

Cilt Volume **33** **Sayı** Number **2** E-ISSN **2618-6330**

SiYASAL

Journal of Political Sciences

INDEXING AND ABSTRACTING

Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI) - Web of Science

Political Science Complete - EBSCO

TR Dizin - TÜBİTAK ULAKBİM

ERIH PLUS

SOBIAD

DOAJ



SİYASAL: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCES
Cilt/Volume: 33 • Sayı/Number: 2 • Ekim/October 2024
E-ISSN: 2618-6330 • DOI: 10.26650/siyasal

Sahibi / Owner

Prof. Dr. Adem ESEN

İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye
Istanbul University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of Political Sciences and
Public Administration, Istanbul, Türkiye

Sorumlu Yazı İşleri Müdürü / Responsible Manager

Prof. Dr. Esra NEMLİ ÇALIŞKAN

İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye
Istanbul University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of Business Administration, Istanbul, Türkiye

Yazışma Adresi / Correspondence Address

İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dekanlığı
Dergi Yazı Kurulu Başkanlığı, Beyazıt, İstanbul, Türkiye
Telefon / Phone: +90 (212) 440-0000/12236
E-posta: sbfdergi@istanbul.edu.tr
<http://jps.istanbul.edu.tr>
www.dergipark.org.tr/siyasal

Yayıncı / Publisher

İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınevi / Istanbul University Press
İstanbul Üniversitesi Merkez Kampüsü, 34452 Beyazıt, Fatih / İstanbul, Türkiye
Istanbul University Central Campus, 34452 Beyazıt, Fatih / İstanbul, Türkiye
Telefon / Phone: +90 (212) 440 00 00

Dergide yer alan yazılardan ve aktarılan görüşlerden yazarlar sorumludur.

Authors bear responsibility for the content of their published articles.

Yayın dili İngilizce'dir.

The publication language of the journal is English.

Mart ve Ekim aylarında, yılda iki sayı olarak yayımlanan uluslararası,
hakemli, açık erişimli ve bilimsel bir dergidir.

This is a scholarly, international, peer-reviewed and open-access journal
published biannually in March and October.

Yayın Türü / Publication Type

Yaygın Süreli/Periodical

DERGİ YAZI KURULU / EDITORIAL MANAGEMENT BOARD

Baş Editör / Editor-in-Chief

Doç. Dr. Çağatay ASLAN, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - mustafa.aslan@istanbul.edu.tr

Baş Editör Yardımcısı / Co-editor-in-Chief

Prof. Dr. Fernando Jiménez SÁNCHEZ, University of Murcia, Department of Political Science and Administration, Murcia, Spain - fjimesan@um.es

Dergi Yazı Kurulu Üyeleri / Editorial Management Board Member

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Çağatay ASLAN, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - mustafa.aslan@istanbul.edu.tr

Doç. Dr. Yusuf AYTÜRK, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - yayturk@istanbul.edu.tr

Doç. Dr. Cemal SALMAN, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Kamu Yönetimi ve Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - cemal.salman@istanbul.edu.tr

Alan Editörleri / Section Editors

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Çağatay ASLAN, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - mustafa.aslan@istanbul.edu.tr

Prof. Dr. Fernando Jiménez SÁNCHEZ, University of Murcia, Department of Political Science and Administration, Murcia, Spain - fjimesan@um.es

İstatistik Editörleri / Statistic Editors

Prof. Dr. Enis SINIKSARAN, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - esiniksaran@istanbul.edu.tr

Prof. Dr. Hakan SATMAN, İstanbul Üniversitesi, İktisat Fakültesi, Ekonometri Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - mhsatman@istanbul.edu.tr

Tanıtım Sorumlusu/Publicity Manager

Arş. Gör., Zehra ÇELİK, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - zehracelik@istanbul.edu.tr

Dil Editörleri / Language Editors

Elizabeth Mary EARL, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Yabancı Diller Yüksekokulu, İstanbul, Türkiye - elizabeth.earl@istanbul.edu.tr

EDITORIAL BOARD

Tindara ADDABBO, University of Unimore, Department of Economics, Modena, Italya
- tindara.addabbo@unimore.it

Meliha ALTUNIŞIK, Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, Ankara, Türkiye - maltunis@metu.edu.tr

Saadet Gülден AYMAN, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - guldenayman@gmail.com

Karol BIENIEK, Pedagogical University of Krakow, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Sciences and Administration, Krakow, Polonya. - karol.bieniek@up.krakow.pl

Ayşegül KOMSUOĞLU, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - komsu@istanbul.edu.tr

Zeynep DÜREN, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye
- zeyduren@istanbul.edu.tr

Charlotte EPSTEIN, The University of Sydney, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sydney, Avustralya
- charlotte.epstein@sydney.edu.au

Pınar GİRİTLİOĞLU, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Kamu Yönetimi ve Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - pinozden@istanbul.edu.tr

Gülşay GÜNLÜK ŞENESEN, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Kamu Yönetimi ve Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - gulaygs@istanbul.edu.tr

Yaprak GÜRSOY, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Institute, Contemporary Turkish Studies, Londra, İngiltere - y.gursoy@lse.ac.uk

Mehmet Akif İÇKE, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Kamu Yönetimi ve Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - mehmetakificke@gmail.com

Umbreen JAVAID, University of the Punjab, Centre for South Asian Studies, Department of Political Science, Punjab, Pakistan - umbreenj62@gmail.com

Fernando JIMENEZ SANCHEZ, Universidad de Murcia, Catedrático de ciencia política y de la administración, Murcia, İspanya. - fjimesan@um.es

Mustafa KİBAROĞLU, MEF Üniversitesi, İktisadi, İdari ve Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - mustafa.kibaroglu@mef.edu.tr

Bogook KIM, Sungkyunkwan University, Academy of East Asian Studies, Seul, Güney Kore
- kimbogook@hufs.ac.kr

Christos KOLLIAS, University of Thessaly, Department of Economics, Volos, Greece - kollias@uth.gr

Emre Eren KORKMAZ, University of Oxford, Department of International Development, Oxford, İngiltere - emre.korkmaz@qeh.ox.ac.uk

Ziya ÖNİŞ, Koç Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - zonis@ku.edu.tr

Olga KRASNYAK, National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Moskova, Rusya
- okrasnyak@hse.ru

Alexandre KUKHIANIDZE, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Department of Political Sciences, Tiflis, Gürcistan - alex_kukhianidze@yahoo.com

Gül Mehpare KURTOĞLU ESKİŞAR, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, İşletme Fakültesi, İngilizce Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İzmir, Türkiye - gul.kurtoglu@deu.edu.tr

Roman KUŹNIAR, University of Warsaw, Department Of Strategic Studies And International Security, Varşova, Polonya. - r.kuzniar@uw.edu.pl

Andrea LOCATELLI, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Facoltà di Scienze Linguistiche, Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche, Milano, İtalya. - andrea1.locatelli@unicatt.it

Rajiv NAYAN, The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Yeni Delhi, Hindistan - rajivnayan@hotmail.com

Yaşar ONAY, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - yasaronay@istanbul.edu.tr

Ömer Faruk ÖRSÜN, New York Üniversitesi-Abu Dhabi, Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü, Abu Dhabi, Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri - omerorsun@nyu.edu

Eeva-Kaisa PROKKOLA, University of Oulu, Faculty of Science, Regional Policy and Regional Development, Oulu, Finlandiya - eeva-kaisa.prokkola@oulu.fi

Pierre Bruno-RUFFINI, University of Le Havre, Faculty of International Affairs, Le Havre, Fransa. - pierre-bruno.ruffini@univ-lehavre.fr

İlter TURAN (Emekli), İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, İstanbul, Türkiye - ilter.turan@bilgi.edu.tr

Kıvanç ULUSOY, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Kamu Yönetimi ve Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - kivanclu@istanbul.edu.tr

Fatma ÜNSAL, Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar Üniversitesi, Mimarlık Fakültesi, Şehir ve Bölge Planlama Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - funsal@msgsu.edu.tr

Ayselın Gözde YILDIZ OĞUZALP, Yaşar Üniversitesi, İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Fakültesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - ayselin.yildiz@yasar.edu.tr

İçindekiler Table of Contents

MAKALELER ARTICLES

Research article/Araştırma Makalesi

Talking Past while Needing One Another: The Complex and Ambiguous Relationship between the EU and Türkiye

Birbirine İhtiyaç Duyarken Geçmiş Konuşmak: AB ve Türkiye arasındaki Karmaşık ve Muğlak İlişki 187
Damla Cihangir Tetik, Thomas Diez

Research article/Araştırma Makalesi

The “Magic” Number: Women’s Critical Mass and Substantive Representation in Angola

“Sihirli” Sayı: Angola’da Kadınların Kritik Eşik ve Niteliksel Temsil İlişkisi..... 205
Pelin Kılınçarslan

Research article/Araştırma Makalesi

The Changing Faces of Populism in Turkey: From “Inclusionary Populism” to “Exclusionary Populism”?

Türkiye’de Popülizmin Değişen Yüzü: Kapsayıcı Popülizmden Dışlayıcı Popülizme? 225
Düzgün Arslantaş

Research article/Araştırma Makalesi

End of the Quest: Rising “Russian Civilisation” Concept In Russian Politics

Arayışın Sonu: Rus Siyasetinde Yükselen “Rus Medeniyeti” Kavramı..... 241
Osman Tekin

Research article/Araştırma Makalesi

The People’s Republic of China’s Strategy in The Three Sea Domain: The East China Sea, South China Sea, Indian Ocean, and The US’s Struggle for Presence in This Region

Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti’nin, Doğu Çin Denizi, Güney Çin Denizi ile Hint Okyanusundaki Stratejisi ve ABD’nin Bölgedeki Varlık Mücadelesi 261
Murat Kağan Kozanhan

Research article/Araştırma Makalesi

The Problem of Freedom of Expression in the Public Sphere of Social Media: Descriptive Analysis of the Echo Chamber Effect

Sosyal Medya Kamusal Alanında İfade Özgürlüğü Problemi: Yankı Fanusu Etkisi Üzerine Betimsel Bir Analiz 277
Hüseyin Köse, Bahar Balcı Aydoğan

Research article/Araştırma Makalesi

Labour Policies of the Centre Right in the Neoliberal Era: The True Path Party

Neoliberal Dönemde Merkez Sağ’da Emeğe Dair Politikalar: Doğru Yol Partisi 319
Caner Yacan

Research article/Araştırma Makalesi

Problem of Unemployment in Türkiye at the Focus of Unemployment of Educated People and Underutilisation (1991-2023)

Eğitilmiş İnsan İşsizliği ve Atıl İşgücü Odağında Türkiye’de İşsizlik Sorunu (1991-2023)..... 339
Ali Osman Balkanlı

Research article/Arařtırma Makalesi

Corporate Hedging and IPO Underpricing in Türkiye

Türkiye’de Kurumsal Riskten Korunma ve İlk Halka Arzlarda Düşük Fiyatlandırma..... 353
Yusuf Aytürk, Caner Akbaba

Research article/Arařtırma Makalesi

The Relation between Corruption and Tax Revenues: An Assessment of Transitional economies

Yolsuzluk ve Vergi Gelirleri İliřkisi: Geçiş Ekonomileri Üzerine Bir Deęerlendirme 375
Nazlı Keyifli Őentürk, Yüksel Bayraktar, Ayfer Özyılmaz



Talking Past while Needing One Another: The Complex and Ambiguous Relationship between the EU and Türkiye

Birbirine İhtiyaç Duyarken Geçmiş Konuşmak: AB ve Türkiye arasındaki Karmaşık ve Muğlak İlişki

Damla Cihangir Tetik¹ , Thomas Diez² 

Abstract

The Republic of Türkiye was one hundred years old by October 29, 2023. This also means 100 years of the Turkish Republic's foreign policy and diplomacy, 100 years of engagement with Europe, and an ambiguous relationship between the EU and Türkiye. In this paper, we argue that the relationship has always been characterised by competing forces of alignment and distancing from both sides. Thus, instead of glorifying EU-Türkiye relations or deploring their demise, in this study, we want to point to the ambiguities of the relationship around five themes in which both cooperation, harmonisation and conflict, divergence occur the most: identity, integration, economy, society, and security. We believe that these are both the main forces behind and affected by Türkiye's 100-year-old Europeanization process. In conclusion, we attempt to clarify that specific historical junctures and circumstances have benefitted different sides in their struggles against each other, and the result is a complex web of entanglements and ruptures that defies reductionist characterisations as "pro-" or "anti-European" in the past and today as well. Yet, we explain that Türkiye and Europe are entangled too deeply to completely break apart and too diverse to be attached to a clearly delineated joint future.

Keywords: European Union, Türkiye, EU-Türkiye Relations, Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkish Politics

Öz

29 Ekim 2023 itibarıyla Türkiye Cumhuriyeti yüz yılını geride bıraktı. Bu aynı zamanda, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti dış politikasının, diplomasisinin, Avrupa ve AB ile süregelen muğlak ilişkisinin yüz yılı demek. Biz bu makalede Türkiye ve Avrupa arasındaki son yüz yıllık ilişkinin iki tarafta çekişen farklı güç odaklarının yer yer uyumlaşması ama bazen de birbirlerine mesafe koymaları şeklinde karakterize edildiğini iddia ediyoruz. Bu nedenle, bu çalışmada, AB-Türkiye ilişkilerini övmek ya da geline nokta hayıflanmak yerine hem işbirliğinin hem de çekişmenin en fazla olduğu şu beş farklı alanda ilişkinin muğlaklığına işaret etmek istiyoruz; kimlik, bütünleşme, ekonomi, toplum ve güvenlik. Bu alanların hepsinin Türkiye'nin yüz yıllık Avrupalılaşma sürecinin arkasındaki ve süreci etkileyen temel faktörler olduğuna inanıyoruz. Sonuç olarak, özel tarihsel kesişim noktalarının ve koşulların farklı taraflara birbirlerine karşı yürüttükleri mücadelede faydalar sağladığını ve bunun sonucunun geçmişte ve günümüzde dahi "Avrupa yanlısı" veya "karşıtı" şeklinde var olan indirgemeci karakterleştirmelere kafa tutan karmaşık bir zorluklar ve uyumsuzluklar ağı olduğuna açıklık getirmeye çalışıyoruz. Ayrıca, Türkiye ve AB'nin tamamen birbirlerinden kopamayacak kadar derin bir şekilde iç içe geçmiş olduklarını, ancak açıkça tanımlanmış ortak bir geleceğe baş koyamayacak kadar da birbirlerinden ayrı olduklarını açıklıyoruz.

Anahtar kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Türkiye, AB-Türkiye İlişkileri, Türk Dış Politikası, Türk Siyasal Hayatı

1 Corresponding Author: Damla Cihangir Tetik (Asst. Prof. Dr.), Istanbul University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of International Relations, Istanbul, Türkiye. Email: damla.cihangirtetik@istanbul.edu.tr
ORCID: 0000-0001-6796-905X

2 Thomas Diez (Prof. Dr.), University of Tübingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Institute of Political Science, Tübingen, Germany. Email: thomas.diez@uni-tuebingen.de ORCID: 0000-0001-8056-6693

To cite this article: Cihangir Tetik, S., & Diez, T. (2024). Talking past while needing one another: the complex and ambiguous relationship between the EU and Türkiye. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 33(2), 187–204.
<http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2024.33.1422435>



Introduction

One hundred years of Turkish diplomacy also means one hundred years of engagement with Europe and one hundred years of ambiguous relations. While many have portrayed this relationship in black-and-white terms between mutual embracement and rejection, we argue in this paper that it has always been characterised by competing forces of alignment and distancing. We consider these forces an essential feature of the relationship between Türkiye and the EU, which have played out differently in various historical circumstances. Thus, Türkiye has always been part of Europe/the EU and at the same time outside. Economic, social, military, and political developments have moved the two countries closer together and yet have at the same time sparked movements of distancing. It is in this sense that we focus on the concept of ambiguity when reviewing the past century of Türkiye-Europe/EU relations. Ambiguity denotes “the permanent parallel existence of two options, meanings or interpretations and a resulting undecidability between these, which leads to the emergence of something new that is not reducible to the original parts” (Ahrens 2018: 203). In that sense, we suggest viewing Türkiye-EU relations as a system of interaction that, while not unique, has specific characteristics that cannot be adequately captured by the membership/non-membership binary or by referring to a “privileged partnership” (Macmillan, 2013) or an “open-ended” process (Uğur, 2010). These characteristics have often been the source of tensions, sparking transformations and backsliding at other points.

