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Türk Dünyası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi  
Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkic World

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**Türk Dünyası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi**  
Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkic World

**GÜZ AUTUMN 2024 • SAYI ISSUE 111**

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## Saygıdeğer Okurlar,

Yeni sayımızın sunumunu bir özel sayı duyurusu ile yapıyoruz. Önümüzdeki yıl içerisinde “Kazakistan’ın Sürdürülebilir Kalkınması için Uluslararası İşbirliği” başlıklı bir özel sayı yayımlamayı hedefliyoruz. Bu özel sayının editörü Nazarbayev Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dekanı Prof. Dr. Aida Sagintaeva olacaktır. Bu özel sayının çerçeve metnini dikkatlerinize sunarım:

Uluslararası iş birliğinin dönüştürücü gücü, ulusal kalkınmanın kilit itici gücü olarak giderek daha fazla önem kazanmaktadır. Gelişmiş devletlerle bilgi, beceri, kültürel değerler ve kaynak alışverişini kolaylaştıran iş birlikleri, özellikle yeni bağımsız olmuş devletlerde kapasite geliştirme, ekonomik büyüme, teknolojik ilerleme, kültürel zenginleşme açısından önemli katkı sağlamaktadır. Bu tür iş birlikleri; uluslararası ilişkiler, kültür, edebiyat, ekonomi, iş dünyası, eğitim, kamu sağlığı ve sürdürülebilir kalkınma gibi çeşitli alanlarda büyüme ve gelişmeyi teşvik etmekle birlikte yerel ve küresel meydan okumaların aşılmasında ciddi öneme sahiptir.

Bu faydalara rağmen, uluslararası iş birliğinin karmaşıklığı dikkatli bir değerlendirme gerektirmektedir. Potansiyel eşitsizlikler ve güç dengesizlikleri gibi konular genç devletleri bağımlı bir konuma getirerek proje sonuçları üzerindeki etkilerini sınırlandırabilir. Böylece kalkınma çabalarının uzun vadeli sürdürülebilirliği riske girer. Ayrıca bu dinamikler, bilgi, kaynak ve kültürel anlatıların aktarımının öncelikle kalkınmış devletlere fayda sağladığı ve potansiyel olarak yerel bilgi ve kültürel uygulamaları bir kenara ittiği postkolonyal bir ilişkiye dönüşebilir. Bu nedenle kültürel hegemonya, ekonomik bağımlılık, beyin göçü ile yerel bilgi ve kültürel değerler gibi hususların da ele alınması büyük önem taşımaktadır.

Yukarıda özetlenen fırsat ve zorlukların farkında olarak bu özel sayı, çeşitli sektörlerdeki uluslararası iş birliği çabalarının Kazakistan’da eşitlikçi ve sürdürülebilir kalkınmayı nasıl teşvik edebileceğini araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Böyle bir çalışmanın, insani gelişimini ilerletme konusunda güçlü bir kararlılığa sahip genç bir cumhuriyet olan Kazakistan örneğine odaklanarak, gelişmekte olan diğer ülkelere ilham kaynağı olabilecek bir model sunacağına inanmaktayız. 1991’de bağımsızlığını kazanmasından bu yana Kazakistan birçok alanda çeşitli stratejik girişimleri hayata geçirmiştir. Bolaşak Uluslararası Bursu, Nazarbayev Üniversitesinin kuruluşu, uluslararası fuarlara ev sahipliği yapma, bölgesel diplomasi inisiyatifleri ve ekonomik ortaklıkları teşvik etme çabaları, Kazakistan’ın uluslararası iş birliğine ne kadar önem verdiğinin göstergeleridir. Bu çabalarda elde edilen başarıları ve karşılaşılan zorlukları inceleyen bu özel sayı, uluslararası iş birliğinin dönüştürücü gücünden sürdürülebilir bir şekilde yararlanma konusunda Kazakistan ve diğer Türk cumhuriyetleri için değerli bilgiler sunacaktır.

Kazakistan’da çeşitli sektörlerde kalkınmanın desteklenmesinde uluslararası iş birliğinin rolünü ele alan makale önerilerini memnuniyetle karşılıyoruz. İlgili alanlarımız arasında, bunlarla sınırlı olmamak üzere, aşağıdakiler yer almaktadır:

- **Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Diplomasi:** Kazakistan’ın bölgesel ve küresel siyasetteki rolü, uluslararası örgütlere katılımı, barışı koruma çabaları ve diplomatik ilişkileri.

- **Kültürel Değişim ve Karşılıklı Anlayış:** Sanat, edebiyat, müzik ve kültürel programların kültürlerarası anlayışın teşvik edilmesi, kültürel mirasın korunması ve küresel kültürel ilişkilerin geliştirilmesindeki rolü.
- **Türk Dünyasının Entegrasyonu ve Kazakistan'ın Rolü:** Kazakistan'ın Türk dünyasındaki yeri, Orta Koridor, Orta Asya iş birliği, Yol ve Kuşak girişimi.
- **Ekonomik Kalkınma ve Ticaret:** Yabancı yatırım, uluslararası ticaret anlaşmaları, ekonomik entegrasyon, küresel piyasaların Kazakistan ekonomisi üzerindeki etkisi.
- **İşletme Yönetimi ve Girişimcilik:** Uluslararası iş birlikleri, yerel işletmelerin küresel ortaklarla gelişimi, girişimcilik ve uluslararası iş birliklerinden etkilenen yönetim uygulamaları.
- **Eğitim Politikaları ve Reformu:** Müfredat geliştirme, pedagojik yenilikler, stratejik ortaklıklar, ortak derece programları, şube kampüs girişimleri.
- **Teknolojik İnovasyon ve Dijital Dönüşüm:** Teknoloji sektörlerindeki iş birlikleri, dijital ekonominin büyümesi, inovasyon ekosistemleri ve uluslararası ortaklıkların teknolojik ilerleme üzerindeki etkisi.
- **Sürdürülebilirlik ve Çevre Girişimleri:** Sürdürülebilirlik, çevre koruma, yenilenebilir enerji yenilikleri, sürdürülebilir tarım ve iklim değişikliğinin azaltılmasına odaklanan ve uluslararası ortaklıklardan kaynaklanan ortak projeler.
- **Hukuk Alanında İş Birliği:** Uluslararası hukuk standartlarının benimsenmesi, yargı reformları, hukuk eğitiminde iş birliği ve uluslararası hukukun ulusal mevzuat üzerindeki etkisi.
- **Sosyal Kalkınma ve İnsan Hakları:** Sosyal politika, insan hakları savunuculuğu, toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği ve sosyal adalet hareketlerinde uluslararası iş birliği.

Yukarıda özetlenen temaları ele alan makalelerinizi bekliyoruz. Çalışmalarınız; araştırma makaleleri, vaka çalışmaları, politika analizleri, teorik incelemeler, yorum yazıları şeklinde olabilir. Makalelerin ampirik veriler içermesi zorunlu olmamakla beraber, Kazakistan ile ilgili olmalı, uluslararası okuyuculara hitap etmeli; sosyal, ekonomik ve kültürel kalkınmayı teşvik etmede uluslararası iş birliğinin zorlukları ve fırsatlarına ilişkin eleştirel teorik zemin ve pratik çözümler sunmalıdır.

Lütfen makale tekliflerinizi **15 Ocak 2025** tarihine kadar [asagintayeva@nu.edu.kz](mailto:asagintayeva@nu.edu.kz) adresine gönderiniz. Özel sayı ile ilgili sorularınız için de aynı adresten konuk editörümüzle iletişime geçebilirsiniz. Ayrıntılı bilgi için [bilig.yesevi.edu.tr](http://bilig.yesevi.edu.tr) adresinden *bilig* Yayın İlkelerine başvurunuz.

Özel sayımıza katkılarınızı bekler, iyi okumalar dilerim.

**Prof. Dr. Fırat PURTAŞ**

Editör

## Dear Readers,

We are presenting our new issue with a special issue announcement. We aim to publish a special issue titled “International Cooperation for Sustainable Development of Kazakhstan” in the coming year. The editor of this special issue will be Prof. Dr. Aida Sagintaeva, Dean of the Faculty of Education, Nazarbayev University. I present to your attention the concept paper of this special issue:

The transformative power of international cooperation is increasingly recognized as a key driver of national development. By facilitating the exchange of knowledge, skills, cultural values, and resources with established partners, such collaborations enhance capacity building, economic growth, technological advancement, cultural enrichment, and innovative practices, particularly in young states. Consequently, these efforts promote growth and development across various domains, including international relations, culture, literature, economics, business, education, public health, policy formation, and sustainable practices, all of which are critical in addressing local and global challenges.

Despite these benefits, the complexities of international cooperation require careful consideration. Issues such as potential inequalities and power imbalances can place young states in a dependent position, limiting their influence on project directions and outcomes and risking the long-term sustainability of development efforts. Furthermore, these dynamics may perpetuate post-colonial relationships, where the transfer of knowledge, resources, and cultural narratives primarily benefits more established partners, potentially sidelining local knowledge and cultural practices. Thus, it is crucial to address these concerns, including the risk of cultural homogenization, economic dependency, brain drain, and the need to strengthen local capacities while preserving cultural identities to ensure that cooperation genuinely benefits young states.

Acknowledging the opportunities and challenges outlined above, this special issue aims to explore how international collaboration efforts across various sectors can foster equitable and sustainable development in Kazakhstan. By focusing on the case of Kazakhstan, a young republic with a strong commitment to advancing its international standing and human development, we aim to provide insights and models that can reflect on related experiences and inform efforts in other emerging nations. Since gaining independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has implemented several strategic initiatives across multiple domains. Efforts such as the Bolashak International Scholarship, the founding of Nazarbayev University, hosting international expos, engaging in regional diplomacy, and fostering economic partnerships highlight Kazakhstan's dedication to enhancing its landscape through international collaboration. By examining the successes and challenges encountered in these efforts, this special issue will offer valuable lessons for Kazakhstan and similar cases regarding harnessing the transformative power of international cooperation sustainably.

We welcome manuscript proposals addressing the role of international cooperation in fostering development across various sectors in Kazakhstan. Areas of interest include, but are not limited to, the following:

- **International Relations and Diplomacy:** Kazakhstan's role in regional and global politics, participation in international organizations, peacekeeping efforts, and diplomatic relations.

- **Cultural Exchange and Mutual Understanding:** The role of arts, literature, music, and cultural programs in promoting intercultural understanding, preserving cultural heritage, and fostering global cultural relations.
- **Integration of Turkic World and Kazakhstan's Role:** Kazakhstan's place in Turkic world, Middle Corridor, Central Asia cooperation, Road and Belt initiative.
- **Economic Development and Trade:** Foreign investment, international trade agreements, economic integration, the impact of global markets on Kazakhstan's economy.
- **Business Administration and Entrepreneurship:** International business collaborations, development of local enterprises with global partners, entrepreneurship, and management practices influenced by international cooperation.
- **Educational Quality and Reform:** Curriculum development, pedagogical innovations, strategic partnerships, joint-degree programs, branch campus initiatives.
- **Technological Innovation and Digital Transformation:** Collaborations in technology sectors, digital economy growth, innovation ecosystems, and the impact of international partnerships on technological advancement.
- **Sustainable Practices and Environmental Initiatives:** Collaborative projects focused on sustainability, environmental protection, renewable energy innovations, sustainable agriculture, and climate change mitigation resulting from international partnerships.
- **Legal and Judicial Cooperation:** Adoption of international legal standards, judicial reforms, cooperation in legal education, and international law's impact on national legislation.
- **Social Development and Human Rights:** International cooperation in social policy, human rights advocacy, gender equality, and social justice movements.

We encourage contributions from scholars, practitioners, and policymakers that address the themes outlined above. Submissions may take the form of research articles, case studies, policy analyses, theoretical explorations, reviews, commentary pieces, or reflective essays. Manuscripts do not have to include empirical data; however, they should relate to the Kazakhstani context, demonstrate relevance to international audiences, and offer critical theoretical insights and practical solutions regarding the challenges and opportunities of international cooperation in fostering social, economic, and cultural development.

Please submit your manuscript proposals by **January 15, 2025** to [asagintayeva@nu.edu.kz](mailto:asagintayeva@nu.edu.kz). For any queries regarding the special issue, please also contact our guest editor via the same email address. Please refer to the *bilig's* style guidelines at [bilig.yesevi.edu.tr](http://bilig.yesevi.edu.tr) (Editorial Principles) for further details.

We look forward to your contributions to our special issue and wish you enjoyable reading.

**Prof. Dr. Firat PURTAŞ**

Editor

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Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

# Central Asia in Regional and Global Policies of Russia and China\*

Nasuh Uslu\*\*

## Abstract

From a realist perspective, there is a power competition between China and Russia and the US-led West. Russian rulers felt that the very existence of Russia was seriously threatened by the advancement of the West in an anarchic system, and they reacted by launching military intervention in Georgia and Ukraine. The efforts of Russian rulers to firmly bind Central Asian countries to Russia through bilateral economic and military relations as well as regional organizations have also been shaped by their struggle to preserve Russian existence against the West. China's efforts to bind regional countries to itself through the SCO and the BRI is a power accumulation reaction given by a state that has emerged as a power pole vis-a-vis the dominant power to the possibility of being prevented from strengthening itself within the system. Russia and China's efforts to act together in regional initiatives have emerged as an effort of balancing the West. Accordingly, China's becoming more influential in the region has been managed by the two states with the same concern and this has served the interests of regional countries. In this study, Russia and China's policies towards regional countries and their approaches in regional organizations have been explained and analyzed from the realist perspective.

## Keywords

Russia, China, Central Asian states, regional organizations, balancing the West.

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# Rusya ve Çin'in Bölgesel ve Küresel Politikalarında Orta Asya\*

Nasuh Uslu\*\*

## Öz

Realist perspektiften bakıldığında, Çin ve Rusya ile ABD liderliğindeki Batı arasında bir güç rekabeti mevcuttur. Rus yöneticiler, anarşik sistemde Batının ilerlemesinin Rusya'nın varlığını ciddi şekilde tehdit ettiğini hissetmiş ve Gürcistan ve Ukrayna'ya askerî müdahalede bulunarak tepki göstermişlerdir. Rus yöneticilerin Orta Asya ülkelerini ikili ekonomik ve askerî ilişkilerin yanı sıra bölgesel örgütler aracılığıyla Rusya'ya sıkı sıkıya bağlama çabaları da Batıya karşı Rus varlığını koruma mücadelesi tarafından şekillendirilmiştir. Çin'in ŞİÖ ve KYG üzerinden bölge ülkelerini kendine bağlama çabası, başat güç karşısında bir güç kutbu olarak ortaya çıkan bir devletin sistem içinde güçlenmesinin engellenmesi ihtimaline verdiği bir güç biriktirme tepkisidir. Rusya ve Çin'in bölgesel girişimlerde birlikte hareket etme çabaları, Batıyı dengeleme çabası olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Çin'in bölgede daha etkili hâle gelmesi, iki devlet tarafından aynı kaygıyla yönetilmiş ve bu durum bölge ülkelerinin çıkarlarına hizmet etmiştir. Çalışmada Rusya ve Çin'in bölge ülkelerine yönelik politikaları ve bölgesel örgütlerdeki yaklaşımları realist perspektiften açıklanmış ve analiz edilmiştir.

## Anahtar kelimeler

Rusya, Çin, Orta Asya devletleri, bölgesel örgütler, Batıyı dengeleme.

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## Introduction

Classical realism argues that states are the main actors in international relations that act rationally by prioritizing their own interests. According to this approach, the state composed of individuals who desire to be powerful and act selfishly constantly tries to increase its power, acts selfishly and protects its security and interests against others by relying on its power. Kenneth Waltz's neorealism argues that the anarchic system (the absence of supra-state authority) pushes the state towards a self-help system. States that arm themselves to guarantee their security face a security dilemma and therefore inter-state relations are prone to conflict. However, getting too strong will lead to emergence of counter-alliances and hence states are advised to act cautiously. According to offensive realism, since there is no power to prevent the aggression of rival states, states try to become stronger and, if possible, hegemonic power as a means of ensuring their security. In defensive realism, since the security dilemma caused by mutual empowerment is dangerous, states may seek ways to reduce mutual distrust and strengthen their own defenses without threatening others. Neoclassical realism argues that systemic factors influence the behavior of states through internal factors. Although systemic factors are important, the perception of these factors by state leaders can shape states' behavior.

To fully understand how realist schools view inter-state relations, it is necessary to look at some general theories produced by realism. According to the balance of power theory, when one state becomes too powerful compared to others, others try to balance its power through internal (increasing their own capabilities) and external (forming alliances) balancing. As a reaction to the perceived threat from the stronger state, states may also engage in balancing behavior (balance of threat theory). The hegemonic stability theory says that the strong state aims to stabilize the system by imposing the rules and institutions of the system on others. According to the power transition theory, the relative weakening of the system's strong state and the rise to prominence of other states can lead to tensions jeopardizing the system. A state that is weakened to the extent that it has difficulty in maintaining power competition with others may seek compromises or engage in a show of strength in the hope of strengthening its position in the system before it loses its power.

Putin's view of Russia-West relations is entirely in line with great power rivalry<sup>1</sup>. His challenge is to protect a state that lost its great power status against an existential threat and, if possible, to make it a great power again. Given that Russia was attacked twice in history by European states, Putin could not rely on constructive Western rhetoric in an anarchic system. The security buffer created during the Cold War, vital in countering Western aggression, was removed with the expansion of the European Union and NATO and was turned into a lever that could be used against Russia. When countries such as Georgia and Ukraine turned against Russia in the wake of Western-backed popular movements, Putin believed that a serious reaction should be given against the West. Accordingly, he militarily intervened in Georgia, annexed Crimea, declared war on Ukraine and annexed the Donbass.

In Putin's eyes, what he does is to try to eliminate the threat to Russia's existence. Security is the most vital national interest of a state and states do not hesitate to increase their military power and use military force to protect this interest. If a state believes that its security is threatened by a powerful state or group of states, it will be ready to use any means to stop and balance them. Russia has reached such a point with the recent war in Ukraine. Seeing that Russia is losing ground in the great power competition since the end of the Cold War, Russians have felt that they are not only reacting to this decline, but also protecting their existence. In the eyes of Russian leaders, Ukraine is used by the West to destroy Russia. From now on, every important step Russia will take in the international arena will be about stopping, containing and balancing the West (Charap et al. 153-165). Since the mid-1990s, Russian rulers' approach to Central Asia has focused on strengthening themselves against the West. Accordingly, one of the main hypotheses of this article is that Russia's policies towards Central Asia are influenced by its struggle with the West. The question is whether Russia's Central Asia policies are shaped under the influence of great power competition.

Chinese have endeavored to become a world power through rapid economic development, and by closing their political system to outside influence. While the hegemonic power of the United States in the early 1990s was relatively weakened over time, China emerged as a power pole vis-à-vis

the U.S. Realist theories say that China's strengthening within the system could lead to global tensions and conflicts. International economic and trade tensions and wars can be seen in this context. China is not satisfied with the US dominance in the system and its unilateralist behavior in international relations. The expansion of the EU and NATO also makes China uncomfortable as it increases Western power and influence in the system. Therefore, balancing the West is important for China (Han and Paul). Although there are issues that may cause tensions with Russia, China has established a strategic partnership with this state. This partnership does not require acting together on every issue, but it at least prevents tensions between them and enables them to take joint action against the West.

Although China contributes to initiatives balancing the West, it currently avoids confrontation with it and instead focuses on strengthening itself economically and militarily. On issues such as Taiwan and the South China Sea territorial disputes, China has taken tough stances and given the impression that it can challenge the US. In general, however, it seeks to increase its initiatives and influence in different parts of the world by presenting itself as a positive actor. It would be appropriate to evaluate China's Central Asia policies in the context of the power struggle within the system. At this point, the question to be answered is whether China's Central Asian relations are influenced by the goal of becoming a great power and containing the West.

Central Asia normally has the potential to be a source of conflict between China and Russia, given benefits and spheres of influence to be gained. However, the priority of maintaining and strengthening their partnership vis-à-vis the West (Garcia and Modlin 23-26; A. Lukin 375-377; Stronski and Sokolsky; Korkmaz 169-171) leads them to harmonize their policies towards the region or at least prevent them from harming each other (Korkmaz 171-174). The hypothesis of the article is that the two states try to take concerted initiatives in Central Asia and that regional groupings led by them continue to exist as regional states benefit from them.

### **Russian Approach to Central Asia**

Russia has always considered Central Asia as its immediate neighbourhood where it should be influential to have a say in world politics. The main goal

of Vladimir Putin is to reverse the retreat Russia experienced in the 1990s vis-à-vis Western powers. Facing the Western-backed colour revolutions in the neighbourhood from 2005, Putin pursues policies to stop Western advances against Russia. Putin's strategy of containing the West and making Russia a big power again plays an important role in his policy of being effective in Central Asia and keeping Western powers away from the region.

Russia sees itself as the main actor with the right to have a say in Central Asia, which it dominated historically (Good 87). The region is part of the 'Near Abroad', which is rooted in the mind-set of Russian officials and strategists. Through bilateral contacts and multilateral political, economic and security organizations, Russian rulers seek to make their state a powerful actor in the region and globe (Wilson 64; Duarte 78). Those organizations contribute to the emergence of a multipolar structure in the world, keep hostile powers away from Central Asia and legitimize Russia's political, military and economic presence in the region (Dubnov 10; Good 88). Cooperation within the organizations reduces the risk of terrorism, Islamic radicalism, separatism and drug trafficking problems spilling over into Russia (Krapohl 357). In this way, Russia, which is too busy on the western front, does not have to worry much about the eastern front.

While it is in Russia's interest to act together with China in the current conditions, Russian officials may have to deal with China's increasing influence in the region in the long run. In particular, China's influence in the extraction, transportation and marketing of the region's energy resources worry Russian authorities. Dominance and influence over the region's energy resources will always be of great importance for Russia to be strong and influential in regional and world politics (Konopelko 221).

Kazakhstan is Russia's strongest economic and military ally (Krapohl 358). Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are open to any influence from Russia due to their limited economic and military capabilities and their dependence on Russia in various fields. Russia faced difficulty in maintaining relations with Uzbekistan and getting its support. However, the change of power in Uzbekistan seems to aid Russia at least to normalize relations with this country. However, Russia's initiatives and preoccupation in Crimea and Ukraine and China's increasing influence in the region have raised the possibility of a change in the position of regional countries vis-à-vis Russia.

What Russia ultimately wants is to protect its military bases in the region, guarantee access to regional markets, establish control over the region's natural resources as well as trade and energy transportation lines, and keep geopolitical rivals away from the region (Talka 47, 49).

### **Military Cooperation and CSTO**

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has sought to maintain its military influence, superiority and presence in Central Asia. It has served as almost the sole supplier of military equipment to Central Asian countries, trained their military personnel, conducted joint exercises with them, and paid rent while maintaining military bases and facilities on their territories.

Russia has a 7,000-strong military contingent (201st Motorized Division) in Tajikistan, a military airbase in Kant in Kyrgyzstan, a space base in Kazakhstan, and radar facilities and test sites in the three states. The agreement signed between Russia and Kyrgyzstan in 2012 extended the Russian base in Kant, its weapons testing ground in Karakol, its signal centre in Kara-Balta and its radio-seismic laboratory in Maylyu-Suu for 15 years (Wilson 65-66). With the agreement, Kyrgyzstan's \$500 million debt to Russia was cancelled and Russia pledged to spend \$1.1 billion to modernize the Kyrgyz army. In 2012, Russia and Tajikistan signed an agreement extending the Russian military presence for 30 years and Moscow pledged to provide \$200 million to modernize Tajikistan's military. However, as the Russian economy suffered from falling oil prices and EU sanctions between 2015 and 2017, Russia postponed its promised military investments, failed to modernize the Kant airbase, and only partially implemented its military aid to Tajikistan (Indeo 7, 8; Charap et al. 55).

In Uzbekistan, the new Mirziyoyev administration chose to have military cooperation with Russia on bilateral basis. In the eyes of Uzbek rulers, given that NATO and the United States stayed away from the region, Russia has remained the only state to cooperate in dealing with threats emanating from Afghanistan. As a reflection of the new administration's preference, in October 2017, Russia and Uzbekistan held their first joint military exercises since 2005. In April 2017, the two states signed the military-technical cooperation agreement which envisaged Uzbekistan purchasing military equipment from Russia at affordable prices and modernizing its existing equipment (Indeo 8-9).

Military training provided by Russia to Central Asian countries is prominent. Kazakhs account for about a third of all foreign military personnel trained in Russian military academies. More than half of the members of the Kazakh army were at least partially trained in Russia. Interrupted in 2012 by Uzbekistan's withdrawal from the CSTO, Russia has recently renewed its training program for Uzbek military personnel. According to Russian sources, more than 1,500 lower-level specialists from Tajikistan are trained in Russian military schools, learning to use new systems deployed in Tajikistan, such as the S-300 missiles. By 2014, 70 percent of Tajikistan's Special Forces had graduated from Russian military training institutions (Jardine and Lemon 8).

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is an important instrument guiding Russia's military relations with regional countries. In 2001, the parties to the Treaty created the Rapid Deployment Force of the Central Asian Region to counter threats emanating from Afghanistan (Rauf and Saud 36-37). With a mandate to counter external aggression and conduct joint counter-terrorism operations, this Force includes military forces from member states and has around 5,000 personnel. In 2007, it was agreed to create a peacekeeping force (deployed in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan) to manage conflicts in member states. The force has 3600 personnel, including soldiers, civilians and police. In 2009, member states agreed to establish a Joint Rapid Reaction Force to respond quickly to challenges and threats to their security and natural disasters, repel military attacks, conduct counter-terrorism operations and combat transnational crime and drug trafficking. The force consists of approximately 18,000 personnel (Mayer 219).

The CSTO conducts regular exercises with the aim of ensuring the security of member states. The Rubezh exercise aimed protecting the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border, to which the members attach great importance. The Channel exercise is conducted with the participation of the parties' anti-drug units, security forces, customs officials, border guards and financial intelligence units. While the Nelegal exercise aims to prevent irregular migration from non-member states, the Proxy exercise aims to strengthen cooperation in the field of cybersecurity and eliminate websites belonging to extremist groups (Shukuralieva 44; Rauf and Saud 38; Kazantsev et al.



59). The CSTO also conducts military exercises on the territory of member states. In November 2017, the Joint Rapid Reaction Force conducted a military exercise in Tajikistan with the participation of 5000 troops, 60 aircraft and 1500 pieces of weaponry, including the Iskander missile system. According to Dubnov (9-10), this exercise demonstrated Russia's approach to a crisis in a regional country: the anti-terrorism label is a convenient camouflage that can be used to fight against all types of enemies.

Previously, the CSTO's rapid response forces did not intervene in conflicts within member states. In 2010, when conflict broke out in Kyrgyzstan between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks and Kyrgyzstan requested assistance, Russia not only did not come to its aid but also opposed the use of the Rapid Reaction Force (Wilson 66; Indeo 6). This incidence showed that the organization would not come to the aid of its members in case of threats. However, the CSTO's intervention in the Kazakh unrest in January 2022 changed this thinking. When Kazakh President Tokayev made a formal request for assistance from the CSTO, Russia sent 3,000 paratroopers in addition to troops from other members.

Russia is far superior militarily in the CSTO compared to the other members. The forces of the organization are largely composed of Russian soldiers. Rather than prioritizing peacekeeping missions, Russia focuses on protecting the regimes in regional states. The organization served as a platform for Russia's bilateral projects with member states, and thus did not acquire a multilateral structure. It has become Russia's foreign policy tool and member states have tried to show that they are satisfied with Russia's foreign policy line and actions (Good 96). Thus, rather than being a truly multilateral regional organization, the organization seemed to be an institutional framework that served Russia's goals in its relations with member states (Lewis 12).

Russia may see the CSTO as a means of balancing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and China's growing influence in the region, and as the regional equivalent of NATO (Talka 64). So, Russia wants to talk to NATO as an actor of equal status and power, legitimize its military presence in regional countries, and deter CSTO members from engaging in serious relations with the West (Peyrouse and Nicharapova 9).

Compared to the SCO, the CSTO is not a regionally significant organization. Turkmenistan has not joined it due to its neutrality. Uzbekistan initially joined when the agreement was signed, left when the extension was due, and joined and left after it became an organization, thus raising questions about its strength (Good 96). The CSTO is not structured to respond strongly to crises and lacks a strong internal unity and cohesion. It does not have strong relations with the SCO despite membership similarities.

Some recent Russian initiatives have the potential to negatively affect its relations with Central Asian countries. Russia supports the Westphalian order, the inviolability of sovereignty, the state-centred application of international law and the transformation of the international system into a multipolar one, and opposes humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect, which seem to violate these principles. However, when it comes to Near Abroad, Russia does not see these principles as absolute, tends to water them down, and interprets sovereignty and international law differently. Russia's recent initiatives in Georgia and Ukraine can be seen by regional leaders as evidence of this Russian behaviour. The language used by Russia in explaining its territorial annexations and border changes is not reassuring for regional leaders (Tskhay and Buranelli).

### **Economic and Trade Cooperation and EAEU**

As the Russian economy strengthened in the 2000s, trade with Central Asia increased (Peyrouse and Nicharapova 12; Kazantsev et al. 59). In the 1990s, Kazakhstan's exports to Russia accounted for 50% of its total exports, which later dropped to 21% and even to 10% during the 2008 financial crisis (Krapohl and Vasileva-Dienes 356). Russia is the third largest trading partner of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the fourth largest partner of Uzbekistan, and the largest partner of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan (Tskhay and Buranelli 1043). Considering Russia's historical association with regional countries, the fact that Russia has ceased to be their first trading partner is important, showing its decline in the region.

Russia sees Central Asian countries' trade dependence on itself as an important factor for its influence in the region, affecting its stance against the West. What Russia is trying to do is not only to maintain the size of direct trade with these countries, but also to ensure that they continue to

use the Russian route for their exports. Russia tries to maintain its influence over regional countries through low customs duties, low oil and gas prices, and control over natural gas and oil pipelines (Konopelko 221). Russia also has close contacts with Central Asian countries in uranium, electricity, construction, telecommunications, transportation, transport, railways, banking and agriculture (Peyrouse and Nicharapova 12). Moreover, Russian companies hold significant stakes in the region's oil fields, refineries, hydroelectric power plants, pipelines and uranium enrichment facilities (Krapohl and Vasileva-Dienes 357).

The purpose of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Belarus, (Mankoff 31) is to further integration of members' economies and to increase their competitiveness by modernizing and developing their economies and increasing their trade. The most important actions of the EAEU are the reduction or elimination of trade tariffs between member states and the adoption of common tariffs and customs duties against others. Although bureaucracy has been reduced in trade between member states, standards, technical requirements and non-tariff barriers imposed by the members have prevented them from getting sufficient benefits from their cooperation (Mankoff 32-33). While remaining faithful to their national trade policies, member states have sought to find loopholes in existing rules and procedures to serve their national rather than common interests (e.g. they have used the exemption of more than 3000 goods and services from common external tariffs to their advantage).

Since the common tariffs were high and other external barriers were created, member states' trade with non-members declined. In theory, the decline in trade with non-members was supposed to be compensated by an increase in trade between member states. Although intra-regional trade increased, the increase was not at the expected and compensatory level due to insignificant increase in Russia's GDP. The only country which increased its trade surplus became Russia (Mankoff 31-32, 34). Since the common tariffs made goods of non-regional countries quite expensive, member states were forced to buy Russia's high-priced and low-quality goods (Duarte 78).

Russia's conflict with Ukraine, its exposure to Western sanctions and Russian sanctions against Western states inevitably affected member states.

For example, member states' trade with Ukraine was reduced and the non-tariff barriers imposed by Russia prevented the export of some goods through regional countries (Moldashev and Qoraboyev 91-92; Buyar and Şener 142-144). When the value of the ruble fell and fluctuated due to Western sanctions, the entrepreneurs of member states trading in rubles faced uncertainty. When Russia shifted from dollar to ruble in response to Western sanctions, the rate of use of ruble by member states' entrepreneurs also increased, but this situation exposed entrepreneurs to the risks of exchange rate changes.

The EAEU has a hierarchical structure and its decision-making mechanism has not been made integrative. Although the decisions taken are envisaged to be binding for the members, no resolution and sanction mechanisms have been established, and the rule of unanimity has made future cooperation problematic (Talka 66). In fact, from the beginning, the EAEU has had a dual character as a technical project that liberal economists and business circles desired and a geopolitical project that politicians and strategists preferred to strengthen Russia's influence in the region and ultimately ensure the emergence of a multipolar system (Lewis 12). Accordingly, Russia sees the EAEU as an important tool to strengthen its position against potential rivals (Krapohl and Vasileva-Dienes 349).

Russia has not hesitated to use carrots and sticks to expand and strengthen the organization, promising large amounts of investment and material rewards to attract new members, resorting to political pressure when necessary, and in the case of Kyrgyzstan, using this country's dependence on it for migration and expatriate remittances (Talka 68). The EAEU has evoked political, economic and cultural as well as technical and institutional meanings, and even Russian nationalists have used the concept of 'Eurasia' in the context of creating a separate hegemonic union against the liberal international order (Lewis 13).

Due to member states' concerns about possible Russian dominance, the Astana Agreement, which established the union, did not contain elements to implement Russia's vision and emphasized more intergovernmental cooperation in a way that prevented creating truly supranational institutions (Mankoff 31). What was also evident from the outset was that Russia and the other members had different strategic objectives and differing views

on how to distribute short-term costs and benefits (Talka 67). Russia saw the organization more as a political project, while others focused on their economic interests and did not dream of creating a super-state (Duarte 78). For example, Kazakhstan insisted on the inclusion of the word ‘economic’ in the name of the organization, and Kazakh leader Nazarbayev emphasized that the union should be limited to economic issues and that Kazakhstan could withdraw from the organization if its sovereignty was violated (Mankoff 31).

### **China’s Central Asian Strategy**

In its policies towards Central Asian countries, China seems to be acting in line with its comprehensive new regionalism strategy. This strategy entails avoiding unilateral policies, using multilateral mechanisms in accordance with the intentions and interests of the interlocutors, and involving them in the processes rather than intimidating them (Ali et al. 228). Complying with this strategy, China seeks to develop economic relations with regional countries as an element of soft power in line with its economic, political, ideological and cultural goals, and aims to serve the emergence of a multipolar world through regional structures based on respect for the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. China’s new regionalism requires grouping based on mutual trust and benefit, sovereignty, scientific knowledge, transparency, gradualism, common identity, and the common values-interests balance (Kolpakova and Kuchinskaya 109, 111-112). China gives the impression that it avoids classical power politics, balance of power and alliance postures and focuses on ‘win-win’ solutions in a harmonious international environment by adopting an inclusive vision. (Lewis 14). However, Chinese initiatives essentially aim at making China a power centre of the international system and balancing superior Western power.

While trying to develop economic, trade and energy relations and cooperation with Central Asian countries, China seems to be careful not to damage the status quo in the region, not to openly conflict with the interests of other competitors, to cooperate with them when necessary, and to show that it is a neutral actor (Talka 51). However, while increasing its initiatives in the region, it inevitably increases its influence and reduces the influence of its geopolitical rivals (Konopelko 223). Chinese leaders naturally realize that China’s increasing influence in Central Asia will strengthen its position

in world politics and accordingly prefer to be active in the region (Talka 50). While launching initiatives in various fields in the region, Chinese leaders try to challenge the global and regional hegemony of the US and even the international liberal order (Ali et al. 227-228).

### **Economic and Trade Cooperation and BRI**

Central Asia's oil and natural gas resources are of vital importance for China, the world's economic giant whose economy is growing rapidly and therefore in dire need of energy resources (Krapohl and Vasileva-Dienes 358). China attaches great importance to energy resources of Central Asia, which appear to be more stable and secure. In order to diversify its energy import and ensure energy security, China has to turn to the region's resources (Talka 50-51). In Kazakhstan, Chinese companies have more than 40% share in total oil production. In 2006, China signed an agreement with Turkmenistan for the purchase of 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year until 2038. By 2015, China had invested more than \$15 billion in Turkmenistan's fuel and energy facilities and controlled more than 25% of the country's natural gas production. Its investment in Uzbekistan's energy sector in 2015 was estimated at \$2 billion and in Kyrgyzstan's at \$400 million (Kazantsev et al. 64; Amirbek and Hanayi 60-62).

China has built a 1000-kilometre oil pipeline from Kazakhstan's oil fields on the Caspian Sea coast to Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang) (Rakhimov 11; Krapohl and Vasileva-Dienes 357; Ali et al. 230), allowing Kazakhstan's oil exports to China to reach 15% of its total exports. In addition, the 2,000 kilo-meter Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China natural gas pipeline, which includes Lines A, B and C, has made China the main lender of these states during the construction phase and has become an important source meeting China's natural gas need (Krivokhizh and Soboleva 8). China tries to construct highways and railways to have land connection with Europe and open Xinjiang to the outside world, and sees Central Asian countries as a transit corridor (Peyrouse and Nicharapova 13; Duarte 75). In December 2014, China and Kazakhstan signed a formal agreement on the joint construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt. When Kazakh President Nazarbayev visited Beijing in September 2015, he agreed to formally link the Belt with their own large-scale highway project Nurly Zhol (Pieper 463).

China tries to strengthen economic and trade relations with Central Asian countries. From 1996 to 2016, Chinese exports to Turkmenistan increased 42 times and trade with Tajikistan 225 times. In 2017, China and Kazakhstan signed agreements worth \$8 billion in energy, agriculture and infrastructure. In 2018, China became a supporter of the Astana Financial Centre, and the two countries agreed on 11 projects worth \$1.9 billion. By 2018, trade between the two countries approached \$100 billion, with China becoming Kazakhstan's second largest trading partner after the EU (Liao 506; Agayeva 9-10; Amirbek and Hanayi 50-60). China's foreign direct investment (FDI) in Central Asian countries has also increased significantly and China has become the region's main source of FDI. The share of Chinese FDI in the energy sectors of Central Asian countries is between 46% and 75% of the total (Wilson 61-62, 63; Agayeva 9).

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) envisages the implementation of 900 projects in 60 countries including Central Asian states and a total investment of 890 billion US dollars (Liao 504). According to Chinese officials, the project aims to facilitate and accelerate the movement of goods, services and people, increase trade, connect economies on a strong infrastructure, support economic development, and ultimately ensure security and stability throughout Eurasia (Kolpakova and Kuchinskaya 113).

China seems to have control at every stage and in every project, and the implementation of the initiative can significantly increase its influence and power in Central Asia (Peyrouse and Nicharapova 13). The prospect of China's political and military dominance raises concerns among rulers and populations of regional states that have previously experienced Russian domination (Wilson 68). Given that economic cooperation and institutionalization works best between states having similar capabilities, and that China's economy is much larger than that of regional countries, it is natural for regional decision-makers to fear exploitation and dependence (Peyrouse and Nicharapova 13). Trade deficits with China and difficulties in repaying debts to China are a harbinger of wider problems to come. Tajikistan agreed to settle its border dispute with China by giving 1 percent of its territory in exchange for forgiveness of its debt (Wilson 63). Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan are also expected to have difficulties in paying their debts to China. Local people in the region are concerned about possible Chinese

domination, Chinese migration, and China's lack of respect (Talka 52; Kazantsev et al. 64).

In the eyes of Chinese leaders, economic and trade cooperation with Central Asian countries will not only contribute to their economic and political stability, but also serve the stability of Eastern Turkestan by ensuring its economic development (Peyrouse and Raballand 408; Duarte 75). Cooperation with Central Asian countries will prevent them from supporting the Uyghur Turks in Eastern Turkestan and prevent the strengthening of radical elements (Ali et al. 230). Chinese economic initiatives in the region are aimed at removing possible regional and internal obstacles in front of becoming world power and increasing China's power against Western states (Kenzhetay 8-10).

### **Military Cooperation and SCO**

China's military initiatives vis-à-vis regional countries are related to combating extremism, separatism and terrorism, which it considers important for preventing the strengthening of Islamic groups. The initiatives take the form of creating security structures, selling arms and military equipment, training military personnel, establishing strategic facilities and bases, and holding joint exercises. China conducted joint exercises with Kyrgyzstan in 2002, with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in 2006, and with Tajikistan in 2016. In 2016, China, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan launched the Quadrilateral Mechanism for Cooperation and Coordination in Combating Terrorism. In the same year, China established a military base in Tajikistan, its first strategic presence in the region (Wilson 66; Bolonina 16; Kazantsev et al. 58; Krivokhizh and Soboleva 6). The base includes a helipad and facilities to house a battalion with armoured vehicles. Chinese officials have trained Kyrgyz and Kazakh military personnel, helped establish a department at Kazakhstan's Defence University, provided anti-drug training to Kazakhs, and partnered with Uzbekistan's Interior Ministry Academy (Jardine and Lemon 8).

China wants to use the SCO to manage security relations with regional countries. The organization emerged as a result of efforts of demarcation, border protection and arms control. Fighting terrorism, extremism, separatism, drug trafficking and transnational crime are seen as the main



tasks and functions of the organization. In the eyes of the Chinese, the SCO's economic cooperation dimension is also closely linked to security (Tskhay and Buranelli 1042; Mayer 219). The Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) is perceived as one of its most important organs. It aims to combat terrorism, collect, analyse and share intelligence on terrorism, create a database on terrorist networks, and maintain contact with other security organizations (Talka 69; Bolonina 16).

RATS has significantly increased its effectiveness in the fight against terrorism, preventing around a thousand terrorist attacks, arresting around 650 terrorists and eliminating some extremist organizations (Shukuralieva 45). Since 2007, RATS has been conducting annual counter-terrorism exercises under the name 'Peacekeeping' on the territory of one of the members. Peace Mission 2018 attracted international attention as it was a comprehensive exercise with the participation of all member states, including India and Pakistan (Rauf and Saud 39). To make RATS more effective, China established the China SCO National Institute for International Exchange and Judicial Cooperation in Shanghai under the Ministry of Public Security in 2014. The institute provides training to officials from member states on combating terrorism and transnational crime (Jardine and Lemon 9). China also established a strategic partnership in 2017 with Tajikistan, which has difficulties in securing its border with Afghanistan, to counter the threat posed by Islamic groups operating in Afghanistan (Peyrouse and Nicharapova 12).

Considering the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking emanating from Afghanistan as one of the main priorities, SCO members closely follow developments in this country. The departure of the U.S. and NATO from Afghanistan has made it imperative for member states to deal with Afghanistan more closely and directly. Member states made their territory available to the American and coalition forces when they intervened in Afghanistan. The SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group was established in 2005 to support joint peace efforts. Although the group suspended its work in 2009, it resumed regular meetings after Pakistan and India were admitted as members (Rauf and Saud 42).

The SCO is an important institutional tool for China to deal with Central Asian affairs, cooperate with Central Asian states in various fields, influence

their geopolitical positions and military postures, manage its relations with Russia and thus strengthen its international posture as a world power (Peyrouse and Nicharapova 11). In general, the SCO contributes to the stability of Central Asia. The SCO has successfully and smoothly brought regional countries together with Russia and China and prevented the emergence of serious tensions and conflicts between them. The SCO has prevented a particular power from dominating Central Asia and contributed to ensuring geopolitical balance and strategic stability in the region. Russia and China, empowered by the SCO, have avoided coming under the influence of the U.S. and NATO. Central Asian countries have used the organization to balance Russia and China against each other and thus have been able to pursue a multidimensional foreign policy in line with their national interests (Argalı). Thanks to the organization, Russia and China have balanced their strategic interests and engaged in constructive cooperation (Bolonina 16; Rauf and Saud 39). The SCO has indeed acted as a buffer in the rivalry between Russia and China, helping them to resolve their disputes peacefully and diplomatically (Nurimbetov and Vasa 32-33).

While the SCO has made significant progress in inclusiveness with Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, and four Central Asian states as its full members, its identity constitutes a problem. The rhetoric of 'Shanghai spirit' consistently used by the Chinese is associated with identity formation (Konopelko 220-221; Khan and Sultana 4-7). It implies that the parties fulfil their obligations regarding borders and arms control in good faith, abide by basic principles of international law, respect different civilizations, conduct business through loose arrangements, and pay attention to multilateralism in all matters (Krivokhizh and Soboleva 6). However, it is not possible to say that this spirit has created an identity and a homogeneous structure. In fact, heterogeneity is what the spirit envisages and what characterizes the current structure of the organization (Talka 71).

The most striking aspect of the SCO is that it is a coordinating actor. The principles of non-interference in internal affairs and mutual respect, emphasized in the founding treaty of the organization, have facilitated relations between members and have been instrumental in creating mutual trust. Since the Organization has not been conceived as a supranational structure having real authority over its autonomous members, it has remained

a structurally weak organization. It does not have long-term development strategies. It is not an organization with strong internal cohesion to allow for deep integration. Many of its institutional instruments, including dispute settlement mechanisms, have not been created. It has not provided serious assistance to member states facing serious crises and has not cooperated with the CSTO in this regard (Rauf and Saud 43).

Overall, the SCO has become more of a regional forum rather than a traditional security organization. It has not adopted a military structure, has not presented itself as a defence alliance, and has not made efforts to establish multilateral military units (Peyrouse and Nicharapova 11). However, Russia and China are determined to keep the SCO as a tool to strengthen their opposition to the U.S. and prevent this country from encroaching into the region and dominating the world. The two states which manage their relations through the organization want to keep and use it to balance the Western power and initiatives (Aydoğan; A. Lukin 2-8).

