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8. Cilt 2. Sayı; 4 İngilizce ve 1 Türkçe olmak üzere toplam 5 makale ve 1 kitap incelemesinden oluşmaktadır.

Makaleler kısmında ilk olarak Prof. Dr. Shangtao GAO ve Jessica DURDU'nun kaleme aldıkları “Overcoming The Security Dilemma Between China and The United States: A New Security Paradigm of Holism” adlı makale paylaşılmıştır. Ardından Sevim BÖRKLÜCE ve Doç. Dr. Ayşe Ömür ATMACA'nın kaleme aldıkları “Reframing Egypt-Israel Relations: A Constructivist Perspective on the Nasser and Sadat Eras” başlıklı esere yer verilmiştir.

Üçüncü sırada ise Doç. Dr. Merve Suna ÖZEL ÖZCAN'ın kaleme aldığı “Sanction Comradeship: The Russia-North Korea Alliance Against Western Embargoes” adlı makale yer almaktadır. Dördüncü sırada, Dr. Serdar ÇAKMAK'ın yazmış olduğu “Developments in The First Karabakh War and the Khojaly Massacre: Historical-Legal Process and Forced Migration” adlı makale bulunmaktadır. Son makale ise Bora İYİAT'ın eseri olan “Mao'nun Uzatılmış Savaş Doktrini Üzerinden PKK Terör Örgütü'nün Stratejisi” başlıklı makedir. Kitap incelemesi bölümünde ise Sümeyra ULUS'un değerlendirmesi yer almıştır.

Dergimiz, Mayıs 2025 tarihinde yayımlanması planlanan 9. Cilt. 1. Sayı için çalışma kabulüne devam etmektedir. Çalışmaların yalnızca DergiPark üzerinden kabul edildiğini ve tüm sürecin buradan yürütüldüğünü belirtmek isterim.

2025 yılına girerken tüm yayın ekibine, bu sayıdaki eser sahiplerine ve bizleri yakından takip eden okurlarımıza çok teşekkür ediyorum. Yeni yılda sağlık, başarı ve esenlikler diliyorum.

UKSAD Baş Editörü
Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin EROL

EDITORIAL

Dear “Journal of International Crisis and Policy Research (JICPR)” readers,

The structure of the international system is undergoing change and transformation, with crises and conflicts playing a central role in this process. This idea was influential in the emergence of our journal in 2017. Since that time, the impact and scale of crises have expanded, and approaches and research on conflict resolution in the field of international relations have gained even more importance.

This inclination towards crises and conflicts in academic studies can easily be understood from the increasing interest in our journal in recent years. In the pre-review stage of the works submitted to our journal, their compliance with the journal’s scope, scientific maturity, and adherence to writing rules are examined, with particular attention paid to whether the writing template has been used. Studies that do not meet the formatting requirements are rejected by the editorial board at this stage. Also, at this stage, the compliance of the study with scientific ethical rules is evaluated by the editorial board, and a similarity report is obtained through intihal.net program.

JICPR, which accepts Turkish and English works through the DergiPark system, reaches you as an international peer-reviewed, open-access, and completely free journal. In the previous issue of our journal, the total number of views and downloads, which was 280,000, has increased by approximately 40,000, reaching 320,000.

International databases also played a role in our success. These are; Index Copernicus, CEEOL, ASOS Index, Cite Factor, DRJI, Google Scholar, Ideal Online, Infobase, JIFACTOR, Journal Factor, Research Bible and Sindex. Additionally, JICPR is monitored by ULAKBİM TR INDEX and EBSCO.

Volume 8, Issue 2 consists of a total of 5 articles, 4 in English and 1 in Turkish, and 1 book review.

First in the articles section, we share the article titled “Overcoming the Security Dilemma Between China and The United States: A New Security Paradigm of Holism”, the common work of Prof. Shangtao GAO and Jessica DURDU. Then, we included the article titled “Reframing Egypt-Israel Relations: A Constructivist Perspective on the Nasser and Sadat Eras”, co-authored by Sevim BÖRKLÜCE and Assoc. Prof. Ayşe Ömür ATMACA.

In third place is the article titled “Sanction Comradeship: The Russia-North Korea Alliance Against Western Embargoes” written by Assoc. Prof. Merve Suna ÖZEL ÖZCAN. Fourth, we share the article titled “Developments in The First Karabakh War and the Khojaly Massacre: Historical-Legal Process and Forced Migration” written by Asst. Prof. Serdar ÇAKMAK. Last article is Bora İYİAT’s work titled “The Strategy of the PKK Terrorist Organization Through Mao’s Doctrine of Protracted War”. In the book review section, Sümeyra ULUS’s evaluation is included.

JICPR continues to accept submissions for Volume 9, Issue 1, scheduled for publication in May 2025. I would like to point out that submissions are accepted only through DergiPark and the entire process is conducted in this platform.

As we enter the year 2025, I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to the publishing team, the authors featured in this issue, and our readers who closely follow us. I wish you health, success, and well-being in the new year.

JICPR Editor in Chief
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Overcoming The Security Dilemma Between China and The United States: A New Security Paradigm of Holism

*Çin ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Arasındaki Güvenlik İkilemini Aşmak:
Bütüncül Bir Yeni Güvenlik Paradigması*

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Abstract

This article explores the increasing security dilemma between the United States (US) and China, rooted in the traditional Western security paradigm of individualism. Through a detailed analysis of US policy discourse and actions, the article highlights how this paradigm leads to an escalating tension. Contrastingly, the article presents China's holistic approach, demonstrated by its four global initiatives, Belt and Road Initiative, Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative, as a solution to overcome these dilemmas. This alternative paradigm emphasizes cooperation, collective security, and multilateralism, suggesting a more effective path for global peace and security in an increasingly interconnected world.

Keywords: Security Dilemma, US-China Rivalry, Holistic Security, Global Initiatives, New Security Paradigm

Öz

Bu makale, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ve Çin arasındaki giderek artan güvenlik ikilemini, Batı'nın geleneksel bireyci güvenlik paradigması bağlamında incelemektedir. ABD'nin politika söylemi ve eylemleri ayrıntılı bir şekilde analiz edilerek bu paradigmanın gerginlikleri nasıl tırmandırdığı vurgulanmaktadır. Makale, buna karşılık Çin'in Kuşak ve Yol Girişimi, Küresel Kalkınma Girişimi, Küresel Güvenlik Girişimi ve Küresel Medeniyet Girişimi gibi dört küresel girişimiyle somutlaşan bütüncül yaklaşımını güvenlik ikilemlerini aşmak için bir çözüm olarak sunmaktadır. Bu alternatif paradigma, iş birliği, kolektif güvenlik ve çok taraflılığı vurgulayarak, küresel barış ve güvenlik için daha etkili bir yol önermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güvenlik İkilemi, ABD-Çin Rekabeti, Bütüncül Güvenlik, Küresel Girişimler, Yeni Güvenlik Paradigması

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Introduction

The competition between China and the United States (US) is undoubtedly one of the most significant events in current international relations. The US regards China's development as one of its biggest security challenges and mobilizes various resources to suppress China. China has to face and respond to the enormous pressure brought by the US, and it seems inevitable that China and the US are falling into a new security dilemma, where the US views China's rise not merely as a challenge but as an existential threat. This dilemma is exacerbated by the traditional Western security paradigm, which relies heavily on individualistic principles and zero-sum logic. Such a framework fails to accommodate the complexities of a multipolar world, where interdependence and cooperative security models are increasingly relevant. Instead, U.S. policy has often resorted to confrontational strategies, resulting in a cycle of mistrust and escalating tensions that do not align with contemporary geopolitical realities.

The so-called new security dilemma between China and the US is actually a new manifestation of the ancient security dilemma in contemporary China-US relations. The security dilemma between countries has existed for a long time and is not uncommon, but its new manifestations in the new situation may bring greater destructive power. How to deeply analyze the underlying logic of the new security dilemma between China and the US and propose a reasonable solution is an unavoidable major issue in current international relations research.

This article attempts to conduct theoretical analysis on this issue and systematically discuss the transcendental logic of the Chinese solution. The second section shed lights on the current dynamics of the US-China rivalry by explaining the competition between two countries in an American policy discourse, how it refers China as a security threat in its official strategies, how it realizes the threat perception on paper into real life by taking practical measures and how the existing literature analyzes this dilemma. The third section will then start the theoretical discussion on the old security paradigm and how it connotes to western individualism and therefore creates a vicious circle of security dilemma. The following section will emphasize the missing aspects of this understanding especially for today's dynamics and why a potential shift from individualistic approach to holistic approach can bring more effective solutions to this vicious circle. Just before the concluding section of the article, the fifth section will demonstrate the Chinese President Xi Jinping's idea of community with a shared future for mankind together with the four global initiatives to overcome the current security dilemmas around the world with a more holistic approach. The article will provide an analysis by blending both the real-life political practices and theoretical backgrounds of these practices. Therefore, the existing literature and the official statements from Chinese and American authorities will be the main sources of this article.

The New Security Dilemma Between China and the United States

The Competition Between China and the United States in American Policy Discourse

Since the end of the Cold War, the dynamics of the global system have been shaped under the predominant role of the US, which is widely recognized by most experts as the singular pole of power. However, various changes that have emerged in the post-Cold

War era—such as economic crises, wars in the Middle East that affected the entire world, Africa's struggles for actual sovereignty, and the phenomenon of globalization—are significantly influencing the dynamics of today's global system and initiating a global transformation. This transformation can also be interpreted as the onset of a new era in world history. A key distinction of this new era is the transition of the global system from a unipolar to a multipolar configuration. During this transitional phase, the US, which has been viewed as a single pole until now, has attempted to constrain newly rising powers. These efforts are interpreted by many experts as attempts to maintain its power and sphere of influence in global politics. In this context, the US's efforts to limit rising powers, particularly the People's Republic of China, are explicitly indicated and observed in numerous policy decisions. Notably, the US perceives the People's Republic of China—celebrating its 75th anniversary in 2024—as an alternative threat to its global leadership and even to its existence. This perception is evident in both general foreign policy decisions and in those specifically aimed at China, wherein China is viewed as a security risk, as supported by various documents. They believe that China's strategy entails “deliberate and determined” efforts to “improve and harness the internal and external elements of national power” that will automatically place China in a “leading position in an enduring competition between systems” (US Department of Defense, 2022, p.3; US Department of Defense, 2023a).

When the US's political history is analyzed briefly, their tendency to define those who are not agreeing with their principle as a security threat is a common policy strategy as it also allows them to legitimate their suppressing and intervening policies around the world. In fact, during the Cold War, the biggest defined threat was the Soviets due to its growing power and potential to spread communism, seen directly in conflict with US-led liberalism. Starting from the Cold War, US also justified itself to intervene the Middle East to *protect* the Arabian Oil and to *protect* those countries from communism. Then the perceived enemy turned out to be located in Middle East for a long time for US officials. Especially throughout the Bush, Obama and partially Trump administrations, the focus was on Middle East. In fact, even during the Obama era, some started to criticize the administration's attitude towards China, claiming that it does not serve US interests (DeLisle & Goldstein, 2021). Yet, especially after the withdrawal decision from Middle East starting from 2020, the US started to shift its enemy perception perspective more into Asia-Pacific, mainly targeting Russia and China.

Chronologically, the framing of China as a significant security challenge can be traced through key policy documents and speeches. The 2000 National Security Strategy of the US, under President Bill Clinton, acknowledged the rise of China but primarily viewed it through the lens of engagement. However, as China's economic and military capabilities expanded, subsequent administrations began to recalibrate this perception. The 2006 National Security Strategy marked a turning point by categorizing China as a potential “*strategic competitor*.” This sentiment was amplified in the 2017 National Security Strategy, which explicitly articulated a shift in US policy, identifying China and Russia as “revisionist powers” that seeks to undermine US interests and global stability by using every means even including trade values, artificial intelligence and intellectual property (2017). In fact, there has even been some scholars defining such a tech war between China and US as the “defining event of the century” (Jain, 2021, p.73). Here, it might be

beneficial to briefly mention the academic perspectives about security dilemma regarding being a 'revisionist power'. Johnston argues that there are two ways to explain security dilemma; (1) the offensive insecurity spiral involving revisionist states and (2) defensive insecurity spiral involving status-quo states (2022). While the first one refers to the scenario that one or more states are actually not happy with the existing status-quo and institutions and therefore becomes offensive to change the dynamics, the second one refers mainly to those supporting the existing dynamics. So, when official documents from US are analyzed, China is claimed to be a revisionist state although they later shifted their way of referring China from the term revisionist to the one of hegemonistic that is challenging US and its institutions. In fact, in her interview the former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice clearly revealed the logic of the American policy makers by stating that "*if we don't shape the international environment, then others will . . . powers like China and Russia.*" (Kempe, 2024). The Russian Chinese partnership is also a specific concern for the US officials, in fact, Worldwide Threat Assessment report emphasized this by stating that they are more aligned together than any other time in history since 1950s (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2019). This Russian Chinese partnership still continues today under President Biden as their number one global priority is to "out-competing China and constraining Russia" (National Security Strategy, 2022, p.23). US's perception of growing US-China rivalry also states that Beijing sees this competition as "a part of an epochal geopolitical shift" (Office of the Director of the National Intelligence, 2022, p.6; Office of the Director of the National Intelligence, 2023).

Internally, China's remarkable economic growth since the late 20th century has transformed it into the world's second-largest economy today. The implementation of reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s propelled China onto the global stage, allowing it to lift 800 million Chinese citizens out of poverty by developing its own economic model. By 2010, China surpassed Japan to become the second-largest economy, further fueling US concerns. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, illustrates China's ambitions to expand its economic influence through infrastructure investments across Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe. This initiative not only reflects China's economic prowess but also raises alarms within the US about potential geopolitical ramifications, as countries become more willing to cooperate with China under the Chinese win-win cooperation models.

Externally, any military modernization has been seen as a direct threat by US, especially for its strategies in the Asia-Pacific region. Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall, who has been observing China's military improvements for over 15 years now, states that "China is not a future threat; China is a threat today," (US Department of Defense, 2024).

The South China Sea and Taiwan are both specifically focused regions of US policy makers in military sense. In fact, many scholars agree on the US-created origin of the concept of Indo-Pacific, which replaced the term Asia-Pacific in order to include the most potential ally of US in the region, i.e. India. The 2021 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy explicitly identifies China's actions in the South China Sea as destabilizing and a threat to the rules-based international order.

The 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance further cements this notion, stating that "*China poses the most significant challenge to our national security.*" This escalatory rhetoric reflects a growing sense of urgency within American policy discourse, as the US perceives China's assertive foreign policy and its BRI as direct challenges to its influence. Additionally, the increasing sophistication of China's technological sector, particularly in areas such as artificial intelligence and cybersecurity has been perceived as issues for national security by US policy makers.

The US perception of China as a significant security competitor has deepened as China's influence and capabilities have expanded. This evolving dynamic highlights the shortcomings of the traditional security paradigm, prompting the need for a strategic reassessment that reflects the complexities of contemporary global interactions. A shift towards a more nuanced security approach, one that emphasizes cooperation and multilateral engagement, could help alleviate the risks associated with this growing rivalry. For US policymakers, the challenge lies in moving beyond the entrenched zero-sum mindset of the past and adopting a framework better suited to managing the intricacies of an increasingly multipolar world.

The Realistic Manifestation of the New Security Dilemma Between China and the United States

The evolving dynamics between the US and China have crystallized into a complex security dilemma that manifests through various strategic actions and counteractions. This section explores three significant dimensions of this dilemma: trade relations, alliance mechanisms, and military deployments. The methods used by US to constrain China as a security threat depended based on the different administrations of the US government. In fact, the Trump administration draws more of an economic and trade-oriented picture whereas the existing Biden administration pays more attention to military and political alliances. This section will present the real-life case studied under these three categories in order to see the realization of the security dilemma more clearly and also in order to demonstrate how the practical solutions provided by China, which will be explained in the last section before the conclusion, can contribute to the solution of the same issues.

US Trade Suppressions Against Against China and China's Counterattack

Many scholars agree that arming is not the only state action to build a security dilemma because modern threats also have a complex content (Liff & Ikenberry, 2014; Gerginova, 2022). The trade relationship between the US and China has increasingly become a battleground for competition despite the fact that they are each other's strongest trade partner, meaning that if one's economy fails, the other will be greatly affected as well. The data also underscores their deep economic interdependence, despite growing competition. In 2023, the total value of the US trade in goods with China recorded \$575 billion, \$148 billion US exports and \$427 billion imports (Statista, 2024). Additionally, China is the second largest holders of U.S. Treasury securities, holding approximately \$777 billion in 2024, signifying financial interdependence (TIC Data, 2024). However, this extensive economic entanglement also means that disruptions in one economy could have significant repercussions for the other. The implementation of tariffs on Chinese goods under the Trump administration, starting in 2018, marked a significant shift toward a more protectionist approach. For instance, the 2018-2019 US-China trade war led to a

sharp decline in bilateral trade and for some scholars these sanctions did not only fail to fulfill the objectives of US against China but also hurt the American businesses (Manak et.al., 2023). Similarly, in a scenario where China's economy slows down, US exporters could also experience a significant drop in demand, especially in agriculture and technology, where China is a major buyer. These statistics reveal that, despite their rivalry, the US and China are crucial to each other's economic stability. A failure in one economy would ripple through the other, further complicating their already tense relationship.

China's ongoing investments in technological innovation, particularly in sectors like semiconductor manufacturing and telecommunications, can be viewed as a countermeasure to US restrictions, aimed at enhancing self-reliance and reducing dependence on foreign technologies. Yet, the sanctions continue. Additionally, the US Ambassador to China Nicholas Burns states that they have sanctioned over three hundred Chinese firms over several months hoping that China will change its policies and make it more align with theirs's (Kempe, 2024). Many scholars in the field also agree that US's reaction actually depends on whether the internal Chinese development is in line with US expectations (Jie, 2020). In fact, the Chief Financial Officer of the Chinese tech giant Huawei, who is also the daughter of the founder of Huawei, has been arrested in Canada upon the request of the US officials and has been sent to US for the court process. This Huawei case also draw a significant attention from scholars and the research showed that the states that rely on US's guarantees of security tend to be far more rejective of Huawei (Christie et. al., 2023). This specific case shows us the spreading nature of US protectionism and concerns regarding the chance to lose its global economic position. Similarly, the US's protectionism started to hurt not only Chinese economy but also the global trade. When the American factories sharply decreased their production due to the global pandemic of COVID-19 and when they could not fill the containers in the seaports to be sent back to China, China was accused of having over supply and dominating the global trade. On the other side of the story, China was still continuing mass production and had to have the containers back to Chinese ports to send them to globe and it was playing a significant role to maintain global trade during such a devastating pandemic. The economy and finance are still popular fields to constrain China among different US administrations but it's not only economy that they try to do so.

The United States's Alliance Mechanisms and It's Countermeasures

In response to the perceived threat from China, the US has actively sought to rebuild and strengthen its alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. Initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), which includes the US, Japan, India, and Australia, serve to create a US led environment with local actors of Asia-Pacific. The AUKUS security pact between the US, the UK, and Australia, announced in 2021, further underscores this commitment to bolstering military capabilities in the region, including facilitating Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, a move that significantly escalates military capacity in the region and signals to China that the US intends to strengthen its military presence around Chinese waters. US's agreement with India to provide a much smaller alternative path to BRI can also be given as an example that showcases itself with economic calculations but underlies a political alliance behind stage.

This *mini-multilateralism* mechanism established by the US in the Asia-Pacific region, which targets China, includes not only the QUAD and AUKUS but also the trilateral cooperation among the US, Japan, and South Korea. These alliances arise from Washington's perception that China's rise, particularly its economic and military modernization, poses a challenge to US's regional influence and its broader global dominance. Although defined as a defensive measure by the US, such actions naturally provoke concern in Beijing, which views them as an effort to contain and encircle China.

Similarly, the increased trilateral cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, particularly in response to North Korea's missile tests, also reflects a broader strategic aim to limit China's regional influence. The US-Japan Security Alliance, which includes military bases in Japan, and joint US-South Korea military exercises are examples of how these trilateral frameworks are operationalized actively. The 2022 trilateral summit between the US, Japan, and South Korea resulted in the strengthening of missile defense systems and the sharing of real-time intelligence, which, while ostensibly aimed at countering North Korean threats, also contributes to the US's broader goal of projecting military power near China just by labeling the activity against North Korea on paper. China's defensive modernization, such as developing its navy and expanding regional trade ties, is frequently misinterpreted by Washington as aggressive, driving the US to deepen its alliances and further increasing tensions.

Beyond the Asia-Pacific, the US's security collaboration with India through the QUAD alliance, comprising the US, Japan, India, and Australia, also illustrates its strategy of mini-multilateralism. The 2021 QUAD summit marked a significant escalation in security cooperation, with commitments to increase joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean, enhance cyber security coordination, and develop supply chain resilience in technology sectors. These actions, often justified under the slogan of maintaining *a free and open Indo-Pacific*, are seen by Beijing as efforts to curtail China's BRI and its growing influence in global trade. The QUAD's military exercises, like the annual Malabar naval exercises, have increasingly become displays of joint military capability, further signaling to China that the US seeks to contain its influence through partnerships with regional actors. In fact, they even create a geopolitical term of Indo-Pacific rather than the pure geographical term of Asia-Pacific with the same objective.

The Philippines and Vietnam, two countries involved in territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea, provides yet other examples that US deepened the relations against China. In 2023, the US gained expanded access to four additional military bases in the Philippines under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) that is originally signed in 2014, enabling the US to station troops closer to Taiwan and the South China Sea, both of which are critical strategic regions to China (US Department of Defense, 2023b). Similarly, the US has bolstered its defense relations with Vietnam, especially after they have declared that they raised the relations into a strategic partnership level in 2023, with both sides agreeing to increase port visits by US naval ships and expand arms sales (US Embassy & Consulate in Vietnam, 2024). These moves are widely interpreted in China as attempts to challenge its legitimate territorial claims in the South China Sea, intensifying the security dilemma.

The construction of these multilateral frameworks by the US exacerbates the security dilemma by framing China's regional activities as threatening. Beijing's actions, which are often aimed at securing economic stability and safeguarding its territorial integrity, are perceived in Washington as evidence of an expansionist agenda. This perception drives the US to fortify alliances and military partnerships throughout the region, which in turn provokes China to further enhance its defensive capabilities, including its naval modernization and the strengthening of its military bases in the South China Sea. The result is a self-reinforcing cycle of action and reaction, characteristic of a security dilemma, where both sides believe they are acting defensively, yet their actions are perceived as offensive by the other.

China has responded to these developments by reinforcing its diplomatic and economic ties with countries in the region. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which came into force in January 2022, illustrates China's strategy to strengthen its economic influence and cooperation with neighboring countries, thus presenting alternative models. Furthermore, China's participation in multilateral forums, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), emphasizes its commitment to regional stability and cooperation.

The Deployment of Military Forces by the United States in the Asia Pacific

The US has significantly increased its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region as part of its strategy to counterbalance China's growing influence. This includes regular naval operations in the South China Sea, joint military exercises with other and mostly local allies, and the establishment of new bases in strategic locations. In 2022, the US conducted a comprehensive military exercise in the Pacific, involving thousands of troops and advanced military assets, showcasing its readiness to address security challenges in the region, although only with military solutions. In fact, the increasing military cooperations between US and Japan and the offer to establish a NATO representative office in Japan can be seen as actual military steps taken to further demonstrate US's desire to have a military presence in the region. In fact, this is a commonly seen practice in US political history. As world recently seen the same strategy in Middle East, they see replacing military forces, whether directly US Army or through NATO, as a solution for ensuring their own power in the expense of turning the dynamics in the regions more complex to solve. For Middle East, for Asia-Pacific and even for Europe they follow similar practices. In fact, the Secretary of the Air Force Kendall also states that they are deepening the partnerships with their traditional allies in Europe and gives the example of the ratification of an agreement for integrating Norwegian Joint Strike Missile on F-35 Combat Jets, although there are clearly more peace-oriented ways to deepen alliance relations (US Department of Defense, 2024).

Obviously for any country that declares China as a clear enemy and the one that has military exercises around its borders, China also responds to these military deployments with a combination of assertive posturing and diplomatic outreach. The Chinese government emphasized its right to safeguard its own territorial integrity, particularly in the South China Sea, while also keeping the door for dialogues with neighboring countries to promote mutual understanding open. In fact, ASEAN can be seen as an effective platform for this aspect. The establishment of military installations on disputed islands in

the South China Sea is framed by China as a necessary measure to protect its sovereignty and maintain regional stability. Yet, this is the exact point where the whole situation looks more like a security dilemma. The security dilemma between the US and China can be characterized by a series of strategic moves and countermoves across trade relations and sanctions, political alliances, and military presence. Both nations continue to navigate this complex landscape, with actions taken in one sphere accelerating responses in another. The challenge lies in finding pathways for constructive engagement for peace that address mutual concerns while acknowledging the realities of the changing global order. As both countries evolve in their strategies, the potential for miscalculations underscores the importance of dialogue and diplomacy to mitigate tensions and foster a more stable international environment.

Academic Attention on the Security Dilemma Between China and the United States

The competition between the US and China, as two major powers of today, has naturally draws significant attention in academic discourse, particularly in the context of the security dilemma that arises from their strategic rivalry. Managing this security dilemma is also seen as the most pressing foreign policy challenge of the 21st century (Kertzer et al., 2023; Tang, 2009). Scholars from all around the world have explored the origins, dynamics, and potential solutions for this dilemma, often trying to understand it with the help of theoretical frameworks within international relations and security studies literature. This chapter will try to understand and categorize the existing academic literature into several key approaches, highlighting the varied interpretations of this issue and reflecting on the centrality of the US-China relationship in shaping global security debates.

As drawing the attention more to the role of power, its transition and structural dynamics in terms of fueling the competition between the US and China, realist tradition turns out to be a crucial part of the literature. In fact, the most famous scholar of this perspective, John Mearsheimer argues that security dilemma is inevitable because the states are always concerned with their survivability and power accumulation (2001). In other words, rivalry will persist as long as the nations will continue seeking more power with relative gains and seeing each other's actions as threat to their own interests. To demonstrate his ideas to today; as China rises, it will seek to challenge US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and US will try to increase its power in the region, which overall leads to an intensification of the security competition. Chinese scholars, while acknowledging the structural tensions highlighted by realists, tend to emphasize the defensive nature of China's rise. They argue that China's strategy is focused on securing its regional interests and ensuring its development, rather than challenging the existing global order (Xuetong & Ryden, 2011). It is also important here to look for the recent history of China in terms of their historical experiences of insecurity and external threats, such as those during the Opium War and the century they call as the *humiliation* era, as motivations behind its defense-oriented policies. The Chinese realist school, therefore, frames the security dilemma not as a result of offensive ambition, but as a consequence of external misperceptions, particularly on the part of the US.

Liberal scholars have also contributed to the debate, focusing mostly on the role of economic interdependence and international institutions in resolving the security

dilemma. A significant part of the literature suggests that the deep economic ties between the US and China have created mutual dependencies which automatically reduces the likelihood of an actual conflict. American political economist Robert Keohane has long argued that economic interdependence, facilitated by international institutions, can act as a stabilizing element in great power rivalries. In this sense, mechanisms such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and bilateral trade agreements can mitigate tensions by creating more space for dialogue and cooperation, even amidst broader strategic competition. On the Chinese side, scholars have explored the potential for initiatives such as the BRI and the SCO to serve as platforms for multilateral cooperation, reducing the likelihood of conflict in line with the liberal scholars. Therefore, these initiatives may provide a framework for inclusive development and security cooperation for all, fostering a sense of shared interest. In fact, if one follows the recent Chinese diplomacy and policy in any field, s/he would also see the Chinese emphasis on win-win and non-zero-sum thinking principles in every action of the Chinese government.

Constructivist scholars offer a different perspective, focusing on the role of identity, perception, and strategic culture in shaping the security dilemma between the two powers. They argue that security dilemma is not just a product of material factors but is also shaped by how states perceive and interpret each other's actions and intentions. American constructivists like Alexander Wendt have argued that states act based on shared ideas and norms, and that the security dilemma is often a result of misperceptions or incompatible identities between different countries (1999). From this perspective, Chinese scholars such as Qin Yaqing have explored how China's strategic culture, rooted in historical experiences of humility and Confucian values, leads to a different approach to security compared to the US (2010). Qin argues that China's concept of peaceful development is shaped by its unique historical and philosophical traditions, which can be misunderstood by the West. In other words, a possible misreading of Chinese actions due to seeing them via "Western IR lenses" can escalate the rivalry and competition (DeLisle & Goldstein, 2021; Bunskoek & Shih, 2021, p.85). Therefore, the constructivist literature emphasizes the need for dialogue and mutual understanding to overcome the perceptual barriers that exacerbate the security dilemma.

