tutumları: Türk Cumhuriyetleri Arasında CHAID Analizine Dayalı Bir Karşılaştırma” başlıklı makalede;

- 1- İkinci yazar soyadını sehven “Mammodov” şeklinde yazmıştır. Yazarın soyadının doğru yazılışı Mammadov’dur.
- 2- 67. sayfada yer alan dipnotta ikinci yazarın soyadı düzeltilerek atıf önerisi şöyle olmalıdır:

Bu makaleyi şu şekilde kaynak gösterebilirsiniz:
Atmaca, Taner, ve Rza Mammadov. “Yükseköğretim Öğrencilerinin Öğrenme Tutumları: Türk Cumhuriyetleri Arasında Bir CHAID Analizine Dayalı Bir Karşılaştırma.” *bilig*, no. 109, 2024, ss. 67-104, <https://doi.org/10.12995/bilig.10904>.

- 3- 69. sayfada yer alan dipnotta ikinci yazarın soyadı düzeltilerek atıf önerisi şöyle olmalıdır:

You can refer to this article as follows:
Atmaca, Taner, and Rza Mammadov. “Yükseköğretim Öğrencilerinin Öğrenme Tutumları: Türk Cumhuriyetleri Arasında Bir CHAID Analizine Dayalı Bir Karşılaştırma.” *bilig*, no. 109, 2024, pp. 67-104, <https://doi.org/10.12995/bilig.10904>.

- 4- Girişten itibaren tüm sayfalarda yer alan üst bilginin doğrusu şöyledir:

• Atmaca, Mammadov, *Yükseköğretim Öğrencilerinin Öğrenme Tutumları: Türk Cumhuriyetleri Arasında CHAID Analizine Dayalı Bir Karşılaştırma* •

Ayrıca 109. sayının kapağında ve İçindekiler kısmında yer alan Rza Mammodov isminin doğrusu Rza Mammadov’dur.

Makale URL: https://bilig.yesevi.edu.tr/shw_artcl-6990.html;
<https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/bilig/issue/84478/1477189>

bilig

Türk Dünyası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi

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Yayın İlkeleri

bilig, Türk Dünyasının kültürel zenginliklerini, tarihî ve güncel gerçeklerini ve problemlerini bilimsel ölçüler içerisinde ortaya koymak amacıyla yayımlanmaktadır.

bilig'e gönderilecek yazılarda; alanında bir boşluğu dolduracak özgün bir makale olması veya daha önce yayımlanmış çalışmalarını değerlendiren, bu konuda yeni ve dikkate değer görüşler ortaya koyan bir inceleme olma şartı aranır. Türk Dünyasıyla ilgili yazar ve yapıtları tanıtan, yeni etkinlikleri duyuran yazılara da yer verilir.

Makalelerin *bilig*'de yayımlanabilmesi için, daha önce bir başka yerde yayımlanmamış veya yayımlanmak üzere kabul edilmemiş olması gerekir. Daha önce bilimsel bir toplantıda sunulmuş bildiriler, bu durum açıkça belirtilmek şartıyla kabul edilebilir.

bilig, Kış/Ocak, Bahar/Nisan, Yaz/Temmuz ve Güz/Ekim olmak üzere yılda dört sayı yayımlanır. Her yılın sonunda derginin yıllık dizini hazırlanır ve Kış sayısında yayımlanır. Dergi, Yayın Kurulu tarafından belirlenen yurt içi ve dışındaki kütüphanelere, uluslararası indeks kurumlarına ve abonelere, yayımlandığı tarihten itibaren bir ay içerisinde gönderilir.