### **Russo-Chinese Relations in the Context of Central Asia**

China's large investments in Central Asia's energy resources, undertaking major infrastructure projects in the region, attempting to revive the historic Silk Road, and becoming the top trading partner of regional countries inevitably put China ahead of Russia and create the possibility of a Second Great Game between the two actors (Krapohl and Vasileva-Dienes 353, 359). While Russia dominated the regional economy in the 2000s, the Chinese dominance replaced it in the 2010s (Peyrouse and Nicharapova 14). China's BRI is a challenge to Russia's Eurasian integration project (Mankoff 35). China has not exhibited serious interest and strong support for the EAEU and the CSTO to which Russia attaches great importance. Whether the EAEU and the BRI, which are similar in terms of developing economic and trade union, will hinder or support each other is an important question. It is also wondered how Russia will balance China's influence and maintain its control over the region's natural resources and transportation lines (Krapohl and Vasileva-Dienes 357).

Russia initially ignored the BRI and did not like the idea of a common trade zone between the EAEU and the BRI (Pieper 472). China, on the other hand, presented the BRI as a purely economic project that would revitalize regional

economies by creating transport corridors (Lo and Dutkiewicz 43). Realizing that a confrontation with the West was inevitable due to the Ukrainian crisis, Russian authorities soon changed their stance and gave their approval to the initiative (Wilson 57). They even became one of the main proponents of the BRI, believing that it would provide the infrastructure, capital and technical capacity support for EAEU integration (Peyrouse and Nicharapova 14; Good 92; Yilmaz and Changming). They believed that establishing official connection between the two structures would strengthen the legitimacy of the EAEU in regional and global level, increase its importance among its members and keep it as an international economic actor. Moreover, the merger of the two structures and the creation of a single customs territory would increase intercontinental trade and all states along the routes and lines would benefit. It would be possible even to talk about realizing the dream of a Greater Eurasian Union (Mankoff 35-36).

In May 2015, Russian President Putin and Chinese President Xi signed the Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on Linking and Cooperation between the Silk Road Economic Belt and the EAEU (Lo and Dutkiewicz 43). The declaration included a commitment to coordinate the planning processes of the two initiatives and to establish a free trade zone that would ultimately integrate the two structures in the long term (Wilson 57). In May 2018, the Economic and Trade Cooperation Agreement was signed between EAEU members and China. While the agreement did not eliminate or reduce tariffs between the two sides, it did include arrangements on customs cooperation, trade facilitation, intellectual property rights, government procurement, e-commerce, market competition, and sanitary and phytosanitary standards with the aim of reducing non-tariff barriers (Lo and Dutkiewicz 43-44; Wilson 59).

It is too early to say that the establishment of the EAEU-BRI link represents a significant achievement. Common initiatives have no real content, there is no clear roadmap on how to achieve what is envisaged, and the goal of a common free trade area has been left as a long-term goal with no clear timetable (Rakhimov 7; Soboleva and Krivokhizh 645). Members of the EAEU have been given the flexibility to continue their policy of balancing between the two big powers (Mankoff 35). For the EAEU-BRI connection to succeed, integration within the EAEU should deepen, but states like

Kazakhstan are not yet ready for this (Bossuyt and Bolgova; Shakhanova and Garlick).

In fact, there are more fundamental reasons for Russia and China to cooperate in Central Asia. The main common interest of the two states is to maintain the regional status quo by preventing trends such as democratization and liberalization and to exclude the West from the region (Krapohl and Vasileva-Dienes 358). The need to act together against the West leads the two states to put aside potential regional tensions between them (Lewis 15). They have to coordinate their Central Asian policies for the sake of their more general strategy of balancing and containing the Western power.

### **Discussion and Conclusion**

When Putin became president, he felt that Russia's security was under direct threat from NATO and EU expansion and the color revolutions in former Soviet republics. In his eyes, Russia had to seize every opportunity to stop the advance of the West and balance its power. Tools which could be used by Russia were to intervene militarily in states that could be used by the West, to remind others that Russia had nuclear weapons, and to create a power grouping by strengthening its ties with former Soviet states and China. Putin immediately created an anti-NATO structure by transforming the Collective Security Treaty into an organization. In line with Russia's wishes, the members of the organization agreed to consider an attack on one of its members as an attack on all, not to join any other military alliance, and not to allow military existence of non-member states on their territories. Russia has firmly tied the three countries of Central Asia to itself through this organization. These countries cannot enter into serious military relations with Western states. Russia has military bases, units and structures in these countries, supplies them with weapons, trains their military personnel, and has the ability to engage in military actions in these countries through joint forces of the organization. While Russia opposed military intervention in the unrest in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, when it was not in direct confrontation with the West, it sent troops to intervene in the unrest in Kazakhstan in 2022 when it was in conflict with Western-backed Ukraine. It has recently entered into close military relations with Uzbekistan, which is not a member of the organization. Thus, Russia has tried to use the CSTO as part of its struggle with the West and to keep Central Asian countries around itself.

Russia has also wanted to ensure a certain degree of stability in the region by using the organization and thus to strengthen its position in its power competition with the West by guaranteeing its eastern front.

Although the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is not a unified and strong organization, Russia has tried to use it, which includes four Central Asian republics, to create a grouping around itself. It has done its best to enable the organization to hold its regular meetings and to function its organs, and has aimed to preserve the Soviet-era unity to a certain extent by encouraging the members to respect Russians, the Russian language and old Russian commemorative days in their countries. The EAEU has emerged as Russia's attempt to further integrate with neighboring states. Russia wants to bind Central Asian states tightly to itself through this organization. The fact that regional countries have intensive economic and trade relations with Russia and depend on Russian routes for the transportation of goods including energy has played an important role in Russia's balance of power policy towards the West. In fact, Russian authorities see the EAEU as a political and geopolitical project rather than an economic one. Since special circumstances of regional states have made it impossible to achieve a high level of economic and commercial integration, Russian rulers have displayed flexibility. The use of the regional countries to circumvent Western sanctions imposed because of the Ukraine war in a way to serve their economic and commercial interests has also been seen as a means of strengthening ties with Russia.

As the main power center facing the United States, China emphasizes its soft power aspects. In its initiatives towards Central Asia, it tries to show that it respects the sovereign rights of its interlocutors and aims to enter into relations with them only on the basis of mutual benefit. However, a closer analysis of China's attitudes reveals that all of China's efforts are aimed at accumulating power to balance the United States. The main tool China uses to achieve this goal is the Belt and Road Initiative. As part of this initiative, China has carried out large-scale infrastructure projects (roads, railways and pipelines) in Central Asian countries. China has also established economic and trade relations with regional countries, provided them with loans and tried to use their natural resources, thereby expanding its power base. China has also established close military ties with regional countries. It has

sold arms to them, provided military training, conducted joint military exercises and sought to establish military bases in their territories. Security cooperation within the SCO strengthens China's power base by creating the stability in the region and relieving China from the East Turkestan problem, its soft underbelly in becoming a great state.

For China, the BRI is the main tool for becoming a great state and the SCO is an important tool for balancing the West. It uses the BRI to increase its foreign economic and trade relations, and sees the SCO in the context of anti-Western groupings. The SCO, which has expanded significantly with the accession of Iran, Pakistan and India, is a potential counterweight for China, even though it has not become a very effective organization. By making the organization active in the field of security, the Chinese rulers both want to strengthen stability in Asia and aim to limit the Western influence. The organization stabilizes China's relations with Russia and allows it to manage these relations in a way that does not turn them into a power competition. Russia and China have used the organization as an instrument of their strategic partnership and have maintained their unity vis-à-vis the West. The two states have also sought to link the EAEU with the BRI as another means of addressing a potential mutual distrust that China's overtaking Russia in many areas in Central Asia could cause.

The two states believe that they have to act together in countering the West. Russia struggles with the imminent threat posed by the West. China does not want to face Western obstruction on its way to becoming a great power. Both states have a deep-seated distrust of the West. In their eyes, strengthening against the West and acting together is essential for their national interests. Therefore, even though there are issues that may cause disagreements between them, they try to strengthen and maintain their unity and act together in their initiatives towards Central Asia. Given that the Central Asian states try to benefit from their behavior for their own interests, it is fair to say that the influence of the two states in regional structures will continue and the region will be an element for the two states to rely on in great power competition.

## Conflict of Interest Statement

There is no conflict of interest with any institution or person within the scope of this study.

## Notes

1 Geopolitical theories and the idea of Greater Eurasia can also be used to explain Putin's thinking (A. Lukin 8-12; Ageyava 2-3; Erenel; Qamar and Zafar; Krickovic and Pellicciari 94-97).

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Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

# Disruption of Pastoral Nomadism: The Impacts of Russian Colonialism on the Kazakh Steppe during the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries\*

Emre Teğın\*\*

## Abstract

This study examines the multifaceted impacts of Russian colonization on the Kazakh Steppes during the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. The colonization process caused significant destruction in various fields in the region, including migration routes, livestock herds, socioeconomic life, trade networks, housing and dietary patterns of nomadic communities. Russian expansionism, aimed at establishing control over the steppe, led to the blockage of ancient migration routes and the restriction of nomadic economic resources. The blockage of migration routes, forced transition to capitalism, forced sedentarization and interaction with sedentary life transformed the livestock herds of the nomads. Socio-economic life and trade were restructured by the Tsardom for reasons such as integration into the Russian Empire market, change of commercial centers and concentration of wealth. The changing structure of pastoral nomadism also led to transformations in housing and diet. Comprehending the complex dynamics of Russian colonialism on the Kazakh Steppe will reveal the destruction of nomadic life by scrutinizing the historical and contemporary sociocultural landscape of the region.

## Keywords

Kazakh Steppe, Russian colonialism, sedentarization, pastoral nomadism, Russian colonizers, settler colonialism.

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# Konargöçer Yaşamın Tahribatı: 19. ve 20. Yüzyıllarda Rus Sömürgeciliğinin Kazak Bozkır Üzerindeki Etkileri\*

Emre Teğın\*\*

## Öz

Bu çalışma 19. ve 20. yüzyıllarda Rus Sömürgeciliğinin Kazak Bozkırları üzerindeki çok yönlü etkilerini incelemektedir. Sömürgeleştirme süreci, konargöçer toplulukların göç yolları, hayvan sürüleri, sosyoekonomik yaşamı, ticaret ağları, barınma ve beslenme kalıpları da dâhil olmak üzere bölgede çeşitli yönleriyle göçer iktisadi yaşam üzerinde önemli tahribatlara yol açmıştır. Bozkır üzerinde kontrol kurmayı amaçlayan Rus yayılmacılığı, kadim göç yollarının tıkanmasına ve konar-göçer iktisadi kaynaklarının kısıtlanmasına yol açmıştır. Göç yollarının tıkanması, zorla sömürge ekonomisine geçirilme, yerleşik yaşam tarzına zorlanma ya da yerleşik yaşamla etkileşim kurulması konar-göçerlerin hayvan sürülerini de dönüştürmüştür. Sosyoekonomik yaşam ve ticaret ise Rus İmparatorluğu pazarına entegrasyon, ticari merkezlerin değişimi ve servet yoğunlaşması gibi nedenlerle Çarlık tarafından yeniden yapılandırılmıştır. Konargöçer yaşamın değişen yapısı barınma ve beslenme biçimi üzerinde de dönüşümlere yol açmıştır. Kazak Bozkır üzerindeki Rus sömürgeciliği kaynaklı karmaşık dinamikleri anlamak, bölgenin tarihsel ve çağdaş sosyokültürel manzarasını mercek altına alarak konargöçer yaşamın maruz kaldığı tahribatı ortaya çıkaracaktır.

## Anahtar Kelimeler

Kazak Bozkır, Rus sömürgeciliği, yerleşikleştirme, pastoral göçebelik, Rus yerleşimciler, yerleşimci sömürgecilik.

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## Introduction

The Kazakhs, who established a khanate around the *Shu* (*Illy*) River in the 15<sup>th</sup> century, were divided into administrative units as ‘Senior, Middle and Junior’ Juz with their increasing population, and in 1724-1725, they faced difficulties with Kalmyks’ raids from the east and requested help from the Tsardom (LeDonne 163-164). Taking advantage of this attractive offer from the Kazakh steppes, which Peter had pointed to as a target, the Tsardom took Abu’l-Hayr Khan and the Junior Juz under her protection in 1731 and Middle Juz in 1845. The Senior Juz, on the other hand, had a tough time under Kalmyk domination until 1756, and then was disturbed by the Kokand Khanate’s efforts to settle in the Yedisu Region, was annexed by the Tsardom in 1824 (Levshin 108). Naturally, this process was not accomplished without resistance or political struggle, and uprisings in the Kazakh Steppe, notably the Kenasari Khan Rebellion, continued till 1868.

The Kazakh Steppe, a vast and historically significant region inhabited by pastoral nomads over four millennia, underwent intense transformation in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries as a result of Russian colonialism and the influx of settler/colonizers. The Russian Empire’s intense interest in steppe paved the way for a process of expansion and territorial control that brought one and a half million Russian settlers to the region by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, thus changing the social, cultural and economic fabric of the region (Cameron 19). While the advance of Russian colonialism into the Turkic world, particularly the Kazakh Steppe, and the resistance to this advance have been frequently discussed from the perspective of political history on a region basis, the sociocultural sphere in the context of the interaction of settlers and nomadic life has not been given much focus.

The pastoral nomadism, deeply rooted in the cultural heritage of the Kazakh Steppe, has faced significant challenges due to Russian colonial policies. Ranges and ancient migration routes, once used to sustain nomadic livelihoods and facilitate trade, were blocked due to administrative boundaries set by the Tsardom, which seized political sovereignty, and access to settlements that had been used for centuries for pasture and winter pasture became difficult or captured by settlers. Nomadic economy, which traditionally relied on the mobility of their herds, has either lost its ability to move freely in the steppe due to settlement efforts and settlers’ appropriation

of pasture lands as virgin lands, or has been sustained with restrictions. It should be noted that the destruction of the steppe and the nomadic way of life developed in three stages in this respect. The first of these is the process of forced capitalization of the steppe, which constitutes the subject of the study and refers to settler colonialism (1822-1916), while the other stages consisted of the forced sedentarization carried out by Stalin during his collectivization (1926-1939) and Khrushchev's Virgin Lands Campaign (1954-1964). New statutes introduced by colonial rule changed the borders of the steppe, and new trade and border agreements between China and Russia were implemented without regard to ancient migration routes, and land enclosed by agricultural policies began to swallow up vast pastures.

The appropriation of the Kazakh Steppe by Slavic settlers also produced profound changes in the socio-economic structure of the region. Colonial policies aimed to integrate the steppe into the larger markets of the Russian Empire, which allowed for the creation of new trading centers and new areas or transfers of wealth. Amidst intense changes involving new means of transportation, roads, new taxation systems, Kazakh nomads tried to take measures to adapt to the market-oriented economy and transform their way of life accordingly. Therefore, Russian colonialism, which began in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and reached its peak in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and the destruction caused by Slavic settlers on the nomadic life in the Kazakh steppe marked the beginning of the movement of forced capitalization (Engels 21) that would spread first to the steppe and then to the whole of Turkestan, just like the enclosure of the lands used by the peasant as common cultivation and planting areas in the British Enclosure Movement.

### **Colonization of the Kazakh Steppe**

The Kazakh Steppe has long been the site of fierce struggles over the control and utilization of its expansive grasslands. The Russian Empire's policies on the steppe have once again pitted nomads against sedentary societies in a profound struggle for existence, much like their relations with China. From the late 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, waves of Slavs from European Russia migrated into the Kazakh steppes. The main motive of the settlers in this migration, which was quite dangerous for them, was based on the simple basics of gaining their freedom and free land. The Tsardom, on the other hand, considered the nomads living in the steppe as obstacles in the process of colonization and



pursued the dream of turning the Kazakhs into agricultural peasants on the basis of military, topographical and sociocultural reports prepared for years on the steppe. This impulse, which continued during the Soviet period, especially after 1928 with Stalin, resulted in major changes in the culture and economy of Kazakh society. Russia's presence in the Kazakh Steppes before Leonid Brezhnev should be analyzed in different stages and be considered within the general policy of Russian expansion to the east. The first phase, from the mid-16<sup>th</sup> century to 1830, was one of containment, defense and commercial ventures rather than control, whereas from the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century onwards it included the neutralization of the steppe, and the second phase, from the 1880s to 1914, involved the colonization of the region and the planned or unplanned direct settlement of settlers by the Tsar (Wendelken 72). Setting aside the large populations exiled to the steppe by Stalin between 1926 and 1939 as a result of collectivization and the Gulags, the third and final phase was the 'Virgin Lands Campaign' (1954-1964), marking the most intensive wave of settler migration during the Soviet era.

The stages and processes of colonization of the steppe are directly related to the Kazakh and Russian sides' rapprochement influenced by a number of developments and the conflicts of interest that arising from this situation. In the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the emerging Kalmyk threat to the Kazakh Juzes from the east forced them to ally with Russians, and this pressure brought about the first intensive contact in terms of relations (d'Encausse 115). The idea of spreading Russian influence into the steppe by taking advantage of the situation turned into political approach with Peter I's idea that 'the Kazakhs hold the key to all of Asia and must be protected' (Hayit 62). It can be seen that the Russian side, inclined to evaluate the newly established relations and to develop a policy accordingly, basically produced two perspectives on the Kazakh steppe. The first one is the compilations including Colonel Kostenko Lev Feofanovich (*Srednia Aziya I Vodvorenije v nei Russkoy Grazhdanstvennost*) and K. Kaufmann (*Turkestanskiy Sbornik Sochinenij i Statej*), which reflect the military perspective and report on the region. The other is the data left historians and ethnographers such as Kharuzin Alexei Nikolayevich and Alexei Iraklijevich Levshin, which reflect an academic perspective. While military reports fed a policy based on annexation until the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the ideas put forward by Levshin, in particular, formed the basis of the harsh colonization policies of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, although this was not the result he expected.

In 1868, when the Tsardom officially annexed the steppe, the region was administratively divided into three oblasts. Sir Derya and Semirechye (Yedisu) were subordinated to the Turkestan Governorate, Uralsk and Semey to the West Siberian Governorate (Wendelken 77). The administrative structure was subdivided into units, producing *uyezd* (уезд) and *volost* (во́лость) in smaller parts downwards in the designated regions (Cameron 26). The administrative and judicial conflicts of interest created by the territorial division were one of the catalysts of ethnic disputes in the struggle of Kazakh against settlers, who were declared ‘Inorodets’ (инородец) within the Russian subjects (Slocum) and had fewer rights than Russian citizens (Brower). The year 1891 marked the most powerful step towards the colonization of the Kazakh Steppe, when the Steppe Statute united Turgay, Uralsk, Akmolinsk and Semey into Governor-Generalship of the Steppes (Olcott, *The Kazakhs* 78). The most objectionable aspect of Steppe Statute for Kazakh nomads was Article 119 and 120, which included the nationalization of lands designated as ‘surplus’ at the Tsardom initiative and the distribution of these lands among the settlers. According to the statute, the number of Kazakhs in the designated areas was multiplied by thirty and subtracted from the total land area, and all surplus land was designated as ‘*izlishki*’ (излишки) (Olcott, *The Kazakhs* 78). Although this calculation may seem to be problematic for sedentarism based on agrarian economy, it created serious resource utilization problems for nomadism based on pastoralist economic foundations that divided people and animal to land rather than land to people.

Accurately determining the number of settlers the administratively subjugated Kazakh Steppe received during the early period remains challenging. Thus, although it is not possible to find data from before 1896, when the Resettlement Administration was established, it can be assumed that the first migrations averaged between 300,000-500,000, considering that in the 1897 census, Russians accounted for 12% of the steppe’s population, approximately 600,000 people (Demko 76). This number increased rapidly in 1891 because of peasants fleeing the Great Famine in European Russia (Johnson). In addition, the establishment of the Resettlement Administration after 1896 and the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway to Omsk, which the settlers considered the gateway to the steppe, led to a significant increase in the number of settlers, and by 1911, Russians accounted for 40% of the steppe population (Demko 77).

For the Russians, the settlers in the steppe were divided into three large groups. The first group were those who were to be settled directly by the Tsardom, whose number was limited by law and who had to pay off all their debts before being allowed to settle. In this respect, those representing the second group were probably those from the first group who wanted to be relieved of their huge debt burden by transfer, and this was an important factor that increased the number of irregular settlers who could not pay their debts. Given the lack of harvest during the 1891 famine, it is not difficult to imagine how large this group would have been. The last group was those who were allowed to migrate to other regions after the abolition of peasant serfdom by Alexander II on February 18, 1861, but could not find a foothold there and tried their luck in the steppes instead of returning to European Russia (Wendelken 79). The Tsardom rulers divided the settlers into *starojili* (Старожилы/old settlers) and *novoseli* (новоселы/new settlers), using the establishment of the Resettlement Administration as a milestone, while Kazakhs referred to them as *qarashependiler* (black coast) or *kelsimseker* (intruders, invaders) (Cameron 36).

The migration of settlers to the steppe was chaotic though it was also systematic owing to the Tsardom control. The settlers in the first group owning sufficient money sent ‘scouts’ to the region to select land that they could rent from the Kazakhs, while the poorer settlers in the second group not having the money to rent or buy seized what they perceived to be vacant and untouched land belonging to nomads migrating between pasture and winter (Siegelbaum 31-58). This behavior of the settlers naturally gave rise to serious problems in terms of land, water and livestock use rights in the steppe, and threats such as increased population, interaction and poor conditions in the migration areas, epidemics and difficulties in accessing materials to meet the need for shelter. Moreover, settlers, expecting to encounter agriculturally “fertile and rich” lands, became more combative and aggressive in their dealings with Kazakh nomads due to the drastically changing climatic structure of the steppe in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Moon 2010). Although the establishment of the Resettlement Administration included punitive measures against illegal migration or the repatriation of settlers who migrated illegally, these were rarely implemented or mostly ignored. Therefore, instead of resolving problems between settlers and nomads or enforcing laws, the government, therefore, directly encouraged migration

to West Siberia and further east, giving settlers free or discounted tickets to use the Trans-Siberian Railroad (Demko 74). Despite various incentives, it is estimated that between 1896 and 1916, following the establishment of the Resettlement Administration, 22% of settlers were unable to withstand the harsh conditions of the steppe, including the unforgiving climate and challenges in adapting agricultural practices, ultimately returning to European Russia (Demko 84).

### **Establishment of Administrative Borders and Blockage of Migration Routes**

Following 1868, the establishment of Russian control over the steppe marked a period in which the dynamics and policies of the 18<sup>th</sup> century were largely abandoned in terms of relations. Prior to the domination of the steppe, the Tsardom policies were intended for non-interference and preserving local autonomy or keeping them busy with conflicts of interest among the tribes. Particularly during the reign of Catherine II (1729-1796), this non-intervention was mostly aimed at encouraging the nomads to sedentarism and expecting them to become “civilized” from their own point of view. Nevertheless, in the changing political situation, establishing dominance over the steppe required a sustainable order for the Tsardom economy by creating administrative units. In this regard, Levshin’s report played a fundamental role in abandoning the effort to settle the nomads and establishing a reliable structure by Russification the region through settlers.

Even though Levshin emphasizes that agricultural land cannot be extracted from the steppes, his view on nomads were uncompromising and unequivocal. Asserting that the steppe was chaotic, anarchic and uncivilized, Levshin described nomadic animal husbandry as meaningless and unproductive, and the nomads as groups that were willing to make peace neither among themselves nor with others and did not want to live under the rule of Russia or any other state authority (Levshin 51-52). Levshin also criticized the ‘civilization’ effort during Catherine’s reign, arguing that the construction of schools and mosques and the settlements designed for the nomads were abandoned (Levshin 125). Directly linking this situation with steppe and the way of life of nomads, Levshin stated that while all people lived under a satirized despotism, the Kazakhs, owing to their pastoral nomadism and the infertility of their lands, led an agricultural, non-hierarchical life (Levshin 127). The most important feature that distinguishes their report

from the others is that Levshin argued that it was impossible to sedentarize the nomads in the steppe and that the Kazakhs could benefit the empire by being left as rich sheepherders rather than creating poor farmers. In this respect, although Levshin did not idealize colonization, it is clear that he caused an awakening that radical decisions had to be taken regarding the steppe. Hence, the presence of 'reliable' settler farmers became a crucial issue for the Tsardom in order for agricultural to be practiced. The fact that the colonization process limited the migration activities of the nomads was also a consequence of the policies to be carried out within this framework.

The limitation of migratory activities can be started with the involvement of the Cossaks, the first 'European' group to arrive in the region before colonization. In exchange for land ownership and autonomy, the Cossaks carried out military-border protection activities in the north-western part of the steppe in direct subordination to the Tsar, creating a kind of defensive, settlement and outpost line, which was later named the Siberian Line (Demko 39). Two important events in three stages turned migration activities into a field of intense struggle for the Kazakhs in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The first of these was the 1822 Statute of Siberian Kirghiz (*Ustav o Sibirskih Kirgizah*), by Mikhail Speransky (1772-1839). In terms of content, the Statue proclaimed direct the Tsardom rule in the Kazakh steppes through bureaucracy and formed the basis for the Statutes of 1868 and 1891. The 1822 Statute introduced administrative division for the first time in the steppe and laid out a comprehensive rulebook that included towns and township, land development projects, taxation, education and social issues, and aimed to settle the nomads (Wendelken 75). As Levshin emphasizes, although this statute was not successful in terms of sedentarization, the administrative divisions it introduced marked the beginning of the enclosures on the migration routes after the Kazakh Juzes came completely under the Tsardom rule.

The 1868 Statute, expressing the administrative structure of the colonization process, contained the most important regulations in terms of blocking migration routes. According to the statute, Semipalatinsk and Akmolinsk Oblasts, which were administered as military possessions of western Siberia, and Uralsk and Turgay Oblasts, which were administered by the Internal Affairs, were separated by strict territorial boundaries, despite the objections of individuals such as Nikolai Andreyevich Kryzhanovsky (1818-1888),

the Governor of Orenburg, and in some of the separated regions, nomadic and sedentary elements were brought together, narrowing the passability (Olcott, "The Settlement" 13). It should be noted that the main reason for the Tsardom governors' opposition to the statutes was that they would lose their authority and regional initiative and would have to delegate power to the civilian ministries of the center. Furthermore, the Governor General appointed the administrator of each administrative region, oblast and uyezd, while volosts and auls were to be removed from their constituencies, subject to approval (*Otchet Po Revizii Turkestarskogo Kraya* 38-39). Although this arrangement in the administration was considered as a step towards disrupting the clan order and bonding among the nomads, the fact that the same clans remained together in divided administrations created a situation that gave them an advantage in choosing the rulers.

The most important impact of the statutes on the blockage of migration routes was the land use regulations. The three main areas designated for the nomads within administrative divisions were pasture (*yaylak*), winter pasture (*kıřlak*) and cultivated land. Accordingly, the volost administrator was to designate a winter pasture area in each aul, including structures such as lodging, barns and warehouses, with permits; in uyezds, administrator was to determine and allocate the necessary pasture parcels for the entire region; and in the case of cultivated land, the head of the household cultivating the land could turn it into private property (*Otchet Po Revizii Turkestarskogo Kraya* 236-237). Considering the decisions taken on land use, it may seem that the structure of Kazakh Steppe and the situation of nomadism were taken into consideration. It is, however, not possible to say whether the designated pasture and winter lands were on the migration routes and the structure of the herds of animals to be driven to pasture on the specified lands was taken into account. In addition, there was no regulation on the use of the lands confiscated by the settlers until 1891, nor did it an application for the obstacles created by the fences and bars drawn by the settlers on the administratively divided migration routes. Concerning it is reasonable to say that proposing controlled migration routes at certain distances for nomads and encouraging private ownership of the lands to be cultivated had any other purpose other than trying to promote sedentarization of nomads. The difficulties that both statutes created for the migration manifested themselves in the judicial situations that arose in

the use of land, which were also determined by the statutes. For instance, Morrison reports that in a land use dispute with injuries that occurred just before the 1906 Statute, the court ruled against the nomads based on the testimony of only six settlers, while a hundred people testified (Morrison, “Peasant Settlers” 391).

The nascent administrative boundaries established by the statutes had a restrictive impact on all migratory activities in the northern and central parts of the Kazakh steppe, from the Sir-Derya to the Caspian, from the Mangistau to the *Ustyurt*, and from the *Elek* to *Sarisu*. Kazakh nomads who spent the harsh winter in the central and southern regions had to travel long distances to reach the vast pastures of the northern regions using ancient migration routes. Indeed, for long-distance migrations (meridional), these distances reached 1000-1500 kilometers, while for nomads following the south-north route, even reaching the Turgay region from the Sir-Derya required 600-800 kilometers (*Aziatskaya Rossiya* 158-159). Yet, the internal borders established by the statutes did not allow nomads who did not want to spend the summer months in the south among dry grass and mosquitoes to spend the spring in the north-west such as Turgay and Kostanay.



**Map 1.** Rangeland in Kazakh Steppe (Kerven et al. 3)

For the nomads who were able to reach the transhumance areas, settling at distances from each other and making efficient use of the land where they could graze their herds was again not possible due to the statutes. While rivers, wells or lakes where herds could drink water between ranges played a crucial role in determining migration routes, settlers’ fencing off the areas

they seized or intensively shifting water resources to unproductive lands for agriculture led to the search for new and uncertain migration routes over limited resources. In parallel, the restriction of nomadic mobility has also paved the way for overgrazing in the same area by the herds, depleting resources in a short period of time and related ecological imbalances.

After the establishment of internal borders through statutes, a second obstacle to the blockage of migration routes emerged with the establishment of external borders. The Treaty of St. Petersburg (1881) (Петербургский договор) or the Treaty of the Ili Region (Договор об Илийском крае) between the Qing Dynasty and the Russian Empire established an official Sino-Russian border roughly between present-day East Turkestan and Kazakhstan (*Russko-Kitayskiye Otnosheniya 1689-1916* 54). According to the treaty, a large part of the Ili Region was left under Qing rule, while Uyghurs and Kazakhs living the region were given a choice and, the right (Article 3) to take Russian or Qing citizenship (*Russko-Kitayskiye Otnosheniya 1689-1916* 55). The exchange of citizenship led to a significant migration movement, especially to the south of the eastern part of the Kazakh Steppes. However, as with the regulations of statutes, the demarcation of external administrative boundaries added a further burden to the enclosure of important migration routes that could take centuries to form. With the Ili Region Agreement, migration from the East Kazakhstan to East Turkestan between the Irtysh, Emin and Ili Valleys was blocked by state borders and military checkpoints. Concordantly, both internal and external demarcation of borders played the most important role in blocking the migration routes of nomads by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and laid the foundation for the problematic of the use limited resources between settlers and nomads in the use of fertile northern regions.

### **The Reorganization of the Means of Production and the Entry of Capitalism into the Steppe**

The arrival of settlers and merchants to the Kazakh steppes brought by Russian colonialism, the establishment of a new administrative order by defining internal and external borders severely restricted the migratory mobility of the nomads. This restriction had a significant impact on the size and diversity of livestock herds, which had to be kept in a delicate balance due to the narrowing of migratory mobility and to increased interaction with sedentary settlers. The basic livestock husbandry approach of the steppes



is mainly based on raising different and compatible livestock, both small ruminants (sheep, goats) and cattle (horses, cattle, camels). Although the animal husbandry required certain rules between winter and spring pastures for its sustainability, the dynamic nomadic pastoralists quickly adapted to the challenges of restrictions and new market opportunities brought by Russian colonization (Ferret 187).

Kazakh nomads, with shorter migration distances following the change in land use patterns, tended to intensively add cattle to the composition of their herds in addition to sheep-goats and horses, especially in the northern regions, which could be migrated over short distances. This tendency, which had not been very common in the 18<sup>th</sup> century before the arrival of Russian colonialism in the steppe, became the main determinant of the composition of animal herds in the coming centuries within the demand balance of the new Russian markets. Cattle are very difficult animals to migrate over long distances, unlike the usual patterns of nomads, and their eating habits are quite different from those of sheep and goats (Khazanov, *Nomads* 46-47). Although cattle, which tend to live on pastures rather than graze on large pasture, make a difference, their density in the herds of Kazakh nomads on the steppe has increased by 20% in most regions (Cameron 37). The increase in the percentage of cattle in the herd composition and the narrowing of migration distances led Kazakh nomads to give up their camels, which they decorated with *asmaldyks*, or to remove them from the herds as they were no longer needed (Kostenko, *Turkestanskiy* 340). Due to restriction of long-distance migration, nomads had to supplement their labor force for daily or seasonal work. Therefore, the need to add 7-8 cattle or 10-12 horses for every 6 camels to the herds in proportion to the required labor force was one of the factors contributing to the transformation of herds (Kartaeva 99).

The haystack created to replace the pastures lost due to the increase in cattle production also had an impact on the duration of pasture and winter pasture use. If we consider the substitutes created for hay production as winter pastures, it was inevitable that the periods spent in these areas were prolonged (by almost 3 months) and the range chosen for pasture was shortened, leading to a shortening in the periods spent there (Martin 80-83). The transhumants started to breed cattle with short-distance migrations due to the change in the duration of pasture and wintering, but in winter

they had to create different routes in order to find suitable pastures for cattle grazing, and depending on the harshness of the winter, they could migrate to more southern regions and Kyzylkum in the same season (Kartaeva 110-111). Reducing the weight of camels in the herd composition or removing them altogether with shorter migratory activities created differences not only in terms of migration distances but also in terms of trade for the nomads. The removal of camels from the equation led to the transformation of caravan-type trade in the steppe, bringing markets close to centers or seasonal fairs to the fore. In a relative situation, more cattle were produced for the Russian markets, and the abandonment of ancient traditions was effective in the transformation of animal husbandry into a direct market-oriented product breeding. This dependency and the new market often enabled the nomads who turned to cattle breeding to sell their livestock before winter came and to overcome the difficult conditions of the winter months more easily. The distinctive features of the steppe brought cattle breeding to a tremendous level, and in 1908, 400,000 head of cattle and more than 6,000 tons of meat were exported from Semirechye and parts of the Sir-Derya to European Russia (Demko 186).

The restriction of migration following the enactment of statutes, along with the rise in cattle numbers –particularly in the northern regions of the steppe– does not appear to have been a unilateral decision by the nomads. Although the addition of cattle to herds partially eliminated the need for migratory mobility during the cold winter months, it increased the amount of fodder needed. According to Olcott, the right to private ownership of cultivated land introduced by the Steppe Statute and the intense demand for cattle generated by Russian markets were not coincidental. The Tsardom introduced these statutes in order to restrict long-distance migratory mobility and to allow households to keep more livestock, thus making cattle-raising nomads more dependent on Russian markets and increasing the amount of pasture land that settlers could seize. In this respect, it is possible to say that the privately owned cultivated lands permitted by the law were the haystacks created by the nomadic activities in order to feed their cattle. Therefore, although cattle breeding entered the steppe out of necessity, it became a capital product of the Russian markets and damaged the balance of herd ownership among the nomads. While the number of herds in the steppe enhanced day by day, the number of people owning

herds diminished, in a way, it started the process of monopolization of herd density around the *bai*, internal conflicts due to disputes and livelihood imbalance (Olcott, *The Kazakhs* 99). This is in line with Salzman's argument that when nomads were not egalitarian in their organization, conflict arose, often directly linked to interaction with neighboring states (Salzman 29).


The transformation of herd components by nomadic pastoralist and the addition of marketed species such as cattle naturally led to differences in the size of herds. In nomadic husbandry, the size of herds has been directly related not only to the number of animal but also to many other factors. As Khazanov ("The Size of Herds") points out, while the lowest limit of herds is 'subsistence', the upper limit may vary with ecological factors related to the environment, the type of animals, annual weather conditions, seasonal changes, gender and age composition of herds. In this respect, the size of herds transformed under the impact of Russian colonialism has been rearranged as the use of pasture land has changed and issues such as hay production have entered the equation. On a family rather than large scale, İogann Gotlib Georgy (1729-1802) estimated that in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, a fairly well-off Kazakh family had a herd of 30-50 horses, 100 sheep, 15-25 head of cattle, 20-25 goats and a few camels (Georgy 125). By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, a family in the northern regions, such as Akmolinsk, was reported to be able to survive on 5 horses, 10 rams-sheep and 6 cattle (Slotvsov 23-24). Leaving aside the period in which the data was collected and whether they were able to meet the minimum size required for sustainability, it can be observed that *yurts*, especially in the northern region, have shrunk at the family level and even become significantly poorer. In addition to this, the decrease in diversity also shows how densely populated the northern regions have become with nomads who used to be located as far away from each other as possible in pasture areas.

Following the arrival of Russian colonialism in the steppe, herds transformed under the impact of restricted migration activities had an effect not only on the types of livestock but also on the amount of livestock owned and their number per family. In this respect, cattle breeding, which became a capital product, increased the number of animals available on the steppe more than ever before at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, whereas the number of grazing animals declined in inverse proportion. While the increase in the

amount of livestock herds gathered around the bai, the ability to migrate long distances with shrinking of the yurts and the decrease in the number of livestock revealed the ability to migrate as a sign of existence. The fact that the nomads, who divided people and herds to the land rather than land, were squeezed into much more limited areas due to administrative boundary arrangements, and that the yurts were located at closer distances to each other with fewer herd animals, created problems that caused hardship for animal husbandry. As herds were transformed due to migration constraints, the introduction of black sheep breeds and horse breeds, especially Orlov Trotter, brought by settlers from European Russia to the north of the steppe brought new problems such as the hybridization of sheep and horse breeds that had been breeding in the steppe for centuries. In addition, the limitation of nomadism and the intensification of agriculture in the region did not have a negative impact on its own. Developments such as the expansion of agriculture and fodder production facilitated large-scale cattle breeding, enabling livestock production on a scale unattainable through traditional pasture grazing. In the central and southern regions, sheep and goats maintained their importance in herds. Cattle breeding was able to keep the impact of settlers away from the southern regions, as the trade link on which small cattle breeding depended was much closer to markets including Bukhara and Khiva, and easier to reach. In the long term, however, agricultural areas were expanded not only on grassland but also through forested areas. The destruction of forests, which would have prevented the desert heat or sand winds from the south of the steppe, negatively affected both the remaining pastures and the newly cultivated areas (Kunhenn).

### **Colonial Trade and Its Impact on Socioeconomic Structure**

In the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century, the Russian colonization of the Kazakh steppe and the arrival of settlers led to significant changes in nomadism. In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, the fertile areas in the north, especially in the Akmolinsk region, where the settlers occupied and concentrated, became a completely fertile area. Destroyed by the impact of the introduced statutes, nomadism also showed its socio-cultural and socio-economic effects intensively and rapidly upon the entry of colonial trade.



**Map 2.** Colonizers Areas where settlers spread in the Kazakh Steppe until 1905 (Demko)

Prior to the colonial regime, trade between the Tsardom and the Kazakh Steppes was characterized by a very limited trade in precious metals, grain and, in turn, a limited trade in livestock. At the peak of Russian expansionism in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, however, the changing commercial structure turned the steppe into a transit point for products to be transported to the depths of Asia, Iran and finally to the Chinese market (Noda 215-216). Nonetheless, the traditional trade routes established on the steppe during this period were carried out through caravan trade, and the transportation of goods to the Caspian via the Idyll River, Bukhara or further east via the steppe could take two to three months and was quite costly (Olcott, *The Kazakhs* 59). The caravan trade, which became more troublesome for the nomads under the new administrative structure, and the disposal of camels in the northern regions also imposed serious burdens on the time and cost ratios in trade. Moreover, the seasonal cycle of the existing caravan trade networks created difficulties in terms of trade fluidity.

Rapid measures were taken to overcome the difficulties of the caravan trade and the obstacles that the colonial regime itself had imposed on the steppe. Besides the settler farmers, the workshops established by Russian merchants who realized the potential of the steppe and came from European Russia to cities such as Orenburg, Orsk, Ural and Semipalatinsk had the greatest impact

on social transformation. These workshops enabled the immediate production of metal products to be sold to the Kazakhs, as well as the processing and rapid transfer of valuable skins from the steppe to European Russia (Campbell 84). The other longer-term investment was the Trans-Siberian and Orenburg-Tashkent Railroad projects, which would cement Russian dominance in both the steppe and Turkestan. The completion of railroad construction completely removed traditional methods from the mainstream trade routes. It is interesting to note that despite the development of all means of production and transportation, the commercial volume of meat, wool, leather, goat hair, and other products imported from the steppe to European Russia from 1858 to 1862 was almost three times that of raw cotton imported from Bukhara and Khiva (Morrison, *The Russian* 17). Although the amount of cotton imported after 1863 tripled and its value increased tenfold, as Morrison emphasizes, this was not enough for anyone to argue that the steppe was occupied for livestock (Morrison, *The Russian* 19). Nevertheless, Russia's colonial benefits from the steppe can be traced in a wide variety of ways, from leather production to the contribution of the plant diversity collected in the region to the Russian chemical industry (Penati 2023). In this regard, it is an important indicator that the Tsardom, after accessing Bukhara and Khiva cotton, encouraged cattle production in the north of the steppe and parceled out certain areas of exploitation that would continue in the USSR period.

As the Russian colonial trade continued to advance across the steppe, the nomads who lost their pasture lands or whose migration routes were restricted tried to compensate for this situation with partial agriculture, hunting, fishing and trade expansion. However, it should be noted that agricultural activities were widespread among the impoverished Kazakh in the auls, and agriculture was practiced on the banks of rivers or lakes, but not on their own land. As Levshin (380) points out, these agricultural activities did not mean the transition to sedentation, but it should not be forgotten that the preference for crops that yielded results in a short time, such as millet, allowed them the use traditional methods such as taking as much of these crops as they needed and burying the rest in the ground when they migrated in terms of practicality. The innovations brought by the colonial regime, or in other words, the difficulties for the nomads, new production systems, administration and consequent transformation with destruction, had a profound impact on the nomadic family and clan

structure. According to recent studies analyzing the destruction from a socioeconomic perspective, this transformation is thought to have taken place in a very short period of 10-12 years, and the rapid change had irreversible consequences on the social structure (Guirkinger and Aldashev). With the arrival of settlers on the steppe, increased competition for resources individualized property rights among nomadic families and clans, reduced communal grazing areas, introduced communal measures for extended families, and expanded the use of individual land and labor among nuclear families (Aldashev and Guirkinger 413). Thus, Russian colonialism's rapid introduction of labor and labor force into the steppe led to the development of wage-labor relations, both among Kazakhs who abandoned traditional nomadism in the workshops of the northern regions and among nomads themselves. According to Aldashev and Guirkinger (2017), this change in labor and labor force was directly related to the population pressure created by the settlers and the agricultural technology they brought with them. The introduction of tools such as hay making, rain irrigation, iron ploughs and harrows into agriculture, together with increasing population pressure and technological intensification, made the private property regime more attractive to nomads, and thus the exploitation of land resources in the new order brought by the colonial regime triggered individualization at the family level with its private-social returns (Aldashev and Guirkinger 415).

The transformation brought to the steppe by agriculture and trade shortened the migration distances of the nomads, which had been restricted by statutes, due to dependence on trade. In combination with the individualization of labor and workforce and the shrinkage of auls brought about by increasing competition in land and water use, the socio-economic status of the nomads, who had once pursued a common purpose and life at a certain level, was profoundly disrupted. While the richer nomads were able to engage in the cattle trade centered on haystacks and fodder, those who endeavored to carry on with small ruminant farming tried to continue their migration activities over shorter distances and with more limited resources. Therefore, in addition to the pasturelands lost to settler occupation by pastoralist nomads who could not integrate into the Russian trade, the settler occupation created the difficult task of finding new pastures against the жҰТ/Juts, a drought in the steppe that annually caused the loss of more than 100,000 animals per year (Olcott, "The Settlement" 19). Thus, the

nomads struggling with Russian colonization gradually lost their influence and herds, while nomads more dependent on Russian trade and could only afford to keep growing herds were able to prosper. Between 1902 and 1913, the population of the downsized and struggling nomads decreased by 8-9%, their herds were lost, and they were forced to wait in line in front of the Resettlement Administration for a handful of lands that had once been theirs in smaller auls (20).

The migration restricted by the regulations, hand in hand with the development of trade, reduced the migration needs of the nomads in the northern regions considerably, and the new market dependencies and the fabrication of the products required for animal husbandry and the implementation of market relations caused the animal husbandry, which was carried out for subsistence, to be fulfilled the concern of producing a capital product in the steppe. The issues of family and clan unity that have emerged from the traditional pastoral nomadism since ancient times have been destroyed by individualization and the struggle to capture limited resources through the market. As the development of colonial trade unlocked socioeconomic transformation, market-oriented Russian currency-based cash-based exchange and complex market instruments such as taxation became part of nomadic life. This was part of the forced capitalist transformation of society, which aimed to impoverish a large part of the population, while simultaneously dispossessing/settling one part of the population. The imposition of new administrative systems, tax regimes and land ownership models weakened the authority of traditional clan administrations, thus eroding autonomous structures and power dynamics, starting with family and auls (Kindler 30). Deprived of their traditional means of production, the nomads were deprived of their traditional knowledge and cultural practices as they integrated into the Russian economy. The loss traditional production disrupted the subsistence system and led to a socioeconomic transformation from self-sufficiency to wage labor and dependence on Russian markets.

## **Conclusion**

The Kazakh steppe, which has been home to the pastoral nomadism for centuries, underwent an intense process of interaction and transformation in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries with the Russian colonization and settlement of settlers on the steppe. This destructive transformation led to the restriction



of the traditional migratory activities of the nomads, the transformation of animal herds, the diversification of trade, and both socioeconomic and socio-cultural differentiation. Until the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, the relationship between the Tsardom and the steppe was one of containment, defense against raids from the steppe and various commercial ventures rather than controlling the region. However, the Russian Empire, which changed her approach after 1830 and aimed to conquer the steppe in a colonialist scheme, intended to neutralize the region and create a colony based on her own descendants. This triggered an influx of settlers into the Kazakh steppe that lasted until around 1964, creating a struggle between sedentary and nomadic life.