A more recent strand of scholarship draws on critical theories and argues that both the US and China should be viewed not just as competitors in a zero-sum game, but as key actors in the reshaping of global governance. They suggest that the US has historically played a dominant role in constructing the global security architecture so far, based on Western norms of governance. This has contributed to tensions with China, which advocates for a more pluralistic and multipolar world order. In a parallel aspect, some Chinese scholars, argue that China's rise represents an opportunity to reform the global system in a way that better reflects the realities of a multipolar world. Another growing area of focus in the literature draws attention to the technological and geopolitical dimensions of the US-China rivalry. Scholars such as Graham Allison have warned of the dangers of a "Thucydides Trap" in which the rise of China leads to inevitable conflict with the established US order by pointing out to emerging technological domains—such as artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, and space exploration—as potential arenas where the security dilemma may intensify even more (2017). This can also be because of a rising China and a relatively declining US (DeLisle & Goldstein, 2021). Ikenberry adds

three characteristics of US-China rivalry's uniqueness; (1) rise of China is a powerful rival creation, (2) China is a non-Western great power and (3) it means a transition from liberal hegemonic order to an illiberal leader (2024). This also emphasizes the structural differences deeply rooted in both the American and Chinese systems (Tiong & Li, 2023).

Individualism and the Old Security Paradigm Under the New Security Dilemma

The concept of the security dilemma has long been a crucial part of international relations, with historical examples illustrating the tragic dynamics that often result when states, seeking to ensure their own security, inadvertently create insecurity for others and ultimately creating wars. The security dilemma is rooted in the anarchic structure of the global system, where no central authority guarantees the security of states. This leads to a vicious cycle of mutual suspicion and military competition, even if no country has aggressive intentions.

The history showcased many examples of security dilemmas that was created due to the individualistic oriented security understanding. One of the most frequently cited historical examples of the security dilemma is the World War I. The rapid military build-up by European powers, combined with alliances and secret treaties, created an atmosphere of intense mutual suspicion. Germany's naval expansion was then seen as a direct threat. Although many European leaders did not desire war, their efforts to bolster their military capabilities created a spiral of fear and competition, which ultimately culminated in the outbreak of conflict in 1914, the costliest security dilemma of human history. Another significant example is the Cold War, particularly the nuclear arms race between the US and the Soviet Union. The development of nuclear weapons by both superpowers intensified their security competition, even though neither side sought direct military confrontation. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 exemplifies how close this security dilemma came to triggering a catastrophic conflict. This mutual escalation could lead to catastrophic consequences for the whole world. The Israeli-Arab conflict also provides a more regional example of the security dilemma. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, the Arab states have viewed Israel's security measures, particularly its military capability, as threatening, leading to reciprocal build-ups and periodic wars. The 1967 Six-Day War can be seen as an outcome of a security dilemma, where Israel's preemptive strike against neighboring countries was motivated by the perception of an imminent attack.

Whether in the context of rising great powers, ideological rivalries, or regional disputes, the tendency for states to view each other's defensive measures as aggressive intentions has often led to conflict. These cases also highlight the difficulty of breaking out of the security dilemma, as mutual suspicion and competitive dynamics can become deeply entrenched. Therefore, the security dilemma between the US and China can be seen as a new manifestation of an old problem, deeply rooted in the Western tradition of individualistic security concepts. Historically, the Western approach to international security has been shaped by a worldview that prioritizes individualism, both at the personal and state level. This tradition, grounded in classical liberal and realist thought, sees states as rational and most importantly as self-interested actors, much like individuals in a competitive, anarchic environment. In fact, Goldstein argues that structural

conditions of anarchy and distribution of power are among the top features to define the system's polarity (2020).

The philosophical underpinnings of this individualistic security paradigm can be traced back to Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, who portrayed human nature and, indirectly, the state behavior as competitive. In Hobbes' Leviathan, individuals, motivated by fear and self-preservation, find themselves in a war of all against all. This idea of unending rivalry can be seen in the realist tradition of international relations today, where states ensure their own safety at the expense of others. This structural necessity for self-reliance and power seeking is a natural consequence of the individualistic perspective that permeates Western security thinking. In this sense, even the actions taken in the name of defense can be interpreted as threats by other states. This actually means that the Western understanding of security is a zero-sum game, where one state's gain inevitably translates into another's loss. The historical cases presented above also demonstrates how the logic of individualistic security leads states into traps of mutual suspicion and competition, even if neither party desires war.

In the contemporary US-China context, this individualistic understanding remains a powerful force. The US, driven by its motive to maintain liberal order and by its historical inclination toward unilateral security, views China's rise through the lens of competition. Defensive measures taken by China to secure its regional interests are perceived by the US as challenges to its own hegemony, leading to actions that worsening the security dilemma. The continuation of this pattern reflects the deep-seated cultural orientation toward individualism in Western strategic thinking. In essence, the security dilemma between the US and China is not a new phenomenon, but rather a contemporary iteration of a broader issue rooted in the Western understanding of security. The individualistic nature of Western political culture, which emphasizes the sovereignty and survival of the individual state in a competitive environment, naturally gives rise to such security dilemmas. As long as security is conceptualized in these narrow, zero-sum terms, the mutual mistrust and competition will continue to define global power dynamics, as has been the case in past historical rivalries. For a more peaceful world, it is clear that we need to change our lenses and start seeing differently.

Critique of Individualist Paradigm and the Holistic New Security Paradigm

As the world has experienced many unsolved security dilemmas, some of which caused actual wars that killed millions, the individualistic security paradigm with dominance in Western international relations theory, has faced increasing criticism. While this framework has historically shaped the policies of great powers, the limitations of viewing security as a zero-sum game have become more evident thanks to the changing dynamics of the globe. The underlying assumption that states must act as rational and self-interested actors in an anarchic system with focus on self-defense and power maximization has led to cyclical security dilemmas, arms races, and sustained instability. Despite efforts to ensure security through deterrence, balance of power, and alliances, these mechanisms have only managed to address immediate threats without fostering long-term global security.

The previous section emphasized the interconnectedness of US and China in terms of their economic relations. One can argue here that this interconnectedness also means if one fails, the other will also be hurt. Meaning, one's security should also be seen as other's security as well. Maybe it can be difficult to demonstrate this logic for US and China due to their extremely different images in world politics but let's take the scenario of Europe and US. Was not there any period in history that they see each other's security as their own? Was not it the reason for US to provide the Marshall Plan to Europe after the World War II, i.e. in order to secure the European market so that they can continue to be the American market's biggest customer? This shed light to the biggest critiques of the individualistic paradigm. Individualistic paradigm treats security in isolation, without recognizing the interconnectedness of states in the modern world. This approach neglects how defensive actions taken by one state can trigger insecurity elsewhere, perpetuating a cycle of fear and retaliation. It is now evident that the competitive self-centered nature of this framework creates environments where security for one often leads to insecurity for others. Such dynamics illustrate that individualism, while functional in maintaining temporary stability, does not provide a foundation for enduring peace. Additionally, the negative impacts of individualism have prompted deeper reflection within the intellectual community. Scholars and policymakers are increasingly aware that in an interconnected world, no single state can secure itself at the expense of all the others without causing harm to the broader system.

In response to these critiques, a shift toward a more holistic security paradigm has gained traction. The holistic approach to security fundamentally diverges from the individualistic model by focusing on the collective, integrated, and inclusive security. Rather than viewing security as the exclusive responsibility of individual states alone, this paradigm advocates for a more cooperative and system-oriented understanding, where the security of one state is inherently tied to the security of others.

The theoretical differences between individualism and holism are crucial and foundational. While individualism is rooted in the isolation and do-it-for-oneself of each actor, holism posits that the parts of a system cannot be understood in isolation from the whole as individuals are indivisible of the whole. Applied to security, this means that no state can be secure in an isolated sense. Security should be comprehensive, addressing economic, environmental, and societal dimensions alongside traditional concerns. Holism recognizes that security is multifaceted and that challenges, that include even the climate change, require collaborative efforts and shared solutions that serves to all. Three core characteristics can highlight the uniqueness of holistic approach to security. First, security cannot be guaranteed solely through military strength and only from separate state's concerns. It covers a wider range and requires addressing even to the economic inequality, access to resources, and political stability. For instance, post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan have highlighted that military success alone does not lead to stability; addressing economic and governance issues is equally important. Especially in today's world, where we started to talk about non-traditional security, a holistic perspective is needed both in terms of defining the security and also the actors of the security. The case that one state recognized a security challenge and solves it based on their view does not provide an actual solution to solve it. In fact, we can see quite recent examples of how security cannot arise or be solved by one state in insolation. The Syrian

War, although originated mainly from Syria alone, could spread to the whole region, even up until Europe. Although many thought in Syria that when the immigrants escaped from war mostly to Türkiye, the problem was solved in Syria. But then Türkiye became the country with the most migrants in the world, approximately more than 5 million, 3.5 million being Syrian (Mülteciler Derneği, 2024). The numbers are also claimed to be higher than that due to the potential groups with illegal border cross. The Syrians who want to move to Europe then start to cross the Greek borders illegally. They are sent back to Türkiye in a harsh way while creating another mini-security dilemma on the border between Greece and Türkiye because of a reason neither side is actually responsible. If one thinks that these examples are all concerning pure political objectives, then another example can be given from the recent global pandemic of COVID-19. No country could isolate itself, no could see it as only their problem, or no could find a solution only for themselves. If we apply the same logic to Asia-Pacific today, the fact that US has security concerns about the region does not automatically mean that there, for sure, is a security concern in the region. As characteristics of security dilemma, what one sees as defense can be seen as an offense by the other based on their point of view. That is exactly why we need a holistic approach to look all from the same point to security for all. Second, the stability, greatly influenced by the economic outlook of the globe, is foundational for global security. An interconnected global economy means that insecurity in one region can ripple outward, affecting the security of others. The 2008 global financial crisis, for example, demonstrated how economic instability in one part of the world can lead to widespread insecurity and crises, highlighted the need for a well-coordinated global response. Third, it highlights many fields and cooperative actions for it. It is not only about the military security that the world needs and we need to integrate various dimensions of security, i.e. military, economic, environmental, social etc. Climate change, for instance, has become a pressing security issue, as its impacts transcend borders and threaten the globe as a whole. The Paris Agreement on climate change reflects an acknowledgment that no single nation can mitigate the impacts of climate change alone, requiring comprehensive, collective action.

In today's global conjecture, the holistic security paradigm offers a way to address the root causes of insecurity rather than just thinking the self-interest first. There are even studies to take holistic approach for human rights defenders (Tactical Technology Collective, n.d.). Unlike the individualistic approach, which fosters competition and mistrust, the holistic approach accelerates cooperation and trust, creating a foundation for lasting peace with collective actions for all. As global challenges become more interconnected, the holistic security concept provides the only viable path to overcoming the persistent dilemmas and crises that have plagued international relations under the individualistic model. But how to realize it into real life and succeed a peace for all? China, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has an answer. Because we see that China's national security has a holistic view, dedicated to coordinate and maintain state's external and internal security together with development (Yuchen, 2022).

New Security Paradigm and China's Solution

As we have started the article by first looking at the real-life demonstration of the old security paradigm by examining American policy discourse and how it reflects its principles in its real-life containment of China, it's now time to take the new security

paradigm under holism and to demonstrate how it can help achieve worldwide peace by overcoming security dilemmas and conflicts. As a country with first-hand experience of how the old security paradigm, imposed by other powers, can attempt to suppress its global success, China provides an effective case study. In fact, the four global initiatives introduced by Xi Jinping provide a concrete framework for practicing the new security paradigm based on holistic principles.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): Comprehensive Connectivity

Launched in 2013 with his speeches in Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev University and the Indonesian Parliament, the BRI is perhaps the most globally recognized of Xi Jinping's initiatives, focusing mostly on a comprehensive connectivity. In ancient Chinese culture, the importance of harmonious relationships and the pursuit of common prosperity were central tenets, often seen in the ancient Confucian thought. The BRI echoes this cultural wisdom today, thousands of years later, by seeking to build cooperative ties with other nations rather than fostering rivalry (Beyaz, 2024). It underscores the idea that mutual benefit and shared success contribute to a stable and peaceful world. It aims to create a network of infrastructure, trade routes, and economic and cultural cooperation that spans Asia, Africa, Europe, and beyond. Under the lens of holistic security, the BRI shifts away from the traditional focus on military dominance and instead, accelerates economic security through development and cooperation. By enhancing infrastructure and trade ties, the BRI increases interdependence of all, reducing the likelihood of conflict. For example, China's infrastructure investments in Africa and Central Asia not just only provide these regions with much-needed development with know-how or sources but also foster stability by increasing sustainable economic opportunities. This holistic view sees economic prosperity as a foundation for long-term peace, moving beyond the narrow, individualistic approach that prioritizes military power above everything.

The Global Development Initiative (GDI): Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity

The GDI, announced in 2021, further advances the holistic security paradigm by emphasizing the interconnectedness of development and security. It focuses on promoting sustainable development globally, with particular attention to reducing poverty, inequality, and the digital divide. It addresses the root causes of insecurity, including economic disparities and underdevelopment, which are often seen as the root causes for conflict. In fact, the holistic nature of the GDI is reminiscent of traditional Chinese thought, particularly from the Daoist concept of balance and harmony. By focusing on balance in global development, the GDI seeks to create a more equitable international environment, where nations can develop alongside one another, reducing competition and conflict. Through the GDI, China advocates for inclusive global development that ensures no country is left behind. In practical terms, this means encouraging collaboration between developed and developing countries, providing assistance in areas such as infrastructure, education, and healthcare. In fact, the training programs of the Ministry of Commerce of China can be seen as an example of how to succeed this in real life. By addressing the structural causes of insecurity, i.e. economic exclusion and poverty, the GDI embodies a more comprehensive approach to achieving global security.

The Global Security Initiative (GSI): A New Vision for Collective Security

The GSI, launched in 2022, reflects a new vision for security that directly contrasts with the old individualistic paradigm that has been explained previously in this article. Just like the other initiatives, the GSI's principles also resonate with traditional Chinese strategic culture, particularly the emphasis on non-aggression and peaceful coexistence found in the ancient Art of War by Sun Tzu, where the highest form of strategy is to *win without fighting*. The GSI emphasizes a collective, cooperative approach to addressing global security challenges, advocating for dialogue, multilateralism, and shared responsibility as it takes a holistic approach. It challenges the realist notion that security is a zero-sum game and instead promotes the idea that security is indivisible, arguing that the security of one nation is interconnected with the security of others. All the GSI principles are covered previously in the holistic approach discussions but providing real life examples can make it clearer. In practice, the GSI encourages resolving conflicts through diplomacy and dialogue, supporting peace initiatives in regions like the Middle East and Africa. In fact, China could successfully mediate the crises between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and also could successfully make Russia and Ukraine sit on the same table after the Ukraine War break out. These two diplomatic attempts highlight the GSI's emphasis on promoting regional stability through dialogue rather than confrontation.

The Global Civilization Initiative (GCI): Promoting Mutual Respect and Cultural Exchange

The GCI, announced in 2023, broadens the understanding of holistic security by incorporating cultural and civilizational dimensions. Historically, China's approach to diplomacy has often included cultural engagement, as seen in the ancient Silk Road, where trade and cultural exchange went together. The GCI, in that sense, continues this tradition by promoting a world where civilizations learn from each other, reinforcing global peace and security through mutual respect. Therefore, the GCI seeks to promote mutual respect, understanding, and dialogue among different cultures, advocating for a world where diversity is seen as a cultural richness, not as a cause of fight. This initiative recognizes that many global conflicts originate not only from political or economic tensions but also from cultural misunderstandings and prejudices. In that sense, it is also closer to the constructivist perspective. By encouraging cultural exchanges, dialogues among civilizations, and respect for different development paths, the GCI works to build bridges of understanding that can prevent conflicts from arising. It aligns with the holistic security concept.

At the heart of all four initiatives is the foundational vision of Xi Jinping about building a community with a shared future for mankind. This holistic, interconnected worldview is also deeply embedded in Chinese philosophy, particularly Confucianism's emphasis on harmony and collective well-being. The idea of a shared future resonates with the Confucian ideal of *tianxia* (all under heaven), which encourages for governance based on mutual respect, fairness, and shared responsibility among all. This concept adopts the holistic security paradigm, promoting the idea that the fate of all nations, in fact all humanity, is interconnected and that global challenges, whether economic, environmental, or security-related, require cooperative solutions for all. It rejects the individualistic notion that any one nation can secure its future in isolation that is

independent than others. In fact, in the era of globalization, it is also getting more impossible. The idea of a shared future is not just a theoretical construct but is increasingly reflected in global cooperation on issues such as climate change, where the actions of one country can have profound impacts on the rest of the world. China's leadership in international climate negotiations and its efforts to promote green development through the BRI can demonstrate the practical application of this vision.

Conclusion

The US-China security dilemma, rooted in the traditional Western security paradigm, continues to dominate the strategic tension and rivalry between the two major Powers of today. This article has examined the competition between the US and China from several critical perspectives, identifying the limitations of the individualistic approach to security that underpins much of the US policy. This approach, based on zero-sum thinking and self-preservation, has exacerbated tensions, creating an environment of mistrust and escalation that is increasingly difficult to navigate. Framing of China as a revisionist power, and later as a hegemonic threat, reveals the deep-seated strategic insecurity that drives US foreign policy today. This has led to practical actions such as trade sanctions, alliance formations like the Quad and AUKUS, and increased military deployments in the Asia-Pacific region, all of which contribute to the intensification of the security dilemma even more.

The traditional security paradigm and the Western individualism founded on Hobbesian and Lockean principles fuels a cycle of competition and mistrust more. This individualistic paradigm views security as a zero-sum game, where the gains of one state mean losses for another. The US-China rivalry fits this pattern, with each side interpreting defensive measures of each other as aggressive, thereby intensifying the security dilemma. In contrast, the holistic security paradigm appears as an alternative framework. Holistic approach emphasizes cooperation, interdependence, and mutual security. It challenges the narrow focus on military and economic power, offering a more comprehensive view that includes social, environmental, and economic dimensions. In fact, China's four global initiatives—Belt and Road Initiative, Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative are all in line with the holistic approach. These initiatives not only focus on development and security but also emphasize cultural exchange, multilateral cooperation, and collective growth. Through infrastructure development, poverty alleviation, conflict resolution, and cultural respect, China offers a new model for addressing the root causes of global insecurity. The emphasize regarding the impossibility of an isolated security for any country in the world is also highlighted greatly by Xi Jinping's concept of common destiny for all mankind.

In conclusion, while the US continues to operate within a framework that perpetuates rivalry and competition, China's holistic security paradigm provides a practical and forward-looking solution to the security dilemmas of the 21st century. By promoting interdependence, mutual respect, and cooperative security, China's initiatives offer a path to global peace that transcends the limitations of the traditional individualistic approach. As the world becomes more interconnected and interdependent, such a holistic model is not only desirable but necessary for overcoming the persistent challenges to international security in a sustainable way.

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Reframing Egypt-Israel Relations: A Constructivist Perspective on the Nasser and Sadat Eras*

*Mısır-İsrail İlişkilerini Yeniden Çerçevelemek:
Nasır ve Sedat Dönemlerine İnşacı Bir Bakış*

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Abstract

One of the most significant consequences of the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 was the advent of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the region. Palestine, which was already home to an Arab population, became the focus of Israeli settlements, which incited hatred and anger among the Arab states in general. The perception of Israel as the primary adversary of the Arab states reached its zenith following the Suez Crisis of 1956. This event propelled Gamal Abdel Nasser to the forefront of the Arab world as a charismatic leader, thereby giving rise to the pan-Arab ideology of the late 1950s and 1960s. Nasser became the epitome of the struggle against the imperialist West and its extension, Israel, in the Middle East. However, Anwar Sadat, who succeeded Nasser, placed Egyptian interests above those of the Arab states, thereby making Egypt the first Arab country to recognise Israel as a state. Egypt's foreign policy towards Israel underwent a significant transformation, shifting from a pan-Arab nationalist stance to one that prioritised Egyptian interests. This article explores the underlying factors that shaped this political shift, drawing upon the principles of social constructivism and the concept of identity. Through an analysis of the foreign policy actions and discourse of key leaders, it posits that the Egyptian state identity evolved from Nasser to Sadat, with this transition being shaped by a complex interplay of domestic and international factors.

Keywords: Egypt, Israel, State Identity, Foreign Policy, Constructivism

Öz

1948'de İsrail Devleti'nin kurulmasının en önemli sonuçlarından biri bölgede Arap-İsrail çatışmasının ortaya çıkmasıdır. Halihazırda bir Arap topluluğunun yaşadığı Filistin, İsrail yerleşimlerinin hedefi haline gelmiş, bu da genel olarak Arap devletleri arasında nefret ve öfkeye neden olmuştur. İsrail'in Arap devletlerinin baş düşmanı olarak algılanması, Cemal Abdülnasır'ı ezilen Arap dünyasının karizmatik lideri haline getiren ve böylece 1950'lerin sonu ve 1960'ların pan-Arap ideolojisini doğuran 1956 Süveyş krizinin ardından en yüksek seviyesine ulaştı. Nasır, emperyalist Batı'ya ve onun Ortadoğu'daki uzantısı İsrail'e karşı mücadelenin simgesi haline geldi. Ancak Nasır'ın halefi Enver Sedat, Mısır'ın çıkarlarını Arap kaygılarının önüne koyarak Mısır'ı İsrail'i resmen tanıyan ilk Arap devleti haline getirdi. Böylece Mısır'ın İsrail'e yönelik dış politikası pan-Arap milliyetçiliğinden Mısır milliyetçiliğine keskin bir dönüş yaptı. Bu siyasi değişimin nasıl ve neden gerçekleştiği, kimlik kavramına odaklanarak sosyal inşacılık ilkelerine dayanan bu makalenin ana araştırma konusudur. Liderlerin dış politika davranışlarını ve söylemlerini inceleyen bu makale, Mısır devlet kimliğinin Nasır'dan Sedat'a değiştiğini ve bu değişimin iç ve uluslararası faktörlerden kaynaklandığını savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mısır, İsrail, Devlet Kimliği, Dış Politika, İnşacılık

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Introduction

The Middle East has historically been a region characterised by a multitude of competing interests, both within and beyond its borders, resulting in a complex web of confrontations, both military and otherwise. In addition to the inherent complexities of the region, the establishment of the State of Israel on Arab soil in 1948 served to exacerbate the already tense situation. Furthermore, it also triggered intense hatred and hostility towards Israel among Arab states, with Egypt being a particularly prominent example. The Arab military forces were repeatedly defeated in confrontation with a superior enemy, supported and equipped by Western powers, particularly the United States (US). This resulted in further enmity towards Israel. Consequently, Israel became a constant item on the Arab world's foreign policy agenda, serving a variety of political purposes.

Egypt is a country of great geopolitical importance located in the MENA region (Anderson, 1987: 1-18). It is distinguished by a number of factors, including its ancient civilisation, culture, population, and geography, as well as its claim to regional leadership. It is therefore unsurprising that Egypt has been a principal driving force behind the Arab-Israeli conflict from its inception. In this regard, the establishment of Israel in close proximity had far-reaching consequences for all segments of Egyptian society, including the military and civilian populations. The 1948 confrontation with Israel resulted in the scattering of the Arab forces, accompanied by significant internal unrest within the military and widespread demonstrations on the streets. This ultimately led to the collapse of the regime in Egypt in 1952.

The Egyptian monarchy was overthrown on the basis of two key promises: firstly, that it would avenge the humiliating defeat in the war and, secondly, that it would obliterate imperialist influence in the region. This marked the beginning of Gamal Abdel Nasser's tenure as the charismatic leader of Egypt, which saw the rise of a highly influential wave of pan-Arabism. Following the 1956 Suez Crisis, Nasser was reinvigorated as the national hero of Egypt and a prominent figure in the Arab world, effectively restoring Arab pride and dignity. His tenure was characterised by the ascendancy of Arab nationalism across the Arab world, which gave rise to a more profound Arab hatred of Israel. Nasser's rhetoric was characterised by a rhetoric of vigorous statements about the eradication of imperialist influence in the region.

In the midst of the Cold War, when competing ideologies were prevalent, Nasser opted to remain neutral and even spearheaded the establishment of a platform to that end, namely the Non-Alignment Movement. Conversely, Nasser fostered close ties and joint initiatives with Moscow, leading to a shift in Egypt's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union (SU). This was accompanied by a growing dependence on the SU, reflected in the rising military budgets and challenging economic circumstances. With regard to relations with Israel, the most notable event of the Nasser period was the 1967 War, which served to exacerbate existing animosity and hostility towards Israel in the wake of the Arab forces' resounding defeat.

Throughout Nasser's tenure, Egypt defined itself in opposition to Israel. It was perceived as the primary adversary of Israel and a staunch advocate for Palestinian rights. Nevertheless, transformative shifts emerged under the leadership of Muhammad Anwar

al-Sadat, his successor. While Israel remained a predominant focus of Egypt's foreign policy, Sadat adopted distinctive approaches that ultimately steered the nation towards a new trajectory, culminating in negotiations and the signing of a peace treaty with Israel in 1979.

The 1973 War represented the final military confrontation with Israel. It was, in the words of Patrick Seale (1979:191), "a war to make peace". It was a radical move by Sadat to liberate Egyptian territory under Israeli occupation by drawing the attention of the US and compelling Israel to engage in negotiations. This remarkable strategy was subsequently complemented by even more striking actions, including his assertion of willingness to travel to Israel to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict and his historic address to the Israeli parliament. Sadat placed the national interests of Egypt above all else, including collective Arab dignity. In order to achieve this, he recalibrated Egypt's relationships with the two superpowers, opting to shift alliances. He was convinced that the US was capable of facilitating peace and viewed the SU as maintaining the status quo; as a result, Sadat decided to realign Egypt's foreign policy orientation.

It would be beneficial to examine how Egyptian nationalism under Sadat replaced pan-Arabism under Nasser and how this affected Egypt's foreign policy behaviour. However, this cannot be explained by the mainstream theories of International Relations (IR), namely realism and liberalism, which attribute a static identity to actors arising from the archaic international structure. In this vein, social constructivism offers an alternative perspective on the evolving Egyptian stance towards Israel. This perspective posits that such shifts in stance can be attributed to changes in the state's identity, which can be defined and redefined through interstate interactions.

There is a divergence of opinion between scholars of constructivism and proponents of mainstream theories on a number of key issues, including the meaning of anarchy and balance of power, the relationship between state identity and interest, an elaboration of power, and the prospects for change in world politics (Hopf, 1998: 172). In contrast to the mainstream perspective, constructivists do not view the international structure as a given entity. Instead, they emphasise the interactions among states, arguing that the primary structures in the system are not material but rather intersubjective. Furthermore, they contend that the identities of states and their interests are not inherent but rather a product of social construction (Wendt, 1994: 385). In an effort to elucidate and comprehend a state's conduct in global affairs, the concept of identity emerges as a pivotal element. Identity is the manner in which states categorise themselves and others as either allies or adversaries. Consequently, they ascribe a specific identity to one another through the medium of social relations (Kubalkova, 2015: 34).

Identity constitutes a crucial element in the formulation of foreign policy. Given that it is not a material fact, it can be redefined by different leaders, institutions or generations in accordance with the evolving circumstances of politics. As identity is a product of social interactions among states, it is susceptible to change, which renders it an effective instrument for elucidating the Egyptian-Israeli relations during the Nasser and Sadat periods. It is widely accepted that an individual state's identity is shaped by a complex interplay of domestic and international factors. Constructivists, for instance, emphasise

the pivotal role of state identity in influencing a state's interests and actions (Matsumura, 2008: 3).

In this vein, the objective of this article is to examine whether the shift in Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel is indicative of a change in Egypt's state identity across the specified periods. To achieve this, a comparative analysis will be conducted, encompassing the political leaders, institutions, foreign policy behaviours and political discourses of the two terms. The data obtained will then be interpreted within the theoretical framework of constructivism. In order to ascertain whether there has been a continuity or change in Egyptian state identity during the Nasser and Sadat periods, this analysis will be conducted at three levels: the individual level, the domestic level and the international level. The individual level analysis will describe the roles of the leaders, Nasser and Sadat, in defining and disseminating state identity. The domestic level analysis will seek to identify the domestic factors that influence the formation of state identity. The international level analysis will examine the external factors that contribute to this process.

Egypt's Transformation under Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat

From Nasser to Sadat, there was a notable shift in Egypt's foreign policy, moving away from the principles of pan-Arabism and towards a more assertive stance of Egyptian nationalism. This shift in approach ultimately led to the Egypt-Israel peace process. In its most general sense, pan-Arabism or Arab nationalism is an idea that aims to unite Arab states around a shared goal, culture and politics. The scope of this ideology is far-reaching, encompassing a range of levels of cooperation and the unification of all Arab states to create a unified Arab nation (Reiser, 1983: 218). Consequently, it is an ideology with specific practical manifestations that reached its zenith during the tenure of Nasser, who sought to assume leadership of the Arab world. Conversely, Egyptian nationalism is primarily concerned with Egypt and gives precedence to Egyptian considerations. Following the zenith of Arab nationalism, Sadat personified Egyptian nationalism, supplanting Arab concerns with his "Egypt-first" policy (Baker, 1978: 142).