Thus, the birth of the Republic in 1923 following the Lausanne Treaty took place against the background of the European powers dividing up the Ottoman Empire in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, as much as it encapsulated the desire to make Türkiye again an equal party to European international society. From the beginning of the post-Second World War European integration process, Türkiye sought close association and ultimate membership, while at the same time insisting on its sovereignty and thus running against the supranational spirit of European integration (Buzan and Diez, 1999). The European Union (EU) member states have been viewing Türkiye with considerable scepticism, while at the same time wanting to keep Türkiye in their orbit and influence its development. Since the 2010s, EU- Türkiye political relations have deteriorated, while significant parts of Turkish society and its economy remain Europeanised, and the EU is dependent on Türkiye’s collaboration on several issues, particularly migration. The emerging focus on “transactionalism” (Kaliber 2024; Bashirov and Yilmaz 2020) in a predominantly “functional cooperation” (Saatçioğlu and Tekin, 2021; Müftüler-Baç, 2017) marks only the latest stage of negotiating the terrain of the ambiguous relationship and will surely succeed in new forms of alignment and differentiation in the future.

Thus, instead of glorifying EU- Türkiye relations or deploring their demise, we want to point to the ambiguities of the relationship around five themes: identity, political integration into the EU, economy, society, and military and security. These themes capture the different dimensions of the engagement between the EU and Türkiye. While one may think of other topics, such as migration, these may be subsumed under our five suggested themes. At the same time, while an unavoidable overlap between the themes, they are sufficiently distinct to warrant a closer examination under each heading. Thus, while identity and society are closely related, changing societal structures cannot be reduced

to identity. Identity refers to states as much as it refers to societies. Within the scope of this article, we are, of course, only able to scratch the surface of the issues and debates involved, but we hope to still contribute to a more nuanced understanding of EU-Turkish relations in their understanding as an ongoing struggle between competing and coexisting forces and navigating a complex terrain of identities and interests pulling in multiple directions. We thus do not want to replicate teleological stories of “Westernisation” or “Ottomanization”, and, following other recent works (see e.g., Saatcioglu, Tekin, Ekim, Tocci 2019), instead emphasise the constant contestation over the future direction of the relations between whatever is defined as “Europe” and “Türkiye” as well as the reversibility of current trends. We see Türkiye and Europe entangled too deeply to completely break apart and too diverse to be attached to a clearly delineated joint future.

In developing this argument, we consider the development of the Europeanization literature, which has moved from a simplistic understanding of Europeanization as a top-down process to emphasise the importance of different actors in their respective locales as well as variations between different policy fields (Diez et al., 2005; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Olsen, 2002). In such an understanding, the meaning of Europe is not merely imposed but constantly reconstructed: becoming “European” is not a linear, quasi-mechanistic process of automatic socialisation but full of contestation, and the degree to which states and societies change within a European context is uneven and not unidirectional (Alpan and Diez, 2014).

We divide our paper into five sections based on the five themes identified above. First, we discuss the ambiguities of Türkiye’s European identity as a nation state and the perceptions of Türkiye within EU member states. Second, we trace the ambiguous history of the political integration process. We chose to limit or discuss politics to the politics of the integration process as an analysis of the interrelationship of domestic political structures, while an important subject for research would have warranted a book-length treatment and is therefore beyond the scope of this paper. We then discuss mutual dependencies and divergences in trade and other economic aspects of the relationship. The final two sections discuss the ambiguous effects of Westernisation and Europeanization efforts in Turkish society and the tensions between the two sides in military and security matters. We argue that it is important to study the relationship between Türkiye and Europe across a range of policy fields rather than focusing on only one to avoid biases resulting from the idiosyncrasies of the respective field. Our conclusion reiterates the absence of unavoidable teleology in the Europe-Türkiye linkages. They are the product of the constant struggles of a range of interested actors who push them in different directions. While at various historical junctures, circumstances have benefitted different sides in these struggles, the result is a complex web of entanglements and ruptures that defies reductionist characterisations as “pro-“ or “anti-European”.

Identity

Whether the Republic of Türkiye as a nation-state and successor of the Ottoman Empire was geographically, socially, and politically “European” or not has been one of the deep-rooted historical identity discussions on Türkiye and Türkiye-EU relations (Müftüler-Baç, 2000). “Westernisation” of the Ottoman Empire began with the 1815

Concert of Europe. While the 19th century was the reform period of the old Empire, it could not escape being the “sick man of Europe” by the end of the century (Kedourie, 1968). Non-Muslims, particularly in the Balkans, who were affected by the nationalist and independence ideals and movements of Europe after the 1789 French Revolution, initiated ethnic, nationalist, and religious uprisings; consequently, the Empire witnessed devastating territorial losses in a short period. The Ottoman officers and generals who fought in the Balkan Wars and on different fronts of World War I became the leaders of the Independence War of Turks and the “founding fathers” of the Republic of Türkiye in 1923. Thus, the political, economic, and military developments of the 19th-century Ottoman Empire had a tremendous impact on the national identity formation of the last century’s Türkiye, including the debate about whether Türkiye and Turkish society were a part of the West or Europe.

Since the very beginning of its establishment, the Republic, together with its political and social institutions, has been facing the ambiguities of trying to form a specific social and national identity that does not see its future outside of the West, which often, although not always meant “Europe”, while simultaneously competing with the West. The new Turkish identity was to be forged both from above through governmental programmes and education, while simultaneously encouraging bottom-up change through a variety of social institutions such as family, civil society, religious organisations (*tarikats* and *cemaats*), kinship relations, and individuals. Yet these processes have stood in continuous tension with each other. The idea of creating a Turkish nation/society as part of “the West”, particularly in science, technology, economic development, and secularisation of the state (laicism), but at the same time keeping its national, religious, and conservative societal and political characteristics, particularly in issues regarding family, individual rights and freedoms, gender equality, nationalism, and further democratisation, has created an ambiguity that has been at the heart of Turkish political identity constructions ever since the 1920s. Until today, narratives on Turkish political identity formation seem to be stuck in the continuing dilemmas of “Westernisation” and “anti-imperialism/nationalism”, of secularisation/modernisation and Islamism/conservatism.

Bahar Rumelili has invited us to consider such identities as “liminal” and focus on their discursive production. In her account, Rumelili stated, ‘the main problematise is no longer one of whether and how Türkiye can Westernise, but how Türkiye reproduces, reconfigures, and subverts the discourses on the West through its very presence and representational practises’ (Rumelili, 2012: 497). Yet the multiple complex arrays of identities that transcend the existing dual understandings of Turkish society have often been written out of portrayals of Turkish history and politics. For instance, Türkiye has been politically polarised tremendously since the turn of the millennium, particularly until the 2023 presidential and general elections when the Justice and Development Party (JDP) and Erdogan government continued its one-party rule since 2002. This is the first time in modern Turkish political history that a political party and a leader have been ruling Türkiye for more than a quarter of a century. During the centennial anniversary of its establishment, Europe met a Türkiye that had moved further away from democracy and whose competitive authoritarian identity had been strengthened (Esen et al., 2023). However, the 2023 Presidential and general election results have also demonstrated that

almost half of the electorate would have preferred a possibility of change in government and thus in the direction that Turkish political identity is heading during the JDP's reign since 2002. 31 March 2024 Local elections in Türkiye strengthened this argument with the unexpected victory of the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (RPP), by winning the mayorships of most megacities, including Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, and Adana, and becoming the leading political party after 47 years. The Republic of Türkiye has been continuously ruled by the JDP government under the leadership of current President R. Tayyip Erdoğan ruled nearly a quarter of its history. The concentration of political power on one hand for decades is one of the reasons that accelerated political polarisation and transformation of the regime and political identity of Türkiye from a democracy to a hybrid regime, even almost an autocracy.

In addition, the country is experiencing rapid sociological and demographic changes that affect the political atmosphere as well because of the huge refugee influx since the eruption of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the increasing brain drain since the 2013 Gezi Park incident, and the recent economic turmoil. For example, according to the Turkish Medical Association, the number of medical doctors (MDs) who request documents from them to apply for a job outside Türkiye has been increasing tremendously since 2015. Although only 150 MDs were applied in 2015, this number has increased to 245 in 2016, 482 in 2017, 802 in 2018, 1047 in 2019, 931 in 2020, 1405 in 2021, and 2685 in 2022 (Turkish Medical Association, 2023). Most people who have emigrated from Türkiye since the mid-2010s have a profession, are well-educated, secular, supporters of a modern welfare state, and democratic Türkiye, and they mostly prefer to move to Europe or the USA. In other words, they represent the achievements of a hundred years of the Republic of Türkiye that the founding fathers of the country were dreaming of. However, this is where the dilemma lies – many of those who fulfilled Atatürk's dream are no longer in Türkiye (Çakır, 2023; Çavdar, 2023).

The EU now faces a new Türkiye in which multi-layered and complex identities are flourishing and in which there has been a marked shift away from the Westernisation agenda of the early Republic (Süleymanoglu-Kürüm and Gençkal-Eroler, 2023). While the shifts and turns in Turkish identity construction have a lot to do with domestic struggles, they have also been affected by the fluctuations of European approaches to Türkiye, including the perception of Türkiye's identity by EU member states and their societies.

However, there is no one Türkiye in European minds and hearts. In addition to the political identity of Türkiye, there are social and cultural perceptions of Türkiye that differ between societies and individuals throughout Europe. While some have been sceptical towards Türkiye's European identity, stuck with stereotypical associations of minarets or head-scarved women as represented in many media outlets, others have seen Türkiye as a part of European history and culture and have emphasised Türkiye's secular and modern history and society (Barysch, 2007).

Although politically and economically, Türkiye was a part of the Western camp during the Cold War, which meant that its foreign policy image and identity were also considered European and Western at that time, the ambivalent stance of European debates towards Türkiye's identity also dates back to the Cold War period. After the end of World War

II, the United States aimed to keep both Greece and Türkiye as allies and partners in the Western liberal order under a NATO umbrella. Yet, Türkiye's 1974 military intervention in Cyprus led to a reconsideration of its commitment to Western values, even though it was sparked by a coup attempt instigated by the right-wing junta in Athens. That Greece was admitted as a member of the European Community (EC) in 1981 in the first attempt of using membership to solidify the democratisation process, while Türkiye suffered from the fallout of the 1980 military coup signified a further estrangement between the two countries. This was followed by the rejection of Türkiye's application to the European Council in 1989 and again in 1997 in the Luxembourg European Council. While these decisions confirmed Türkiye's principal eligibility to membership, the refusal to accept Türkiye as a membership candidate while pursuing enlargement to many Central and Eastern European countries (European Council, 1997) was a reflection not only of a strict interpretation of the so-called Copenhagen Criteria but also of the contested and ambiguous perception of Türkiye's identity in EU-ropean debates. Indeed, following the 2004 Big Bang enlargement and the accession of the Republic of Cyprus without a solution to the Cyprus dispute, opinion polls showed that many Europeans perceive Türkiye and Turks politically, socially, culturally, and religiously as "others" and "non-Europeans" (Barysch, 2007; Gerhards and Hans, 2011; Kosebalaban, 2007). Thus, support for Türkiye's EU membership in EU member states has declined from 36% in 1996 to 31% and 7% respectively in 2010 and in 2016 (Lindgaard, 2018). Among the core drivers of EU public opinion on Türkiye's accession are "perceived cultural differences" and the "presence of Turkish background minorities" (Lindgaard, 2018: 2).

While perceptions of such differences in identity have also been on the rise in Turkish society (Şenyuva, 2018; Şenyuva and Aydın, 2021), a large proportion of the population still see Türkiye as a European country and continue to support its membership (Aydın-Düzgit 2018). According to the 2022 German Marshall Fund survey on Turkish Perceptions of the EU, 61% of Turks and even 3 quarters of those aged 18 to 24 still favour Türkiye's EU membership (Ünlühisarçıklı et al., 2023). Yet, at the same time, many have come to believe that their goals have become unattainable.

Türkiye's foreign policy since the 2010s has also reflected several ambiguities in its political identity. It is a member of the G-20, yet at the same time it is one of the emerging powers and a part of the MIST countries, including Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, and Türkiye, which some see as following in the footsteps of the BRICS. While JDP-led governments have increasingly emphasised Türkiye's distinction from the West in anti-interventionist, anti-imperialist, and anti-exclusionary terms and in solidarity with the Global South, they have, at the same time, continued to insist on being a part and an enduring partner of the EU and NATO. The 2016 EU-Turkey Joint Statement and Action Plan agreed between Türkiye and the EU, and Türkiye's bargaining with NATO over Finland and particularly Sweden's NATO membership are perfect examples of this situation. Türkiye's ambiguities in its recent foreign policy towards the EU and the West have a clear reflection in Turkish society as well as in the increasing importance of Russia and China in people's minds. A recent poll after the 2023 elections shows that only 46,9% of the respondents think that Türkiye should prioritise the EU and the USA in its foreign policy, and 35.5% believe that Russia and China are the most important countries for Türkiye (Metropoll, 2023).

These findings reveal the inherent contentions, tensions, and ambiguities of the mutual political identity constructions of Türkiye and Europe. While the public debates and official policies have fluctuated between seeing these identities as either coalescing or distinct, they are, in fact, directly related to and even dependent on each other in their linkages and positive associations as much as in their mutual motherings and negative distinctions—they are, in David Campbell’s term, “radically interdependent” (Campbell, 1993).

Politics

The political history of Türkiye since the Ankara Agreement provides us with multiple illustrations of how Türkiye’s Europeanization as well as its distancing from European political integration have been intertwined (Alpan, 2021). Whenever Turkish politics has been less divided and favourably disposed towards Europeanization, the room for political and institutional integration and public support for integration has increased. Yet because these political attempts at integration have mostly been pursued by the political elite in a top-down approach, have often remained shallow, and because Turkish domestic politics has hardly ever come fully out of a crisis mode, political, economic, and social setbacks have continued to characterise the relationship and prevented further political integration of Türkiye into the EU. However, the de-Europeanization of Türkiye is not a unidirectional phenomenon. European political developments, decisions, and perceptions of Türkiye and related issues have also contributed to further entanglement and division. Table 1 demonstrates how successive moves of integration, disintegration, Europeanization, and de-Europeanization have appeared not only after the mid-2000s but have been a constant feature of EU-Türkiye relations.

Table 1

*A Brief Chronology of Türkiye’s Ambiguous European Integration**

European Integration	Disintegration / De-Europeanization
1963 Association (Ankara) Agreement on visa-free travel of Turkish citizens	1978, Türkiye suspended its obligations under the Additional Protocol because of economic problems
1970 Additional Protocol, including regulations on the Customs Union	1980, relations were de facto suspended because of military rule and democratic backsliding in Türkiye; Germany and France suspended visa-free travel for Turkish citizens.
1986, the Türkiye and EEC Association Council convened	1989 EC rejected Türkiye’s application
1987, Türkiye applied for full membership	1993 Copenhagen European Council: ‘No to Türkiye, yes to CEECs, Cyprus and Malta’
1995 Customs Union Decision	1997 Luxembourg EU Summit: Türkiye was not mentioned as a candidate, so Türkiye suspended its relations with the EU
1999 Helsinki EU Summit: Türkiye was declared an EU candidate	2004 Annan Referendum was held in Cyprus and rejected by the Greek Cypriots.
2005 accession negotiations opened for Türkiye – Türkiye meets Copenhagen political criteria	2005, Türkiye signed the Additional Protocol but declared that the move did not mean the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus.