After the fall of the Kazakh Juzes one by one, new statutes and administrative regulations were introduced to bring a colonial order in the steppe. While the statutes divided the steppe into Russian-type administrative divisions, settlers and nomads were squeezed into certain areas with new borders within the same administrative divisions. The Tsardom, gaining new lands and new neighbors as she moved deeper into Asia, signed the Ili Region Treaty with the Qing Dynasty in order to determine her external borders while determining her internal borders with new statutes, causing the connection of today's East Turkestan with the Kazakh steppe to be disrupted. The border restrictions imposed by statutes and international agreements limited most of the migration activities in the north-south direction from the Sir-Derya to the Caspian, from Mangustau to Ustyurt, from Elek to Sarusu and narrowed the migration distance considerably. The establishment of the Sino-Russian border also eliminated the permeability between the Irtysh, Emin and Ili valleys, which represented the ancient migration routes of the nomads over much longer distances.

The restriction of migratory activities led to changes in the size and composition of herds, especially in the northern regions, where nomads interacted more frequently with settlers. Unable to migrate over long distances, nomads have been seen to abandon their traditional habits such as camel breeding with the reemergence of long-distance migrations and the inclusion of species such as cattle, which can be migrated over shorter distances and which can also be transferred to the Russian market. Although the addition of cattle to the herds made the nomads more dependent on the Russian market within the framework of the feed-straw connection to

the settler agriculturalists, it caused a significant increase in the number of animals on the steppe, but significantly reduced the number of free grazing animals. Cattle breeding, becoming a market commodity rather than a struggle for subsistence, was concentrated on the *bai*, impoverishing families in small auls who had to divide more limited land. In addition, the introduction of black sheep breeds and horse breeds such as the Orlov Trotter, brought by settlers from European Russia, created problems such as the hybridization of centuries-old breeds of sheep and horses.

The nomadic way of life, which complements the rules that follow each other in a sequence and order starting from daily work to seasonal activities, has lost the pastures where it roamed freely under the influence of Russian colonialism and has been dragged into the struggle for land and water use by being squeezed into oblasts and uyezds where people are divided into land. This struggle has seriously disrupted both socioeconomic and socio-cultural balance. Increased competition for resource using individualized property rights among the nomads, narrowed common grazing areas, and expanded the use of individual land and labor. The transition from the traditional struggle for subsistence to the process of capital production and labor has also led to the destruction of the concepts of family and clan unity that the nomadic way of life had shaped over centuries. As the development of colonial trade unlocked socioeconomic transformation, the use of Russian currency, new forms of taxation and complex capital market instruments became part of everyday life. The new order brought by the colonial regime weakened clan administrations through the way taxes were collected and the authority with which they were transmitted, while issues such as land ownership eroded the autonomous structures of the steppe, starting with the family. Deprived of their traditional means of production, the nomads moved away from their ancient knowledge and cultural practices as they became more integrated into Russian colonialism, disrupting the lost traditional production subsistence system and accelerating socioeconomic transformation in favor of Russian rule by replacing it with wage labor and dependence on the Russian market. Therefore, Russian colonialism in the Kazakh steppe in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries resulted in the transformation of the steppe in accordance with the interests of the Russian administration, thus creating an important example of settler colonialism and causing the transformation of nomadic life at the level of destruction.

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## Conflict of Interest Statement

There is no conflict of interest with any institution or person within the scope of this study.

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Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

# Geopolitical Analysis of the Shusha Declaration: Constructing Theoretical Framework in the Regional Order Context\*

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**Kenan Aslanlı\*\*\***

## Abstract

Comprehensive relations between Türkiye and Azerbaijan, characterized by the “one nation, two states” discourse, have not only an emotional but also a rational dimension. The Shusha Declaration upgraded bilateral relations to the level of a political and military alliance on cemented rational basis. In addition to advancing of bilateral relations, the Shusha Declaration also contributed to building a new regional order in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the entire Turkic World, legally and politically. The article attempts to construct a theoretical framework to examine the contribution of the Shusha Declaration on the regional order-building process in the context of regional power dynamics, common identity and ideology, exigent internal and external threats, domestic political transformation, political leadership, and tangible regional cooperation initiatives such as Zangezur Corridor.

## Keywords

The Shusha Declaration, Türkiye-Azerbaijan relations, regional order, Turkic World, Zangezur Corridor.

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# Şuşa Deklarasyonu'nun Jeopolitik Analizi: Bölgesel Düzen Bağlamında Teorik Çerçeve Oluşturulması Girişimi\*

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Kenan Aslanlı\*\*\*

## Öz

Türkiye ve Azerbaycan arasında “tek millet, iki devlet” söylemiyle karakterize edilen kapsamlı ilişkilerin sadece duygusal değil, aynı zamanda rasyonel boyutu da vardır. Şuşa Deklarasyonu, ikili ilişkileri sağlamlaştırılmış rasyonel temeller üzerinde siyasi ve askerî bir ittifak seviyesine yükseltmiştir. İkili ilişkilerin geliştirilmesinin yanı sıra Şuşa Deklarasyonu, Kafkasya, Orta Asya ve tüm Türk Dünyası'nda hukuki ve siyasi açıdan yeni bir bölgesel düzenin inşasına da katkıda bulunmuştur. Makale, Şuşa Deklarasyonu'nun bölgesel düzen inşası sürecine katkısını bölgesel güç dinamikleri, ortak kimlik ve ideoloji, ivedi iç ve dış tehditler, iç siyasi dönüşüm, siyasi liderlik ve Zengezur Koridoru gibi somut bölgesel iş birliği girişimleri bağlamında incelemek için teorik bir çerçeve oluşturmaya çalışmaktadır.

## Anahtar Kavramlar

Şuşa Deklarasyonu, Türkiye-Azerbaycan İlişkileri, bölgesel düzen, Türk Dünyası, Zengezur Koridoru.

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## Introduction

“The Shusha Declaration on Allied Relations between the Republic of Türkiye and the Republic of Azerbaijan” (The Shusha Declaration) was signed in the newly liberated Karabakh’s cultural and historical center, Shusha, on June 15, 2021, between the Presidents of Türkiye and Azerbaijan, as an international agreement based on mutual consent. The purpose of the Declaration is to consolidate and specify the political, legal, military, security, and economic mechanisms of establishing alliance relations between Türkiye and Azerbaijan, which was defined as friendship in 1994, and strategic partnership in 2010, based on the two countries’ state sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. The Shusha Declaration has not only an identity-based emotional basis but also a rational and pragmatic framework. These rational, pragmatic, and even normative foundations streamline the attempts of Türkiye and Azerbaijan to establish a regional order in the Caucasus and Central Asia regions.

Türkiye’s grand strategy goal toward getting geostrategic, geopolitical, geocultural and geoeconomic access to Central Asia’s Turkic Republics and Azerbaijan’s vital necessity to obtain a security guarantee from Türkiye against Russia and Iran formed the basis for the Shusha Declaration from a security standpoint that upgraded the bilateral cooperation to the strategic alliance level. The Second Karabakh War in 2020 was a consequential accelerator of the signing of the Shusha Declaration that significantly scratched out the existing and limited roughness in the mutual trust environment between Türkiye and Azerbaijan. The Shusha Declaration implicitly invites the other Turkic states to have identical deep cooperation between Türkiye and Azerbaijan. The convergence of bilateral relations at the level of the strategic alliance set an institutional and legal model for the Turkic World. In addition, The Shusha Declaration constructed a new historical, legal, and geopolitical reality for the region’s countries, including Russia, Iran, Armenia, and even Georgia.

The article begins with the determination of the integral theoretical framework of the Shusha Declaration based on the existing literature on regionalization. After that, the possible effects of the Shusha Declaration on (a) bilateral alliance relations between Türkiye and Azerbaijan, (b) perennial stability in the Caucasus region, (c) cooperation and integration attempts

in the Turkic World, and finally, (d) the realization of regional strategic connectivity initiatives such as the Zangezur Corridor were thoroughly discussed in the article. The article considers the Shusha Declaration as a legal and institutional mechanism that characterizes the new regional order through joint decision-making devices and *omnibus* integration endeavors in a recent environment of geopolitical fragmentation and disorder in Eurasia.

### **Theoretical Framework for the Shusha Declaration**

The Shusha Declaration was signed on June 15, 2021, and entered into force after being approved in accordance with the domestic law of both states. On February 1, 2022, the Azerbaijani National Assembly (Millî Meclis) approved the Shusha Declaration on the alliance relations between the Republic of Türkiye and the Republic of Azerbaijan in the general assembly (E-qanun.az. No. 478-VIQ), and the Shusha Declaration entered into force according to the Azerbaijani legal system. In the Turkish constitutional system, for an international agreement to become binding, it must first be approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi) with a law and then approved by the decision of the President. The Shusha Declaration was approved by Law No. 7355, which was accepted by the majority vote in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on February 3, 2022, and entered into force by being published in the Official Gazette dated February 14, 2022 (*Resmî Gazete* No. 31750). Therefore, the Declaration has become a binding document for both countries.

With the Shusha Declaration, Türkiye and Azerbaijan are forming a political, economic, and military alliance, which serves the two countries' national interests and security, stability, and prosperity in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The Declaration addresses military, security, defense industry, diplomacy, economy, trade, energy, transport, counter-terrorism, cybercrime, culture, and humanitarian issues from a multidimensional perspective, and it states that the relationship between the parties should be deepened and integrated into a multidimensional and multi-layered manner. The Declaration also *greening seed* for the broader regional conformity and convergence among Turkic Republics. Çelik and Aslanlı emphasized that the Shusha Declaration presented a road map of cooperation and integration in the Turkic World to determine the geopolitical architecture of the region (38).

The main reason for the process that led Türkiye and Azerbaijan to sign the Shusha Declaration was to guarantee the success and gains achieved by Azerbaijan after the Second Karabakh War in 2020, which ended with Azerbaijan's victory. However, from a broader perspective, the crisis of the global system in the last decade, the challenge to the neo-liberal order, the insecurity caused by non-state actors, the increase in conventional conflicts at the regional level, and the nuclear threat, which became more closely with the war in Ukraine, have led two states to more optional and effective regional cooperation structures and alliances (Çelik and Aslanlı 38). Therefore, the Shusha Declaration is more than a diplomatic document aimed at raising Türkiye-Azerbaijan relations to the level of an alliance; it is the founding document of the two countries' attempt to create a regional order.

There are rational and normative foundations for Türkiye's and Azerbaijan's attempts to create a regional order. The order has been analyzed differently in the mainstream theories of international relations. Liberals argue that order is achieved through interdependence, international organizations, and global governance. On the other hand, constructivists have emphasized ideas, norms, and ideologies and believe that order is attained through legitimate shared ideas on a global scale. According to realists, order is achieved through the balance of power based on political, military, and economic capacities. In *World Order*, Kissinger argues that regional orders, like global orders, can be built on mutual power sharing and fair practices (Kissinger, *World* 9). Kissinger also emphasizes that the quest for regional order within regionalism, regional subsystems, and reciprocity is more suited to regional dynamics and more effective in resolving regional crises. There is a similar dynamic in the alliance relationship that the Shusha Declaration seeks to establish.

The structure of the international system has shaped the search for regional order. During the Cold War, Karl Deutsch's concept of the *security community* came to the fore in the search for a security-based order. According to Deutsch, mutual communication and interaction would build trust between states and create a sense of *togetherness*. Acting with this awareness and wishing to establish a regional order, states would voluntarily choose to form either an amalgamated security community or a pluralistic security community. Deutsch argued that to create a security community,

whether amalgamated or pluralistic, it is essential that there would be harmony between the parties in terms of trade and transportation, constant communication, a perception of common interests and security, and a sense of unshakable loyalty (Deutsch et al. 154-159).


During the *détente* of the Cold War, Barry Buzan conceptualized the *regional security complex*. According to Buzan, states' national security concerns cannot be considered apart from their adjacent regional security complexes (Buzan, *People* 105-106). The arrangements of the states and the differentiation amongst them, the patterns of amity and enmity, and the distribution of power among the states shape the content of the regional security complex (Buzan, "Regional security" 143). With the changes in the post-Cold War global system, Buzan, together with Waever, updated the regional security complex approach with social constructivism, arguing that the mutually indistinguishable level of national and regional securitization, desecuritization and both processes internalized by states, rather than concrete threat perceptions, would be the primary motive (Buzan and Waever 44).

Amitav Acharya has developed a more recent approach to establishing order in the last decade's global disorder era, power transition process and the neoliberal system crisis. Continuing Buzan and Waever's social constructivist approach to regionalism, Acharya analyses regions as socially and politically constructed environments rather than territorial boundaries (Acharya, *Constructing* 80). According to Acharya, regional cooperation encourages states to create a platform to address common challenges, achieve common goals, and express a common identity. The regional cooperation and organizations thus created play an essential role in solving regional challenges, managing conflicts and crises, and enhancing cooperation. He notes that regional cooperation built on these foundations will build the global order in the *multiplex world* through their participation in global governance (Acharya, *The End* 82).

In addition, Karns and Mingst specify five political factors that drive regionalism (148-152): Power dynamics, identity and ideology, internal and external threats, domestic politics, and leadership. As a result of these approaches, which have evolved in response to changes and transformations in international politics, it is also possible to create a new theoretical

framework by considering bilateral relations and regional and global dynamics in defining the alliance that the Shusha Declaration seeks to establish.

In the theoretical framework part of this article, the aim is not to explain the Shusha Declaration with one single regionalization theory solitarily. None of the existing theories can explain this phenomenon on its own. While making the political analysis of the Shusha Declaration, the solution proposals presented by the current theoretical discussions and debates were combined in a *melting pot*. This article combined the known parameters of theoretical discussions on regionalization trends and emerged with a 6-parameter theoretical framework (Scheme 1).



**Scheme 1.** Six dimensions of regional integration in the Turkic World from the lens of the Shusha Declaration (The general framework of the scheme was modified from Karns and Mingst 148-152)

(a) *Power dynamics.* Theoretically, power dynamics can be realized by regional power centers or larger sides on economic, political, diplomatic, and military weight in asymmetrical regional arrangements. If we approach the Shusha Declaration as a forefoot for the greater regionalism in the Turkic World stretching from the Balkans and Central Europe (e.g., Hungary) to Central Asia via Anatolia and the South Caucasus, then we could emphasize that Türkiye drives regional integration in this geopolitical axis. Paradigmatic changes materialized in Turkish foreign policy toward proactivity and initiative in the regional geopolitical order and global affairs with revisionist challengers of the emerging global order system such as Russia and China. Asia Anew Initiative was proclaimed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye as an indication of the new era in the relations with emerging Asian powers. These principal changes intensified Türkiye's strategic communication and long-term alliance-building efforts with Azerbaijan and other Turkic Republics. All these developments take place sensitively in some problematic domains and realms between Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and other Turkic Republics arising from historical identity and current political reasons.

(b) *Identity and ideology.* Karns and Mingst (148-152) define regional identity from the constructive perspective as a shared perception of being part of a definable region. Domestic constituents such as culture and religion or external determinants such as joint security or economic menaces could form shared perceptions and common identities. Grevi underlines that region-level identities and historical values shape regional orders in heterogeneous global systems (30-38). Regional and bilateral economic cooperation and communications can contribute to the shared identity. Acharya points out that regional identities can be reinterpreted from the social construction standpoint, changing the regional position of various countries (Acharya, "The Emerging" 650-651). Potentially, ideologies that can upgrade bilateral relations to regional integration scope could be cooperation-based neo-liberal ideologies, anticolonial attitudes of post-Soviet area's Turkic states against post-imperial Russia, and growing interest toward ethnic identity in the region.

Shared Turkic identity was outstandingly strengthened among Turkic Republics, including Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Central Asian Republics after

1991, by the growing social interactions, economic cooperation, official and non-official communications, and common threats such as terrorism, separatism, and global powers' expansionist and sometimes destructive behavior. Turkic identity evolved from the people-level distinguishing element to the founding ideology of the nation-building and state-building process. Identity-based bilateral and regional integration efforts caused the emergence of a variety of interstate legal documents, including the Shusha Declaration and regional organizations, such as the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and its affiliated institutions and initiatives.

(c) *Internal and external threats.* Actual external-internal threats or valid menace perceptions could trigger a regional integration process based on a bilateral intense cooperative relationship through the constructivist joint identity-building process or realist balance-of-power strategy. Not only direct military threats, ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and terrorism but also economic difficulties, migration inflows, environmental challenges, natural disasters, pandemics, and noxious humanitarian catastrophes could precipitate regional integration that is rooted in bilateral affairs and shared interests. Internal and external threats and relevant security perceptions played a crucial role in the appearance of the Shusha Declaration and the intensification of the Turkic World's rapprochement. The long-lasting Karabakh issue and Armenia's direct military occupation of Azerbaijan's internationally recognized territories created immense regional security risks and common threats to the joint economic, energy, transport, and infrastructure projects of Türkiye and Azerbaijan (See also. Şen). Also, the aggressive position of Iran toward Azerbaijan and Russia's covert support to the illegal Armenian armed forces in the region after the Second Karabakh War intensified the emergence of the comprehensive military-alliance agreement in the example of the Shusha Declaration in 2021 between Türkiye and Azerbaijan.

(d) *Domestic politics.* Karns and Mingst emphasize the importance of similar state structures and regime types in the subjects of the regional integration process (148-152). Türkiye's transformation from a parliamentary to a presidential system in 2017 (*Resmî Gazete* No. 29976) adducted the state to the deep-seated state structure of Azerbaijan and other Turkic Republics where the presidency institute is very powerful. The structure of regional

political, military, and economic order is influenced by the characteristics of domestic political alliances and their approaches toward other states in the region. Conservative and nationalist domestic political alliance or coalition between the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) that emerged after the July 15 coup attempt in 2016 led to more attention to the Turkic World dimension in Turkish foreign policy.

The actors of the Azerbaijani political system and the political parties in the parliament have consistently taken a stand in favor of deepening cooperation with Türkiye. In particular, the Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance and Joint Declaration on the Establishment of a High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council between Azerbaijan and Türkiye signed in 2010, right after overcoming the “flag crisis” between the two countries in 2009 (“Eurasianet”), scaled up bilateral relations to the next level. The social support in Azerbaijani society for the partnership with Türkiye has traditionally been above 90% (“Caucasus Barometer”).

(e) *Leadership*. Purposeful policy preferences and strong characteristic features of political leaders and heads of state advance regional integration based on the developed bilateral ties. Kissinger (*Leadership*) highlighted the importance of transformational and strategic leadership for the crises and transition periods of the states, regions, and even international order. Leadership is one of the main driving factors of contemporary national, regional, and global politics. The political leadership styles of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Ilham Aliyev, their long-lasting personal friendship relations, and their all-encompassing awareness of regional and global developments intensified bilateral ties and the emergence of new regional order settings in the Caucasus.

(f) *Cooperation*. Despite the overemphasis on the role of nation-states, comprehensive cooperation, and integration were perceived as the cornerstone for any regionalization tendency (Börzel 41-63). The cooperation dimension of regional integration covers regionalism’s economic and political economy drivers, such as interdependence, the need for foreign trade and investment, and economic globalization. Regional cooperation and interdependence can potentially avert deeper fragmentation and instability in the polycentric global order (Grevi 30-38). In addition to stability and security factors



based on common external threats and conjunctural conditions, economic cooperation is also the founding principle of any regionalism. Export-oriented economic sectors in Türkiye and their political influence on official policy-making and decision-making processes contributed to the growing cooperation and integration with Azerbaijan and Central Asia. The need to raise the ongoing economic cooperation to a new level, especially in terms of transport corridors, including the Zangezur Corridor and joint energy infrastructure projects, necessitated the elimination of the Karabakh conflict as a common security threat and blocking barrier. In this sense, the security dimension of bilateral affairs has been a factor that deeply triggered comprehensive economic cooperation. The Shusha Declaration expressed its determination to improve bilateral and regional economic, energy, transportation, and social cooperation.

The Shusha Declaration envisaged the establishment of mechanisms for realizing the free movement of goods and diversification of exports in June 2021. In April 2023, Türkiye and Azerbaijan signed the protocol to expand the scope of the Preferential Trade Agreement (*Resmî Gazete* No. 31369), signed in February 2020 after long and compelling negotiations, to reach the 15-billion-dollar trade volume target set by the presidents of both states (Ministry of Trade). So, a *spiral-shaped pattern* exists between the Shusha Declaration and the economic cooperation disposition between Türkiye and Azerbaijan. Also, the Shusha Declaration proposes joint and effective decision-making mechanisms for the economy and security realm. Finally, the Shusha Declaration is an attempt to bring order to the regional disorder.

### **Türkiye-Azerbaijan Bilateral Relations and The Shusha Declaration**

Except for a few crises, relations between the two countries have generally progressed in close cooperation in line with the *one nation, two states* discourse during the last three decades. It is not enough to explain bilateral relations only with moral values. Türkiye and Azerbaijan are rational actors seeking maximum benefit in their national and mutual interests. Rational factors such as the territorial integrity of the countries, the common attitude towards the powers in the region such as Iran and Russia, energy and transportation transit lines in the East-West axis, the stability and security in the South Caucasus, and the cooperation and integration in the Turkic World guide the bilateral relations. Structural changes in the international

system and Türkiye's active and entrepreneurial foreign policy in the last two decades are effective in this disposition. Today, Türkiye and Azerbaijan act together in regional and global politics within the strategic partnership framework in diplomatic, military, and economic relations.

The Shusha Declaration aims to raise the relations to the level of *alliance*, which was defined as *friendship* in 1994 (*Resmî Gazete* No. 22059), *strategic cooperation* in 1997 (E-qanun.az. No. 368-IQ) and *strategic partnership* in 2010 (*Resmî Gazete* No. 27889). The Shusha Declaration (*Resmî Gazete* No. 31787) aims to deepen the cooperation between two countries in various domains, such as politics, economy, defence, security, culture, humanitarian issues, health, education, social, youth, and sports (par. 5 and 45)<sup>1</sup>; diversification of exports, evaluation of joint production opportunities (par. 28); operation of the East-West/Central international transport corridor (par. 30); a partnership in diaspora activities (par. 35 and 36); communication (par. 38); a partnership in the protection of historical and cultural heritage (par. 40); mutual convenience in matters of travel and residence (par. 44).

Although the Shusha Declaration aims to deepen cooperation in all areas, the security, defence, and military fields stand out. Paragraph 20 of the Declaration clearly emphasizes the will for an alliance like Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO):

If, in the opinion of one of the parties, there is a threat or an act of aggression from a third state or states against their independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, the inviolability or security of their internationally recognized borders, *the parties will hold joint consultations* [such as “consultation among members” in Article 4 of NATO] and, in order to eliminate this threat or acts of aggression, *carry out initiatives* [such as “collective defence” in Article 5 of NATO] in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and provide each other with the necessary assistance in accordance with the UN Charter. After determining through urgent discussions, the volume and form of such possible assistance, a decision will be made to secure defence needs for the *adoption of joint measures, and coordinated activities* will be organized of power-wielding and administrative agencies of the Armed Forces.

The Declaration also stipulates the modernization of the armed forces of the two countries (par. 22), exchange of military personnel, coordination of defence industry institutions (par. 24); joint projects in the fields of sea, air, and space and cooperation in the defence industry (par. 25); and joint work in the field of cyber security (par. 27). Additionally, Paragraph 21 of the Declaration is important in terms of showing the depth of the strategic and allied dimension of the relationship between the two countries: “Regular joint meetings of the Security Councils of the Parties on national security issues shall be organized, during which national interests and regional and international security issues affecting the Parties’ interests shall be discussed”.

The security councils in this paragraph are the National Security Council of Türkiye and the Service of the Secretary of the Security Council of Azerbaijan. *Holding regular joint meetings and consultation on regional and global developments* between the two states’ Security Councils indicates a significant deepening in security and defence policies.

### **The Shusha Declaration’s Regional Implications and Stability Assurance in the Caucasus**

The Shusha Declaration has a solid regional dimension, especially considering the Caucasus region. In 2020-2021, Türkiye needed to make new moves to deepen the strategic dimension of its relations with Azerbaijan and gain permanent geopolitical status in the region by taking advantage of the historical momentum gained with Russia in the Caucasus (Çelik and Aslanlı 38). The Shusha Declaration emphasized that Türkiye and Azerbaijan “will continue their efforts to consolidate stability and security in the Caucasus region, restore all ties in the field of economy and transportation, as well as normalize relations between the states of the region and ensure long-term peace” (par. 14). The liberation of the Karabakh region from Armenian occupation by Azerbaijan with the comprehensive support of Türkiye was seen and presented in the Declaration as a step to ensure regional stability and security in the Caucasus. In his speech at the Azerbaijan National Assembly on June 16, 2021, President Erdoğan stated, “We must make the best use of the opportunities that come before us so that no one can put a chain of captivity on the Caucasus again” (“Kafkaslardaki barış ve huzur”). It means Türkiye’s vision encompasses the entire Caucasus region, including the North Caucasus which is part of Russia.

Military alliance or pact between Türkiye and Azerbaijan that was reinforced and further consolidated by the Shusha Declaration seeks to secure the South Caucasus region from possible external intervention, probably from Iran, Russia, or ambitious Western powers such as France. Therefore, the Shusha Declaration presents Türkiye's strategic partnership and shields against possible and viable Russian and Iranian interventions in Azerbaijan. While discussing the effects of the Shusha Declaration on the Caucasus region and wider Eurasia, it should be underlined that this document reflects the strategic and regional rivalry of Türkiye with Iran and Russia. Iranian officials insistently stated they would not be willing to *change the borders* in the South Caucasus after the Second Karabakh War, deploying military units on the state border and threatening Azerbaijan ("Iran does not accept").

Türkiye and Azerbaijan had the opportunity to give clear political messages to all regional actors, including Russia, Iran, and even global actors such as the USA and France on the Karabakh through a new strategic alliance document. That message was about the new regional security architecture and changing regional power dynamics. The document laid the groundwork for expanding the bilateral alliance to potential new members from the Turkic World and other countries such as Georgia that also needed trustworthy security guarantees. This new regional order that was designed around the Türkiye-Azerbaijan strategic military and political alliance started to unblock and unlock the potential of regional cooperation between South Caucasus republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), regional powers (Türkiye, Russia, Iran, and even Pakistan) and global powers (the USA, China, the EU, and even India).

The Karabakh conflict blocked regional economic cooperation in the Caucasus. It increased the vulnerability of the strategic energy and transportation infrastructure projects. The Shusha Declaration accentuates the strategic stature of the Southern Gas Corridor that supplies the natural gas of Azerbaijan to Europe through Türkiye, ensuring route diversification for energy supply. The Declaration also promises that Türkiye and Azerbaijan will continue contributing to regional and international energy security by exporting electricity (par. 29).

The Shusha Declaration underlines the political will of Türkiye and Azerbaijan to carry on with mutual efforts and cooperation to ensure smooth operations and functionality of the East-West (Middle) Transport Corridor through the Zangezur Corridor. It means the regional dimension of the Shusha Declaration covers not only the Caucasus but also the welfare and unity of Central Asia, the Caspian Sea basin, and the entire Turkic World. After signing the Shusha Declaration, the Presidents of Türkiye and Azerbaijan made a joint press statement about the 3+3 regional economic cooperation and stability platform covering the South Caucasus states and the three regional powers - Russia, Türkiye, and Iran (“Azərbaycan və Türkiyə prezidentləri mətbuatı”). The Shusha Declaration, which has the nature of an international treaty and takes the relations between the two states to a new level in all policy domains, also has a wider regional dimension in Eurasia.

### **The Shusha Declaration’s Repercussions on the Turkic World and Deepening the Cooperation**

The Shusha Declaration states that activities for the development of the Turkic World need to be supported (par. 9) and that national and international efforts need to be increased for this purpose (par. 41). The Declaration also addresses the promotion of the Turkish cultural heritage in the international arena (par. 42), strengthening solidarity in the Turkic World (par. 43). In order to strengthen solidarity in the Turkic World, it is suggested to employ regional organizations such as the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States (now OTS), the Turkic Academy, the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation, TURKSOY, and the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic Speaking States more actively.

The Shusha Declaration can become an institutional framework for Turkic states to cooperate politically, economically, and culturally. The fact that the areas of cooperation addressed in the Declaration are realizable, that the areas of cooperation are issues that occupy the agenda of each country and await a solution, and that the alliance relationship to be realized respects the sovereignty rights of the parties is quite effective in this. For the Turkic republics, which closely feel the political pressure of regional and global powers such as Russia, China, and India, mechanisms such as the Shusha Declaration, which provides sovereign equal relations, are desirable. While

the Shusha Declaration aims to raise Türkiye-Azerbaijan relations to the alliance level, it has content that protects the national interests and sovereign rights of both states (par. 18). The Shusha Declaration envisages that Türkiye and Azerbaijan can conduct an independent foreign policy to protect their national interests. The Declaration postulates that their positions on regional and international issues cannot fully overlap. Therefore, the alliance relationship sought to be established by the Shusha Declaration envisages an intergovernmental rather than a supra-governmental mechanism. As in the case of the Shusha Declaration, the Turkic States will increase the possibility of rapprochement with each other in different fields within the framework of the principles of independent foreign policy, sovereignty, sovereign equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and non-hierarchical cooperation (Çelik and Aslanlı 59).

There are also examples where the Shusha Declaration directly impacted cooperation in the Turkic World. The Shusha Declaration significantly impacted the OTS as the institutional representative of cooperation in the Turkic World (Purtaş 23-25). Only five months after the signing of the Shusha Declaration, the Eighth Summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States was held in Istanbul on November 12, 2021, and the name of the institutional structure was changed to the OTS. This name change is crucial in deepening cooperation in the Turkic World. Moreover, Turkmenistan attended the Summit at the presidential level and became an observer member. Thus, all Turkic republics gathered under an umbrella. The Summit Declaration bears the traces of the Shusha Declaration.

The Eighth Summit Declaration emphasized the need for close cooperation and common policies in the Turkic World in foreign policy, security, economy, education, culture, humanitarian issues, transport, energy, tourism, and many other fields. The decision to ensure the connection of the Zangezur Corridor within the scope of the International East-West (Central) Corridor and to support Azerbaijan in this regard which was envisaged in Article 40 of the Declaration has strategic importance. It demonstrates that the issues highlighted in the Shusha Declaration are on the agenda not only between the two countries but also by the member states and observers of the OTS.

The most concrete output of the Summit is the approval of the 2040 Vision Document of the Turkic World. The 2040 Vision Document includes the

medium-term goals of the Turkic World for 2040 and details the objectives in the Shusha Declaration under four main headings: political and security cooperation, economic and sectoral cooperation, international cooperation, and cooperation with third parties (“Türk Dünyası 2040 Vizyonu”).

Lastly, according to the Shusha Declaration, the Security Councils of Türkiye and Azerbaijan were to hold joint meetings on national security issues (par. 21). Thereupon, the two countries’ security councils signed a memorandum of cooperation in May 2022 (MGK Genel Sekreterliği). Only one month after this bilateral memorandum, on June 29 – July 1, 2022, the secretaries of the National Security Councils of the members of the OTS held a consultative meeting in Türkiye. As can be seen, some of the mechanisms established by the Shusha Declaration were also accepted and implemented by the OTS. In this respect, the Shusha Declaration is the first and most concrete attempt to show that the Turkic states can move from a strategic partnership to a level of alliance.

### **The Shusha Declaration as a Trigger of Regional Initiatives: Zangezur Corridor**

The Trilateral Statement signed in November 2020 ended the Second Karabakh War with the active mediation of Russia and the consent of Türkiye. Article No. 9 of the Trilateral Statement contemplated *the restoration of all economic and transport links in the region* (“İlham Əliyev xalqa müraciət”). Armenia guaranteed the safety of transport links between the western regions of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (NAR) to organize the unobstructed movement of citizens, vehicles, and cargo in both directions. The construction of new transport communications and transport links (which will be controlled by Russia) connecting the NAR and the western regions of Azerbaijan was ensured with the agreement. Azerbaijan (West) – Armenia – NAR (Azerbaijan) – Türkiye regional transport lines, which the 9<sup>th</sup> article of the tripartite declaration envisaged being opened, were later introduced to the public as the Zangezur Corridor.

At the informal summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States (now OTS) in March 2021, President Aliyev stated that *transportation, communication, and infrastructure projects passing via Zangezur will connect the entire Turkic World and will also create additional opportunities for other*

*countries, including Armenia* (“Türkdilli Dövlətlərin Əməkdaşlıq Şurasının videokonfrans”). In April 2021, President Aliyev stated that the Zangezur Corridor cannot be opened without the consent and participation of Türkiye (“İlham Əliyev ADA Universitetində”). In November 2022, in Samarkand Declaration of the 9<sup>th</sup> Summit of the Council of Heads of State and Government of the OTS, member states were committed to supporting the opening of the Zengezur Corridor as soon as possible, as a component of the Trans-Caspian East-West Middle Corridor (“Devlet ve Hükümet Başkanları Konseyi”).

The Shusha Declaration considered that *the opening of the Zangezur Corridor between the western regions of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan, which connects Türkiye and Azerbaijan, and the construction of the Nakhchivan-Kars railway as a continuation of that Corridor will make an important contribution to the intensification of transport and communication relations between the two countries* (par. 31). After the signing of the Shusha Declaration, Presidents of Türkiye and Azerbaijan made joint statements to the press where both leaders underlined the strategic importance of the Zangezur Corridor for both countries and the entire region (“Azərbaycan və Türkiyə prezidentləri mətbuatı”). On October 26, 2021, the presidents of Türkiye and Azerbaijan laid the foundation of the Horadiz-Jabrayil-Zengilan-Aghband local highway net that will be an integral part or contributing element of the Zangezur Corridor (“Azərbaycan və Türkiyə prezidentləri Horadiz”). Although the Shusha Declaration emphasizes the 40-kilometer length Zangezur Corridor as a bilateral communication route, it also has a regional dimension.

The Zangezur Corridor, as the new transportation artery of Eurasia, meets the interests of the EU, Russia, Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, as well as Eurasian powers such as China.

In the Turkic World 2040 Vision Document approved by the OTS, the “joint promotion of the Zangezur Corridor in various international economic platforms” was emphasized (Aslanlı). The Shusha Declaration cemented guarantees the realization of the Zangezur Corridor initiative against security risks and external threats stemming from Iran and non-regional actors.



From the Russian angle, the Zangezur Corridor is an international route that could potentially connect Russia and Türkiye with an uninterrupted land connection that consists of two branches – the railway and the highway. Iran does not want to lose its feature of being a transit country connecting other regions of Azerbaijan to NAR with the Zangezur Corridor. At the same time, Türkiye's direct land connection with the Central Asian states through the Zangezur Corridor and expanding its economic cooperation with the region contradicts Iran's national interests ("İran Zengezur Koridoruna"). In order to mitigate the Iranian harsh position on the Zangezur Corridor, Azerbaijan proposed an alternative route via Iran. In March 2022, a memorandum was signed between the governments of Azerbaijan and Iran on the new communication ties.

The Shusha Declaration and the interlinked Zangezur Corridor initiative are manifestations of the determined personal leadership in turbulent regional circumstances. The Zangezur Corridor initiative would serve as a key mission that would, in a way, remove the blockade of the entire Caucasus region and relieve the region in terms of transportation. Türkiye and Azerbaijan attempt to strengthen the position of the transit logistics hub of the region with multidimensional transportation systems and cooperative models. Zangezur Corridor will connect countries by railway and highway, which concerns the entire Eurasia region as an indicator of the regional dimension of the Shusha Declaration.

## **Conclusion**

The Shusha Declaration is the first document that defines the relations between Türkiye and Azerbaijan as an alliance, defined as friendship in 1994, strategic cooperation in 1997, and strategic partnership in 2010. The Declaration is also an attempt by Türkiye and Azerbaijan to establish a regional order in the nexus of cooperation and security. There are rational and normative foundations of this attempt. In this article, we have tried to draw a theoretical framework for the regional order that the Shusha Declaration will establish. We have designed a six-parameter approach to define the backdrop of the regional order devised by the Shusha Declaration.

This six-parameter theoretical framework included changing power dynamics envisaging Türkiye as a strenuous driver of regional integration;

growing Turkic identity and related political ideologies in Turkic Republics in the post-Cold War epoch; internal and external threats such as separatism, terrorism, and global hegemonic powers' behavior in the entire Eurasian region; domestic political dynamics and factors in Türkiye such as the AK Party-MHP coalition after 2015-2016, the transformation from a parliamentary to a presidential system in 2017, the increasing influence of domestic export-oriented groups on foreign policy, and in Azerbaijan such as generational changes and growing pro-Türkiye attitudes in political and social groups; result-oriented leadership styles and mutual trust of President Erdogan and President Aliyev; growing bilateral cooperation between Türkiye and Azerbaijan in transportation, investments, energy, trade, agriculture, and other economic realms.

In this article, we make a geopolitical analysis of the Shusha Declaration through bilateral relations, stability in the South Caucasus, cooperation and integration in the Turkic World, and the Zangezur Corridor.

The Shusha Declaration raised bilateral affairs from the level of strategic partners to the level of the political-military alliance. The Shusha Declaration includes many issues, including military, security, defense industry, counterterrorism, cybercrime, economy, investment, trade, energy, transport, culture, and humanitarian issues. It states that the Türkiye-Azerbaijan relationship should be deepened and integrated into a multidimensional and multi-layered manner.

The Shusha Declaration determined the political and military alliance, policy-level coordination, and action-level synchronization between Türkiye and Azerbaijan as a nucleus of the new regional order in the Caucasus that can be expanded to Central Asia. Political and military pressures on Azerbaijan from regional countries and outside of the region were balanced by Türkiye in 2020-2023. The anti-terror operations carried out by the Azerbaijani Army in Karabakh on September 19-20, 2023, and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan have made the Shusha Declaration a fully functional document in terms of military and political alliance between Türkiye and Azerbaijan. Türkiye and Azerbaijan established a regional order in the Caucasus with a broader regional perspective and repercussions.

The geopolitical and geo-economic power struggle between regional and global actors in the Caucasus and Central Asia region has coerced the Turkic World to approximate and affiliate with Türkiye regarding military, security, political, and economic cooperation. The Shusha Declaration was a pilot practice or model in the context of cooperation and integration of the Turkic World in the regional environment related to the circumstances and consequences of the Second Karabakh War.

Furthermore, the Shusha Declaration is essential in establishing a bilateral alliance between the Turkic Republics, which embodies the foundations of wider regional cohesion and rapprochement. The Declaration presented a road map of cooperation and integration in the Turkic World to determine the geopolitical architecture of the region. In future research, the reflections of the Shusha Declaration in the Central Asian Turkic Republics can be examined regarding foreign policy perceptions of the region's nation-states. The odds of the Shusha Declaration transforming from a Türkiye-Azerbaijan bilateral military-security deal into a regional security pact, including the Central Asian Turkic Republics, may be the subject of future research.

The geopolitics, geoculture, geoeconomics, and sustainable stability of the South Caucasus directly affect regional transport corridors. The Shusha Declaration's potent emphasis on the Zangezur Corridor as an integral part of the Middle Corridor demonstrated the document's strategic vision and regional scope, predicting the growing geopolitical significance of transportation corridors and critical checkpoints around the globe after 2021. The period after the signing of the Shusha Declaration manifested the intensification of the global debates and conflicts on the transportation corridors and energy chokepoints in the nexus of security and connectivity agenda (e.g., India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, Northern Sea Route, International North-South Transport Corridor, Red Sea, Suez Canal).

### **Contribution Rate Statement**

The authors' contribution rates in this study are equal.

### **Conflict of Interest Statement**

There is no conflict of interest with any institution or person within the scope of this study. There is no conflict of interest between the authors.

## Notes

1 The Shusha Declaration consists of 46 paragraphs, but the provisions in the Declaration are not numbered as articles or paragraphs. The paragraph numbers cited in this section show their order in the Declaration.

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Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

# Unraveling the Rationality of Genocide: A Comparative Analysis of Khojaly and Srebrenica\*

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## Abstract

Within the scholarly debates in political science and genocide studies, an increasingly prevailing view posits that the most adequate explanation for the occurrence of genocide is the strategic approach. According to this view, the main impetus behind the decision to use violence against civilians is not irrational barbarism but rational choices to realize strategic interests. However, how and under what circumstances genocide becomes a rational choice for aggressors in pursuing their strategic objectives has remained largely unexplored. Through a comparative analysis of the cases of Srebrenica and Khojaly, this study seeks to uncover the strategic, political, and ideological factors that underpin the rationale for genocide. The findings show that the viability of genocide as a low-risk option is underpinned by three interrelated factors. These are the recognition of the limited capacity of the victims to mount armed resistance, resulting in a reduced or negligible risk of counterattack; the awareness of the international community's

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reluctance to intervene; and the expectation that demographic transformation through ethnic cleansing and genocide could be preserved as a beneficial post-conflict resource.

**Keywords**

Genocide, Karabakh, Khojaly, massacre, Srebrenica.



# Soykırımın Rasyonalitesini Çözümlemek: Hocalı ve Srebrenitsa'nın Karşılaştırmalı Analizi\*

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## Öz

Siyaset bilimi ve soykırım çalışmaları alanındaki tartışmalarda soykırımın meydana gelmesine ilişkin en uygun açıklamaları stratejik yaklaşımın sunduğu görüşü yaygınlık kazanmıştır. Bu yaklaşıma göre, sivillere karşı şiddet kullanma kararının ardındaki temel itici güç irrasyonel bir saldırganlıktan ziyade stratejik çıkarları gerçekleştirilmeye yönelik rasyonel seçimlerdir. Fakat soykırımın nasıl ve hangi koşullar altında saldırgan taraf için stratejik amaçlarına ulaşmada rasyonel bir seçenek olarak görüldüğü yeterince ele alınmamıştır. Srebrenitsa ve Hocalı örneklerinin karşılaştırmalı analizini sunan bu çalışma, soykırımın gerekçesini oluşturan stratejik, siyasi ve ideolojik faktörleri keşfetmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Her iki örneğin derinlemesine incelenmesiyle elde edilen bulgular, soykırımın failer için düşük riskli bir seçenek hâline gelmesinde birbiriyle ilişkili üç temel faktörün rol oynadığını göstermektedir. Bunlar, mağdur tarafın silahlı direniş gösterme kapasitelerinin sınırlı olması sonucunda karşı saldırı riskinin azalması, uluslararası toplumun müdahale etme konusundaki isteksizliğinin farkına varılması ile etnik temizlik ve soykırım yoluyla elde edilen demografik dönüşümün çatışma sonrasında bir kazanım olarak korunabileceği beklentisidir.

## Anahtar Kelimeler

Soykırım, Karabağ, Hocalı, katliam, Srebrenitsa.

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## Introduction

One of the most significant problems facing humanity in the 21st century is the increased number of civilian victims of armed conflicts. While there is a long history of atrocities, there has been an increasing research interest in comprehending the mass killings and genocide that have taken place in recent decades. These events have left profound and enduring marks on societies around the globe, such as East Timor, Sudan, Guatemala, Burundi, Rwanda, Palestine, Azerbaijan, and the former Yugoslavia. Understanding the complex causes and manifestations of genocide and mass killings is crucial for preventing such heinous acts in the future.

Article 2 of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as:

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

This phenomenon has led researchers to investigate the intricate interplay of factors that contribute to such horrifying acts. Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term genocide, viewed it as a departure from modernity, representing a regression towards past barbaric practices. Nevertheless, contemporary perspectives widely perceive genocide as a modern phenomenon characterized by rational considerations, encompassing meticulous planning, efficient organization, coordination, and the utilization of technological resources (see Bauman; Fearon and Laitin; Gagnon; Schwartz and Straus; Valentino, “Why We Kill”; Goldsmith et al.; Magula; Chalk and Jonassohn 26).

Within the scholarly debates in political science and genocide studies, an increasingly prevailing view posits that strategic interests are the primary driving force behind the use of large-scale violence against civilian populations as aggressors perceive benefits such as territorial expansion, consolidation of power, or the establishment of ethnically homogeneous nation-states

(Schwartz and Straus; Valentino, “Final Solutions”; Valentino, “Why We Kill”; Straus 546-548; Goldsmith et al.; Mueller; Scherrer 15; Wood). Thus, it has been widely recognized that in analyzing the phenomenon of genocide, it is necessary to examine the strategic planning to target specific groups and territories, the systematic implementation involving displacement and murder, and the complex interplay with prevailing territorial and ultra-nationalist aspirations (Levene 326; see also Mann; Wood; Valentino et al.; Ulfelder and Valentino; Fjelde and Hultman; Straus; Midlarsky).

While there is a growing body of literature that highlights genocide as a rational strategic choice, extending beyond mere expressions of hatred, the essential question of how and under what circumstances genocide becomes a rational choice for aggressors in pursuing their strategic objectives remains an aspect that has not been comprehensively explored. The central aim of this study is to shed light on the conditions that made genocide a rational option for the perpetrators in the cases of Srebrenica and Khojaly. The study further attempts to bridge the gap often seen (Scherrer 21-22) between theoretical and empirical research in genocide studies by offering an analytical framework that combines practical considerations drawn from the cases of Srebrenica and Khojaly with theoretical insights.

This paper presents a comparative analysis of the cases of Khojaly and Srebrenica. Using a qualitative approach, it examines the overlapping characteristics and distinct features of these two cases to understand the complex interplay of factors that led to genocide. It seeks to shed light on the underlying preconditions of genocide while raising pertinent questions about the possible recurrence of these conditions for prevention and enhancing international responses. Secondary data sources were employed as the primary means of data collection. These sources encompass a diverse range of scholarly articles, historical documents, reports, and analyses that pertain to the Khojaly and Srebrenica cases. The abundant availability of secondary data related to each of these cases facilitated a comprehensive and rigorous analysis of the events, thus allowing researchers to conduct an in-depth exploration of the multifaceted dimensions underlying both incidents. Process tracing, a reliable method for uncovering causal mechanisms and pathways, and identifying the critical junctures and decision points inherent in complex phenomena such as genocide and mass killings (Schwartz and

Straus 225-226; George and Bennett; Gerring 349), was used to analyze the data. It ensures a fine-grained understanding of the complex interplay between strategic calculations, ideological motivations, and contextual factors that contributed to the devastating outcomes.