The concept of identity is inherently dualistic, encompassing both the self and the other. This is particularly evident in the context of Egyptian conceptions of self, which play a pivotal role in shaping the relationship with Israel. As posited by Ewan Stein (2011: 737), the formation of the Israeli state represented a significant geopolitical shift, becoming the "other" uniting Arab states under a common objective: combating Zionism. The foreign policy agenda of the Arab states was fixed and unwavering in its opposition to the "Zionist State of Israel." Nevertheless, Egypt assumed a dominant role in its opposition to the State of Israel, serving as the primary catalyst for the 1947, 1967, and 1973 confrontations. Furthermore, Egyptian leaders explicitly expressed their opposition to the existence of Israel, despite their inability to achieve military victory against Israeli forces. The following section will examine the relevance of these perceptions of "self" and "other" to Egyptian-Israeli relations from an Egyptian perspective, focusing on the Nasser and Sadat periods.

Individual Level

As with any other state, an understanding of Egypt's foreign policy cannot be achieved without consideration of the material and non-material factors that shape it, including geography, culture and demography (Shalaby, 1992: 107). However, above all, the actions of Egypt's leaders have been a significant influence on the country's foreign policy. It can be argued that foreign policy represents the primary instrument through which political leaders engage in the definition, reproduction, and transformation of identities (Demirtaş-Coşkun, 2008: 33). In this regard, the influence of these two leaders on the identity of the state of Egypt will be examined in the following sections.

A closer examination of Nasser's personal traits is warranted, given his significant influence on Egypt's foreign policy. He was an inspiring individual and a highly influential orator. He possessed the ability to captivate his audience for extended periods, elucidating the exploitation of Egyptian resources by the West and the potential of Arab unity under Egyptian leadership to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and usher in peace in the Middle East (Tignor, 2010: 260). He was "the man with savage sincerity," who "comes into historical being to lead his people" and who "represents the aspirations of generations before and beyond him" (Osman, 2010: 51).

Nasser's foreign policy was predicated on a set of personal beliefs, which included anti-imperialism, Arabism, leadership, and prestige (Dawisha, 1976: 125). In particular, Arab nationalism constituted the principal ideological tenet of the Nasser era. At the outset of his tenure, Nasser did not initially pursue an "Arab nationalist project." However, what was initially a socio-economic initiative gradually evolved into a "pan-Arabic historical and transformational political vision." Nasser was almost regarded as Saladin, who fought against Crusader armies (Osman, 2010: 66).

Nasser employed the instrument of propaganda through the national radio channel, the Voice of the Arabs, which once proclaimed that "what impacted one part of this nation would by definition impact the other parts". This provides an insight into Nasser's rationale for justifying his involvement in the internal affairs of other Arab states (Dawisha, 2002: 142). In a subsequent transmission, it was stated that "Egypt is in the service of the Arab nation and its struggle against Western imperialists and its lackeys in the Arab world" (Dawisha, 2002: 147).

"Sailing from Yemen, you were crying Palestine" Nasser said in his speech of 22 October 1963 to motivate his soldiers returning from Yemen (Ferris, 2012: 262), reflecting his Arabist views that focused on Israeli enmity. According to Nasser, Arab nationalism "took precedence over any other consideration, even state sovereignty since it was the primary ideological and emotional identification of every Arab" (Dawisha, 2002: 152). In this sense, it is important to emphasise Arab nationalism because "the more pan-Arab the Arab state, the more antipathy and conflict it will express toward Israel" (Dawisha, 2002: 17-18). Therefore, it can be argued that Arab nationalism influences Arab-Israeli relations and that the Nasser era is characterised by an Arab nationalist identity.

Nasser's stance on Arab unity was not merely evident in his approach to Israel; it was also manifest in his broader efforts to challenge imperialism across the region. He once asked "why should Arab efforts to oppose imperialism be dissipated when the region is one, with the same conditions, the same problems, the same future and the same enemy.

The Arabs could be potential allies in getting rid of the remaining influence of imperialism in the region” (Mansfield, 1965: 54). This statement by Nasser is a clear manifestation of his Arab nationalist thinking.

It is argued that it is political leaders who articulate the identity of a state. Moreover, political leaders instrumentally resort to state identity in order to achieve certain foreign policy goals (Demirtaş-Coşkun, 2008: 33). Similarly, Nasser used pan-Arab identity to intervene in the internal affairs of other Arab states and to demonize Israel. All of this can be revealed by examining statements, speeches, and memoirs. In this sense, Nasser’s political discourse on Israel provides important clues about his conceptions of “self” and Israel as “other.”

Nasser’s discourse against Israel was noteworthy as he defined Egypt as the main obstacle to “the Israeli project of becoming an integral part of the Middle East,” as he strongly argued that “all Arab lands belonged to the Arabs” and that “Israel was an arrow aimed at the heart of the Arab world.” According to him, there was a “civilizational and generational war between the Arabs and Israel” and “the armed struggle against Israel was valid and necessary” and also “the struggle with Israel was not a Palestinian-Israeli struggle but an Arab-Israeli struggle” (Osman, 2010: 71).

He was convinced that Israel was a “Western military base” positioned in the Middle East with the ultimate goal of creating divisions among Arab states. In this sense, Israel was considered both an “occupier of Arab Palestine” and “the strategic enemy of the nation.” Therefore, Egypt was never completely secure in the face of an Israeli state; even the existence of Israel was intolerable and against the interests of the Arab nations (Osman, 2010: 71).

Between the revolution of 1952 and the October War of 1973 -which marks the entire Nasser period and the first years of Sadat’s tenure-, Israel was considered synonymous with imperialism. An analysis of Nasser’s major speeches revealed that Israel generally did not receive many direct references -visibly less than the references of imperialism- as Israel was generally regarded as a “child of imperialism” (Dawisha, 2002: 243).

For Nasser, Israel was a “fabricated state” (dawla mulaffaqa) after all (Stein, 2011: 740). Nasser announced in a speech that “Israel today does not represent for the Egyptians, the Arabs, the Afro-Asian bloc, nor for the world’s conscience, only a military aggression toward Egypt or the Arabs, or this region of the world. Rather, it represents something else. It represents the attempt to dominate us by way of this state. Israel represents foreign pressure on the Arabs. It represents the attempt to divide the Arab forces and spread division among them, to prevent them from joining and uniting and benefiting from the fruits of their country and their land” (Nasser, 1955).

According to Nasser, Israel “stands for imperialism. It serves imperialism and its objectives of domination and exploitation. It follows that the triumph of freedom and peace in liquidating imperialism cannot occur without affecting Israel’s existence... It is one and the same battle” (Stein, 2011: 741). He further argued that Israel is “actively aggressive and expansionist” and will not stop until it has conquered most of the Arab territories (James, 2006: 9).

In defining state identity, Marc Lynch (1999: 349) presents it as a combination of leaders' perceptions, ideas, institutions and discourse. Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (2002: 8) describe it as "corporate and officially demarcated identity linked to the state apparatus." In his statements, Nasser consistently characterised Israel as "hostile, threatening, deceitful and aggressive." He portrayed it as "the fundamental enemy who is a manifestation of perpetual aggression." Just before the 1967 War, Nasser described Israel as "militarily boastful, deluded by false past successes and ripe for destruction by the Arab nation" (Parker, 1993: 97-99).

Regarding a settlement with Israel, Nasser was convinced that "as long as the Israelis cannot sign a peace treaty with us, Israel will not consider that it has won the war. The Zionist strategy is to force a settlement" (Parker, 1993: 135). Nasser believed that Israel would not agree to withdraw from Sinai because the main objective of their "deceitful," "cunning," "vicious," and "depraved" enemy was "expansion at the expense of Arab territory" (James, 2006:138).

With regard to the West, and the US in particular, Nasser always urged caution and was openly opposed to US involvement in regional affairs. According to Nasser, the US was "biased in favor of Israel" and was "planning to facilitate Israel's domination of the Arab area" (Farid, 1994: 58). A Soviet ambassador reported in 1967 that he "did not trust the Americans" and described them as "crooks and thieves" (James, 2006: 141).

Apart from being the result of social construction, identity not only defines an actor, but also determines how that actor must "think, feel, evaluate, and ultimately behave" (Chafetz et.al., 1998: viii). In other words, this self-defining concept has significant consequences for a state's behaviour and thus for its foreign policy. In this sense, Nasser once said that "there is no alternative to battle. Despite his losses, the enemy continues his pressure and arrogance. The enemy's friends, with the US foremost among them, continue to give him aid, thus helping him continue his aggression" (James, 2006: 144). He did not separate Israel from the US and saw it as a single and unified struggle as follows: "The struggle with Israel is not over yet. And the struggle with the Americans also is not over" (James, 2006: 130). Even his statements in the early 1970s indicated a clear hostility towards the US, "which wanted Israel to crush the peoples of the Arab nation" (James, 2006:159). The Soviet statesman Anatoly Dobrynin once said that Nasser "would not negotiate with Israel about anything, about demilitarisation, free maritime passage or security arrangements. And he would not agree to the language on peace that the US had made a condition for its endorsement of total Israeli withdrawal from Sinai" (Korn, 1992: 163-164).

According to Vendulka Kubalkova (2015: 34), it is the states that reflect each other as friends, rivals or enemies. Thus, they ascribe a certain identity to each other through social relations. Nasser never described himself as "an anti-Semite on a personal level", claiming that his "feelings of hostility towards Israel" and his "actions against it came later from only one thing: the Zionist movement, which led to the usurpation of a piece of Arab land" (Nasser, 1962). In an interview, Nasser responded to a question from David Morgan about the "problem of Israel" as follows: "The existence of Israel in our region is impossible to accept. It is not possible for us to go back on our determination to attain the full recognition of the Palestinian rights, to return a million Arab refugees to their

homes in Gaza from which they have been evacuated. Any thought of reconciliatory negotiations with the Israelis is necessarily inconsiderable. Even if they are willing to offer financial compensation of some kind, it is impossible to buy a human beings fatherland, or spirit, or basic human rights” (Nasser, 1962).

Commenting on the likelihood of a settlement with Israel, Nasser said in the same interview: “The account will be settled one day. I believe what will help achieve this is to promote the economy of the Arab World and raise the standard of living of its people, to reach this stage where we can exert pressure upon the Israelis and those who support them, until they realize the futility of their resistance” (Nasser, 1962).

Nasser’s influence on definition of the Egyptian identity and determination of foreign policy behaviour towards Israel is profound since “the evaluation of a foreign state by decision-makers is not based on what it is but their image of a state concerning its positions, capabilities and culture” (Boulding, 1956: 6) Like Nasser, Sadat left his mark on the direction of his country’s policy towards Israel and the West, which will be analysed below.

Upon the sudden death of Nasser, Sadat ascended to the Egyptian presidency. His ascension was not anticipated to be long-lasting, and he was not expected to implement significant alterations to the country’s domestic or foreign policy. This was due to the fact that he lacked the charisma and leadership qualities that were associated with Nasser (Tignor, 2010: 274). Even some observers initially derisively referred to the new President as “Nasser’s pet poodle.” However, as time passed, even his opponents were compelled to acknowledge that Sadat had left an indelible imprint on Egypt’s domestic and international standing, just as his predecessor had done (Cleveland, 2008: 416).

“No nation has a greater stake in Sadat’s survival than Israel,” writes Henry Jackson (1981: 61) to define how Sadat’s Israel policy could end Nasser’s shadow on his leadership and transform him into a remarkable name of unexpected developments. Thus, the Nasser and Sadat periods differ greatly, among other things, in their handling of the key foreign policy issue of Israel. Nasser rejected any possibility of reconciliation with Israel, while Sadat officially reached an agreement with Israel to avoid war (Stein, 2011: 745).

Nasser’s dream of Arab identity was transformed by Sadat into an “Egypt first” policy. The two leaders differed in their responses to a common problem of sovereignty. Ending British influence was Nasser’s initial objective, while Sadat’s main concern was to regain control of Egyptian territory under Israeli occupation (Shalaby, 1992:109). In order to achieve these goals, they pursued drastically different policies both domestically and internationally.

Political leaders may choose to adopt a particular identity over the others in order to respond to some international developments or to realise their particular agendas. In this sense, Anaïd Flesken (2018: 52-54) argues that political leaders significantly influence the formation and redefinition of identities that are subsequently adopted by society and constitute a shared understanding. They have the capacity to shape and reshape the public discourse on the boundaries of self and other. It is therefore important to examine the qualities of the leader, as it has been argued convincingly that it is the leaders who have the greatest impact on the foreign policy orientations of authoritarian states. Indeed,

leaders “make decisions from among different choices, plan and conduct diverse actions and utilize their knowledge to look after their goals” (Sylvan et.al., 1990: 75). In this sense, Sadat’s concept of self and other, and his personal limitations that condition such a definition, need to be illuminated. To begin with, Sadat considered himself “an Egyptian rather than an Arab”, which allowed him to sit at the negotiating table with Israel and defend his country’s interests rather than adhere to the principles of Arab unity. He once said that “it is not conceivable that the fate of my country should be dependent on the consent of other Arabs” (Dishon, 1978: 12-15). In this way he distanced himself from Nasserist Arabism.

Sadat put his country on an “Egypt first” axis, which left Arab unity in the shadow of patriotism. This adherence to Egyptian patriotism became the dominant ideology of the Sadat era. In this context, Sadat launched the 1973 War with Israel not as an extension of Arab nationalism, but of “Egyptian patriotism and domestic unity” (Dawisha, 2002: 267).

“He (Sadat) was particularly thick-skinned when it came to Arab nationalist causes,” writes Michael Barnett (1998: 197) in explaining the peace treaty with Israel. Another note accused Sadat of abandoning the “Arab cause”, to which Sadat responded by stressing “his primary responsibility to Egypt” (Dawisha, 2002: 267). Thus, “state sovereignty” and “national interests” became the basis for Sadat’s foreign policy behaviour towards Israel, signalling a change in Egyptian identity.

In attempting to explain this structural shift in foreign policy, it can be argued that Nasser’s foreign policy choices were strongly influenced by the anti-colonial movements of his time, and also by his conception of Egypt as a leader in its region. Sadat’s policy orientations, on the other hand, were essentially driven by his goal of defending the country’s national interests above all else (Shalaby, 1992: 114). Sadat prioritised Egyptian national interests over the Arab identity glorified by his precedent, which led Sadat to approach the Arab-Israeli question from a different perspective and a new way of thinking. This is relevant to Kubalkova’s argument that “what states want to do is based on how they see themselves in relation to others” (Kubalkova, 2015: 33).

Birgül Demirtaş-Coşkun (2008: 33) argues that states can choose to maintain or change their identities through interstate interactions. In this regard, foreign policy is the main tool of political leaders in defining, reproducing or transforming identities. Sadat’s main break with Nasser’s foreign policy orientations came after the 1973 War, which changed Sadat’s position towards the two superpowers. Sadat chose to end the Nasserist hostility to the West and instead to downgrade relations with the SU. The 1973 War also marks the date of the change in policy towards Israel. “No recognition, no negotiations, no peace” became “recognise Israel, negotiate with Israel and make peace with Israel”. In this way, Sadat abandoned his longstanding policy of pan-Arabism in favour of Egypt’s national interests. The last battle with Israel was launched with the goals of recovering the Egyptian territories under Israeli occupation, ending the military confrontations with Israel because of its ruinous economic burden, restoring relations with the US because of its weighted role in Israel’s policies and improving Egypt’s economy through Western capital. These goals did not include any reference to “Arab nationalism”, “Arab unity” or “Arab revolution”, which were like the “staple diet” of Nasser’s statements (Dawisha, 2002: 265).

In 1973, Egypt and Syria were engaged in a joint military campaign with the stated objective of liberating the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. However, it is evident that Syria's primary motivation was the retrieval of Egyptian territory, as evidenced by the fact that Sadat had no intention of ceding any territory to Syria. This priority was made evident by Sadat's acceptance of the unilateral armistice with Israel, which was only revealed to Syria during the Security Council announcement of the Egyptian government's acceptance of the ceasefire (Dawisha, 2002: 266). According to Seale (1979: 261), this marked the conclusion of Egypt's pan-Arab phase and signalled a shift in Sadat's ideological orientation, which became increasingly opposed to the principles espoused by Nasser. For some, this process would culminate in Sadat's "concessions emboldening Israel, leaving the Palestinians in the lurch, and wrenching Egypt from the community of Arab states it had previously led" (Brownlee, 2011-2012: 666).

Daniel Green (2015: 33) posits that identities, in particular, emerge as a pivotal element when they undergo a transformation, giving rise to hitherto unexperienced alternatives, behaviours and preferences that have the potential to alter the course of history. Similarly, the Camp David Accords provide clear evidence of a new approach to Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel. In lieu of the erstwhile hostile stance, the government has now acknowledged the necessity to adopt a "constructive" and "correct" approach in its relations. It is argued that Nasser's "Arabism" transformed into "Egyptian nationalism" during the Sadat period. This shift in identity was a crucial factor in enabling the conclusion of a peace treaty with Israel (Stein, 2011: 739).

The Camp David Accords pushed Egypt from the "heart and centre of Arab politics" to its "extreme periphery" (Dawisha, 2002: 268). The treaty brought back "Nile Valley nationalism" as it focused more on "domestic concerns" than on "pan-Arab causes such as Palestine". In fact, Palestine was the main issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but it was completely ignored in the treaty. Above all, the peace treaty was said to damage the Palestinians' "negotiating stance" (Dawisha, 2002: 195). Sadat's foreign minister, Ismail Fahmi, even accused him of being "double-faced," arguing that he was publicly supporting the Palestinians while in fact "sending different messages" to Israel (Abadi, 2019: 9).

The foreign policy behaviours of agents cannot be defined as "routinized social practices." Rather, they are "non-routine actions designed to effect or deal with change." Furthermore, foreign policy encompasses deliberate and premeditated actions based on "conscious decision making designed to achieve a specific goal which may well be a change from the status quo" (Flockhart, 2016: 90). Similarly, the October War was a "war to make peace," a strategy designed to alter the status quo in a profoundly historic manner.

As has been previously argued, it is political leaders who define a state's identity. This part of the article will analyse Sadat's discourse towards Israel by examining his speeches and statements. The speeches will be presented in chronological order, which is essential for demonstrating the evolution of Sadat's discourse on the subject of Israel and the US.

In the initial years of his tenure, Sadat espoused a rhetoric similar to that of Nasser, which subsequently underwent a transformation. To illustrate, in a speech delivered at the Egyptian Assembly in 1972, Sadat attributed the displacement of Palestinians to Israel's actions, which he characterised as "genocide and destitution." He also accused the US of

supplying Israel with resources. Furthermore, he posited that the US would be unable to impose upon the Arab people the notion of a *fait accompli* of peace. He further asserted that “We will not cede one inch of Arab land. There will be no negotiations with Israel. There will not be in Egypt and we will not allow in the Arab land anybody who would relinquish the Palestinian people’s right.” Moreover, Sadat characterised Israel as “a tool of imperialism,” a term previously employed by Nasser. This rhetoric does not bode well for the prospect of a settlement, as it positions Israel as an adversary (Sadat, 1972).

In his statement of 16 October 1973, Sadat (1973: 90-96) modified his previous stance and asserted that “when great nations confront major challenges, they are capable of setting their priorities with the utmost clarity”. He discussed the concept of “peace based on justice,” asserting that Egypt is “fighting for the sake of peace” and referred to Israel as the “Zionist state.” Furthermore, he asserted that they are not “adventurers in war” but “seekers of peace,” and that they “want the policy of detente to succeed and be fostered.” Israel is depicted as an adversary, whereas numerous references are made to the “Arab nation.” In his statement, Sadat expressed his willingness to attend an international peace conference on the condition that Israel would retreat to the lines held prior to the 1967 War.

In contrast to the previous hostile stance towards the US due to its forthright support for Israel, President Sadat welcomed President Nixon to Cairo on June 12, 1974. Nixon described this meeting as a “turning point” in bilateral relations, contrasting it with the previous period, which he characterised as “a period of misunderstanding and non-cooperation” (Nixon, 1974: 173). In a reversal of his previous stance, Sadat returned to the “pre-Nasser era,” concluding that Egypt’s “national interests could be best served under American hegemony” (Seale, 1979: 191).

Sitting down at the negotiating table with Israel was regarded as “inconsiderable” by Nasser, but just 13 years later, in 1975, Sadat told the press that “we stand at a turning point of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the first time in 26 years, it is possible to achieve peace in the area. I quite agree with Dr. Kissinger that the position of Egypt and Israel can be reconciled” (Sawant, 1979: 29). Towards the end of the same year, Sadat expressed his commitment “to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations” (Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt, 1975).

In support of his *infitah* policy, Sadat (1975a) delivered a speech to the Economic Club of New York on 30 October 1975, in which he sought to attract foreign investment to his country as long as it was aimed at “mutual benefit and not exploitation”. This was also a departure from the foreign policy of Nasser, who had distanced his country from the West.

In his speech to Egyptian nationals in Washington in 1975, Sadat (1975b) stated that his visit to the US had “realised a balance with the big powers and put an end to the attitude of traditional friendship and traditional enmity, and hence Egypt’s national interests have become the foremost consideration”. This focus on national interest can be seen as a harbinger of the Egyptian nationalism that Sadat would embrace throughout his presidency. On 7 November 1975, Sadat (1975c) met with British businessmen to declare his open-door policy and invite foreign capital to his country. This signalled a change in the previous identification of Britain with imperialism.

State identity has its roots in political leaders and certain state institutions and plays a decisive role in conditioning foreign policy practices through which it will show friendship, hostility or rivalry towards other states. Therefore, the redefinition of state identity basically means the redefinition of relations with other actors as friends, enemies or rivals (Altorai, 2012:52). In one of his speeches in 1975 (1975d), Sadat said that “when I went to America and spoke before the Congress after the October War, I was addressing them as an equal, as a friend but not as an ally” and he implied his “willingness to negotiate with the US despite ideological differences”. Thus, Sadat described the US as a friend, which is a redefinition of self and the other.

At a meeting with Arab and African ambassadors, Sadat declared: “we do not have traditions of friendship nor enmity with anyone. We side with our interests, and we can never live in isolation from the world.” Sadat (1975e) went on to explain how he “used” the US “to advance the peace process”. In doing so, Sadat turned his back on the former enmity that had been vigorously maintained during the Nasser period.

In his address to the assembly in 1976, Sadat (1976a), referring to a Nasserist policy, declared that Egypt had “got rid of the categorizations which separated the Arab states, and which wasted much of the Arab and national effort in internal and secondary fights which could only benefit the enemy. When I say categorizations, I mean labels such as reactionary, progressive and the likes”. This was Nasser’s discourse for intervening in the other Arab states and supporting the revolutionary movements there. Sadat made it clear that he would not pursue such a foreign policy and would instead focus on the interests of his own country.

In his statements, Sadat (1976b) began to emphasise the benefits of ending the war with Israel, telling the German Foreign Policy Society in 1976 that Egypt wanted to “put an end to human suffering and misery” and “relieve the burden of defence budgets and military expenditures”. In terms of conflict resolution, scholars believe that identity changes of the groups involved would eventually strengthen peace processes and become a shortcut to reconciliation (Rumelili and Todd, 2018: 4).

In a statement released on 11 November 1976, Sadat (1976c) called on the US to “establish a just peace in the area and to set up new Arab-American relations.” During a visit to Ismailia in the same year, he (1976d) stated that “1977 shall be the year for exerting our utmost for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.” In his speech of 9 November 1977, he (1977a) asserted that he was indifferent to the procedural methods that Israel might demand in order to proceed to the Geneva negotiations. He further stated that he was even prepared to meet with Israeli representatives in the Knesset to discuss the matter.

On 20 November 1977, Sadat (1977b) delivered his historic speech in the Israeli Knesset, calling for “peace and a lasting, fair settlement”. His declaration that he could visit Jerusalem was a major challenge to a deep-rooted Arab taboo and even included tacit recognition of the Israeli state. In his address to the Knesset, Sadat called for “a comprehensive peace with total Israeli withdrawal from Arab lands and the recovery of the Palestinians’ rights, including their right to set up an independent state” (Brownlee, 2011-2012: 653). In his speech to the Knesset, he “expressly recognized Israel’s right to exist in West Asia.” Sadat further added that “Egypt would accept all international

guarantees that you can imagine and from whomever.” Before presenting his ‘five-point formula’, he asked the Israeli parliament to stop the desire for conquest and not to use force in its relations with the Arabs (Sawant, 1979: 36). On 8 February 1978, as he left the US, President Sadat (1978) promised not “to fail” the American people and referred to US President Carter as his “friend”.

In conclusion, state identity is about drawing boundaries and labelling others as friends or enemies, and therefore this concept is a very important tool for describing the nature of relations between states. By abandoning the Arab nationalist identity of the previous era and adopting a new Egyptian nationalist identity, Sadat was able to sit at the negotiating table with Israel and reach a settlement that ended in a peace treaty that was unimaginable only a decade ago.

Domestic Level

The constructivist perspective posits that agents shape their identities and make them known through their policy choices. Moreover, agents are inclined to define their identities and interests in accordance with their domestic or external circumstances (Demirtaş-Coşkun, 2005: 190). It is therefore crucial to gain an understanding of the internal and international environment in order to conduct a more robust analysis. This section of the article will examine the internal indicators that suggest the existence of a specific identity, initially Arab nationalism and subsequently Egyptian nationalism in this instance, and the domestic factors that influence such a definition.

At the domestic level, the capital sign of Arab nationalism is evidenced by the adoption of the Constitution of 1956 and the Provisional Constitution of the United Arab Republic of 1958. The Constitution of 1956 defines Egypt as “an independent Arab state that is in its essence sovereign, and it is a democratic republic, and the people of Egypt are a part of the Arab nation” (Sivak-Reid, 2016: 45). Similarly, the Provisional Constitution of the United Arab Republic (1958) resulted in a change of the state’s name. Egypt continued to use the name of the United Arab Republic until 1971. The 1956 Constitution defined Egypt as an Arab country, which subsequently influenced the country’s national position in the following years. This definition associated the Egyptian identity with a specific ethnicity, following the long-term imperial presence in the country (Alsayyad, 2013: 238). The official use of the term “Arab” in the constitution serves as a crucial indicator of the dominant ideology of Arab nationalism during the 1960s. Furthermore, Nasser employed Islam as a unifying force within the Arab world, as evidenced by the 1956 Constitution’s designation of Islam as the state religion. Nevertheless, Nasser did not invoke Islam in relation to Israel. In this sense, his struggle against Israel was essentially framed in terms of a “theft of land” rather than any religious competition (Hatina, 2007, p. 100).

Another domestic component of the state identity of the Nasserist era was an “Arab version of socialism” (Hatina, 2007: 70), which served to bind Egypt and the SU closer together despite the considerable differences in their respective ideologies. However, as this article is concerned with the role of Egyptian state identity in Egyptian-Israeli relations, and as this component did not exert any significant influence on their bilateral relations, the socialist dimension of Egyptian identity will be excluded from consideration. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the United Egyptian Communist Party

has made some statements that shed light on its understanding of Israel. In a report published by the Party in 1955, it was asserted that “American imperialism has made Israel its spearhead in its Middle Eastern policy directed against Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia- a springboard for extending its influence and domination over the economy and politics of the Arab countries” (Beinin, 1990: 170).

In the following year, the Party published a report in which it was stated that “imperialism is the principal enemy.” The regime’s newspaper, *al-Misa*, described Israel as both an “imperialist base” and a “tool against the Arab liberation movement.” The Israeli attack on the Suez was primarily aimed to “break the Arab front and turn the attention of the Arabs from the direct battle with imperialism to an indirect battle with its stepdaughter (rabiba) Israel” (Stein, 2011: 740).

The media, which had a domestic base but international repercussions, referred to Israel as an “illegitimate entity” and accused it of being “behind every ill that befell the Arab world” (Dawisha, 2002: 242). Consequently, Israel was regarded as the “perceived common enemy of all Arab states, be they monarchies or republics, traditional or revolutionary” (Dawisha, 1976: 43). The state’s control of the media contributed to the consolidation of Nasser’s position as the emerging leader of the Arab world. For instance, the radio programme *The Voice of Arabs* played a pivotal role in popularising Nasser and disseminating his impassioned orations across the entirety of the Arab region, from “the Ocean to the Gulf.” Furthermore, the film and music industries were employed as a means of lauding and glorifying Nasser’s pan-Arabic perspectives (Osman, 2010: 66).

The most notable domestic factor that precipitated the ascendance of Arab nationalism in Nasser’s Egypt was the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. This subsequently evolved into an international issue following the tripartite aggression. The unexpected conclusion of the crisis marked a pivotal moment in the ascendance of Egypt-led Arab nationalism, thereby reinvigorating Nasser’s legacy as a leader who “restored the dignity of the Arab masses” (Mansfield, 1973: 675).

The poor economic situation in Egypt and the prevalence of poverty were significant contributing factors to the consolidation of Arab nationalist ideology. Egypt was expected to be able to sustain itself, particularly given the significance of the Suez Canal. However, the country’s resources had long been exploited by Britain and Western imperialism, a phenomenon that was pervasive throughout the Middle East. The shared fate of the Arab states may have contributed to the intensification of Arabist nationalist sentiments among the Egyptian populace, fostering a sense of solidarity and opposition towards a perceived common adversary. As Nasser asserted, “Arab unity was the only weapon available to fight imperialism in the Middle East” (Jillani, 1991: 79).