Yazıların Değerlendirilmesi

bilig'de makale başvurusu bilig.yesevi.edu.tr web adresinden "Makale Yönetim Sistemi"ne kaydolarak yapılır. E-posta ile gönderilen makaleler değerlendirmeye alınmaz.

bilig'e gönderilen yazılar, önce dergi ilkelerine uygunluk açısından incelenir. Uygun görülmeyenler düzeltilmesi için yazarına gönderilir. Yayın için gönderilen makalelerin değerlendirilmesinde akademik tarafsızlık ve bilimsel kalite en önemli ölçütlerdir. Yayın ilkelerine uygun yazılar Yayın Kurulu tarafından incelenir. Dergi kapsamına giren ve değerlendirme için uygun bulunanlar, ilgili alanda uzman hakemlere gönderilir. Hakemlerin isimleri gizli tutulur ve raporlar Makale Yönetim Sisteminde saklanır. Hakem raporlarından biri olumlu, diğeri olumsuz olduğu takdirde, yazı, üçüncü bir hakeme gönderilebilir veya Yayın Kurulu, hakem raporlarını inceleyerek nihai kararı verebilir. Yazarlar, hakem ve Yayın Kurulunun eleştiri ve önerilerini dikkate alırlar. Katılmadıkları hususlar varsa, gerekçeleriyle birlikte itiraz etme hakkına sahiptirler. Yayına kabul edilmeyen yazılar, sistemden silinmez. Yazıların yayımlanmasında nihai karar Yayın Kuruluna aittir.

bilig'de yayımlanması kabul edilen yazıların telif hakkı *Ahmet Yesevi Üniversitesi Mütevelli Heyet Başkanlığı*'na devredilmiş sayılır. Yayımlanan yazılardaki görüşlerin sorumluluğu ve yazım tercihleri, yazarlarına aittir. Yazı ve fotoğraflardan, kaynak gösterilerek alıntı yapılabilir.

Etik İlkeler

bilig, Yayın Etiği Komitesinin (COPE) “Dergi Editörleri için Davranış Kuralları ve En İyi Uygulama Rehber İlkeleri” ve “Dergi Yayıncıları için Davranış Kuralları” belgelerini takip etmektedir.COPE'nin “Öz Uygulamalar” belgesi ile ilgili olarak bk. <https://publicationethics.org>

bilig'e çalışmalarını sunan yazarların aşağıda belirtilen etik ilkeleri karşılamaları zorunludur.

Ortak yazarlık: Aday makalenin yazarları sunulan çalışmaya önemli katkı sağlayanlarla sınırlı olmalıdır. Makalenin yazarları makalenin sunumundan önce kesinleşir. Çalışmaya katkısı olmayanların isimlerine aday makalede yer verilmesi (hediye yazarlık) ya da katkısı olanların isimlerine yer verilmemesi (hayalet yazarlık) kabul edilemez.

Teşekkür: Yazarlar gönderdikleri çalışmaları destekleyen kuruluşları, finansal kaynakları Teşekkür kısmında beyan etmekle yükümlüdür.

Özgünlük ve intihalden arınıklık: Sunulan çalışma bütünüyle yazarlarına ait olmalıdır. Diğer araştırmacıların çalışmalarına makale içinde yer verildiyse bunun uygun bir şekilde alıntılanması ve kaynaklarda bu çalışmaların listelenmesi gerekmektedir. Yazar makalesini intihal önleme yazılımı olan Turnit-in ya da iThenticate programlarından biri ile kontrol ederek benzerlik raporunu makale başvurusunda dergiye göndermekle yükümlüdür. Benzerlik oranı %15 ve üzeri olan makaleler değerlendirilmez alınmayacaktır.

Etik kurul izni ve onayı: Katılımcılardan anket, ölçek, görüşme, gözlem vb. yollarla veri toplamayı gerektiren araştırmalar için etik kurul izni alındığı aday makale içinde belirtilmelidir. Veri toplama sürecinde etik hususlara hassasiyet gösterildiğinin kanıtları (başkalarına ait ölçek, anket, fotoğrafların kullanımı için izin alınması gibi) çalışma içinde sunulmalıdır.

Basılmış bir yayının tekrar sunumu: Yazarların, daha önce yayınlanmamış çalışmalarını *bilig*'e sunmaları beklenir. Çalışmanın *bilig*'e sunumuyla birlikte başka dergiye de gönderilmiş olması kabul edilemez.