The inherent uniqueness of each genocide case highlights the necessity of closely analyzing the complex interactions between local and regional factors. This demands a comprehensive investigation that considers the diverse historical, cultural, social, and political contexts shaping these tragic events. Nonetheless, delving into the shared traits and nuanced diversities of different cases has the potential to yield analytical generalizations and thus enrich scholarly efforts to comprehend the origins and motivations of genocide. Although each case has distinct attributes, a side-by-side examination enables the identification of both common and unique elements, offering a comprehensive conceptual framework. This approach may generate insightful propositions that could be applicable to other situations.

The discussion surrounding the distinction between genocide and mass murder may distract attention from a more discerning focus on understanding the causes, consequences, and global responses to organized atrocities (see Kuper). In this sense, the focus of the study is not to engage in a definitional debate<sup>1</sup> regarding the categorization of acts as genocide, but rather to delve into the exploration of the underlying causes of genocide and the factors that contribute to making genocide a viable option for aggressors.<sup>2</sup>

### **Srebrenica Case**

After Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) declared independence following a referendum held on February 29-March 1, 1992, its independence was recognized a month later by both the United States and the European Community (shortly thereafter succeeded by the European Union). In retaliation, the Bosnian Serb administration, led by Radovan Karadžić and vehemently opposed to the separation from Yugoslavia, launched a military offensive to carve out an ethnically homogeneous Serb state within the territory of BiH (Tatum 72-75; Ali and Lifschultz 371; Ramet 10). Following the outbreak of conflict in April 1992, nationalist paramilitary groups from Serbia took control of Srebrenica with the primary objective

of forcibly displacing the town's Muslim population, as they had in other parts of BiH (Holbrooke 34). But only three weeks later, Srebrenica was retaken by Muslim forces under the leadership of Naser Orić. Although this marked a significant blow to the heavily armed Serb forces who had experienced one of their first substantial setbacks in the ongoing, and imbalanced conflict, they still encircled the town and maintained their siege. In the following months, Bosnian Muslim forces achieved a series of remarkable victories, significantly doubling the size of Muslim territory. By January 1993, the enclave of Srebrenica was merely five miles away from establishing a link with the central regions held by Bosnian Muslims. But this promising advancement triggered a swift and forceful counteroffensive by Bosnian Serb forces, bolstered by troops, tanks, and artillery support from neighboring Serbia. Consequently, Muslim-held towns and villages continued to succumb to Serb forces, and by mid-March 1993, a staggering population of over 60,000 Muslim civilians had sought refuge within the confines of the town of Srebrenica (see Rohde).

Amid the worsening security situation and Bosnian Serb attacks that weakened the town's defenses, the UN Security Council acted on April 16 by passing Resolution 819, declaring Srebrenica and its thirty-square-mile surrounding area the first United Nations-designated "safe area." As part of this resolution, approximately 750 UN peacekeepers were deployed to the area to provide a sanctuary for the Bosniak civilians, disarm the town's Muslim defenders, and take a position to prevent any attacks by the Bosnian Serbs. However, the safe area designation did not translate into effective protection for the civilians. The UN peacekeeping forces were severely under-equipped and faced immense challenges in maintaining security against the Serbs (see Rohde).

The Srebrenica genocide's origins lie in "Directive 7," issued by the *Republika Srpska* (RS) leadership in March 1995, with the purpose of wiping out the Eastern Bosnian enclaves, pockets of Bosnian Army-controlled territory in the Drina Valley. The directive instructed the Army of Republika Srpska to conduct combat operations to render the Bosnian Muslim inhabitants of Srebrenica in an unbearable situation of total insecurity, with no hope of survival or life (Nettelfield and Wagner 10). The Serb forces, led by General Ratko Mladić, subjected Srebrenica to a relentless siege, cutting off

vital supply routes and isolating the town from the outside world. As the situation deteriorated, it became evident that the international community was unable, or unwilling to provide meaningful protection for the Bosnian Muslims, setting the stage for the tragic events. Finally, two years after the safe area was declared, a Serbian flag flew where the UN once stood, and more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men were taken away to be executed (Tatum 83; Taras and Ganguly 267).

In one of the worst mass atrocities in Europe since World War II, the Bosnian Serb army, under the command of General Ratko Mladić, captured and killed more than 6,000 men and boys between July 11 and July 19 as they tried to flee the war zone through the mountains. In addition, some 1,200 people taken from the UN-protected 'safe area' with little or no resistance from the Dutch peacekeepers in Potočari met the same unfortunate fate (Nettelfield and Wagner 12; Subotić 74; see also Honig and Both). Once the enclave was effectively "cleansed" of its Bosniak inhabitants through genocidal acts, the RS leadership gained the opportunity to repopulate the vacated territory with Serbs under its strategic political objectives (Nettelfield and Wagner 12; Hoare 117-122; Mulaj 35). This repopulation process involved significant demographic engineering, facilitating the establishment of an ethnically homogeneous territory in line with their desired vision of territorial control and dominance (see Björkdahl; Stjepanović).

The aggressors' aspiration to uphold or regain a position of power following the dissolution of Yugoslavia was justified by extreme Serbian nationalism, centered on the unification of Serbia with Serb-populated territories in neighboring states of Croatia and BiH (Tatum 76; Glenny 151; Biserko 79-83; Biondich 199; Carmichael 17-18; Cigar 23; Preljević 218; Jelavich 109-110). While the ideological goal was to create an ethnically homogeneous Serb homeland, genocide was posited as the most adequate *rational* method to achieve it (see Weitz). Bosnian Serb officers tactically and systematically employed horrific practices as a method of warfare, in which acts of rape, mass executions, and mutilation were not rare but rather unavoidable side effects of their combat. These methods were purposefully selected as essential elements of their strategy to cause people to flee and to deter them from ever thinking of returning to the same area (Allen; Valentino, "Final Solutions" 38; Tatum 76-77).

## Khojaly Case

Even before the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Baku's declaration of independence, Armenian forces had already commenced their territorial aspirations in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region in 1988, which is officially a part of Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (Goltz, *Azerbaijan Diary* xv). Taking advantage of the political turmoil resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union and internal dissension within Azerbaijan, Armenia began military operations inside Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992. The conflict continued until 1994 when a ceasefire agreement was brokered between the two nations. As a result, the Armenians seized approximately twenty percent of Azerbaijan's territory. Despite numerous calls from the UN Security Council for the rapid withdrawal of Armenian forces such as S/RES/822 (1993), S/RES/853 (1993), S/RES/874 (1993), S/RES/884 (1993), there was no removal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijani territories. The invasion of the Armenian armed forces into Karabakh was a gross violation of Azerbaijan's sovereignty, as Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent districts are internationally recognized as de jure integral parts of Azerbaijan (Muradov 148-149; Ertuğrul 58-59; Tokluoğlu 322).

The Khojaly genocide is a tragic and horrific episode of the Karabakh war that broke out in the early 1990s. It occurred on the nights of February 25-26, 1992, in the town of Khojaly, Azerbaijan, after the town was occupied by Armenian forces led by Major Oganyan Seyran Mushegovich and Yevgeniy Nabokhin and supported by the 366<sup>th</sup> Motorized Infantry Brigade of the Russian Army. Following the occupation, Armenian forces and associated paramilitary groups committed one of the deadliest atrocities of the conflict, killing hundreds of Azerbaijani civilians (Abilov and Isayev 295-296; Heydarov; Yunusov 43; Cornell, "Undeclared War" 1; Pope; Reuters; Goltz, "Nagorno-Karabakh Victims").

The city was under siege by Armenian forces since October 1991, and its road access was completely cut off on 30 October 1991. The blockade escalated in the second half of the following February, subjecting the city to daily artillery and heavy weapons bombardments. Unable to get aid from Baku, Khojaly succumbed to a siege that deprived it of essential resources such as food and fuel. On the morning of 26 February, in a desperate attempt to save their lives, people flocked to the only escape route from the besieged

city to safety in the neighboring Azerbaijani town of Agdam, some six miles away, only to be caught and slaughtered by Armenian soldiers (Abilov and Isayev 299; Muradov 149-150; Heydarov).

The attack of Armenian forces on Khojaly, one of the most strategic regions of Karabakh, and the subsequent genocide, were to sow terror among the Azerbaijani population, undermine their resolve to resist, and forcibly uproot the Azerbaijani Turks from their homeland were parts of a deliberate strategic plan (Muradov 150; Aziz 21; Abilov and Isayev). From the very beginning of the conflict, the Armenian forces had the occupation of Khojaly as a key objective. Having the only airport in the region and playing a critical role as a conduit for vital infrastructure such as the power line from Khankendi, the center of Karabakh, the Baku-Khankendi railway, and the Baku-Shusha highway, the strategic importance of this city compelled the Armenians to seek occupation and the complete expulsion of the Turks from this area. Since Khojaly provided convenient access to Agdam, Shusha, Khankendi, Askeran, and the other Armenian-majority regions, its capture was essential for the Armenians (Abilov and Isayev 301).

A notable parallel between the cases of Srebrenica and Khojaly is the aggressor's embrace of secessionist movements and the subsequent forcible displacement campaign of civilians of the enemy group residing in the desired territory (Nagorno-Karabakh for Armenians, Drina Valley for Serbs) to secede from the country (Abilov and Isayev 294; Tchilingirian 445; Milanova 2-3; Matveeva 446). In this respect, genocide was committed in both cases as a military tactic to consolidate and complete the ethnic cleansing intended by expulsing the undesired ethnic civilian population to ensure the lasting political and social consequences of the territorial occupation for the post-war period (Abilov and Isayev 295; Vaserman and Ginat 355). In both cases, however, it would be a misleading oversimplification to characterize the aggression solely as a secessionist insurgency or internal conflict. In the case of BiH (Mujanović; Oliver 10-11; Güven), with the participation of Serbia, and in the case of Azerbaijan (Waal 60-61; Cornell, "Undeclared War"; Kurkchian 153), with the direct involvement of Armenia and the indirect support of Russia (Waal 66), the intervention of foreign states played a significant role in the war and the subsequent genocidal consequences.



In both cases, a common facet is that local secessionist forces within the targeted regions played an organized and participatory role in establishing an independent state, carrying out plans of occupation and offensive campaigns that ultimately culminated in genocide. (Cornell, “Turkey” 55-56; Güven 35-37). In 1991, two newly declared units, the ‘Republic of Artsakh’ within Azerbaijan, and the ‘Republika Srpska’ within BiH, emerged as instruments serving the ambitions of Greater Armenia (İsmayilov; Cornell, “Undeclared War”; Dudwick 427; Goltz, *Azerbaijan Diary* xxii; Waal 56–61; Yunusov 31; Laitin and Suny 146-47) and Greater Serbia (Lukic; Güven 31-34; Mujanović). These secessionist entities promptly launched military occupations, resulting in rapid territorial conquests. Armenian forces seized nearly one-fifth of Azerbaijan’s land in Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions, while Serb separatists quickly took control of nearly seventy percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s territory (Ali and Lifschultz 371; Mann 389). The perpetration of genocide in both cases was a deliberate effort to secure territorial gains by altering population dynamics in pursuit of achieving larger mono-ethnic states.

A common feature of Srebrenica and Khojaly was not only their strategic location but also their transformation into hubs where the population of war-ravaged victims gathered before the genocide took place. While Srebrenica had become a sanctuary for thousands of Bosnian Muslims because of forced displacement by the Serb forces since the beginning of the war (Nettelfield and Wagner 8-10), Khojaly was similarly home to thousands of Azerbaijani Turks expelled from Armenia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, along with hundreds of Meskhetian Turks who had fled from Uzbekistan (Waal 110). As a result, both areas became significant population centers where victims sought refuge. Since this concentrated population was an obstacle to the achievement of ethnically cleansed territories, the aggressors were forced to launch violent attacks in these regions, reshaping the demographic landscape through genocidal actions.

### **Discussion: How Does the Genocide Turn into a Reasonable Option?**

Having explored the events in Srebrenica and Khojaly, it is essential to delve into why the perpetrators in both cases perceived the benefits of genocidal actions as outweighing the associated risks. In other words, what factors made genocide a relatively low-risk choice for Armenians at Khojaly and

Serbs at Srebrenica? We argue that the viability of genocide as a low-risk option is underpinned by three interrelated factors: (1) recognition of the limited capacity of victims to mount armed resistance, resulting in a reduced or negligible risk of counterattack; (2) awareness of the international community's reluctance to intervene; and (3) the expectation that demographic transformation through ethnic cleansing and genocide could be preserved as a beneficial post-conflict resource.

For aggressors who anticipate the absence of counterattacks and the unimpeded achievement of their objectives without deterrence or serious threat of military casualties, genocide emerges as a potent, low-risk tactic capable of achieving the desired results quickly. Genocide tends to manifest through a rational cost-benefit analysis in which the aggressors perceive the victimized party as too weak to pose a significant resistance, as seen in many cases of targeting civilians who lack the means to stop the onslaught effectively (Mann 503; Fein). Since genocide differs from a war in that it targets unarmed civilians (Scherrer 14), it may be considered redundant to say that the aggressors view genocide as rational due to their immunity from any armed counterattack. Nevertheless, this absence of counterattack-risk encompasses more than the victims' inability to mount a defense. A crucial factor for mitigating risk in this context is not only the victims' inability to resist genocide with a military action, but also the absence of any military intervention from regional, and global powers, and also the indifference of the wider international community for this horrific event. Consequently, actors who discern an opportunity to target civilians and gain benefits from this act without any significant consequences can adopt such a strategy without any major penalty.

Genocide becomes a conceivable option when regional or global actors adopt a passive stance and show reluctance to intervene or when one or more actors actively support the aggressor. A closer look at the case of Srebrenica underscores a significant failure of the international community to deter this mass killing. The international community's firm and unyielding stance could have made committing genocide an irrational ideological choice for the Serb forces (see McAllister). Despite the awareness of all the local and international actors that Srebrenica would fall without NATO air strikes, and despite desperate pleas from the UN headquarters in Srebrenica, the NATO

air force waiting on standby on at the Adriatic coast was not mobilized to prevent the Serb forces from taking over the town and committing the genocide. Not only were the effective forces under the command of the international community reluctant to act, but the Bosnian army's ability to act in self-defense was largely impeded by resolutions of the UN, such as the arms embargo and the establishment of the safe zones. As a result, the international community's reluctance to intervene made genocide a reasonable tactical choice for Bosnian Serb political and military elites to achieve their strategic goals (see Rohde; Tatum 59-60).

In the case of Khojaly, the potential for international intervention was limited because of its location in newly independent territories of the Soviet Union. The Moscow administration's early alignment with the Armenian side at the outset of the Karabakh conflict further emboldened Armenian forces to continue their occupation and ethnic cleansing campaign (Abilov and Isayev 299). As the realization dawned that international intervention was unlikely, and with Russia refraining from any effort to halt the violence (Cornell, *Azerbaijan* 12; İşyar 193-94), the attacks on Karabakh, culminating in the Khojaly genocide, proved to be a calculated and strategic choice for the Armenian troops.

Another rationale for genocide, in conjunction with other factors, is the expectation that population transformations brought about by mass killings, rape, torture, and forced displacement will persist as permanent changes in the post-war period. The tendency of international mediators and peacebuilders to offer negotiations based on demographic realities on the ground, and to discuss post-war arrangements along these lines, encouraged aggressors to come to the table with extensive territorial holdings and strategically advantageous population distributions in disputed regions. Genocide, while extremely inhumane, proves to be one of the quickest ways to achieve such a strategically advantageous position. Indeed, in both cases that we examined, the recognition of the genocide-induced territorial and demographic structure as a post-war reality and the drafting of peace provisions through accepting these new realities illustrate how the gains secured by genocidal actions are safeguarded in the post-war period (Verémis 6-7).

The changing population composition of BiH, particularly in the eastern parts of the country, where Srebrenica is located, serves as a prime indicator of how the effects of the conflict have crystallized into the prevailing post-war reality. Today, within the RS entity, which encompasses Srebrenica, the demographic landscape has shifted, with Bosniaks now constituting a minority population, in stark contrast to the pre-war period. This demographic transformation has emboldened the RS authorities to pursue policies reminiscent of an independent, mono-ethnic Serb state characterized by secessionist tendencies against the state of BiH and implementing discriminatory measures that marginalize non-Serb ethnic communities. Furthermore, the post-war political framework as stipulated by the Dayton Accords served to legitimize the wartime atrocities by granting the RS a legitimate status. This, in effect, translated the acts of violence and human rights violations committed during the war into territorial and political advantages for the Serb forces, which even persist to this day.

In the Karabakh context, the situation developed in a distinct way due to the Armenian side's recent decline in demographic achievements that were previously maintained despite all the efforts, such as diplomatic talks and the Minsk Group initiative (Milanova 13-20; Kurkchiyan 157-158; Matveeva 445). Despite the diplomatic endeavors undertaken to address the aftermath of the First Karabakh war, Armenia has actively pursued the establishment of a legal foundation for the existing *de facto* situation in the disputed regions (Ertuğrul 59-60; Gasparyan 235-38; Ataman and Pirinççi 25-26). Furthermore, prominent global and regional actors such as the United States, Russia, and France which had the opportunity to help resolve the conflict as permanent co-chairs of the Minsk Group formed under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), chose to leave the issue under control but unresolved, allowing Armenian forces to hold on to the captured territories (Laitin and Suny; Sarıkaya and Aslanlı; Cornell, "Undeclared War" 10-12; Cornell, "Turkey" 51; Kurkchiyan 158; Waal 3; Ataman and Pirinççi 21-25).

The enduring demographic ramifications of the war, impervious to amendment by international law mechanisms and diplomatic negotiations, ultimately prompted the Azerbaijani government to launch a military campaign in Karabakh aimed at reclaiming the occupied territories in 2020.

Consequently, Azerbaijan successfully liberated seven districts within and surrounding Karabakh from occupation, marking a significant step towards a partial resolution of the Karabakh conflict (Ataman and Pirinççi 17-18). Hence, although violent demographic engineering was initially implemented as a rational option (Laitin and Suny 159), unforeseen factors beyond the purview of Armenian foresight acted as a barrier to preserving the war gains in the postwar period. This event included a significant change in the military power balance between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Türkiye's substantial political and military support for Baku, and Russia's temporary departure from its traditional pro-Armenian stance (Ataman and Pirinççi 27-29).

Last, but not least, it is crucial not to overlook the significant role of emotions such as hatred, rage, and revenge as a contributing factors to mass killings in conflicts where identity issues and historical claims play a critical role (see Chirot and McCauley; Taras and Ganguly 19; Petersen 1). Both Khojaly and Srebrenica reveal a complex interplay between ideological, emotional and strategic impulses for genocide, each influencing and reinforcing the other (see Milanova). In the Bosnian war, the central strategic goal of secessionism and the construction of a mono-ethnic Greater Serbia was underpinned by an ideological basis that legitimized the cleansing of the territories of their historical enemies, Bosniaks, whom they also called as "Turks". Thus, beyond the strategic objective, an ideological dimension of intending to eradicate all elements related to Bosniak's existence and identity existed, ultimately transforming the region into an exclusively Serb territory (Nettelfield and Wagner 8-12; Valentino, "Final Solutions" 38; Biserko 41). Likewise, in the Karabakh war, the underlying motives driving the Armenian separatists to commit atrocities stem from strategic objectives aimed at establishing an exclusive Armenian state and achieving unification with Armenia. However, the sheer ferocity of the violence (Cornell, *Azerbaijan* 62; Atun; Goltz, "Nagorno-Karabakh Victims Buried in Azerbaijani Town"; Reuters; Pope; Goltz, *Azerbaijan Diary* 117-30), coupled with the adoption of rhetoric promoting revenge against Turks and Muslims (Melkonian 213-14; Laitin and Suny 153), underscores a more complex reality.

It becomes clear that explaining the violence solely in terms of political and military strategies falls short, given the nuanced mix of strategic pursuits justified by ideological, cultural, and economic motivations. This complex

dynamic paints a multifaceted portrait in which strategic goals are nourished by ideological beliefs, cultural and economic aspects, while at the same time seeking rational justifications for realizing goals rooted in historical and ideological premises. Furthermore, it is crucial to emphasize that in both instances, using socio-political elements such as dehumanization, fear-mongering, and ethnic animosity serves to secure bottom-up validation (Waal 7), while top-down policymaking is driven primarily by cost-benefit analysis. These observations align with Scott Straus's perspective, which asserts that the two primary theoretical paradigms regarding the origins of genocide, namely strategic and ideological approaches, are not conflicting but rather complementary.

### **Conclusion**

Whether witnessed in Srebrenica, or Khojaly, the commission of genocide involves actions such as forced displacement, terrorizing, and aggression against civilians, cannot be attributed solely to a manifestation of identity-based hatred or a state of insanity. Instead, it constitutes a deliberate, carefully planned, and strategic method for achieving long-envisioned objectives. This explanation is the key to understanding why certain post-Cold War conflicts have been marked by genocide and comparable acts while others have not. Genocide becomes a choice for aggressors to accomplish their objectives when the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs. The key factors that make genocide a cost-effective option are the perception that the targets and the international community either lack the capacity or will to prevent the aggression. Another noteworthy factor is the prevailing international practice of accepting territorial gains as a given reality during negotiations, even when such gains were acquired through wartime actions that violated international law and human rights.

The observed cases have demonstrated that the motivation behind perpetrators' desire to commit atrocities is the result of a complex interplay between political and strategic agendas and the ideological motives that often justify those aspirations. Those desires alone are not sufficient to render genocide a rational option. The other rationale behind genocide hinges on the perpetrators' assumption that they won't encounter adequate deterrent actions from the international community and that they can secure long-

term gains, such as territorial or demographic reshaping as a new reality created by violence.

Given the insights provided by these findings, it may be argued that establishing effective deterrence mechanisms against potential acts of mass violence must be the primary duties of the international community. Since the political goals and ideologies of aggressors are unlikely to change through the efforts of international actors, deterrence would be sole necessary means to render such actions irrational. When targeted groups lack the capacity to defend themselves, it becomes incumbent upon the international community to deter genocidal activities (see McAllister). This can be understood within the framework of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, which asserts the responsibility of the international community to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Furthermore, to eradicate forced displacement and mass murder as strategic choices for aggressors, peace agreements and post-war arrangements must avoid legitimizing and prioritizing the political, demographic, and territorial outcomes of conflict as imperative realities on the ground. Accepting the status quo of territorial and demographic realities on the ground as a pre-established framework for peace negotiations, as seen in BiH, encourages aggressors to maximize their territorial gains before entering peace talks. This frequently leads to additional rigging of the demographic composition of the interested area in their favor, often by violent means. This observation underscores the vital importance of repatriating the displaced populations in substantial numbers to counteract ethnic cleansing and convey a resolute message to the perpetrators that their wartime gains cannot be preserved once the conflict ends.

As a recommendation for future scholarly inquiries, it is imperative that the analysis of cases of genocide and mass killings must go beyond the confines of domestic dynamics. A comprehensive approach is warranted in these kinds of research, which requires a thorough consideration of a myriad of factors. These factors include the policies and actions of neighboring nations, the intricate web of regional power dynamics at play within the geographic locus of mass violence, and a prudent assessment of the global context during the period that is under consideration. Adopting this holistic approach allows for moving beyond the confines of limited analyses that

tend to view genocide primarily as a domestic issue, a concern emphasized by Martin Shaw, who contends that a historical and sociological approach to the international relations of genocide is essential for a comprehensive understanding of genocide phenomena. This multidimensional approach will not only enrich our understanding of the complexities surrounding acts of mass violence, but it will also shed light on the interplay of various geopolitical and socio-cultural forces that invariably influence the genesis and perpetuation of such catastrophic events. By broadening our investigative lens to encompass these broader dimensions, we can foster a more nuanced understanding of the underlying factors and motivations behind genocide and mass killings, thereby facilitating more effective preventive measures and informed policy interventions.

### **Contribution Rate Statement**

The authors' contribution rates in this study are equal.

### **Conflict of Interest Statement**

There is no conflict of interest with any institution or person within the scope of this study. There is no conflict of interest between the authors.

### **Notes**

- 1 On various perspectives on this definitional debate, including advocates of a narrower conceptualization of genocide and arguments in favor of a broader approach, see: (Naimark; Suny; Graziosi; Weiss-Wendt, *The Soviet Union*; Weiss-Wendt, *A Rhetorical Crime*).
- 2 For some remarkable studies that discuss the case of Khojaly within the framework of international law and the definition of genocide, see: (Özarlan; Muradov).

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Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

# Bir 19. Yüzyıl Edibinin Portresi: İbn-i Kemal Giritli Süleyman Nüzhet ve Edebî Kişiliği\*

Nesrin Aydın Satar\*\*

## Öz

Bu çalışma, bugüne kadar neredeyse üzerinde hiç durulmamış bir 19. yüzyıl edibi olan İbn-i Kemal Giritli Süleyman Nüzhet'in (187?-19??) edebî portresini ortaya çıkarmayı hedeflemektedir. Şiirleri, hikâyeleri, makaleleri, telif ve tercüme eserlerine rağmen Süleyman Nüzhet hakkındaki bilgiler, kendisinin yazılarında ve şiirlerinde açık ettiklerinin dışında yok denecek kadar azdır. Dahası, oldukça kısıtlı veriyle şekillenen biyografisi, yazarın eserleri hakkında yanlış ve eksik bilgileri de ihtiva eder. Örneğin, az sayıdaki araştırmada yazarın, kaynaklarda ismi geçmesine rağmen rastlanamayan *Şu'ûn-ı Edebiyye* isimli kitabından bahsedilir. Süleyman Nüzhet'in edebî görüşleri hakkında bilgiler içeren, yazı ve şiirlerini ihtiva eden bu kitabın asıl adı *Bir Şey Değil*'dir. Bu makalede hem İbn-i Kemal Süleyman Nüzhet'in hayatına dair bilgilere yer verilmiş hem de kaleme aldığı eser ve yazılar dikkate alınarak edebiyat anlayışı ve edebî yöneliminden bahsedilmiştir. Yazarın, dönemin edebiyat dergilerinde ve *Bir Şey Değil* isimli kitabında yer alan şiir, makale ve hikâyeleri göz önünde bulundurularak Süleyman Nüzhet'in döneminin edebiyat dünyasındaki yeri değerlendirilmiştir.

## Anahtar Kelimeler

İbn-i Kemal Giritli Süleyman Nüzhet, *Bir Şey Değil*, *Muktebes*, *Mütalâa*, edebiyat-ı cedide, Defterdar Kemal Efendi.

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# A Portrait of a 19<sup>th</sup>-Century Literary Figure: Ibn-i Kemal Giritli Süleyman Nuzhet and His Literary Personality\*

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## Abstract

The aim of this study is to find out the literary portrait of Ibn-i Kemal Giritli Suleyman Nuzhet, a 19<sup>th</sup>-century literary figure who has been almost neglected until today. Despite his poems, stories, articles, and many other works, almost no information about Suleyman Nuzhet exists, except for what he mentions in his writings and poems. Moreover, his biography, which is shaped with very little data, also contains incorrect and incomplete information about his works. For example, a small number of studies mention the author's book *Şu'ûn-ı Edebiyye*, which cannot be physically found despite being mentioned in these sources. Actually, the name of this book is *Bir Şey Değil* and it contains information about Suleyman Nuzhet's literary ideas and includes his writings and poems. This article gives the information about Ibn-i Kemal Suleyman Nuzhet's life and mentions about his literary understanding by taking into accounts the works and writings that he wrote. In this article, the author's poems, articles and stories in the literary journals of the period and in his book *Bir Şey Değil* are considered and Suleyman Nuzhet's place in the literary world of his period is evaluated.

## Keywords

İbn-i Kemal Giritli Suleyman Nuzhet, *Bir Şey Değil*, *Muktebes*, *Mütalâa*, early modern Turkish literature, Defterdar Kemal Efendi.

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## Giriş: İbn-i Kemal Giritli Süleyman Nüzhet Kimdir?

### Literatür İncelemesi

Süleyman Nüzhet ismine bazı makale, şiir ve vecizeler kaleme aldığı *Mütalâa* ve *Muktebes* dergilerinde rastlanır. Selanik'te basılan *Mütalâa* ve İzmir'de yayınlanan *Muktebes* dergilerinde müellifin; “İbnü'l Kemal Giritli Süleyman Nüzhet”, “Süleyman Nüzhet”, “İbn-i Kemal Süleyman Nüzhet” ve “Selanikli Nüzhet” imzalarını kullandığı görülür. Bu dergilerle ilgili çalışmalarda Süleyman Nüzhet'e yazar ve şair kadrosunun bir mensubu olarak kısaca yer verilmiştir. Hatice Harika Nüfusçu tarafından hazırlanan *Muktebes*'e dair çalışmada; yazarın hayatı, eğitimi, bulunduğu memuriyetler konusunda bilgiye ulaşılamadığı, dergideki yazılarının altındaki imzasından Giritli olduğunun ve Selanik'e dair kayıttan da Selanik'te ikamet ettiğinin anlaşıldığı belirtilir (Nüfusçu 30). Yine Nüfusçu, *Muktebes*'in 7. sayısında yer alan “Muhâberât-ı Aleniyye” başlıklı açık haberler kısmından Süleyman Nüzhet'in Selanik defterdarı Kemal Efendi'nin oğlu olduğunu tespit edilebildiğini paylaşır (Nüfusçu 30). İlgili haberde müellif, “Selanik defterdâr-ı zî-iktidârı saâdetli Kemal Beyefendi Hazretlerinin mahdûm-ı âlileri izzetli Süleyman Nüzhet Bey” olarak anılır (57). Gönderdiği bir şiirinin taraflarına ulaştığını belirten yayın ekibi, Süleyman Nüzhet Bey gibi kıymetli bir edebiyatçının dergilerine gösterdiği teveccühe her zaman muhtaç olduklarını ve başka eserlerini de beklediklerini anlatarak şaire teşekkür eder. Bu satırlardan Süleyman Nüzhet'in İzmir yayın hayatında önemli bir yere sahip olan *Muktebes* tarafından dönemin değerli ediplerinden addedildiği anlaşılmaktadır.

Selanik'te yayınlanan uzun soluklu dergilerden biri olan *Mütalâa* gazetesi hakkındaki iki tez çalışmasında ise Süleyman Nüzhet Bey'e ismen yer verilmiş, hayatı hakkındaki detaylardan bahsedilmemiştir. Hâlbuki Oğuzhan Davut İslamoğlu'na ait çalışmada, İbnü'l-Kemal Giritli Süleyman Nüzhet *Mütalâa*'da en çok eser veren kişiler arasında anılmıştır (İslamoğlu 30). Bu dergide yayımladığı 16 yazı ve şiiriyle Süleyman Nüzhet; Emine Semiye, Tevfik Fikret, Sadı Efendi ve Hamdibeyzâde Osman Adil'i takip eder. Dergide Türk edebiyatının önemli edebî simalarıyla birlikte yer almasına ve en az onlar kadar eser vermesine rağmen akademik çalışmalarda Süleyman Nüzhet'in üzerinde durulmaması, edebiyatçının hayatı hakkındaki bilgilere ulaşılamamasından kaynaklanıyor olmalıdır.

İsmail Avcı tarafından kaleme alınan “Yeni Bilgiler Işığında Giritli Şairlere Ek” isimli makalede Giritli şairler üzerine yapılmış araştırmalarda ismine rastlanmayan yeni şairlere yer verilmiştir. Süleyman Nüzhet de bu isimler arasında yer alır. Avcı, şairin hayatı hakkında yeterli bilgi olmadığından, yalnız yayınlanan şiirlerinin altında kullandığı Giritli Süleyman Nüzhet imzasından Giritli olduğunun anlaşıldığına dikkat çeker (Avcı 342-343). Şairin hayatı ve edebî kişiliği hakkında detaylı bir bilgi verilmeyen çalışmada *Mütalâa* ve *Muktebes* dergilerindeki şiir ve nesirlerinden ismen bahsedilir.

Amet Molla Memet tarafından hazırlanan *Ege Adalarında Klasik Türk Şiiri ve Şairler* isimli doktora tezinde Nüzhet adıyla yer verilen yazarın Girit’te doğduğu ve diğer çalışmalar ve *Muktebes*’teki doğru bilginin aksine babasının Defterdar Ahmet Bey olduğu anlatılır. Süleyman Nüzhet’in yazdığı şiirleri İsmail Avcı ve Hatice Harika Nüfusçu’nun çalışmalarından aktaran Molla Memet, yazarın hayatı hakkında detaylı bilginin bulunmadığını yineler (Molla Memet 111-112).

Tüm bu çalışmalardan sonra, Süleyman Nüzhet’in ilgili dergilerde bulunan yazılarından başka onun hayatına dair bilgi veren bir çalışma olmadığını söylemek gerekir. Yazılarının içeriği incelendiğinde, kendi hayatıyla ilgili birkaç anekdot dışında Süleyman Nüzhet’in okuyuculara hayatı ve edebî duruşu hakkında malumat vermediği görülür. Dergilerdeki yazı ve şiirlerinin altında yer alan imzalardan edebiyatçının ikamet ettiği birkaç yer ismi çıkarılabilmektedir. Bunlar; İstanbul, Büyükkada, Konya, Selanik ve yine Selanik’te bir yer olan Yalılar isimli muhittir. Bu şehir ve yer adlarından yazarın çokça seyahat ettiği ve yaşamak için birçok kez yer değiştirdiği anlaşılır. Bu durum, babası Kemal Bey’in yürüttüğü defterdarlık vazifesi gereği defalarca tayin edildiği ve görev yerinin değiştiği, Süleyman Nüzhet’in babasıyla hareket ettiğini düşündürür. Nitekim Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri’nin İrade Meclis-i Maliye kurumuna kayıtlı belgelerde Defterdar Kemal Efendi’yle ilgili bazı kayıtlara ulaşmak mümkündür. Bunlardan Kemal Efendi’nin Selanik Defterdarı olmadan önce Konya Defterdarı olduğunu kanıtlayan tayin belgesi (BOA, İ.ML., 23/41, H. 14.05.1315) ile yine Kemal Efendi’nin Konya ve Selanik defterdarı olduğu zamanlarda mazhar olduğu nişan ve taltifler (BOA, İ.TAL., 108/107, H. 21.08.1314; BOA, İ.TAL., 205/23, H. 06.11.1317) ve görevi icabı hakkında yazılan diğer resmî belgeler, Süleyman Nüzhet’in ikamet geçmişinin

babasının göreviyle alakasını anlamak açısından önemlidir. Diğer taraftan, ilgili belgeler içerisinde yer alan ve Dâhiliye Nezareti Mektubî Kalemi'ne yazılan “Selânik Vilâyeti Defterdârı Kemal Efendi'nin oğlunun tedavisi için izin talebi” başlıklı evrak, hem Kemal Efendi ve Süleyman Nüzhet'in akrabalık bağını resmî olarak kanıtlamak hem de Süleyman Nüzhet'in memuriyeti hakkında bilgi sahibi olmak için mühimdir. Belge, Kemal Bey'in mahdumu “Selânik Bank-ı Osmanîsi'nde mülâzemeten müdâvim bulunan Süleyman Nüzhet Bey'in müptelâ olduğu romatizma rahatsızlığını tedavi(si)” amacıyla günümüzde Çek Cumhuriyeti sınırları içinde yer alan Karlsbad veyahut Sırbistan'da yer alan İvranye Kaplıcaları'na gitmek için izin istemesine dairdir (BOA, DH.MKT., 2353/111, H. 02.02.1318). Bu belgeden, Süleyman Nüzhet'in bugünkü tabiriyle stajyer memur olarak Selânik Osmanlı Bankası'nda görevli olduğunu ve romatizma hastalığından mustarip bulunduğunu anlamak mümkündür. Edebiyatçı, eldeki şiir ve nesirlerini en son Rumi 1315 yılında kaleme almıştır (R. 10 Şubat 1315/M. 22 Şubat 1900) tarihli “Gece” isimli şiir). İlgili belgenin Miladi 1 Haziran 1900 tarihine ait olduğu ve Nüzhet Bey'in hastalığını tedavi ettirmek için babası eşliğinde uzak ve yorucu bir seyahati göze aldığı düşünüldüğünde, hastalık yüzünden yazarın edebî hayatının da sekteye uğradığı söylenebilir.

### *Bir Şey Değil* Adlı Eseri

Yukarıda anılan ve yazarla ilgili kimi ayrıntılar içeren çalışmalarda, *Muktebes* dergisinde yer alan bir haberde Süleyman Nüzhet'in bazı makale ve şiirlerini kapsayan *Şu'ûn-ı Edebiyye* isimli bir kitabının yayımlanacağını ilan edildiğinden ancak bu esere tesadüf edilemediğinden bahsedilir (Nüfusçu 31, Avcı 344). Nüfusçu, eserin kataloglarda yer almaması dolayısıyla muhtemelen basılmamış olabileceği sonucuna varır. Oysa müellifin tek kitabı olan bu eserin basılacağından, araştırmacılarının da dikkat çektiği *Muktebes* dergisinin ilgili sayısında bahsedilmiştir. “Şu'ûn-ı Edebiyye” ise bu haberin yayınlandığı dergi bölümünün serlevhasıdır. Derginin muhtelif sayılarında yer alan bu kısımda, edebiyat dünyasından havadisler, yeni çıkan ve çıkması yakın kitaplar ile bazı yazar ve şairlere dair haberler paylaşılır. Derginin 2 Nisan 1314 (M. 14 Nisan 1898) tarihli 14. sayısında yer alan ve “Bir Şey Değil” alt başlığı taşıyan haber şu şekildedir:

“Edib-i bedâyi-perver Giritli izzetli Süleyman Nüzhet Beyefendi’nin bâladaki ünân-ı mahviyetkârâne ile bazı makalât ve eş’arı muhtevî bir mecmûa-i ‘aliyyeleri derdest tab’ u temsil olub karîben tenvir-i uyûn-ı müştakân edecektir. Mir-i mûmâileyhi an-samimü’l-kalb tebrik ederiz.” (“Şu’ûn-ı Edebiyye” 114)

Bundan başka yazarın birçok makale ve şiirini yayınladığı *Mütalâa* dergisinin 89. sayısında da “Bir Şey Değil” serlevhalı bir tebrik yazısı yayınlamıştır. Yazıda *Emma* isimli tefrika romanıyla anılan İbn-i Kemal Giritli Süleyman Nüzhet Bey’in “bâladaki nâm-ı mahviyet-kârâne altında bazı eş’âr-ı aliyyeleriyle bir mukaddime-i edibânelerini muhtevî bir mecmûa-i eş’âr neşretmeleri” (“Bir Şey Değil” 6) haber verilip tebrik edilir.

Rumi 1315 (M. 1897/1898) yılında Selanik’te Osmanlı Asır Matbaası tarafından basılan söz konusu eser, İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Atatürk Kitaplığı’nda Nadir Eserler Kataloğunda 814.32 numarasıyla taranmış hâliyle çevrimiçi olarak yer alır. Eserin içeriği ile ilgili ilk bilgiler Türk Edebiyatı Eserler Sözlüğünde ansiklopedi maddesi olarak yer almaktadır (Aydın Satar). Eserin başında Abdülhalim Memduh tarafından kaleme alınan bir takriz vardır. Şiirinde Abdülhalim Memduh, müellifin edebî dehasını ve kitabında yer verdiği eserleri “Yirmi senede başlasaydı eğer/ Bunu ancak yazar idi –Flöber (Flaubert)–” (Abdülhalim Memduh 4) dizeleriyle över. Süleyman Nüzhet’in eserlerinin ve kişiliğinin her zaman methedilmeye değer olduğunu ifade eden şair, müellif ve eseri için dualar ederek takrizini sonlandırır.

İlgili takrizden sonra, Süleyman Nüzhet’in eserinden ve edebî kişiliğinden kısaca bahsettiği bir önsöz bölümü gelir. İnsanın eserini değersiz olarak görmesine rağmen yine de onu bastırmasını “hod-perestlik” olarak nitelendiren müellif, bu kendini beğenmişlik durumunun insan tabiatıyla ilgisi olduğunu ve kendisinin de bu tür hislerden azade olmadığını anlatır (İbn-i Kemal Süleyman Nüzhet, *Bir Şey Değil* 5). Süleyman Nüzhet’in bu ifadelerinden eserinin ismini koyarken de aynı duygular içinde olduğu anlaşılır. *Mütalâa* ve *Muktebes*’teki haberde “ünân-ı mahviyet-kârâne” olarak nitelendirilen bu isim, eserinden “mecmûa-i kemterîn” olarak bahseden, bu mecmuanın okurlarının “bedbaht bir halk” olduğunu anlatan müellif nezdinde uygundur (İbn-i Kemal Süleyman Nüzhet, *Bir Şey Değil* 6).

Aynı mütevazı duruşu önsözün ilerleyen kısımlarında da devam ettiren yazar, eserin kompozisyon tarzı hakkında kendisinin söyleyecek bir sözünü olmadığını, bu işi okuyuculara bıraktığını anlatır (İbn-i Kemal Süleyman Nüzhet, *Bir Şey Değil* 7). “Edebiyat-ı Garbiyye” ile meşgul olduğunu, bu edebiyat daresi içinde eser vermeyi arzu ettiğini söyleyen Süleyman Nüzhet, okuyucuların eseri okurken bu arzuyu akıllarında tutmasını rica eder. Yine de Batı tarzında eser kaleme almanın eski üslubu terk etmek anlamına geldiğini düşünen okurlara seslenen müellif, bu düşüncenin yanlış olduğunu; edebiyatın, edebî düşüncenin vatanı olmadığını anlatır. Dahası, Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem’i Batı tarzındaki edebiyatın önde gelen mümessili olarak kabul eder ve onu bir “nadire” olarak nitelendirir (İbn-i Kemal Süleyman Nüzhet, *Bir Şey Değil* 10).

Bu ifadelerle sonlandırılan önsözün altında “İbn-i Kemal Süleyman Nüzhet” ismi yer alırken “Selanik: 5 Teşrinisani 1313 (M. 17 Kasım 1897)” bilgileri de geçer. Mecmua içinde en erkeni 1309 (M. 1893/94), en geçi ise 13 Şubat 1313 (M. 25 Şubat 1898) tarihli şiir, makale, hikâye, şiir-düzyazı türünde tercüme ve telif eserler yer alır. Süleyman Nüzhet’in daha önce *Mütalâa*’da yayınladığı “Gonkorlar [Goncourtlar]” isimli makale, “Efkâr” başlığı taşıyan özlü sözler ile “Şarkı”, “Sanadır Ey Gaddarî-i Ebr-i Seher” ve “Şühedâmıza” isimli şiirler de mecmuada bulunmaktadır. Mecmuada toplam 12 şiir, 1 makale, 1 hikâye ve 1 manzum-nesir karışımı özlü söz derlemesi bulunur.

### **Süleyman Nüzhet’in Edebî Kişiliği**

Süleyman Nüzhet’in ilgili kitap ve dergilerdeki yazılarına bakarak “Bir Gurûb” başlıklı 1894/95 yılına ait anı türündeki yazı ile “Osman Nazmi Bey’e Mektup” isimli 9 Mart 1315 (M. 21 Mart 1899) tarihli mektup arasında geçen yaklaşık 5 senelik bir yazı hayatı olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Bu tarihler göz önüne alındığında yazarın 19. yüzyıl sonlarından 20. yüzyıl başına kadar eser verdiğini ve dolayısıyla Türk edebiyatında üslup ve içerikle ilgili köklü değişimler yaşandığı, “tarz-ı cedide” de denilen Batı tesirindeki Türk edebiyatının içinde yazdığı anlaşılmaktadır. Süleyman Nüzhet, *Bir Şey Değil*’in önsözünde Batı edebiyatı taraftarı olduğunu belirtir. Fransız romancılarından Goncourt Kardeşler hakkındaki uzun makalesi, Fransızca bir tercüme olan “Rüfekâ” isimli şiiri, *Mütalâa*’da 14 sayı boyunca devam eden *Emma* isimli tefrika romanı ile “Paris Çapkını”, “Vakî Fakat Gayet Kısa Bir Hâl” ve “Çamlıca’da” isimli hikâyeleri onun Batı edebiyatına yönelik

çalışmalarıdır. Yazarın ayrıca, Ahmet Mithat Efendi ve felsefe konusuyla ilgili görüşleri de *Muktebes*'in iki sayısında peş peşe yayınlanmıştır. Bizde felsefenin oldukça yanlış bir şekilde tefsir edildiğini söyleyerek başladığı yazısında Süleyman Nüzhet, çalışmasını bize felsefenin gelişi, sonrası ve öncesini anlatmak üzere kaleme aldığını belirterek yazısının sonunda da teşekkür edeceğini söyler. İki kısımdan oluşan yazının ilk kısmı; felsefenin hangi ilimler üzerine kurulu olduğu, mesâlik-i felsefenin dört şubesi olan materyalizm, spiritüalizm, skeptisizm ve pozitivizm ile Osmanlı'ya felsefenin girişi ve yanlış anlaşılması üzerinedir. Ayrıca merhum Beşir Fuad ve felsefi görüşlerinden bahseden yazar, onun gençlerden hakkıyla felsefe okumuş tek kişi olduğunu, felsefenin “maddiyûn” koluna şiddetle bağlı bulunduğunu da anlatır (Süleyman Nüzhet, “Bizde Felsefe” 4). Derginin bir sonraki sayısında yayınlanan yazının ikinci kısmında da Beşir Fuad ve materyalizme dair yorumlarına devam eden Süleyman Nüzhet, bizde felsefe konusunda halkı bilinçlendiren kişinin her alanda olduğu gibi bu alanda da yine Ahmet Mithat Efendi olduğunu söyler (Süleyman Nüzhet, “Bizde Felsefe İkinci Nüsha” 6). Ahmet Mithat'ın *Kırkambar* ve *Dağarcık* dergileriyle “efkâr-ı umûmiye felsefe-i cedide ve atıkası hakkında bir fikir” verdiğini anlatan Süleyman Nüzhet, yazısını, yazara hizmeti için teşekkürlerini sunarak tamamlar.