European Integration	Disintegration / De-Europeanization
2006 Detailed Screening Meeting on Chapter 25: Science and Research and Screening meeting on all chapters were completed and the chapter was temporarily closed; this was the first and only chapter that temporarily closed.	2006, the EU stated that 8 chapters shall not be opened and that none of the chapters will be closed temporarily until the commitments related to the Additional Protocol of Türkiye
2011 was the Ministry for EU Affairs was established in Türkiye	2007 France stated that it will not allow opening of 5 chapters because these chapters are directly related to membership
2012 'Positive Agenda' with the EU	2012 German and French leaders mentioned the notion of 'privileged partnership' and 'strategic partnership'
2013 Türkiye and the EU launched a dialog on visa modernisation and signed the Readmission Agreement.	2015 President Erdoğan met EU leaders and Türkiye and the EU agreed on an Action Plan in Brussels to control refugee influx. Joint Action Plan (Refugee Deal)
2014 readmission agreement provisions for Turkish citizens were entered into force.	2016 The EU Commission indicated that 7 benchmarks are left from 72 benchmarks are left for the realisation of visa-free travel for Turkish citizens.
2016 The European Commission requested authorisation from the Council to begin negotiations on upgrading the customs union.	2016 In the EP the decision which called to suspend the accession negotiations temporarily with Türkiye was accepted.
	2018–2019 The EU stated “Türkiye has been moving further away from the European Union. Türkiye’s accession negotiations have therefore effectively come to a standstill, and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing and no further work towards the modernisation of the EU- Türkiye Customs Union is foreseen.”
2020 The EU offered a conditional Positive Agenda	2019 In the conclusions adopted by the EU Foreign Affairs Council, it was stated that in light of Türkiye’s activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Council decided to suspend negotiations on the Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement and agreed not to hold the Association Council and further meetings of the EU-Türkiye high-level dialogues for the time being. In addition, the Council stated that it endorses the Commission’s proposal to reduce pre-accession assistance to Türkiye for 2020 and invites the European Investment Bank to review its lending activities in Türkiye.
*Table was constructed by the authors.	

After World War II, Türkiye joined liberal West-led international institutions one by one. Concurrently, Turkish politics transformed into a multiparty system in 1946. The first competitive elections were held in 1950, resulting in the victory of the opposing Democratic Party (DP), which came into power for the first time. Following these democratisation steps, Türkiye became a NATO member in 1952. It also developed relations with the newly-established EC through the 1963 Association (Ankara) Agreement. Following the Agreement, Türkiye and the EC signed the Additional Protocol, which included regulations on a future Customs Union, in 1970. However, between 1950 and 1970, Turkish politics faced two military interventions, increasing polarisation among the main

political parties, the RPP and the Democrat Party (re-named as Justice Party after the 1960 military coup) and their supporters, the flourishing of different social movements and civil unrest, fighting between leftist and ultra-rightist nationalist groups, and an economic downturn. Consequently, due to political and economic crises in 1978, Türkiye suspended its obligations under the Additional Protocol. At the same time, sceptical views towards Türkiye prevailed in EC member states, partly because an increasing number of Turkish migrants, although economically desired, were constructed as a threat (McLaren 2007). In 1980, relations were de facto suspended because of military rule and democratic backsliding in Türkiye, and Germany and France suspended visa-free travel for Turkish citizens.

Military rule ended rapidly and Türkiye re-established its civil government after the 1982 elections under the Prime Ministry of Turgut Özal, who was the leader of the newly-established Anavatan (Motherhood) Party. Özal supported both 'Westernisation' and economic 'liberalisation' of the country. Yet simultaneously, he also looked Eastwards to extend Türkiye's influence on the Turkic states established after the collapse of the Soviet Union and provided more leeway for religious influence in public life. The transition to democracy and the establishment of a free market economy paved the way for the prioritisation of Türkiye-West/Europe relations during the 1980s (Hale, 2013). Thus, Türkiye applied for full membership of the EC in 1987, which the EC rejected in 1989. By the end of the Cold War, while Turkey's foreign policy's commitment to the international liberal order was strengthened, the newly founded EU prioritised its institutional deepening and widening towards Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, Türkiye was struggling with new political, economic, and social crises, including the failure of coalition governments, the financial and banking crisis, the Kurdish issue, and the rise of political Islam during the 1990s. Despite all this, Türkiye signed the Customs Union Agreement with the EU in 1995 and deepened its economic integration with the EU. However, the Agreement did not ensure further political reforms, integration and EU accession.

At the 1999 Helsinki Council meeting, Türkiye became an EU candidate and committed to intensive political and economic reform process, fostering Türkiye's "Europeanization" process. Türkiye passed multiple regulations in different policy areas within a short period of time as a requirement for opening membership negotiations, which started in October 2005. Although Türkiye has thus become a member of a network of countries in the EU's close orbit, it has performed weakly during the negotiations. Only sixteen out of thirty-five negotiation chapters were opened at the time of writing, and only one chapter (research) was successfully closed. The opening of all other chapters has been vetoed by the Republic of Cyprus because of ongoing conflict on the island, which has resulted in disputes over recognition and thus violations of the Ankara Agreement. The Agreement would have to be extended to all EU members, including the Republic of Cyprus, which Türkiye does not recognise as a sovereign state. Yet at the same time, other member states have done little to find a solution to this problem and have often hidden their own agendas behind Cyprus's stance (Kuşku-Sönmez and Türkeş-Kılıç, 2018: 264). France, for instance, added a clause in its constitutional law that requires a referendum on all future EU accessions after Croatia's EU membership. In addition, in contrast to the

CEEC enlargement, no clear target date for the conclusion of membership negotiations with Türkiye has not been set. All of this has furthered Türkiye's estrangement from the EU and its failure to comply with EU political reforms (Macmillan, 2013; Uğur, 2010).

Türkiye thus moved from being one of the allies of the Western Camp during the Cold War to a long-term accession country in terms of its European integration process and its relations with the EU, during the 2000s. While Bulgaria and Romania became EU members in 2007, Croatia, which initiated accession negotiations in parallel with Türkiye in 2005, became the 28th and latest member state of the EU in 2013. Yet, out of the six Western Balkan countries (WB6), five, excluding only Kosovo as a potential candidate, gained candidacy status. The EU created a visa-free regime with eight non-EU countries (Montenegro, Serbia, North Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine) until today. Due to the recent Ukraine War, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova officially applied for EU membership in March 2022 (Gehrke, 2022) and became candidates in June 2022. As citizens of a candidate country since 1999, who signed an Association Agreement with the European Union in 1963 and became a part of the CU by 1996, Turkish citizens still cannot travel to the EU without a Schengen visa. While different modes of European integration for non-EU countries, opt-ins and outs, and differentiated integration (Leuffen et al., 2012) have created several opportunities for Türkiye's further integration into the EU under several emerging discourses, such as associate membership (Duff, 2013), dynamic association (Ekim, Ülgen and Saatçioğlu 2019), and functional integration (Müftüler-Baç, 2017; Saatçioğlu, 2020), particularly in specific policy areas such as trade, security, and migration, the current state of Türkiye-EU relations is a deadlock. While Turkish President Erdoğan emphasised several times during and after the 2023 elections that one of their ultimate goals is Türkiye's EU accession, declaring that "Türkiye could part ways with the EU, if necessary" (Reuters, 2023) just after the announcement of the 2023 EU progress report on Türkiye, which harshly criticised democratic backsliding, violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms, and Türkiye's Cyprus policy.

At the same time, both sides continue to "do business" with each other when it is in their mutual interest. The most obvious example of this is the 2016 EU and Türkiye Statement and Action Plan in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis, which effectively made Türkiye a gatekeeper for migrants on their EU migration route. On the one hand, such cooperation in specific policy areas has indicated a rise of a transactional relationship rather than one grounded more fundamentally in joint institutions and norms (Bashirov and Yilmaz, 2020; Öniş, 2023; Turhan and Wessels, 2021). On the other hand, they have reinforced the ambiguous nature of the political relationship between Türkiye and the EU, which has been characterised by steps that have bound the two countries closer to each other and simultaneously distancing them from each other.

Economy

The area where Türkiye-EU relations are most integrated is the economy. Although economic integration is deeper than the other issues discussed here, the relationship between the Europe and Türkiye has encountered many ups and downs in this field during the last century as well. In the mid-19th century, the Ottoman Empire began to borrow

from European states. When the Ottoman Empire could not service its debts on time, these countries established Duyunu Umumiye, a Public Debt Administration, in 1881. Thus, foreigners began to manage the finances of the Ottoman Empire (Eğilmez, 2011). Therefore, it is not surprising that the Republic of Türkiye prioritised “full independence” and “anti-imperialism” in economic terms. However, Türkiye only paid its debts to foreign state authorities it had taken over from the Ottoman Empire in 1954. The payment of foreign debt became a trauma confronting Europe (West) and Türkiye both politically and socially. When the Ottoman free trade obligations with European states expired in 1929, Türkiye turned to import restrictions and a statist economic policy (Eğilmez, 2011) until the beginning of the Cold War to strengthen its autonomy.

Türkiye accelerated its economic integration with the West during the Cold War. Marshall Aid provided by the United States to European countries including Türkiye for the recovery of continental Europe after World War II coincided with the fact that the opposition Democratic Party came into power for the first time right after the transition to the multiparty system in Türkiye. The initiation of the EEC membership process in 1959 laid the groundwork for the gradual integration of the Turkish economy with the European one. While the Ankara Agreement facilitated the free movement of Turkish citizens to Europe and the right to establishment, the Additional Protocol to the Customs Union brought Türkiye one step closer to the EEC. However, one of the first and most profound blows to economic integration occurred during the 1970s, during one of the most turbulent periods in Türkiye’s domestic politics. In 1978, under the Prime Minister’s Office of Bülent Ecevit, Türkiye suspended its obligations arising from the Additional Protocol on the grounds that the country was struggling with internal political and economic problems. During his election campaign in 1973, Ecevit, emphasising that “they are Partners, we are the Market”, expressed his reservations about Türkiye’s membership in the EEC. While his discourse played on the views of many people who defined themselves as anti-imperialist, leftist, Kemalist, and even Turkish nationalists in the Cold War Era-Türkiye, it also reflected the feelings and behaviours of most Turkish bureaucrats and political elites (Erdem, 2008).

The suspended relations with the EC after the 1980 military coup regained momentum with the initiation of the Customs Union process in the early 1990s. The Customs Union Agreement signed with the EU in 1995 was welcomed by political elites, especially by Prime Minister of the time Tansu Çiller, Turkish media, and pro-Europeans in Türkiye, almost as if Türkiye had become an EU member. The Customs Union enabled Türkiye to receive intense and high foreign direct investments (FDIs) from Western states. This situation has led to high profits, integration of bilateral economic relations, and increased trade volumes with European institutions and companies that trade with and invest in Türkiye. In this context, during the first decade of the Customs Union, an economic win-win situation emerged for both parties. Türkiye enjoyed remarkable economic growth together with a considerable decrease in unemployment and inflation rates since the beginning of the 2000s.

While the average per capita income of Western countries was US\$6,000 in 1923 when the Republic was founded, the average per capita income of Türkiye was only 700 dollars (Eğilmez, 2011). The rate has increased continuously since the second half of the 1990s.

In 2013, Türkiye reached its highest per capita income in its history at 12,582 million USD. However, it has not exceeded this level since 2014. In 2023, the estimated average per capita income was 11,931 dollars (IMF, 2023).

In addition to the ongoing economic crisis in Türkiye today, it is clear that there are many problems regarding the functioning of the Customs Union between Türkiye and the Union. Among others, one of the main problems is that Türkiye remains the first and only state in a customs union with the EU without being an EU member. Türkiye thus does not have a say in bilateral free trade agreements (FTA) negotiated by the EU with third countries; there is a trade diversion through Türkiye after those FTAs enter into force (European Commission, 2019); Türkiye's various strong and competing sectors (such as automotive, textile, etc.) are negatively affected by this trade diversion; some sectors, importantly the agriculture sector, are excluded from the CU; and Turkish citizens are subject to travel restrictions. These problems make recovery difficult, but at the same time, they offer a window of opportunity for relations to be re-energised.

This brief overview of economic relations illustrates that ambiguities prevail even in highly integrated economic sectors. While the economies of Europe and Türkiye have been intertwined to a considerable degree, obstacles, partly stemming from identity and politics, have prevented further integration and have even led to centrifugal forces. Türkiye has thus sought to diversify its trade patterns and has pursued stronger linkages with partners outside Europe, including Central Asia and Africa. At the same time, Europe remains its largest trading partner. Likewise, EU member states have kept Türkiye at a distance and, for instance, have restricted migration while remaining dependent on Turkish labour force influx as well as the import of cheaply produced goods from Türkiye.

Society

The Kemalist project of Westernisation had a strong and paternalistic element (Dumont, 1984). For Atatürk and the elite of the new Turkish Republic, the masses had to be educated and transformed into a modern secular society. After World War II, linkages with the member states of the European integration project and their societies became an important pillar in this process. Anchoring Türkiye in Europe meant not only international recognition but also embedding Turkish society in (Western) Europe. At the same time, as the economic recovery of especially Western Germany led to a demand of labour immigration, Turkish citizens formed a strong presence in Western European states, particularly in industrial centres, while the diaspora retained deep-seated linkages to their "homeland" (Küçükcan, 2007).

After the Cold War, the Kemalist project of a transformation of Turkish society was mirrored in the conceptualisation of a top-down Europeanisation process through increasing linkages between the EU and Türkiye after the end of the Cold War. In such simplistic renderings of Europeanization, both scholars and practitioners expected domestic changes by bringing societies into the EU context (Kaliber 2014). At the same time, sceptics of Türkiye's EU membership within the EU saw Turkish society as alien to what they considered the EU's main values and identity. Ironically, in doing so, they shared their view of Turkish society as backward, non-Western, and in need of modernisation with the early Kemalists.

Clearly, both positions were misguided. Turkish society has long been linked to transformations in other parts of Europe (e.g., Deringil 2008), and societies in general are complex and diverse phenomena. Their development is a highly differentiated and contested process. At the same time, Europeanization does not function as a one-way street with a prefigured outcome (Yılmaz, 2015). How the societies of member candidate countries (as well as EU member states) react to the embedding in the EU context depends on their economic and social backgrounds, political predispositions, immediate interests, historical context, and many other factors. In addition, the Europeanization literature has long taken a turn to emphasising “uploading” as well as “bottom-up” processes that make the meaning of “Europe” a site of constant struggle (Featherstone, 2003).

Thus, instead of seeing Türkiye-EU relations as a one-way project of modernisation, we should conceptualise them as a highly complex enmeshment of EU member states and Turkish societies, which in many ways form a transnational space (Kaya, 2007). On the one hand, we find a dense network of business and academic contacts and links to civil society. These concepts have often but not always reinforced “Westernisation” as classically conceived. City twinning and scholarship programmes such as Erasmus, have led to enhanced contacts among civil societies. At the same time, diaspora organisations are embedded in the local lives of their “host societies” as much as they have been an avenue for Turkish governments to influence migrants and have replicated political divisions in Türkiye. The immense number of tourists visiting Türkiye from EU member states has only partly led to more exchange, as many have visited the country as part of all-inclusive package holidays, with little contact with the local population outside their hotels.