Nasser’s tenure is characterised by numerous socio-economic reforms, including those pertaining to the field of education. The implementation of free primary and university education served to enhance the country’s literacy and intellectual capacity (Tignor, 2010: 270). This resulted in a heightened level of awareness among the citizenry, enabling them to comprehend the ramifications of colonialism on their homeland. One might posit that such a national consciousness served to exacerbate enmity towards the West and reinforce ties with other Arab states that had similarly suffered from similar oppression.

Conversely, the tenure of Sadat was shaped by domestic factors that contributed to the rise of Egyptian nationalism. With regard to the domestic developments of the period that could be related to a new identity formation, the name of Egypt was changed from the United Arab Republic to the Arab Republic of Egypt. Consequently, the official designation of the state retained the term “Arab” but omitted the word “United”, which may be perceived as a gesture of distancing from pan-Arab ideologies. Despite Sadat’s discontinuation of the Arab nationalist identity, there was a notable increase in the prominence of Islamic identity in Egypt during the 1970s. In particular, Sadat sought to exploit Islamism and Islamists as a means of suppressing those who adhered to Nasserism and leftism. Consequently, Sadat became known as the “believer president”. In this context, the 1971 Constitution established Sharia as a “source of legislation,” which was subsequently designated as the “principal source” in 1980 (Tignor 2010: 44-45). Despite the growth of Islamic influence, it is not possible to assert that Egypt adopted an Islamic identity that would have had implications for its relations with Israel.

From Nasser to Sadat, there was a discernible shift in identity that paved the way for the establishment of a peace treaty with Israel. In this context, a number of socioeconomic factors contributed to the necessity of such a rapprochement. Firstly, negotiations were required in order to safeguard the regime from internal threats to its own stability. Exhausted from the perception of “unwinnable wars,” Egypt required a prolonged period of “retrenchment,” which resulted in a sense of emotional distance from Arab grievances. This represented a departure from the Egyptian foreign policy pursued from the end of the Second World War onwards, which had been characterised by a desire for dominance over Arab countries (Seale, 1979: 192).

Sadat had initiated the Infitah policy with the objective of improving the Egyptian economy, which was experiencing difficulties. However, the Infitah policy did not yield the anticipated results. Consequently, Sadat was convinced that he had to relieve the economic burden created by military expenditures and revive the war-torn finances of the country. Consequently, this radical move by Sadat gained some support from economically devastated Egyptians (Brownlee, 2011-2012: 653), and he was convinced that Egypt’s prosperity depended on it.

In conclusion, the war-torn economy of the country, the pressing necessity to advance socio-economic development by reducing military expenditure and securing US assistance, and the persistently declining confidence of the Egyptian populace in the regime were among the principal domestic factors influencing the redefinition of the state identity.

International Level

In accordance with constructivist theory, the international environment also serves to condition and shape a state's identity. As Martha Finnemore (1996: 128) observes, “The fact that we live in an international society means that what we want and, in some ways, who we are shaped by the social norms, rules, understandings, and relationships we have with others”. This is an important consideration in understanding the impact of external factors on state identity. Accordingly, this section of the article will concentrate on the international context of the pertinent periods in order to ascertain its influence on the formulation of Egyptian identity.

In the context of the Nasser period, the initiation of the Non-Alignment Movement under the leadership of Egypt and the foundation of the United Arab Republic represent noteworthy instances of Arab nationalism in the international arena. In the 1950s, Nasser declined an alliance proposal from US President Dulles, asserting that the defence of the region should originate from within the region itself, without the involvement of external actors (Dawisha, 2002: 161).

From the outset, the new regime was not wholly averse to the idea of maintaining normal relations with Israel. However, following 1955, there was a shift in political discourse, with the term “Zionist entity” becoming more prevalent than “State of Israel”. This new orientation was further intensified when the US was unable to provide the requisite aid and particularly when Israel joined forces with Britain and France to attack the Suez Canal. Subsequently, Israel was no longer regarded as a “sovereign actor,” but rather as a “hive of imperialism” (Stein, 2011: 740).

The 1960s saw the highest level of Egyptian enmity towards Israel since the time of the Arab nationalism doctrine of Nasser, which aimed to end the Western presence in the region, settle the Palestinian issue and topple the Israeli state. Furthermore, the 1967 War intensified this hostility. In the aftermath of the 1967 War, which resulted in a humiliating defeat for Arab forces, Arab leaders convened in Sudan and they decided “not to negotiate with Israel, nor to recognize or make peace with it” (Abadi, 2019: 6).

The definition of identity is significantly influenced by international developments. On occasion, international structures serve as a catalyst for local transformations. To illustrate, imperialism prompted discussions of self-determination. In the case of Egypt, the US’s containment policy led to the rise of Arab nationalism during the Nasser era, which reached its zenith with the Baghdad Pact (Telhami and Barnett, 2002: 12-13). It is crucial to consider the East-West struggle during the Cold War and its impact on the perception of the Middle East by the superpowers in order to gain a deeper understanding of the motivations behind the actions of both Nasser and Sadat. To illustrate, Nasser’s era was a period during which Third World countries were striving for national independence under the leadership of prominent figures such as Nehru from India, Nkrumah from Ghana, and Lumumba from Congo. These developments also contributed to the emergence of pan-Arabism.

Following the US’s decision to withdraw its financial support for the construction of the Aswan Dam and to cease supplying military equipment to Egypt, the latter turned to the SU for assistance. The competition between Washington and Moscow to expand their influence in various regions of the globe provided Nasser with an alternative financier and supplier, which effectively served to distance Nasser from the West and approach the SU, thus influencing the formation of Egypt’s state identity.

The weak position of other regional states also contributed to the ascendance of Nasser as an unparalleled figure. Additionally, revisionist movements were present in Syria and Iraq, while Lebanon was engaged in an ongoing struggle with sectarian tensions. The situation in other countries was similarly unsatisfactory. The external situation had an impact on the Arab nationalist identity of Egypt during Nasser’s tenure, influencing the development of Egyptian foreign policy.

Kuniko Ashizawa (2008: 571) posits that state identity engenders a “pro attitude toward a certain kind of action,” which in turn informs a particular foreign policy. In the case of Arab nationalism during the Nasser era, Egypt did not prioritise its own national interests; instead, it gave precedence to the interests of the Arab nation, which placed the concept of a “transnational Arab nation” above the boundaries of the nation-state (Telhami and Barnett, 2002: 17). Without consideration of this concept of identity, it would be impossible to comprehend the rationale behind Egypt’s involvement in Yemen and its union with Syria. Conversely, it is unlikely that Egypt would have been able to reach a peaceful settlement with Israel had it adopted an Arab nationalist identity. In this way, identity becomes a significant factor in determining interests. In the case of pan-Arabism, for example, it has been observed to influence “inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli dynamics” (Telhami and Barnett, 2002: 17-18).

Conversely, Sadat’s tenure occurred concurrently with the *détente* between the US and the SU. This context partially explains Moscow’s reluctance to endorse Egypt’s confrontations with Israel. Egypt’s reliance on the SU was significant, yet the lack of support during a potential military operation further estranged Sadat from the SU and drew Egypt closer to the US, which had a vested interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In addition to its relations with the superpowers, Saudi Arabia played a significant role in Sadat’s efforts to achieve a settlement. Indeed, in their pursuit of peace, the three states - Egypt, Israel and the US- each pursued their own geopolitical agendas, seeking to assert their influence and gain a strategic advantage in the region. From the perspective of Egypt, the peace treaty can be viewed as a form of rebellion against the status quo imposed upon it by oil-rich states. In the context of Egypt’s historical challenges, including the dissolution of the UAR, the Yemen War, and the 1967 War, Saudi Arabia emerged as a dominant regional power. It was challenging for Egypt to accept the secondary position it was forced into, particularly given its demographic structure, industrial infrastructure and significant role in “intellectual, cultural and Islamic achievement” (Seale, 1979:192).

Sadat sought to reverse this “unnatural state of affairs,” as he believed it was the right of the Egyptians to lead the Arab world, given their role as a crucial mediator in the region. Without Egypt, he argued, there could be no peace, as their involvement was essential for maintaining stability in the region. Consequently, Sadat’s visits to Jerusalem, Camp David and Washington were not, as has been previously asserted, an act of “isolationism” from the Arab world. Rather, they were an expression of Egypt’s desire to reassert its leadership position in the region (Seale, 1979: 193).

From the perspective of the US, its involvement in the peace efforts of Sadat was driven by the alignment of its national interests with the pursuit of a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Primarily, the US sought to conclude costly and uncertain military conflicts, prevent the SU from gaining influence in the region, guarantee access to Middle Eastern oil, and, most crucially, guarantee the security of Israel, which had consistently been a priority in its foreign policy (Seale, 1979: 189). In this context, the 1973 oil crisis is of particular significance. The Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) initiated an oil embargo on Western countries in response to US support for Israel. This resulted in unprecedented chaos, prompting the US to take action to prevent a similar scenario from occurring in the future. These developments prompted the US to become

involved in the peace process, which was accepted by Sadat. According to Mohamed H. Heikal (1978: 725), Kissinger is reported to have told Sadat that while the Soviets could provide arms, which would lead to war, the US could only offer peace through the return of occupied territories.

Conclusion

The Arab-Israeli conflict is a historical issue that encompasses a vast geographical area and involves a significant number of states in the Middle East region. For an extended period, Israel was regarded as a foreign entity by Arab states. Egypt, in particular, maintained a prominent role for Israel in its foreign policy, engaging in every confrontation with Israel and serving as the primary source of hostility towards it. Despite the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, Egypt's stance towards Israel underwent a significant transformation over the twenty-five-year period between Nasser and Sadat.

The objective of this article was to present a constructivist interpretation of the relationship between Egypt and Israel, with a particular focus on the evolution of state identity. To this end, the article compares and contrasts the approaches of Nasser and Sadat. The individual-level analysis delineated the roles of the leaders, Nasser and Sadat, in defining and disseminating state identity. In the context of social constructivism, the conduct of foreign policy is understood to be shaped by the distinctive identity of the state in question. A discernible shift in Egyptian state identity from pan-Arab nationalism to Egyptian nationalism is observable when the eras of Nasser and Sadat are compared. Egyptian state, under the leadership of Nasser, underwent a significant transformation. Initially, it espoused a pan-Arab and socialist ideology. However, over time, it became increasingly aligned with Western interests and demonstrated a growing inclination towards liberalism. A change in a state's identity will result in a corresponding change in its foreign policy behaviour and, consequently, in its interstate relations. Consequently, the relationship between Egypt and Israel underwent a transformation in accordance with the redefinition of state identity. While Israel was perceived as Egypt's primary adversary and even the legitimacy of its existence was called into question, Sadat initially recognised the state of Israel and subsequently signed a peace treaty that brought an end to the military confrontations that had characterised the region for decades.

An analysis of Egypt's state identity must consider both internal and external developments. Domestic factors have also contributed to this transformation of Egyptian national identity. These include socio-economic unrest, largely attributable to an underdeveloped and conflict-ravaged economy, as well as a decline in confidence in the regime and an urgent necessity to revitalise the country's image. With regard to international factors, developments at the regional and international levels gave rise to a transformation in Egyptian state identity. Consequently, the winds of change began to blow, resulting in the decline of Arab nationalism and the ascendance of Egyptian nationalism in Egypt.

In conclusion, this article posits that Egypt's state identity has exerted a significant influence on its relations with Israel, particularly during the Nasser and Sadat eras. A shift in Egyptian state identity has occurred as a consequence of alterations in the political landscape and interactions between states. Ultimately, shifts in state identity are

contingent upon the personality of the leader, as well as domestic developments and international factors.

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Sanction Comradeship: The Russia-North Korea Alliance Against Western Embargoes

Yaptırım Yoldaşlığı: Batı Ambargolarına Karşı Rusya-Kuzey Kore İttifakı

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Abstract

The division of the Korean Peninsula after World War II and its emergence as a focal point of the Cold War turned this country into a geopolitically significant actor, leading to a close relationship with the Soviet Union. This study focuses on the historical and geopolitical background of the long-standing relationship between Russia and North Korea, stemming from their ideological solidarity during the Cold War years. In this article, this resilient alliance between the two powers is termed as “sanction comradeship,” highlighting their common stance of resistance against the West and their enduring opposition to international sanctions. In examining the position of these two countries within international system, the study focuses primarily on the period from 2010 onwards, particularly until 2023. In this context, the study explores how the rapprochement between North Korea and Russia, under the influence of international developments, has evolved as a response to sanctions imposed to limit their impact on global affairs through the lens of “sanction comradeship.” This study will point out the continuity and changes in the history of their relations, discussing how both ‘countries’ behaviors in the face of sanctions shape their current foreign policies.

Keywords: Russia, North Korea, Sanction, Comradeship

Öz

İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası Kore Yarımadası'nın bölünmesi ve Soğuk Savaş'ın bir çatışma noktası haline gelmesi, Kuzey Kore'yi jeopolitik açıdan önemli bir oyuncu haline getirmiştir. Soğuk Savaş yıllarındaki ideolojik dayanışmadan doğan Sovyet ve Kuzey Kore arasındaki ilişkilerin tarihsel ve jeopolitik arka planına özellikle 2022 Rusya-Ukrayana Savaşı ile daha da önem kazanmıştır. Bu iki güç arasındaki dayanıklı iş birliği “yaptırım yoldaşlığı” olarak Batı'ya karşı ortak bir direniş pozisyonlarını ve uluslararası yaptırımlara karşı sürdürülen karşıtlıklarını vurgulamaktadır. Örnek olay incelemesi olarak bu iki ülkenin sistemdeki durumu incelenirken uluslararası alandaki gelişmeler ışığında, Kuzey Kore ve Rusya arasındaki yakınlaşmanın, dünya meselelerindeki etkilerini sınırlamak amacıyla uygulanan yaptırımlara bir yanıt olarak nasıl geliştiği, “yaptırım yoldaşlığı” çerçevesinde ele alınmaktadır. Çalışma, iki ülkenin ortak çabalarını ve ilişkilerindeki tarihsel süreklilikleri ve değişimleri işaret ederek, her iki ülkenin yaptırımlar karşısındaki davranışlarının mevcut dış politikalarını nasıl etkilediğini tartışacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rusya, Kuzey Kore, Yaptırımlar, Yoldaşlık

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Introduction

The division of the Korean Peninsula along the 38th parallel between capitalist South Korea and Communist Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea)¹ irrevocably and profoundly changed what at one time had been a unified political entity. This seismic shift in the politics of the peninsula occurred shortly after the Allied forces freed the region from 36 years of Japanese rule at the end of World War II. Separate governments were established and military occupations occurred in the south by the United States and in the north by the Soviet Union. In the American zone, the 24th Corps U.S. Army under General John R. Hodge held command, and in the Soviet zone, under the command of the 25th Army was the 1st Front of the Soviet Far Eastern Front Forces. However, this military government that seemed so bewildering and mortifying to the Koreans brought a high level of discontent and defiance, particularly in the South. The local sentiment thus became a fundamental consequence of the unfulfilled expectations by the Koreans. This has been an important influence in the shaping of post-war history in this region. Both Koreas, due to different ideological differences, set up separate governments and engaged this region as a crucial battle zone in the Cold War. The Korean peninsula, at the interface of two geopolitical spheres, became an epicentre of ideological struggle between the capitalist West and communist East (Chang-II, 2010). This era of tension culminated in the Korean War, which lasted from 1950 to 1953. North Korea is north of the demarcation line established by the Korean Armistice Agreement in July 1953. Its total area measures 123,138 km², accounting for approximately 55% of the entire Korean Peninsula, which spans 223,516 km², showcasing the vastness and diversity of this region (Nationalatlas, nd.).

The influence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Korea would continue throughout the Cold War on ideological grounds. Indeed, this situation is still important today. Although the Cold War is over and the division between North and South has divided Korea today, the rigid ideological situation that existed in the past is still felt. Throughout the Cold War and the new millennium, the Korean Peninsula and the Russian Federation have played a crucial role in shaping global geopolitics. On the one hand, the Korean Peninsula has emerged as a frontline in the ideological struggle between the capitalist West and the communist East. As one of the central actors in this global struggle, Russia has maintained particular influence on both regional and international levels. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia's foreign policy underwent a significant shift. It sought to reinforce its influence in traditional areas like Central Asia and Europe and aimed to broaden its strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. In the contemporary shifting world, North Korea's geopolitical location on the borders of China and Russia has made the country incrementally a focal point for Russia, especially concerning the planned effort to counter Western influence in order to strengthen its own position as a global power.

The Russian Federation's foreign policy has become increasingly important, especially in the post-2000 period. The most fundamental reason for this can undoubtedly be seen in Russia's regaining its power as one of the leading actors of the bipolar system (a system

¹ Hereafter, North Korea.

characterized by the existence of two major powers or blocs, typically the United States and Russia, just like during the Cold War. In this context, while the relations with Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe in Russia's foreign policy have been revised and become power-oriented, the Asia Pacific region has also become an equally important area. In this region, relations with North Korea create the most attention-grabbing field. But what makes the relations between North Korea and Russia so remarkable? While this study will discuss the rapprochement between Russia and North Korea in the international arena, our primary goal here is to see the common ground formed by the relations between the two countries. It is seen that the West is particularly decisive in the relations between the two countries. In this context, the West's other discourses have become the most fundamental unifying factor for both Russia and North Korea. As a result, sanctions have become the most fundamental common motivation in their bilateral relations. While the West has imposed sanctions aimed at limiting North Korea's and Russia's power in their foreign policy, both actors have created a common alliance area to evade these sanctions. Particularly, after 2010, this process opened a new era in North Korea's relations with Russia and China, with the later being a key actor in the region. The second pivotal moment is particularly evident in the case of Russia. This is marked by Russia's initiation of its so-called "special military operation" in Ukraine in February 2022, a military action intended to achieve a defined objective. In the regional war that has been ongoing since 2022, the West has made harsh sanction decisions against Russia. Moscow has been defending these sanctions by seeking and consolidating new alliances. In this context, North Korean relations become essential.

This study will comprehensively focus on the impact of sanctions in the context of recent developments in the relations between Russia and North Korea. However, when discussing North Korea, the underlying structure shaped by historical and ideological contexts is often overlooked. To address this, the study will briefly examine the historical influence that began during the Cold War, driven by the ideological framework that shaped relations between Russia and North Korea. The goal is to understand how past and future dynamics shape both countries' positions and policies against the West in the current context. The term "Sanctions Comradeship" is used here to emphasize the historical ties between the two countries and to highlight a consistent Western approach that has remained unchanged over time. This study will therefore examine Western sanctions, the key issue underpinning the sanctions camaraderie between Russia and North Korea within the current international system. From the Cold War to the present, relations between Russia and North Korea have consistently reflected their stance against the West. Within this framework, the study effectively analyzes the significant impacts of the Russia-Ukraine War since 2022. The primary focus here is twofold: the ongoing international sanctions against North Korea, especially in relation to its nuclear ambitions, and the significant sanctions and geopolitical rupture affecting Russia in its relations with the West as a result of the Russia-Ukraine War.

Navigating Political Dynamics in Russia-North Korea Relations

The relations between Russia and North Korea, which have historical and ideological ties, stand out as one of the most notable examples of China.² When the DPRK was established on September 9, 1948, it adopted the Soviet model of socialism. It followed Soviet-style foreign policy during the Cold War starting in 1950s. However, North Korea's divergence from the Soviet Union's model led to the development of a unique and independent policy known as Kimilsungism with Korean characteristics in the post-Korean War in 1950s and 1960s. This policy, rooted in Kim's Juche ideology, emphasized self-reliance and bore similarities to the Maoist model of development. The leadership cult has relegated the KKP to an insignificant role in policymaking, relegating the Party to a secondary position. The Suryong system is a type of hereditary leadership; that is why North Korea has had only three leaders since the country was formed. Kim Il-sung, its founder and eternal leader, designed a peculiar socialist state system and installed 'Juche' as its official ideology. Hence, Juche is curical in its highly particular political culture (Kılıçtaroğlu & Demir, 2023, p. 483).

With great determination, the North Korean leadership pursued a hard-line policy of three great revolutions—the ideological revolution, the cultural revolution, and the technological revolution—to address the economic challenges arising from the Sino-Soviet disputes over Communist ideology (Kim, 2002). On the other hand, alliances with China and the Soviet Union were especially crucial in the security and economic spheres for North Korea. However, the de-Stalinization process under Nikita Khrushchev after the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, and the liberalization efforts in China and the Soviet Union during the 1980s prompted debates within North Korea's leadership about governance and its relations with those Powers (Kılıçtaroğlu & Demir, 2023, pp. 486-488).

Indeed, the bond between the North Korea and the Soviet Union was marked by the ideological closeness between Joseph Stalin and Kim Il Sung. In the relations between the USSR and North Korea, Soviet economic and military support was significant. During Nikita Khrushchev's period, the two countries signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.³ On the other hand, economic relationship between Soviet and the DPRK has greatly diverged from the era of the 1970s and 1980s when the Soviet Union handled up to 50% of North Korea's foreign trade. Currently, trade statistics show that Russia accounts for only 1.2% of North Korea's foreign trade, with China dominating the sector with 92.5%, pushing Russia to the second position in terms of trade partnership (Lukin & Zakharova, 2018).

The problems that Russia experienced in domestic politics during the 1990s, especially economic problems and sociological fractures (suicide, alcoholism, etc.), limited the

² For a correct understanding of the importance of the imperial-era relationship between Russia and Korea, one has to put both countries in the 19th century context as an interplay against colonial ambitions in the Western powers and Japan. Japanese colonialism took its first target in the Korean Peninsula, but the process was not quite easy for Japan. Both China and Russia tried to support Korea against the expansionist policies of Japan (see Çelik, 2020, p.133).

³ For more information: Treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance. Signed at Moscow, on 6 July 1961 <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20420/volume-420-I-6045-English.pdf>

robust Russian approach and presence in foreign policy. In this respect, Russia was a limited actor in Asia Pacific, as it was in many regions during the 1990s. After the Cold War, as the Russian Federation turned inward to focus on domestic politics, North Korea lost its most important economic and military supporter. This support, which included economic aid and military equipment, was crucial for North Korea's survival and development. Also, an exception to this might be North Korean labour, which is evident in Russia's Far East. North Korea's shortage of hard currency limits its appeal as an export market. Unlike the Soviet era, Russia is not willing to sell goods at friendly prices or provide long-term preferential credit to North Korea. Their economic relations are now more pragmatic and market-based, contrasting with the unilateral economic advantages Russia offers to former Soviet allies like Belarus.

On the one hand, the post-1990 era reflects the emergence of a newly shaped global international system, with the collapse of the Soviet Union having a great impact on North Korea. In this context, the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union marked a turning point for North Korea, which has since become more aggressive in both domestic and foreign policy. Officially announced in 1997, the so-called Songun (Military First) policy was the continuation of the Juche ideology but gave the military the leading role in state governance. In this respect, the military was supposed to act not only as a defense force but also as the "brain" that plans the state and solves both domestic and international problems. The KKIP which previously held authority second only to the leader, ceded this role to the military, creating a brief period of dual power (Kılıçtaroğlu & Demir, 2023, p. 490).

On the other hand, in this period Yeltsin's policy focused on developing relations with South Korea for several reasons, including the de-ideologization of foreign policy and limited resources to support North Korea. Russia's orientation towards the USA and EU, and the inability to work out a new policy towards former allies, were weaknesses. The deterioration of relations with North Korea was due to economic constraints, including Russia's own deep economic crisis and the public opposition to continuing economic assistance to former Soviet allies. Disagreements over market mechanisms, and North Korea's sympathy towards anti-democratic opposition also played a role in this deterioration. Market reforms in Russia led to limited cooperation with North Korea by local governments in the Russian Far East regions. Seung-Ho Joo's (2000) analysis underscores the historical significance of the 1961 alliance treaty between the DPRK and the USSR, a pivotal document that shaped Russia's relations with both Koreas. The fate of this treaty, particularly Seoul's concerns regarding Article 1 which mandated automatic military involvement in the event of war, was a key factor in the evolution of these relations. Despite Moscow's decision not to formally renounce the treaty in 1992, it was extended for another five years as stipulated. The Russian Foreign Ministry considered amending the treaty, a move that would require approval from a parliament dominated by opposition parties, leading to apprehensions about the treaty's future.

During the same period, Russia created new alternative areas when addressing its foreign policy. In addition to the historical relations with North Korea, South Korea was also seen as an essential factor in the post-1990 period in terms of creating a new area of cooperation. South Korea wanted to expand its trade relations with the Soviet Union and after 1992 with the Russian Federation in line with its strong economy and search for new

markets. After the formalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries, at the end of 1990, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo met with Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow and agreed to provide a three-year loan of \$3 billion to the later. This loan agreement was a significant step in their economic relations. While \$2 billion of this loan was allocated for the purchase of South Korean products by the Soviets at attractive prices, the remaining \$1 billion was allocated for the development of Soviet industry. The Soviets stated that they would partially pay this loan with raw materials such as coal and natural gas. While these resources were abundantly available to the Soviets, they were capable of meeting South Korea's import needs. As of 1993, the two countries engaged in negotiations about a pipeline project that would stretch from North Korea to South Korea, covering the natural gas fields in Yakutia. This project, with an estimated cost of \$20-30 billion, was not just a financial investment. It held the potential to foster a strategic partnership that would not only strengthen economic ties but also influence political relations. Furthermore, it would serve as a means to enhance Russia's presence on the Korean Peninsula, promising a future of mutual benefit and growth (Zacek, n.d.).

However, these relations do not present a picture as deep as the historical relations with North Korea. Russia aims to establish a stable relationship with North Korea for national security and economic reasons based on cooperation. Concerned about a potential collapse of North Korea impacting its Far East security, Russia seeks to mediate between the Koreas and encourage dialogue for peaceful unification. Having previously neglected its ties with North Korea, Russia now wants to regain Northeast Asian influence. Economically, Russia is dissatisfied with South Korea's limited investments and needs to normalize relations with Pyongyang to recover 3.6 billion rubles in debt. Additionally, North Korean cooperation is not only essential for the success of a natural gas pipeline project to South Korea, but also holds the potential for significant economic growth. Resuming economic ties would benefit the Russian economy, particularly in the Far East (Seung-Ho Joo, 2000)

The relationship between the Russia and North Korea remained limited until the 2000s. However, with the start of Vladimir Putin's tenure, Russia's relations with North Korea began to revive. During the era of Kim Jong Un, who succeeded his father, Kim Jong Il, after his death, continuity in bilateral relations was maintained. The latest development in these relations is Pyongyang's statements supporting Russia in the face of Western sanctions during the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War. This demonstrates that the historically rooted relationship between the two countries has remained unchanged.

Creating Sanctions Comradeship Between Russia and North Korea

Economic sanctions can be applied to restrict an actor's ability to import or export specific goods or to halt financial aid to that actor, as in the case of U.S. sanctions on Iran (Katzman, 2021). Relatedly, arms embargoes are implemented with the intention of reducing violence between actors, or to deter an opponent in a particular defense or offensive area. However, they can also serve as a punitive measure to influence an actor's behavior, as in the arms embargo imposed on Türkiye during the Cyprus Operation (Goodie, 2020). Additionally, diplomatic sanctions may involve the limitation or cessation of diplomatic relations with an actor. The most significant example in this

context is the withdrawal of ambassadors or the suspension of diplomatic relations between states (Grebe, 2010).

At this point, there needs to be a sanctions partnership between Russia and North Korea. With this understanding, there are certain commonalities that push these two countries into a “sanctions comradeship”. The first is being perceived as the “other” in the system. Secondly, both countries exhibit a tendency to act independently in the international community, maintaining a critical stance both ideologically and in their approach. Thirdly, the West seeks to contain these countries, viewing them as unpredictable actors within the international system. Fourthly, both actors are subject to strong and extensive international sanctions, limiting their interactions and capabilities on the global stage. Fifthly, both countries possess the capacity to mitigate the impact of sanctions through mutual interests. In other words, each country is inclined to counteract sanctions by pursuing strategic steps and cooperation with the other.

Sanctions on North Korea

Particularly, after 2010, the relationship between Russia and North Korea has deepened due to the impact of sanctions. In other words, the marginalization of North Korea in the West’s policy has pushed it to further increase its cooperation with Russia and China. The period after 2010 has witnessed a resurgence of global conflicts and wars, particularly in the Middle East and the former Soviet territories. These conflicts have heightened tensions among Russia, China, and the United States, impacting North Korea’s geopolitical position. The transfer of weapons from North Korea contravenes a minimum of 10 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanction resolutions, which Russia endorsed upon their adoption in the 2000s and 2010s after North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests. These UNSC sanctions prohibit the procurement or sale of arms to North Korea, among other restrictions. Additionally, they proscribe any assistance to North Korea’s ballistic missile programs, encompassing space or satellite launch activities (Nikitin et al., 2024).