*Emma, Mütalâa*'nın 69. sayısından başlayarak 14 sayıda yaklaşık bir sene boyunca devam eden bir romandır. Dergideki tefrikadan sonra romanın bu defa basılacağını haber veren “Yakında Basılacak Emma İsmindeki Romanıma Mukaddime” isimli yazıyı *Muktebes* dergisinde yayınlayan Süleyman Nüzhet, mukaddimesinde *Emma*'nın Goncourt Kardeşler'in *Renée Mauperin* isimli romanının bazı noktalarıyla ufak benzerlikler arz eden bir hikâyesi olduğunu aktarır. Süleyman Nüzhet, Goncourt Kardeşler'in romanlarında yazarın tabiriyle “bir iki satırla ifade ve tefekkür edilen” mevzudan bir roman çıkarmıştır. 1864 yılında basılan *Renée Mauperin*, Mauperin ailesinin en küçük kızları olan Reneé'nin hikâyesine odaklanır. Reneé, evlenmek istemeyen, özgürlüğüne düşkün, enerjik ve uçarı bir genç kızdır. Anne Madam Mauperin'in Reneé'nin başına buyruk halleriyle uğraşıp onu ehliştirmeye çalışırken diğer taraftan henüz evlenememiş oğlu Henri için endişelenmektedir. Madam, oğlunun evliliği düşünmesi için onu aile dostları Bourjot'ların kızı Naomi'yle sık sık bir araya getirir ancak Naomi'nin babası kızı için hiçbir soylu unvanı olmayan Henri'yi uygun

bulmamaktadır. İş dünyasına girmek isteyen Henri, Naomi'yle evlenmek için Madam Bourjot ile ilişki kurmaya başlar ve anneyi kendine aşkla bağlı hale getirerek onun sevgilisi olur. İşte Süleyman Nüzhet'in *Emma*'sı bu yasak aşk üzerine kuruludur. Emma, Madam Bourjot ve Eduar da Henri Mauperin'dir. Goncourtların romanında kızının nişanlısıyla tek taraflı ve hastalıklı bir aşk yaşayan Madam Bourjot'un hikâyesinden ziyade Reneé'nin bu ilişkiyi öğrenmesi ve ağabeyi Henri ile hesaplaşması, bir şekilde onun ölümüne sebep olması ve bu yüzden ömrü boyunca acı çekmesinden bahseder. *Emma* ise özellikle Madam Bourjot'ya, onun kızı ve aşkı arasında kalmasına, yasak ilişkisinden vazgeçememesinden duyduğu derin üzüntüye odaklanır. Süleyman Nüzhet, *Reneé Muperin*'deki damat-kayınvalide ilişkisini eserinin merkezine almış ve bu ilişkiyi özellikle yasak aşkın taraflarından biri olan kadın üzerinden işlemiştir. *Emma*'nın gerçek bir olayı aktardığını ve isimlerin, şahıs özelliklerinin ve mekânların değiştirildiğini anlatan yazar, *Emma*'nın tüm benzeşimlere rağmen *Renée Mauperin*'den farklı olduğuna dikkat çeker. Hem *Emma* hem de *Renée Mauperin*'in hikâyelerinin “tab‘-ı beşer” ile ilişkili olduğunu söyleyen Süleyman Nüzhet, buradan hareketle mukaddimesine edebiyatın milliyeti konusundaki düşüncelerini anlatarak devam eder. “Millî edebiyat” ve “gayri millî edebiyat” konusunda fikirlerini ifade eden yazar, romanların bir milliyeti olamayacağını, onların tüm insanlığa ait olduklarını, kavimleri tarif etmek gibi bir görev üstlenmediklerini, romanın bir “maîşet” olduğunu savunur (Süleyman Nüzhet, “Yakında Basılacak Emma” 6). Bu düşünceye göre romanlar, hayatın her veçhesinin, “aşkın, kalbin ve hisselerin beyânnâmesi” hükmündedirler ve dolayısıyla millileşemezler. Tarihî romanları bu bahisten ayrı tutan yazar, *Emma*'ya da millî bir roman denilemeyeceğini belirtir. Eğer öyle olsaydı, bu romandaki ahlaka mugayir olayları “eşhâs-ı milliyemizle” tasvir etmenin mümkün olamayacağını anlatan yazar, romandaki olayların ancak Müslüman olmayan bir ailede yaşanabileceğini söyler (Süleyman Nüzhet, “Yakında Basılacak Emma” 7). Zira romanın esin kaynağı olan *Renée Mauperin*'deki kişilerin isimlerini, olayların geçtiği mekânları değiştirip, hikâyeyi detaylandırsa da Süleyman Nüzhet, *Emma*'nın karakterlerine Fransızca isimler vermiş ve olayların Hıristiyan bir ailede yaşandığını vurgulamıştır.

Goncourt Kardeşler'in romanındaki bir hikâyeden esinlenerek, bu hikâyeyi yeniden kurguladığı *Emma*'ya dair böyle bir mukaddime yazması, Süleyman Nüzhet'in Batı edebiyatını takip ettiğini göstermesi bakımıyla önemlidir.

Türk edebiyatında Batı tesirini millilik ve gayrimillilik kavramlarıyla ilişkilendiren Süleyman Nüzhet, Batı ve Türk edebiyatı arasındaki etkileşimi ve Batı edebiyatından esinlenilerek yapılan edebî üretimi millî bir mesele olarak değerlendirmez. Ona göre, insan tabiatı üzerine kurulu hikâyeler oldukları için romanlar, milliyetlerle değil doğrudan hayatla ilgilidir.

Süleyman Nüzhet edebiyatın yanı sıra dil ve imla konusunda yazılar da kaleme almıştır. “Mebâhis-i Lisâniye Makâlesine Bir Nazar,” isimli yazısında müellif, daha önce *Malûmat* gazetesinde yayınlanan “Mebâhis-i Lisâniye” başlıklı yazıda geçen, yeni tarz ifadelerin Türk edebiyatında yer etmesine dair görüşleri eleştirmiştir. Süleyman Nüzhet yazısında, yeni tarz ifadelerin hızlı bir şekilde edebiyatımıza girmesine ve hem bunları kullananların hem de buna karşı çıkmayanların Türk edebiyatı ve dilini düşünmediğine dair görüşleri tenkit eder. Yazar, eleştiriye konu olan yazıda “ceffelkalem hüküm ver(ildiğini)” söyler (İbn-i Kemal Giritli Süleyman Nüzhet, “Mebâhis-i Lisâniye” 1). Müellifin bu tavrı, Türk dilindeki yeni ifade şekillerini desteklemesi bakımından önemlidir. Zira yazar, Osmanlı Türkçesinin “elsine-i mesrûka” olarak ifade ettiği dillerin bir terkibi olduğunu daha yazısının girişinde belirtir. Dahası, son on beş, yirmi seneden beri var olan (yazının Rumi 1313 yılında kaleme alındığı düşünüldüğünde 1877-1897 arası kastediliyor) kendilerine “edebiyat-ı cedide taraftarları” eserlerine de “edebiyat-ı cedide numûneleri” denilen topluluktan bahseder. Süleyman Nüzhet, Osmanlı Türkçesine yeni tarzda ifadeler kazandıran ve eserlerinde bu ifadeleri kullanan elli kadar gencin oluşturduğu topluluğun eserlerinin – söz konusu makaledeki iddiaları asılsız bırakacak şekilde– matbuat âleminde rağbet gördüğünü anlatır (İbn-i Kemal Giritli Süleyman Nüzhet, “Mebâhis-i Lisâniye” 1). Buna karşılık eski ifade tarzını devam ettirenlerin üç dördü aşmadığını hatırlatan yazar, bu kişilerin “mürde-pesend”, eserlerinin de “mürde-pesendâne” olarak yorumlandığının altını çizer. Süleyman Nüzhet bu değerlendirmeleriyle eski tarzın “öldüğünü” yeni tarzın ise Türk dili ve edebiyatını şekillendireceğini belirtir.

Süleyman Nüzhet, *Mütalâa* dergisinde yayınlanan diğer yazılarda “istilâ” fiiliyle yapılan imla hatalarını paylaştığı “Bir Hakikat Kalmasın Dünyada Allah’ım Nihân” isimli yazıyı, yine aynı dergide bir takma ad kullanarak yayınlar. *Mütalâa*’nın 70-75. sayıları arasında geniş bir yer kaplayan ve ilgili fillinin kullanımı hakkındaki düşünce, eleştiri ve tartışmaları içeren



makaleler silsilesi işte bu yazıyla başlar. “Selanikli Nüzhet” imzasını taşıyan yazısında müellif, “İstîlâ fiilin bir şeye mi yoksa bir şeyi mi lâ-hakk olacağı” sualinden yola çıkarak, ilgili fiilin yönelme hâliyle kullanılmasının doğru olduğu sonucuna varır (Süleyman Nüzhet, “Bir Hakikat” 4). Metnin ilerleyen kısımlarında yazarlardan da görüş beyan eden Süleyman Nüzhet’e ilk cevap, derginin bir sonraki sayısında Fazlı Necib (1864-1932)’ten gelir. Fazlı Necib, makale sahibinin imzasını tanımadığını, Selanik’te yazarların birbirlerini tanıdığını ve böyle bir yazara denk gelmediğini anlatır (Fazlı Necib, 2). Yazar bu imzanın Selanik’te son zamanlarda moda olan takma isimlerden biri olabileceğini düşündüğünü söyleyerek fiil üzerine görüşlerini belirtir. *Mütalâa*’nın 72. sayısında bu sefer Hamdibeyzâde Osman Adil imzası taşıyan “İstîlâ Üzerine Bir İki Söz” başlıklı yazı yayımlanır ve bu yazıda Selanikli Nüzhet’in yazarlardan ricası “tıflâne (bir) suâl” (Hamdibeyzâde Osman Adil, “İstîlâ Üzerine” 1) olarak nitelendirilir. Osman Adil, yazısını yalnız ilgili fiilin doğru kullanımı üzerine değil aynı zamanda yeni edebiyat ve yeni edebiyat minvalinde eser veren yazar ve şairlerden, onların edebiyat hiyerarşisi gözetmemelerinden şikâyet etmek için de kaleme aldığını belirtir. Yeni edebiyatı “az zamanlık bir şey” olarak nitelendiren Osman Adil, “gazetelere bir iki tefrika, üç beş makâle veya ortalama birkaç hikâye koymakla insan(ın) edib değil, belki heveskâr-ı edeb” olabileceğini iddia eder (Hamdibeyzâde Osman Adil, “İstîlâ Üzerine” 1). Nüzhet Efendi’nin yazısında verdiği örneklerin sahiplerini söz konusu edebiyat heveslilerden sayan müellif, ilgili fiilin doğru kullanımının ancak “gerçek edib” sayılabilecek kişilerin eserlerinden örneklerle elde edilebileceğini vurgulayarak Süleyman Nüzhet’in görüşünün zıddı bir sonuca varır (Hamdibeyzâde Osman Adil, “İstîlâ Üzerine” 2).

Tüm bu eleştirilerin ardından “İstîlâ’ya Bir Nazar” başlıklı yazıyı bu defa “İbnü’l Kemal Giritli Süleyman Nüzhet” imzasıyla kaleme alan Süleyman Nüzhet, özellikle Osman Adil Bey’in yazısından duyduğu üzüntüyü dile getirir. “Selanikli Nüzhet” lakabının kendisine ait olduğunu kanıtlayan satırlarda yazar, tek amacının bilmediğini öğrenmek olduğunu ve yazarlardan yalnızca bir izah beklediğini anlatır (İbn-i Kemal Giritli Süleyman Nüzhet, “İstîlâ’ya” 2). “İstîlâ” fiilinin kullanımı konusunda zorlandığını ve bu yüzden ilgili yazarlara müracaat ettiğini söyleyen Süleyman Nüzhet, Osman Adil Bey’in eleştirisinin haksızlığına dikkat çekerek yazısını sonlandırır.

74. sayıda “istilâ” kelimesi üzerinde yapılan tartışmalar hakkındaki görüşlerini belirten Ahmet Enverî’den (Ahmet Enverî 3-4) sonra derginin 75. sayısında Osman Adil, ağır sözlerle Süleyman Nüzhet’e bir cevap vererek kelime üzerindeki tüm görüşleri toplar ve tartışmaya son noktayı koyar. Çok genç olduğu için Süleyman Nüzhet’in hakkında bir şey söylemeye gerek duymadığını anlatarak başladığı yazısında Osman Adil, “İstilâ’ya Bir Nazar” isimli makaleyi “baştan aşağı muhteviyâtından bir şey anlaşılmayan makâle-i zarîfâne” olarak nitelendirir (Hamdibeyzâde Osman Adil, “Mütalâa-i Ceride” 5). Yazar, Süleyman Nüzhet’in söylediği sözlere gücenmediğini ancak bu şehre –Selanik– yeni gelmesine rağmen hiç kimseyle dostluk kurmadan tartışmayı tercih ettiğini yadırgadığını belirtir. Bundan sonra Osman Adil, Süleyman Nüzhet’in konuyu da anlamadığını çünkü kendi tefrikası olan ve “ucûbe” duygulardan bahseden *Emma* isimli romanında fiili iddia ettiğinin tersi şekilde, belirtme haliyle birlikte kullandığını yine romandan örneklerle açıklar (Hamdibeyzâde Osman Adil, “Mütalâa-i Ceride” 6).

Sonuçta, “istilâ” fiiline dair söz konusu tartışmalar hem Süleyman Nüzhet’in bir takma adı olduğunu kanıtlaması hem müellifin bulunduğu yerdeki edebî simalarla olan ilişkisini ve ilgili edebî muhitteki tanınırlığını göstermesi yönleriyle önemlidir. Dahası bu tartışmalar, yazarın dilbilgisi ve dilin kullanımı konusundaki tercihleri hakkında da bilgi verir. “Mebâhis-i Lisâniye Makâlesine Bir Nazar” başlıklı yazısının girişinde kullandığı “İstanbul’dan infikâk edeli topu 20 gün oldu” (İbn-i Kemal Giritli Süleyman Nüzhet, “Mebâhis-i Lisâniye” 1) ifadesi düşünüldüğünde, Süleyman Nüzhet’in Selanik’e yeni yerleştiği ve dolayısıyla Osman Adil’in vurguladığı gibi muhitinde “yeni” olduğu anlaşılır. Dahası Osman Adil’in kendisi hakkındaki “genç” yorumu ve müellifin eldeki ilk şiir ve yazılarını genellikle 1313 (M. 1897/1898) tarihinde kaleme aldığı göz önüne alındığında, Süleyman Nüzhet’in yeni üyesi bulunduğu Selanik yazın dünyasında yeterince tanınmadığı, henüz etkili bir yer edinemediği sonucuna varılır.

Süleyman Nüzhet’in dergide ayrıca suların tatlı su ilave edilerek mikroplardan nasıl arındırılacağını, bunun faydalarını ve önemi anlatan “Suların Mâ’ül Bahr İlâvesiyle Tasfiyesi” başlıklı fennî bir yazısı da bulunmaktadır.

Yazın hayatına bakıldığında Süleyman Nüzhet’in daha çok şiirle meşgul olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Dolayısıyla onu bir şair olarak anmak yanlış olmayacaktır. Hemen bütün şiirleri gazel, şarkı, tevhit, naat, mesnevi ve

serbest müstezat gibi eski Türk edebiyatı nazım türlerinde kaleme alınmıştır. Şiirlerinin birçoğunda eski tarzı devam ettiren, divan edebiyatının mazmun dünyasından yararlanan ve Farsça ve Arapça tamlamalar kullanan şair, bazı şiirlerini oldukça ağıdalı bir dille kaleme almıştır. Örneğin, aşağıda alıntılanan “Tebcîl” isimli şiirinde şair, İslam peygamberine övgüsünü şöyle dile getirir:

“Ey habîb-i ahadı ol ahad zü’ n-niamın  
Eder ikrâm kerâmetle tekerrüm-i keremin  
(...) Urvet-i vüskâdır rûhuma zeyl-i şer’in  
Fikr-i pejmürdemedir mülhem haşmet-i hışmın” (İbn-i Kemal Giritli Süleyman Nüzhet, “Tebcîl” 1).

Yine “-birdir” redifli “Tevhîd” başlıklı şiirinde şair, divan edebiyatına has Farsça ve Arapça uzun tamlamaları ve kelimeleri kullanmıştır:

“Zât-ı alâ-yı kibriyâ birdir  
Mûcid-i âlem-i bekâ birdir  
Zâtıdır masdar-ı zuhûr-ı zevât  
Hâlıkü’l-hulk mutlaka birdir” (İbn-i Kemal Süleyman Nüzhet, “Tevhîd” 1).

Şairin hemen bütün şiirleri beşerî aşk, sevgiliye ulaşamama, Allah ve peygamber aşkı, doğal güzellikler ile ilgili lirik konular hakkındadır. “Rüya” ve “Gece” isimli şiirlerinde öte dünya ve ölüme dair sorgulamalara da rastlamak mümkündür. Yine de bu şiirlerde doğrudan yaratıcıya ithaf olmadığını söylemek gerekir. Sonuçta, tüm sorgulamalar Allah’ın varlığına ve birliğine sonsuz imanla biter. Diğer taraftan insanın nasıl davranması ve olaylar karşısında ne gibi bir duruş sergilemesi gerektiğini anlatan “Bir Gazete Okurken” başlıklı şiirinde Süleyman Nüzhet, insanlar hakkında iyi düşünmenin ve sabretmenin genellikle maraz doğuracağından bahseder. Yalnız “Şühedâmıza” isimli şiirini, 1897 Türk-Yunan Savaşı’nda şehit olan askerler için daha epik duygularla kaleme alan şair, bu şiirde vatan savunmasında şehit düşen askerlere seslenerek onların cennetle müjdelendiğini ve Allah tarafından takdir ve takdis edildiklerini belirtir.

Süleyman Nüzhet’in eserlerine ve edebî kişiliğine dair değerlendirmeler yalnız Abdulhalim Memduh’un takrizinden ibaret değildir. Hem *Muktebes* hem de *Mütalâa*’da Süleyman Nüzhet’e takdim edilen şiirler, onun eserlerine dair olumlu eleştiriler ve yayıncıların müellif hakkındaki övgü dolu sözlerine rastlamak mümkündür. *Muktebes*’in 7. sayısında “Muhaberât-ı Aleniyye”

başlığı altında, müellifin dergiye gönderdiği şiir ve yazıların taraflarına ulaştığına dair haberde “risâlemize, zât-ı aliyeleri gibi erbâb-ı edeb ve kemâlin muâvenet ve himmet-i tahririyyelerine dâimâ muhtaçtır.” (57) ifadeleri geçer. Aynı dergide Bahr-ı Sefid valisi Abidin Paşa (1843-1906) tarafından, Süleyman Nüzhet’in yine *Muktebes*’te yayınlanan ve “Hâkim-i edîb devletlü Abidin Paşa”ya atfedilen “Gece” isimli şiiri üzerine kaleme alınan kısa bir değerlendirme yazısı yer alır. Abidin Paşa, bu yazısında şairin edebî kişiliği hakkında “efkârınız âlî, belâgatiniz ulvî, hissiyâtınız nûr, vahdâniyetiniz mâlî ve münclidir.” (Abidin Paşa 5) yorumunda bulunur.

### **Sonuç**

Bu makalede; yazı hayatı, edebî kişiliği ve biyografisi üzerine doğrudan bir çalışma olmayan, yalnızca şiir ve yazılarını yayınladığı dergiler ve Giritli şairler hakkındaki akademik araştırmalarda kısaca anılan İbn-i Kemal Giritli Süleyman Nüzhet hakkında detaylı bir edebî ve biyografik portre ortaya koymak hedeflenmiştir. Bahsi geçen makale, tez ve bildirilerde bulunan yazarın hayatı ve eserlerine dair yanlış bilgiler, hem Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi’nde yer alan belgeler hem de *Mütalâa* ve *Muktebes* dergilerindeki metinlerin yeniden incelenmesi yoluyla düzeltilmiştir. Amet Molla Memet’in çalışmasında geçen, müellifin babasının Ahmet Bey olduğuna dair bilginin hatalı olduğu, *Muktebes*’te yer alan bilgiler ve Dâhiliye Nezareti Mektubî Kalemî arşivindeki belge gösterilerek kanıtlanmış ve Süleyman Nüzhet’in babasının Defterdar Kemal Efendi olduğu anlaşılmıştır. Diğer taraftan, Hatice Harika Nüfusçu ve İsmail Avcı’nın çalışmalarında bahsettikleri, Süleyman Nüzhet’in arşivlerde rastlanamayan “Şu’ûn-ı Edebiyye” isimli eserinin aslında olmadığı da bu çalışmayla ispatlanmıştır. *Muktebes* dergisindeki ilgili sayıda Süleyman Nüzhet’in *Bir Şey Değil* isimli kitabından bahsedildiği gösterilmiş, bu kitabın taranmış hâliyle İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Atatürk Kitaplığı’nda yer aldığı belirtilmiştir. Dahası Nüfusçu’nun *Muktebes* dergisinin analizi üzerine olan tezinde ve süreli yayın arşivlerinde yer almayan ilgili derginin bazı sayılarına ulaşılmış ve Süleyman Nüzhet’in yazı ve şiirlerinin tam bir listesi hazırlanmıştır.

Tüm bunlara ek olarak, bu çalışmayla birlikte Süleyman Nüzhet’in oldukça sınırlı olan biyografik bilgilerine yenileri eklenmiştir. Kendisinin Giritli ve babasının Selanik Defterdarı Kemal Efendi olduğundan başka hakkında bir bilgi bulunmayan Süleyman Nüzhet’in hayatı, Başbakanlık Osmanlı

Arşivlerinde yer alan babası ile ilgili belgeler ve yazı ve şiirlerinin altında kullandığı imzaların yanında yer alan yer isimleri üzerinden şekillenmiştir. Bir Bank-ı Osmanî memuru olan, romatizma hastası Süleyman Nüzhet; babasının yüksek memuriyeti sebebiyle İstanbul, Konya, Selanik arasında bir yayın hayatı kurmuş, muhtemelen Karlsbad veya İvranye kaplıcalarında şifa aramıştır. Sık yer değiştirmesi sebebiyle bulunduğu yerde muhitleşmiş olan edebiyatçılar tarafından dışlandığı bile olmuştur. Süleyman Nüzhet'in doğum ve ölüm tarihi ise hâlen tam olarak bilinmemektedir. Bununla beraber, babası Kemal Efendi'nin yine Osmanlı Arşivi'nde yer alan ilgili Sicill-i Ahval belgesine göre Hicri 1267 (M. 185/1851) Girit doğumlu olması, (BOA, DH.SAİDd, 10/535, H. 26.12.1267) yukarıda da bahsedilen ve yazar hakkında *Mütalâa*'da yapılan "genç" yorumu ile Selanik'te banka memuru olarak çalışması, yazarın Selanik'te ikameti sırasında yirmili yaşlarda olduğunu düşündürmektedir.

Bu çalışma ayrıca Süleyman Nüzhet'in edebi kişiliği hakkında bilgi veren ilk araştırmadır. Müellifin hem daha önceki çalışmalarda yanlış bir isimle anılan *Bir Şey Değil* isimli eseri hem de *Muktebes*'in tez çalışmasında erişilemeyen sayılarında yer alan eserlerinden bahsedilmiş, Süleyman Nüzhet'in yazı ve şiirlerinin içeriklerine değinilmiş ve *Emma* isimli tefrika roman üzerinde durulmuştur. Müellifin Türk edebiyatı ve dili hakkındaki düşünceleri, Batı edebiyatı ve milli edebiyat konularındaki görüşleri paylaşılmıştır.

Sonuç olarak, *Mütalâa*'da çağdaşı olan; Tevfik Fikret (1867-1915), Rezaizade Mahmud Ekrem (1847-1914), Ahmet Mithat (1844-1912) ve Cenap Şahabettin (1870-1934) gibi isimlerle birlikte yazı ve şiirleri yayımlanan Süleyman Nüzhet'in hayatı hakkındaki oldukça az malumat ile eserlerine dair eksik ve yanlış bilgilerin, yazar hakkındaki potansiyel araştırmaları da engellediğini söylemek gerekir. Diğer taraftan, yazarın yayın hayatının muhtemel sağlık sorunları sebebiyle kısa sürmesine rağmen yazı ve şiirleriyle Süleyman Nüzhet, yeni Türk edebiyatı mümessillerinden biri olarak incelenmeye değerdir. Kendini "üdebâ-yı garbiyye"den eserlerini ise "numûne-i edebiyât-ı cedîde"den sayan Süleyman Nüzhet'in edebiyat ve dilbilgisi meselelerine dair görüşleri, İstanbul dışında muhitleşmiş yeni edebiyatçıların Türk edebiyatı söz konusu olduğundaki meselelerini anlamak ve örneklendirmek için önemlidir. Süleyman Nüzhet, hemen tüm şiir külliyyatını eski tarz dil ve anlatım özellikleriyle kurmasına rağmen

makale ve eleştirilerinde Batılı türleri ve bu türlerde eser veren edebiyat-ı cedide mensuplarını savunmuştur. Türk edebiyatını şekillendiren dilin değişimine dair görüş bildirerek aksini düşünmeyi “ölü sevicilik” olarak yorumlayan Süleyman Nüzhet, Türk edebiyatının güncel durumuna dair tartışmaların içinde yer almaktan çekinmemiştir. Hakkındaki olumsuz ve olumlu eleştiriler de onun içinde bulunduğu edebî çevrede belli bir yeri olduğunu gösterir.

İbn-i Kemal Giritli Süleyman Nüzhet ile ilgili yapılacak bundan sonraki araştırmalar, yazarın biyografisine dair aydınlatılmayan detayları paylaşmaya, eğer varsa yazın hayatına dair eksiklikleri ortaya çıkarmaya yönelik olacaktır.

### **Destek ve Teşekkür Beyanı**

*Muktebes*'in ilk serisi 1 Kanunusâni 1313 (13 Ocak 1898) ile 23 Temmuz 1314 (4 Ağustos 1898) tarihleri arasında 30 sayı olarak yayınlanmıştır. Derginin imtiyaz sahibinin İzmir'den ayrılmasının ardından yayın hayatına bir süreliğine son veren *Muktebes*'in ikinci serisi ise 2 Kânunuevvel 1315 (14 Aralık 1899) ile 13 Nisan 1316 (26 Nisan 1900) arasında 19 sayı olarak yayınlanarak yayın hayatını tamamlamıştır. Hatice Harika Nüfusçu'nun yukarıda da bahsedilen tez çalışmasında derginin ikinci serisine ait sayıların tamamına ulaşılamadığı göze çarpar. Nüfusçu'nun ulaşamadığı 8 sayı kütüphane arşivlerinde de yer almamaktadır. Süleyman Nüzhet'in dergideki tüm yazı ve şiirlerinin bibliyografik künyelerini ortaya çıkarmayı hedefleyen bu çalışma için *Muktebes*'in ulaşılamayan sayılarını kendi özel koleksiyonundan benimle paylaşan ve böylelikle Süleyman Nüzhet'in dergideki yayınlarının tam bir listesinin ortaya çıkmasına katkıda bulunan saygıdeğer Ümit Yazıcı Bey'e teşekkürlerimi sunarım.

### **Çıkar Çatışması Beyanı**

Çalışma kapsamında herhangi bir kurum veya kişi ile çıkar çatışması bulunmamaktadır.

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- Süleyman Nüzhet. “Bir Hakikat Kalmasın Allah’ım Dünyada Nihân.” *Mütalâa*, no. 70, 26 Teşrinisani 1313, ss. 3-4.
- “Şu’ûn-ı Edebiyye.” *Muktebes*, no. 14, 2 Nisan 1314, s. 114.

## EK 1

Süleyman Nüzhet’in hem *Bir Şey Değil* adlı kitabında hem de *Muktebes* ve *Mütalâa* dergilerinde yer alan şiir, makale, hikâye, roman ve mektup türlerindeki eserlerinin tümünün bibliyografik künyeleri aşağıda sıralandığı gibidir:

### *Bir Şey Değil*

1. “Naatü’l-nebî” (Şiir), 26 Teşrinievvel 1311, ss. 12-13.
2. “Gonkorlar” (Makale), 3 Temmuz 1313, ss. 13 – 28.
3. “Yâl ü Bâl-i Hayâl” (Şiir), 8 Şubat 1312, ss. 28-30.
4. “Çamlıca’da” (Hikâye), Tarihsiz, ss. 30-33.
5. “Şarkı” (Şiir), 5 Haziran 1313, ss. 33-35.
6. “Sanadır Ey Gaddarî-i Ebr-i Seher” (Şiir), 1 Mayıs 1313, ss. 35-36.
7. “Beter Çanak” (Şiir), 13 Şubat 1313, ss. 36-38.
8. “Kamere Hitap” (Şiir), 1 Haziran 1313, ss. 38-40
9. “Şühedâmıza” (Şiir), 28 Nisan 1313, ss. 40-42.
10. “Bir Rûyet-i Serîka” (Şiir), Tarihsiz, ss. 42-43.
11. “Bir Gurûb” (Anı), 1309, ss. 43-47.
12. “Rüfekâ” (Tercüme Şiir), Tarihsiz, ss. 47-50.
13. “Şarkı” (Şiir), 5 Şubat 1313, s. 52.
14. “Efkâr” (Özlü Sözler), Tarihsiz, ss. 53-60.
15. “Bir Hayâl” (Şiir), 10 Eylül 1312, s. 60.



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1. “Hayat” (Şiir), sayı: 1/7, 12 Şubat 1313, s. 50.
2. “Vakî Fakat Gayet Kısa Bir Hâl” (Hikâye), sayı: 1/11, 12 Mart 1314, ss. 84-85.
3. “Paris Çapkını” (Hikâye), sayı: 1/16, 16 Nisan 1314, ss. 123-125.
4. “Rüya” (Şiir), sayı: 1/20, 14 Mayıs 1314, s. 102.
5. “Gazel” (Şiir), sayı: 1/23, 4 Haziran 1314, s. 177.
6. “Bir Gazete Okurken” (Şiir) sayı: 1/27, 2 Temmuz 1314, s. 210.
7. “Efkâr” (Özlü Sözler) sayı: 1/30, 23 Temmuz 1314, ss. 237-238.
8. “Gazel” (Şiir) sayı: 2/1, 2 Kânunuevvel 1315, ss. 6-7.
9. “Bizde Felsefe ve Ahmet Mithat Efendi Hazretleri” (Makale), sayı: 2/2, 7 Kânunuevvel 1315, ss. 3-5.
10. “Bizde Felsefe ve Ahmet Mithat Efendi Hazretleri (İkinci Nüshadan Mabad)” (Makale), sayı:2/3 12 Kânunuevvel 1315, ss. 6-7.
11. “Yakında Basılacak Emma İsmindeki Romanıma Mukaddime” (Kitap Tanıtımı) sayı: 2/6, 6 Kânunusani 1315, ss. 5-6.
12. “Gece” (Şiir) sayı: 2/11, 10 Şubat 1315, ss. 5-6.
13. “Osman Nazmi Bey’e Mektup” (Mektup) sayı: 2/10, 9 Mart 1315, s. 2.


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4. “Gonkorlar, (Mâbad – Nihayet)” (Makale), sayı: 63, 8 Teşrinievvel 1313, ss. 3-4.
5. “Sanadır Ey Gaddarî-i Ebr-i Seher” (Şiir), sayı: 64, 15 Teşrinievvel 1313, s. 1.
6. “Emma” (Hikâye), sayı: 69, 19 Teşrinisani 1313, s. 7-8.
7. “Bir Hakikat Kalmasın Allah’ım Dünyada Nihân” (Makale), sayı: 70, 26 Teşrinisani 1313, ss. 3-4.
8. “Temennî-i Muhabbet” (Şiir), sayı: 70, 26 Teşrinisani 1313, s. 1.
9. “Emma” (Hikâye), sayı: 70, 26 Teşrinisani 1313, ss. 7-8.
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12. “Tâli” (Şiir), sayı: 72, 10 Kânunuevvel 1313, s. 3.

13. “Emma” (Hikâye), sayı: 72, 10 Kânunuevvel 1313, ss. 7-8.
14. “İstîlâya Bir Nazar” (Makale), sayı: 73, 17 Kânunuevvel 1313, s. 2.
15. “Emma” (Hikâye), sayı: 73, 17 Kânunuevvel 1313, ss. 7-8.
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17. “Şarkı” (Şiir), sayı: 76, 7 Kânunusani 1313, s. 1.
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27. “Suların Mâ’ül Bahr İlavesiyle Tasfiyesi” (Makale), sayı: 83, 4 Mart 1313, ss. 4-5.
28. “Emma” (Hikâye), sayı: 83, 4 Mart 1313, ss. 6-7.
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EK 2

Selanik Vilayeti Defterdarı Kemal Efendi'nin Oğlunun Tedavisi İçin İzin Talebi



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Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

# Güneybatı Anadolu'nun Türkleşmesi ve Attouda/Hisar Çevresinde Türk-İslam Döneminin Somut Kültürel Miras Ögeleri\*

Tevfik Orkun Develi\*\*

Mehmet Sait Sütücü\*\*\*

## Öz

Attouda Antik Kenti, Denizli'nin Sarayköy ilçesi, Hisar (Köyü) Mahallesi'nde bulunan arkeolojik bir tepe yerleşimi ve birinci derece sit alanıdır. Şehrin iskânı, MÖ II. yüzyıla kadar uzanmakta olup neredeyse hiç kesintiye uğramadan günümüze kadar devam etmektedir. Ancak şimdiye kadar arkeolojik buluntular ışığında bölgenin Türk-İslam devrine odaklanan herhangi bir bilimsel çalışma yapılmamıştır. 2021 yılında Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı'nın izniyle gerçekleştirilen arkeolojik yüzey araştırmasında, Babadağ dağ sırasında bulunan tepeleri ve vadileri hilal biçiminde kuşatan yedi türbe tespit edilmiştir. Bölgede stratejik olarak batıya geçiş güzergahlarını tutan bu yapıların, İkinci Beylikler Dönemi'ne tarihlenen ve güneybatı Anadolu'nun Türkleşmesinde önemli roller üstlenen *kolonizatör Türk dervişlerine* ait oldukları değerlendirilmektedir. Arkeolojik bulgularla tarihsel verileri bir araya getiren bu keşif, bölgenin Osmanlı öncesi Türk-İslam devrine ilk kez ışık tutmaktadır.

## Anahtar Kelimeler

Attouda, Hisar, Kolonizatör Türk dervişleri, Denizli, Anadolu Beylikleri.

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# The Turkification of Southwest Anatolia and the Tangible Cultural Heritage Elements of the Turco-Islamic Period in Attouda/Hisar Region \*

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## Abstract

Attouda Antique City is a first-degree archaeological site and hill settlement located in the Hisar Village of Sarayköy district of Denizli. The settlement of the city dates back to the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE and has continued until today without any significant interruption. However, there has been no scientific study focusing on the Turkish-Islamic period of the region considering archaeological findings. During the archaeological survey conducted in 2021 with the permission of the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, seven mausoleums were identified that surround the hills and valleys of the Babadağ mountain range in a crescent form. These structures, strategically hold the routes to the west in the region, are believed to belong to the *colonizer Turkish dervishes* who played a significant role in the Turkification of southwest Anatolia and were dated to the Second Beyliks Period. This discovery, which combines archaeological findings with historical data, sheds light for the first time on the pre-Ottoman Turkish-Islamic period of the region.

## Keywords

Attouda, Hisar, Colonizer Turkish dervishes, Denizli, Anatolian Beyliks.

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## Giriş

XI. yüzyıldan XV. yüzyıla kadar sürekli bir şekilde Türk göçüne sahne olan Diyâr-ı Rum toprakları, Malazgirt Zaferi'nin (1071) ardından İlk Türk Beyliklerinin ortaya çıkması ve Anadolu Selçuklu Devleti'nin kurulmasıyla Türk yurdu olma evresine girmiştir. Anadolu'daki Türk varlığı her ne kadar Malazgirt Zaferi'nden önceki tarihlere uzansa da Türklerin burada kalıcı olduklarının anlaşılması mezkûr dönem sonrasına tekabül etmektedir. Anadolu, jeostratejik konumu gereği gerek doğudan gerekse de batıdan çeşitli kavimlerin istilasına uğramış, birçok dinin ve kültürün beşiği olmuştur.

Göç olgusunun tarihi değiştiren ve dönüştüren önemli bir etmen olduğu hatırlanacak olursa, sözü edilen devirlerde Türklerin kitleler hâlinde Anadolu'ya yerleşmeleri sonucu bu topraklar *Türkiye* olarak adlandırılmaya başlamıştır. Bu dönüşümü doğru anlayabilmek adına, yaklaşık bin sene geri giderek Anadolu'nun adım adım Türk yurdu olmasının merhalelerine bu zaviyeden bakmak gerekmektedir. İkinci olarak dikkat edilmesi gereken, Moğol istilaları ile başlayan ve İkinci Türk Beyliklerinin ortaya çıkış sürecini hazırlayan dönemdir. Bu dönem, içinden Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nu çıkararak ve Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sine doğru tarihî serüvenin devamını sağlayan göçlerin son safhasını ihtiva etmektedir.

Genel olarak bakıldığında, İlk Dönem Beylikler zamanında Anadolu'nun doğusu ve güneydoğusu Türk yerleşimine açılmış, akabinde Anadolu Selçukluları zamanında bölgede siyasi birlik sağlanarak Orta Anadolu'ya kadar olan topraklar kati biçimde Türk hâkimiyetine girmiştir. Bu dönemde gerçekleşen Türk fetihleri ve Anadolu'ya akan Türk nüfusu sayesinde, bu topraklar daha evvel tarihinde eşine rastlanmayan bir siyasi, sosyal, etnik, dinî ve kültürel değişim geçirmiş, adı da artık yeni sahipleri olan Türklerle anılmaya başlamıştır. Üstelik bu adlandırma bizzat Batılılar tarafından yapılmıştır. Claude Cahen de (143-154) buna vurgu yaparak, yoğunluğu ne olursa olsun o dönemde sınırları bile belli olmayan bu topraklarda *Türklüğün* nitelikçe ön plana çıktığına değinmiştir. Böylece kadim *Anatolia*'nın yerini *Turcia* almıştır.

## Anadolu'ya Gerçekleşen Türk Göçünün Mahiyeti

Anadolu'nun Türk-İslam yurdu hâline gelmesini sağlayan süreçte kazanılan her mücadele yeni bir göç dalgasını tetiklemiş ve fethedilen topraklar, kitleler

hâlinde akıp gelen yeni nüfusla iskân edilmiştir. Bu sayede kılıç ile kazanılan başarılar, Türk yerleşimlerinin ve Türk-İslam kültürünün yayılmasıyla kalıcı bir hâl almıştır. Dolayısıyla, Anadolu'nun siyasi yapısını değiştiren göçlerin aynı zamanda son derece belirgin, *askeri* bir yönü bulunmaktadır. XI. asırdan itibaren artarak devam eden bu göçler, *geri dönüşsüz, zorunlu, kalabalık/yoğun* ve *sürekli* bir nitelik arz etmektedir (Çevik 2-28; Sümer, “Anadolu’ya Yalnız” 567-594). Öncelikle, göçerler bu kez yanlarına aileleri, çocukları ve sürülerini de alarak “topyekûn bir hareket” başlatmıştır (Çevik 9-10). Bir boy ya da oba yerini terk ettiği zaman, arkasından gelen diğer gruplar onlardan kalan boşlukları hemen doldurduğundan, bunlar için geri dönüş artık isteseler bile imkânsız hâle gelmiştir. İkincisi, hem Orta Asya'nın değişen siyasi ve sosyo-ekonomik koşulları hem de fethedilen yeni toprakların iskânı gibi pek çok sebepten ötürü yeni topraklar bulmak zorunlu hâle geldiğinden, hareketli kitleler için göç artık kaçınılmaz bir hâl almıştır (Özgüdenli 657-659). Orta Asya'dan başlayarak İran, Azerbaycan ve Gürcistan hattı boyunca üst üste binen göçmen gruplar, bu iki etmene bağlı olarak yoğun bir şekilde batıya doğru ilerleyerek Diyâr-ı Rum topraklarına ulaşmıştır. Çağdaş Bizans kaynakları bu durumu, “deniz ve kara bütün topraklar barbar Türkler tarafından işgal edildi ve ıssızlaştırıldı” şeklinde değerlendirmektedir (Çevik 10). Son olarak, başlangıcından varış noktasına kadar savaş, kıtlık ve ölüm gibi tüm zorlu şartlara rağmen göçlerin *süreklilik* arz etmesi, Anadolu'daki Türk varlığını pekiştirmiş ve buradaki Türk yaşam tarzının kesintiye uğramadan devam etmesini sağlamıştır.

XI. asırdan itibaren Büyük Selçuklular, Anadolu Selçukluları, Artuklular, Dilmaçoğulları, Saltuklular, Mengüçükoğulları, Danişmendoğulları, Yıvaloğulları, Karakoyunlular ve Akkoyunlular Türk nüfusunun Anadolu'da kök tutmasını sağlamıştır (el-Hüseynî 20-38 vd; Sevim 79-107; *Urfa'da Mateos* 117-118, 137-143 vd; Turan 1-37). Buna rağmen ne yazık ki Türklerin Anadolu'ya aktığı bu erken asırları konu edinen ve demografik yapı hakkında doğrudan bilgi veren bir kaynak mevcut değildir. Ayrıca yaşanan siyasi karmaşa ve olaylardan olsa gerek, bu dönemde bölgeye çok fazla seyyah da uğramamıştır. Bu sebeple, “âdet olarak sürüleriyle yaz-kış otlaklarda oradan oraya dolaşan” (Simon de Saint Quentin 52) Türkmenlerin Anadolu'daki varlığına ait izlerin tespitinde, arkeolojik delillerin önemi bir kez daha kendini göstermektedir.



## Batı Anadolu'da Türk-İslam Varlığı ve Kolonizatör Türk Dervişleri

I. Alaeddin Keykubâd (1220-1237) devrinde gücünün zirvesine ulaşan Anadolu Selçuklularının hâkimiyeti altındaki topraklar, başta Konya olmak üzere Moğol istilasından kaçan Türkmenler için bir sığınak hâline gelmiştir (Sümer, “Anadolu’da Moğollar” 1-147). Dahası, bu gelen kalabalık kitlelerin iyi bir sevk ve idareye tabi tutulması, Batı Anadolu’nun Türk-İslam yurdu hâline gelmesine zemin hazırlamıştır. Buradan hareketle, gerek Anadolu’da Türk-İslam medeniyetinin temsili gerekse kadim medeniyetlerin izlerini bünyesinde barındıran kültürel dönüşüm, Türklerin bölgedeki imar faaliyetleriyle doğrudan ilişkilidir. Bu dönemde Türklerin yerleşik hayat nosyonunu giderek ön plana alması ile bölgenin demografik yapısında görülen değişim doğru orantılıdır. Bunun doğal bir sonucu da Türk-İslam mimarisinin gelişerek, bu estetik zevki temsil eden eserlerin Anadolu’da giderek daha görünür hâle gelmesidir. Yine de bu konargöçer toplulukları duvarların arasına koymanın ya da yerleşik hayata bütünüyle uyarılmanın zorlukları hâlen gözlemlenebilmektedir. Ayrıca, Orta Asya’dan gelen Türklerin yaşam biçimi ve geçim kaynağı olan hayvancılığın etkisini de göz önünde bulundurmak gerekir. 1260 yılına kadar çoğunlukla istila hareketlerinde bulunan Moğolların, bu tarih itibarıyla bütün bölgede hâkimiyet kurarak ele geçirdikleri şehirleri tahrip etmeleri, nüfusu etkileyen en önemli etkenlerden biri olmuştur. Bir diğer husus, Moğolların Azerbaycan’a girmesiyle orada yaşayan Türk unsurların Anadolu’ya geçmesidir. Aslında Moğollar, bu yönüyle Anadolu’nun demografik yapısının değişmesine ve Batı Anadolu’ya kitleler hâlinde yoğun göçlerin yapılmasına sebep olmuşlardır. Abdülkadir Yuvalı’ya göre (1289-1290), Moğol istilasıyla Türkistan’dan Anadolu’ya uzanan hat boyunca göç eden grupların içindeki âlim, fazıl ve tacirler, geldikleri bölgelerdeki tekke, zaviye ve medrese ekollerini Anadolu’ya taşıyarak buranın sosyokültürel yapısını büyük ölçüde değiştirmişlerdir. İşte, “Horasan ve Maveraünnehr yöresinden koparak” gelen bu insanlardan önce “Asie Mineur, Anatolia, Diyâr-ı Rûm” olarak bilinen bu toprakların artık “Türkiye” olarak adlandırıldığı İkinci Beylikler Dönemi’nde, Anadolu’nun kuzeyinden güneyine, yani Kastamonu’dan Alanya’ya yay şeklinde uzanan hat, uç hâline gelmiş ve Türkler bu hat boyunca yerleştirilmişlerdir. Bu sınır boylarını tutan beylere de “uç beyi” denmiştir (Emecen 38-39; Köprülü, *Osmanlı* 73-101). Özellikle Anadolu Selçuklu Devleti’nin merkezi işleyişinin bozulması ve Anadolu’daki Moğol etkisi,

*İkinci Tevâif-i Mülûk* adıyla Bizans hudutlarında *gazâ* mücadelesi verilen yeni bir döneme sahne olmuştur (Soygüzel vd. 69-70). Türklerin, Büyük Selçuklu Devleti'nde ve hatta bu devletin kuruluş ve inkişafından evvel Anadolu'ya gerçekleştirdikleri göçler sonucunda bir iskân ve kolonizasyon metodunu takip ettikleri görülmektedir (Barkan 280-281). Hem Mehmet Fuad Köprülü hem de onun nazariyesi üzerinden Ömer Lütfi Barkan'ın kati surette ortaya koyduğu üzere, bu iskân ve kolonileşmenin Selçuklulardan beri sistematik bir işlev üstlendiği anlaşılmaktadır. Özellikle, İslamiyet'in kabulüyle Türklerin Diyâr-ı Rum'u *darü'l-harp* olarak menzillerine koymaları ve gayrimüslimlere karşı verilen mücadele, bu motivasyona esas teşkil etmiştir. Bu yüzden önce Büyük Selçuklular ardından da Anadolu Selçukluları, süreci yöneten temel aktörler olmuşlardır. Bir yandan göçün sevk ve idaresi, diğer yandan her iki devletin de zamanla Anadolu'daki etkinliğini yitirmesine rağmen bazen hilafet merkezi ve bazen de Altın Orda ile Memlûklerin sürece dâhil olması, Türk-İslam âleminin her hattıyla bu mücadele için sıkı bir münasebet hâlinde olduğunu göstermektedir. Dahası, uç bölgelerine gelen nüfusun yalnızca göçerlerden oluşmadığı, buralara aynı zamanda Türk-İslam dünyasının hemen her tarafından şehirli ulema, şeyh ve zanaat erbabı grupların geldiği müşahede edilmektedir (Barkan 281-282; Köprülü, *Osmanlı* 73-77). Özellikle batıdaki uçlara yerleşen ve Moğol istilasından hemen önce Maverâünnehr, Harezm, Horasan, İran ve Azerbaycan'dan Anadolu'ya geçen zümreler arasında bunlara rastlanabilir. Farklı toplumsal/kültürel tabakalarda yer alan *dervişler* ile *heterodoks* ve İslamiyet öncesi *mistik inancı* temsil eden bu gruplar hem şehirlerde hem de kırsal kesimlerde etkili olmuşlardır. Yesevî, Haydarî, Vefâî, Mevlvî, Rufâî, Bektaşî, Bayramî, Kalenderî gibi birçok kola mensup *derviş*, *gâzi*, *abî*, *abdâlân*, *baciyân* ve *alperen* bu uçlara yerleşip bir yandan gâzâ faaliyetlerinde bulunmuş bir yandan da bu topraklardaki Türk-İslam varlığının gelişmesine vesile olmuşlardır (Köprülü, *Osmanlı* 73-101; Köprülü, *Türk Edebiyatı* 207-209; Ocak 53-72).