The effects of these complex links between EU and Turkish societies are full of ambiguity. In Türkiye, they have tended to reinforce existing polarizations between a secular, Westernised and a more traditional, religious part of the population, although this is an oversimplification. As Senem Aydın-Düzgit (2018) demonstrated on the basis of focus group discussions, whether or not citizens accepted the EU as a normative power depended much more on their value systems than on their immediate economic benefits. In EU member states, migrants from Türkiye and their descendants are sometimes fully integrated and part of the political and societal elite; they may sometimes consider themselves outcasts and find pride in the new Turkish nationalism of the post-2016 Turkish governments. The question of whether migrants of Turkish descent are part of European societies and their identities is still hotly debated among both societal majorities and sometimes among migrants themselves, even though life in most EU member states would be unthinkable without their presence (Karamik and Ermihan, 2023). Similarly, the issue of whether Islam is part of European societies, or vice versa, Christianity is part of Turkish society, has repeatedly stirred up highly emotional debates.

Thus, European and Turkish societies are strongly interlinked, forming a transnational space marked by high levels of trade, cultural, and labour exchange. This exchange has transformed both EU member societies and Turkish society and has made them dependent on each other to a significant extent. Yet as much as these societies need each other, significant parts of their members have time and again engaged in mutual Othering, have rejected the ties that have grown since the early Twentieth Century, and have looked

elsewhere for alternative linkages. Mirroring our findings in other dimensions of EU-Türkiye relations, the societal relationship is therefore highly ambiguous. While the concrete relationship between societies has changed considerably over the past 100 years, the underlying ambiguity has not.

Military and Security

Regarding military and security issues, the relationship between Türkiye and Europe must move beyond the EU and include NATO. Thus, analysing Türkiye-EU relations in foreign and security policy is complicated by the parallel development of the EU and NATO, as well as the longer trajectory of Türkiye and the EU in a broader European security context. For a long time, the relationship between European states, including the Ottoman Empire, was marked by power politics and military aggression. The resulting antagonisms led to two World Wars. While Türkiye took up some 100 German Jewish academics during the reign of the Nazis in the 1930s and 1940s, it maintained good relations with the Nazi regime, officially remained neutral during World War II, and only entered the war in support of the Allies in its final stages in February 1945 (Guttstadt, 2008). Its staunch Western orientation in security policy was a result of the ascending Cold War and claims by the Soviet Union on Turkish territory. Integrating into the Western alliance thus allowed Türkiye to shore up the security of its borders while allowing the US and NATO to put up its military defences in a strategically important area in the direct neighbourhood of the USSR. At the same time, Türkiye was critical of hegemonic ambitions and continuing colonial practises of Western great powers. Thus, it participated in the 1955 Bandung conference of African and Asian states but was met with considerable suspicion because of NATO's involvement and support of the West (Aydın, 2000).

Thus, despite Türkiye's clear Western orientation, security relations with European states were far from clear-cut even in the early days of the post-World War II international system because of a simultaneous discourse that saw the West as colonial. The fact that Greece joined NATO with Türkiye did not make the situation any less complex. Despite both being NATO members, the two countries have been close to war several times and, in 1974, confronted each other directly in Cyprus. The EU membership of the Republic of Cyprus has also complicated EU-NATO cooperation in Security and Defence Policy, as Türkiye does not want the Republic of Cyprus, which is not a NATO member state, to gain access to strategic military information. At the same time, Greece and Türkiye have experienced historical phases of *détente* and even expressions of friendship, for instance, after the devastating earthquakes of 1999. However, in every instance, optimism about the overcoming of enmity (Rumelili, 2007) quickly dissipated.

The post Cold War period generally made matters more difficult. Removing the "overlay" of bipolarity has provided regional powers in an "insulator" position between regional security complexes such as Türkiye with new opportunities to follow more active foreign policy (Diez, 2006). While Türkiye as a NATO member and EU candidate is bound to strategic decisions within NATO and expected to align its foreign and security policy with the EU, it has increasingly diverged from both, particularly since the 2010s. Its strategy of diversification has included a focus on previous Ottoman regions, claiming

leadership in the Global South, and increasing links with Russia and China. It became a “dialog partner” of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2012 and declared its intention to intensify its relations with the observer status or even membership. President Erdoğan sought close links with Russian President Putin. Türkiye’s purchase of Russian S-400 air defence missile systems demonstrates the “sitting-on-the-fence” policy of the Turkish government since 2017: while buying from the Russians, Türkiye also ordered US-made F-35 fighter planes and invested in developing its national air defence system. In the Ukraine war, Türkiye has supplied Ukraine with its *Bayraktar TB2* drones and has advocated NATO membership while maintaining close economic ties with Russia and not fully supporting EU sanctions on Russia. Furthermore, disputes over Kurdish activists’ human rights treatment continue to sour relations between Türkiye and EU member states. At the time of writing, Türkiye was still blocking NATO membership of Sweden, an EU member.

The list of disagreements between the EU and Türkiye on strategic matters is thus as long as their common interests, although one should add that tensions also run deep between EU member states on many issues, from developing their own defence systems to sanctions on Russia. Expectations that membership in joint security organisations may lead to a “security community” with a growing common identity have been disappointing. Domestic and international historical contexts have turned out to influence security identities and interests more than institutional membership, which has, however, prevented a complete break-up. Thus, security is a policy field that is symptomatic for the EU and Türkiye both needing each other and drifting apart, and simplistic expectations of EU integration have been proven wrong. Instead, what we have witnessed since the end of World War II is a movement between phases of increasing cooperation and enmity, the development of parallel and often contradictory relationships, and increasing complexity due to diminishing structural constraints after the end of the Cold War in combination with a regime change away from Kemalism in Türkiye.

Conclusion: Entanglement and Estrangement

In the early 2000s, after the customs union had been agreed, Türkiye had become an official EU membership candidate, and the Annan Plan had promised a solution to the Cyprus conflict. Many analysts of EU-Türkiye relations expected the effects of Europeanization to unfold within Türkiye. Europeanization was intended to reinforce democratisation of the political system and the rule of law, to further intensify economic linkages, and to strengthen civil society. When the EU membership process stalled, the Annan Plan failed, and the AKP-led government under President Erdoğan increasingly followed an EU-critical foreign policy stance, observers quickly observed processes of “de-Europeanization”. Instead of buying into such dichotomies, we have pointed out the inherent ambiguities and tensions in the relationship between Europe and Türkiye over the past century, specifically after the end of World War II and the beginning of the European integration process. Our review of five different aspects of the relationship demonstrates a situation of both entanglement and estrangement rather than a clear unidirectional movement.

In relation to identity, we noted how Türkiye and Europe have defined themselves as both opposing and intertwined with each other. We argue that even mutual mothering

relied on radical interdependence that bound Türkiye and Europe to each other. In the political realm, we have traced the ups and downs of Türkiye's and Europe's complex relationship and have shown how processes of political integration and distancing often occurred simultaneously or in quick secession. Even in the economic sector, which has been deeply integrated since the 1960s, we found both dependencies and efforts towards diversification and separation. Societies in EU member states and Türkiye are likewise strongly interconnected, but it is this interconnection that has at the same time led to rejection and distancing. And last but not least, we argue that NATO, in particular, has provided a strong institutional embeddedness of Europe and Türkiye that cannot easily be untangled, while tensions remain and alternative strategic options have been explored.

What does this mean for our assessment of the relationship between Türkiye and Europe after 100 years of the Republic? One clear conclusion is that there is no "natural" place for Türkiye inside or outside "Europe" or the EU. Throughout this paper, we have emphasised how this relationship is the result of continuous struggles in a context of path dependency and ever-changing global and domestic contexts (Rumelili and Süleymanoglu-Kürüm, 2017). Both those who saw Türkiye on an unstoppable path towards EU membership in the 2000s and those who argued that turning East and South is Türkiye's only future today have underestimated not only the contestations but also the room for manoeuvre and the opportunities provided by Türkiye's liminality. There is no determinacy or teleology in such complex societal relationships, and we cannot assume automatic processes of change.

Is this a problem? Certainly, for those who prefer clear-cut boundaries and futures, our discussion demolishes the ground on which they intend to stand. Yet history has shown repeatedly that such a firm foundation does not exist. From our point of view, it is thus better to accept the ambiguities and embrace the struggle, but also reflect that countercurrents exist that one must factor in and even accommodate. Thus, the ambiguous relationship between Türkiye and Europe will continue and provide as many opportunities as risks. As analysts, a hundred years of studying Türkiye and Europe taught us to steer clear of simple truths and teleology, and emphasise the need to think in terms of complexities instead.

Peer-review: Externally peer-reviewed.

Conflict of Interest: The authors have no conflict of interest to declare.

Grant Support: The authors declared that this study has received no financial support.

Author Contributions: Conception/Design of study: D.C.T., T.D.; Data Acquisition: D.C.T., T.D.; Drafting Manuscript: D.C.T., T.D.; Critical Revision of Manuscript: D.C.T., T.D.; Final Approval and Accountability: D.C.T., T.D.

References

- Ahrens, B. (2018). Normative Powers in Europe during a Crisis? Understanding the Productive Role of Ambiguity in the EU's Transformative Agenda. *Asia-Europe Journal* 16 (2), 199-212.
- Alpan, B. (2021). Europeanization and EU-Turkey Relations: Three Domains and Four Periods, In W. Reiners and E. Turhan (Eds). *EU-Turkey Relations: Theories, institutions and Policies*. Cham: Palgrave, pp. 107-137.
- Alpan, B., & Diez, T. (2014). The Devil is in the 'Domestic'? European Integration Studies and the Limits of Europeanization in Turkey. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 16(1): 1-10.
- Aydın, M. (2000). Determinants of Turkish foreign policy: Changing patterns and conjunctures during the Cold War. *Middle Eastern Studies* 36(1): 103-139.

- Aydın-Düzgüt, S. (2018). Legitimising Europe in Contested Settings: Europe as a Normative Power in Turkey? *Journal of Common Market Studies* 56(3): 612–627.
- Barysch, K. (2007). *Turkey's role in European energy security*. London: Centre for European Reform.
- Bashirov, G. and Yılmaz, I. (2020). Transactionalism's rise in International Relations: Evidence from Turkey's Relations with the European Union. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 74(2): 165–184.
- Buzan, B. and Diez, T. (1999). The European Union and Turkey. *Survival* 41(1): 41–57.
- Çakır, R. (2023). *Büyük Göçün gösterdiği acı Türkiye gerçekleri*. Istanbul: Medyascope. Available online: medyascope.tv/2023/08/20/buyuk-gocun-gosterdigi-aci-turkiye-gercekleri/ (accessed January 2024).
- Campbell, D. (1993). *Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Çavdar, A. (2023). *Müflis babalar ülkesi*. Istanbul: Medyascope. Available online: medyascope.tv/2023/08/20/ayse-cavdar-yazdi-muflis-babalar-ulkesi/ (accessed January 2024).
- Deringil, S. (2008). The Turks and 'Europe': The Argument from History. *Middle Eastern Studies* 43(5), 709–723.
- Diez, T. (2006). Turkey, the European Union and security complexes revisited (2006). *Mediterranean Politics* 10(2): 167–180.
- Diez, T., Agnantopoulos, A., & Kaliber, A. (2005). File: Turkey, Europeanization and Civil Society: Introduction. *South European Society and Politics* 10(1): 1–15.
- Duff, A. (2013). The case of associate membership of the European Union. *LSE Blog*, 6 March.
- Dumont, P. (1984). *The Origins of Kemalist Ideology*. London: Routledge.
- Eğilmez, M. (2011). Osmanlı'dan Devraldığımız Borçlar, 11 December. Available online: <https://www.mahfiegilmez.com/2011/12/osmanli-dan-devraldigimiz-borclar.html> (accessed January 2024).
- Erdem, S. (2008). Türkiye'de Sosyal Demokratların Avrupa Birliği'ne Yaklaşımları. *Toplum ve Demokrasi* 2(2): 91–106.
- Esen, B., Gümüşçü, Ş. and Yavuzylmaz, H. (2023). *Türkiye'nin Yeni Rejimi: Rekabetçi Otoriterlik*. Istanbul: İletişim.
- European Commission. (2019). *Economic Impact of the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: 1 January 2017-31 December 2017*. Brussels: Euroopan Commission.
- European Council (1997). *European Council Presidency Conclusions*. Brussels, Belgium. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1_en.htm (accessed May 2024).
- Featherstone, K. (Ed). (2003). *Europeanization's politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Featherstone, K., & Radaelli, C. M. (2003). *Europeanization's politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gehrke, L. (2022). 'Georgia, Moldova follow Ukraine in applying to join EU. *Politico*, 3 March. Available online: <https://www.politico.eu/article/georgia-and-moldova-apply-for-eu-membership/> (accessed January 2024).
- Gerhards, J. and Hans, S. (2011). Why not Turkey? Attitudes towards Turkish Membership in the EU among Citizens in 27 European Countries. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49(4): 741–766.
- Guttstadt, C. (2008). *Die Türkei, die Juden und der Holocaust*. Berlin: Assoziation A.
- Hale, W. (2013). *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774*. London: Routledge.
- IMF (2023). *Republic of Türkiye Datasets*. <https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/profile/TUR> (accessed May 2024).
- Kaliber, A. (2014). Turkey's Europeanization: In Search for a New Paradigm of Modernisation. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 16(1): 30–46.
- Kaliber, A. (2024). Oscillating Between Securitisation and Transactionalism: The Everlasting Drama of Turkey-West Relations. In N. Christofis (ed), *Elections and Earthquakes: Quo Vadis Turkey* (London: Transnational Press), 209–222.
- Karamik, İ. and Ermihan, E. (2023). Imagined Spaces: Emotional Geographies in the EU-Turkey Relations. *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*: 1–18.
- Kaya, A. (2007). German-Turkish Transnational Space. A Separate Space of Their Own. *German Studies Review* 30(3): 483–502.
- Kedourie, E. (1968). The End of the Ottoman Empire. *Journal of Contemporary History* 3(4): 19–28.
- Kösebalaban, H. (2007). The Permanent "Other?" Turkey and the Question of European Identity. *Mediterranean Quarterly* 18(4): 87–111.
- Küçükcan, T. (2007). Bridging the European Union with Turkey: The Turkish Diaspora in Europe. *Insight Turkey* 9(4): 85–99.
- Kuşku-Sönmez, E. and Türkeş-Kılıç, S. (2018). Dynamics of Technical Progress Towards the EU Accession: New Rules, Vetoes and Power Asymmetries. *European Foreign Affairs Review* 23(2): 263–280.
- Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2012). *Differentiated Integration: Explaining Variations in the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Lindgaard, J. (2018). *EU Public Opinion on Turkish EU Membership: Trends and Drivers*. Cologne: FEUTURE Online Paper 25.
- Macmillan, C. (2013). *Discourse, Identity and the Question of Turkish Accession to the EU: Through the Looking Glass*. London: Routledge.