Dilimleme: Yazarlar bir araştırmanın sonuçlarını, araştırmanın bütünlüğünü bozacak şekilde ve uygun olmayan biçimde parçalara ayırıp birden fazla sayıda

yayımlayarak bu yayınları akademik atama ve yükselmelerde ayrı yayınlar olarak sunmamalıdır.

Ham verileri sunma ve saklama: Yazarlar, editör ve hakemler tarafından talep edildiğinde araştırmalarının ham verilerini sunmak ve bu verileri makaleleri yayımlandıktan sonra da saklamak zorundadırlar.

Yayımlanmış makalelerde hata tespiti: Bir yazar *bilig*'de yayınlanmış makalesinde önemli bir hata veya yanlışlık olduğunu tespit ettiğinde, dergi editörünü derhal haberdar etmek ve makaleyi geri çekmek veya düzeltmek için editörle işbirliği yapmak zorundadır.

Yayın Politikası

bilig'de yayımlanan bütün makaleler aynı zamanda tam metin olarak bilig.yesevi.edu.tr web adresinde açık erişimli olarak yer almaktadır.

bilig'de makale değerlendirme ve yayın aşamasında yazardan hiçbir şekilde ücret alınmaz. Yazara da telif ücreti ödenmez.

Yazım Dili

bilig'de Türkçe ve İngilizce makaleler yayımlanır. Makalelerin Türkçe ve İngilizce özetlerine (abstracts) yer verilir.

Yazım Kuralları

bilig'de 97. Sayıdan itibaren MLA atıf sisteminin yazım kuralları uygulanmaktadır. Alıntılar, göndermeler ve kaynakça ile ilgili temel hususlar aşağıda örneklerle gösterilmiş olup örneği bulunmayan kaynaklar için MLA atıf sisteminin 8. versiyonu (<https://style.mla.org/>) esas alınmalıdır.

Makalelerin, aşağıda belirtilen şekilde sunulmasına özen gösterilmelidir:

1. Başlık: İçerikle uyumlu, içeriği en iyi ifade eden bir başlık olmalı ve **koyu** harflerle yazılmalıdır. Makalenin başlığı, en fazla 10-12 kelime arasında olmalıdır.

2. Yazar ad(lar)ı ve adres(ler)i: Makale dosyasında yazar ad(lar)ı ve adres(ler) i bulunmamalıdır. Yazar(lar)la ilgili bilgiler başvuru sırasında Makale Yönetim Sisteminde ilgili alanlara yazılmalıdır.

3. Öz: Makalenin başında, konuyu kısa ve öz biçimde ifade eden ve en az 75, en fazla 150 kelimedenden oluşan Türkçe ve İngilizce öz bulunmalıdır. Öz içinde, yararlanılan kaynaklara, şekil ve çizelge numaralarına değinilmemelidir. Özün altında bir satır boşluk bırakılarak en az 5, en çok 8 sözcükten oluşan anahtar kelimeler verilmelidir. Anahtar kelimeler makale içeriği ile uyumlu ve kapsayıcı olmalıdır.

4. Ana Metin: A4 boyutunda (29.7x21 cm.) kâğıtlara, MS Word programında, *Times New Roman* veya benzeri bir yazı karakteri ile 12 punto, 1.5 satır aralığıyla yazılmalıdır. Sayfa kenarlarında 2.5 cm boşluk bırakılmalı ve sayfalar numaralandırılmalıdır. Yazılar öz ve kaynakça dâhil 7.000 (yedi bin) kelimeyi geçmemelidir. Metin içinde vurgulanması gereken kısımlar, koyu değil eğik harflerle yazılmalıdır. Metinde tırnak işareti eğik harfler gibi çifte vurgulamalara yer verilmemelidir.

5. Bölüm Başlıkları: Makalede, düzenli bir bilgi aktarımı sağlamak üzere ana, ara ve alt başlıklar kullanılabilir. Ana başlıklar (ana bölümler, kaynaklar ve ekler) koyu ve ilk harfleri büyük; ara başlıklar, yalnız ilk harfleri büyük; alt başlıklar ise ilk harfleri büyük ve italik yazılmalıdır.