Barkan'ın ifadesiyle (281), “bu kadar geniş hudutlar içinde kaynaşmakta olan bir âlemin dört bucağında tekevvün eden dinî ve sosyal cereyanları, bilgi ve tecrübeye sahip insanları ve manevî kuvvetleri” bir araya getiren bu dönem, Güneybatı Anadolu'nun kaderini de değiştirmiştir. Anadolu'nun bu bölümündeki sınır boylarında bulunan nüfus, aynı zamanda Türk-İslam dünyasının döneme özgü karışık ve çok renkli yapısını yansıtmaktadır. Bu

karışımında Türk-İslam dünyasının farklı bölgelerinden gelen, hemen her sınıftan ve meslekten birilerini görmek kaçınılmazdır. Bölgenin rahatlıkla kozmopolit olarak nitelendirilebilecek yapısıyla Barkan'ın (282-283) kolonizasyon sürecinin aktörleri olarak yer verdiği “İran, Mısır ve Kırım medreselerinden çıkan hocalar, Orta ve Şarkî Anadolu'dan gelmiş Selçukî ve İlhanî bürokrasisine mensup şahsiyetler, muhtelif tarikatların mümessilleri, İslam şövalye ve misyonerler diyebileceğimiz dervişler” arasında doğrudan bir ilişki kurmak mümkündür (Köprülü, *Bizans* 51-198). Her hattıyla Anadolu'da Türk-İslam varlığının temsilcileri olarak bulunan ve hatta ordulardan önce manevî başarılar kazanan bu *misyoner dervişler*, buldukları bölgelerde tesis ettikleri teşkilat ve vazife olarak benimsedikleri “Türk-İslam nizam ve adalet telakkisinin” teşekkülü için yılmadan mücadele etmişlerdir (Babinger ve Köprülü 13-15). Batı Anadolu bölgesi örneğinde bu durum Denizli ve çevresi için de geçerlidir.

### **Denizli ve Çevresinde Türk-İslam Varlığı ve İnançoğulları Beyliği**

Lâdik Beyliği veya Denizli Beyleri olarak da bilinen İnançoğulları (Kerimüddin Aksarayî 25, 103; Köprülü “Anadolu Beylikleri” 958; Baykara “İnançoğulları” 263-264), XII. yüzyılın sonları ile XIII. yüzyılın başlarında Uluborlu ve Kütahya meliki olan Gıyâseddin Keyhüsrev'in fethettiği topraklarda kurulmuştur. Temelleri ise Denizli-Antalya yöresine yerleştirilen Türkmen gruplarının komutanı Mehmed Bey tarafından atılmıştır (Bayram 294-298). Ancak ilk dönemleri, Anadolu'ya hâkim olan siyasî karmaşadan ötürü net değildir (İbn Bîbî 604). İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı (55-57), beyliğin bu erken safhasının Denizli sınırlarında ve çevresinde vuku bulan hadiselerle bakarak anlaşılabileceğini ifade etmiş, ardından da beyliğin asıl kuruluşunu Şûcauddin İnanç Bey'e bağlamıştır (İbn Battûta 55-57; el-Ömerî 246). İnanç Bey, yukarıda sözü edilen Mehmed Bey'in damadı ve Germiyan ailesinden olan Ali Bey'in oğludur (Baykara, “İnançoğulları” 48-49; Uzunçarşılı 55-56). Bu dönemde Denizli'yi birkaç defa ziyaret eden ve döneme kaynaklık eden bir eser kaleme alan Ahmed Eflâki (253, 303, 307 vd.) hem Ali Bey hem de İnanç Bey'den söz etmektedir. Yine, İbn Bîbî de (664-665) Ali Bey hakkında bilgiler vermektedir.

İnanç Bey, tarihi tam olarak bilinmese de 1319 yılından önce beyliğin tahtına oturmuş olmalıdır. Zira bu dönemde, Anadolu'ya gönderilen ve İlhanlılara bağlı olan beyliklerin verdiği vergi listelerinde İnanç Bey'in de

adına rastlanmaktadır (Baykara, “İnançoğulları” 48-49; Uzunçarşılı 55-56). Muhtemelen İlhanlılar ve onların Anadolu'ya gönderdiği valilerle iyi ilişkiler içinde olan İnanç Bey hem beyliğin isim babalığını yapmış hem de 1336 yılına kadar başında bulunmuştur. İnanç Bey'in, özellikle Germiyanogulları ile olan iyi ilişkilerini Moğollarla da tesis edince uzun bir beylik dönemi geçirdiği anlaşılmaktadır. Bu süre boyunca bölgesini mamur ve müreffeh bir hâle getirerek Denizli'yi ihya ettiği değerlendirilmektedir. Zira döneme tanıklık etmiş bir seyyah olan İbn Battûta, Denizli'ye gelerek İnanç Bey ve oğlu Murad Bey'in yanı sıra bölge hakkında da kıymetli bilgiler vermiştir. Seyyaha göre Lâdik hükümdarı Anadolu'nun ileri gelen beylerinden biri olup, ülkesi de büyük bir ahi yurdudur. Bu ahiler, misafirperverlikte yarış hâlinde ve hatta seyyahı misafir etmek için kavgaya tutuşacak kadar ateşlidirler. İbn Battûta (409-410), ahilere misafir iken İnanç Bey, fakihi Alâeddin Kastamonî'yi onları huzuruna davet etmek üzere göndermiştir. Ramazan ayını Denizli'de geçirdiği anlaşılan seyyah, Denizli'yi bölgenin en güzel, en büyük şehirlerinden biri olarak tasvir etmiştir. Eserinde, Cuma namazının kılındığı yedi büyük camii, bağ ve bahçeleri, düzenli akan çayları, memba suları ve şirin çarşıları olan bu şehirde, dünyada eşi benzeri olmayan altın işlemeli pamuk elbiseler üretildiğinden bahsedilmektedir. Buradan anlaşılacağı gibi İnanç Bey zamanında beylik oldukça parlak bir dönem geçirmiştir. İnanç Bey'e ait son kayıt ise 1335 yılına tarihlenmektedir. Buna göre bir tesis kitabesinde İnanç Bey'in adı, “fi eyyam-i devleti'l-emîr-i muazzam Şücauddin İnanç bin Ali Bey” şeklinde zikredilmektedir (Uzunçarşılı 56).

İnanç Bey'den sonra beyliğin başına oğlu Murad Bey geçmiştir. Gerek İbn Battûta'ya ait kayıtlar gerekse namına kesilmiş sikkeler, Murad Bey'in babasının halefi olduğuna işaret etmektedir. Ayrıca Murad Bey zamanında Fatıha ve İhlas sure tefsirlerinin yapıldığı, Türkçe olarak yapılan bu tefsirlerin mukaddimesinde kendisinden bahsedildiği bilinmektedir.<sup>1</sup> Ancak kendisi kısa bir süre hüküm sürdüğü için dönemine dair fazla bilgi bulunmamaktadır. Ondan sonra beyliğin başına 1360 dolaylarında oğlu İshak Bey geçmiştir. İshak Bey'in de babası gibi ilmî çalışmalara meraklı olduğu belirtilmektedir (Baykara, “İnançoğulları” 49; Uzunçarşılı 57). Ancak onun döneminde komşu Germiyanogulları Beyliği giderek güçlenirken İnançoğullarının özellikle Kuzeybatı Anadolu'da hızla büyümekte olan Osmanlıların etkisinde kaldığı tahmin edilmektedir. Buna göre, 1390 yılında hâlâ hayatta olduğu

anlaşılan İshak Bey, topraklarının bir kısmını Osmanlılara satmış, ardından da onlara tabi olmuş görünmektedir. Dahası, 1402'den sonra Timur tarafından İnançoğulları Beyliği'nin toprakları Germiyan Beyi II. Yakup'a bırakılmıştır (Baykara, “İnançoğulları” 49; Uzunçarşılı 57).

Yaklaşık bir asır gibi kısa süren egemenliği boyunca İnançoğulları Beyliği, Denizli ve yöresinin Türk-İslam varlığını perçinlemesi açısından büyük öneme sahiptir. Germiyanogulları, Aydınogulları ve Menteşeoğulları ile ilişkilerde bulunup bu yörelerin Türk-İslam yurdu olmasına önemli katkılar sunmuştur. Bunun yanında en önemli özelliği, Yukarı Menderes havzasını gayrimüslimlere karşı koruması ve onların daha güneye inmelerine mâni olmasıdır. Ayrıca, Aydınogulları ve Menteşeoğulları topraklarına giden göçü Anadolu'nun batı ve güneybatısına yönlendirerek bu beyliklere insan kaynağı sağlamıştır. Tuncer Baykara, bu yönüyle İnançoğullarının mezkûr beyliklerin esasını oluşturduğu kanaatindedir (Baykara, “İnançoğulları” 49). İnançoğullarının hâkim olduğu toprakların Yukarı Menderes Havzası ve Çürüksu Vadisi'ni tutması (Gökçe 30-32), Anadolu Selçuklu Devleti'nin merkezi Konya ile güneybatı Anadolu'nun bağlantısını kurması ve hatta sağladığı nüfus akışıyla Akdeniz kıyılarının Türkleşmesine katkıda bulunması, onları değerli kılan diğer hususlardır. Ayrıca, XIV. yüzyılın ikinci yarısından sonra Osmanlılara kattıklarıyla Kuzeybatı Anadolu'nun Türk-İslam yurdu hâline gelişindeki etkileri de hafife alınamaz. Daha evvel, İbn Battûta'dan da nakledildiği üzere, bu beylik, nüfusunun çoğu Rumlardan oluşan Denizli'nin Türkleşmesinde rol oynamıştır. Özellikle bu devirde Denizli ve çevresinin ahi, fakih ve dervişlerle dolması, nüfusun Moğolların ardından bu bölgede yoğunlaşması oldukça dikkate değerdir. Bu bağlamda, kalabalık şekilde tutulan stratejik noktalar sayesinde batıdan gelebilecek tehlikelerin de önüne geçilmiştir (Altan 580-581; Baykara, *Denizli Tarihi* 15-19; Gökçe 37-40). Ayıca bu kimseler, Osmanlı dönemine gelindiğinde burada bulunan Rumların dillerini unutup Türkçe konuşmalarını sağlayacak süreci de başlatmışlardır.

Barkan'ın (284) işaret ettiği dervişler, şehir yerleşimlerinde Mevlevî ve Bektaşî gibi tarikatların öğretilerinden ve oluşturdukları düzenden ziyade, “hâli” ve “tenha” yerlerde “Türk manastırları” tarzında zaviyeler kuran kişilerdir. İşte bu noktada, Yukarı Menderes Havzası'nı tutan bölgede konumlanan ve bu araştırmaya konu olan dervişler ile bunların

oluşturdukları düzen, bölgedeki Türk-İslam varlığının yerleşmesini sağlayan bir örnek olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Özellikle Denizli il merkezinde İbn Battûta ve el-Ömerî'nin işaret ettiği yoğun ahi ve derviş unsurlarından farklı olarak *kırsal* yerleşime odaklandığı anlaşılan bu dervişlerin, tuttukları geçiş noktalarıyla yer değiştiren nüfusun sağlıklı bir rota izlemesini sağlamak ve özellikle Moğol istilasıyla beraber göçebe unsurların yerleşeceği yeni mıntıkların belirlenmesi gibi işlerle ön plana çıktıkları anlaşılmaktadır. Böylece, Güneybatı Anadolu'nun demografik yapısındaki değişimin önemli bir parçası hâline gelen bu dervişlerin buldukları konum ve aralarındaki bağlantı, onların geldikleri bölgelerin örf ve adetlerini beraberinde getiren, yerleştikleri noktalarda *muhaceret* sürecini yöneten ve Türk-İslam olgusunu oturtmaya çalışan seçkin kimseler olduklarını ortaya koymaktadır. Bu süreç ve amacın hasıl oluşu ise hem bölgedeki Anadolu Selçuklu etkisi hem de kurulduktan sonra İnançoğulları Beyliği'nin burada sağladığı nizamın bir sonucudur.

### **Attouda/Hisar ve Çevresinde Türk-İslam Varlığı**

#### **Attouda ve Çevresinin Kısa Tarihi**

Attouda, günümüzde Denizli ilinin Sarayköy ilçesine bağlı Hisar Mahallesi olarak varlığını sürdüren canlı bir yerleşimdir. Salbakos (Babadağ) Dağı'nın kuzeyindeki doğal bir tepe üzerinde kurulan bu kent, kuzey, güney ve doğu olmak üzere üç yönden sarp uçurumlarla çevrili olup, doğal ve korunaklı bir kale görünümündedir. Yerleşimin sınırlarını belirleyen ve kentin doğusunda birleşip Menderes Irmağı'na doğru akan kuzeyindeki Arap Deresi ile güneyindeki Bakla Deresi, kentin doğal sınırlarını oluşturmaktadır. Sırtını Babadağ'a yaslayan Attouda, bu yönüyle son derece korunaklı ve alınması çok zor bir kaleye dönüşmüştür (Yılmaz Kolancı 369-370).

Farklı kültürlerle ait izler barındırmasına ve köklü bir geçmişe sahip olmasına rağmen kentin tarihi hakkında bilgi veren eserlere ancak XIX. yüzyıldan itibaren tesadüf edilmektedir. Bunlar ise sayıca az ve içerikçe sınırlıdır. Yine de Denizli yöresinde günümüze kadar gerçekleştirilen birtakım arkeolojik kazı ve belgeleme çalışmalarının, kentin antik dönemine bir nebze ışık tuttuğu söylenebilir.<sup>2</sup> Öte yandan buranın Türk-İslam kültürüne iltisakını ele alan çalışmaların sayısı bir elin parmaklarını geçmemektedir. Dahası, Attouda/Hisar'ı “yeri ve sağlam yapısı ise Lâdik'in batıdaki bekçisi” olarak

niteleyen Tuncer Baykara'nın ("800 Yıl Önce" 46) kısa değerlendirmesi dışında, kentin Osmanlı öncesi devrine odaklanan neredeyse hiçbir çalışma bulunmamaktadır. Bunun haricinde, Sarayköy Belediyesi tarafından 2016 yılında basılan yirmi sayfalık broşürde de (Söğüt 2-21) kentin Türkler tarafından kontrol altına alınması ve sonrasına dair bilgi bulabilmek neredeyse imkânsızdır. Burada yalnızca cami, tekke ve mezarlıklardaki birtakım buluntulardan örnekler verilerek, bunlar kısaca yorumlanmıştır. Dolayısıyla bu boşluğu doldurmak üzere, günümüzde Attouda ve çevresini disiplinlerarası bir anlayışla her yönden ele alan en kapsamlı teşebbüsün, 2021-2023 yılları arasında *Attouda ve Çevresi Yüzey Araştırması* adıyla yürütülen proje olduğu söylenebilir.<sup>3</sup>

Denizli ve yöresinin Türk-İslam yurdu hâline gelişinde 1206 yılına işaret eden Baykara ("800 Yıl Önce" 45-46), Selçuklu ordusunun kuvvetlerini ikiye bölerek, Antalya'nın fethinden önce yöreyi elde tutabilecek müstahkem mevkilere yöneldiği kanısındadır. Dolayısıyla, Bizans'ın elinde açık bir şehir görünümü arz eden "Lâdik/Laodikeia ile hiç meşgul olmamış" ve bütün gücüyle batıya yönelerek bölgedeki stratejik önemi haiz diğer kalelerle birlikte Attouda/Hisar'ı ele geçirmiştir. Buraya hâkim olduktan sonra da ileri karakollarını daha batıya taşıyarak burada ribâtlar yaptırmışlardır. Esasında, Denizli kırsalı XI. yüzyıldaki göçlerle büyük oranda Türkleşmişse de bu sürecin İnançoğulları Beyliği'nin tekâmülüyle tamamlandığı söylenebilir. Ancak, bunu kati surette belgeleyen yazılı bir kaynak günümüze ne yazık ki ulaşmamıştır. Buna binaen en erken kayıtların, Osmanlı Devleti zamanında yapılan idarî taksimat içerisinde görüldüğü söylenebilir. İlgili belgeler aracılığıyla Sarayköy'ün mahiyeti ile zaman içerisinde geçirmiş olduğu değişim izlenebilmektedir. Örneğin Hisar'ın bugün bağlı olduğu Sarayköy ilçesi, Osmanlı kaynaklarında "İbsili", "Ezine-i Lâdikiye" "Ezine-i Lazkiye" gibi adlarla yer almış, İbsili ve Ezine daha sonra idarî taksimat içerisinde faklı kadılıklar olarak varlıklarını devam ettirmişlerdir.<sup>4</sup> XVI. ve XVII. yüzyıllara ait defterlere göre (Ek 1) "Lâzıkıyye" kazası merkez dışında İbsili, Kaş-Yenice ve Avdos olmak üzere dört nahiyeden oluşmuştur (BOA.TT.d.369 458; Gökçe 69-71 vd.). İbsili, aslında bugünkü Sarayköy ve Babadağ ilçelerinin bütün hududunu kapsarken, XVI. asrın sonunda kazadan ayrılarak kadılık statüsü kazanmıştır (Gökçe 70). Sarayköy ise merkezini "Hoca-Oğlu" köyünün teşkil ettiği ve 1622 tarihli avâriz kayıtlarında görülen Ezine isimli bir iskân merkezidir. Hatta bu dönemden itibaren Saray ismiyle de maruftur

(Gökçe 257-258). Bu örnekte görüldüğü üzere, araştırma konusu bölgeyi bu denli net bir idarî taksimata tabi tutmak ya da bu hâl üzere tanımlamak, erken dönem için oldukça zor görünmektedir.

Daha önce değinildiği üzere, Hisar ve çevresine yerleşen *dervişler* Denizli merkezdeki zaviyelerden farklı birer örnek teşkil etmektedir. Bu açıdan şehirlerde ve diğer yerleşim birimlerinde daha sistematik bir hüviyet arz eden, nispi bir kurumsallık ve yönetim sergileyen zaviyelerden ziyade, bu bölgede görülen dervişler tamamen *kırsal hayat nosyonuna* göre hareket etmiş gibidir. Barkan (285), şehirlerdeki dervişleri “tekkelerde âyin ve ibadetle meşgul olan ve sadaka ile geçinen” zatlar olarak tanımlamaktadır. Onların aksine, özellikle konargöçer Türkmenler arasında telkinde bulunan, kırsalda yaşayan ve toprakla uğraşan derviş tiplmesi Hisar'daki örnekleri bire bir karşılamaktadır. Bu dervişlere ait olan türbelerinin durumlarına bakıldığında ise ne çok kompleks ne de azametli yapılar oldukları görülmektedir. Buna rağmen üstlendikleri misyon gereği tıpkı Barkan'ın (285) belirttiği gibi “yeni bir dünyaya gelip yerleşen halk yığınları için, içtimaî ve siyasi büyük rol oynamış büyük kahramanlar, bu hengâmeli devirde halkın içinden yetişmiş mümessil şahsiyetlerdir.” Bu özellikleriyle bugün Hisar halkı arasında hâlen anılan ve *yedi kardeş* olarak bilinen bu dervişler, büyük bir ihtimalle kardeşliklerini kan bağına değil, Hisar ile çevresinin Türk-İslam yurdu olması için verdikleri mücadeleye borçludur. Onlar hem Yukarı Menderes Havzası geçiş yollarını tutan kolcular hem de bu bölgenin iskân ve kolonizasyonunu sağlayan aktörler olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Kaldı ki nasıl hitap edildiğine bakarak, bunların bölgede bulunan Osmanlı kurumsal zaviyelerinden açık bir şekilde ayrıldıkları öne sürülebilir *Sarı, Çiçek, Eren, Mecnun, Okçu, Deynekli* ve muhtemelen Hızır figürüne gönderme yapan *Hıdırellez* gibi ad ve lakaplarla karşımıza çıkan bu kimseler, aslında sadece birer tasavvuf ehli değil aynı zamanda dertlere derman bulan, otacılık yapan, gayrimüslimlerle harp eden ve bu noktada halkı örgütleyen *derviş, eren* ve *baba* gibi rollerle karşımıza çıkmaktadır. O yüzden Hisar ve çevresindeki bu dervişler, bir diğeri ile iltisaklı şekilde *biri düzlükte, diğeri vadi ve tepeleri tutan, intizam içerisinde haberleştikleri belli olan bir ağ* kurmuşlardır (Ek 2). Bunlar, Babadağ dağ sırasının hemen her noktasını tutmuş, batıya geçiş güzergahlarını kontrol altına almış ve bir *hilal* biçiminde bölgeye konuşlanmışlardır. Her biri bulunduğu bölgeye/köye/vadiye “ismini vermiş, elinin emeği ve alnının teriyle dağ başlarına ve ücra



köşelere yer açıp yerleşmiş, bağ-bahçe yetiştirmiş bu dervişler, garbe doğru Türk akınlarını” (Barkan 285) yönetmişlerdir.

Attouda/Hisar'da Kolonizatör Türk Dervişlerine Ait Olduğu Düşünülen Türbeler:

### *Sarı Baba Türbesi*

Koordinat: 37° 54' 29,34" Kuzey — 28° 45' 56,25" Doğu

Sultan Sarı Baba olarak da bilinen türbe, kuş uçuşuyla Hisar'ın yaklaşık 9 km kuzeybatısında olup, 420 metrelik rakımda yer almaktadır. Bakımlı ve restore edilmiş iki odalı bir yapı içerisinde 300 cm uzunluğunda, 132 cm genişliğinde ve 80 cm yüksekliğinde, etrafı beton yapıyla çevrilmiş bir sanduka mezar bulunmaktadır (Ek 3). Her ne kadar türbenin girişine, bu şahsın VII. yüzyılda yaşadığı ve İslamiyet'e hizmet etmek için Horasan'dan bu bölgeye geldiğini ifade eden bir yazı asılmışsa da Türklerin İslamiyet'i kabulü ve Anadolu'ya gelmeye başladıkları tarihler düşünüldüğünde, bu bilginin tutarsız olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Kaldı ki türbe ya da mezarda herhangi bir kitabe ya da şahide taşı mevcut değildir. Buna ek olarak, Gökçe'nin çalışmasında (257) Sarı Baba'nın kardeşi olduğuna inanılan ve Sarayköy'de bir mahalleye ismini veren *Veli Dede* adlı dervişe ait bir türbeden daha söz edilmektedir. Adı geçen türbenin, gelecek yıllarda yapılacak olan saha araştırmalarına dâhil edilmesi düşünülmektedir.

Sarı Baba Türbesi'nin hemen yanında Tekke Köyü Camii bulunmaktadır. Bu cami 1900 yılına tarihlendirilmiştir. Türbenin üç yanında abidevi zeytin ağaçları dikilmiş olup, hazire ve çevre kısmında çoğu Osmanlı dönemine tarihlenen mezarlar yer almaktadır. Günümüzde bu alan defin işlemleri için hâlen kullanılmaktadır. Türbenin kapısında yer alan ve borazan olduğu düşünülen bir adet işlenmiş taş mevcuttur (Ek 3). Köyün yerlileri tarafından iki tane olduğu dile getirilen bu borazan taşlarından biri kayıptır. Taşların haberleşme amaçlı kullanıldıkları düşünülmektedir. Hisar'ın eski sakinlerinden Salih Aytekin'in anılarında da (64) ortası delikli bu mermer taşın üflendiğinde “vapur düdüğü” gibi kuvvetli bir ses çıkardığını, “dağdaki, taştaki Yukarı Tırkazdaki insanları ve dervişleri çağırmak” için kullanıldığı doğrulanmaktadır. Türbenin su kaynağı vardır. Restorasyon geçirmiş olan türbe, diğer altı tanesine kıyasla çok daha iyi korunmuştur. Bulunduğu konum yerleşim yeri içerisinde kalmış olup, günümüzde burası bir mahalle hüviyetindedir.

### *Çiçek Dede Türbesi*

Koordinat: 37° 52' 52,91" Kuzey — 28° 45' 11,38" Doğu

Yusuf Çiçek Baba adıyla da bilinen türbe, kuş uçuşuyla Hisar'ın yaklaşık 7 km kuzeybatısında olup, 700 metrelik rakımda yer almaktadır. Burada, 450 cm x 600 cm ebatlarında bir yapı içerisinde 315 cm uzunluk, 130 cm genişlik ve 84 cm yüksekliğinde bir sanduka mezar bulunmaktadır (Ek 4). Baş kısmında Osmanlı dönemine tarihlenen, mezara ait olmayan fakat türbenin tarihçesi ve önemi hakkında bilgi veren işlenmiş bir şahide taşı mevcuttur. Üzerindeki yazılara göre bu türbe, "Çiçek Baba" adına, hicri "1324 senesinde" [m. 1906/7] "Hacı Osman" adlı bir şahıs tarafından yaptırılmıştır (Ek 4). Şahide 23 cm genişlik, 70 cm yükseklik ve 6 cm kalınlığındadır. Taşın arka kısmı konveks şekillidir. Türbe, bulunduğu konum itibarıyla Eren Tep'e'ye giden bağlantı noktası üzerinde yer almaktadır. Türbenin dışında mezarlık bulunmayıp yanında bir adet gömü tespit edilmiştir (Ek 4). Türbenin su kaynağı mevcuttur. Bununla birlikte çevresinde düzenleme yapılmış ve 2014 yılında ziyaret amaçlı bir mesire alanı oluşturulmuştur. Türbenin kendisi de 13 Eylül 1983 tarihinde tamir ve bakım görmüştür. Bakım masrafları Denizli "Yenağa" köyünden "Hüseyin Balta Aydın" tarafından karşılanmıştır. Türbe, ormanlık alan ve vadi içerisinde bir tepeye kurulmuş, geçiş güzergahını koruyan silsilenin ikinci merkezidir. Bir taraftan da Sarı Baba — Eren Baba hattı arasında kalmakla bu bağı kuran nokta olduğu düşünülmektedir.

### *Eren Baba Türbesi*

Koordinat: 37° 51' 45,19" Kuzey — 28° 45' 29,93" Doğu

Kuş uçuşuyla Hisar'ın yaklaşık 5,5 km batısında olup, 1164 metreyle buraya ait yedi türbe içerisindeki en yüksek rakımda konumlanmıştır. Bu özelliğiyle diğer türbeleri kontrol edebilecek bir mahiyeti haiz olabilir. Aynı zamanda mezar üzerinde türbevari bir yapısı bulunmayan tek yerdir. Burada, 63 cm genişliğinde, 183 cm uzunluğunda ve 58 cm yüksekliğinde, sembolik olduğu düşünülen mermerle çevrili bir mezar yeri bulunmaktadır (Ek 5). Mermer sandukanın üzerinde bulunduğu alanın tümsek yapısı, buranın ana mezar olabileceği izlenimini uyandırmaktadır. Bunun dışında herhangi bir gömü izine rastlanmamış olup mezarın yanındaki anıtsal ağaç dışında ne bir su kaynağı ne de başka bir yapı kalıntısı göze çarpmaktadır.

Mezarın bulunduğu tepe, günümüzde Orman Genel Müdürlüğüne bağlı bir yangın kontrol noktası olarak kullanılmakta ve ilgili kuruma ait modern bir yapıyı barındırmaktadır. Bu derviş silsilesi içerisinde çevreye en hâkim konumda olmasının dışında, diğerlerinin aksine Babadağ'ın arka tarafını yani batısını gözetleme imkânı sunmaktadır. Bu yönüyle bölgeye batıdan yönelen herhangi bir tehlikenin buradan diğer dervişlere haber verilmiş olması kuvvetle muhtemeldir. Ayrıca Hisar'ı tepeden görebilecek hâkim bir noktayı tutmasıyla kentin sırtını yasladığı bir dayanak gibidir.

### *Mecnun Dede Türbesi*

Koordinat: 37° 50' 19,86" Kuzey — 28° 48' 46,80" Doğu

Hisar'ın merkezindeki bu türbe, 710 metrelik rakımda yer almaktadır. Burada, 540 cm x 630 cm ebatlarındaki bir yapı içerisinde 295 cm uzunluğunda, 162 cm genişliğinde ve 155 cm yüksekliğinde bir sanduka mezar mevcuttur (Ek 6 ve 7). Türbenin etrafında Osmanlı dönemini de içine alan bir hazire ve küçük mezarlık yer almaktadır. Ancak, burada Mecnun Dede'nin mezar taşına veya yapıya ait herhangi bir kitabe rastlanmamıştır. Türbenin güneyinde, günümüzde kullanılmayan fakat tarihî olduğu anlaşılan düz tavanlı ufak bir mescit bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca, türbenin güneybatısında, önceleri *Azizler* lakabıyla bilinen bir aile tarafından kullanılmış ve korunmuş bir yapı daha mevcuttur. 2021 yılında yapılan yüzey araştırmasında tespit edildiği üzere buranın aslında bir *çilehane* olabileceği düşünülmektedir (Ek 7). 1980'li yıllara kadar türbenin bekçiliğini yapan Azizler aile mensuplarından edinilen bilgiye göre, türbede yatan şahsın Mecnun Dede olarak bilindiği teyit edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla, Sarayköy Belediyesi tarafından basılan broşürde (Sögüt *Attouda: Hisarköy* 9) "Azizler Tekkesi" olarak gösterilen bu türbenin yanlış adlandırıldığı ve yerel halkın Azizler sözcüğü ile aslında türbeye bekçilik eden aileyi kastettiği görülebilir. Aytekin'in anılarında (61-62), "Meçhul Dede" adıyla da bilinen türbeyi dergâha çevirdiği ifade edilen üç şeyhten ikisinin adı da Aziz'dir. Kaldı ki Baykara da ("800 Yıl Önce" 46) bölgenin fethinde etkin bir rol oynayan Esedüddin Ayaz Bey'in aynı zamanda "Mecnun Ayas" olarak bilindiğini ve Mecnun Dede ile ikisinin aynı kişi olabileceğini ifade etmiştir. Benzer şekilde Aytekin (64), köyün yakınlarındaki türbelerin "Anadolu'nun fethinde şehit düşen Horasanlı askerlere" ait olduğuna yönelik bir inanıştan söz etmektedir.

Mecnun Dede Türbesi'nin güney-güneydoğu hattında uzanan alanda, yine aynı yıl yapılan jeoradar çalışması neticesinde kutsal mekân izlenimi veren yapılar tespit edilmiştir. Türk-İslam geleneğine göre fethedilen topraklardaki mabetlerin ibadethaneye çevrilmesi örneğine uyan bu türbe, İslami bir yapı kompleksi izlenimi vermektedir. Türbenin su kaynağı mevcuttur. Sahip olduğu kompozisyon ve merkezî konumu, diğer türbelerin buraya bağlı olma ihtimalini güçlendirmektedir. Ancak bunu açıkça gösteren bir delil henüz mevcut değildir.

Türbede muhtemelen Osmanlı dönemine denk gelen biri kırmızı, diğeri yeşil renkli olmak üzere iki sancağın bulunduğu hakkında yerel halktan edinilen bilgiye rağmen bunlardan yeşil renkli olanının kaybolduğu ve günümüze ancak diğेरinin ulaşabildiği belirtilmiştir. Kayıp sancağa ait eski bir fotoğraflardan anlaşıldığı kadarıyla eserin sağ üst kısmında besmele bulunmaktaysa da devamı sola doğru tahrip olmuştur. İkinci satırında hamd ve üçüncü satırında Kelime-i tevhid yazılıdır. Alt kısmında “Ya hazret-i pir Hüsamettin Şeyh Uşşaki kuddise sırruhu fi 27 Ramazan sene 1297/2 Eylül 1880” ibaresi bulunmaktadır. Bu satırın hemen üstünde yine türbeye ait fakat kayıp ya da çalıntı olduğu söylenen bir teberin tasviri yer almaktadır (Ek 8). Kaybolana kadar uzun yıllar boyunca türbenin duvarında asılı olduğu söylenen sancağın XV. ve XVI. yüzyıllarda yaşamış olan bu zata ait olmadığı ve türbe ile doğrudan bir ilişkisinin bulunmadığından söz edilebilir. Üzerinde Fetih Suresi'nin yer aldığı kırmızı sancağın ise bugün Sarayköy Belediyesi tarafından muhafaza edildiği ifade edilmektedir. Benzer şekilde, Osmanlı dönemine tarihlendiği hâlde anakronik biçimde türbeye ait olduğu düşünülen ve burada muhafaza edildiği hâlde sonradan çalınan veya kaybolan parçalar arasında bir adet sancak alemi ve gürz de bulunmaktadır (Ek 8).

### *Hıdırellez Türbesi*

Koordinat: 37° 50' 15,96" Kuzey — 28° 49' 16,38" Doğu

Hisar'ın doğusunda, kuş uçuşu yaklaşık 1 km uzaklıkta bulunan türbe, 780 metrelik rakımda konumlanmıştır. 5 x 5 metre ebatlarında bir yapı içerisinde 119 cm genişliğinde, 232 cm uzunluğunda ve 82 cm yüksekliğinde sahip beton bir sanduka mezar bulunmaktadır (Ek 9). Türbenin girişine giden yol ayrımında *Yedi Kardeşler Türbesi* yazan bir tabela yer alsa da

yerel halk tarafından bölgedeki türbelerin tamamı zaten bu şekilde adlandırılmaktadır. Türbe yanında modern bir gölgelik bulunmakta olup burası her sene Hıdırellez şenliklerinde kullanılmaktadır. Bu geleneğin bir parçası olarak burada yapılan şenliklerde aşure kaynatılmaktadır. Aytekin'in anılarında (70), söz konusu şenliklerin 1840'lı yıllardan itibaren yaklaşık bir asır boyunca her yılın 6 Mayıs günü kutlandığı bilgisi yer almaktadır. Kutlamalarda, okul çocuklarından yaşlılara kadar her grubun yanlarına erzak alıp “bağa bahçeye” gittikleri, büyüklerin ve gençlerin “silah atarak eğlendikleri” ifade edilmektedir. Bu bilgiler, türbenin en azından 1950'li yıllara kadar Hıdırellez şenliklerinde özel bir yere sahip olduğuna işaret etmektedir. Aytekin'e göre (70) köyün ekonomisinin giderek bozulmasıyla 1948 yılından sonra şenlikler artık yapılmaz olmuştur. Ancak köyün yaşlıları arasında Hıdırellez'in “atılan silahlar yüzünden ürkütüğü ve artık köye uğramadığına” yönelik birtakım inanışların varlığından söz edilmektedir. Yerel halktan edinilen bilgilere göre de türbe en az elli yıldır bu şenliklerin uğrak noktasıdır. O hâlde türbe hem köye olan yakınlığı sebebiyle bağa bahçeye çıkma geleneğinin yaşatılabilmesi hem de yerel inanışlara konu olması bakımından köydeki Hıdırellez şenliklerine sonradan tekrar ev sahipliği yapmaya başlamış olabilir. Çevresinde günümüzde kullanılabilecek bir su kaynağına rastlanmamıştır. Ayrıca, türbe ve çevresinde Anadolu'da yaygın olan çaput bağlama geleneği de görülmemektedir. Türbenin bitişiğinde 210 cm genişliğinde, 360 cm uzunluğunda sıra taşlarla çevrili, doğu-batı eksenli bir mezar daha mevcuttur (Ek 9). Bu yapının doğal görünümünü korumadığı ve muhtemelen kaçak olarak kazıldığı/eşildiği tahmin edilmektedir.

### *Okçu Baba Türbesi*

Koordinat: 37° 49' 04,91" Kuzey — 28° 48' 55,33" Doğu

*Okçu Halil Baba* olarak da bilinen ve kuş uçuşuyla Hisar'ın yaklaşık 2 km güneyinde bulunan türbe, 740 metrelik rakımda yer almaktadır. 580 cm x 450 cm ebatlarında bir yapı içerisinde 394 cm uzunluğunda, 100 cm genişliğinde ve 68 cm yüksekliğinde yan yana defnedilen iki kişilik sandukasız bir mezar barındırmaktadır (Ek 10). Yerel halktan edinilen bilgiye göre Okçu Baba ve eşi Fatma, Haçlı/Bizans ile yapılan bir savaşta şehit olarak buraya defnedilmiştir. Bu mevki çorak arazi anlamına gelen *Kıranyer* olarak bilinmektedir. Ancak daha önce “kırıklar” ve “kırılan

yer” olarak denilen bu bölgede, vadiden geçen Bizans/Haçlı birliklerinin pusuya düşürüldüğü ve çok sayıda askerin kırıldığı ifade edilmektedir. Dolayısıyla, adlandırma bu olayla ilişkilidir (Denizli İl Kültür 7). Türbenin yakınlarındaki tepelik alanlarda bulunan ve Selçuklu-Bizans/Haçlı savaşına ait olduğu söylenen buluntular da bu iddiayı doğrulamaktadır. Kaldı ki *okçu* hitabı aslında bu dervişin savaşçı bir figür olduğunu ve şehadeti dolayısıyla saygı gördüğünü göstermektedir. Türbenin çevresi bugün yaygın bir mezarlık olarak kullanılmakta ve bünyesinde Osmanlı dönemine ait birçok mezar barındırmaktadır. Ayrıca, Sarı Baba Türbesi'nde olduğu gibi burada da anıtsal ağaçlara rastlanmıştır.

Türbe içerisinde yer alan ikili mezarın baş ve ayak kısımlarında ikişer adet şahide taşı bulunmakta olup, baş şahidelerinin ön ve arka yüzlerinde Arapça yazılar mevcuttur (Ek 10). Sağda bulunan baş şahidesi 28 cm genişliğe, 52 cm yüksekliğe ve 7 cm kalınlığa, solda bulunan baş şahidesi ise 32 cm genişliğe, 54 cm yükseliğe ve 7 cm kalınlığa sahiptir. Her iki şahidenin de dip kısımları betonla kaplanmış olup, üzerine kireç çekilmiştir. Bu yüzden yazıların altta kalan kısımları fazla okunaklı değildir. Okunabilen kısımlara bakıldığında ise soldaki şahidenin ön yüzünde “Merhume Fatma”, arka yüzünde de “Okçu Halil'in” adları yer almaktadır. Sağdaki şahidenin ön yüzünde ise sonradan yapılan kaplama sebebiyle tam okunamayan bir tarih verilmiştir. Türbe duvarına ziyaretçilere bilgi verme amacıyla asılan metinde bu tarih, “Haram (Ramazan) ayının 9. Seheri” olarak gösterilmiştir. Ayak kısmında bulunan sağ şahide 30 cm genişliğe, 34 cm yüksekliğe ve 9 cm kalınlığa, sol şahide ise 23 cm genişliğe, 39 cm yüksekliğe ve 9 cm kalınlığa sahiptir. Her iki ayak şahidesinde de yazı bulunmamaktadır.

Okçu Baba Türbesi'nde yer alan mezarları diğer türbelerdeki mezarlardan ayıran en temel özellik, öncelikle diğerlerinde bulunmayan bir *kitabeye* sahip olmasıdır. Üstelik, bu kitabenin Osmanlı Türkçesiyle değil de Arapça yazılmış olması, mezarların Osmanlı öncesi döneme tekabül ettiğini gösteren kuvvetli bir delildir. Denizli İl Kültür ve Turizm Müdürlüğüne ait bir broşürde (7) Okçu Halil'in “1207-1212 yıllarındaki” Selçuklu-Bizans çatışmalarında “şehit olan uç beylerinden biri” olduğu bilgisi yer almaktadır. Türbenin su kaynağı mevcut olup, türbe ziyaret ve gömü amaçlı olarak hâlen kullanılmaktadır.

### *Deynekli Baba Türbesi*

Koordinat: 37° 48' 29,04" Kuzey — 28° 49' 53,35" Doğu

Kuş uçuşuyla Hisar'ın yaklaşık 3,7 km güneydoğusunda olup, 777 metrelik rakımda konumlanmıştır. Türbe, 550 cm x 600 cm ebatlarında bir yapı içerisinde 104 cm genişliğinde, 315 cm uzunluğunda ve 85 cm yüksekliğinde bir sanduka mezar barındırmaktadır (Ek 11). Türbenin etrafı bugün yaygın bir mezarlık hâlinde olup çevresinde Osmanlı döneminden birçok mezar bulunmaktadır. Türbe, bakımlıdır ve ziyaret/gözü amaçlı olarak günümüzde hâlen kullanılmaktadır. Türbenin yanında su kaynağı mevcuttur.

Uğrak bir yer olmasına rağmen diğerlerine kıyasla hakkında en az bilgi ve rivayet bulunan türbe burasıdır. Üstelik, çevrede buranın tarihine ışık tutacak bir kitabe ya da Deynekli Baba'ya ait bir mezar taşı da bulunmamaktadır.

### **Sonuç**

2024 itibarıyla üç yıl süren yüzey araştırmaları ve önceki yıllara ait sınırlı çalışmalardan elde edilen veriler, Attouda/Hisar bölgesindeki türbeler ile bölgenin Türk-İslam yurduna dönüşmesinin erken safhaları arasındaki tarihsel bağlantıyı güçlü biçimde ortaya koymaktadır. Burada, adlarıyla birlikte türbe ve mezarlarına değinilen kolonizatör Türk dervişleri ile Hisar yerleşimine yakın ve merkezi olarak konumlanan muadilleri arasında belirgin farklılıklar bulunmaktadır. Her birine *eren*, *derviş*, *baba*, *dede* gibi roller atfedilen bu kişiler ne yerel halkın zihninde ne Denizli merkezde ne de Babadağ dağ silsilesinin hemen batısında yer alan diğer tekke ve zaviyelere mahsus *şeyh* ve buna benzer yüksek makamlarla anılmışlardır. Söz gelimi, Hisar'ın batısında konumlanan ve açık bir şekilde Osmanlı dönemine tarihlendirilen *Şeyh Kemal Zaviyesi* gerek adı gerekse ihtiva ettiği kompleks yapıyla bu türbelerden açıkça ayrılmaktadır. Daha kırsal bir profil çizen kolonizatör dervişler ise hilal düzeninde konuşlandıkları Babadağ hattı boyunca Türklerin batıya sarkmasını kolaylaştırarak Menteşe ile Aydın yöresinde iskân edilecek Türkmen nüfusunun geçiş güzergahını güvence altına almışlardır. Buna ek olarak, kendi aralarında kurdukları iletişim ağıyla, batıdan yönelebilecek tehditler karşısında yöre halkını örgütleyen birer ileri karakol görevi üstlenmişlerdir. Yukarı Menderes Havzası'nın batıya açılan ilk kapısını tutan ve Çürüksu Vadisi'ni kontrol altına alan bu kişiler,

göçerlerin kolaylıkla uyum sağlayabildiği yeni kırsal alanları yerleşime açarak bölgedeki Türk-İslam varlığının perçinlenmesine ön ayak olmuşlardır. Öte yandan, *Mecnun Dede* dışındaki türbelerin etrafında yapılaşmanın başlaması ve nüfusun iskâna tabi tutulması, muhtemelen daha geç dönemlere denk düşmektedir. Bizi bu düşünceye sevk eden durum ise hâlihazırda bu türbelerden üçünün etrafında hâlen bir yerleşimin bulunmayışıdır. Bu bağlamda, *Çiçek*, *Eren* ve *Hıdırellez* türbelerinin yakınında veya yöresinde henüz Türk-İslam devrine ait bir yerleşim izine rastlanmamıştır. Bunun yanı sıra *Sarı*, *Okçu* ve *Deynekli Baba* türbelerine yakın yerleşimler ise daha geç dönemlere işaret etmektedir. Bunlardan ilk ikisinin çevresinde bolca bulunan ve en erken örnekleri XVII. yüzyıla tekabül eden mezar taşları incelenerek bu değerlendirme doğrulanabilir. Dahası, etrafında yerleşim bulunan türbelerin Osmanlı döneminde kullanıldıkları, çevresinde bulunan mezarlıklardan da anlaşılmaktadır. Bu süreklilik, türbelerin korunması ve günümüze kadar ayakta kalmasını sağlamış görünmektedir. *Mecnun Dede Türbesi*'ne ait olmadığı hâlde muhtemelen sonraki dönemlerde buraya getirilen ve daha sonra kaybolan eserler de bu ihtimali güçlendirmektedir. Dolayısıyla, *Mecnun Dede* örneğinde, türbenin Uşşaki Tarikatı'yla bir ilişkisinin bulunduğu ya da mensuplarınca kullanıldığı söylenebilir.