- McLaren, L. M. (2007). Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU. *European Union Politics* 8 (2), 251-278.
- Metropoll. (2023). *En Büyük Tehdit: Türkiye'nin Nabzı Temmuz ayı araştırması*. Ankara: MetroPOLL Research.
- Müftüler-Baç, M. (2000). Through the glass: Turkey in Europe. *Turkish Studies* 1(1): 21–35.
- Müftüler-Baç, M. (2017). Turkey's Future with the EU: An alternative model of differentiated integration, 2017. *Turkish Studies* 18(3): 416–438.
- Olsen, J. P. (2002). The Many Faces of Europeanization. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(5): 921–952.
- Öniş, Z. (2023). Historic Missed Opportunities and Prospects for Renewal: Turkey-EU Relations in a Post-Western Order. *Turkish Studies* 24(3-4): 691–713.
- Reuters. (2023). *Turkey could part ways with the EU, if necessary says Erdogan*. 16 September. Available online: <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-says-country-could-part-ways-with-eu-if-necessary-2023-09-16/> (accessed January 2024).
- Rumelili, B. (2007). Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders: The Case of Greek-Turkish Relations. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45(1): 105–126.
- Rumelili, B. (2012). Liminal identities and processes of domestication and subversion in International Relations. *Review of International Studies* 38(2): 495–508.
- Rumelili, B. and Süleymanoğlu-Kürüm, R. (2017). Brand Turkey: Liminal Identity and its Limits. *Geopolitics* 22(3): 549–570.
- Saatçioğlu, B. (2020). The European Union's Refugee Crisis and Rising Functionalism in EU-Turkey Relations. *Turkish Studies* 21(2): 169–187.
- Saatçioğlu, B., Tekin, F., Ekin, S. and Tocci, N. (2019). *The future of EU-Turkey Relations: A Dynamic Association Framework amidst Conflictual Cooperation*. Brussels: FEUTURE Synthesis Paper.
- Saatçioğlu, B. and Tekin, F. (2021). *Turkey and the EU: Key Dynamics and Future Scenarios*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Şenyuva, Ö. (2018). *Turkish Public Opinion and EU Membership: Between Support and Mistrust*. Istanbul: Trans European Policy Studies Association.
- Şenyuva, Ö. and Aydın, M. (2021). Turkish Public Opinion and Transatlantic Relations. In: E. Kuşku-Sönmez and Ç. Üstün (Eds). *Turkey's changing transatlantic relations*: Lanham: Lexington Books, pp. 265–282.
- Süleymanoğlu-Kürüm, R. and Gençkal-Eroler, E. (2023). Spatial Construction of a Turkish National Identity: The Exclusion and Inclusion of Europe. *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*: 1–17.
- Turhan, E. and Wessels, W. (2021). The European Council as a Key Driver of EU–Turkey Relations: Central Functions, Internal Dynamics, and Evolving Preferences. In W. Reiners and E. Turhan (Eds). *EU-Turkey Relations: Theories, institutions and Policies*. Cham: Palgrave, pp. 185–217.
- Turkish Medical Association-TTB (2023). “TTB'ye İyi Hal Belgesi Başvuru sayısı”. @ttborgtr: <https://twitter.com/ttborgtr/status/1740746140457279822> (accessed May 2024).
- Uğur, M. (2010). Open-Ended Membership Prospect and Commitment Credibility: Explaining the Deadlock in EU–Turkey Accession Negotiations. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 48(4): 967–991.
- Ünlühisarcıklı, Ö., Taştan, K. and Akman-Canbilek, C. (2023). Turkish Perceptions of the European Union 2022. Available online: <https://www.gmfus.org/news/turkish-perceptions-european-union-2022> (accessed January 2024).
- Yılmaz, G. (2015). From Europeanization to De-Europeanization: The Europeanization Process of Turkey in 1999–2014. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 24(1): 86–100.



The “Magic” Number: Women’s Critical Mass and Substantive Representation in Angola

“Sihirli” Sayı: Angola’da Kadınların Kritik Eşik ve Niteliksel Temsil İlişkisi

Pelin Kılınçarslan¹

Abstract

This study explores whether and how a critical mass of women in parliament, after years of underrepresentation, translates into substantive representation of women (SRW). Critical mass in politics refers to a threshold number necessary to effect change in legislative contexts. It is rooted in the assumed causal relationship between two forms of representation—descriptive and substantive—implying that SRW depends on active political engagement. This paper offers a nuanced perspective by deconstructing SRW into a process and an outcome, and it suggests four potential scenarios that connect critical mass to SRW. Through a comparative within-case analysis of Angola, a country that witnessed the emergence of a critical mass of women through the adoption of gender quotas after a prolonged period of underrepresentation, this study reveals that SRW can manifest in multiple forms. This study challenges the assumption of a direct link between SRW and descriptive representation of women (DRW) by demonstrating that the impact of DRW on SRW is multiple and can proceed independently as both a process and an outcome. Ultimately, this paper underscores the need for a more comprehensive understanding of SRW in diverse political contexts.

Keywords: Women’s political representation, critical mass, substantive representation, descriptive representation, Angola

Öz

Bu çalışma, uzun yıllar süren temsil eksikliğinin ardından parlamentodaki kadınların kritik eşik düzeyinde temsiline kadınların niteliksel temsiline etkilerini ve bu etkilerin ne şekilde ortaya çıktığını incelemektedir. Siyasal temsilde kritik eşik, yasama bağlamında dönüştürücü etki sağlayabilmek için gerekli olan en düşük sayısal oranı ifade etmektedir. Niceliksel ve niteliksel temsil arasındaki nedensel ilişkiye dayalı bu ölçüt, kadın temsiline kadınların aktif siyasi katılımlarına bağlı olduğu varsayımını taşımaktadır. Bu makale, niteliksel temsili süreç ve sonuç olarak iki boyutta kavramsallaştırarak kritik eşik düzeyindeki temsil ile niteliksel temsil arasındaki ilişkiyi dört farklı olasılık üzerinden açıklamaktadır ve böylece daha kapsamlı bir yaklaşım sunmaktadır. Cinsiyet kotalarının benimsenmesiyle uzun bir temsil eksikliği döneminin ardından kritik eşik düzeyinde kadın temsiline ortaya çıktığı Angola’nın karşılaştırmalı vaka analizi yoluyla bu çalışma niteliksel temsiline farklı biçimlerde ortaya çıkabileceğini göstermektedir. Ayrıca, niceliksel temsil ile niteliksel temsil arasında doğrudan bir bağlantı olduğu varsayımını sorgulayarak, bu bağlantının farklı biçimlerde kurulabileceğini ve bunun süreç ve sonuç açısından bağımsız bir şekilde gerçekleşebileceğini ortaya koymaktadır. Böylelikle bu makale, farklı siyasi bağlamlara dikkat çekerek niteliksel temsiline daha kapsamlı bir şekilde anlaşılmasının gerekliliğini vurgulamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kadınların siyasal temsili, kritik eşik, niteliksel temsil, niceliksel temsil, Angola

1 Corresponding Author: Pelin Kılınçarslan (Dr./Postdoctoral Researcher), Koç University, Migration Research Center (MiReKoc), İstanbul, Türkiye. E-mail: pkilincarslan@ku.edu.tr ORCID: 0000-0003-2534-8444

To cite this article: Kılınçarslan, P. (2024). The “Magic” number: women’s critical mass and substantive representation in Angola. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 33(2), 205–223. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2024.33.1367071>



Introduction

Women's under-representation globally, with women comprising half the population yet holding only 27% of elected political positions worldwide (IPU, 2024), has led to widespread adoption of legislated candidate gender quotas in over 60 countries (International IDEA, 2023). These quotas typically aim for a 30% threshold, rooted in the critical mass debate in policy and scholarship, which suggests that women need to constitute at least 30% of parliamentary representation to have a significant impact on political decision-making.

As women have long been marginalised in political decision making, the question of how and whether their increasing presence makes a difference in parliament has been a subject of inquiry. While descriptive representation is typically identified in numerical terms, substantive representation is a more complex and contested phenomenon that is understood from varying perspectives (Celis et al., 2008; Clayton, 2021; Joshi, 2023). The link between these two forms of representation is a central topic in feminist scholarship on gender and politics (Beckwith, 2007; Htun et al., 2013; Mansbridge 1999; Park, 2023; Phillips 1995; Young 2002). The quest to establish this link surfaces in discussions over whether women constitute a distinct group best represented by women themselves (Beckwith, 2014; Celis & Childs, 2012; Celis et al., 2008; Clayton, 2021; O'Brien & Piscopo, 2019). Supporting this claim, empirical work in different countries is more inclined to find a positive relationship between the descriptive representation of women (DRW) and substantive representation of women (SRW) (Bauer & Britton 2006; Coffé & Reiser, 2018; Devlin & Elgie, 2008; Kalra & Joshi, 2020; Shim, 2021; Tam, 2020; Taylor-Robinson & Heath, 2003; Wang, 2023).

Despite this extensive scholarship on gender quotas, analysis of the critical mass argument in relation to both forms of representation is limited. The conceptualisation of SRW remains problematic since the existing literature most often does not differentiate between the processes and outcomes when analysing the links between the presence or absence of a critical mass of women and SRW (Francheschet & Piscopo, 2008). Furthermore, there has been a significant oversight in understanding the diverse trajectories of non-Western women concerning the issue of representation (Shim, 2021, p. 142). In response to these concerns, my aim is to address a more intricate question: To what extent and in what forms does the presence of a critical mass of women in parliament, following years of underrepresentation, contribute to SRW in a non-Western context?

I explore this question through a comparative within-case analysis of Angola, where a critical mass of women emerged following the adoption of gender quotas in 2005, after a prolonged period of underrepresentation. To capture the immediate effects, I analyse the electoral periods of 2004-2008 and 2008-2012. Using data from official sources, reports, and newspapers, I compare legislative outcomes and processes related to women's issues, including constitutional amendments, international agreements, family code, violence against women, and labour and poverty. My argument is twofold: First, process-oriented SRW may exhibit similarities between the presence and absence of a critical mass of women. Second, outcome-oriented SRW is more likely to occur in women with a critical mass, even without significant changes in process-oriented SRW.

While this study focuses on the immediate impact of the critical mass of women in parliament on SRW, it is important to acknowledge that no numbers are “magical,” and progress in gender equality is longitudinal (Beckwith, 2007; Grey, 2006, p. 494). In the past decade, Angola has significantly improved women’s political representation, with women now holding 38.1% of parliamentary seats and 9 out of 23 ministerial positions (Pacatolo et al., 2023). However, despite these advancements, Angola ranks 125th out of 146 countries in the 2022 Global Gender Gap Index (WEF, 2022, p. 10), and concerns such as gender-based violence, access to education, and formal employment persist among women (Kitombe & Pacatolo, 2023). Although undoubtedly significant, women’s political representation is just one facet of the broader landscape of progress in achieving gender equality.

The paper proceeds as follows: First, it presents an overview of the existing literature on women’s political representation and group identity that underlies the critical mass debate. Next, I introduce an alternative conceptualisation of SRW, modelling four scenarios for the link between critical mass and SRW. Finally, I analyse the Angolan case by comparing two electoral terms across specific areas of concern.

Literature on the Connection between Women’s Representation and Critical Mass

Linking Descriptive and Substantive Representations

The nexus between DRW and SRW forms a pivotal aspect of feminist discussions on women’s political representation, rooted in Hanna Pitkin’s conceptual framework (Tremblay, 2006, p. 503). Pitkin (1967, p. 61) delineates descriptive representation as the degree to which a representative resembles those they represent, implying a correspondence between the characteristics of the representative and the represented group, effectively rendering representatives as reflective mirrors of their constituency (Childs, 2007, p. 75). In contrast, substantive representation delves into “the content of acting for others” and denotes an endeavour undertaken “in behalf of; in the interest of, as the agent of, someone else” (Pitkin, 1967, pp. 113-114). It materialises when a representative, irrespective of their characteristics, actively pursues policies and interests that align with a specific group through deliberate actions. Therefore, DRW hinges on the numerical presence of women representatives, whereas SRW pivots not on the actors themselves but on the actions taken on behalf of women. Substantive representation is thus more complex, as Joshi (2023, p. 2) notes citing Dahlerup (2014: 63), spanning various dimensions from the voter-representative relationship to legislative processes and policy outcomes, encompassing a broad study of actors, sites, goals, and means.

The quest to establish a connection between DRW and SRW has led feminist scholarship to grapple with the question of whether women can be effectively represented by women. This inquiry emerges in discussions concerning the definition of women as a distinct group separate from men and the determination of what constitutes genuine representation for women. Existing research underscores that representatives with a descriptive link to a particular social group are more inclined to prioritise that group’s concerns, allocate more time to them, and endeavour to elevate them to legislative priority (Mansbridge, 2005, p. 625).

Women as a Group

When discussing women's political representation, the question of whether women hold distinct interests, issues, and needs that men do not adequately represent is a central and contested focus of feminist scholarship on gender and politics (Beckwith, 2014; Celis & Childs, 2012; Celis et al., 2008). Scholars who argue that representation should align with the shared experiences of the represented suggest that women's interests are best advocated for by women themselves (Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995, 1998; Sapiro, 1998; Weldon, 2002). While women's identities are multiple (Reinhart, 1992, p. 41), and essentializing them as homogeneous might be misleading (Clayton, 2021), they share common experiences related to issues such as pregnancy, reproduction, marriage, employment, violence, and education (Sapiro, 1998, p. 167). Descriptive representation is seen as a potential catalyst for advancing substantive representation of these interests (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 638). Representatives and voters who share common experiences of subordination are more likely to foster trust-based relationships (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 641). Young (2002) distinguishes between the representation of individual interests and social perspectives, emphasising the importance of shared experiences, social positions and knowledge in the latter. Even women with conflicting interests can find common ground in their shared relational experiences, such as balancing motherhood and work responsibilities (Weldon, 2002, p. 1157).

These arguments emphasise the importance of the "politics of presence" as described by Phillips (1995). While what constitutes a women's issue is an ongoing debate and can differ across local contexts and specific policy areas (Beckwith, 2014; Celis & Childs, 2012; Celis et al., 2008; Clayton, 2021), without women's political participation, there is a higher likelihood that women's interests will be overlooked. This idea forms the basis for the critical mass concept (Grey, 2006, p. 493).

Women as a Critical Mass

A critical mass represents "a threshold number (or percentage) of women in a legislature necessary for transforming the legislative context from one in which women-friendly policy is unlikely to one in which the opportunities for women's policy success are increased" (Grey et al., 2006, p. 491). The term originates from Kanter's (1977) work on organisational culture, later adapted to legislative contexts by Dahlerup (1988), and endorsed by the UN's Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, aiming for a 30% critical mass of women in decision-making positions, paving the way for gender quotas (Dahlerup, 2006, p. 515; Paxton & Hughes, 2007, p. 208).

This concept is central to discussions on "whether women in politics will make a difference" (Dahlerup, 2006, p. 517). Mansbridge (2005, p. 622) observed, "descriptive representation by gender improves substantive outcomes for women in every polity for which we have a measure." Studies across various countries show that women representatives are more inclined to address women's issues in parliamentary settings, significantly influencing politics. Supporting empirical evidence comes from Sweden (Wangnerud, 2000), Honduras (Taylor-Robinson & Heath, 2003), African countries (Bauer & Britton 2006), and Rwanda (Devlin & Elgie, 2008).

Recent research also confirms that women representatives are more likely to focus on women's issues and concerns (Coffé & Reiser, 2018; Kalra & Joshi, 2020; Lippmann,

2022; Shim, 2021; Tam, 2020; Wang, 2023). Furthermore, studies on parliaments in countries including the United States, New Zealand, and Scandinavian countries where women have achieved a critical mass demonstrate women’s ability to reshape political culture, steer parliamentary debates, and influence legislation (Bratton, 2005; Childs & Krook, 2009; Dahlerup, 1988; Grey, 2002; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005; Thomas, 1991; Vega & Firestone, 1995).