6. Tablolar ve Şekiller: Tabloların numarası ve başlığı bulunmalıdır. Tablo çiziminde dikey çizgiler kullanılmamalıdır. Yatay çizgiler ise sadece tablo içindeki alt başlıkları birbirinden ayırmak için kullanılmalıdır. Tablo numarası üste, tam sola dayalı olarak dik yazılmalı; tablo adı ise, bir alt satırda her sözcüğün ilk harfi büyük yazılmalıdır. Tablolar metin içinde bulunması gereken yerlerde olmalıdır. Şekiller siyah beyaz baskıya uygun hazırlanmalıdır. Şekil numaraları ve adları şeklin soluna hizalı şekilde yazılmalıdır. Şekil numarası nokta ile bitmelidir. Hemen yanından sadece ilk harf büyük olmak üzere şekil adı dik yazılmalı ve kaynağı verilmelidir. Aşağıda tablo örneği sunulmuştur.

Tablo 1

Türk Üniversitelerinde Uluslararası Öğrenciler (2017-2018)

	Erkek	Kadın	Toplam
Toplam Uluslararası Öğrenci Sayısı	81706	43324	125030
TÜRKSOY Tam ve Gözlemci Üye Ülkeler	24309	11686	35995
Azerbaycan	12911	4177	17088
Kazakistan	1051	1014	2065
Kırgızistan	1105	821	1926
Moldova	175	225	400
Özbekistan	435	405	840
Rusya	808	621	1429
Türkmenistan	7824	4423	12247
Türkiye'deki Üniversitelerdeki Toplam Lisansüstü ve Lisansüstü Öğrenci Sayısı	2622936	2168678	4791614
Uluslararası Öğrenci Oranı	3,12%	2,00%	2,61%

Kaynak: "Uyruğa Göre Öğrenci Sayıları Raporu." YÖK, 17 Ağustos 2019, <https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/>

7. Resimler: Yüksek çözünürlüklü, baskı kalitesinde taranmış halde makaleye ek olarak gönderilmelidir. Resim adlandırmalarında, şekil ve çizelgelerdeki kurallara uyulmalıdır.

Şekil, çizelge ve resimler toplam 10 sayfayı (yazının üçte birini) aşmamalıdır. Teknik imkâna sahip yazarlar, şekil, çizelge ve resimleri aynen basılabilecek nitelikte olmak şartı ile metin içindeki yerlerine yerleştirebilirler.

8. Alıntı ve Göndermeler: Doğrudan alıntılar tırnak içinde verilmelidir. 2.5 satırdan az alıntılar satır arasında; 2.5 satırdan uzun alıntılar satırın sadece solundan 2 cm içeride, blok hâlinde ve 1.5 satır aralığıyla yazılmalıdır. Dipnot kullanımından mümkün olduğunca kaçınılmalı, bu kullanıma yalnız açıklamalar için başvurulmalı ve otomatik numaralandırma yoluna gidilmelidir.

Metin içinde göndermeler, parantez içinde aşağıdaki şekilde yazılmalıdır:

(Köprülü 15).

İki yazarlı yayınlarda yazarların soyadları aşağıdaki şekilde yazılmalıdır:

(Taner ve Bezirci 22).

Üç ve daha fazla yazarlı yayınlarda, metin içinde sadece ilk yazarın soyadı ve “ve diğerleri/vd.” yazılmalıdır:

(Gökay ve diğerleri 18).

(Gökay vd. 18).

Metin içinde, gönderme yapılan yazarın adı veriliyorsa kaynağın sadece sayfa numarası yazılmalıdır:

Tanpınar (131), bu konuda ...

Aynı yazara ait iki veya daha fazla esere gönderme yapılırsa yazar soyadından sonra yayının ilk birkaç kelimesi yazılarak ayırt edilmelidir:

(Dilçin, *Divan Şiiri* 86).