Between 2006 and 2017, Russia and China supported 10 UNSC sanctions resolutions targeting North Korea’s illicit nuclear weapons and missile programs (table I). These measures impose trade and engagement restrictions, prohibit weapons transfers, and aim to compel North Korea to denuclearize (Bowen et al., 2024). Actually, in Russia’s foreign policy, the official goal of supporting the international regime against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is consistently emphasized. However, Moscow’s response to another country’s acquisition or testing of nuclear weapons is a strategic process, varying depending on its relations with that country. This response usually does not involve serious sanctions (Lukin, 2018). However, before 2017, Russia supported sanctions on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs at the UN Security Council. Russia-North Korea bilateral economic ties are relatively marginal, with China accounting for over 90% of North Korea’s trade. Also, UNSC has decided to impose new sanctions on North Korea following a series of events. These include North Korea’s alleged hydrogen bomb tests, the adoption of two UNSC resolutions, 1695 on July 15, 2006, and 1718 on October 14, 2006, and North Korea’s alleged ballistic missile tests in 2006 (Table I). Resolution 1718 (Table I) was issued under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which covers the use of force (AA, 2016).

Since March 2016, when the first stringent UN sanctions were imposed, North Korea has approached its dealings with foreign partners, including Russia, with greater seriousness and professionalism. The Federal Customs Service of Russia reported that the bilateral turnover 2016 amounted to \$76.8 million (Jochheim, 2023). It is also essential to consider the relationship between Seoul and Moscow, which has developed mainly through active economic cooperation since South Korea and the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations in 1990. In 2021, Russia emerged as the tenth-largest export partner of South Korea, with South Korean goods exported to Russia totalling \$9.97 billion, as reported by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Furthermore, Russia is a significant energy supplier for South Korea, contributing to less than 10% of its total energy imports. On the flip side, Russia's goods exports to South Korea surpassed \$17 billion in 2021. This issue is making South Korea its fifth-largest export destination (Chiacu & Brunnstrom, 2024). The economic ties between the two countries are further strengthened by Korea's investment in Russia, which accumulated to USD 4.16 billion by 2022 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs ROK, n.d.). Both countries also view each other through an economic and geostrategic lens, with Russia seeing South Korea as a primary gateway to the Pacific Ocean, and South Korea recognizing Russia as a key partner in regional connectivity projects, such as logistics and energy networks. This perspective underscores the potential of their relationship for transnational cooperation in the Eurasian continent (Chiacu and Brunnstrom, 2024).

Resolution No	Sanctions	Events
1718	Arms embargo, luxury goods import ban	Nuclear and ballistic tests
1874	Ban on all arms transfers	Nuclear test
2087	Tightening of previous sanctions	Satellite launch
2094	Increased financial restrictions	Nuclear test
2270	Restrictions on mineral exports, banking bans	Nuclear test
2321	Restrictions on maritime and air transportation	Nuclear test
2371	Ban on the export of coal, iron, and other resources	Ballistic missile tests
2375	Reduces of refined petroleum products	Nuclear test
2397	Quota on petroleum imports*,* maritime embargo	Nuclear and ballistic missile activities

Table 1: Sanctions on North Korea (Davenport, 2022; Habib, 2016; Howell, 2016; TRThaber, 2017; Macdonald, 2017)

On the contrary, in 2018, Kim Jong Un expressed interest in meeting U.S. President Donald Trump during a meeting with South Korean officials in Pyongyang. Trump accepted, and they met in Singapore three months later, signing a joint statement to improve bilateral relations and denuclearization efforts. After the summit, joint military exercises between the U.S. and South Korea were put on hold. This led to increased dialogue between the two Koreas, and North Korea began dismantling some of its facilities. Additionally, the remaining U.S. service members from the Korean War were returned. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) later expressed

* The annual import limit for refined petroleum products to North Korea is set at 500,000 barrels.

concerns regarding North Korea's nuclear program. The subsequent Trump-Kim meeting in Hanoi in 2019 made little progress, with the U.S. maintaining sanctions while North Korea continued missile tests. Tensions grew, with North Korea accusing the Trump administration of seeking diplomatic gains for domestic politics. Under the Biden administration, North Korea has continued missile testing and resisted negotiations (Davenport, 2022).

Finally, it is necessary to consider the background of Russia's approach, especially regarding nuclear and sanctions. Russia played a pivotal role in the preparation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted after North Korea launched missiles and conducted nuclear tests in 2006. It also supported the tightening of these sanctions in 2009 and 2013. However, Russia, like China, has generally tried to soften these sanctions when negotiating the terms of the sanctions. There are two main reasons: First, Russia is concerned that the sanctions will lead to an uncontrolled collapse of the North Korean regime, which will create serious problems such as nuclear weapons falling into the hands of uncontrolled groups or a flow of refugees. Second, the feelings in Russia dating back to the Cold War period, which sees North Korea as a partner against the efforts of the U.S. and its allies to establish dominance in Asia, are still firm; therefore, it is thought that the destruction of North Korea would be harmful (Lukin, 2018, pp. 274-275). The third view suggests that Russia aimed to strengthen its position as an independent and vital actor that could contribute to stability on the Korean Peninsula. The goal was to prevent war and avoid direct involvement in the Sino-American rivalry while also steering clear of efforts to contain North Korea following the 2013 Sino-American summit. The Korean Peninsula became important in Putin's strategy toward Asia, as Moscow feared that lacking influence in the region would lead to exclusion from both China and the U.S. While Russia and China often voice their common interests against Washington on a global scale, their rivalry and disagreements appear to be more pronounced on a regional level (Blank, 2019, p. 286).

Sanctions on Russia

Since 2022, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the continued imposition of sanctions have contributed to a complex international landscape, especially between the West and Russia. Russia has been exploring new avenues and engaging with regional and international organizations to safeguard its interests. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, European Council President Charles Michel held an extraordinary meeting with EU member states, announcing comprehensive sanctions against Russia (European Commission, 2022). Coordinated by the European External Action Service, the European Commission, and member countries, these sanctions aimed to weaken Russia's economic base, restrict its access to critical technologies, and limit its warfare capacity. Measures included freezing the assets of Russia's Central Bank, removing major Russian banks from the SWIFT system, and imposing a price cap on Russian oil imports (Table II). Additionally, the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline project was suspended, severing Russia's strategic energy links with Europe, particularly Germany (Wettengel, 2023). These sanctions represent significant steps toward economically and politically isolating Russia on the international stage.

Against this backdrop, the relationship between Russia and North Korea has gained significance. While Western influence is evident, North Korea is using this bilateral engagement to alleviate its international isolation. The reciprocal sanctions imposed on both countries have led to a marginalized partnership, with the deepening of their relationship seen as a key strategy to bypass existing sanctions. As a result, the development of ties between these two countries has impacted the positive momentum in Russia-South Korea relations since 1990. In this sense, Western sanctions on Russia have created divisions reminiscent of the Cold War era.

Sanction Package	Sanction	Description
First Sanctions Package	Freezing of Russian Central Bank Assets Removal of Major Russian Banks from SWIFT	The European Union, USA, UK, and Canada froze the assets of the Russian Central Bank in their respective countries. Major Russian banks have been removed from the international SWIFT payment system.
Second Sanctions Package	Prohibition of Russian Companies from Borrowing	Russian companies are prohibited from borrowing in international markets.
Third Sanctions Package	Price Cap on Seaborne Transport of Russian Oil	A price cap has been imposed on the transport of Russian oil to third countries via sea.
Fourth Sanctions Package	Ban on Export of Oil Refinery Goods and Technology to Russia	Exports of goods and technologies related to the oil refinery sector to Russia are prohibited

Table 2: Sanctions on Russian Federation (Bloomberg, 2023; BBC, 2022; NTV, 2022)

Although North Korea appears to be a closed country, its influence on the international system cannot be neglected. The most basic criterion here is the Russia-Ukraine War that started in 2022, and the process that followed. Before that, one issue that needs to be focused on in the region is North Korea's relations with regional and European countries. Evidently, after China the Netherlands and Poland are the largest trade partners of North Korea. Last year, Poland imported a significant volume of goods, including iron, steel, plastic products, and pharmaceuticals, valued at nearly \$10 million. Meanwhile, approximately half of the Netherlands' imports, totalling around \$8 million, consisted of nickel and nickel products, with substantial amounts of polyethylene and aeroplane parts also being imported.

The table shows that for North Korea, the 2023 data represents an increase. But it needs to be highlighted that this improvement only partially reflects the economic situation of the country. This is due to the imposed sanctions and its restrictive anti-COVID policy. Most of its sparsely populated border trade was virtually choked off by self-imposed lockdowns to keep out COVID-19—a move that devastated trade and economic activities in that country (Reuters, 2023).

On the Russian side, as the West continues to extend support to Ukraine in its struggle against Russian aggression, it concurrently enforces comprehensive global sanctions on Russia. This unified approach underscores the extensive ramifications of the conflict on an international scale. Following 2022, the effect of sanctions on arbitration has become an increasingly important topic. Shortly after the war, the European Union, the United

States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and other nations imposed extensive sanctions to bring Russia to the peace table and uphold Ukraine's territorial integrity, swiftly making Russia the most sanctioned country in the World (Kryvoi, 2022).




Chart I : North Korea's real gross domestic product (GDP) in 2023, by industry (Statista, available at: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/747759/north-korea-real-gdp-by-industry/>)

In 2023, while the Russian-Ukrainian war was ongoing, Kim Jong Un visited Russia. The importance of this visit is hidden in the historical past of the train. As mentioned before, history has an important place in Russian-North Korean relations. In fact, this visit is based on the Soviet Union leader Josef Stalin giving Kim Il-sung a specially equipped wagon to use on his travels (Wonju, 2023). Thus, since 1948, train journeys have become a tradition for Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il. It is important to note that when President Putin visited Pyongyang in 2000, Russia was a member of the G8, and North Korea had not yet conducted its initial nuclear test. Since then, the geopolitical landscape has undergone significant transformations, characterized by a more assertive stance from Putin and the younger Kim Jong-un focused on advancing nuclear capabilities. The ongoing invasion of Ukraine by Russia, alongside North Korea's continued missile tests, has heightened the isolation of both countries. However, these developments have also fortified their alliance in opposition to what they consider the "hostile" actions of the United States and its allies. They also finalized economic and security agreements, demonstrating their unity in confronting the West. The U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin confirmed that North Korea has shipped arms and munitions to Russia, and the deployment of troops is a next step in their support (U.S. Department of Defense, 2024). Hence, during this meeting, the messages exchanged between Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin at the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Russia's Far East were significant. Concluding his first trip abroad in four years, Kim highlighted the deep-rooted friendship between the two nations and reiterated his ideological stance in contrast to the West, echoing sentiments from the Soviet era. While Russia upholds its position on sanctions against North Korea at the U.N., the potential benefits of a significant arms deal should not be

overlooked. Russia claims it could impede bilateral relations, while the U.S. worries about its impact on the Ukraine conflict. The recent meeting at the Vostochny Space Center seems primarily focused on North Korea's support for satellite production. Putin noted that, due to isolation from the G-20 and other forums, Russia seeks to strengthen ties with North Korea. Kim's rocket and space research involvement may mark the beginning of closer relations (Özel Özcan, 2023). However, the implications for global security, particularly concerning the Russia-Ukraine situation, are significant.

Conversely, South Korea remains the nation's most apprehensive about the armament strategies employed by its northern counterpart. The country is closely monitoring the strengthening ties between Russia and North Korea and the outcomes of their agreements. Official reports indicate that, as of February 2024, North Korea has sent approximately 6,700 containers of ammunition to Russia, believed to include over three million 152-mm artillery shells (Al Jazeera, 2024b). This development is not surprising, given the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War and the sanctions imposed on Russia. The UN Security Council has set North Korea's refined oil imports at 500,000 barrels per year, a clear energy limitation under the international sanctions imposed on North Korea. The ongoing oil trade between the two countries, in defiance of UN Resolution 2397, is a blatant violation of the sanctions and a matter of urgent concern (Chiacu and David Brunnstrom, 2024). RUSI's analysis in March revealed that North Korean tankers were loading oil from a Russian port in the country's Far East, allegedly in exchange for ammunition and missiles, further highlighting the need for stricter enforcement of the sanctions (Byrne, et al., 2024).



Figure I: North Korean oil tankers in Chongjin (Planet Labs, and RUSI Project Sandstone, Byrne, et al., 2024).

As of May 2024, the issue has resurfaced with the announcement of new companies added to US sanctions. The companies Rafort Limited Liability Company, Trans Kapital

Limited Liability Company and Tekhnologiya have been included in the US's new sanctions decision scope. This was to prevent the exchange of arms between North Korea and Russia, a potential threat to international security.⁴ From the U.S. perspective, Russia's provision of weapons and technology to North Korea is seen as a destabilizing initiative. However, it also provides a realpolitik area of interest that brings the two countries closer. This 'realpolitik area of interest' refers to the strategic benefits and influence that Russia gains from its relationship with North Korea. Although the extent of military-focused relations between the parties does not directly lead to confrontation with the West to the point of an international conflict, it is evident that it creates a deterrent effect against the West on a win-win basis for both countries. According to state media, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un received a car from Russian President Vladimir Putin as a gesture of their "special personal relations." The car, whose make and model were not disclosed, was delivered to Kim's aides for his "personal use." This gift may violate UN sanctions that prohibit supplying vehicles to North Korea (Al Jazeera, 2024a)

In a nutshell, relations between Russia and North Korea have experienced notable momentum, especially in recent times. This development highlights the fact that the relationship between Russia and North Korea, deeply rooted in historical and geopolitical contexts, has been reshaped by their shared interests. These shared interests, which go beyond military and economic cooperation, have led to a significant enhancement of their alliance. Both Moscow and Pyongyang deny any arms transfers and maintain a united front against accusations from the West. Moreover, the ties between these countries extend beyond military and economic cooperation; they are also reinforcing a common stance against Western pressures, including economic sanctions and military presence in the region. This rapprochement between Russia and North Korea emerges as a new and intricate alliance within the current global balance of power.

Conclusion

The historical bond between Russia and North Korea is also notable for its ideological dimension. Both actors have positioned themselves in opposition to the West within the international system, often regarded as the "other." In this sense, relations between the two countries have changed since the Cold War era, but, paradoxically, have also remained unchanged. This continuity can be attributed to the evolving nature of the global system and the changing context, which still places both actors in a marginalized position. Following the Cold War, Russia, as the successor state of the USSR, encountered issues with the West, particularly under a great power paradigm, which has set certain limits on its geopolitical actions. This situation is similarly applicable to Kim Jong-un. Both leaders are challenging the West within the current system, asserting a different approach to power. As a result, the international sanctions imposed on these actors limit their actions, but their interdependent relationship has effectively rendered these restrictions meaningless.

Thus, while both actors increase their mutual dependence, they simultaneously challenge the system's isolating policies against them. This defiance also enhances the value of reducing the impact of sanctions. In this regard, the existing differences within the system,

⁴ More information: <https://www.state.gov/new-measures-to-degrade-russias-wartime-economy/>

much like during the Cold War, have fostered a form of camaraderie between these two countries. Both nations, based on common interests, are challenging the Western-led courses of action in the international stage. In particular, Russia has provided North Korea with a vital breathing space by helping to mitigate or circumvent United Nations sanctions, while also supplying significant aid to counter the country's food shortages. Conversely, North Korea has become a lifeline for Russia. Particularly, amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, North Korea has provided artillery shells and similar supplies that Russia has been unable to access due to sanctions. In this respect, North Korea has become a critical "factory" for Russia, offering essential support during the conflict. In conclusion, the "sanctions comradeship" between Russia and North Korea, much like during the Cold War era, is becoming increasingly strengthened and significant amid what can be seen as a new Cold War period.

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Developments in The First Karabakh War and the Khojaly Massacre: Historical-Legal Process and Forced Migration

*Birinci Karabağ Savaşı ve Hocalı Katliamı Döneminde Yaşanan Gelişmeler:
Tarihsel-Hukuksal Süreç ve Zorunlu Göç*

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Abstract

In this study, historical conjuncture will be mentioned in the first place in order to understand the problem of “fugitive” and “forced migrant”, then political explanations will be made in the context of chronological information. What is more, answers to those questions will be sought: To which society did this region originally belong from past to present?; to what extent was the influence of internal and external factors in the process which lead to Karabakh War and Khojaly massacre?; why was the Khojaly region in a very important position from a strategic point of view?; what battles and massacres happened during this period? Additionally, it will be addressed, what kind of results were acquired against Armenia in the case of "Chiragov and Others v. Armenia" before the European Court of Human Rights in 2015 and which articles of the European Convention on Human Rights were violated.

Keywords: The First Karabakh War, Khojaly Massacre, Fugitive, Forced Migrant, ECtHR

Öz

Bu çalışmada bahsedilecek olan “kaçkın” ve “zorunlu göçmen” sorununun daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi için ilk etapta tarihsel konjonktürden söz edilecek, ardından kronolojik bilgiler bağlamında siyasi açıklamalar yapılacaktır. Ayrıca, bu bölge geçmişten buyana aslen hangi topluma aitti?; I. Karabağ Savaşı ve Hocalı katliamına giden süreçte iç ve dış unsurların etkisi ne derece belirleyici oldu?; Hocalı bölgesi stratejik açıdan neden çok önemli bir konumdaydı?; bu süreç zarfında hangi muharebeler ve katliamlar gerçekleşti? şeklinde soruların da cevabı aranacaktır. İlaveten, 2015 tarihli “Chiragov ve Diğerleri v. Ermenistan” adlı Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi’nde görülen davada Ermenistan aleyhine ne tür sonuçlar çıkmış, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi’nin hangi maddeleri ihlal edilmiş bunlardan da bahsedilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: I. Karabağ Savaşı, Hocalı Katliamı, Kaçkın, Zorunlu Göçmen, AIHM

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Introduction

The Nagorno-Karabakh problem is at the center of questions such as why has the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, which remains a significant issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan and has gained historical prominence as the region's power struggles have been going on for so long, persisted to this day? Which civilizations actually had a stronghold in this region? As a result of these questions which will be sought to be answered in the first part of the article, the communities that should have the right to own property in Nagorno-Karabakh will also emerge. These questions are expected to be answered: What kind of developments occurred in the process leading to both the First Karabakh War and the Khojaly massacre? Who were the imperialist powers that influenced these developments? What were the effects of important developments in other parts of the world in this process? In fact, although all these events seem to be the expression of two different conflicts over a period of thirty years, they emerge as an expression of an effort to receive a share that has been going on for centuries. It is necessary to take notice of the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the Karabakh region and to analyze the close combats in this context, the settlement policies towards the region and the equation on the axis of forced migration in order to understand these developments.

The developments that occurred before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the debates that took place in the field of life of the Armenian-Azerbaijani community and other conflicts in the region continued to increase, resulting in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Khojaly massacre. While USSR Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev gave innovative messages to the whole world with his theoretical approaches such as perestroika (economic restructuring) and glasnost (openness), proposals of the same solutions were out of the question for Karabakh. Taking an active role of the 366th Infantry Regiment in the Khojaly massacre that took place on February 26, 1992, which remained in the region in the post-Soviet period corroborates this situation (Yavuz-Gunter, 2022a: 54). The fact that the Russian Motorized Infantry Regiment which remained in the region in the post-Soviet period, took an active role in the Khojaly massacre that took place on February 26, 1992 affirms this situation (Yavuz-Gunter, 2022a: 54). Military contributions to the Armenians by countries such as Russia, France, Iran and Greece indicate that the Azerbaijanis are left alone in this geography and did not get serious support except for the help of countries such as Türkiye, Israel and Pakistan, etc (Yavuz-Gunter, 2022a: 171). What is more, the force migration that occurred during this period of time gave rise to hundred of thousands of Nagorno-Karabakh Turks to be homeless, some of them became internally displaced persons (called "fugitives" and "forced migrants") and some of them became asylum seekers and refugees in another country. Towards the end of the article, the Armenian migrants who settled in the region throughout history as well as the processes that the Turkish-Muslim people exiled from the region went through and the geographies they went to will be touched upon. The answers of these questions will be sought: Was the geography of migration from adjacent regions or did they take refuge in different continents? What kind of problems did these Azerbaijani asylum seekers, who are divided into two as "fugitives" and "forced migrants" encounter and whether these problems could be solved?

The United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1416, which was adopted on January 25, 2005, also expressed the breach of numerous international legal norms as a result of the Khojaly massacre. (Krüger, 2010: 140-142). Many cases have not been brought before the courts because many crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, war crimes, and genocide were perpetrated concurrently. It is evident that the Armenian diaspora and its lobbying efforts actively participate in these rights struggles and works to conceal the crimes perpetrated. With Türkiye's and Azerbaijan's activities, Armenia, which is attempting to get support from Western nations by bringing up the so-called "Armenian genocide" charges in an effort to forget these legal crimes, is unable to fully accomplish its goal (Krüger, 2010: 16, 41, 141). The Khojaly massacre has been inscribed in history as a crime against humanity that should not be forgotten and has emerged as a topic that needs to be brought up for future generations and it was classified as both a war crime and a crime against humanity in UN texts and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) dated April 22, 2010. In this context, in the conclusion and evaluation part of the article, case of the ECtHR, which is "Chiragov and Others v. Armenia" 2015 will narrate the tale of six Azerbaijani individuals who became asylum seekers as a result of the persecution they experienced in the Lachin corridor and won compensation (HUDOC, 2015). Furthermore, did Armenia bear direct responsibility for the aforementioned 2015 case? Which specific articles of the ECHR did it breach and what were the resulting repercussions? These inquiries will also be addressed in the final section.

Historical Conjuncture

Based on the etymological origins of the name Karabakh and the archaeological research conducted in the region, compelling evidence emerges that highlights the influential role of the Turks within this geographical area. The term 'kara' in Turkish not only denotes color but also signifies 'large', as evidenced by the translation of "Büyükbağ (Black Garden)" (Гусейнов, 2015: 21). This region was visited by individuals during prehistoric eras, and it served as a significant stop along trade routes, particularly the Silk Road, in later historical periods. The region's climate in both Azerbaijan and Karabakh has facilitated the growth of numerous vegetation, leading to the formation of fertile agricultural lands. Nowadays, Karabakh, known for its abundant underground and surface resources, has become a battleground for major powers to relocate Armenians to the area and achieve their objectives in this regard. Prior to discussing the settlement policies, it is beneficial to briefly touch upon the historical progression. During the 8th-7th centuries BC, the Urartians, followed by the Sakas in the 2nd century BC, the Sassanids in the 3rd century AD, and Balamir Khan in the 4th and 5th centuries AD, along with Uldız, Karaton, and other Hun-Turk leaders, played a significant role in establishing the dominance of a culture primarily composed of Turks and Persians in the Mesopotamian region. Following the 7th century AD, Islam was disseminated in the region by the Khazar Turks, and during the 7th-9th centuries AD, the Umayyads and Abbasids altered the demographic structure (Yavuz-Gunter, 2022a: 16-18).

The conquests initiated by the Seljuk ruler Çağrı Bey in the Vaspurakan region, which includes Karabakh in 1040-1060 AD, and which were shaped by the entry of Emperor Alp Arslan into Anatolia with the Battle of Manzikert on August 26, 1071, have played a significant role in the Turkification of this region and its preservation until today

(Hillenbrand, 2008: 13-14). After this period, an equation was developed in which the struggles between the Eastern Rome (Byzantium), the Seljuk State and the Persian Kingdom were continuous, and with the shrinkage of the territory of Byzantium, the wars between the Ottoman Empire and the Persian State and the effort to include the location to their own lands increased (Hillenbrand, 2008: 95, 127). The strategic position of Karabakh came to the fore at that time as well, and this region, which was the central headquarters of Timur in the Ankara War that occurred between Timur and Bayezid I at the beginning of the 15th century, was a military base ruled by his son Miranshah (governor of Azerbaijan and Khorasan) (Aka, 2022: 304). Although it took years for the Ottomans to rule these lands again during the reigns of Mehmet the Conqueror and Suleiman the Magnificent, the superiority of the Akkoyunlu and Karakoyunlu states in the region in the second half of the 15th century indicates that the Oghuz Turks made Karabakh their epicenter (Authors, 2013: 8-10).

Apart from the above-mentioned Turkish theses, the claims of the Armenians were that "the Karabakh region belongs to them and they have lived here for a century", and there were some anti-theses they maintained on this issue. One of the the most significant claims is that "they are the continuation of the Albanian people, who established a civilization in the region of Azerbaijan and Dagestan between the 4th and 8th centuries BC and 8th centuries AD". When a question of what the historical truths indicate is asked, the answers become clear. This people, who speak largely Persian and Turkish and live in the regions of Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Russia, converted to Christianity in the 3rd century AD and came under the influence of Islam in the 7th century. Even though the great majority of them converted to Islam and became Turks, the Armenians had an impact on the minority of Christians. The geography of Albania, in which nearly 26 different languages are spoken, has been the center of many communities throughout history, and has consisted of provinces such as Sheki, Paytarakan, Girdman, Uti, Artsakh, etc., where not only Armenians but also Turkish tribes lived. This is demonstrated by the founding of the Karabakh Khanate in the 18th century and the subsequent ascent of the Turks in the area (Souleimanov, 2013: 52, 102, 194, 207).

The following can be said if it is necessary to mention both the establishment process of the Turkish Khanates in the region in the 18th century and the efforts of the Russians to make the region an Armenian ethnic and cultural basin in the 19th-20th centuries. The Karabakh Khanate, which was established under the leadership of Panah Ali Khan and was on the rise during the reign of his son Ibrahim Khalil Khan ruled over in the region between 1748 and 1805 and was brought down due to pressures of Christian communities such as Armenians, Georgians, Russians, etc. (Yunusov, 2005: 17). On the other hand, the growth of Russia in the area was exposed by a number of battles and subsequent accords, which set the groundwork for the Nagorno-Karabakh issues that still exist today. Some measures were taken in order to prevent Russian expansionist policies which spread over the region from the North Caucasus and the Kurekchay Treaty in 1805 was signed with Russia. As a result, the Karabakh Khanate was forced to acknowledge Russia's dominance in the area and pay taxes to it. Naturally, Russian protectionism against a potential Iranian attack also influenced the Karabakh Khanate's objectives. The outcome was the reverse, and the regional balances have been influenced by Russia's interests in

the Caucasus, which have been a part of Russia's policy of landing in warm waters since the time of Tsar Peter I (the Great). The Russian Empire, which continued its ascent in the region with the Gulistan Peace Treaty in 1813 and the Turkmenchay Treaty in 1828, signed after the Russo-Persian War, tried every efforts to make the Karabakh geography an Armenian basin (Yunusov, 2005: 18-19). Russia, which settled the Armenian communities living in Iran, Eastern Anatolia and the North Caucasus region in these lands, ascertained the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of Nagorno-Karabakh and attempted to create its own satellite states with its settlement policies.

The demographic structure, which was between 72-78% for Turks and Muslims and 22-28% for Armenians until the mentioned treaties above and the period when Russia increased its sway in the region, quickly turned into the opposite scenario, and the activities of clandestine organizations in the region accelerated (Alvarez et al., 2023: 53). In this context, the Armenian rebellions, which took shape in the middle of the 19th century and increased rapidly towards the end of the century, intensified with the encouragement of Armenian committees such as Hunchak and Dashnak, and led to the occupation of both Karabakh and Azerbaijan by the Russians and Armenians (Tasnapetean, 1990: 35-36). After the Armenian Deportation in 1915, thousands of Armenian insurgents who joined the Russian army and the civilian population who reached the region were settled in the Karabakh region, and they gave rise to serious casualties in the Turkish army during both World War I and the War of Independence (Tasnapetean, 1990: 117-120). If it is required to clarify the other historical processes in the introduction of the "First Nagorno-Karabakh War" and "Khojaly Massacre" topics, the following can be said.

The First Nagorno-Karabakh War and The Political Equation

Even though the Karabakh conflict dates back to the 18th and 19th centuries in relation to the previously listed historical events, regional disputes persisted until the October Revolution of 1917, which set off a chain of events that led to the developments that occurred in 1988. This is demonstrated by the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, which was established on July 24, 1923, by decree of USSR Secretary General Josef Stalin (Geukjian, 2012: 76). This autonomous region was part of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, and no major events occurred in the region except for sporadic clashes until the collapse of the USSR. The primary cause of this is that, in accordance with the Soviet constitution, an autonomous territory can not join another country unless the Supreme Council of the USSR and the Azerbaijani government approve it (This is mentioned in Article 78 of the Soviet Constitution of 1977) (Geukjian, 2012: 125, 158). Nagorno-Karabakh and the neighboring raions (район=region) remained under Turkish administration, despite various occupation attempts by Armenia between 1923 and 1988 that were ineffective in response to Azerbaijani diplomats' actions. The USSR's collapse and subsequent loss of power, along with the impending end of the Cold War, created a vacuum that the Armenians exploited and opened the door for initiatives that eventually became actions.