An Alternative Categorisation of the Connection between Critical Mass and Substantive Representation

The critical mass literature, while generally optimistic, overlooks several key issues. First, despite significant attention to gender quotas and theoretical discussions on DRW and SRW, little attention has been paid to understanding how a critical mass of women in parliament relates to SRW prospects (Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008, p. 394). Second, we must further explore whether the presence or absence of a critical mass of women has different implications for shaping discourses and outcomes. This does not imply that discursive shifts are insignificant for SRW, but it prompts an analysis of whether gendering political agendas (not outcomes) can occur in a critical mass. For this analysis, a careful distinction between outcomes and processes is necessary, which is often undermined (Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008). Third, women’s representation scholarship focuses on European or Latin American countries (Shim, 2021, p. 142). However, African women’s distinct experiences with land rights, poverty alleviation, HIV/AIDS, sexual freedom, and violence against women (Devlin & Elgie, 2008) can generate different representation trajectories (Bauer & Britton, 2006).

With these considerations, I extend Franceschet and Piscopo’s (2008) twofold conceptualisation of SRW as a process and an outcome. The former involves active engagement on behalf of women, including advocating for laws addressing women’s issues, collaborating with women’s organisations, and elevating women’s concerns to the political agenda. The latter category encompasses the adoption of laws, policies, agreements, and national programmes on women’s issues. Distinguishing between processes and outcomes is essential because gendering legislative discussions may not result in laws and policies. However, whether successful or not, parliamentary

Table 1
Four Scenarios Depicting the Impact of the Critical Mass of Women (CMW) on Their Twofold Substantive Representation (SRW)

Scenarios	Impact of CMW on SRW	Description
I	<i>Strongest</i> Substantive representation as an outcome and as a process	Women successfully gendering both the political agenda and legislative outcomes
II	<i>Partial</i> Substantive representation as a process	Women successfully gendering the political agenda but not successfully gendering legislative outcomes
III	<i>Partial</i> Substantive representation as an outcome while process remains the same	Women continuing with the same political agenda but also successfully gendering legislative outcomes
IV	<i>Weakest</i> Substantive representation neither as a process nor as an outcome	Women’s presence does not lead to changes in either the political agenda or outcomes

discussions signal progress in SRW by shaping agendas, prioritising women's issues, and incorporating them into legislative debates. Drawing from Franceschet and Piscopo (2008), I propose four broad scenarios for assessing the impact of critical mass on SRW.

In Scenario I, women in a critical mass in parliament successfully gender both the political agenda and legislative outcomes, resulting in the strongest relationship between DRW and SRW. Scenario II shows that women effectively shape the political agenda but do not impact legislative outcomes despite their critical mass, thus limiting the influence of DRW to process-oriented SRW. Scenario III demonstrates that women's critical mass does not influence the current political agenda but impacts legislative outcomes, emphasising the role of a critical mass in SRW as an outcome. In Scenario VI, despite being a critical mass in parliament, women do not actively alter politics, suggesting that DRW has no discernible impact on SRW.

Few studies have explored SRW as a process and an outcome. For instance, in Argentina, Htun et al. (2013) and Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) found that women's increased presence in parliament enhances SRW as a process but decreases it as an outcome because of male-dominated institutional barriers and party divisions among women. Park (2023), in a cross-national analysis of quota-adopting parliaments, demonstrated that women's increased presence enhances SRW as both a process and an outcome, especially in previously severely underrepresented parliaments. Given the complexity of SRW, I contribute to this scholarship by exploring multiple pathways of its manifestations.

As Clayton (2021) suggests, gender quotas influence representation in two main ways: by altering the behaviour of legislators, women or men, and by enhancing women's collective influence over decisions. However, empirical findings vary depending on how representation is measured and how gendered institutional settings mediate representation practises in specific legislative contexts (Beckwith, 2007). These mediating factors are multiple, including the broader political environment, institutional norms, party divisions among women, representatives' newness, and hierarchical positions (Celis & Childs, 2012, p. 214; Tripp & Kang, 2008). This conditional nature of SRW makes it extremely important to explore various contexts with alternative conceptual frameworks, especially understudied ones like Angola.

Women's Critical Mass and Representation in Angola

After centuries of Portuguese colonisation, Angola gained independence in 1975, leading to a civil war primarily between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), until a peace agreement aimed at democratisation in 2002. This conflict has disproportionately affected women, subjecting them to violence, poverty, harassment, health issues, polygamy, land disputes, and domestic challenges (Accord 15, 2004). Post-conflict countries often witness higher rates of women in parliaments through quotas and enact legislative reforms for women's rights during transition periods due to international pressures and women's involvement in peace negotiations (Tripp, 2015). Similarly, less democratic countries may adopt quotas to instrumentalize women's increased representation as a symbol of commitment to democracy (Towns, 2012, p. 194). Indeed, Angola adopted quota legislation during its transition to democracy, spurred by

a window of opportunity and pressure from the women’s parliamentary group, which forged crossparty alliances among women (Tripp, 2015, p. 132).

The Ministry of Family and the Promotion of Women (MINFAMU) has played a key role in advancing gender equality and establishing vital international connections (ADB, 2008). In 2005, Angola’s Political Parties Law mandated that all political parties must adopt rules that promote equal opportunities and gender equity, establishing candidate gender quotas with a minimum gender representation of 30%. Angola follows a presidential-parliamentary system with a unicameral parliament, the National Assembly, that is, an elected through a party-list proportional representation system. The adoption of quotas resulted in a significant increase in women’s seats in the National Assembly, rising from 9.6% in 1992 to 37.3% in 2008 (IPU, 2024). In the 2008 elections, MPLA, the ruling party since independence and currently representing the left-wing, secured 81% of the seats, including 77 women out of its 191 members of parliament, while UNITA, the main opposition party currently representing the right-wing, elected 4 women out of its 16 members of parliament (Adams, 2012, p. 6).

I conduct a comparative within-case analysis of Angola to explore whether women’s critical mass in parliament impacts SRW as a process and an outcome. I compare the periods before and after the quota implementation: 2004-2008 and 2008 (September) - 2012 (August). I selected the case as follows: First, among countries where women achieved 30% of parliamentary seats, I identified those with legislated candidate quotas (International IDEA, 2023) since such increases occur through mandatory measures (Mansbridge, 2005, p. 622). Next, I pinpointed countries where women rapidly attained a 30% critical mass following prolonged underrepresentation to capture the immediate effects of the critical mass. Lastly, from the three countries meeting these criteria (Angola, Burundi, Costa Rica), I chose Angola due to data availability. Data were obtained from multiple sources: documents and reports from the United Nations, CEDAW, IFAD, USAID, and various women’s organisations; Angolan newspapers; and official documents, including the constitution and laws, translated from Portuguese to English.

I rely on feminist literature to identify women’s issues and guide my focus on legislative outcomes and processes (Bratton, 2005, p. 106). Accordingly, I analyse constitutional amendments, international agreements, family code, labour and poverty, and legislation against violence against women. I measure “SRW as a process” through discussions on policies and laws, and “SRW as an outcome” through concrete results, including legislation, policies, national programmes, and international agreements.

Angolan Parliament: Before and After the Women’s Critical Mass

Constitutional amendments

Constitution drafting, 2004-2008

The 1992 Constitution of Angola ensured equal rights for all citizens, regardless of “color, race, ethnic group, sex, place of birth, religion, ideology, level of education, or economic or social status” (Article 18). After the civil war, Parliament made significant efforts to draft a constitution focused on gender equality. Genoveva Lino, the MINFAMU

Minister, stressed the importance of gender equality “as a key element for the building of an equal and just society” and encouraged both women and men to participate in the constitution-drafting process (ANGOP, 2009, 2010a). Deputy Minister of Culture Cornélio Caley similarly advocated for equal legal standing, emphasising that “women and men must stand on the same plan of the national juridical order” (ANGOP, 2010b). Women at the ministerial level organised meetings to promote gender equality in peacebuilding. Despite these efforts, the Constitution excluded substantial gender-related provisions.

The new Constitution, 2008-2012

The parliamentary efforts culminated in the adoption of a new Constitution in 2010. This updated Constitution retains the clause emphasising equality and nondiscrimination among citizens, irrespective of sex, race, age, or other forms of discrimination.¹ However, it expands on its predecessor by explicitly defining “equality between men and women” as a fundamental duty of the state.² Additionally, it reaffirms the state’s commitment to ensuring equality and nondiscrimination before the law on all grounds.³

Another significant legal advancement in the Constitution pertains to customary law. Many Angolans reside in traditionally organised communities governed by customary law, which became more prevalent in the absence of formal regulations, especially during civil war. Customary law addresses various issues, including marriage, land, child custody, adultery, divorce, and paternity. Therefore, any regulations concerning customary law directly impact women’s status within the family and society (ADB, 2008, 9). Under the new Constitution, customary law is acknowledged as a valid source of law⁴ but is deemed invalid if it contravenes constitutional provisions on nondiscrimination or equality.⁵ With a stronger emphasis on women’s rights and an enhanced principle of gender equality, the gender-biased aspects of customary law could be invalidated under the new Constitution (UNCTAD, 2013, 19). Thus, the adoption of the new Constitution during this period represents a progressive outcome for women’s rights after years of deliberation.

International agreements

Angola ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1984, considered the international bill of rights for women. In the latter half of the 2000s, particularly after the civil war, Angola ratified more international agreements on gender equality. These include the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography in 2005,

1 Constitution of Angola, Art. 21(h): The fundamental tasks of the Angolan state shall be to promote equal rights and opportunities between Angolans, regardless of origins, race, party affiliations, sex, color, age or any other form of discrimination.

2 Constitution of Angola, Art. 21(k)

3 Constitution of Angola, Art. 23: (1) Everyone shall be equal under the Constitution and by law. (2) No-one may be discriminated against, privileged, deprived of any right or exempted from any duty on the basis of ancestry, sex, race, ethnicity, color, disability, language, place of birth, religion, political, ideological or philosophical beliefs, level of education or economic, social or professional status.

4 Constitution of Angola, Art. 7: The validity and legal force of custom which does not contradict the Constitution and does not threaten human dignity shall be recognized.

5 Constitution of Angola, Art. 223 (1) The state shall recognize the status, role and functions of the institutions of the traditional authorities founded in accordance with customary law which do not contradict the Constitution.

the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict in 2007, the CEDAW Protocol in 2007, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa in 2007, and the Protocol of the Southern African Development Community on Gender and Development in 2008. To align with international gender equality standards, Angola reviewed all discriminatory laws in compliance with the requirements of these agreements. Consequently, the revision process has facilitated legal and institutional improvements and fostered discussions on gender equality.

Family code

Angola’s family affairs have been governed by the Family Code (*Código da Família*) since 1988 (UNCTAD, 2013, p. 17). It mandates equal rights and responsibilities⁶ for husbands and wives, whether in marriage or union,⁷ in areas including household management,⁸ divorce,⁹ parental authority, inheritance, and marital property.¹⁰ Since the late 2000s, the Family Code has been under revision due to its perceived inadequacy in addressing the country’s evolving conditions and post-civil war effects on women and families. After the new Constitution was adopted, Maria Teresa Cardoso of MINFAMU stressed the need to revise the Family Code to ensure comprehensive state protection for families, especially regarding gender equality: “As everyone knows a new Constitution was approved and it is urgent the need for adjusting the Family Code so that the family can get broad protection from the state, mainly with regard to the equality between man and woman” (ANGOP, 2010c).

In 2012, government discussions on revising the Family Code were ongoing, with the Council of Ministers deliberating on its approval, as reported to the UN (UN, 2012, p. 2). Despite the absence of concrete changes since 2004, the process of drafting a new version has persisted.

Labour and poverty

Between 2004 and 2008

The 2000 General Labour Law (*Lei Geral do Trabalho*) promotes equal treatment for citizens and prohibits discrimination based on “race, color, sex, ethnic origin, marital status, religious or political ideals social, trade union membership or language.”¹¹ Additionally, Angola ratified several ILO conventions, including one on equal pay for equal work (ILO, 2023). The Law addresses the rights of women workers, including

6 Civil Code, Art. 3(1)

7 Civil Code, Art. 29(1)

8 Civil Code, Art. 45

9 Civil Code, Art. 79

10 Civil Code, Art. 54

11 General Labour Law Art. 3(1)

maternity leave,¹² equal pay,¹³ paternity leave,¹⁴ and pregnant women's protection.¹⁵ For women workers' concerns within trade unions, the Federation of Trade Unions of Angola agreed to form the National Committee for Women in 2005, which actively engaged in public discussions (ADB, 2008, p. 14). Additionally, the government initiated the Rural Women Support Programme in 2007 to enhance rural women's productivity, entrepreneurship, and empowerment (UN, 2012, p. 3). These developments signify progress for women workers.

Angola's poverty combat strategy, *Estratégia de Combate à Pobreza* (2004), integrated gender considerations as a "crosscutting issue" in various initiatives, recognising women's inclusion as essential for effective poverty reduction and national development (ADB, 2008, p. 7; UNCTAD, 2013). The targets were developed by MINFAMU's National Strategy and the Plan for Gender Equality Promotion (2006), focusing on women's education, maternal and child healthcare, economic and political participation, healthcare access, education services, HIV/AIDS prevention, and domestic violence prevention (ADB, 2008, p. 12). These efforts have led to progress in addressing women's labour and poverty-related issues, with tangible policy outcomes and ongoing endeavours.

Between 2008 and 2012

In 2010, MINFAMU established the Committee for Maternal Death Prevention to reduce maternal and infant mortality rates and raise awareness through campaigns and training programmes (CEDAW, 2013, p. 6). The Committee published an Action Programme (2009-2013) outlining strategies for women's domestic labour, women's involvement in unions, and sexually transmitted disease training (van Klaveren et al., 2009, p. 14).

Significant legislative changes occurred in 2011 when Angola enacted Presidential Decrees to enhance the status of women workers. The Decrees improved maternity rights, nursing, family allowances, and benefits.¹⁶ Employers were mandated to provide these benefits, resulting in increased support, extended maternity leave and shared responsibilities between employers and the state. Pitra Neto, Minister of Public Administration, Labour, and Social Security, emphasised that these revisions aimed to benefit "young people, children, and women" (ANGOP, 2013). Furthermore, Maria Fernanda Francisco, the Deputy General Secretary of the Trade Union Federation, urged the government to focus more on women's domestic work and support the adoption of the ILO Convention (IDWF, 2012).

During this period, Angola made progress towards gender equality. Vice Minister Ana Paula S. Sacramento Neto regarded gender equality as a "cornerstone" in the government's efforts to achieve the "harmonious development of the country, the

12 General Labour Law, Art. 272

13 General Labour Law, Art. 164, 268

14 General Labour Law, Art. 152

15 General Labour Law, Art. 227, 272

16 Presidential Decree No. 8/11 of January 7, 2011. See Presidential Decree No. 8/11 of January 7, 2011, Art. 10 (maternity benefits), and Presidential Decree No. 8/11 of January 11, 2007, Arts. 5 and 9 (maternity pay); Presidential Decree No. 8/11 of January 7, 2011, Art. 13 (remuneration of nursing breaks); Presidential Decree No. 8/11 of January 7, 2011, Art. 10 (financing of benefits)

wellbeing of the families and the consolidation of democracy”. She highlighted ongoing initiatives, including microcredits and support for rural entrepreneurship, and underscored that women “should reduce their economic dependence on men in order to balance the inequalities that are still to be addressed” (CEDAW, 2009). This period witnessed concrete outcomes and a political agenda for gender equality.

Violence against women

Between 2004 and 2008

After the civil war, women’s vulnerability to violence, including sexual violence and domestic abuse, worsened due to customary laws granting men authority over women, reinforced by cultural and institutional norms, especially in rural areas (CEDAW, 2004, p. 19; IFAD, 2002, p. 4). Despite the severity of the issue, Angola lacked laws specifically addressing violence against women and prosecuting sexual crimes (ADB, 2008, p. 10; CEDAW, 2002, p. 15). MINFAMU launched public campaigns and discussions to propose a Law on Domestic Violence and draft a National Gender Plan (De Carvalho et al., 2011, p. 90; UNDP, 2005, p. 16). However, despite these ministerial efforts, the law was not adopted until June 2011.