Edindiğimiz izlenimlere göre *Mecnun Dede Türbesi* bu silsile içerisinde merkezî bir rol almış olabilir. Öncelikle bu türbe, yerleşimin antik dönemden beri süregeldiği Attouda/Hisar'ın içinde yer almaktadır. Ayrıca, proje kapsamında gerçekleştirilen jeoradar uygulamaları neticesinde, türbenin altında kutsal alan izlenimi veren anomali tespit edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla bu türbe, erken dönem Türk-İslam şehircilik anlayışının bir parçası olarak Hisar'da bulunan çok daha eski bir mabedin dönüştürülmesiyle yapılmış olabilir. Şayet böyleyse *Mecnun Dede Türbesi*'nin etrafında *Eren*, *Çiçek* ve *Sarı Baba* olmak üzere üç tanesi batı-kuzeybatı istikametinde, *Hıdırellez*, *Okçu* ve *Deynekli Baba* olmak üzere geri kalan üç tanesi ise doğu-güneydoğu hattında yer alan bu yedi türbe bilinçli ve birbirleriyle ilişkili bir biçimde kurulmuşlardır. Kendi içerisinde oldukça belirgin bir düzen barındıran bu yedi türbeden dört tanesi, etrafına kıyasla daha yüksek rakımda olan tepelere, kalan üç tanesi ise nispeten düşük rakımlı vadilere yerleşmiştir. Bu sayede, batıya doğru giden nüfus, Aydın ve yöresinde Aydınoğulları Beyliği, Muğla ve civarında da Menteşeoğulları Beyliği'nin hâkimiyet tesis etmesinde önemli roller üstlenmişlerdir.



Sonuç olarak, halk arasında *yedi kardeş* olarak bilinen bu dervişler, aslında XIII. asırda bölgeye gelmiş ve buranın Türk-İslam yurdu olmasını sağlamış kolculardır. Bunların gerçekten kardeş olup olmadıklarını ya da hangi tarikatı/görüşü temsil ettiklerini tespit etmek şimdilik mümkün görünmese de yüklendikleri misyon açıktır. İlerleyen yıllarda Attouda/Hisar ve çevresinde disiplinlerarası anlayışla sürdürülecek arkeolojik çalışmalar, bölgenin antik mirasını gün yüzüne çıkaracağı kadar Türk tarihinin hâlen aydınlatılmayı bekleyen bu dönemlerine de ışık tutacaktır.

### **Destek ve Teşekkür Beyanı**

Bu çalışma, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı'nın 12.07.2021 tarih ve 161.01-1545564 sayılı izniyle 2021-2023 yılları arasında yürütülen Attouda ve Çevresi Yüzey Araştırması kapsamında elde edilen verilerle hazırlanmıştır. Yazarlar, desteklerinden ötürü başta ilgili projenin yürütücüsü Doç. Dr. Bilge Yılmaz KOLANCI ile Attouda Hisarköy Turizm ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Başkanı Tarık URGAN olmak üzere tüm proje ekibine teşekkür eder.

### **Katkı Oranı Beyanı**

Yazarların çalışmadaki katkı oranları eşittir.

### **Çıkar Çatışması Beyanı**

Çalışma kapsamında herhangi bir kurum veya kişi ile çıkar çatışması bulunmamaktadır. Yazarlar arasında herhangi bir çıkar çatışması söz konusu değildir.

### **Açıklamalar**

- 1 Uzunçarşılı, bu tefsirlerin Ankara Millî Kütüphane “nr. 754 t 3/68'de” bulunduğunu ve yine Türkçe Fatiha tefsirinin bir nüshasının İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesinde olduğunu belirtmektedir (Uzunçarşılı 56).
- 2 Attouda'ya ait “kültürel miras değerlerinin korunması ve envanter oluşturması” amacıyla önemli görülen bu çalışmalara ait bir liste için bk. (Özdemir ve Şimşek 236-237).
- 3 2024 yılından itibaren Denizli Müze Müdürlüğü'nün Başkanlığında ve Pamukkale Üniversitesi, İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Fakültesi, Arkeoloji Bölümünde görev yapan Doç. Dr. Bilge Yılmaz Kolancı'nın bilimsel danışmanlığındaki bir ekiple kentteki ilk arkeolojik kazı çalışmalarına başlanmıştır.
- 4 Baykara (“800 Yıl Önce” 46), Attouda adının Bizans döneminde devam etmiş olmayacağını, aksi hâlde sözcüğün bir şekilde Türkçeleşeceğini ifade etmektedir.

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
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### Ekler


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
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
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
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
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

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## Ek 2. Çalışma alanı ve Attouda/Hisar çevresinde Türk-İslam dönemine ait maddi kültür varlıklarını gösterir harita ve rakım çizelgesi



**Ek 3.** Sarı Baba Türbesi ile türbenin kapısında yer alan ve borazan olduğu düşünülen taşlardan biri



**Ek 4.** Çiçek Dede Türbesi, türbede yer alan mezarlara ait şahide taşı ve türbenin yanında bulunan gömü



## Ek 5. Eren Baba Türbesi



**Ek 6.** Mecnun Dede Türbesi ve çevresindeki yapıların havadan fotoğrafı





## Ek 7. Mecnun Dede Türbesi ve çevresindeki yapılar



**Ek 8.** Mecnun Dede Türbesi'nde muhafaza edilen fakat sonradan kaybolan eserler



## Ek 9. Hıdırellez Türbesi ile bitişiğinde yer alan mezar



**Ek 10.** Okçu Baba Türbesi ile türbede yer alan mezarlara ait şahideler



## Ek 11. Deynekli Baba Türbesi





Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

# From Chinggisid to Modern State: Geopolitics and Sovereignty in Central Eurasia during the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Centuries<sup>\*</sup>

**Kubilay Atik<sup>\*\*</sup>**

**Suat Beylur<sup>\*\*\*</sup>**

**Nurlan Kenzheakhmet<sup>\*\*\*\*</sup>**

## Abstract

The decline of the Mongol Empire and its successor states led to anarchy in Central Eurasia from the 16<sup>th</sup> to the 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. This era saw the fall of the Timurids and the Ming Dynasty and the rise of new regional powers, including the Kazakhs and Zunggars in Central Asia. Externally, the Manchus, and Russia began influencing Central Asian geopolitics. Meanwhile, significant political, cultural, and scientific developments were taking place in Europe, alongside the rise of colonialism. Although these trends in Europe began to affect Central Asia, the regional powers of the time focused more on European technological innovations than on ideas of sovereignty and statehood. With the acceleration of political and cultural interactions between the East and the West,

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mapping and related innovations reached Central Asia and soon became symbols of political hegemony. This strategy, adopted by China's Ming and Manchu Qing dynasties and Russia, was efficiently utilized in the struggle for dominance in Central Asia. This article examines the last attempts of the regional Kazakh and Zunggar polities as independent states to become the hegemon power in the region within the framework of the role of mapping in Russian and Manchu colonial advances, which has not been sufficiently studied yet. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, this study employs historical methodologies, as well as international relations terminologies and theoretical frameworks.

**Keywords**

Central Asia, Historical Geography, Maps, Kazakhs, Kazakh Khanate, Zunggars, Cultural interaction.



# Cengizlilerden Modern Devlete: 17. ve 18. Yüzyıllarda Merkezî Avrasya'da Jeopolitik ve Egemenlik\*

**Kubilay Atik\*\***

**Suat Beylur\*\*\***

**Nurlan Kenzheakhmet\*\*\*\***

## Öz

Moğol İmparatorluğunun ve halefi olan devletlerin dağılması, 16. ve 18. yüzyıllar arasında Merkezî Avrasya'da bir anarşiye yol açtı. Bu dönemde Timurlular ve Ming Hanedanı yıkılırken Kazaklar ve Cungarlar gibi yeni bölgesel güçler yükseldi. Dışarıdan ise Mançular ve Ruslar, Orta Asya'nın jeopolitiğini etkilemeye başladı. Bu dönemde Avrupa'da da önemli bir kısım siyasi, kültürel ve bilimsel gelişmeler yaşanmakta, sömürgecilik yükselmekteydi. Avrupa'daki bu gelişmeler bir şekilde Orta Asya'yı da etkilemeye başlamış olsa da dönemin bölgesel güçleri, egemenlik ve devlet anlayışlarından ziyade Avrupa'nın teknik yeniliklerine odaklanmışlardı. Batı ile Doğu arasındaki siyasi ve kültürel etkileşimin ivme kazanmasıyla haritalama ile birlikte diğer bazı yenilikler, Orta Asya'ya ulaştı ve siyasi hegemonya için bir sembol hâline geldi. Çin'in Ming ve Mançu Qing hanedanları ile Rusya tarafından benimsenen bu strateji, Orta Asya'daki

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hâkimiyet mücadelesinde etkin bir şekilde kullanıldı. Bu makale, bölgesel Kazak ve Cungan siyasi yapılarının bağımsız devletler olarak hegemon güç olma yolundaki son çabalarını, şimdiye kadar yeterince çalışılmamış olan Rus ve Mançu sömürgeci ilerlemelerinde haritalamanın rolü çerçevesinde incelemektedir. Disiplinlerarası yaklaşımı benimseyen bu çalışmada, tarihsel metodolojilerin yanı sıra uluslararası ilişkiler terminolojileri ve teorik çerçeveler de kullanılacaktır.

### **Anahtar Kelimeler**

Orta Asya, Tarihi Coğrafya, Haritalar, Kazaklar, Kazak Hanlığı, Cungarlar, Kültürel etkileşim.

## Introduction

The collapse of the Mongol Empire, followed by the disintegration of its successor states and ultimately the Timurids, ushered in a period of anarchical society in Central Asia. As in other anarchical societies, like the Westphalian European system, the hierarchical structure of the states system collapsed, and different states claimed equality to each other in their relations. The period between the 16<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries witnessed not only the disintegration of the Timurids and the Ming Dynasty but also the emergence of new actors: two internal and two external. In Central Asia, after a brief period of Uzbek supremacy, the Kazakhs emerged as a new regional power. In Mongolia and parts of Central Asia, the Oirad Mongols wrested power from the Chinggisids and the Eastern Mongols. In Manchuria, and later in China, the Manchus appeared as an external power projector, meddling in Central Asian geopolitics soon after their conquest of China. Concurrently, Russia became another external power exerting influence in the region following its conquest of Kazan in 1552 and the Siberian Khanates beginning in the late 16<sup>th</sup> century onwards. This period also marked the rise of colonialism in Europe, with European trends gradually extending to East, Southeast, South, and West Asia, eventually influencing Central Asia. However, at this stage, the global prevalence of European ideas on sovereignty, hegemony, or statehood was still limited. Nonetheless, colonial movements led to the diversification of global trade routes, a change in the global balance of power and cultural interaction. This mobility also facilitated the transmission of military and technical knowledge and tools to the region. In particular, adaptations to magnetic compasses accelerated the further development of mapping and cartography. These technical innovations also garnered the attention of actors in Central Asia and were utilized in cartography studies, as will be mentioned later.

We must acknowledge that although social and cultural interaction was limited during the period, the activities of Jesuit missionaries, which commenced in Japan in 1549, spread to China, India, and eventually to Mongolia. The Jesuits, present in Central Asia under the patronage of Russia in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, were perceived as a means of exerting control over the region, particularly through religion. Actors in Central Asia were more interested in the technical innovations occurring in Europe. Among these, one of the least studied aspects of Russian and Manchu/Chinese colonial encroachment

into Central Asia is the role of historical and contemporary maps. Similar to the European powers in Africa and the Americas, mapping a territory began to signify political hegemony over that area and its inhabitants. The Chinese Ming (1368-1644), and later the Manchu Qing (1644-1912) dynasties, became aware of this strategy through Jesuit missionaries at their courts. For the Russians, initially, Siberia and later Central Asia became terra incognita, despite Russia's centuries-long subjugation under Mongol rule, with many Russian princes traveling to Mongolia via Central Asia and Siberia. Subsequently, historical and contemporary maps began to be used as an effective tool in the Russian and Manchu/Chinese encroachment into Central Asia, which is an understudied aspect in this field. From this point of view, this study aims to examine the changing geopolitics of the region as well as the changing understandings of sovereignty and power via new tools such as the use of maps by these four powers and the resulting transformation of the political order and interactions in Central Asia.

Methodologically, the article relies heavily on the theoretical analysis of the *longue durée* developments rather than direct translations of relevant documents due to the length of time and geographic area as well as the variety of sources. Since the limitations of an article would not allow for a detailed analysis of primary sources, a macro history approach was preferred by the authors while at the same time using select primary sources when necessary. Also, in their approach to the general analysis of the changes in the region in terms of geopolitics and political order, the authors adopted IR terminologies and approaches by taking into account such ideas as states system, balance of power, state formation etc. By using an interdisciplinary approach this way, the authors wish to contribute to both fields of macro history and IR, and since early modern Central Eurasia is rather taken as part of global history studies, the article also aims to serve as an introduction to the region during the early modern period for the non-specialist researchers working on either global history or other areas. The article argues that a hierarchical system established by the Mongol Empire was followed by an anarchical society where both state and non-state actors acted in their own interests on an equal basis and a balance of power based on the military strength of participants of this system emerged. While both the Zunggars and the Kazakhs tried to change this and become the dominant power in the region, despite the advantage of having access to both Russian and Chinese markets, the Zunggar superiority was

short-lived and ended in the collapse of both polities and a Russo-Manchu dominance as external colonial powers. These two centuries of Central Eurasia have not garnered the attention of IR scholars despite being the pivotal centuries for the later emergence of Russian and Chinese spheres of influence and although many historians paid great attention later on, the attention was mostly paid on the individual actors such as the Kazakh, Zunggar, and Uzbek polities. This article seeks to give a general picture of the era in terms of the geopolitical and systemic changes that the region underwent before Russian and Chinese hegemony over the region in the succeeding centuries.

### **Geopolitical Shifts and the Legacy of Chinggisid Rule: Tracing Historical and Geographical Transformations in Central Eurasia**

Following the reign of Qubilai Qaghan (1260-1294), the Chinggisid polities slowly became rivals, and the power of the great qaghan was limited to Mongolia and China by the beginning of Timur's reign (1294-1307). Timur was perhaps the last real qaghan who could wield significant political power throughout the empire, albeit a waning one. Soon, the Golden Horde allied with the Mamluks against the Ilkhans. This alliance was not based on Chinggisid legitimacy but on Islam, marking the first time a Chinggisid allied with an external power against another Chinggisid. After a while, the Ilkhans lost all power and were replaced by the Jalairids (1335-1432), while in China, the great qaghans were expelled by the Ming dynasty in 1368, and the Chaghataid Khans were reduced to puppet rulers under the Timurids. The Ögödeids had already been weakened by Qubilai during his reign. As a result, by the beginning of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, the only Chinggisids holding real political power were in the territories of the Golden Horde and Mongolia, and their power was a shadow of what their predecessors had. However, the Mongol political system was more resilient than it seemed. As Zarakol (29) has demonstrated in her book, the Ming and the Timurids adopted Chinggisid modes of sovereignty and, more importantly, their understanding of world order was a continuation of the Chinggisid legacy, though they themselves were not Chinggisids. In fact, Neumann and Wigen (12) argue that this tradition continued into modern times. This was certainly true for the period between the 16<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. What blurs the picture, however, is the introduction of new elements and actors to the region. Islam was introduced into Central Asia long before the Mongols came, the Khitans, and later the

Mongols also brought non-Muslim nomadic populations to the region. More importantly, although Islam continued to play a significant role in social life and even thrived under Mongol rule, becoming the dominant religion, it was still not part of the Chinggisid charisma during the Mongol hegemony in the region. As an example, Öljeitü converted multiple times in Iran (Jackson 26-29), and the Mongol tribes still living in the Kypchak Steppe did not convert to Islam for a long time. However, beginning with Timur, Islam became an important factor in the political ecumene of Central Asia once more.

The Kazakhs, as a result, not only embraced Islam but also promoted it within their khanates. Around the same time, the Oirad Mongols were being converted to Tibetan Buddhism. Their Mongol cousins had begun this process during the Yuan dynasty, and they were among the last Mongolic peoples to convert to Buddhism from their Tengriist belief systems. The Lamas played a crucial role in Oirad politics as well as Mongol and East Asian politics. The Manchus were also Tibetan Buddhists, and they also sought to control and use Tibetan Buddhism to their advantage (Li 74). The Russians were perhaps the only actors in the region who did not share any religious affinity with the other actors, and their discourse on religion and politics was mostly for internal consumption in the Russian public, and Russian attempts at conversion were sporadic and disorganized compared other colonial powers elsewhere. But Islam and Buddhism certainly became important factors in the political landscape of the region. Another religious group that began to play a role were the Jesuits. However, unlike the Franciscans who traveled to the Mongol court, such as Carpini or Rubruck by land, the Jesuits traveled with the Portuguese and sometimes Spanish ships, and they arrived in China first. Their initial attempts in the Ming court were also unsuccessful despite having ingenious members such as Matteo Ricci among their ranks (Chen 102). But the Manchus employed people with useful skills regardless of their religious, ethnic, or social background. Thus, the Jesuits became frequent members of the Manchu court. The Oirads and the Kazakhs, on the other hand, employed the Tibetan and Muslim clergy that were available to them. Due to their connections with European powers, the Russians and the Manchus played a pivotal role in terms of introducing technical innovations to Central Eurasia. Moreover, modern cartographic methods were first utilized by these two powers as an extension of their colonial outreach in the region. Later on, under the leadership of Galdan Taishi (1671-1697), the Oirad Mongols

united to establish the Zunggar Khanate (1634-1755), attempting to imitate the Russian and Chinese polities and undergoing an extensive modernization process that covered various areas. They also aimed to pursue similar colonial policies as those of the Russians and the Manchus in Central Asia.

Meanwhile, the Kazakhs were also busy establishing their own polities. Compared to the Oirads, they faced disadvantages due to their lack of resources and their distance from major trading centers other than the cities of Transoxiana, which were more often prone to raids and attacks compared to the Chinese and Russian trading centers. This resulted in difficulties in attracting manpower with the necessary know-how to their polities. Furthermore, both polities were quite unstable in terms of their political structure and organization. While the Zunggars, albeit often not very centralized, functioned as a unitary state, whereas the Kazakhs were divided into three jüz.

The role of religion further complicated the political landscape. The Kazakhs had officially become Muslims long ago, but due to the persistence of old Turkic and Mongolic practices, thorough social Islamization was taking place at this time, with the Sunni branch gaining prevalence. This period marked significant shifts in the religious and political dynamics of the region, profoundly influencing the historical and geopolitical developments of Central Eurasia. In fact, the Islamization of the Kazakhs dates back to the 8<sup>th</sup> century (Kurt 254, Yazıcı 13). However, the mass Islamization coincided with the spread of Sufi movements, particularly Naqshbandiyya and Yassawiyya, into the Kazakh steppes in the 12<sup>th</sup> century (Altunkaya 1-16). These two Sufi traditions, rooted in Maturidi and Hanafi thought, not only influenced the societal structure but also gained political acceptance. Sufi leaders, known as Seyyid, Khoja, or Ata, were considered among the Aksüyek / White Bone (as opposed to the Karasüyek / Black Bone), one of the two main groups in the Kazakh social structure, along with the Töres who are descendants of Chinggis Qaghan.

In other words, Sufis who were respected in society were also respected by the rulers. During the reign of Tauke Khan (1680-1715), privileged arrangements were made for the Sayyids as well as the rulers in the Zhety Zhargy / Seven Jurisdictions, which was accepted as the first constitution of the Kazakh Khanate, where customary and Sharia law were combined (Rustemov). Similarly, it should be noted that after Kasym Khan, Kazakh Khans held their Khanate ceremonies in front of the tomb of Khoja Akhmed

Yassawi in Turkestan, on Fridays, with prayers led by the qadi (Ergaliyeva and Shakauzdauli 300-317). Herein, it is important to mention the letter dated 1715 sent by the Kazakh Khan Gaib Muhammed to the Ottoman Sultan Ahmed III, which clearly shows how the Kazakhs perceived themselves at the highest level. In the letter, while Gaib Khan asks for help from the Ottoman Empire for the Esteks, a tribe of the Bashkirs, he emphasizes that they (the Esteks) are also Ahl al-Sunnah like the Kazakhs (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, fol.6/219). Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that some old Turkic and Mongolian practices, both implicit and explicit, continued within this belief system. Unlike the Kazakhs, the Oirads converted to the Lamaist branch of Tibetan Buddhism. Similar to the Kazakhs, the Mongols' conversion to Buddhism dates back centuries, to the reign of Qubilai Qaghan, but it became socially and politically more prevalent around the 15<sup>th</sup> century when nobles also began sending their sons to Buddhist monasteries. Additionally, the Muslim begs who became Zunggar vassals also provided a source of intellectuals needed for state building in the Zunggar Khanate.

#### The Rise of the Kazakhs and Zunggars

The collapse of the Yuan Dynasty in China and the subsequent waning of Chinggisid power in the Eastern Eurasian steppe during the 15<sup>th</sup> century coincided with a collapse of the political order in the Western Eurasian steppe. Whether these two phenomena were interconnected is beyond the extent of this article. However, as Zarakol suggests, the Chinggisid world order was still prevalent in both areas (Zarakol 89-91). But what followed these collapses was also the synchronous rise of the Kazakhs and the Oirads in the western and eastern halves of the Central Eurasian Steppe. While the Kazakh tribes broke away from the Uzbeks and gained dominance over the steppe areas of most of Central Asia, the Oirads had to fight first with the Ming and then with the Eastern Mongols (Khalkha) for dominance over the Inner Asian Steppe. Esen Taishi's victory in the Tumu Incident over the Ming armies and the capturing of the Ming emperor Zhu Qizhen in 1449 gained him and the Oirads prestige and popularity among the Mongol tribes. By the time of Esen Taishi who became a de facto ruler of the Yuan which continued in Mongolia despite having lost China. In fact, Esen also fought with the last independent Chaghataids of Moghulistan and captured their leader Üveys Khan three times in battle and released him in all instances finally marrying his sister Mahtum



Hanım and converting to Islam (Duglat 401). Taisung Qaghan remained as the nominal ruler of the Yuan Dynasty under Esen's rule, and during this time, the Oirad Mongols became the main power in the steppe, even subduing the Jürchens in Manchuria (Xiao 147). The Tumu incident did not solve the problems with the Ming and later on Taisung Qaghan and Esen Taishi fought each other over the issue of who should be the next Yuan ruler. Taisung Qaghan at this point still had armies albeit not as strong as Esen Taishi, and he also got help from the Ming who was willing to help him in return for his recognition of the Ming as suzerain. Meanwhile, Akbarjin who held the title of Jinong (Prince of Jin 晉王) was married to Esen's sister Cheчек whose son Esen wanted on the throne after Taisung Qaghan, came to the Oirads, and in the ensuing war between Taisung's forces and the Oirads, Akbarjin won against his elder brother Taisung Qaghan in 1451. Taisung Qaghan died the next year, but Esen chose to kill Akbarjin and the other Borjigin and Chinggisid members of his entourage in a banquet, claiming the Yuan throne for himself with the title Tengri Boghd Qaghan. He was later killed following a rebellion by his own generals, who were unhappy with his rule and his claim to the Qaghanate, as he was not of the Chinggisid lineage in the traditional sense (his grandmother was a Chinggisid princess, but this was not sufficient for him to become a Qaghan). After Esen's death at the hands of his own men, the Oirads lost their supremacy until the rise of the Zunggars later on.

For the Kazakhs, the developments that took place during the initial phase of their rise were different. They were initially under the rule of the Shibanids during the reign of Abulhayr Khan. Abulhayr Khan was actually an unlikely candidate for the throne, he was taken hostage at a young age, and later on he was aided by Ulug Beg, the ruler of the Timurid Empire, and came to the throne in 1428 after the death of Barak Khan. He began by consolidating his power in the capital Chimgi Tura, and later on extended his power in Siberia by defeating Haji Muhammed, the ruler of the Sibir Khanate and turned his attention to his erstwhile ally, the Timurids. He defeated Shahruh and took control of most of Transoxiana and made Ebu Said, another Timurid contender for power, his vassal. As the Timurids lost most of Khwarazm and Transoxiana between 1430-1446, the Uzbeks upset the balance of power in the region in the long run despite their short-lived ascendancy. Abulhayr Khan himself died circa 1468 fighting against the Kazakhs who by this time began to assert their independence. The Dörben Oirad confederacy also dealt heavy blows to the

Uzbek Khans including Abulhayr Khan. After defeats at the hands of Kazakhs and the ruler of the newly rising Safavid State, Shah Ismail, the Uzbek Khan Muhammed Shaibani recognized the Kazakh Khans as independent rulers of Kazakhstan. Ten years later, his death at the hands of Shah Ismail marked the rise of the Kazakhs as the dominant power in Central Asia.

In a way, the collapse of the political order in East Asia and Central Asia paved the way for the rise of the two polities. The Oirads fell into political chaos following the death of Esen Taishi, but they reorganized as the Dörben Oirad again but they disintegrated as the Torghud tribe migrated westwards in the early 1600s becoming the Kalmyks under Kho Örlük, and the Khoshud tribes migrated to Tibet under Güshi Khan at around the same time. The remaining tribes organized around the Choros and became the Zunggar Khanate under Erdeni Baghadur. The Kalmyk alone were a formidable power and their raids on the Kazakhs, Nogais, Tatars, and Circassians were devastating. But in 1640, when the remaining Oirads in Western Mongolia united with the eastern Khalka Mongols in a qurultai changing the balance of power in the region once more, the Kazakh Khanate was also consolidating its power. The upsetting of the balance of power in Central Asia by Abulhayr Khan had long-lasting geopolitical consequences for the region. As the Timurid power completely dissolved, the Safavids in Iran filled the vacuum and rose to become the main rivals of the Uzbeks, and the subsequent Uzbek/Bukhara Khans consumed most of their power in this rivalry. As the Safavids rose, Islam began to play a more important political role in the Shia/Sunni rivalry in the region.

The Rise of Russia and the Qing

#### *Russia's Strategic Calculations and Siberian Expansion*

The Principality of Muscovy had been slowly but steadily rising since the 15<sup>th</sup> century in Eastern Russia, and after eliminating their own rivals within Russia proper, they set their sights on Kazan and its eastern expansion. As Khodarkovsky (74-78) argues, one of their lesser-discussed goals was to reach China via a land route in addition to exploiting the furs of Siberia, since their access to the ocean was limited in the Baltic and Black seas by the Swedish and Ottoman Empires. Unlike the Rurikids, the Romanov dynasty adopted a more colonialist mindset, utilizing Cossacks as frontiersmen to expand Russian influence into Siberia.

Tactically, the Cossacks and the Russian State deemed it prudent to expand into the northern tundras of Siberia and to steer clear of the steppe zone to avoid any costly confrontations with the steppe polities (Bergholz 46). It is often considered with hindsight that the Russians would eventually become the victors in Central Asia, but for contemporaries nothing was guaranteed. Despite possessing superior firearms, the Russian Cossacks were still no match for the Kazakh, Kalmyk, Zunggar, or Manchu armies that they would later confront. At this point, the Russian grand strategy was to become a power equivalent to the other European powers of the time, and since Central Asia and the Caucasus were out of reach during the 17<sup>th</sup> century due to a strong Ottoman and Kazakh presence, the Russian objective was to access the Chinese markets to provide a steady source of income for modernizing the Russian state and the military (Perdue, *China Marches West* 77-79). Thus, by circumventing the Kazakh steppe and Central Asia, the Russians first encountered the Zunggars through their Buryat and Kyrgyz vassals. Although the Kyrgyz and Buryat tribes created tense relations between the two over who should be their suzerain and collect *yasak* tax from them in the form of pelts, the two powers soon reached an agreement after a series of military confrontations. They were obliged to pay tribute to both polities (Chonov 52). At this point, the Zunggars became aware of the changing norms of sovereignty. The Russians were not only building forts as physical signs of their sovereignty over the new lands they “discovered,” but were also mapping the region and using these maps as proof of their sovereignty. They also adhered to more traditional forms of taking oaths of allegiance in a Chinggisid fashion from their new subjects, but maps and forts as physical evidence of sovereignty, albeit not new, began to gain more importance.

### *Manchu Ascendancy and Jesuit Contributions*

Meanwhile, in China, the Ming Dynasty began to collapse and was eventually replaced by the Manchu Qing Dynasty. The first half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century was relatively calm in terms of the Manchus’ relations with the steppe, due to their efforts in conquering China and consolidating power there. However, as the Manchus established the Qing Dynasty in China and consolidated their power, the Jesuits, who had lost their influence for a time at the Ming court, were again active in the Qing court. They were welcomed by the Manchu emperors not for their religious teachings but for the technical know-how

they brought with them. They brought valuable knowledge in metallurgy, iron casting, cartography, mathematics, astronomy, and geography. Later on, they also served as translators for the Qing emperors in their dealings with Western states, including Russia. It was in fact in this context that the first treaty between Russia and China was penned in Latin. The Jesuits working in the service of the Qing Kangxi Emperor managed to sway influence over both parties. One important innovation that the Jesuits brought to China was the way maps were perceived. Of course, the Chinese were very efficient in drawing maps, and the Chinese cartography tradition goes back centuries. As Kenzheakhmet (47) has also demonstrated, the Ming dynasty, preceding the Qing, was very adamant about mapping the regions of China as well as the neighboring regions of Central Asia and Inner Asia. However, for the Chinese, mapping a space conveyed a different meaning than it did for the Inner Asians. It was either for administrative purposes if the mapped space was part of a Chinese dynasty, or it was for military and political use in foreign relations for mapping the neighbors. And to a great degree, these maps concentrated on the tribes, mountains, rivers, and other strategically important geographical features. However, as the European powers began to colonize Africa and the Americas, mapping a space without “state” control over that space began to mean claiming sovereignty over that space. The Russians understood this soon enough, and the Manchus and Russians saw an advantage in mapping the areas not directly under their control.

### **Contested Steppes: Sovereignty and Strategy in the Shifting Borders of Eurasia**

However, despite not having states in a European or sedentary sense, Eurasia was not militarily or politically a no man’s land. Unlike the other victims of colonialism in Africa and the Americas, the Eurasian nomads still had the military and political capacity to rule over these areas and to challenge Russian or Manchu claims based merely on maps. In fact, during the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the main struggle for hegemony in the Central Eurasian steppes was between the Kazakhs and the Zunggars. The Russians and the Manchus were at best external powers attempting to exert their influence in the region. As discussed above, the collapse of the Chinggisid states created a power vacuum, and the Kazakhs and the Zunggars were vying for hegemony over the region by the 17<sup>th</sup> century. In fact, both the Kazakh khans and Zunggar khans were trying to emulate what Chinggis Qaghan had achieved. Therefore, the initial struggle

for hegemony over the region was between these two groups. The Zunggars and the Kazakhs at this point still viewed geographical space in a more traditional Eurasian sense. A patch of land could be used in a defined order according to the seasonal changes by different groups, therefore they often laid claim on the people inhabiting the land rather than the land itself. Sovereignty over the land came with it. Of course, this is not to say that they had no sense of fixed borders. But the strategic goal in their wars was to gain people and livestock rather than setting fixed land borders. The Zunggars would at times erect steles in the areas that roughly corresponded to a border, or that were the site of important events, and this was a tradition going back to the Tang times and the Türk Qaghanate. This was why in *barantas* the Kazakhs and Zunggars would rather kidnap people and herds than lay claim on a certain area, and would return to their own area soon after. But by the 18<sup>th</sup> century, after failed negotiations with the Zunggars, the Russians finally reached the Qing Empire via Siberia (Shan and Wang 97). After a series of skirmishes in Siberia where the Russians built forts and took allegiances of vassalage from some Tungus tribes in Manchuria, the Russian Empire and the Qing Empire signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk on the 27<sup>th</sup> of August in 1689. This treaty became a blueprint for later treaties as well. It was drafted by the Jesuits in the service of the Qing emperor Kangxi (1661-1722). This treaty came as a result of Russian incursions into Northern Manchuria, the homeland of the Manchu people. The Russians were essentially trying to reach the Qing Empire, and they heard that the “Altan Qaghan” was beyond the Argun River. So, a group of Cossacks set out to take the region south of the Argun River and took allegiances of vassalage from the Tungus and Manchu tribes living there. But soon after they built a fort in Albazin, the Manchus with their Korean allies sent an expeditionary force that also included firearms and naval power in the river basin. The Russians had finally met their match in terms of firepower in Asia. The Russian force was defeated in 1685 and the Russians came to the realization that they would not be able to hold onto the Amur River basin, and after all, their grand strategy in the east was to commence trade with China on advantageous terms rather than getting *yasak* tax in the form of pelts from some Tungus and Manchu tribes in the Amur basin. The Treaty of Nerchinsk delineated the Russo-Manchu border. They also aimed at setting their borders in Mongolia as well, but this could not be achieved due to two reasons. The first reason was that both the Manchus and the Russians laid

claim over the Buryats and the other Mongol tribes in the Baikal region. The Russians laid claim in virtue of their having “discovered” and mapped the region, and the Manchus also began mapping their northern territories with help from their Jesuit advisors, and laid claim to the region on their claim to qut/tianming of the Yuan Dynasty which ruled over the area some centuries ago. The second reason was a more fundamental one. The Zunggars had just attacked the Eastern Mongols in the Selenge region and were also laying claim on the same area, and the fact on the field that the Zunggars were dominant in the region both militarily and politically would make any delineation on the map by Russians and Manchus be meaningless. The Russians were in good terms with the Zunggars due to their previous trade, and were also providing firearms to them. The Manchus were therefore wary of the Russian intentions in Mongolia. And the Zunggar Khan Galdan was also boasting of an alliance with the Russians, and he claimed the Russians would attack together with the Zunggars if it came to war with the Qing (Chang 123). At around this time, the Zunggars themselves were busy with their own state-building process. Galdan Boshughtu Khan, who was educated in Tibet was also very close with the fifth Dalai Lama, and after his brother Sengge was killed by rivals, he was permitted by the Dalai Lama to give up his status as a Lama and assume the Zunggar throne in 1671. His Tibetan connection also brought with it the alliance of the Khoshud Oirads who migrated to Tibet. He was given the title of Hongtaiji by the Dalai Lama after his victory over his rivals. This marked also the political entry of Tibetan Buddhism into Mongol politics at higher levels. Normally a Chinggisid ruler or a Chinese emperor (Ming emperors bestowed titles on Mongol rulers after the Yuan Dynasty was ousted from Mongolia) would bestow such titles to give legitimacy to the new ruler. But Galdan sought to legitimize his rule by the blessing of the Dalai Lama. Meanwhile in East Turkistan, the last Chaghataid rulers were also ousted from power and were replaced by Naqshibandiya Khojas. However, two groups, the Aktagh Khojas and Qaratagh Khojas began a struggle amongst themselves, and the Aktagh Khojas sought refuge in Tibet upon which Galdan seized the opportunity to take the region under his control. Galdan defeated the Qaratagh group and installed the Aktagh group as his proxies in the region (Kalan 58). Next, he turned his attention to the west after using a Kyrgyz raid into Moghulistan as a pretext, and defeated the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz and raided all the way to Taraz and Fargana. It was after these series of victories and

political background that Galdan tried to take control of Mongolia. Qing and Russian empires had every reason to be careful about such a rival. At this point Galdan had already united the Zunggars, subdued East Turkistan, defeated the Kazakhs, his main rivals to the west, and held sway over Tibet and Qinghai via his allies Dalai Lama and Khoshuud Oirads. However, although he managed to defeat and drive out the Khalkha Mongols out of Mongolia and took Mongolia under his control just at around the time of the Nerchinsk Treaty (1687-88), he was later on defeated 1696. But before his defeat at the hands of the Manchus and death, he also learnt the importance of cartography, firearms, metallurgy, and state-building. He was exceptionally well-educated for the Mongol rulers of his time. Despite his devout Buddhist beliefs, he could manipulate both the Muslim and Buddhist groups to his advantage. He even took the Russians on his side during his attack on the Khalkha Mongols in 1688 and he not only received firearms from the Russians, but Russians sent an army into Mongolia as well. He was later on defeated by the Manchu and committed suicide in 1697. His successors, however, despite their political rivalries, continued the reforms. A Swedish cartographer and soldier, Johan Gustaf Renat, who was captured by the Russians during the Great Northern War was captured by the Zunggars during an unauthorized Russian excursion into Zunggar territory in 1716 for discovering gold mines (Chonov 96). He became instrumental in modernizing the Zunggar military by teaching them cannon casting which gave them an edge in their wars with the Kazakhs, Khalkha Mongols, and even the Manchus. But more importantly, he also taught the Zunggar modern cartography and its political significance. He was actually formally a slave under Zunggar captivity, but he married another Swedish captive Brigitta and helped the Zunggars to map their territory, to set up artillery regiments and cast cannons as well as advanced metallurgy to cast better iron cannons. He and his wife were permitted to go back in 1733. Thus, Chewang Rabdan and Galdan Cheren, two Zunggar Khans had the necessary know-how to oppose the Manchu forces as well as to demonstrate military superiority over their Kazakh rivals who were not only attacked by the Zunggar Oirads from the East but were also constantly attacked by the Kalmyk Oirad group to their west. For a time, during the first half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, it seemed as though Central Eurasia would see the revival of the Mongol Empire, albeit in a much smaller scale. But it was not to be, Galdan Cheren died in 1745, and his sons began a war amongst themselves. Seizing

upon this opportunity, Emperor Qianlong (1735-1796) led successful expeditions against the Zunggars and in the aftermath of the battles, massacred most of the Oirad Mongols he captured thus ending the Oirad hegemony.

### Cartography and Mapping: Political, Economic, and Sociocultural Aspects

Cartography studies date back to the 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> centuries B.C.E. It is known that the first sophisticated map, characterized by the systematic use of latitude and longitude, projection, and extensive geographic coverage, was created by Claudius Ptolemy of Alexandria, who was part of the Greco-Roman cartographic tradition. Ptolemy, a mathematician, astronomer, and geographer, mapped parts the continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa. Although Ptolemy's maps have not survived to the present day, his explanatory texts have had a significant influence on Islamic cartography, exemplified by Al-Khwarizmi in the 9<sup>th</sup> century and Al-Idrisi in the 12<sup>th</sup> century, as well as on Western cartography of European origin (Dilke 177-178).

However, it was during the Age of Exploration, spanning from the 15<sup>th</sup> to the 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, that cartography truly experienced a renaissance. This resurgence was driven by the demand for accurate maps to guide ambitious voyages of exploration (Fernandez-Armesto and Woodward 749-752). European cartographers, drawing upon classical knowledge and motivated by the spirit of exploration, developed new techniques and tools to depict the world with unprecedented accuracy. During this period, maps and cartography became tools for European expansionism in various ways as will be discussed, and later on Russia and the Qing Empire also adopted this strategy in their expansion into Central Eurasian steppes and Siberia.

The utilization of maps and cartography for political aims had multiple phases. First of all, many of the areas of the world that were *tabula rasa* for the expansionist powers became more navigable thanks to technically more accurate maps that allowed soldiers and settlers to have a better grasp of these new environments. The developments in cartography gave an edge to the Europeans in their expansionism in two distinct ways. The first advantage that technically superior maps provided was the technical superiority they provided to the European settlers and soldiers in planning settlements, military and geopolitical decisions and maneuvers. This was paralleled later on only by the invention of the planes that gave a superiority in observing as



well as locating the enemy forces when making military decisions. While the medieval Islamic and Chinese maps were mainly concerned about peoples and the rough location of countries, the new European maps contained information on more precise geographic data. While this kind of information could be found in Chinese and Islamic geographies, rather than maps, this information was mostly sketchy and based on hearsay. The main driver for these technical developments was initially navigation. It was a matter of life or death for the sailors to determine exact locations. One of the most notable advancements in cartography during this era was the development of the portolan chart, a navigational map used by sailors to plot their courses along coastlines and across oceans (Ash 509-512). These charts, distinguished by their detailed coastlines, rhumb lines, and compass roses, revolutionized maritime navigation and played a crucial role in the expansion of European powers into distant lands. Portuguese and Spanish explorers, in particular, relied on portolan charts to navigate the perilous waters of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, leading to the discovery of new trade routes and territories. Other European nations such as the Netherlands, Britain, and France also extensively utilized cartography during their colonial expansion efforts. Maps became indispensable tools for planning military campaigns, establishing fortified outposts, and asserting territorial claims in distant lands (Craib 9-16).

Portuguese cartographers, for instance, produced detailed maps of their African and Asian territories, which were instrumental in navigating trade routes and establishing trading posts along the coastlines of Africa, India, and Southeast Asia.

These technical developments in return not only turned into economic gain, but also into political tools for expansionism. The second benefit that having technically more precise and better maps was gaining political superiority against the European rivals in the newly “discovered” lands. Demarcating a land on maps and mapping previously “unknown” lands in themselves became legitimizing tools for colonizing those lands in the eyes of the European powers. Drawing lines on a map came to signify drawing borders on land in a legitimate way, and continues to be so. A recent example is the Chinese maps demarcating most of the South China Sea as Chinese maritime areas, or the Greek Sevilla Map both with maximalist claims in the Mediterranean. While previous treaties were mostly containing only the

treaty text defining the agreed upon borders in the case of a land takeover by signing parties, the new treaties began to include maps beginning from the early modern Era. While drawing a map alone is not sufficient today, as in the case of the Sevilla Map, when backed by a strong army and navy as in the case of China, such acts might still act as political tools, and this was definitely the case during the early modern and modern eras.

Moreover, some cartographic efforts were entirely culturally motivated. Jesuit missionaries, for example, played a significant role in the colonization and evangelization of the Americas. Jesuit cartographers, including Matteo Ricci and José de Anchieta, produced maps of newly discovered territories to support their missionary activities. These maps often depicted geographical features, indigenous settlements, and mission stations, serving not only as navigation tools but also as means for exploring and spreading Christian teachings among indigenous populations. Similarly, Jesuits traveled to Asian countries such as China, India, and Japan to propagate Christianity. Missionary societies sponsored the production of maps detailing missionary routes, native populations, and target areas for evangelization (Cattaneo 71-86). These maps provided crucial intelligence for missionaries and acted as visual aids during interactions with local communities. The missionary endeavors in Africa, which escalated in the 16<sup>th</sup> century and intensified into a competitive arena by the 19<sup>th</sup> century, can be cited as an example in this context. In addition to their religious pursuits, missionaries also endeavored to understand the languages and cultures of the communities they engaged with, producing ethnographic maps. Similarly, like its European counterparts, Tsarist Russia generated religious, linguistic, and cultural maps to consolidate its dominion over the regions it occupied. Notably, the Kazan Spiritual Academy, established in 1842, served as a significant instrument for the religious and cultural assimilation of the peoples of Turkestan (Özdemir 141).

In the case of the Americas, the Pacific Island chains and sub-Saharan Africa where statecraft, cartography and political structures were seen less developed by the European powers, maps became tools of expansionism. What a European power needed to do was to “explore” and map an area unknown to the other Europeans, and thus lay claim on that area after mapping it. In this way, coupled with the military advantage of firearms these peoples became victims of colonialism. According to the European

approach, unmapped land was no man's land. In fact, territorial claims over fixed borders and recognition of these claims by peers became and continues to be the basic conditions for being recognized as a state.

On the other hand, Chinese and Muslim cartography traditions actually had deeper historical roots. But, by the 17<sup>th</sup> century, with the exception of the Ottomans, the map making and cartographic traditions of the Europeans developed far beyond them. Especially the maritime traditions and sailing in the Oceans made it more vital for the European maritime powers to develop better maps. The Muslim merchants who navigated the Indian Ocean for centuries by then did not have a need for such precise maps since they navigated mostly based on personal experience and tradition like the Polynesian sailors who navigated the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean without maps or even writing, but rather relied on stars and personal experience. In the case of the Mongols and their predecessors, the Song Dynasty (960-1279) however, maritime and land route trade was strongly supported by the state and there was an expansion of geographical knowledge thanks to the Mongol conquests which brought Chinese and Muslim know-how together. However, since both traditions lacked Ocean faring experience, such precise maps were not produced during the Yuan as well. As mentioned above, the Ottomans were an exception within the non-European world since they were the only non-European actor at the time with global ambitions spanning from Indonesia to West Africa. The Ming Dynasty also continued the Mongol policies in Central Asia and the Indian Ocean for a while but later on they burnt down their own fleet and gave up their ambitions in Central Eurasia following the Tumu Incident in 1449.