(Dilçin, *Fuzulî'nin Şiiri* 110).

Aynı soyadı taşıyan yazarlara ait yayınlarda soyadından önce yazar adı kısaltılarak yazılmalıdır:

(S. Kaplan 41).

(M. Kaplan 16).

Sayfa numarası bulunmayan elektronik yayınlarda sadece soyadı ya da başlık yazılmalıdır.

Yazarı belirtilmeyen ansiklopedi vb. yayınlarda ise eser ismi yazılmalıdır, eser ismi uzun ise ilk 2-3 kelimesi yazılmalıdır.

Kişisel görüşmeler, metin içinde soyadı belirtilerek gösterilmeli, ayrıca kaynaklarda da tarihle birlikte belirtilmelidir.

9. Kaynaklar: Metnin sonunda, yazarların soyadına göre alfabetik olarak düzenlenmelidir. Yararlanılan kaynağın yazarı soyadı önce belirtilecek şekilde gösterilmelidir.

Örnek:

İsen, Mustafa. *Tezkireden Biyografiye*. Kapı Yayınları, 2010.

Köprülü, Mehmet Fuat. *Azeri Edebiyatının Tekâmülü*. MEB Yayınları, 1961.

Kaynağın iki yazarı varsa öncelikle çalışmada ismi önce yazılmış yazarın soyadı bilgisi ile başlanır, künye bilgilerinin alfabetik sıralanmasında ilk yazardan sonrakilerin soyadlarının öne alınmasının işlevi yoktur.

Örnek:

Taner, Refika, ve Asım Bezirci. *Edebiyatımızda Seçme Hikâyeler*. Gözlem Yayınları, 1981.

Kaynağın üç ve daha fazla yazarı varsa, ilkinin soyadı ve adı, sonra “ve diğerleri/vd.” yazılmalıdır.

Örnek:

Altaev, Zhakypbek ve diğerleri. “Essence and Typology of Intellect in al-Farabi’s Epistemology.” *bilig*, no. 95, 2020, ss. 79-95.

Kitap ve dergi adları eğik yazılmalı; makale, kitap bölümü gibi kaynaklar tırnak içinde gösterilmelidir. Kitap künyesinde sayfa numara bilgisi gerekmezken; dergi, ansiklopedi maddesi, kitap bölümü gibi kısa yapıtlarda yararlanılan bölüme ait sayfa aralığı bilgisi mutlaka yer almalıdır.

Örnek:

Berk, İlhan. *Poetika*. Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1997.

Demir, Nurettin. “Türkçede Evidensiyel.” *bilig*, no. 62, 2012, ss. 97-117.

Aydınğün, İsmail, ve Ayşegül Aydınğün. “Crimean Tatars Return Home: Identity and Cultural Revival.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 33, no. 1, 2007, ss. 113-128.

Kitabı çeviren, derleyen, yayıma hazırlayan ya da editörlük yapan varsa ismine yazar ve eser bilgisinden sonra yer verilmelidir.

Örnek:

Shaw, Stanford. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*. Çev. Mehmet Harmancı, Sermet Matbaası, 1982.

Aydemir, Yaşar. “Lâmiî Çelebi'nin Mecmualara Yansıyan Şiirleri.” *Bursalı Lâmiî Çelebi ve Dönemi*, ed. Bilal Kemikli ve Süleyman Eroğlu, Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi Yayınları, 2011, ss. 149-172.

Yazar ismi yoksa editör, hazırlayan ya da derleyen ismi başta verilmelidir:

Tarlan, Ali Nihat, haz. *Hayâlî Divanı*. Akçağ Yayınları, 1992.

Ansiklopedi maddelerinde madde yazarının biliniyorsa soyadı ve adından sonra, sırasıyla turnak içinde maddenin başlığı, ansiklopedinin tam adı, cilt numarası, yayınevi, yazılış tarihi ve sayfa aralığı belirtilmelidir:

Örnek:

İpekten, Haluk. “Azmî-zâde Mustafa Hâletî.” *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 4. cilt, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1991, ss. 348-349.