Since the early 2000s, addressing violence against women has been a prominent concern for both women’s organisations and the government. In September 2004, Eduarda Borja, a member of the *Rede Mulheres*, stated, “Today, practically every Angolan family is home to some form of violence. In richer households, this violence can be more sophisticated and, better hidden, but it still exists. In poorer families it is more brutal” (IRIN, 2004). She added that despite the government’s concern, “there is still a long way to go before this kind of law is introduced - we first need to complete our studies and come up with a concrete proposal” (IRIN, 2004).

In a statement to the 2006 UN Commission on the Status of Women, Vice Minister of MINFAMU Ana Paula Sacramento, expressed concerns about domestic violence, describing it as having “reached worrying proportions.” A year later, in 2007, she reiterated that the violence rate was “very worrying” (ANGOP, 2007). A 2008 study by the Angolan Women’s Organisation revealed nearly 4000 incidents of violence in just one district in a year (IMPOWR, 2011). By 2010, the number of cases remained alarmingly high, with 6515 recorded incidents of violence (ICGLR, 2012, p. 4). Hence, the government and NGOs collaborated to combat violence through campaigns, public awareness meetings, and training programmes (CEDAW, 2002, p. 5). However, progress in enacting a law criminalising violence remained slow in parliament, with the issue receiving significant attention on the agenda but failing to produce legal outcomes.

Between 2008 and 2012

After nearly a decade, the Law Against Domestic Violence was enacted in 2011, alongside the Plan for Combating Domestic Violence and the Law for the Protection and Development of Children¹⁷ (CEDAW, 2013, p. 3). The Law criminalises domestic violence and provides protection to women and their families, including safe houses,

¹⁷ Law No. 25/12 of the Protection and Development of Children

medical treatment, legal assistance, and financial support (UN, 2013). It mandates the establishment of reception centres and specialised training to assist domestic violence victims at police stations and hospitals (HRC, 2012, p. 9). Furthermore, it categorises violence as a “public crime,” enabling both victims and third parties to report cases to the police (ICGLR, 2012, p. 4). Genoveva Lino, the Minister of MINFAMU, described the new legislation as a “victory for all Angolans,” playing a significant role in its adoption (SAGPA, 2012). Angolan laws now cover various forms of domestic violence, including physical, sexual, emotional, and financial abuse, and explicitly address workplace sexual harassment, imposing penalties.¹⁸

The government also enhanced collaborations with international organisations. In 2012, MINFAMU collaborated with the UNFPA in the UNITE to Put an End to Violence campaign and launched the Zero Tolerance campaign (CEDAW, 2013, p. 3; UN, 2013, p. 4). Maria Filomena Delgado, the MINFAMU Minister, viewed these initiatives as “a further step in combating violence, which is essential for building a truly democratic society, based on respect for the rights and the dignity of people, thus ensuring full equality between men and women” (UN, 2013, p. 4).

Yet, Penal Code articles could potentially discriminate against homosexuality (ARC International, 2010). However, public discussions on LGBT rights grew, as exemplified by a televised programme in 2011 where homosexuals discussed discrimination and intimidation based on sexual orientation (USDOS, 2011). The National Assembly also tackled human trafficking, especially its impact on women and girls by drafting a law to prevent trafficking (UN, 2013, p. 4). Consequently, notable progress was made in combating violence against women and addressing related issues.

Substantive Representation: Process, Outcome, or Both?

The review of legislation, policies, and discussions regarding women’s issues in Angola indicates a sustained emphasis on gender equality in the post-civil war era.¹⁹ MINFAMU (currently MASFAMU, referring to the Ministry of Social Action, Family and Women’s Promotion), established in 2002 and led by women ministers, has been vital in advancing gender equality policies in collaboration with women’s organisations and international partners. However, the achievements have varied in terms of process and outcome. On the outcome front, the second period (2008-2012) demonstrates more success compared to the first (2004-2008). Key developments in the 2008-2012 period include the enactment of new constitutional laws, the implementation of national programmes, the issuance of presidential decrees, the passage of the violence against women law, the establishment of a new ministerial-level committee, and the adoption of the SADC protocol. In contrast, the primary outcome achievements in the 2004-2008 period encompassed the creation of a women’s trade union committee, the formulation of a national equality strategy, the initiation of a programme to support rural women, the implementation of the quota law, and the ratification of regional and international agreements.

In contrast to outcomes, the process remained largely consistent between the two periods. From 2004 to 2008, discussions revolved around drafts of the constitution, the

¹⁸ Criminalisation of violence is supported by the additional clauses to the Penal Code, Article 173.

¹⁹ The summary of the key achievements in terms of process and outcome is presented in the Appendix.

family code, and the law on violence against women, with a national focus on women’s roles in economic growth. These discussions persisted into the second period, including the drafting of the constitution, the family code, and initiatives related to rural women’s entrepreneurship. Only a few minor new discussions emerged during this period, such as those related to discrimination against homosexuals and trafficking in women. Therefore, the critical mass of women played a pivotal role in ensuring that while the agenda remained similar between the two periods, the outcomes were more noticeable and progressive in the second period.

This finding challenges and confirms feminist scholarship that suggests a positive link between DRW and SRW (Dahlerup, 1988; Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995, 1998; Young 2002). This is a challenge because the twofold conceptualisation of SRW complicates drawing a straightforward connection. Viewing SRW as a process and an outcome reveals that parliamentary agendas and actions may not necessarily align simultaneously (Htun et al. 2013; Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Park, 2023). However, this does not mean that agenda setting alone is a failure for SRW because it remains a significant component of SRW as a process. During the first period, despite the notably low representation of women, the political agenda on gender equality was still developing. This demonstrates that SRW as a process does not necessarily rely on achieving a 30% critical mass or DRW in general (Bratton, 2005; Beckwith, 2007). National concerns about integrating citizens into peace-building processes, coupled with significant social and economic transformations, underscored the role of women in the post-conflict context (Tripp, 2015). This emphasis facilitated closer collaboration with international organisations advocating for women’s rights between 2004 and 2008 (Townes, 2012).

However, the most significant outcomes for women were achieved only in the presence of a critical mass between 2008 and 2012, confirming the positive association between DRW and SRW. Despite similarities in the agenda during periods of high and low women’s representation, SRW as an outcome was only possible when a critical mass of women was present. Consequently, the Angolan case aligns with the third scenario described earlier (Table 1), suggesting that issues previously debated in the absence of a critical mass of women could transform into outcomes once women have formed a critical mass.

While this study explores the immediate impact of the critical mass of women on SRW, it is essential to recognise that political representation is just one aspect of women’s status in society (Park, 2023). Despite advancements in legislative processes and outcomes, there are both progress and challenges to the broader societal impact. In recent decades, alongside improvements in women’s parliamentary representation, Angola has made significant progress in gender equality indicators, including maternal mortality, adolescent fertility, and women’s completion of secondary education, while its Gender Inequality Index (GII) value has improved from 0.725 to 0.520 (Table 2). However, out of 195 countries, it ranked 133rd in 2022. Compared with the sub-Saharan Africa region, Angola performs better in maternal mortality, women’s parliamentary representation, and labour force participation but worse in adolescent fertility rates and lower secondary education completion for women (Table 2).

Table 2
UNDP Gender Inequality Index

	Gender Inequality Index	Maternal mortality ratio	Adolescent birth rate	Share of seats in parliament	Population with at least some secondary education (% ages 25 and older)		Labor force participation rate (% ages 15 and older)	
					Women	Men	Women	Men
Angola Year	<i>Value</i>	<i>(deaths per 100,000 live births)</i>	<i>(births per 1,000 women ages 15–19)</i>	<i>(% held by women)</i>				
1990	0,725	1102	198,8	9,5	4,5	23,3	—	—
1995	0,714	1023	193,2	9,5	—	—	—	—
2000	0,671	860	177,3	15,5	—	—	—	—
2005	0,636	550	171,0	15,0	—	—	62,3	74,4
2010	0,554	367	165,0	38,6	15,7	25,9	75,7	79,0
2015	0,548	274	148,1	36,8	19,9	38,2	44,2	56,1
2020	0,529	222	139,8	30,0	21,3	37,4	73,9	77,7
2022	0,520	222	135,8	33,6	21,3	37,4	74,7	78,2
Sub-Saharan Africa (2022)	0,565	516	99,3	26,4	30,9	42,0	63,9	76,4

Despite recent fluctuations, women currently occupy 38.6% of the seats in the Angolan parliament (IPU, 2024). However, women's representation at the local level needs further improvement. In 2017, out of 18 provincial governors, only one was a woman (Dos Santos Monteiro, 2022, p.153). Additionally, despite its vast natural resources, Angola is classified as a lower-middle-income country, with 31.1% of its population living below \$2.15 a day and a life expectancy age of 62 in recent years, exacerbating gendered patterns (Tripp, 2015; World Bank, 2023). Angolans identify gender-based violence as their primary concern regarding women's rights, followed by unequal access to education and formal employment (Kitombe & Pacatolo, 2023; Nadya & Fernandes, 2017). In 2018, 24.7% of women reported recent physical and/or sexual violence experienced by an intimate partner (UN Women, 2023). In this context, over 51.3% of women express dissatisfaction with the government's efforts to promote gender equality (Afrobarometer, 2023).

Additionally, government repression of dissent has hindered independent civil society organisations and women's collective organising around feminist agendas in Angola (Mouzinho & Cutaia, 2017; Tripp, 2015). The ruling party, MPLA, despite recent seat losses to UNITA, continues to dominate parliament, forming a one-party rule. Angola, currently scoring 28/100 in Freedom House's global freedom index, has maintained a "not free" status since the 1970s. Similarly, ranking 109th among 167 countries in the Economist Democracy Index, it is classified as an "authoritarian regime," despite recent improvements.

Angola's recent gender equality discourse however continues to emphasise women's empowerment, democratic consolidation, and violence prevention, with significant contributions from women in parliament. In 2017, Angola adopted its first National

Action Plan (2017-2020) focusing on women’s participation in peacebuilding, amplifying NGO voices, empowering women, combating gender-based violence and implementing gender-responsive budgeting (SecurityWomen, 2023). In 2023, the first woman vice-president of Angola, Esperança da Costa, along with women ministers, hosted the first International Women’s Forum for Peace and Democracy, highlighting gender equality concerns across all spheres, including peace consolidation (The Guardian, 2023).

These processes underscore the importance of women’s continued presence in parliament to influence legislative processes and outcomes, while also emphasising the need for further efforts to address the structural challenges faced by women and involve feminist organisations in decision making.

Conclusion

This article has delved into the complexities of women’s descriptive and substantive representation, focusing on the contested nature of their connections and revisiting the critical mass debate. Challenging the assumption of a straightforward link between descriptive and substantive representation, it underscores the potential for multiple paths to substantive representation when considering representation as both a process and an outcome. Through the case of Angola, the article has investigated the extent to which, and in what ways (process or outcome), a critical mass of women in parliament, after years of underrepresentation, can instigate change in a non-Western context. It asserts, first, that process-oriented SRW (such as parliamentary agendas and discussions on policies and laws) may exhibit similarities regardless of the presence or absence of a critical mass of women in parliament. Second, this shows that outcome-oriented substantive representation (including legislation, policies, national programmes, and international agreements) is more likely to materialise when a critical mass of women is present in parliament.

These findings reveal that while descriptive representation may set the stage, the active engagement and critical mass of women ultimately drive the outcomes of women’s rights agendas. While focusing on the immediate impact of the critical mass of women in parliament on SRW, this study underscores the importance of acknowledging that no numbers are “magical,” and progress in gender equality is longitudinal and often nonlinear. Therefore, any analysis of SRW should consider these points: First, women’s political representation, while undoubtedly significant, is just one facet of the broader landscape of progress in achieving gender equality. Second, representation practises are mediated by gendered power structures and institutional contexts, which are shaped by multiple factors, including the broader political environment, gender norms, women’s party divisions, and hierarchical positions. Finally, although higher levels of women’s political representation may facilitate advancements in legislative processes and outcomes, their impact on wider society in terms of gender equality is often not equally proportional and requires collective and sustained efforts over time.

Investigating women’s increased representation in authoritarian regimes is essential to understand how their presence makes a difference under political repression and additional institutional barriers, including dominant party systems and hierarchical party structures. In Angola, the repression of civil society, including women’s organisations,

the fewer women representatives from minority parties than from the majority, and the limited opportunities for women representatives in lower-level positions all contribute to slow progress in gender equality. Further research on women's increased representation in repressive political contexts should explore how this numerical advantage can more effectively decrease barriers through alliances formed by women representatives within and outside parliament, focusing on both vertical (cross-party and local women's organisations) and horizontal alliances (between different levels of representatives and engagement with international bodies).

Peer-review: Externally peer-reviewed.

Conflict of Interest: The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

Grant Support: The author declared that this study has received no financial support.

References

- Accord 15. (2004). From military peace to social justice? The Angolan peace process. International policy briefing paper.
- Adams, K. S. (2012). The Sub-Saharan African triumvirate: Female representation in the national parliaments of Angola, Ethiopia and Lesotho. *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, 3(3.3): 1-26.
- ADB. (2008). Angola country gender profile. African Development Bank.
- Afrobarometer. (2023). Online analysis. <https://www.afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/>
- ANGOP. (2007). Government official worried about domestic violence rate. *Angolan Press Society*. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/47d6543ec.html>
- ANGOP. (2009). Family minister calls people to contribute to constitution drafting. *Angolan Press Society*. http://www.portalangop.co.ao/angola/en_us/noticias/politica/2009/11/50/Family-minister-calls-people-contribute-Constitution-drafting,c4b982e5-1076-4bdc-9be5-cfec37b6c7a0.html
- ANGOP. (2010a). Angola: Minister highlights importance of gender equality. *Angolan Press Society*. <http://www.peacewomen.org/content/angola-minister-highlights-importance-gender-equality>
- ANGOP. (2010b). Angola: Deputy Culture Minister defends gender equality. *Angolan Press Society*. <https://www.peacewomen.org/content/angola-deputy-culture-minister-defends-gender-equality>
- ANGOP. (2010c). Family Code revision should contribute to family cohesion. *Angolan Press Society*. <https://allafrica.com/stories/201009281002.html>
- ANGOP. (2013). Angolan Minister highlights Labour Law review. *Angolan Press Society*. <https://allafrica.com/stories/201306130281.html>
- ARC International. (2010). Angola, Document number: A/HRC/14/11. <http://arc-international.net/global-advocacy/universal-periodic-review/a/angola>
- Bauer, G., & Britton, H. E. (2006). *Women in African parliaments*. Lynne Rienner.
- Beckwith, K. (2007). Numbers and newness: The descriptive and substantive representation of women. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 40(1): 27-49.
- Beckwith, K. (2014). Plotting the path from one to the other: Women's interests and political representation. In M. C. Escobar-Lemmon & M. M. Taylor-Robinson (Eds.), *Representation: The Case of Women* (pp. 19-40). Oxford University Press.
- Bratton, K. A. (2005). Critical mass theory revisited: The behavior and success of token women in state legislatures. *Politics & Gender*, 1(1), 97-125.
- CEDAW. (2002). *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women combined initial, second and third periodic reports of state parties, Angola*. United Nations.
- CEDAW. (2004). *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women combined fourth and fifth periodic reports of states parties, Angola*. United Nations.
- CEDAW. (2009). Statement by Mrs. Ana Paula S. Sacramento Neto Vice-Minister of Family and Promotion of Women. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Angola to the United Nations.
- CEDAW. (2013). Statement by H.E Ana Paula Da Silva Sacramento Neto during the presentation of the sixth periodic report of the Republic of Angola on the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
- Celis, K., & Childs, S. (2012). The substantive representation of women: What to do with conservative claims? *Political Studies*, 60: 213-225.
- Celis, K., Childs, S., Kantola, J., & Krook, M. L. (2008). Rethinking women's substantive representation. *Representation*, 44(2): 99-110.
- Childs, S. (2007). Representation. In G. Blakeley & V. Bryson (Eds.), *The impact of feminism on political*