Between 1988 and 1994, the Nagorno-Karabakh War raged on without slowing down, resulting in a number of issues, including several abuses of human rights that are still being felt today. The first signs of the Armenian uprising in the Karabakh region appeared

in January 1988, and on February 20, 1988, the National Council of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region voted in favor of the region's admission to Armenia (Geukjian, 2012: 141). Partial disagreements were bound to increase because the majority of the council was made up of Armenians, raising doubts about the decision's impartiality. Thousands of people were left homeless after the killings of Azerbaijanis in Spitak and Armenians in Sumgait, and the first phase of irregular migration flow started. A natural disaster (earthquake) that struck the Armenian city of Spitak on December 7, 1988, threw off the balances during these conflicts, the USSR Supreme Council intervened in the area, imprisoned the Karabakh Committee leaders, and temporarily halted the fighting. The USSR's Secretary General at the time, Mikhail Gorbachev, created the Special Management Committee as a superstructure to put an end to the hostilities in the area, he also provided some support and remedies by giving the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region more authority (Kambeck, 2013: 24-25).

It's important to clarify any confusion around Russia's position on this matter because, when analyzed in the context of the events, it appears to support both Armenia and Azerbaijan at different periods. The primary cause of this predicament is the ideological stances of the governments in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the third nations they maintain ties with. Particularly during the period of Abulfaz Elchibey, who ruled Azerbaijan between June 16, 1992 and June 24, 1993, the development of relations with Türkiye and the desire to establish and strengthen the Turkish union drew the reaction of Russia, and during this period, Armenia was supported (Yavuz-Gunter, 2022b: 98). The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region's autonomy was terminated two years prior to this date, in November 1989, when the region was annexed by the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic by the USSR Supreme Council. The Karabakh National Council and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic's administration refused to acknowledge this ruling by the USSR Supreme Council in December 1989, claiming that the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region had been annexed by Armenia by virtue of a power vacuum. On November 26, 1991, the Azerbaijan Soviet Administration made a decision to abolish the independent administration of the territory and annexe Karabakh to itself, while the First Nagorno-Karabakh War was still in progress. The conflict area, which first emerged at key sites, grew and affected the entire region, and the autonomous structure which was divided into the raions of Shusha, Kelbajar, Tartar, and Khojavend were continuously occupied throughout the war (Kazimirov, 2014: 109-110).

The Khojaly, Kushchular, and Maragha Massacres occurred during this conflict, which lasted six years and affected the central and southern regions of the Caucasus. As a result, crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, and genocide crimes were committed in numerous locations. During this period, street demonstrations were held in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, and these actions paved the way for the expansion of the Armenian occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh and the acceleration of massacres (Papazian, 1995: 13-18). It is important to discuss some of the major battles of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War before going on to the Khojaly Massacre.

Battle of Askeran

The conflict that took place on February 22-23, 1988 constituted the beginning of the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflicts, and the problems started after the Karabakh National

Council proclaimed that it was ceding the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region to the Armenian Soviet. On February 22, 1988, Azerbaijani citizens wanted to obtain information about the Azerbaijanis who were killed in the city of Khankendi, however, the calls made to the USSR administration were inconclusive, and complete and precise information about the dead and wounded could not be acquired. On February 27, 1988, Azerbaijan retaliated against the Armenian city of Sumgait in these skirmishes, which resulted in the deaths of two Azerbaijani civilians and the injuries of around fifty Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Similar attacks occurred in 1988 against Azerbaijanis in Ganja (Kirovabad), Armenians in Kugark, and Armenians in Baku between January 13–20, 1990, resulting in fatalities and injuries (Saparov, 2014: 94-95). Prior to the ethnic cleansing in Khojaly, there was a significant attack and widespread killing associated with the Baku conflicts, called "Black January (Black Saturday)".

Black January Massacre (Black Saturday)

Due to the simultaneous street protests by inhabitants of Azerbaijan and Armenia, events in Baku, the capital of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, were inevitable, and the Soviet army intervened without delay. When the USSR government brutally interfered against Azerbaijani citizens on January 19–20, 1990, around 200 people died and almost a thousand were injured. The Russians, who tried to maintain the Soviet regime which was on the verge of collapse within the framework of Mikhail Gorbachev's views such as glasnost and perestroika, helped this massacre both to intimidate the other 14 countries and to end the conflicts and unstable process in the Caucasus. However, the outcome did not suit Russia's interests, and the freedom struggles and separatist movements of the countries within the Soviet Union persisted without losing steam (Merezhko, 2014: 22-24).

Khojaly Massacre and Its Consequence

As it is well known, there was another massacre nearly 85 years before to the Khojaly massacre, and the ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population in the area and their attempts to manipulate the demographic structure to their advantage were not the first or the last. Hunchak and Dashnak, two Armenian communists, began mass killings of Muslim Turks between 1905 and 1907; Turks, exercising their right to self-defense as in Eastern Anatolia, engaged in confrontations with Armenians in cities like Baku, Nakhchivan, and Shusha. In response to the mass murders and burning of Tatar villages at that time, the Azerbaijanis that among whom the "Caucasian Tatars" were also counted that established both offensive and defensive fronts in major cities like Shusha. Armenian theses also exist that assert the reverse (Demoyan, 2006: 21).

When historical comparisons are done, a number of related incidents come out. As a result of the Russian Revolution in 1905, the two sides, which took advantage of the authority vacuum in the region and clashed, undertook the First Nagorno-Karabakh War at the end of the 1980s, when the USSR was about to fall, and history repeated itself. Furthermore, in order to ascertain Russia's stance in this equation, it is necessary to examine the political ideologies of these nations' governments as well as their interactions with other nations like Türkiye, France, England, etc.

The Khojaly massacre, started on February 25-26, 1992, with the participation of the 366th Russian Motorized Infantry Regiment in the events, which operated in the area during the post-USSR era and the mass slaughter of Azerbaijani citizens with Armenian-Russian military cooperation, transitioned into a new phase (Babayev et al., 2019: 21-22). The question is whether Khojaly was occupied as a natural consequence of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War or was it chosen for a particular purpose. First, it becomes clear that the fierce battles of the Karabakh War were mirrored in this area; second, it is recognized that the Khojaly region occupies a strategically significant location. As it is well known, Khojaly is situated in the heart of Azerbaijan and Armenia, which is also home to Nagorno-Karabakh. The only airport in the area is located in Khojaly, which is strategically located near the intersection of the highways and railways that connect the Aghdam, Khankendi, Shusha, and Fizuli raions, and this puts the country that possessed the region in a position to establish a significant advantage (Koç-Tarcan, 2020: 95). The Armenian military and administrative management, went beyond the limits of human rights and the laws of war and massacred people with all kinds of tortures, regardless of whether they were children, women or the elderly with the intention of cutting off Azerbaijan's supply routes and instilling fear in the area.

The population of the Nagorno-Karabakh region was approximately 200 thousand in 1988, while the combined population of the region and the other occupied raions were approximately 400 thousand. With the forced or voluntary migration strategies of imperialist nations like Russia, the balances changed for centuries, while 30% of these migrants are Armenians and 70% are Azerbaijanis, the 1990s saw the emergence of the reverse situation (Yüce, 2023: 83). When the war started, the Khojaly region had about ten thousand citizens, many of whom were forced to migrate; those who fled abroad attempted to obtain the status of "asylum seeker" or "refugee," while some of them battled to survive in difficult conditions in tents, containers, etc. under the status of "internally displaced persons" (also known as "fugitives" or "forced migrants"). Nearly three thousand people remained in the city of Khojaly, and the majority of them were Azerbaijani citizens of Turkish origin before the massacre. As a result of the massacre that took place on February 26, 1992, it was recorded that 613 Azerbaijani citizens were killed, and it was eventually determined how serious the incident was. The reason for this was that 106 of the Turks killed were women, 83 were children, and 70 were elderly, and various forms of tortures took place. Furthermore, 487 individuals had critical injuries, 150 people vanished and were never heard from again, and 1275 people were held captive and treated against the laws of war (Çeliksoy, 2021: 130).

Nagorno-Karabakh and the Forced Migration

It is necessary to consider the types of prior acts that occurred in this environment in order to accurately understand the migrant movements in the Karabakh region. The Ottoman Empire's conflicts with Russia and the Iranian Empire, in particular, brought about some successes for them, and then there was forced migration. Articles pertinent to the Kurekchay Treaty in 1805, the Gulistan Peace Treaty in 1813, and the Turkmenchay Treaty of 1828 all attempted to settle Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh territory, sometimes willingly and other times forcedly (Mustafayev, 2011, 26-27). The original occupants of these regions were the Azerbaijanis until 1825, at which point the Armenians, with a population of up to 70 percent, achieved control over both the land

area and the demographic structure. Following the 1890s, Armenian separatists like Hunchak and Dashnak carried out terrorist attacks and raids on villages in both the Baku and Nagorno-Karabakh regions, forcing the population to flee either to the eastern regions of Türkiye or to the Iranian provinces of Tabriz, Khoy, Urmia, Zanjan, Ardabil, Dilman, Eher, Salmas, etc (Shaffer, 2002: 24-32). Iran is required to act cautiously at all times because of the 18–25 million Azerbaijani Turks living there, who have been subjected to forced migration for nearly 200 years that roughly double the population of Azerbaijan, which is 10 million. An ethnic structure of this magnitude disturbs Iran even today, causing Iran to keep its distance from Türkiye on a diplomatic and political level (Shaffer, 2002: 197, 224).

Although these changes occurred in the 19th century, comparable migration patterns persisted in the 20th century, and numerous other events contributed to this state of affairs. The challenges deteriorated because every big incident led to the creation of internally displaced people and asylum seekers. Among them are the events of World War I (1914–1918), the Deportation of Armenians in 1915, the October Revolution in 1917, the founding of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic on May 28, 1918, the USSR's occupation of Azerbaijan on April 27–May 14, 1920, the decision to declare the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic on July 24, 1923, and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region as part of it (Demirci, 2022: 23). Regional battles between Armenia and Azerbaijan between 1918 and 1920 also made it easier for people to flee Nagorno-Karabakh, which made the issue of asylum seekers more apparent. During the Cold War period between 1945 and 1990, when the rebel movements were suppressed under the rule of the USSR, certain migrations occurred, but remained in a partial area under the pressure of the higher authority. When the First Nagorno-Karabakh War broke out in 1988, the Armenian troops finally had the chance they had been waiting for 65 years and they utilized forced migration as a weapon to drive out the Azerbaijani population in the area. The following can be stated if using observable and numerical scientific data in the framework of Behavioral Theory is required during this process.

A few statistically significant facts emerge when we examine the war's trajectory, and this makes it possible to draw conclusions about the war's outcome as well as the migration. The population of Azerbaijan was 9 million, while the population of Armenia was approximately 3.5 million in 1990 and the Azerbaijanis who were in an advantageous position, faced the opposite scenario, both because the army left over from the USSR was used by the Armenians and the Armenians had easy access to military equipment (Yavuz-Gunter, 2022a: 54). Nearly 14 million people have been impacted by the fighting in the area, including in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, and some of them have been compelled to migrate. Almost one million people were forced to flee Karabakh for Azerbaijan between 1988 and 1994, when the conflict persisted, and nearly 250 thousand people had to do the same from Karabakh for Armenia (Shaffer, 2002: 201). Although the Azerbaijani government appealed for international assistance, the necessary aid did not arrive, and these internally displaced people were resettled in Baku and the surrounding districts. Furthermore, these displaced individuals were referred to as "fugitives" (qaçan) and "forced migrants" and they encountered a number of challenges in both Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh territory (Çil, 2023: 470).

During this period, it was aimed for Armenia to seize the Lachin corridor, which is described as a buffer zone, and move toward the Khojaly region in order to occupy the Karabakh region. Hundreds of thousands of people were left homeless as a result of the occupation; some individuals attempted to travel by military helicopter, while others traveled by train and land to the Azerbaijan region (Akıncı-Kaba, 2023: 99). Numerous civilians were murdered when military helicopters carrying aid workers, Azerbaijani nationals, and humanitarian supplies were shot down. The most significant of these was the fact that Azerbaijani military helicopter Mil Mi-8 was struck down by Armenian military powers on November 20, 1991, as hostilities escalated. 13 Azerbaijani citizens, 2 Russian and 1 Kazakh officials, 3 Azerbaijani journalists, and 3 helicopter workers perished in this disaster. Although Armenia referred to this tragedy as an "accident," Azerbaijan described it a "terrorist act" and the investigating commissions that were established were unable to come to a decision. By the end of 1992, the Armenians who had taken control of Nagorno-Karabakh and 7 surrounding raions, occupied 20 percent of Azerbaijan, caused the displacement and forced migration of nearly one million people (Dadaşova, 2020: 59).

Forced migration has caused severe economic burdens and irreparable harm to the local communities anywhere in the world. Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan have benefited from the forced migrations in the area and many of the profits from farming and raising animals have become unaffordable due to the production of agricultural items like wheat, barley, tobacco, etc. Between 1988 and 1994, hospitals, factories, hamlets, and several essential components were heavily bombarded and destroyed throughout the war. Even if the people who were subjected to forced migration returned to the region, they were deprived of the elements that would enable them to make a living, and their existing livelihoods were in the hands of the Armenians (Aras, 2015: 116-118).

Additionally, on September 29, 1992, the "Law on the Status of Fugitives and Forced Migrants" was passed in order to address the issues these people were facing, as a result, migrants who obtained identity cards were granted certain rights regarding settlement and employment prospects. Both the terms "fugitive" and "forced migrant" are defined in Article 1 of this law, making the distinctions between them easier to comprehend. "Those who fled from the territory of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War because of their language, religion or nationality, whose life, movable or immovable property is in danger, who cannot benefit from the protection of the country of which they are a citizen, who have left their country and who are not citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan" were referred to as "fugitives". Azerbaijani citizens who permanently abandon their place of residence within the borders of Azerbaijan and migrate to other regions or leave their place of permanent residence in other countries and enter the borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan are described as 'forced migrants' (Yusifsoy-Özsüer, 2022: 471-473).

In short, a lot of work has been done to make sure that Muslim Turks who reside in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region but are not citizens of Azerbaijan, or refugees who feel a connection to Azerbaijani culture while coming from different ethnicities or religions, are not mistreated. As it is known, there were also occupied Azerbaijani territories outside of Nagorno-Karabakh, both Azerbaijani citizens living within the borders of this Azerbaijan Socialist Republic and non-Azerbaijani citizens residing in the region were subject to forced migration and were protected by refugee policies. When an

evaluation is made in the context of the migration policies reflected until today, the problems of the asylum seekers, especially those from the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region who are described as "fugitives", have mostly been resolved, while the problems of people who are Azerbaijani citizens and are subjected to forced migration continue. There are still issues with the economy, education, and housing that are related to unemployment (Yusifsoy-Özsüer, 2022: 484-487). [In addition, while international humanitarian aid (through the Red Cross, UNHCR, etc.) is actively providing to Armenians who migrated from the Nagorno-Karabakh Region today (2020-2023), the same circumstance did not occur for Muslim Turks between 1988-1994, and it was clearly seen that Western countries took a different attitude when it came to a Christian country. See also the migration policies of European countries towards the citizens of these two countries, who are Muslim and Christian, as a result of the wars in Syria and Ukraine...]

Nearly one million people were forced to live as "fugitives," "forced migrants," or "asylum seekers" as a result of the migrations that followed the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (these individuals who are typically "internally displaced persons," shall be referred to as "refugees" in order to avoid repeating their experiences). Nearly 800 thousand of these people are fugitives and forced migrants, and nearly 200 thousand of them are asylum seekers who came to Azerbaijan from countries such as Armenia, Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Yusifsoy-Özsüer, 2022: 476-479). Some of the fortunate migrants moved to Baku and the other areas, while others settled with close relatives. People moved to Baku's interior due to a lack of work opportunities in the area and restricted access to social services like schools, hospitals, and other facilities, as a result of a dense population accumulation, the city was unable to handle this. A number of asylum seekers were forced to reside with their family, while others were housed in state institution facilities, tents, barracks, train cars, etc. Over time, asylum seekers who had inadequate food and housing in the first place began to meet these requirements. With the assistance of governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations, there are still a significant number of survivors today (Yusifsoy-Özsüer, 2022: 487).

Regardless of their location in the globe, finding a job and supporting their family is one of the most crucial things for refugees and asylum seekers. The majority of asylum seekers in Azerbaijan work in rural agriculture and animal husbandry because they are unable to find suitable employment. Additionally, the education of their children and their integration into Azerbaijani society present a significant challenge for these individuals. As it is known, a group that deprives of education will always pose a problem for that society and will pave the way for an increase in criminal cases. Consequently, around 100,000 asylum seekers continue their education in the roughly 15% of schools that the Azerbaijani state has offered to them. One of the main reasons for this is that almost all the educational institutions belonging to these people were destroyed by the Armenians and they have nowhere to return (Rüstemov, 2013: 89-90). Apart from issues related to housing and education, fugitives and forced migrants have also experienced health issues, these include a rise in diseases like measles, respiratory tract infections, anemia, hepatitis, and others when there is inadequate shelter and protection, no access to clean drinking water, and unhygienic conditions. While providing health care to refugees can present certain challenges, the support activities of the Turkish Red Crescent and the Republic of

Türkiye Ministry of Health have always existed. It is obvious that these people who were deprived of their rights such as health, shelter, food and drink, etc., by Armenia, especially during the Khojaly massacre, were victims of genocide (Özarslan, 2014: 198).

Conclusion

Three distinct effects of the Khojaly massacre and the First Nagorno-Karabakh War need to be resolved; the political, legal, and sociological (the refugee problem) consequences. During the terms of office of both Heydar Aliyev and his son Ilham Aliyev, the problems of fugitives and forced migrants were closely monitored and aid was provided to the extent possible. The missing parts have been completed and the grievances of these people for nearly 30 years have been tried to be overcome. Armenia, which occupies 20% of Azerbaijan's land, has settled in its own citizens in the seized territories of Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh and has continued to hold these areas illegally (Sarı, 2015: 106; Eyvazlı, 2019: 161). In the event that Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding provinces, districts and villages occupied by Armenians are captured back by Azerbaijan, the return of Turkish Muslim asylum seekers to their homes and their resettlement in these regions will be a permanent solution. It should be noted, nevertheless, that in the asylum-seeker and refugee cases that have occurred globally thus far, individuals who remain in the locations they visit for an average of five years do not return; instead, they settle there permanently.

Apart from the unresolved issue of illegal and coerced migration, there exist unresolved legal difficulties as well and the rulings from the Khojaly massacre serve as a reference in this regard. The United Nations took certain legal action during the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and Khojaly between 1988 and 1994; this state of affairs was documented in four distinct Security Council resolutions (resolutions 822, 853, 874, and 884) that were issued in 1993. The UNSC referred to Armenia's violations as "occupation" and ordered the immediate evacuation of the relevant Azerbaijani and Nagorno-Karabakh lands (United Nations, 1993). The judgment rendered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on June 16, 2015, for the Azerbaijani citizens who were displaced in the Khojaly region, was also significant in this regard. Six Azerbaijani residents filed an ECtHR lawsuit titled "Chiragov and Others v. Armenia" after they were persecuted in the Lachin corridor and became asylum seekers, they took their case before the court. The incident declared in these judgments and causing Armenia to become a criminal is the violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life), Article 13 (right to effective remedy), Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and Article 1 (protection of property) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (ECHR, 1950: 11, 13, 33). It should be known that as Armenia was the "defendant" nation, it was unable to avoid being held accountable for the crime, which led to the need for compensation. According to the ECtHR, the parties must confer and make a decision regarding compensation within a year (HUDOC, 2015).

The occupation of the Azerbaijani regions and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region had political ramifications, as discussed in the third and final section. Armenia's consideration of recognizing and admitting Nagorno-Karabakh as a state is one of these political ramifications, which are also connected to legal matters. There have been some initiatives in the context of peace-building with the Minsk Group, which Türkiye is a

member of and which was founded on March 24, 1992, under the OSCE's presidency of the USA, Russia, and France, however, complete success has not been realized (TRT News, 2020). Subsequently, Azerbaijan and Armenia, which achieved a ceasefire in Kyrgyzstan with the Bishkek Protocol on May 5, 1994, came to the fore with some solution proposals that were formed later (United Nations, 1994). The Madrid Principles were proposed on November 29, 2007, and they state that "Azerbaijan should be granted the occupied raions; Nagorno-Karabakh should be granted an interim status; a buffer zone-style corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh should be opened; displaced, fleeing, and forced migrants (asylum seekers) should return to their countries; Armenia disregarded these directives, despite it being declared that peacekeepers should be sent to the regions occupied by the OSCE" (OSCE, 2009).

In the context of the decisions of the Madrid principles, a result was reached in favor of Azerbaijan and although it was said that the event was an "occupation", it was not emphasized that the occupying state was Armenia (Kırışık, 2023: 138-139). The issues from the 1990s still exist today, and in addition to the social, legal, and political ramifications, it is important to talk about and work for the International Community's acceptance of the reality that the Khojaly massacre was a "genocide."

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Mao'nun Uzatılmış Savaş Doktrini Üzerinden PKK Terör Örgütü'nün Stratejisi

*The Strategy of the PKK Terrorist Organization
Through Mao's Doctrine of Protracted War*

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Öz

Terör, tarihi çok eskiye dayansa dahi literatüre kavram olarak Fransız İhtilali'nin ardından karşımıza çıkar. İhtilalin ardından jakobenlerin temsil ettiği idare tarafından halkın üzerinde etkili kontrol sağlamak için yürüttüğü sert rejim sürecine "terör dönemi" denmiştir. Terör, eski fakat kendisini en iyi şekilde güncelleyebilen bir kavramdır. Bu anlamda modern terör örgütleri benzer yapısal özellikleri, stratejileri ve biçimleri taklit eden, öğrenen bir yapıya sahiptir. Bu çalışma, ülkemizin en önemli terör sorunu olan PKK terör örgütünün geçmiş benzer isyanlar tecrübesi üzerinden, klasik gerilla harbi metodolojisine dönüşümü, benzerlikleri ve uygulanma biçimini Maoçu savaş doktrini üzerinden değerlendirmek üzere hazırlanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Terör, PKK, Asimetrik Savaş, Mao, Strateji

Abstract

Even though terrorism dates back to a very long time, it appears in the literature as a concept after the French Revolution. After the Revolution, the harsh regime process carried out by the administration represented by the Jacobins to ensure effective control over the people was called the "terror period". Terrorism is an old concept that can update itself in the best way. In this sense, modern terrorist organisations have a learning structure that imitates similar structural features, strategies and forms. This study has been prepared to evaluate the transformation of the PKK terrorist organisation, which is the most important terrorist problem of our country, into the classical guerrilla warfare methodology, its similarities and the way it is applied through the Maoist war doctrine, based on the experience of similar insurgencies in the past.

Keywords: Terror, PKK, Asymmetric Warfare, Mao, Strategy

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Giriş

Uluslararası güvelik aktörleri arasında yer bulan Terörizm; kavramsal olarak bakıldığında, bilimsel yazına girişinin ilk olarak Fransız İhtilali'nin ilk yıllarına rastladığı görülür. İhtilalin hemen sonrasında kutuplaşan toplumsal katmanlar ve geri dönüş sendromu birleştiğinde özellikle kraliyet yanlısı Jirondenler üzerinde Jakobenler tarafından uygulanan hesaplı şiddet dönemi "terör dönemi" olarak isimlendirilmiştir. Ancak tarihsel açıdan ele aldığımızda kavramın uygulama biçimi, ideolojik alt yapısı, sistematik şeklinin Roma dönemine kadar uzandığını görürüz. Söz konusu çağda Roma işgali altında bulunan Filistin topraklarında kurulan Sicarii adlı Yahudi örgüt, Özellikle, işgalci lejyon subaylarına yönelik suikastları gerçekleştirerek, kargaşa ortamında yaptıkları faaliyetlerle isimlerini duyurmuşlardır. Daha sonraları ise günümüzdeki tanımı ile hücre tipi örgütlenmeye sahip bir başka Orta Doğu merkezli Haşşaşiler'de ön planda olan lider kültü ve onun temsil ettiği dini-ideolojik yapıya sıkı sıkıya bağlı yapısıyla günümüzdeki birçok terörist organizasyonun da temelini oluşturmuşlardır (İyiat, 2022: 522).

Her ne kadar modern dünyanın bir temel olgusu olarak bahsedilse dahi, tarihi çok daha geçmişe uzanan terörizm olgusu ve onun insan faktörü olan teröristin kimliğine yönelik hala kesin bir tanım ortaya konulmamış olması neticesinde hem kavramsal hem de hukuki açıdan gri bir saha yaratmaktadır. Bu sorunun çözümü adına özellikle modern çağın başından itibaren farklı açıklamalar yapılmaya çalışılmış ancak bu çalışmalarda da tam bir birlik ortaya konulmamıştır. Bunun temel nedeni ise, söz konusu çalışmaların içeriğinin bir kısmının eylemin metodolojisine, bir kısmının eylemin hedefindeki kişi ya da kişilere bir kısmının da eylemin arkasındaki ideolojik motivasyona odaklanmasıdır (Şimşek, 2016: 320). Bu kavramın belirsizliğini daha net anlayabilmek adına verilecek en güzel örnek ise 1936 ve 1981 yılları arasında geçen toplam 45 yıllık süreçte yapılan çalışmalar neticesinde birbirinden bağımsız 109 farklı terörizm tanımının yapılmış olmasıdır.

Aslında terörizm hangi açıdan tanım ya da yorumlanırsa yorumlansın, ortak noktasının yapılan eylemin sonuçları, etki çevresi ve propaganda ölçeğinin eylem öncesinde çarpan etkisinin hesap edilerek planlanmış ve gerçekleştirilmiş bir şiddet eylemi olmasıdır. Bu noktada gerçekleştirilen veya gerçekleştirilmesi planlanan terör faaliyetinin temel amacının eylem neticesinde öldürülen kişi sayısından çok öte eylemin dehşet etkisinden etkilenen kitlenin büyüklüğüdür. Bu anlayış da eylemin esas gücünün onun duyurulmasından geçmesi anlamına gelmektedir. Böylece amaçlanan kitlelerin 'dehşete' kapılması ile birlikte, karamsarlığa düşerek eylemi gerçekleştirenler ve onun ardında bulunan güçlerin arzuladıkları duruma hedefin boyun eğdirilmesinden başka bir yol olmadığını hissetmelerini sağlamaktır. Bu korkunun yaratılmasıyla birlikte kamu otoritesinin zayıf düşürülmesi, toplumun geleceğe yönelik umutlarının yok edilmesi sayesinde mevcut sisteme yönelik olarak bir inançsızlık ortamı oluşması sağlanacaktır (İyiat: 2013: 137). İşte terörizmin hedefine alarak beklediği, ortaya koydukları hesaplı şiddet ile örgütün idealleri karşısında olan devlete sınımsızlığa bağlı olan her bir bireyin düşman olarak tanımlanarak hedef alınacağı duygusu toplumda yerleştirilmektir. Bu sayede hedef toplumun sürekli ve zaman-mekân anlamında belirsiz, Böylece görünmeyen bir düşman tarafından hasım olarak kabul edildiğiniz düşüncesi, toplumun davranış biçimini, hayatı yaşama şeklini negatif yönde etkisi altına alacaktır. Ortaya çıkan kolektif

düşünce biçimi ve duygusal hal, toplumu ayrıştırmanın yanı sıra bireylerin psikolojisinde güvenliklerinin sağlanamadığı hissini tehlikeli biçimde arttırmaktadır. Böylece hem birey hem de toplum için güven tesisinin ana kaynağı olarak kabul edilmesi gereken “Devlet” olgusuna yönelik septik bir düşünce hali oluşur.

Güvenlik ve devlet olgusu birbirinin mütemmim cüzü şeklindedir. Ontolojik bir gerçeklikten doğan, bireysel veya toplumsal kazanımların elde tutulması ve korunması olarak tanımlayabildiğimiz güvenlik Peter Hought'un yorumuyla “Devletin kuruluşunun da maksadıdır” (Özdağ, 2015: 7). Antik Yunan'dan beri devlet kavramı güvenliğin ana teminatı ve bu yönüyle itaat edilmesi gereken bir üst mekanizma olarak kabul edilmiştir. Thomas Hobbes tarafından 1651 yılında yayımlanan Leviathan eserinde, devlet olgusunu tek bir başa sahip fakat mutasyona uğramış pek çok canavarın vücut bulmuş hali, her şeyi yöneten ve tek kudret sahibi olarak tanımlar (Akın, 2021: 106). İnsanoğlu doğası gereği çatışmaya meyillidir. İşte Hobbes'un tarif ettiği bu canavarın varlık sebebi, tematik olarak toplumun kendisini içeriden ve dışarıdan gelecek tehditlerden korumak adına yaptığı bir anlaşmanın tezahürüdür. Üstelik toplumlar bu anlaşmanın karşılığında sahip oldukları en kıymetli varlıkları olan özgürlüklerinin bir kısmını canavarın ayaklarının altına sermeye gönüllü olmuşlardır. Bir başka önemli düşünür olan Hegel ise devleti tarif ederken, Tanrı'nın yeryüzündeki yürüyüşü olarak nitelendirmiş ve bu sebepten dolayı dünya ürünü ancak Tanrısallık taşıyan bu nedenden dolayı da hürmet göstermemiz gerektiğini ifade etmiştir (Hegel, 2003: 279). Antik Yunan çağının önemli filozoflarından olan Aristoteles, bir devlet var aslında doğal bir toplumsallaşma adımı olduğunu ileri sürmüş ve ilave olarak devletsiz bir canlının sosyalleşmenin bir adımı olarak medeniyet konusunda kararlı olan ve erdem, insanlık onuru gibi önemli hasletleri önceleyen tüm toplumların kendileri için en iyisini isteyerek bu fikir etrafında devlet adı verilen kurumsal yapıyı yarattıklarını iddia etmiştir (Erdoğan, 2017: 118). İşte terörün hedefinde insanların zihnindeki bu kutsallık taşıyan, güven kaynağı vardır.