Tezler kaynak gösterilirken sırasıyla tez yazarının soyadı ve adından sonra, *eğik harflerle* tezin tam başlığı, tez tipi, tezin hazırlandığı üniversitenin adı, tezin yazıldığı tarih yer almalıdır:

Örnek:

Karakaya, Burcu. *Garibi'nin Yûsuf u Züleyhâsı: İnceleme-Tenkitledir Metin-Dizin*. Yüksek Lisans Tezi. Ahi Evran Üniversitesi, 2012.

Yazmalar “Yazar. Eser Adı. Kütüphane, Koleksiyon, Katalog numarası, yaprağı.” şeklinde kaynak gösterilmelidir.

Örnek:

Âsım. *Zeyl-i Zübdetül-Eş'âr*. Millet Kütüphanesi, A. Emiri Efendi, No. 1326, vr. 45a.

İnternette yer alan bir çalışmaya atıfta bulunmak için yazarın soyadı, adı, yazının başlığı, yayıncı (web site adı), yayın tarihi, bağlantı adresi bilgilerini vermek yeterlidir.

Örnek:

Gökçek, Fazıl. “Mehmet Akif Ersoy.” *Türk Edebiyatı İsimler Sözlüğü*, 03 Ocak 2018, <http://teis.yesevi.edu.tr/madde-detay/ersoy-mehmet-akif>.

Kişisel görüşmelerde, kaynak kişinin soyadı, adı, görüşme türü ve tarihi şu şekilde yazılmalıdır:

Demir, Adem. Telefon görüşmesi. 22 Mayıs 2018.

Henüz yayımlanmamış ama yayımlanmak üzere kabul edilmiş makale atıfları da şu şekilde gösterilebilir.

Örnek:

Bayram, Bülent. “G.T. Timofeyev’in Notları Çerçevesinde 20.Yüzyıl Başında Orta İdil’de Çuvaşların Etnik-Kültürel İlişkileri.” *bilig*, (yayımlanacak), doi: 10.12995/bilig.9801.

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bilig aims to present the cultural riches as well as the historical and contemporary realities and problems of the Turkic world within a scientific framework.

Submissions to *bilig* should be original articles that will fill a gap in the field or to be a review that evaluates previously published studies and produces new and worthwhile ideas. *bilig* also publishes essays introducing authors and works and announcing new and recent activities related to the Turkic world.

An article to be published in *bilig* should not have been previously published or accepted for publication elsewhere. Papers presented at a conference or symposium may be accepted for publication if this is clearly indicated

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Acknowledgements: Those (institutions and financial resources) who have provided support but have not contributed to the research should be acknowledged in an Acknowledgements section.

Originality and purity of plagiarism: The submitted work should be entirely owned by the authors. If the work of other researchers is included in the manuscript, it should be cited appropriately and listed in the references. The author is obliged to check the manuscript with one of the plagiarism prevention software, Turnitin or iThenticate, and submit the similarity report to the journal for application. Manuscripts with a similarity rate of 15% or more will not be considered.

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bilig publishes articles in Turkish and English. Abstracts of the articles will be in Turkish and English.

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In *bilig*, the style of the MLA citation system are applied as of the 97th issue. The main points regarding citations, references and bibliography are shown below with examples, and the 8th version of the MLA citation system (<https://style.mla.org/>) should be taken as a basis for sources without examples.

The following rules should be observed while preparing an article for submission to *bilig*:

1. Title of the article: The title should suit the content and express it in the best way, and should be written in **bold** letters. The title should consist of no more than 10-12 words.

2. Name(s) and address(es) of the author(s): The article file should not contain the name(s) and address(es) of the author. Information regarding the author(s) should be written in the relevant fields in the Manuscript Handling System during the application.

3. Abstract: The article should include an abstract in Turkish and English at the beginning. The abstract should explain the topic clearly and concisely in a minimum of 75 and a maximum of 150 words. The abstract should not include references to sources, figures and charts. Keywords of 5 to 8 words should be placed at the end of the abstract. There should be a single space between the body of the abstract and the keywords. The keywords should be comprehensive and suitable to the content of the article.