Of course, this is not to say that the Muslim and Chinese worlds were unaware of the political and military value of maps. For the Chinese, maps had always been political and strategic tools for decision-making and planning. However, the Chinese and Islamic approaches to maps differed from those of the Europeans. For the Chinese and Muslims, maps were often tools for intelligence gathering on their neighbors, intended for possible military operations, as well as for geopolitical decision-making. In the Islamic tradition, there was also the additional aim of gaining scientific knowledge about the world around them, with the hope that those lands could be incorporated into the Islamic fold. Much like the Jesuits, they

sought to gather information to facilitate future conversions to Islam. However, since Arab expansionism ceased with the Abbasids, the primary purpose of mapping became knowledge acquisition. As a result, maps were often crude, and aside from major geographical features, they primarily focused on the rough locations of tribes and countries in relation to each other. Therefore, most of the time, the Islamic tradition remained stagnant in terms of technical development. This is why, despite both traditions originating from Ancient Greek scholarship, the Muslim tradition fell behind the European one, despite having surpassed it during medieval times, when most Muslim states had larger political ambitions.

Knowing the existence of and mapping an area never meant laying claim to an area for the polities in Asia and Africa. In fact, the Chinese drew crude maps of Inner Asia and Central Asia early on, but this was for decision making processes. Even when the Tang Dynasty ended the Türk Qaghanate and brought the Jimi System which brought the steppe under loose Chinese control, this control and the local administrations were merely nominal. The Mongols also used maps mostly for military and strategic decisions. They mostly relied on Islamic and Chinese maps, and for them, legitimate claim on a land derived from Tengri rather than lines on a paper. Therefore, it is no wonder that the Russians were the first to utilize maps as a tool for expansionism in Central Eurasia. Russian expansion in Siberia was unhindered, all they needed to do was to send Cossack parties, map an area alongside oaths of allegiance to the Aq Qaghan (the Russian Tsar) from the local population. This was mainly modeled on the European expansionism in the Americas. While the Muslim and Turco-Mongol traditions did have dichotomies such as nomadic-sedentary, Muslim-Infidel, they did not have a civilized barbarian dichotomy like the West and China. But the approach to the so-called barbarians differed in China and Europe by the early modern era. In the Chinese tradition there was no “burden” for the Chinese as a whole or the emperor as an individual to go out and conquer those barbarians to civilize them. The emperor was free to choose “punishing or pacifying” these barbarians but being considered as a barbarian by the Chinese did not necessarily make it a just war for the Chinese to wage war and conquer those peoples unlike the medieval and early modern European understanding of a just war. The Russians, despite having been Mongol vassals for centuries, began to embrace European ideas after Peter I’s modernization efforts. As early as the 15<sup>th</sup> century, Russians were employing

European cartographers in their expansions. The unorganized groups following the collapse of the Sibir Khanate (1598), were considered as legitimate targets for exploitation in Siberia. But the Mongol tradition continued as the Russians called their emperor as Aq Qaghan in official documents and asked for oaths of allegiance and jasaq taxes. The Russians finally met their match in the form of the Kazakh Jüz and the Zunggar Khanate. The Russians initially refrained from direct military confrontations with both groups. To make matters more complicated, a group of Oirads headed by the Torghuds migrated west in the early 17<sup>th</sup> century, and settled in the lower Volga region close to the Russian heartland on the Northeastern shores of the Caspian Sea at a time when Russian Emperors claimed to have rid themselves of the so called “Tatar Yoke”. This showed that Russian superiority in the region was not as strong as they claimed. But the Russians continued to lay claim to the areas that the Cossacks “discovered” and as they came in contact with the Zunggars, this became the end of Russian unhindered expansion in the East. While the Ottomans and the Central Asians were boasting of cities more ancient and sometimes as developed as the Russian cities, the Zunggars were mostly nomadic, and did not have such claims. The same was mostly valid for the Kazakhs who despite having ancient cities under their control were themselves mostly nomadic. Therefore, the barbarian-civilized dichotomy for the Russians was based not only on life-style, but also on military power. Those who could field armies that were on par with the Russians were deemed worth being negotiated and recognized as states, those who could not, were not considered as such.

### Changing Geopolitics and Maps


During one of the skirmishes with the Russians, the Zunggars captured afore mentioned Johan Gustaf Renat. He was sent to Siberia to help the Russian expansion there, and was taken captive by the Zunggars in 1716 near Lake Yamysh where the Russians were exploring gold mines (Haines 145). He was mapping the area for the Russians, but under Zunggar captivity he helped the Zunggars to map their territories and the Zunggars were quick to realize the intrinsic political value of maps. He also helped them to cast canons and taught metallurgical technology which they put to good use in their consequent wars. He served under Tsevang Rabdan and Galdan Cheren Khans. In fact, Renat returned to Sweden with two maps that are the earliest extant maps of Central Eurasia drawn by Mongols, and these maps were more accurate than the Jesuit

and Russian maps that were drawn later (Poppe 158). Drawing borders had great political implications for the peoples of the region at an existential level, for the first time, the Russian, Manchu and Mongol polities agreed on fixed borders and constrained the nomadic subjects and their identities within these fixed borders (Perdue, “Boundaries, Maps, and Movement” 265-67). There was a similar attempt, between the Chinese Song and Khitan Liao dynasties at the treaty of Shanyuan (1005) tried to set borders and prohibited people from crossing these borders without permissions of both sides or changing allegiances (Standen 25), but in the case of Russo-Manchu treaties and Russo-Zunggar treaties, maps were also involved. The Zunggar maps show the possibility that either Renat himself or other Europeans helped the Zunggars draw detailed maps of their areas, and one of the maps (Figure 1) that Renat brought with him to Sweden might have been drawn by the Zunggar Khan Galdan Cheren himself (Perdue, *China Marches West* 207).



**Figure 1.** Map of Zunggaria and Central Asia which is thought to have been drawn by Galdan Tseren Khan (Renat, [Map of Russia])

The Manchus had the Jesuits in their service who first came to China during the Ming. In fact, the first treaty between the Russians and the Manchus was drafted in Latin thanks to the Polish Jesuits in the retinue of the Manchus who acted as interpreters (Perdue, *China Marches West* 256).




**Figure 2.** A fragment of the Qianlong Atlas (Chinese version), detail showing the Aqsaqal-Barbī Lake (modern Shalqar Tengizi) in the Kazakh Khanate. The atlas with large-scale maps was finished in 1766 and is now known as Qianlong shisan pai tu 乾隆十三排圖 /Atlas of the Qianlong Reign in Thirteen Rows (Benoist)

The Manchus were also active in Central Asia and drew maps of Central Asia as borderlands or peripheries of the empire. In fact, after China, their main goal was to dominate the whole steppe as successors to the Mongol Empire. They had formed marriage alliances with the Mongols, and acted like Chinggisid rulers, aiming to create their own dynasty as the new Chinggisids. Their understanding of sovereignty also began to change, and they used maps for better control over Mongol and Turkic subjects. The banners system they brought to the Mongol tribes prohibited them from migrating to areas other than their mapped and demarcated banners. As a result, a clash between the Manchus and the Oirads became inevitable. The map (Figure 2) above shows a Manchu drawn map of the Kazakh Steppe. As can be seen, this map was drawn during the Qianlong Emperor's

reign (1735-1796). This map is of course drawn half a century after the Mongol maps brought by Renat, and therefore is more complicated and accurate. But the Mongol map contains more information. Stylistically it was different from the Manchu map above, which shows that the Mongols blended their own traditions with the newly introduced western cartography while the Manchus mostly stuck to the western tradition, and most probably the maps were drawn by Jesuits and the texts were written down by Chinese officials both working under a Manchu official who knew the local toponyms better than both. After the treaties of Nerchinsk (1689) and Kyakhta (1727) delineating borders and mapping Manchuria, Mongolia and Central Asia became an important tool of Manchu strategy in their rivalries with the Russians and the Zunggars. The maps also show the Kazakh Steppe. The Manchus tried to establish and later on managed to ally with the Kazakhs against the Zunggars for a while, but the Kazakhs were fiercely independent and at times some Kazakh leaders also helped the Zunggars. The Manchu expansion in East Turkistan was definitely an event alongside Russian expansion, that limited the regional actors' abilities. One could ask the question why the Kazakhs and other Central Asian actors of the time failed to draw their own maps. Unlike the Russians and Manchus, who had western technicians in their employ, and the Zunggars who took western captives such as Renat who was more than willing to help them against the Russians, the main enemies of the Swedish Empire at the time, the Kazakhs and other Central Asians had no access to this technical knowledge or personnel. In fact, much later, as Kolodziejczyk points out, the Kalmyks would also be targets of an anti-Russia alliance with a Polish letter to the Kalmyk Khan Ayuki, but this mission was captured by the Russians and could never reach the Kalmyks (Kolodziejczyk 232). The only possible alternative for the Kazakhs was the Ottomans, but the Ottoman Empire was more concerned with the Balkans and the Habsburg Wars during this period. The map (Figure 4) below was one of the maps of Central Asia brought to Sweden by Renat. As a comparison, a map (Figure 3) drawn by the Jesuits can also be seen below. Not only is the map brought by Renat more accurate, it also contains more detailed information on topography and toponyms. While the map titled as the map of the Russian Empire (the Latin title calls Russia as the Muscovite Empire though) contains political borders of the time as rough borderlines between polities, the Renat map



does so in more detail. This attention to detail in the Renat maps shows not only the technical level of the maps but also their aims. The red line that can be traced in the map clearly demarcates the Zunggar borders unlike the Russian map which only shows the approximate locations of the polities in Asia with very crude and unproportionate drawings.



**Figure 3.** Generalis totius Imperii Moscovitici (General map of the entire Muscovite Empire), 1720 (Homann)



**Figure 4.** Charta öfwer landet Songarski Kalmucki med ther under lydande kotttoner [Map of the Zunggar Kalmyk Land with the Subject Tribes] (Renat, [Map of Russia])

Consequently, the evolution of cartography in Central Eurasia during the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries demonstrates how maps became pivotal in shaping the geopolitics and sovereignty of the region. European powers, along with the Zunggars, Russians, and Manchus, recognized the political value of cartography in controlling vast steppes and nomadic populations. Maps were not just tools for navigation; they became essential instruments of power, allowing empires to legitimize their territorial claims and assert sovereignty over newly discovered lands. Johan Gustaf Renat's contribution to Zunggar cartography exemplifies how access to Western technical knowledge strengthened the strategic capabilities of non-European powers, while the Manchus, aided by Jesuit cartographers, used maps to consolidate their territorial control, particularly in Central Asia. In contrast, the Kazakhs and other Central Asian actors struggled to compete with these external forces due to their limited access to similar cartographic advancements.

At the same time, maps during this period played a far-reaching role in more than just military campaigns. Detailed maps produced by colonial powers became fundamental tools for delineating borders, facilitating the movement of trade routes, and even shaping cultural and linguistic interactions. As Central Eurasia transitioned from a fluid, nomadic landscape to one defined by fixed borders, maps enabled empires to solidify their influence and authority. This shift was not only political but also deeply economic and cultural, as the act of mapping territories laid the groundwork for asserting and maintaining sovereignty, ultimately shaping the historical trajectory of the region.

### **Conclusion**

Following the collapse of the Chinggisid polities in Eurasia, a power vacuum appeared that gave rise to new empires and states. While the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire and the Manchu Empire receive most of the attention among these newcomers, the Kazakh Khanate and the Zunggar Khanate which rivaled both each other and Russia and the Manchu Empire for domination of Central Eurasia are often overlooked in the hindsight knowledge that their enterprises were not to be success stories. However, for their contemporaries both were strong and resilient states and to the last moment were candidates to rule over Central Asia. Additionally, they were not unaware of the developments that were taking place in areas such as cartography, firearms and cannons as is often claimed in Sinocentric and Russocentric historiography that depicts these two groups as outdated polities in need of civilizing for their own sakes. This kind of colonial historiography needs to be challenged and as this paper demonstrates the two formidable polities that emerged in Eurasia around the same time, the Kazakh Khanate and the Zunggar Khanate, contended for dominance over the Central Eurasian steppe despite the rising colonial Russian and Manchu empires that took advantage of the rivalries between the two. Their conflicts resulted in significant human losses and had enduring effects on the region, both culturally and politically. The Zunggars leveraged their geographic advantages and access to superior technology and financial resources to inflict serious setbacks on the Kazakh Khanate. The Kazakhs, fragmented by these assaults, were eventually compelled to seek Russian protection. By the time the Zunggar Khanate disappeared in the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup>

century, it was too late for the Kazakhs to establish their own state as a dominant power in Central Asia. In a sense, the conflicts between these two regional actors paved the way for Russian and Manchu takeover of their territories.

This process however is often taken as a benevolent intervention of Russian and Chinese “civilizations” that helped these “backward barbarians” to advance their civilizations. However, these technologies that were brought by the Russian and Qing empires primarily helped to build colonial spheres in the steppe and cartography was used as a tool in demarcating Russian and Qing interests as well as laying claim on lands that were actually ruled over different polities that all stemmed their legitimacy from a much older steppe tradition. Although the Russian and Qing empires also derived their legitimacies from this same tradition, they employed cartography and new ideas stemming from Europe to legitimize their colonial expansion while at the same time depicting these lands as *tabula rasa* like the Europeans did in Africa and the Americas, deeming the already existing states and political structures as outdated and therefore illegitimate. This was the main difference in the employment of the new technologies by these four Eurasian powers. While the Kazakhs and the Zunggars employed the new technologies as much as their geographic isolations permitted them, the Russians and the Qing Empire not only utilized these technologies, but also employed a colonial ideology to legitimize their colonial expansion. While they took allegiances from the groups living in these areas in a Chinggisid fashion, they also claimed that by merely mapping these areas they had the right to claim that land based on the premise that the pre-Russian and pre-Qing polities were not to be taken as “states”.

But the Zunggars as the more organized state of the two, had certain advantages against the Kazakhs to their west, and they saw Kazakh weaknesses at the time as well as the disorganized state of the region as an opportunity to further enlarge their state. Eliminating the Kazakh steppe would not only eliminate their enemy but would also add the Kazakh population and fighting forces to the Zunggar cause. The same was also valid in the Zunggar-Khalkha competition to the east. Ironically both attempts drew the colonial Russian and Chinese expansion into the steppe. First the Khalkha leaders felt compelled to ask for assistance from the Manchus in

the east, much later, the Kazakh leaders beginning with the head of the junior jüz asked for Russian help. In a way, the Zunggar ambition to reunite the state under their hegemony and end the anarchic system in Central Asia ended in a new hierarchical order, but this order had no place for the Zunggars themselves and the dominant powers were the external actors. Different tools such as new political arguments, maps, military technologies and settlements were used by almost all the parties save the Kazakhs who did not have access to these or in some cases very limited access. This would transform the region of Central Eurasia forever, and the Eurasian steppe and the neighboring areas would be divided into two as Central Asia and Inner Asia solely based on Russian and Chinese spheres of influence. One could easily anachronistically see good or evil in these events, but actually both the Zunggars and Kazakhs were actually trying to rebuild the Chinggisid World order against the Russian and Chinese onslaughts into their territories.

However, the efforts of the Zunggars and Kazakhs to reorganize their polities, along with their understanding of modern political theory in dealings with their Russian and Chinese counterparts, as well as their adherence to Chinggisid political ideology, demonstrate that these groups were not the backward, disorganized nomads often portrayed in nationalist Russian or Chinese historiography. Despite their modernizing efforts and their ability to stave off Qing and Russian expansion for a time, the Zunggars also inadvertently weakened the Kazakh Khanates and the Khalkha Mongols, who were subsequently forced to become subjects of the Manchu and Russian empires, respectively. While this historical fact is crystal clear to a modern reader, it was not so to their contemporaries and both the Zunggars and the Kazakhs were in pursuit of reviving the Chinggisid legacy albeit in a new form that actually also changed. Unlike Wittfogel (Wittfogel 469-478) and others who follow his ideas, the steppe was not a place of oriental despotism where time, people, ideas and institutions froze in time, but was rather a vibrant and ever-changing environment, and the Kazakhs and Oirads both brought about their innovations to the region in terms of the political order that they hoped to create, and both were actually no more different from the Russian and Qing empires at their starting points, to build up new empires on the lands that was once covered by the Mongol Empire. Thus, they also used cartography and other technologies emanating from Europe as much as they could. But at the end of the day, it was the

availability of these technologies and the rising economic power of the sedentary population centers that determined the outcome.

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The main body of the text was prepared by Kubilay Atik and Suat Beylur, while some of the maps and related information were provided by Nurlan Kenzheakhmet. The authors’ contribution rates in this study are equal.

### **Conflict of Interest Statement**

There is no conflict of interest with any institution or person within the scope of this study. There is no conflict of interest between the authors.

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# *bilig*

## Türk Dünyası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi

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*bilig*, Kış/Ocak, Bahar/Nisan, Yaz/Temmuz ve Güz/Ekim olmak üzere yılda dört sayı yayımlanır. Her yılın sonunda derginin yıllık dizini hazırlanır ve Kış sayısında yayımlanır. Dergi, Yayın Kurulu tarafından belirlenen yurt içi ve dışındaki kütüphanelere, uluslararası indeks kurumlarına ve abonelere, yayımlandığı tarihten itibaren bir ay içerisinde gönderilir.

### Yazıların Değerlendirilmesi

*bilig*'de makale başvurusu [bilig.yesevi.edu.tr](http://bilig.yesevi.edu.tr) web adresinden "Makale Yönetim Sistemi"ne kaydolarak yapılır. E-posta ile gönderilen makaleler değerlendirmeye alınmaz.

*bilig*'e gönderilen yazılar, önce dergi ilkelerine uygunluk açısından incelenir. Uygun görülmeyenler düzeltilmesi için yazarına gönderilir. Yayın için gönderilen makalelerin değerlendirilmesinde akademik tarafsızlık ve bilimsel kalite en önemli ölçütlerdir. Yayın ilkelerine uygun yazılar Yayın Kurulu tarafından incelenir. Dergi kapsamına giren ve değerlendirme için uygun bulunanlar, ilgili alanda uzman hakemlere gönderilir. Hakemlerin isimleri gizli tutulur ve raporlar Makale Yönetim Sisteminde saklanır. Hakem raporlarından biri olumlu, diğeri olumsuz olduğu takdirde, yazı, üçüncü bir hakeme gönderilebilir veya Yayın Kurulu, hakem raporlarını inceleyerek nihai kararı verebilir. Yazarlar, hakem ve Yayın Kurulunun eleştiri ve önerilerini dikkate alırlar. Katılmadıkları hususlar varsa, gerekçeleriyle birlikte itiraz etme hakkına sahiptirler. Yayına kabul edilmeyen yazılar, sistemden silinmez. Yazıların yayımlanmasında nihai karar Yayın Kuruluna aittir.

*bilig*'de yayımlanması kabul edilen yazıların telif hakkı *Ahmet Yesevi Üniversitesi Mütevelli Heyet Başkanlığı*'na devredilmiş sayılır. Yayımlanan yazılardaki görüşlerin sorumluluğu ve yazım tercihleri, yazarlarına aittir. Yazı ve fotoğraflardan, kaynak gösterilerek alıntı yapılabilir.

### Etik İlkeler

*bilig*, Yayın Etiği Komitesinin (COPE) “Dergi Editörleri için Davranış Kuralları ve En İyi Uygulama Rehber İlkeleri” ve “Dergi Yayıncıları için Davranış Kuralları” belgelerini takip etmektedir.COPE'nin “Öz Uygulamalar” belgesi ile ilgili olarak bk. <https://publicationethics.org>

*bilig*'e çalışmalarını sunan yazarların aşağıda belirtilen etik ilkeleri karşılamaları zorunludur.

**Ortak yazarlık:** Aday makalenin yazarları sunulan çalışmaya önemli katkı sağlayanlarla sınırlı olmalıdır. Makalenin yazarları makalenin sunumundan önce kesinleşir. Çalışmaya katkısı olmayanların isimlerine aday makalede yer verilmesi (hediye yazarlık) ya da katkısı olanların isimlerine yer verilmemesi (hayalet yazarlık) kabul edilemez.

**Teşekkür:** Yazarlar gönderdikleri çalışmalarını destekleyen kuruluşları, finansal kaynakları Teşekkür kısmında beyan etmekle yükümlüdür.

**Özgünlük ve intihalden arınıklık:** Sunulan çalışma bütünüyle yazarlarına ait olmalıdır. Diğer araştırmacıların çalışmalarına makale içinde yer verildiyse bunun uygun bir şekilde alıntılanması ve kaynaklarda bu çalışmaların listelenmesi gerekmektedir. Yazar makalesini intihal önleme yazılımı olan Turnit-in ya da iThenticate programlarından biri ile kontrol ederek benzerlik raporunu makale başvurusunda dergiye göndermekle yükümlüdür. Benzerlik oranı %15 ve üzeri olan makaleler değerlendirilmez alınmayacaktır.

**Etik kurul izni ve onayı:** Katılımcılardan anket, ölçek, görüşme, gözlem vb. yollarla veri toplamayı gerektiren araştırmalar için etik kurul izni alındığı aday makale içinde belirtilmelidir. Veri toplama sürecinde etik hususlara hassasiyet gösterildiğinin kanıtları (başkalarına ait ölçek, anket, fotoğrafların kullanımı için izin alınması gibi) çalışma içinde sunulmalıdır.

**Basılmış bir yayının tekrar sunumu:** Yazarların, daha önce yayınlanmamış çalışmalarını *bilig*'e sunmaları beklenir. Çalışmanın *bilig*'e sunumuyla birlikte başka dergiye de gönderilmiş olması kabul edilemez.

**Dilimleme:** Yazarlar bir araştırmanın sonuçlarını, araştırmanın bütünlüğünü bozacak şekilde ve uygun olmayan biçimde parçalara ayırıp birden fazla sayıda

yayımlayarak bu yayınları akademik atama ve yükselmelerde ayrı yayınlar olarak sunmamalıdır.

**Ham verileri sunma ve saklama:** Yazarlar, editör ve hakemler tarafından talep edildiğinde araştırmalarının ham verilerini sunmak ve bu verileri makaleleri yayımlandıktan sonra da saklamak zorundadırlar.

**Yayımlanmış makalelerde hata tespiti:** Bir yazar *bilig*'de yayınlanmış makalesinde önemli bir hata veya yanlışlık olduğunu tespit ettiğinde, dergi editörünü derhal haberdar etmek ve makaleyi geri çekmek veya düzeltmek için editörle işbirliği yapmak zorundadır.

### Yayın Politikası

*bilig*'de yayımlanan bütün makaleler aynı zamanda tam metin olarak [bilig.yesevi.edu.tr](http://bilig.yesevi.edu.tr) web adresinde açık erişimli olarak yer almaktadır.

*bilig*'de makale değerlendirme ve yayın aşamasında yazardan hiçbir şekilde ücret alınmaz. Yazara da telif ücreti ödenmez.

### Yazım Dili

*bilig*'de Türkçe ve İngilizce makaleler yayımlanır. Makalelerin Türkçe ve İngilizce özlerine (abstracts) yer verilir.

### Yazım Kuralları

*bilig*'de 97. Sayıdan itibaren MLA atıf sisteminin yazım kuralları uygulanmaktadır. Alıntılar, göndermeler ve kaynakça ile ilgili temel hususlar aşağıda örneklerle gösterilmiş olup örneği bulunmayan kaynaklar için MLA atıf sisteminin 8. versiyonu (<https://style.mla.org/>) esas alınmalıdır.

Makalelerin, aşağıda belirtilen şekilde sunulmasına özen gösterilmelidir:

**1. Başlık:** İçerikle uyumlu, içeriği en iyi ifade eden bir başlık olmalı ve **koyu** harflerle yazılmalıdır. Makalenin başlığı, en fazla 10-12 kelime arasında olmalıdır.

**2. Yazar ad(lar)ı ve adres(ler)i:** Makale dosyasında yazar ad(lar)ı ve adres(ler) i bulunmamalıdır. Yazar(lar)la ilgili bilgiler başvuru sırasında Makale Yönetim Sisteminde ilgili alanlara yazılmalıdır.

**3. Öz:** Makalenin başında, konuyu kısa ve öz biçimde ifade eden ve en az 75, en fazla 150 kelimedenden oluşan Türkçe ve İngilizce öz bulunmalıdır. Öz içinde, yararlanılan kaynaklara, şekil ve çizelge numaralarına değinilmemelidir. Özün altında bir satır boşluk bırakılarak en az 5, en çok 8 sözcükten oluşan anahtar kelimeler verilmelidir. Anahtar kelimeler makale içeriği ile uyumlu ve kapsayıcı olmalıdır.

**4. Ana Metin:** A4 boyutunda (29.7x21 cm.) kâğıtlara, MS Word programında, *Times New Roman* veya benzeri bir yazı karakteri ile 12 punto, 1.5 satır aralığıyla yazılmalıdır. Sayfa kenarlarında 2.5 cm boşluk bırakılmalı ve sayfalar numaralandırılmalıdır. Yazılar öz ve kaynakça dâhil 7.000 (yedi bin) kelimeyi geçmemelidir. Metin içinde vurgulanması gereken kısımlar, koyu değil eğik harflerle yazılmalıdır. Metinde tırnak işareti eğik harfler gibi çifte vurgulamalara yer verilmemelidir.

**5. Bölüm Başlıkları:** Makalede, düzenli bir bilgi aktarımı sağlamak üzere ana, ara ve alt başlıklar kullanılabilir. Ana başlıklar (ana bölümler, kaynaklar ve ekler) koyu ve ilk harfleri büyük; ara başlıklar, yalnız ilk harfleri büyük; alt başlıklar ise ilk harfleri büyük ve italik yazılmalıdır.

**6. Tablolar ve Şekiller:** Tabloların numarası ve başlığı bulunmalıdır. Tablo çiziminde dikey çizgiler kullanılmamalıdır. Yatay çizgiler ise sadece tablo içindeki alt başlıkları birbirinden ayırmak için kullanılmalıdır. Tablo numarası üste, tam sola dayalı olarak dik yazılmalı; tablo adı ise, bir alt satırda her sözcüğün ilk harfi büyük yazılmalıdır. Tablolar metin içinde bulunması gereken yerlerde olmalıdır. Şekiller siyah beyaz baskıya uygun hazırlanmalıdır. Şekil numaraları ve adları şeklin soluna hizalı şekilde yazılmalıdır. Şekil numarası nokta ile bitmelidir. Hemen yanından sadece ilk harf büyük olmak üzere şekil adı dik yazılmalı ve kaynağı verilmelidir. Aşağıda tablo örneği sunulmuştur.

**Tablo 1**

Türk Üniversitelerinde Uluslararası Öğrenciler (2017-2018)

	Erkek	Kadın	Toplam
Toplam Uluslararası Öğrenci Sayısı	81706	43324	125030
TÜRKSOY Tam ve Gözlemci Üye Ülkeler	24309	11686	35995
Azerbaycan	12911	4177	17088
Kazakistan	1051	1014	2065
Kırgızistan	1105	821	1926
Moldova	175	225	400
Özbekistan	435	405	840
Rusya	808	621	1429
Türkmenistan	7824	4423	12247
Türkiye'deki Üniversitelerdeki Toplam Lisansüstü ve Lisansüstü Öğrenci Sayısı	2622936	2168678	4791614
Uluslararası Öğrenci Oranı	3,12%	2,00%	2,61%

Kaynak: "Uyruğa Göre Öğrenci Sayıları Raporu." YÖK, 17 Ağustos 2019, <https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/>

**7. Resimler:** Yüksek çözünürlüklü, baskı kalitesinde taranmış halde makaleye ek olarak gönderilmelidir. Resim adlandırmalarında, şekil ve çizelgelerdeki kurallara uyulmalıdır.

Şekil, çizelge ve resimler toplam 10 sayfayı (yazının üçte birini) aşmamalıdır. Teknik imkâna sahip yazarlar, şekil, çizelge ve resimleri aynen basılabilecek nitelikte olmak şartı ile metin içindeki yerlerine yerleştirebilirler.

**8. Alıntı ve Göndermeler:** Doğrudan alıntılar tırnak içinde verilmelidir. 2.5 satırdan az alıntılar satır arasında; 2.5 satırdan uzun alıntılar satırın sadece solundan 2 cm içeride, blok hâlinde ve 1.5 satır aralığıyla yazılmalıdır. Dipnot kullanımından mümkün olduğunca kaçınılmalı, bu kullanıma yalnız açıklamalar için başvurulmalı ve otomatik numaralandırma yoluna gidilmelidir.

Metin içinde göndermeler, parantez içinde aşağıdaki şekilde yazılmalıdır:

(Köprülü 15).

İki yazarlı yayınlarda yazarların soyadları aşağıdaki şekilde yazılmalıdır:

(Taner ve Bezirci 22).

Üç ve daha fazla yazarlı yayınlarda, metin içinde sadece ilk yazarın soyadı ve “ve diğerleri/vd.” yazılmalıdır:

(Gökay ve diğerleri 18).

(Gökay vd. 18).

Metin içinde, gönderme yapılan yazarın adı veriliyorsa kaynağın sadece sayfa numarası yazılmalıdır:

Tanpınar (131), bu konuda ...

Aynı yazara ait iki veya daha fazla esere gönderme yapılırsa yazar soyadından sonra yayının ilk birkaç kelimesi yazılarak ayırt edilmelidir:

(Dilçin, *Divan Şiiri* 86).

(Dilçin, *Fuzulî'nin Şiiri* 110).

Aynı soyadı taşıyan yazarlara ait yayınlarda soyadından önce yazar adı kısaltılarak yazılmalıdır:

(S. Kaplan 41).

(M. Kaplan 16).

Sayfa numarası bulunmayan elektronik yayınlarda sadece soyadı ya da başlık yazılmalıdır.

Yazarı belirtilmeyen ansiklopedi vb. yayınlarda ise eser ismi yazılmalıdır, eser ismi uzun ise ilk 2-3 kelimesi yazılmalıdır.

Kişisel görüşmeler, metin içinde soyadı belirtilerek gösterilmeli, ayrıca kaynaklarda da tarihle birlikte belirtilmelidir.

**9. Kaynaklar:** Metnin sonunda, yazarların soyadına göre alfabetik olarak düzenlenmelidir. Yararlanılan kaynağın yazarı soyadı önce belirtilecek şekilde gösterilmelidir.

Örnek:

İsen, Mustafa. *Tezkireden Biyografiye*. Kapı Yayınları, 2010.

Köprülü, Mehmet Fuat. *Azeri Edebiyatının Tekâmülü*. MEB Yayınları, 1961.

Kaynağın iki yazarı varsa öncelikle çalışmada ismi önce yazılmış yazarın soyadı bilgisi ile başlanır, künye bilgilerinin alfabetik sıralanmasında ilk yazardan sonrakilerin soyadlarının öne alınmasının işlevi yoktur.

Örnek:

Taner, Refika, ve Asım Bezirci. *Edebiyatımızda Seçme Hikâyeler*. Gözlem Yayınları, 1981.

Kaynağın üç ve daha fazla yazarı varsa, ilkinin soyadı ve adı, sonra “ve diğerleri/vd.” yazılmalıdır.

Örnek:

Altaev, Zhakypbek ve diğerleri. “Essence and Typology of Intellect in al-Farabi’s Epistemology.” *bilig*, no. 95, 2020, ss. 79-95.

**Kitap ve dergi adları** eğik yazılmalı; makale, kitap bölümü gibi kaynaklar tırnak içinde gösterilmelidir. Kitap künyesinde sayfa numara bilgisi gerekmezken; dergi, ansiklopedi maddesi, kitap bölümü gibi kısa yapıtlarda yararlanılan bölüme ait sayfa aralığı bilgisi mutlaka yer almalıdır.

Örnek:

Berk, İlhan. *Poetika*. Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1997.

Demir, Nurettin. “Türkçede Evidensiyel.” *bilig*, no. 62, 2012, ss. 97-117.

Aydınğün, İsmail, ve Ayşegül Aydınğün. “Crimean Tatars Return Home: Identity and Cultural Revival.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 33, no. 1, 2007, ss. 113-128.

Kitabı çeviren, derleyen, yayıma hazırlayan ya da editörlük yapan varsa ismine yazar ve eser bilgisinden sonra yer verilmelidir.

Örnek:

Shaw, Stanford. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*. Çev. Mehmet Harmancı, Sermet Matbaası, 1982.

Aydemir, Yaşar. “Lâmiî Çelebi'nin Mecmualara Yansıyan Şiirleri.” *Bursalı Lâmiî Çelebi ve Dönemi*, ed. Bilal Kemikli ve Süleyman Eroğlu, Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi Yayınları, 2011, ss. 149-172.

**Yazar ismi yoksa** editör, hazırlayan ya da derleyen ismi başta verilmelidir:

Tarlan, Ali Nihat, haz. *Hayâlî Divanı*. Akçağ Yayınları, 1992.

**Ansiklopedi maddelerinde** madde yazarının biliniyorsa soyadı ve adından sonra, sırasıyla turnak içinde maddenin başlığı, ansiklopedinin tam adı, cilt numarası, yayınevi, yazılış tarihi ve sayfa aralığı belirtilmelidir:

Örnek:

İpekten, Haluk. “Azmî-zâde Mustafa Hâletî.” *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 4. cilt, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1991, ss. 348-349.

**Tezler** kaynak gösterilirken sırasıyla tez yazarının soyadı ve adından sonra, *eğik harflerle* tezin tam başlığı, tez tipi, tezin hazırlandığı üniversitenin adı, tezin yazıldığı tarih yer almalıdır:

Örnek:

Karakaya, Burcu. *Garibi'nin Yûsuf u Züleyhâsı: İnceleme-Tenkitledi Metin-Dizin*. Yüksek Lisans Tezi. Ahi Evran Üniversitesi, 2012.

**Yazmalar** “Yazar. Eser Adı. Kütüphane, Koleksiyon, Katalog numarası, yaprağı.” şeklinde kaynak gösterilmelidir.

Örnek:

Âsım. *Zeyli Zübdetül-Eşâr*. Millet Kütüphanesi, A. Emiri Efendi, No. 1326, vr. 45a.

**İnternette yer alan bir çalışmaya** atıfta bulunmak için yazarın soyadı, adı, yazının başlığı, yayıncı (web site adı), yayın tarihi, bağlantı adresi bilgilerini vermek yeterlidir.

Örnek:

Gökçek, Fazıl. “Mehmet Akif Ersoy.” *Türk Edebiyatı İsimler Sözlüğü*, 03 Ocak 2018, <http://teis.yesevi.edu.tr/madde-detay/ersoy-mehmet-akif>.

**Kişisel görüşmelerde**, kaynak kişinin soyadı, adı, görüşme türü ve tarihi şu şekilde yazılmalıdır:

Demir, Adem. Telefon görüşmesi. 22 Mayıs 2018.

**Henüz yayımlanmamış ama yayımlanmak üzere kabul edilmiş makale** atıfları da şu şekilde gösterilebilir.

Örnek:

Bayram, Bülent. “G.T. Timofeyev’in Notları Çerçevesinde 20.Yüzyıl Başında Orta İdil’de Çuvaşların Etnik-Kültürel İlişkileri.” *bilig*, (yayımlanacak), doi: 10.12995/bilig.9801.

#### **Yazışma Adresi**

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*bilig* aims to present the cultural riches as well as the historical and contemporary realities and problems of the Turkic world within a scientific framework.

Submissions to *bilig* should be original articles that will fill a gap in the field or to be a review that evaluates previously published studies and produces new and worthwhile ideas. *bilig* also publishes essays introducing authors and works and announcing new and recent activities related to the Turkic world.

An article to be published in *bilig* should not have been previously published or accepted for publication elsewhere. Papers presented at a conference or symposium may be accepted for publication if this is clearly indicated

*bilig* is published quarterly: Winter/January, Spring/April, Summer/July and Autumn/October. At the end of each year, an annual index is prepared and published in the winter issue. Each issue is forwarded to subscribers, libraries and international indexing institutions within one month after its publication.

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Article applications at *bilig* are made by registering to the “Manuscript Handling System” at [bilig.yesevi.edu.tr](http://bilig.yesevi.edu.tr) web address. Articles sent via e-mail will not be evaluated.

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If one of the referee reports is positive and the other negative, the article may be forwarded to a third referee for further assessment or alternatively, the Editorial Board may make a final decision based on the nature of the two reports. The authors are responsible for revising their articles in line with the criticism and suggestions made by the referees and the Editorial Board. If they disagree with any issues, they may make an objection by providing clearly-stated reasons. Submissions which are not accepted for publication are not deleted from the system. The final decision regarding the publication of the articles belongs to the Editorial Board.

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**Acknowledgements:** Those (institutions and financial resources) who have provided support but have not contributed to the research should be acknowledged in an Acknowledgements section.

**Originality and purity of plagiarism:** The submitted work should be entirely owned by the authors. If the work of other researchers is included in the manuscript, it should be cited appropriately and listed in the references. The author is obliged to check the manuscript with one of the plagiarism prevention software, Turnitin or iThenticate, and submit the similarity report to the journal for application. Manuscripts with a similarity rate of 15% or more will not be considered.

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### Language of Publication

*bilig* publishes articles in Turkish and English. Abstracts of the articles will be in Turkish and English.

### Style Guidelines

In *bilig*, the style of the MLA citation system are applied as of the 97th issue. The main points regarding citations, references and bibliography are shown below with examples, and the 8th version of the MLA citation system (<https://style.mla.org/>) should be taken as a basis for sources without examples.

The following rules should be observed while preparing an article for submission to *bilig*:

**1. Title of the article:** The title should suit the content and express it in the best way, and should be written in **bold** letters. The title should consist of no more than 10-12 words.

**2. Name(s) and address(es) of the author(s):** The article file should not contain the name(s) and address(es) of the author. Information regarding the author(s) should be written in the relevant fields in the Manuscript Handling System during the application.

**3. Abstract:** The article should include an abstract in Turkish and English at the beginning. The abstract should explain the topic clearly and concisely in a minimum of 75 and a maximum of 150 words. The abstract should not include references to sources, figures and charts. Keywords of 5 to 8 words should be placed at the end of the abstract. There should be a single space between the body of the abstract and the keywords. The keywords should be comprehensive and suitable to the content of the article.

**4. Body Text:** The body of the article should be typed on A4 (29.7x21cm) paper on MS Word in size 12 Times New Roman or a similar font using 1,5 line spacing. Margins of 2,5 cm should be left on all sides and the pages should be numbered. Articles should not exceed 7.000 words including the abstract and bibliography. Passages that need to be emphasized in the text should not be bold but italicized. Double emphases like using both italics and quotation marks should be avoided

**5. Section Titles:** The article may contain main and sub-titles to enable a smoother flow of information. The main titles (main sections, bibliography and appendices) should be bold and their first letters be capitalized; subtitles, only the first letters should be capitalized; sub-headings should be written in italics with their first letters capitalized.

**6. Tables and Figures:** Tables should have numbers and captions. In tables vertical lines should not be used. Horizontal lines should be used only to separate the subtitles within the table. The table number should be written at the top, fully aligned to the left; the table caption should be in the lower line and the first letter of each word in the caption should be capitalized. Tables should be placed where they are most appropriate in the text. Figures should be prepared in line with black-and-white printing. The numbers and captions of the figures should be written aligned to the left of the figure. The figure number should be written in italics, ending with a period. The caption should immediately follow the number. The caption should not be written vertically, with only the first letter capital, and the references should be stated. Below is a sample table.

**Table 1**

International Students at Turkish Universities (2017-2018)

	Male	Female	Total
Total Number of International Students	81706	43324	125030
TÜRKSOY Member and Observer Member States	24309	11686	35995
Azerbaijan	12911	4177	17088
Kazakhstan	1051	1014	2065
Kyrgyzstan	1105	821	1926
Moldova	175	225	400
Uzbekistan	435	405	840
Russia	808	621	1429
Turkmenistan	7824	4423	12247
Total Undergraduate and Graduate Students Number at Universities in Türkiye	2622936	2168678	4791614
International Student Ratio	3,12%	2,00%	2,61%

Reference: “The Report of the Number of the Students regarding” YÖK, 17 August 2019, <https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/>

**7. Pictures:** Pictures should be attached to the articles scanned in high-resolution print quality. The same rules for figures and tables apply in naming pictures.

The number of pages for figures, tables and pictures should not exceed 10 pages (one-third of the article). Authors having the necessary technical equipment and software may themselves insert their figures, drawings and pictures into the text provided these are ready for printing.

**8. Quotations and Citations:** Direct quotations should be placed in quotation marks. Quotations shorter than 2.5 lines should be placed within the flowing text. If the quotation is longer than 2.5 lines, it should be turned into a block quote with a 1.5 cm indentation only from the right and left, and the font size should be 1 point smaller. Footnotes and endnotes should be avoided as much as possible. They should only be used for essential explanations and should be numbered automatically.

Citations within the text should be given in parentheses as follows:

(Köprülü 15).

When sources with two authors are cited, the surnames of the authors should be given as follows:

(Taner and Bezirci 22).

When sources with three or more authors are cited, the surname of the first author is given and ‘et. al’ is added.

(Gökay et. al 18).

If the text already includes the name of the cited author, only the page number should be given:

In this respect, Tanpınar (131) says ...

When two or more works belonging to the same author are cited, the first few words of the publication should be distinguished after the author’s surname:

(Dilçin, *Divan Şiiri* 86).

(Dilçin, *Fuzulî’nin Şiiri* 110).

In manuscripts belonging to authors with the same surname, the name of the author should be shortened before the surname:

(S. Kaplan 41).

(M. Kaplan 16).

In electronic manuscripts with no page number, only the surname or title should be written.

In encyclopaedias and other sources without authors, only the name of the source should be written. If the title is long, the first 2-3 words should be given.

Personal interviews should be cited within the text by giving the surnames and dates should also be cited in the bibliography.

**9. References:** References should be placed at the end of the text, the surnames of authors in alphabetical order. The work cited should be entered with the surname of the author placed at the beginning:

Example:

İsen, Mustafa. *Tezkireden Biyografiye*. Kapı Yayınları, 2010.

Köprülü, Mehmet Fuat. *Azeri Edebiyatının Tekâmülü*. MEB Yayınları, 1961.

If a source has two authors, the surname of the first author should be placed first; it is not functional to place the surname of the other authors first in alphabetical order.

Example:

Taner, Refika, and Asım Bezirci. *Edebiyatımızda Seçme Hikâyeler*. Gözlem Yayınları, 1981.

If a source has more than three authors, the surname and name of the first author should be written, and the other authors should be indicated by et.al.

Example:

Altaev, Zhakypbek et. al. "Essence and Typology of Intellect in al-Farabi's Epistemology." *bilig*, no. 95, 2020, ss. 79-95.

**The titles of books and journals** should be italicized; article titles and book chapters should be placed in quotation marks. Page numbers need not be indicated for books. Shorter works like journals, encyclopedia entries and book chapters, however, require the indication of page numbers.

Example:

Berk, İlhan. *Poetika*. Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1997.

Demir, Nurettin. "Türkçede Evidensiyel." *bilig*, no. 62, 2012, ss. 97-117.

Aydınğün, İsmail, and Ayşegül Aydınğün. "Crimean Tatars Return Home: Identity and Cultural Revival." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 33, no. 1, 2007, ss. 113-128.

Translator's, compiler's and editor's names (if there are any) should follow the author and title of the work:

Example

Shaw, Stanford. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*. Çev. Mehmet Harmancı, Sermet Matbaası, 1982.

Aydemir, Yaşar. "Lâmiî Çelebi'nin Mecmualara Yansıyan Şiirleri." *Bursalı Lâmiî Çelebi ve Dönemi*, ed. Bilal Kemikli ve Süleyman Eroğlu, Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi Yayınları, 2011, ss. 149-172.

**If there is no author name**, the name of the editor, preparer or compiler should be given first:

Tarlan, Ali Nihat, pre. *Hayâli Divanı*. Akçağ Yayınları, 1992.

For **encyclopedia entries**, if the author of the encyclopedia entry is known, the author's surname and name are written first. These are followed by the date of the entry, the title of the entry in quotation marks, the full name of the encyclopedia, its volume number, place of publication, publisher and page numbers:

Example:

İpekten, Haluk. "Azmi-zâde Mustafa Hâletî." *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 4. cilt, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1991, ss. 348-349.

For **theses and dissertations**, the surname and name of the thesis author should be followed by the full title of the thesis in italics, the thesis type, the name of the university where the thesis was prepared, the date the thesis was written:

Example:

Karakaya, Burcu. *Garibi'nin Yûsuf u Züleyhâ'sı: İnceleme-Tenkitli Metin-Dizin*. Yüksek Lisans Tezi. Ahi Evran Üniversitesi, 2012.

**Handwritten manuscripts** should be cited in the following way: Author. Title of the Work. Library. Collection. Catalogue number sheet.

Example:

Âsım. *Zeyl-i Zübdetü'l-Eş'âr*. Millet Kütüphanesi, A. Emirî Efendi, No. 1326, vr. 45a.

To cite **a study found on the Internet**, it is sufficient to provide the author's surname, name, title of the article, publisher (website name), date of publication, and link address.

Example:

Gökçek, Fazıl. "Mehmet Akif Ersoy." *Türk Edebiyatı İsimler Sözlüğü*, 03 Ocak 2018, <http://teis.yesevi.edu.tr/madde-detay/ersoy-mehmet-akif>.

**In personal interviews**, the surname, name, interview type and date of the source person should be given as follows:

Demir, Adem. Phone Call. 22 May 2018.

**An article accepted for publication but not yet published** can be cited in the following way:

Example:

Bayram, Bülent. "G. T. Timofeyev'in Notları Çerçevesinde 20. Yüzyıl Başında Orta İdil'de Çuvaşların Etnik-Kültürel İlişkileri." *bilig*, (yayımlanacak), doi: 10.12995/bilig.9801.

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