Terörizm ve bir örgütsel organizasyon işidir. Terör örgütleri ise sürekli öğrenen organizasyonlardır ve tamamının ortak özelliği bir ideolojik kökene dayanmasıdır. Bilindiği gibi ideolojiler, günlük politik, sosyal ve akademik yazımda birbirinden ayrı anlamlar içerecek şekilde kullanılan bir kelime olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. İdeoloji adıyla tanımladığımız bu fikri alan, terör örgütünün ana dinamiğini oluşturmada ve hangi ideolojik kodla hareket ederse etsin her terörist organizasyon kendi benimsediği bu fikri alt yapıya uygun olacak strateji belirlemektedir. Bir ideolojik eksene sempatiyle yaklaşan bir bireyin, eli kanlı bir militan haline dönüştüğü süreç, içinde dahil olduğu örgütün anılan ideolojik yaklaşımına dair siyasal eğitimi ile başlar. Bu eğitimde amaçlanan, örgütün beslendiği ideolojik kaynağın, mensuplarına anlatılması, benimsetilmesi ve kesin bir biçimde inandırılmasıdır. Teröristin örgüte bağlılığının tek yolu bu eğitimin başarılı olmasıdır. Modern terörizm tanımında ideolojik temel dört ana dalga üzerinden tanımlanmaktadır. Bunlar; anarşist dalga, sömürge karşıtı dalga, yeni sol dalga ve dini dalga biçimindedir.

Birinci dalga olarak isimlendirdiğimiz anarşist dalga; kendi düşünce sistematigi içinde devletin ortadan kaldırılarak, bireyi önceleyen ademi merkeziliği ve en üstün otorite olarak kabul ettikleri Tanrı kavramı ve ondan kaynaklı dinlerin tümünü ret ederek, ateizmi savunmuşlardır. Bu noktada ilk düşman olarak gördükleri devlet organizmasının yıkılması ana hedefleri olmuştur. Bu noktada fikirlerinin propagandasının ancak eylemler

yoluyla yapacakları inancını taşımışlardır. Hem propagandalarını daha geniş kitlelere ulaştırmak hem de devleti yıkmamanın tek yolunun ise ancak terörizm ile mümkün olabileceğine inanmışlar ve küçük hücreler şeklinde örgütlenmişlerdir (Martin, 2017: 57).

İkinci dalga olarak tanımlanan sömürge karşıtı dalga; emperyalizm çağının pik noktasında patlak veren İlk kitlesel büyük savaş olan 1. Dünya Savaşı'nın ardından, ABD Başkanı Woodrow Wilson tarafından ortaya atılan idealizm temelli self determinasyon ilkesinin uygulamaya konulması ulus devletler ve imparatorluklar üzerinde küresel bir çözülme sürecini başlattı. Bu yeni durum bir yandan Avrupa toprakları üzerinde yeni yeni devletler ve Avrupa dışında da diasporalar anlamına geliyordu. Örneğin 1922 yılında aynı temelde beslenen IRA (İrlanda Cumhuriyet Ordusu) terör örgütü bir İrlanda devleti yarattı. Bundan cesaret alan terörist gruplar ikinci büyük savaşın sona ermesini de fırsat bilerek; İsrail, Kıbrıs, Yemen, Cezayir gibi yeni devletlerin kuruluş sürecini başlattılar. Eylem tarzı olarak benimsedikleri taktik devlet kademesinde görev yapan yöneticiler yerine kolluk kuvvetleri ve onların yakınlarına yönelik suikast ve saldırılar biçiminde olacaktı. Bu sayede kendilerine daha iyi ve anlamlı bir imaj katmayı amaçlamışlar, üstelik terörist kelimesinin verdiği olumsuz anlama karşı bir strateji geliştirerek, devleti esas terörü uygulayan aktörler halinde ifade ederken, kendilerini de "özgürlük savaşçıları" olarak tanımlayacaklardı (Bayer, 2007: 9).

Anarşizm ve sömürge karşıtı dalgalardan sonra üçüncü dalga olarak tanımlanan terörizm türü yeni sol dalga olarak adlandırılmaktadır. Soğuk savaş adı verilen çift kutuplu dünya düzeni içerisinde özellikle 1960'lı yılların ardından küresel olarak tüm dünyada şiddet ve başkaldırı hareketlerinin artışı ile birlikte özellikle SSCB'nin devrim ihracıyla Avrupa'nın özellikle doğusunda ve Amerika kıtasının güneyinde yayılan Marksist ve Leninist ideoloji, benzer şekilde Çin'de yükselen Maocu felsefe etkisiyle yaşanan siyasal dönüşümü, Bolivya'da isyancı Che'nin öldürülmesi, Vietnam Savaşı ve Avrupa'da yaşanan öğrenci olayları söz konusu faaliyetlere önemli bir ivme ve ideolojik temel kazandırmıştır (Avcı: 2019: 142). İdeallerinin içindeki ütopya sayesinde özellikle de gençler üzerinde hissettiren komünist ideolojinin özünde bulunan sınırların ortadan kalktığı, sınıf farklarının olmadığı ve bu sayede tam anlamıyla eşit bir toplum yaratılacağı fikri, ekonomik eşitsizliklerin arttığı anılan tarihler, büyük şehirlerde gettolaşmanın ve sınıfsal eşitsizliklerin belirgin hale gelmesi neticesinde daha da taraftar kazanmış, devrime ulaşmanın yolunun silahlı mücadele ile var olabileceği anlayışı bunu amaçlayan grupları birkaç istisna dışında terörizme yöneltmiştir (Demir, 2009: 59). Söz konusu dalga içerisinde bir önemli detay da terörist organizasyonlarda kadın varlığının daha fazla hissedilir olmasıdır. Aşırı sol politik anlayışın sağlamış olduğu cinsiyet eşitliğinin etkisiyle çatışma sahasında daha sıklıkla varlıklarını göstermeye başlayan kadın teröristler; gerilla savaşlarından, intihar bombacılığına birçok alanda yer almış ve saldırıların doğrudan gerçekleştiricisi olmuşlardır (Ekiz, 2020: 557).

Terörizmin dördüncü dalgası temelinde günümüzde etkisi belki de en fazla görülen terörizm çeşididir. Anılan terör grupları dini kendisi için bir ideolojik eksen olarak kabul ederek eylemlerini Tanrı buyruğu gibi sözde meşru bir zemine oturtmaya çalışırlar. Aslında din-siyaset ve ideoloji ilişkisi sadece çağımızın eseri bir normatif durum değildir. Çağlar boyunca din gerçekliği toplumların yaşayış biçimlerinin belirlenmesinde birincil sırada yer alarak, birbirinden farklı yaşayışlarına rağmen tamamı temelinde iyiler-kötüler arasında gerçekleşecek bir karar verme süreci ve bunun mücadelesi üzerine kurulmuştur

(Şöhret, 2021: 515). Dinin araç haline getirilerek, terör odaklı bir duruma dönüşmesi paradoksal bir durum olarak algılansa dahi anılan sahanın sıklıkla tercih edilmesinin temel nedeni olgunun temelini oluşturan kutsallık, dinin skolastik tarafı ve bu yönüyle bireyleri istediği gibi yönlendirmesi ile birlikte yukarıda bahsettiğimiz iyi ile kötünün arasındaki mücadelenin içinde iyi tarafta yer almanın ve bunu eylemle şiddete dayanarak da olsa desteklemenin neticesinde hak edilecek manevi ödüllerin davayı sözde haklı kılmasıdır. Bu hal bir motivasyon kaynağı olarak bireylerin örgüte katılımları ve organizasyonun sürekliliği konusunda önemli bir psikolojik alt yapı sağlamaktadır (Şöhret, 2021: 516). Yapısal olarak detaylı bir inceleme yaptığımızda bağımsız bir terör dalgası içinde yer almasına rağmen dini tandanslı bu tip terörist grupların demografik yapıları anlamında dini kimliklerin, etnik kimliklerle bir arada olduğunu görülmektedir. Bu anlamda sadece modern terörizm olgusu ile birlikte eski durum regule halde dönüşerek özellikle bir din devleti kurma şeklinde ortaya çıkmak ya da Tamil Kaplanları gibi anılan amaç karşısında olmak şeklinde diğerlerinden farklılaşmaktadır.

Bu noktada çalışmamızın ana konusunu teşkil eden PKK terör örgütüne geçmeden önce onun stratejik ve taktik eksende kendisi için örnek aldığı ve arasında özellikle demografik kaynak noktasında benzerlikler taşıyan Maoçu savaş doktrinine yakından bakmak faydalı olacaktır.

Mao Zedung ve Çin Halk Savaşı Pratiği

Mao, 1893 yılında Çin-Huan kentinde dünyaya geldi. Doğumuyla birlikte kendisine dönemin ezoterik gelenekleri uyarınca su anlamına gelen “Zedung” adı verildi. Orta sınıf bir çiftçi ailenin çocuğu olan Mao, eğitim alırken babası tarafından eğitimi bırakarak kendisine yardım etmesini istemesi üzerine evi terk edecekti. Kendisi o günlerden bahsederken; “*Sürekli olarak babam ile bir mücadele ve kavga halindeydik. Onun istek ve hatta emirlerine uyup, kendisine itaat ettikçe daha çok dayak yiyordum. Bu durumu bitirmenin tek yolunun isyan olduğunun farkına vardım*” (Short, 2007:43). O gün yaptığı isyan ileride onun kişiliğinin önemli bir parçası haline gelecekti. Mao, eğitimi müteakip, başlarda ticaret, hukuk gibi farklı alanlara yönelse dahi sonuçta yapmak istediği mesleğin öğretmenlik olduğuna karar vermiş ve hayatının tam merkezine yerleşecek olan Marksist fikirlerle, öğretmen okulundayken tanışmıştır (Chang, 2006: 62). Komünizmin etkisi altında kafasında bir devrim fikri oluşmaya başlayan Mao, her ne kadar cahil olarak kabul etse dahi demografik yapısı itibarıyla Çin’de gerçekleştirmeyi planladığı devrimin ancak köylü sınıfı ile gerçekleşeceğini düşünmeye başlamıştır (Short, 2007: 120). Söz konusu tarihlere ülkede iktidarda olan Milliyetçi Parti’nin, Japonya karşısında yürüttüğü teslimiyetçi politikanın sonucunda daha da fütursuzlaşan Japonların “21 Talep” adı verdikleri isteklerine boyun eğilmesi Çin halkı adına utanç günü olarak kabul edilmiştir. Bu gelişmeler neticesinde Çin’de gittikçe azalan prestijinin yarattığı ortam Çin Komünist Partisi için uygun vasat yaratmış, bunu fırsat olarak kabul eden Mao, partinin 1921 yılında gerçekleşen ilk kongresinde Milliyetçi Parti’yi sert bir dille eleştiren bir bildiri ve dergi yayınlamıştır. İlerleyen süreçte de partinin Merkez Komite üyesi olarak, özellikle köylü sorunu üzerine yazılar kaleme alarak, planladığı köylü devrimi için köylülerle düşünsel anlamda bağ kurmayı başarmıştır (Short, 2007: 83). Bu bağın kuruluşunda kuşkusuz en büyük avantajı merkez ve yerel yöneticilerin halka zulmetmesi olmuş, bu durum Mao’nun planladığı isyanın çıkmasını kolaylaştırmıştır. Birkaç küçük isyan başlasa dahi Mao, bu hareketlerin netice vermeyeceğini, yöneticilerin devrilmesi değil, sistemin değişmesinin

tek çare olabileceğini ifade etmiş, model olarak anarşist Marksizm ve Ekim Devrimi'ni model kabul etmiştir (Fengcheng, 2011: 94). Japonların, Milliyetçi Parti'den istediği "Yirmi Bir Talep" nedeniyle yaşanan utanç gününün intikamını almaya dair yemin edilmiş ve çıkarılacak isyanın "gerilla savaşı" şeklinde olacağı kararlaştırılmıştır.

Köylü gerillalar anlayışına dayalı olan Mao'nun savaş stratejisi, Mao önderliğindeki direniş hareketleri hem bu taktik yaklaşımın test edilmesi hem de ölçülebilmesini sağlayacaktır. Söz konusu tarihte ölçek olarak göreceli küçük ancak güçlü bir devlet olan Japonya'yı Çin topraklarından atmak için, o zaman büyük fakat zayıf bir ülke olan Çin, gerilla savaşı taktiklerini etkili bir şekilde kullanarak 1945 yılına kadar savaşmıştır. Bu taktik anlayış geçen süre göz önüne alınarak "uzatılmış savaş stratejisi" olarak da isimlendirmiştir (İyiat, 2017: 193). Üç ana başlık altında topladığımız aşamalı bir taktik anlayış üzerine inşa edilen savaş stratejisi özünde, Mao tarafından merkezi yönetimin etki ve kontrol alanı dışında bulunan kırsal bölgelerde, gerilla güçlerinin eğitim yaptıkları, istirahat ettikleri ve eylemleri için hazırlandıkları kurtarılmış bölgeler teşekkül ettirmek için faaliyet gösterdikleri stratejik savunma, kurtarılmış bölgeleri daha fazla yayararak, düşman kuvvetlerini yıpratma savaşıyla zayıf düşürmek ve ilerleyen zamanda teşkil ettireceğimiz ordu birliklerimiz için gereken silah ve mühimmatı elde etmek için yürütülen stratejik denge safhası ve geleneksel savaş yöntemlerini kullanarak netice alınabilecek bir saldırı ile kentleri ele geçirme şeklinde olan stratejik saldırı aşamalarının toplamıdır (İyiat, 2013: 193). Bu yıpratıcı savaş karşısında Japon birliklerinin konvansiyonel savaş anlayışı ile mücadele etmeye çalışmalarının kendilerini başarıya götürdüğünü bizzat Mao şöyle ifade ediyordu; *"Düşmanımız yanlışlar yaptı. Kızıl Ordu'ya karşı savaşmanın, başka kuvvetlerle mücadelede kullanılanlardan farklı olduğunu anlayamadı. Çeşitli bakımdan üstünlüğüne güvenerek, bizi hafife aldı ve eskiden beri kullandığı savaş yöntemlerine saplanıp kaldı. Her böyle yaptığında yenilgiye uğradı"* (Zedung, 2003: 27). Bu taktik anlayış her ne kadar son safhasında konvansiyonel bir savaş planı izlenimi verse dahi büyük çapta ve cephe savaşına ilişkin eğitim gören düzenli ordular karşısında plansız gibi görülen ve hızlı, dağınık, küçük çaplı birliklerle uygulandığından ve vur-kaç sistemine dayandığından günümüzde asimetrik savaş olarak adlandırılmıştır. Bu stratejinin uygulanmasının bir zorunluluk ve tek kazanma ihtimali olan savaş tipi olabileceğini, koşullar dahilinde yine bizzat Mao şu şekilde ifade ediyordu; *"Çin Devrimci Savaşı'nın başlıca özellikleri şunlar oluyordu; ülkemiz siyasi ve iktisadi açıdan düzensiz bir biçimde gelişmeye çalışan, büyük bir devrimi yapan, yarı-sömürge durumunda olan bir ülke, karşımızda kuvvetli olan bir düşman ve zayıf bir Kızıl Ordu. Bu farklılaştırıcı nitelikler, bizim yürüteceğimiz bu devrimci savaşının idari niteliklerini ortaya çıkartırken diğer yandan da savaşımızın temel stratejik ve taktik ilkelerini belirliyor. Yukarıda yazdığımız nedenlerden ordumuzun süratle büyüyebilmesi ve düşmanımızı çabuk yenebilmemizin imkânsız olduğu neticesi ortaya çıkar. Yani, bu mücadele tarzı tam anlamıyla uzatmalı bir savaş olacaktır ve üstelik iyi idare edilemezse kaybedilebilecektir"* (Zedung, 2003: 28).

Uzatılmış Savaş Stratejisinin ana ilkeleri Mao tarafından ayrıntılı olarak açıklanmış olmakla birlikte, bu stratejide asimetrik etki yaratan husus; düzenli birliklerle genel olarak savunma stratejisi uygularken, inisiyatif sahibi, çevik ve küçük birliklerle, düşmanın cephe hattından uzak birliklerine, zamana yayılmış taarruzlar icra etmek şeklinde formüle edilmişti. Adından da anlaşılacağı üzere, Mao'nun stratejisi, işgal kuvvetlerini önce hızlı

bir zaferden mahrum bırakmak, daha sonra düşmanı uzun süreli bir yıpratma savaşına zorlamaktır. Uzatılmış savaş stratejisinden beklenen sonuç; işgal ordusunun savaşın başlangıcında ümit ettiği sonucu elde edememesi ve yıllarca süren bir savaşın ekonomik ve politik yükü altında ezilmesi, buna karşılık halk arasında işgalciye karşı duyulan nefretin her geçen gün artarak çoğalması sonucunda direniş kuvvetlerinin sürekli güçlenerek, işgal kuvvetleriyle savaşacak bir düzenli ordunun oluşturulmasıydı (İyiat, 2013: 194). Bu savaş tipolojisinde başarılı olmak için Mao'ya göre gerilla birliklerinin bazı taktik özelliklere sahip olması şarttı. Bu özellikler: Gizli ve hızlı hareket etmeleri, düşmana birdenbire saldırımları ve muharebeyi çabuk sonuçlandırmaları, mevzi savunmasından, gecikme ve ertelemelerden kesinlikle kaçınmaları, küçük birlikler halinde hareket etmeleri, fakat düşmanın zayıf noktalarına darbe vurmaktan önce büyük bir kuvvet oluşturacak şekilde toplanmaları, geniş bir cephe üzerinde bulunan düşmanı küçük birliklerle yapacağı süratli, eş zamanlı ve çoklu darbelerle taciz etmeleri, hedefledikleri başarıyı elde etmek için muharebeye tutuşmalı, eğer durumları uygun değilse, derhal düşmandan uzaklaşmaları, düşmanın birliklerini teker teker ezebilmek için, bir yerde mukim düşman birliğini imha eden gerilla birliği, bir sonraki hedefini imha etmek adına süratle farklı noktaya hareket etmeli, planlama olmadan hareket etmemeli, bir gerilla harekâtı, elden geldiği kadar ayrıntılı bir şekilde planlanmalı ve titizlikle icra edilmeli idi (Zedung, 2003: 33). Kendi ifadelerinden ve saldırı-savunma yöntemlerinden de anlaşılacağı gibi Mao tarafından planlanarak, uygulanan bu asimetrik savaşın özü; sürekli hareket halinde bulunan küçük çaplı birliklerin yapılarını esnek tutmak, mümkün olduğunun en üst seviyesinde sürat içinde hareket etmek, yapılacak saldırıların ise sadece başarı şansının yüksek oranlı olabileceği hedeflere baskın olacak biçimde icrası şeklinde kurgulanmıştır. Mao tarafından doktrine edilen bu harekât tarzının icrasında yürütülen gerilla kuvvetlerinin herhangi bir sahayı düşmandan geri almak gibi bir hedefi olmadığı gibi buldukları bölgeleri gerektiğinde, düşmana terk edilmelidir. Stratejik denge olarak adlandırılan taktik anlayışın ardından hazır olduğunda ulus çapında girişilecek stratejik karşı saldırıyla işgal altındaki topraklar geri alınacaktır. Bu son aşama öncesindeki sürede, geri alınması planlanan ülke topraklarının epeyce büyük bir kesimini elinde bulunduran düşmanın, tüm lojistik faaliyetlerini icra ettiği, fakat kontrol altına almakta zorlanacağı geniş bir geri bölge oluşacaktır. Bu sayede, gerilla güçleri inisiyatifi ele almak için savaşı düşman işgali altındaki bu geniş bölgeye yayarak, düşmanın gerisini bir cephe haline getirecek, düşmanı işgal ettiği topraklarda durmadan savaşmak zorunda bırakacaktır. Böylece kentler sırayla kuşatılacak ve top yekûn bir ayaklanma ile son darbe vurulacaktır (İyiat, 2013: 195).

Bu doktrin kendisini sözde işgal altında olduğunu iddia eden, terörist organizasyonlar için bir önemli eğitim kaynağı olmuştur. Bu kaynağı kullanarak, askeri eğitim veren ve sözde komuta kadrosunu anılan konsept çerçevesinde savaşmaya yönlendiren örgütlerden birisi de hiç kuşkusuz bölücü terör örgütü PKK'dır.

Uzatılmış Savaş Konsepti ve PKK Terör Örgütü

Mao'nun savaş konsepti anlamında en çok benzerlik gösteren ve anılan taktikleri eğitimlerinde ve sahada uygulamaya çalışan önemli yasa dışı terör organizasyonlarının başında hiç kuşkusuz etnik bölücü PKK terör örgütü gelmektedir. Söz konusu bölücü örgütü anlayış olarak değerlendirdiğimizde ilk benzerlik, kendi sözde ideolojisi içerisinde gizlidir. PKK terör örgütü, ikinci dalga olarak tanımladığımız ve sözde sömürge karşıtı

eylem yapmak üzere teşekkül etmiş, ideolojik taban olarak Kürt halkının kendi topraklarında işgal altında tutulduğu ve yine Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarafından sözde sömürüldüğü iddiası ile kendi halkını bilinçlendirmek, Türkiye'nin bölgeyi terk etmesini sağlamak ve anılan sahada ve tüm Kürt nüfusunun yerleşik olduğu alanlarda sözde Büyük Kürdistanı kurmayı amaçlamaktadır (Yılmaz, 2007: 46).

Kürtçülük ideali aslında cumhuriyet ile birlikte ortaya çıkmamış aksine, ondan çok daha öncelere dayanan ve özellikle Osmanlı Devleti'nin son dönemlerinde görülmeye başlayan bir siyasal tezdir. Cumhuriyetin ilanı ile birlikte yeni bir cumhuriyetin ulus devlet olarak şekillenmesi neticesinde Osmanlı'nın son döneminde faaliyet gösteren ve aynı sözde ideale sahip örgütler genellikle bir isyanın tertipleycisi olan ve kati amacı bağımsız bir Kürdistan olan siyasi teşekküller iken, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin ilk yıllarından 1961 yılına kadar görülen Kürtçülük hareketlerinde tek başına bir teşekkül edecek bir sözde Kürdistan yaratma düşüncesine rastlanmamış ancak 1960 askeri müdahalesinin ardından yapılan yeni anayasanın demokratik kitle hareketlerinin oluşumu noktasında sağladığı geniş alan ve dünyada hızla yayılan sol akımlar bu fikrin gelişerek Marksist-Leninist ideoloji ölçeğinde bağımsızlık fikrine dönüşmüştür (Bulut, 2011: 124). 1960'lı yıllar ile birlikte küresel çapta yaşanan öğrenci olayları yalnızca Üçüncü Dünya ülkeleri ya da Avrupa merkezli değil, neredeyse dünyanın her yerinde ve eşzamanlı olarak başlaması ve oldukça süratle yayılması neticesinde her bir coğrafya kendi özgün tarihi gerçekliğinde meydana gelen olaylara birbirinden farklı gerçeklikle, kendisine has özgünlük kazandırmıştır. Bu etkiler sonrasında toplumsal sınıflar içerisinde farklı bir yapılanma ve buna bağlı olarak da siyasal ve kültürel farklılaşmalar belirginlik kazanmıştır. Devrimci örgütlenmelerin farklı fraksiyonlar ve örgütlenmeler içerisinde hızla çoğaldığı Türkiye'nin üniversitelerinde okuyan Kürt gençleri de bu etkiyle 1969 senesinin mayıs ayında cumhuriyet döneminin "ilk ulusalcı, demokratik ve ayrı örgütlenmeyi hedefleyen Kürt demokratik gençlik örgütü" olarak Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları adlı yapıyı Ankara ve İstanbul merkezli olarak kurmuşlardır. Bu yapılanma yakın dönem Kürt hareketinin nüvesini oluşturmuştur. Artık kendilerini Kürt kimliği ile tanımlamaya başladıkları, çocuklarına ilk kez Kürtçe isimler koydukları, sol hareket ile tanışarak kimliklerinin ifadesinde tarihsel dinsel söylemlerle bağlarını kopardıkları yeni bir dönemin başlangıcı olacaktır (Bulut, 2011: 125). 12 Eylül öncesi birbiri ardına kurulan ve birçoğu sosyalist doktrinlerden beslenen Kürt örgütlenmeleri 12 Eylül darbesinin getirdiği ağır koşullar ile birlikte tarih sahnesindeki yerlerini alarak yerini PKK terör örgütüne bırakacaktı.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin doğu ve güneydoğusunda örgütsel faaliyetlerini ağırlıklı olarak yürüten PKK, anılan bölgenin demografik yapısı itibarıyla propaganda, taktik ve eleman temini anlayışını da benzer biçimde Maoçu yaklaşımı temel alarak sürdürmektedir. Örgütün kuruluş manifestosuna baktığımızda, sözde "Kürdistan'ın" askeri işgal rejimi altında tutulduğu ve bölgenin ekonomik sömürüye tabi kılındığı belirtilerek mevcut durumu sonlandıracak devrimin ise bilimsel sosyalizmin kılavuzluğunda, Bağımsız, Birleşik ve Demokratik Kürdistan'ı kurmak amacıyla, bir politik örgüt, bu politik örgütün önderliğinde bir ulusal kurtuluş cephesi ve bu cepheye bağlı savaşılan güçlü bir halk ordusunun örgütlenmesi ve nüfusunun azlığına veya çokluğuna bakılmadan, eğer savaşılacaksa, uzun süreli bir halk savaşı ile gerçekleştirileceği öngörülmektedir (Yılmaz, 2007: 46). Mao'nun savaş konseptinde olduğu gibi partinin (ÇKP) köylüyü bilinçlendirici

ve feodal toprak ağalarına karşı tutumu benzer şekilde PKK içinde geçerlidir. Bu anlamda PKK ilk eylemlerinde bölge köylüsünü şiddet kullanarak yanına çekmeye çalışmanın yanı sıra önemli aşiretlere de saldırmıştır. Bu noktada aynı Mao ve ÇKP örneğinde olduğu gibi temel olarak sömürgeciliğe karşı olduğu iddiasını ana amaç olarak ortaya koyan bu sözde devrimsel atılım, ülkedeki ana sorunun kaynağının milli nitelikte olduğunu ifade ederek, bunun dışındaki sözde Kürdistan'a ilişkin diğer tüm görüşlerin, ana amaçtan uzaklaşmanın yanı sıra mücadele edilen emperyalizme katkı sağlayacağını ileri sürmektedir. Nitekim PKK tarafından temel kaynak olarak ortaya konan programın, yerine getirilmesinin emredildiği vazifelere yer verilen "Kürdistan Devriminin Görevleri" başlıklı dördüncü ve son bölümde de ilk görev; "Türk sömürgeciliğine son vermek" olarak belirlenmiştir (Yılmaz, 2007: 46 ve Öcalan, 1993: 119-128).

PKK terör örgütünün kır gerillacılığı faaliyetlerini sürdürmek için kendine seçtiği ilk jeopolitik saha onun sözde "Botan" olarak tanımladığı Şırnak, Hakkari'nin Çukurca ilçesi, Van'ın Çatak, Bahçesaray ve Gevaş'ın bir bölümü, Siirt Merkez, Pervari, Kurtalan ve Erüh ilçeleriyle, Şırnak iline mücavir Kuzey Irak topraklarını kapsayan bölge idi. Mao tarafından ortaya konulan savaş konseptine göre ayaklanmanın başlayacağı yer coğrafi ve sosyal olarak; devlet denetiminin zayıf olduğu, köylü nüfusun fazla olduğu, dağlık ve engebeli arazilerden oluşmalıydı (Zedung, 2003: 17). Bu coğrafya bu yönüyle örgüt için en elverişli sahaydı. Bu amaçla ve anılan coğrafyayı direnç noktası olarak belirleyen bölücü örgüt mücadelesinde, Mao tarafından ortaya atılan üç aşamalı savaş stratejisini öngörmüştür. Bu üç aşama Çin ulusal savaşında olduğu gibi stratejik savunma, stratejik denge ve örgüt tarafından "serhildan" adı verilen stratejik saldırıdır.