4. Body Text: The body of the article should be typed on A4 (29.7x21cm) paper on MS Word in size 12 Times New Roman or a similar font using 1,5 line spacing. Margins of 2,5 cm should be left on all sides and the pages should be numbered. Articles should not exceed 7.000 words including the abstract and bibliography. Passages that need to be emphasized in the text should not be bold but italicized. Double emphases like using both italics and quotation marks should be avoided

5. Section Titles: The article may contain main and sub-titles to enable a smoother flow of information. The main titles (main sections, bibliography and appendices) should be bold and their first letters be capitalized; subtitles, only the first letters should be capitalized; sub-headings should be written in italics with their first letters capitalized.

6. Tables and Figures: Tables should have numbers and captions. In tables vertical lines should not be used. Horizontal lines should be used only to separate the subtitles within the table. The table number should be written at the top, fully aligned to the left; the table caption should be in the lower line and the first letter of each word in the caption should be capitalized. Tables should be placed where they are most appropriate in the text. Figures should be prepared in line with black-and-white printing. The numbers and captions of the figures should be written aligned to the left of the figure. The figure number should be written in italics, ending with a period. The caption should immediately follow the number. The caption should not be written vertically, with only the first letter capital, and the references should be stated. Below is a sample table.

Table 1

International Students at Turkish Universities (2017-2018)

	Male	Female	Total
Total Number of International Students	81706	43324	125030
TÜRKSOY Member and Observer Member States	24309	11686	35995
Azerbaijan	12911	4177	17088
Kazakhstan	1051	1014	2065
Kyrgyzstan	1105	821	1926
Moldova	175	225	400
Uzbekistan	435	405	840
Russia	808	621	1429
Turkmenistan	7824	4423	12247
Total Undergraduate and Graduate Students Number at Universities in Türkiye	2622936	2168678	4791614
International Student Ratio	3,12%	2,00%	2,61%

Reference: "The Report of the Number of the Students regarding" *YÖK*, 17 August 2019, <https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/>

7. Pictures: Pictures should be attached to the articles scanned in high-resolution print quality. The same rules for figures and tables apply in naming pictures.

The number of pages for figures, tables and pictures should not exceed 10 pages (one-third of the article). Authors having the necessary technical equipment and software may themselves insert their figures, drawings and pictures into the text provided these are ready for printing.

8. Quotations and Citations: Direct quotations should be placed in quotation marks. Quotations shorter than 2.5 lines should be placed within the flowing text. If the quotation is longer than 2.5 lines, it should be turned into a block quote with a 1.5 cm indentation only from the right and left, and the font size should be 1 point smaller. Footnotes and endnotes should be avoided as much as possible. They should only be used for essential explanations and should be numbered automatically.

Citations within the text should be given in parentheses as follows:

(Köprülü 15).

When sources with two authors are cited, the surnames of the authors should be given as follows:

(Taner and Bezirci 22).

When sources with three or more authors are cited, the surname of the first author is given and 'et. al' is added.

(Gökay et. al 18).

If the text already includes the name of the cited author, only the page number should be given:

In this respect, Tanpınar (131) says ...

When two or more works belonging to the same author are cited, the first few words of the publication should be distinguished after the author's surname:

(Dilçin, *Divan Şiiri* 86).

(Dilçin, *Fuzulî'nin Şiiri* 110).

In manuscripts belonging to authors with the same surname, the name of the author should be shortened before the surname:

(S. Kaplan 41).

(M. Kaplan 16).

In electronic manuscripts with no page number, only the surname or title should be written.

In encyclopaedias and other sources without authors, only the name of the source should be written. If the title is long, the first 2-3 words should be given.

Personal interviews should be cited within the text by giving the surnames and dates should also be cited in the bibliography.

9. References: References should be placed at the end of the text, the surnames of authors in alphabetical order. The work cited should be entered with the surname of the author placed at the beginning:

Example:

İsen, Mustafa. *Tezkireden Biyografiye*. Kapı Yayınları, 2010.

Köprülü, Mehmet Fuat. *Azeri Edebiyatının Tekâmülü*. MEB Yayınları, 1961.

If a source has two authors, the surname of the first author should be placed first; it is not functional to place the surname of the other authors first in alphabetical order.

Example:

Taner, Refika, and Asım Bezirci. *Edebiyatımızda Seçme Hikâyeler*. Gözlem Yayınları, 1981.

If a source has more than three authors, the surname and name of the first author should be written, and the other authors should be indicated by et.al.

Example:

Altaev, Zhakypbek et. al. "Essence and Typology of Intellect in al-Farabi's Epistemology." *bilig*, no. 95, 2020, ss. 79-95.

The titles of books and journals should be italicized; article titles and book chapters should be placed in quotation marks. Page numbers need not be indicated for books. Shorter works like journals, encyclopedia entries and book chapters, however, require the indication of page numbers.

Example:

Berk, İlhan. *Poetika*. Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1997.

Demir, Nurettin. "Türkçede Evidensiyel." *bilig*, no. 62, 2012, ss. 97-117.

Aydınğün, İsmail, and Ayşegül Aydınğün. "Crimean Tatars Return Home: Identity and Cultural Revival." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 33, no. 1, 2007, ss. 113-128.

Translator's, compiler's and editor's names (if there are any) should follow the author and title of the work:

Example

Shaw, Stanford. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*. Çev. Mehmet Harmancı, Sermet Matbaası, 1982.

Aydemir, Yaşar. "Lâmiî Çelebi'nin Mecmualara Yansıyan Şiirleri." *Bursalı Lâmiî Çelebi ve Dönemi*, ed. Bilal Kemikli ve Süleyman Eroğlu, Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi Yayınları, 2011, ss. 149-172.

If there is no author name, the name of the editor, preparer or compiler should be given first:

Tarlan, Ali Nihat, pre. *Hayâli Divanı*. Akçağ Yayınları, 1992.

For **encyclopedia entries**, if the author of the encyclopedia entry is known, the author's surname and name are written first. These are followed by the date of the entry, the title of the entry in quotation marks, the full name of the encyclopedia, its volume number, place of publication, publisher and page numbers:

Example:

İpekten, Haluk. "Azmi-zâde Mustafa Hâletî." *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 4. cilt, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1991, ss. 348-349.

For **theses and dissertations**, the surname and name of the thesis author should be followed by the full title of the thesis in italics, the thesis type, the name of the university where the thesis was prepared, the date the thesis was written:

Example:

Karakaya, Burcu. *Garibi'nin Yûsuf u Züleyhâ'sı: İnceleme-Tenkitli Metin-Dizin*. Yüksek Lisans Tezi. Ahi Evran Üniversitesi, 2012.

Handwritten manuscripts should be cited in the following way: Author. Title of the Work. Library. Collection. Catalogue number sheet.

Example:

Âsım. *Zeyl-i Zübdetü'l-Eş'âr*. Millet Kütüphanesi, A. Emirî Efendi, No. 1326, vr. 45a.

To cite **a study found on the Internet**, it is sufficient to provide the author's surname, name, title of the article, publisher (website name), date of publication, and link address.

Example:

Gökçek, Fazıl. "Mehmet Akif Ersoy." *Türk Edebiyatı İsimler Sözlüğü*, 03 Ocak 2018, <http://teis.yesevi.edu.tr/madde-detay/ersoy-mehmet-akif>.

In personal interviews, the surname, name, interview type and date of the source person should be given as follows:

Demir, Adem. Phone Call. 22 May 2018.

An article accepted for publication but not yet published can be cited in the following way:

Example:

Bayram, Bülent. "G. T. Timofeyev'in Notları Çerçevesinde 20. Yüzyıl Başında Orta İdil'de Çuvaşların Etnik-Kültürel İlişkileri." *bilig*, (yayımlanacak), doi: 10.12995/bilig.9801.

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