Stratejik Savunma aşaması, ajitasyon ve terörün en önemli mühimmatı olarak kabul edeceğimiz propaganda ile halkın ekonomik ve ulusal taleplerinin dile getirilerek biçimlendirilmesi ile başlayacak ardından, örgüt tarafından tespit edilecek ajan, muhbir ve işkencecilerin ortadan kaldırılması, silahlı propaganda birliklerinin çoğaltılarak kurulacak ordunun askeri çekirdeğinin oluşturulması, illegal partinin her alanda inşa edilerek bu faaliyetleri başarıya ulaştığında yüksek gerilla aşamasına geçerek 3-5-7-11 kişiden oluşan silahlı propaganda birliklerini 50-60 kişiyle oluşturulmasını kapsamaktadır. Doğru bir strateji sonucunda izlenecek bu aşamanın ardından amaçlanan siyasal temeldeki güçlülüğü askeri güçlülüğe dönüştürerek devlet güçleri ile denge konumuna ulaşmaktır (İyiat, 2013: 199). Stratejik denge aşamasında ise amaçlanan, artık gerillanın kendini aldığı yerel ve uluslararası destekler neticesinde güçlendirdiği ve yaptığı eylemleriyle etkili olmaya başladığı ve sözde bazı kurtarılmış bölgelerin oluşturulduğu ve üs alanlarının olduğu bir dönem olarak kabul edilir. Bu dönemde esas olan Mao tarafından öğütlenen hareketli savaşın esas alınmasıdır (Bilgiç, 2014: 89). Mao'ya göre "Hareketli bir savaş yürütmek mi? Yoksa mevzi savaşını tercih mi? Sorusuna yanıtımız hiç kuşku yoktur ki hareketli ve dinamik bir savaş olacaktır. Düşmana kıyasla bulunduğumuz durumda ve sayıca büyük ve güçlü bir ordudan yahut geride kullanabileceğimiz ihtiyat savaş malzemelerinden yoksun iken ve ayrıca her üs bölgesinde savaşı sürdürebilmek adına sadece tek bir ordu kuvvetimiz bulunduğu süreçte başka türlü kesinlikle için yararsızdır" (Zedung, 2003: 75). Diyerek temel olarak kendi eksikliğinin ancak hareketli birliklerle yıpratma darbeleriyle olabileceğini vurgulamıştır. PKK tarafından tanımlanan sözde üs bölgeleri kavramı da Mao tarafından doktrine edilmiş ve uygulanmıştır. Üs bölgelerini Mao şöyle tanımlamaktadır: "Bizim üs bölgeleri

kavramından kastımız, gerilla kuvvetlerimizin taktik ve sahadaki görevlerini icra etmede, düşman unsurlar karşısında korunma ve birliklerini genişletme, düşman unsurlarını ise yok etme veya işgal ettikleri topraklardan kovma amacımıza ulaşmak için konuşlandıkları ve destek aldıkları stratejik alanlardır. Bu önemli alanlar olmadan, taktik ve stratejik vazifelerimizi yerine getirmek adına veya savaşımızda amaca ulaşmak için güvenebileceğimiz yerden yoksunuz anlamındadır. Düşmanın ileri hatlarının arkasında yürüttüğümüz bu gerilla harbinin bir önemli özelliği de gerisinde bir alan olmadan savaşı sürdürmesidir; çünkü gerilla kuvvetleri, ülkenin gerisinden kopmuş bir haldedir. Ancak unutulmaması gereken şudur ki bu savaşın devamı üs bölgelerine bağlıdır. Onlar olmadan savaş ne uzun zaman sürebilir ne de gelişebilir. Aslında, gerilla savaşının cephe gerisi üs bölgeleridir” (Zedung, 2003: 87) Stratejik saldırı aşaması ya da topyekûn halk ayaklanması anlamına gelen serhildan aşamasında ise, şehirler kuşatılmaya başlanacak burada da farklı nitelikte eylemler yapılarak, büyük çaplı isyanlar başlatılacaktır. Zaman içerisinde yapılan bu silahlı mücadelelerle beraber örgütün güçlenmesinde, halkın örgütlenmesi en önemli unsurlardan biridir. Bu noktada artık PKK “gerilla” merkezli silahlı güçlerini konvansiyonel bir orduya dönüştürerek, Türk Ordusu’nu bozguna uğratmayı ve savunma durumuna itmeyi; nihai olarak da “sözde Kürdistan’ı kurmayı hedeflemektedir. PKK açısından zaferin tanımı bu şekilde yapılmıştır (Özdağ, 2010: 19).

PKK Terör Örgütü, geçmiş Kürt isyanlarında görülen düzenli bir orduya sahip olamama zaafını ortadan kaldırmak için kurulduğu iddiasındadır. Türkiye’nin milli birlik ve beraberliğini tehdit eden PKK terör örgütü bir dönem kent savaşları doktrine de yönelmiş ancak başarılı olamamıştır. Şimdi ise bölgenin iki ülkesi Suriye ve Irak’ın parçalanmış yapısından faydalanarak farklı isimlerde eylemlerini sürdürmektedir.

Sonuç

Terörizm, sözel ifade olarak akademik literatüre Fransız İhtilali neticesinde girmiş bir kavram olmakla birlikte tarihi çok eskiye dayanmaktadır. Farklı zamanlarda, farklı temeller üzerinden açıklanmaya çalışılan söz konusu kavram özünde sonuçları ve etki çevresi önceden hesap edilmiş bir şiddet eylemidir. Bir terörist eylemin amacına odaklandığımızda hedefin sayıca fazla insanı öldürmekten ziyade, yapılan eylemin şiddeti ve dehşetinden geniş ölçekteki kitlelerin etkilenmesidir. Bu yaratılacak psikolojik durumla birlikte umutsuzluğa düşen kitlelerin terör örgütünün isteklerine boyun eğmesi ana amaçtır. Terör örgütleri öğrenen organizasyonlardır ve her birisi temelinde bir ideolojik kökene dayanmaktadır. İdeolojik temel örgüt için temel çıkış noktasını oluşturmaktadır. Örgüt, benimsediği bu ideoloji doğrultusunda eylemlerini planlamakta ve sürdüreceği stratejiyi de bu ideoloji ekseninde belirlemektedir. Sıkça duyduğumuz ve terör kamp ya da hücre evlerinde sürdürülen bir faaliyet olan siyasi eğitim, işte bu örgütün dayandığı ideolojiyi sempatizan veyahut militanlarına benimseterek onları örgütün ideolojik amaçlarına yönelik bilinç kazandırmaktır. Bu ideolojik unsur aynı zamanda örgütün eylem tarzını ve stratejisini de doğrudan etkilemektedir. Bu anlamda örneklendirebileceğimiz bir terör örgütü PKK’dır. Söz konusu terörist organizasyon kendine göre sömürge karşıtı eylem yapmak üzere teşekkül etmiş, ideolojik eksenine ise Kürt halkının Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarafından sözde sömürüldüğü iddiası ile kendi halkını bilinçlendirmek, Türkiye’nin bölgeyi terk etmesini sağlamak ve anılan sahada ve tüm Kürt nüfusunun yerleşik olduğu alanlarda sözde Büyük Kürdistanı kurmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bahsettiğimiz eylem ve ideolojik bağlantı biçimi PKK terör örgütünde

oldukça net bir biçimde göze çarpmaktadır. Örgütün eylemlerindeki taktik ve stratejiyi incelediğimizde, Mao tarafından ortaya atılan “Uzun Süreli Halk Savaşı” konsepti ile hareket ettiği görülmektedir. Mao'nun kır gerilla taktik anlayışı olarak isimlendirilen bu yöntem, söz konusu tarihlere Çin'in demografik koşulları içerisinde geliştirilmiştir. Mao, devrimi gerçekleştirmek istediği ülkenin nüfusunun büyük bölümünün toprak köylüsü olmasından hareketle, milliyetçilik fikri ile bezendirdiği köylü sosyalizmini düşünsel anlamda bir araya getirerek, söz konusu bu fikrin etrafında şekillendirdiği kır gerillası anlayışını gündeme taşımıştır. Japonya'nın 1931 yılında Çin'i işgal etmesi sonrasında başlayan direniş hareketleri onu tarafından geliştirilen bu savaş doktrini de kendisi için test edebilme fırsatı tanımıştır. Uzatılmış savaş doktrini ile üstün Japon kuvvetlerini yıpratmaya dayalı asimetrik savaş yöntemi üç aşamalı olarak ortaya konmuş ve Mao tarafından siyasi yönetimin kontrolü dışında kalan kırsal alanlarda savaşı sürdüreceği olan gerillaların eğitimlerini sürdürdükleri, harbe hazırlık faaliyetlerini yaptıkları kurtarılmış alanlar meydana getirmek için faaliyet gösterdikleri stratejik savunma. Kurtarılmış bölgeler olarak adlandırdıkları sahaları büyütürken, düşman güçlerini yıpratacak saldırılarla zayıflatmak ve gelecekteki kuracakları konvansiyonel birlikler ve ordu gücü için gerek duyacakları silah ve mühimmatı elde etmek amacıyla sürdürülen stratejik denge aşamaları ile açık ve geleneksel harp yöntemlerini kullanarak, netice alacakları kesin olan bir taarruzla kentleri ele geçirme şeklinde olan stratejik saldırı aşamalarının toplamı olmuştur. Ana hatlarıyla ve özetle PKK terör örgütünün ana yapısı ve taktik-stratejik hedefleri aynıdır.

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Structured Abstract

Terrorism entered the academic literature as a verbal expression as a result of the French Revolution, and the period of repression by the Jacobins on the pro-royal Jirondenes as a result of the revolution was called the "period of terror". The first form of systematic implementation dates back to the Roman period and the Jewish organisation called Sicarii, which carried out assassinations of Roman legion officers in the occupied Palestinian territories, made a name for themselves with their activities in an environment of turmoil. The Hashshashi organisation, which worked with a cell structure, formed the basis of today's terrorist organisations when we look at their mass psychology structure, whose members were completely loyal to their leaders. The phenomenon of terrorism, which has a long history in the modern world, and the lack of a clear definition of the identity of the terrorist create a blurred ground both conceptually and legally. In this sense, in order to clarify the concept, various interpretations have been made, especially since the beginning of the 20th century, but some of the researchers in the field have focused on the methodology of the action, some on the person or persons targeted by the action, and some on the purpose behind the action. No matter how and from which angle the definition is interpreted, terrorism is essentially "calculated" violence. Its aim is not to kill as many people as possible, but to ensure that the masses are 'affected by its actions'. Its aim is to make the masses 'horrified', to make them think in a state of despair that 'there is no choice but to submit to the terrorist's demands'. This is the result that the terrorist also desires. It can be expressed as the weakening of authority, people's inability to see their future, uneasiness and lack of faith in the system.

Terrorist organisations are learning organisations and each of them is based on an ideology. As it is known, ideologies is a word that is used in daily political, social and academic writings with different meanings. The ideological element constitutes the starting point of the organisation. The organisation acts in line with the ideology it adopts and determines its strategy accordingly. The aim of the activities that terrorist organisations call political education is to make the members of the organisation adopt the basic ideology on which the organisation is based and to raise awareness in line with the organisation's goals. Through this process, which we can also call ideological education, the loyalty of the members of the organisation to the organisation is ensured. In the modern definition of terrorism, the ideological basis is defined through four main waves. These are anarchist wave, anti-colonial wave, new leftist wave and religious wave.

The PKK terrorist organisation, which we define as the second wave, was formed to carry out anti-colonial actions according to itself, and its ideological axis is to raise the awareness of its own people with the claim that the Kurdish people are allegedly exploited by the Republic of Turkey, to ensure that Turkey leaves the region and to establish the so-called Greater Kurdistan in the aforementioned area and in areas where the entire Kurdish population is settled. Contrary to what some people claim, the Kurdish ideal did not emerge with the republic. The existence of organisations based on this ideal dates back to the last period of the Ottoman Empire. However, while the organisations established in the years when the republic was proclaimed and Turkey was shaped as a nation state and in the last period of the Ottoman Empire were generally political organisations that were the organisers of a rebellion and whose ultimate aim was an independent Kurdistan, the idea of establishing an independent Kurdish state was not seen

in the Kurdish movements between 1938 and 1961; however, due to the flexibility of the provisions regarding mass movements in the 1961 Constitution, the Kurdish phenomenon and structure began to be rapidly processed and woven within the masses, and Marxist-Leninist ideology played an important role in this.

When we analyse the PKK from a strategic and tactical point of view, we see that it acts in accordance with the concept of "Long People's War" put forward by Mao. This method, called Mao's rural guerrilla tactical approach, was developed within the demographic conditions of China at the time. Mao brought the concept of rural guerrilla, which sprouted from this point, to the agenda by intellectually embodying peasant socialism, which he synthesised with nationalism, since the vast majority of the country was land peasants. The resistance movements that started after Japan's invasion of China in 1931 provided the opportunity to test this tactical approach. The doctrine of protracted warfare and the method of asymmetric warfare based on attrition of superior Japanese forces were laid out in three phases, and the strategic defence in which Mao operated to create liberated zones in rural areas outside government control where guerrillas trained, rested and prepared. Strategic equilibrium, in which the guerrillas operated in the countryside outside government control to create liberated zones in which the guerrillas trained, rested and prepared; and strategic offensive, in which the guerrillas used open and conventional warfare tactics to seize cities in a decisive offensive.

At this point, as in the case of Mao and the Chinese Communist Party, this so-called revolution, which basically targets colonialism, states that the main contradiction in the country is of a national nature and asserts that all other views on the so-called Kurdistan, which do not put the national contradiction as the main contradiction, will serve colonialism and reaction. As a matter of fact, in the fourth and final section of the organisation's programme, titled "Tasks of the Kurdistan Revolution", which includes the tasks to be fulfilled, the first task is determined as "putting an end to Turkish colonialism". The first geopolitical area chosen by the PKK terrorist organisation to carry out its rural guerrilla activities was the so-called "Botan" region, which it defined as Şırnak, Hakkari's Çukurca district, Van's Çatak, Bahçesaray and Gevaş districts, Siirt Merkez, Pervari, Kurtalan and Erüh districts, and Northern Iraqi territory adjacent to Şırnak province. According to Mao's concept of warfare, the place where the uprising was to start should be geographically and socially composed of mountainous and rugged terrains where state control was weak, the peasant population was high, and the state control was weak. In this respect, this geography was the most favourable area for the organisation. For this purpose, the separatist organisation, which identified the aforementioned geography as a point of resistance, envisaged the three-stage war strategy put forward by Mao in its struggle. These three phases are strategic defence, strategic balance and strategic offence called "serhildan" by the organisation, as in the Chinese national war.

The PKK Terrorist Organisation claims that it was established in order to overcome the weakness of not having a regular army as seen in past Kurdish revolts. The PKK terrorist organisation, which threatens Turkey's national unity and solidarity, has also turned to the doctrine of urban warfare for a while, but has not been successful. Now, it continues its activities under different names by taking advantage of the fragmented structure of Syria and Iraq, the two countries of the region.

Kitap İncelemesi: Başkanı Sorgulamak: Saddam Hüseyin'in Sorgusu

Book Review: Debriefing the President: The Interrogation of Saddam Hussein

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Başkanı Sorgulamak: Saddam Hüseyin'in Sorgusu

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1985 yılında Wantagh-New York'ta doğan ve uzun süre İran-İrak konularında CIA analistliği yapan John Nixon, 2016 yılında özgün ismiyle 'Debriefing the President: The Interrogation of Saddam Hussein' eserini yazmıştır. 264 sayfalık eser Türkçeye Berna Yılmazcan tarafından çevrilerek, Angın Yayınları aracılığıyla okuyuculara sunulmuştur. Eserin niteliği şudur; Amerika'nın 2003 yılında Irak'a savaş açmasının ardından uzun süre saklanan Irak Devlet Başkanı Saddam Hüseyin yakalandığında onu ilk sorguya alan CIA görevlisi Nixon olmaktadır. Böylece kitap, 2003 savaşına ve Saddam'ın sorgusuna dair ilk elden kaynak niteliği taşımaktadır. Saddam'ın iktidarlığı döneminde birçok dublöre sahip olduğu söylentileri ışığında, onun gerçek Saddam olup/olmadığını parmağında bulunan aşiret dövmesinden teşhis eden Nixon, devrik Başkana karşı birçok itiraf ve analize ilk elden sahip olmaktadır. Savaşın üzerinden 20 yıldan uzun süre geçmesine rağmen Saddam, akademik çalışmaların ilgi odaklarından biri olmaktadır. Bu bağlamda bu eser, Başkana ve Amerikan karar alıcılara yönelik birçok bilgi barındırmaktadır. Kitabın en dikkat çekici yanı, CIA analisti tarafından kaleme alınmasına rağmen, istihbarat ve Amerikan karar alıcıları arasındaki krizleri objektif biçimde aktarılmasıdır.

Nixon, eserin önsözünde Irak'a savaş açma kararının, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) tarafından yapılan bir hata olduğunu belirtmektedir. Üstelik bu hata meyvelerini, bölgede Irak Şam İslam Devleti (İŞİD) gibi aşırı İslami grupların faaliyete geçmesi şeklinde vermektedir. Yazara göre Irak devrik Başkanı Saddam Hüseyin masum sayılmazdı ancak onu deviren Amerika'nın yaptığı sistematik hatalar ve harcanan paralar göz önünde alındığında işgal kararı mantıklı değildi. Kitle İmha Silahları (KİS) henüz bulunamamış olmasına karşın, işgalin ana nedenini oluşturmaktaydı. Yazar bu noktada KİS'lerin olduğundan emin olunmadan böylesine radikal bir savaşa hazırlanmanın ciddi manada istihbarat eksikliği olduğundan yakınmaktadır.

Kitabın ilk sayfaları Saddam'ın karakter çözümlemesini ele almaktadır. Yazar devrik Başkanın ruhuna benzersiz bir bakış açısı ile bakarak onun motivasyonlarını, inançlarını ve eylemlerini analiz etmektedir. 2003 yılında işgalci güçler Irak'ı işgal ettiğinde tüm yetkilerini yardımcılara devreden Başkan, roman yazmaya başlamıştı. Başkanın roman yazdığını ve sanatla ilgilendiği konusunda literatürde yer alan kaynak neredeyse yoktur. Ancak Saddam sorgusu sırasında yetkililerden kâğıt/kalem talep ederek yazmaya devam etmek istemiştir. Nixon, Saddam Hüseyin'in psikolojik profilini inceleyerek onu hem acımasız hem de karizmatik olan karmaşık ve esrarengiz bir figür olarak tasvir ediyor. Saddam'ın, ülkesinin ve döneminin siyasi/stratejik zorluklarını derinlemesine anlayan biri olduğu konusunda düşüncelerini paylaşan Nixon, sorgulamalar aracılığıyla diktatörün zihnini açığa çıkarıyor, çeşitli siyasi ve askeri konulara bakış açısına dair fikir veriyor. Kitap ayrıca Saddam gibi üst düzey siyasilerden bilgi edinebilmenin karmaşıklığını vurgulayarak CIA ve istihbarat camiasının işleyişi hakkında bilgi sunmaktadır.

Eserin birçok sayfasında Saddam'ın işlediği suçların ağır olduğu ve yazarın amacının hiçbir şekilde Başkan'ı masum göstermek olmadığı vurgulanmaktadır. Kitabın yazılış amacı Saddam'ın haklı veya haksız olmasından ziyade Amerikan karar alıcıların izledikleri politikaları eleştirmektir. Nixon'un gözünde Saddam acıması olmayan bir liderdi ancak işgal ile devrilecek ve devamında infaz edilecek kadar tehlikeli bir adam değildi. Daha yalın anlatımıyla, yazar şu soruyu sormaktadır: "Saddam, devrilmeye değer miydi?" ardından sorusunu "hayır" olarak cevaplayan Nixon, Başkanın savaş sırasında

köşesine çekilerek kitap yazmakta olduğunu aktarmış bulunmaktadır. Saddam'ın ağır suçlarından biri olan, Kürt vatandaşlara karşı işlenen 'Halepçe katliamı' sorgu sırasında Başkana yöneltilen sorulardan bir tanesiydi. Saddam Halepçe sorusuna cevap olarak, Kürt halka karşı kimyasal silah kullanma emrini kendisinin vermediğini, olaydan daha sonra haberinin olduğunu söylemiştir. Nixon ise bu cevabın yeterli gelmediğini düşünmektedir. Çünkü diktatörün haberi olmadan kim Kürt halkı öldürecek kadar rüştünü ispat edebilirdi?

Yazarın düşüncesine göre Amerikan tarafı ve Saddam birbirlerini anlayamamışlardı. Özellikle Saddam, ABD'nin kendisine neden savaş açtığını anlayamıyordu. Kendisine KİS'leri satan onlardı, silahları İran'a karşı kullandığında göz yuman yine onlardı, şimdi ne değişmişti de silahlar savaş sebebi olarak servis ediliyordu? 11 Eylül Amerika saldırısının ardından El-Kaide gibi aşırı İslami örgütler ABD'nin hedefi haline geldi. Saddam ise 11 Eylül olaylarından sonra Amerika'nın kendisiyle ittifak halinde olacağını düşünmekteydi. Sünni tabanlı El-Kaide gibi radikal örgütler, Saddam'ın kendisinin de Sünni olmasına rağmen, Başkan için tasvip edilen bir husus değildi. Saddam sorgusu sırasında, hiçbir şeyden korkmuyor gibi görünse bile Irak'ta Sünni aşırılıktan çok korktuğunu söyledi. El-Kaide gibi radikal İslami gruplar yalnızca Batı için değil aynı zamanda Irak için de riskliydi.

Eserde, savaş sonrası bölgede oluşacak olan Şii-Sünni gerilimlerinin, iç savaşa alan açacağına dair öngörüler de mevcuttur. Yaşanacak olan mezhep çatışmasının sebebi olarak Amerika'yı gören Nixon, Birleşik Devletler'in dini ve etnik açıdan bölgeyi yeterince analiz etmeden, işgale kalkışmasının Irak'ın demografik yapısını tahrip ettiğini aktarmaktadır. Batı, İslamiyet'in Müslüman Doğu ülkeleri üzerindeki yadsınamaz etkisini gözden kaçırıyordu. Yazar eserinde, Şii dini lideri Muhammed Sadık el-Sadr'ın öldürülmesinden sonra yerine oğlunun geçeceğini ve oğul Mukteda el-Sadr'ın savaş sonrası Irak'ta önemli bir figüre dönüşeceğini söylemesine rağmen, Amerikan karar alıcılar bu konuya yeterince önem vermedi. Nixon kısa süre içinde haklı çıktı ve Mukteda Sadr, Şii'lerin dini lideri haline geldi. Devrik Başkanın bakış açısına göre ABD, Irak'ı yönetemeyecekti. Saddam sorgusunda "Başarısız olacaksınız çünkü Irak'ı tanımıyorsunuz" derken, Irak'ın heterojen yapısının analiz edilmesinin imkânsız olduğunu, bölge halkını yönetebilmek için Arapları ve Iraklıları yeterince tanımak gerektiğini vurgulamaktadır. Aynı zamanda Nixon, Irak'ta aktif Kimyasal Silahların olmadığı konusunda, Saddam ile aynı fikirdeydi.

Saddam hakkında bilinen çoğu şeyi Nixon'a yalanlamıştı. Örneğin, Başkanın sırt ağrısı çektiği ve sağlığından dolayı alkolü, sigarayı bıraktığı iddiaları gerçek değildi, çocukluğunda üvey babasından şiddet görmemişti -aksine onun ömründe gördüğü en nazik adam olduğunu söylemişti.- Böylece yazar, Batı'nın lanse ettiğinin çok zıttı bir Saddam ile konuştuğunu ifade ediyordu. Aslında Amerikan tarafı, Saddam'ın roman yazmasıyla, sırtının ağrılamasıyla ve üvey babasından şiddet görmesiyle ilgilenmiyordu, onların asıl duymak istedikleri şey, devrik Başkan'ın KİS'lere sahip olduğunu itiraf ederek, savaş kararını haklı çıkartmasıydı. Nixon'un sorgu bitiminde ulaştığı sonuçlar, Amerika'nın beklediğinin tam tersiydi: Irak'ta KİS yoktu ve Saddam edinmek için çabalamadı. Eski bir CIA analistinun sunduğu rapor, Amerikan Başkanı George Walker Bush için mühim değildi. Nixon'un düşündüğü şekliyle: "CIA'nın sunduğu analiz raporlarının önemli olduğunu ve Bush'un bizi dikkate alacağını düşünürdüm, fakat bizim

ne ifade ettiğimiz önemli değil ve onlar için siyaset istihbarattan üstündür. Saddam'ın masum olduğunu öne sürmek istemiyorum. Korkunç bir diktatördü (...) Ancak geriye dönüp bakıldığında, silahsızlandırılan ve yaşlanan bir Saddam'ın iktidara gelme ihtimali, askerlerimizin hayatlarının boşa gitmesinden, IŞİD'in yükselişinden ve 2,5 trilyon dolarlık maliyetten çok daha iyi olacaktır."

Nixon, aynı zamanda Bush'un 11 Eylül sonrası tüm dünyaya gösterdiği "ya bizimlesiniz ya da değilsiniz" tavrının yanlış algılandığının da altını çizmektedir. Birçok politikacı ve analist, Bush'un Eylül saldırısından sonra terörü önlemek adına politika güttüğünü düşünmektedir ancak yazara göre, Amerikan Başkanının takındığı 'bizdensin veya ötekisin' tavrı aslında Bush'un her şeye bakış açısıdır. Nixon'un aktarımlarıyla; CIA çalışanları Başkana, Irak'ta ciddi anlamda Sünni ve Şii çatışması olduğundan bahsettiğinde Bush dehşete düşmüş bir şekilde "onların hepsi Müslüman değil mi?" cevabını vermişti. Müslümanların da kendi içinde farklı mezheplere ayrıldığını ve üstelik bu farklı mezheplerin birbirinden ölesiye nefret ettiğini bilmiyordu. İşgal ettiği toprakların etnik ve dini kimliğine dair hiçbir fikri yoktu, Irak'ı ve Iraklıları tanımıyorlardı. Bu durum 'Irak'ta başarılı olamayacaksınız çünkü Irak halkını tanımıyor, havasını bilmiyorsunuz, Irak'ı yönetmek ne demek asla anlayamayacaksınız' diyen Saddam'ı bir noktada haklı çıkartıyordu.

Ülkesi işgal edilmiş, oğulları öldürülmüş, ülkesindeki yabancılar tarafından sorguya çekilen ve idam edileceğinden şüphesi olmayan devrik Başkan ne kadar dürüst olabilir? Saddam'ın sunduğu çoğu bilgi Nixon tarafından mantıklı gerekçelerle sorgulandı. Bu sebeple Saddam'ın her zaman dürüst cevaplar verdiği söylenemez. Buna rağmen kitabın bazı sayfalarında Saddam sorulara cevap vermekten kaçınıyordu. Yalan cevaplar vererek geçiştirmek yerine 'bunu yanıtlamak zorunda değilim' demesi onun birçok soruya dürüstçe yaklaştığını işaret etmekteydi. Saddam'ın 2006 yılında idam edilmesi eserin son bölümlerine doğru açıklanırken, yazar bu idamın gerekçelerini tartışmaktadır.

Sonuç olarak Nixon, bu eseri kaleme alırken, Saddam'ın sorgusuna çok az bir oranda değinmektedir. Kitabın büyük çoğunluğu, yazarın devrik Başkan hakkında edindiği izlenimleri ve Birleşik Devletlerin işgal öncesi/sırası/sonrası şeklinde yaptığı hataları, Irak'ta şu an bile kurulamayan istikrarını, savaş sonrasında bölgeyi ele geçiren radikal grupların dengeyi daha çok sarsmasını, halkın yaşadığı psikolojik savaş ve mezhepsel çatışmaların 2003 sonrasında daha çok belirgin hale gelmesini ifade etmektedir. Saddam'ın devrilmesinin ardından ona alternatif bir otoritenin inşa edilememiş olmasının, Irak'ın güç boşluğuna düşmesine ve silahlı radikal örgütlerin faaliyete geçmesine sebep olduğuna dikkat çeken Nixon, bölgede yükselişe geçen IŞİD, El-Kaide ve diğer radikal grupların, otoritenin yokluğundan faydalandığını söyler. İşgal sonrası Irak'ın, Saddam'ın lideri olduğu Baas Partisinden arındırma politikası sonrası Sünni Arapların ülke üzerindeki siyasi gücünü kaybetmesi üzerine, başta Şii dini lideri Sadr olmak üzere Şii Arapların yükselen güç konumuna geçeceği Nixon'un kendisi tarafından iddia edilmişti (bu öngörü gerçekleşti ve savaş sonrasında Sadr toplumsal ve siyasi bir figüre dönüştü). Tüm bu ihtimaller detaylıca analiz edilerek Bush'a sunulmuş olmasına rağmen, risklerin göz ardı edilmesini eleştiren yazar, Amerikan istihbarat servisinin savaş konusunda yetersiz kaldığını ve Saddam'ın tabiriyle 'bölgeyi, Arapları ve Iraklıları hiç tanımadıklarını' aktarmıştır. Yazar eserini Saddam'ın idamının 10. Yılında okuyucularla buluşturarak, 2016 yılında da Irak'ın durumunda hiçbir değişim olmadığını

vurgulamaktadır. Günümüz tarihiyle Saddam tam 18 sene önce idam edildi, Irak ise 21 sene önce işgal edildi. Nixon'un vurguladığı ve eleştirdiği noktalar bugün bile bölge halkı nezdinde güncelliğini muhafaza etmektedir.