- concepts and debates* (pp.73-91). Manchester University Press.
- Childs, S., & Krook, M. L. (2009). Analysing women’s substantive representation: From critical mass to critical actors. *Government and Opposition*, 44(2): 125-145.
- Clayton, A. (2021). How do electoral gender quotas affect policy? *The Annual Review of Political Science*, 24: 235-252.
- Dahlerup, D. (1988). From a small to a large minority: Women in Scandinavian politics. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 11(4), 275-298.
- Dahlerup, D. (2006). The story of the theory of critical mass. *Politics & Gender*, 2(4), 511-522.
- Dahlerup, D. (2014). The critical mass theory in public and scholarly debates. In R. Campbell & S. Childs (Eds.), *Deeds and words: Gendering politics after Joni Lovenduski* (pp. 137-163). ECPR Press.
- De Carvalho, K. V., Chianeque, L., & Delgado, A. (2011). *Inequality in Angola*. Open Society for Southern Africa.
- Devlin, C., & Elgie, R. (2008). The effect of increased women’s representation in parliament: The case of Rwanda. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 61(2), 237-254.
- Dos Santos Monteiro, C. J. (2022). Women in politics in Angola. *Revista Textos Graduados*, 8(1): 151-158.
- Franceschet, S., & Piscopo, J. M. (2008). Gender quotas and women’s substantive representation: Lessons from Argentina. *Politics & Gender*, 4(3), 393-425.
- Grey, S. (2002). Critical mass and New Zealand women MPs. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 55(1), 19-29.
- Grey, S. (2006). Numbers and beyond: The relevance of critical mass in gender research. *Politics & Gender*, 2(4), 492-502.
- Grey, S., Tremblay, M., Dahlerup, D., & Childs, S. (2006). Do women represent women? Rethinking the “critical mass” debate. *Politics & Gender*, 2(4), 491-492.
- HRC. (2012). *Civil society report on the implementation of the ICCPR (prior to the list of issues CCPR/C/ANG/1) Angola*.
- ICGLR. (2012). Eradicating sexual and gender based violence in the Great Lakes region: Realities in member states. International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.
- IDWF. (2012). Angola: National Women’s Union appeals Angolan women to unite for C189 ratification. International Domestic Workers Federation.
- IFAD. (2002). *Gender strengthening programme in Eastern and Southern Africa*. Report No. 1328-AO. The International Fund for Agricultural Development.
- ILO. (2023). Ratifications for Angola. http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102999
- IMPOWR. (2011). Current legal framework: Domestic violence in Angola. International Models Project on Women’s Rights.
- International IDEA. (2023). Gender quotas database. <https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas-database/legislative-overview>
- IPU. (2024). Inter-Parliamentary Union. <https://data.ipu.org/>
- IRIN. (2004). Our bodies - their battle ground: Gender-based violence in conflict zones. <https://www.peacewomen.org/node/89765>
- Joshi, D. K. (2023). Substantive representation of women by parliamentarians in Asia: A comparative study of ten countries. In D. K. Joshi & C. Echle (Eds.), *Substantive representation of women in Asian parliaments* (pp. 1-23). Routledge.
- Kalra, S., & Joshi, D. K. (2020). Gender and parliamentary representation in India: The case of violence against women and children. *Women’s Studies International Forum*, 82.
- Kanter, R. M. (1977). Some effects of proportions on group life: Skewed sex ratios and responses to token women. *American Journal of Sociology*, 82(1), 965-990.
- Kitombe, C., & Carlos, P. (2023). In Angola, gender-based violence is seen as the top challenge to women’s rights. Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 586.
- Lippmann, Q. (2022). Gender and lawmaking in times of quotas. *Journal of Public Economics*, 207.
- Mansbridge, J. (1999). Should blacks represent blacks and women represent women? A contingent “yes”. *The Journal of Politics*, 61(3), 628-657.
- Mansbridge, J. (2005). Quota problems: Combating the dangers of essentialism. *Politics & Gender*, 1(4), 622-638.
- Nadya, E., & Fernandes, E. (2017). Gender and entrepreneurship in Angola: Narratives of the ‘Muambeiras’ of Lubango. In C. Machado & J. P. Davim (Eds.), *Managing organizational diversity*. Springer.
- O’Brien, D. Z., & Piscopo, J. M. (2019). The impact of women in parliament. In S. Franceschet, Krook, M. L., & N. Tan (Eds.), *The Palgrave handbook of women’s political rights, gender and politics*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pacatolo, C., Boio, D., & Kitombe, C. (2023). Angolans dissatisfied with government efforts to promote equal rights for women. Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 622.
- Park, S. (2023). Quota effects moderated by descriptive gender representation within legislatures: A cross-national analysis. *Representation*, 59(4): 659-681.
- Paxton, P., & Hughes, M. M. (2007). *Women, politics and power: A global perspective*. Sage.

- Phillips, A. (1995). *The politics of presence*. Clarendon Press.
- Phillips, A. (1998). Democracy and representation: or, why should it matter who our representatives are? In A. Phillips (Ed.), *Feminism & politics* (pp. 224-240). Oxford University Press.
- Pitkin, H. (1967). *The concept of representation*. University of California Press.
- Rinehart, S. T. (1992). *Gender consciousness and politics*. Routledge.
- SAGPA. (2012). Angola: Domestic Violence Act allows for third party reporting. Southern Africa Gender Protocol Alliance.
- Sapiro, V. (1998). When are interests interesting? The problem of political representation of women. In A. Phillips (Ed.), *Feminism & politics* (pp. 161-192). Oxford University Press.
- Schwandt-Bayer, L. A., & Mishler, W. (2005). An integrated model of women's representation. *The Journal of Politics*, 67(2): 407-428.
- SecurityWomen. (2023). Angola, National Action Plan. <https://www.securitywomen.org/unscr-1325-and-national-action-plans-nap/angola>
- Shim, J. (2021). Gender and politics in Northeast Asia: Legislative patterns and substantive representation in Korea and Taiwan. *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy*, 42(2): 138-155.
- Tam, W. (2020). Women's political representation in a hybrid and patriarchal regime: Evidence from Singapore. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 73(4): 759-789.
- Taylor-Robinson, M. M., & Heath, R. M. (2003). Do women legislators have different policy priorities than their male colleagues? *Women & Politics*, 24(4), 77-101.
- The Guardian. (2023). Angola Debates The Women's Role In Building Peace And Democracy. <https://guardian.ng/ama-press-releases/angola-debates-the-womens-role-in-building-peace-and-democracy/>
- Thomas, S. (1991). The impact of women on state legislative policies. *Journal of Politics*, 53(3), 958-976.
- Towns, A. E. (2012). Norms and social hierarchies: Understanding international policy diffusion 'from below.' *International Organization*, 66(2): 719-209.
- Tremblay, M. (2006). Numbers and beyond: The relevance of critical mass in gender research. *Politics & Gender*, 2(4), 502-511.
- Tripp, A. M. (2015). Angola: The limits of postconflict gender policy reform. In *Women and power in postconflict Africa* (pp. 114-142). Cambridge University Press.
- Tripp, A. M., & Kang, A. (2008). The global impact of quotas: On the fast track to increased female legislative representation. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(3): 338-361.
- UN Women. (2023). Angola. <https://data.unwomen.org/country/angola>
- UNCTAD. (2013). *Who is benefiting from trade liberalization in Angola? A gender perspective*. United Nations.
- UNDP. (2005). *Millennium development goals report, Angola*. United Nations.
- United Nations. (2012). Statement by Ambassador Ismael Gaspar Martins Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Angola to the United Nations at the Third Committee on Agenda Item 28: Advancement of Women.
- United Nations. (2013). Statement by Maria Filomena Delgado Minister for Family and the Promotion of Women at the Fifty-Seventy Session of the Commission on the Status of Women.
- USDOS. (2011). *2010 Human rights report: Angola*. US Department of State. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/>
- van Klaveren, M., Tjidsen, K., Hughie-Williams, M., & Martin, N. R. (2009). *An overview of women's work and employment in Angola decisions for life*. MDG3 Project Country Report No. 2, Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies.
- Vega, A., & Firestone, J. M. (1995). The effects of gender on congressional behavior and the substantive representation of women. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 20(2), 213-222.
- Wang, S. (2023). Do women always represent women? The effects of gender quotas on substantive representation. *Political Behavior*, 45: 1979-1999.
- Wangnerud, L. (2000). Testing the politics of presence: Women's representation in the Swedish Riksdag. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 23(1), 67-91.
- WEF. (2022). *Global gender gap report 2022*. World Economic Forum.
- Weldon, S. L. (2002). Beyond bodies: Institutional source of representation for women in democratic policymaking. *The Journal of Politics*, 64(4), 1153-1174.
- World Bank. (2023). Angola. <https://data.worldbank.org/country/AO>
- Young, I. M. (2002). *Inclusion and democracy*. Oxford University Press.

Appendix: Key Gender Policy Developments in Angola

	2004-2008 <i>Before the women’s critical mass</i>				2008 (Sep 6)-2012 (Aug 31) <i>After the women’s critical mass</i>			
	Year	Substantive Representation as a Process	Year	Substantive Representation as an Outcome	Year	Substantive Representation as a Process	Year	Substantive Representation as an Outcome
Constitution	2002	*A new draft in progress		No outcome	2008 - 2010	*A new draft in progress	2010	*Constitution, Art. 21(k) Equality between men and women as one of the fundamental tasks of the state *Constitution, Art. 7, Customary law is recognised *Constitution, Art. 223 (1), Customary law is subordinated to the Constitution
Family Code	2002	*A new draft in progress		No outcome	2010	*A new draft in progress		No outcome
Labour & Poverty	2005	*Gender equality is considered a “crosscutting issue” to fight poverty *Women in trade unions *Women’s economic role	2004 2004 2005 2006 2007	*UNDP Angola Enterprise Programme *National Strategy to Combat Poverty *National Committee for Women in Trade Unions *National Strategy and Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality *The Rural Women Support Programme	2009	*A concern about microcredits and rural entrepreneurship support for women	2009 2011 2011	*2009-2013 Action Programme *Presidential Decree No. 8/11 - Art. 5 & 9 (maternity pay) - Art. 10 (financing of benefits) - Art. 13 (remuneration of nursing breaks) *UNDP Promoting Angolan Women’s Empowerment through CSOs
Violence against Women	2004 - 2008	*MINFAMU campaigns *Discussion on a National Gender Plan *Discussion on the law against violence against women *NGO support: <i>Rede Mulheres</i> , and Angolan Women’s Organisation	2006	*National Strategy and Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality	2011 2012	*Public discussion on discrimination against homosexuals *MINFAMU considering a draft law on Trafficking of Human Beings	2011 2011 2012 2012 2012	*Law N. 25/11 Violence Against Women *National Plan for Combating Domestic Violence *Law N. 25/12 of the Protection and Development of Children *Campaign: UNITE to Put an End to Violence *Campaign: Zero Tolerance
International Agreements			2005 2007 2007 2007	*Convention on the Rights of Children *Convention on the Rights of Children in Armed Conflict *CEDAW Protocol *Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa			2008	*SADC Protocol
Other			2005	*Law No 2/05, Art. 20 (l) of Political Parties: 30% candidate gender quota			2010 2010	*MINFAMU Committee for the Prevention of Maternal deaths *World Bank Municipal Health Service Strengthening



The Changing Faces of Populism in Turkey: From “Inclusionary Populism” to “Exclusionary Populism”?

Türkiye’de Popülizmin Değişen Yüzü: Kapsayıcı Popülizmden Dışlayıcı Popülizme?

Düzgün Arslantaş¹

Abstract

This study examines the evolving populist policies of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or JDP) since it gained power in 2002. Although populism was embedded in the JDP’s policies from the outset, this paper argues that the dominant form of the JDP’s populism has transformed from “inclusionary” to “exclusionary.” Specifically, in its early years, the JDP leadership implemented inclusive populist policies to overcome the threat of party closure and expand its voter base. This policy worked well in the first two terms, and the JDP’s vote share increased to 49% in the 2011 legislative elections. However, as the economic indicators deteriorated and the clientelist resources shrunk from the end of the second term onwards, the JDP gradually shifted towards exclusionary populism, which relied on deepening polarisation along religious and ethnic lines to consolidate its voter base. However, this strategy backfired and consolidated the opposition voters under the umbrella of the Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi or CHP). Overall, the populist transformation of the JDP’s policies overlapped with the tightening of authoritarianism in the country.

Keywords: JDP, authoritarianism, clientelism, exclusionary populism, inclusionary populism

Öz

Bu çalışma Justice and Development Party’nin (JDP) 2002 yılında iktidara geldikten sonra dönüşüme uğrayan popülist politikalarını analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Makalenin temel argümanı JDP’nin popülist politikalarının “kapsayıcılıktan”, “dışlayıcılığa” evrildiğidir. JDP’nin ilk dönemindeki kapsayıcı popülist politikalarının temel amacı parti kapatma tehdidinden kurtulma ve oy tabanını genişletme kaygısıdır. Ekonomik göstergelerdeki kötüleşme ve klientalist kaynakların azalmasıyla birlikte JDP yönetimi, dini ve etnik kutuplaşmanın derinleşmesine dayanan dışlayıcı popülizme kaymıştır. Son tahlilde, JDP’nin popülist dönüşümü ve ülkenin otoriter rejime sürüklenmesi paralellikler barındırmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: JDP, dışlayıcı popülizm, kliyentalizm, kapsayıcı popülizm, otoriterlik

1 Corresponding Author: Düzgün Arslantaş (Postdoctoral Researcher), University of Cologne, Cologne Center for Comparative Politics, Department of Political Science, Cologne, Germany. E-mail: darslan4@uni-koeln.de
ORCID: 0000-0002-8133-6280

To cite this article: Arslantaş, D. (2024). The changing faces of populism in Turkey: From “inclusionary populism” to “exclusionary populism”?. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 33(2), 225–239. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2024.33.1491666>



Introduction

Recent scholarship has shown remarkable interest in the rise of populist-right parties. Despite their growing appeal, many of the populist-right parties, such as the Front Nationalé and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), are excluded from the government because they are perceived as a threat to political regime stability (Arslantaş & Arslantaş, 2020a; Arslantaş & Arslantaş, 2020b). Additionally, electoral systems and strategic voting effectively weaken the chances of the populists being a part of the governing coalition.

In contrast to these cases, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or JDP), as a populist-right party, has maintained its electoral dominance since 2002.¹ Scholars have attempted to read the JDP's electoral success through various lenses, including its "Islamic,"² "neoliberal,"³ or "leader-mediated"⁴ populism. However, these studies often focus on a single aspect of JDP's populism—such as neoliberal populism—and do not consider the interaction with other dimensions of the populist rule (Baykan, 2024). Similarly, recent studies largely ignore the effect of the institutional elements on the JDP's populism after the transition to a la Turca presidential system in 2018. Given the JDP's long tenure in government and its evolving policies across multiple fields, these aspects make it necessary to revisit this conceptualisation.

In this framework, this study sheds light on the changing characteristics of the JDP's populism. Additionally, it seeks to contextualise the JDP within the broader group of ruling populist-right parties, such as Hungary's Fidesz and Poland's Law and Justice Party, using Mudde & Kaltwasser's (2013) widely used taxonomy. The paper argues that the JDP initially adopted an "inclusionary" populism to counter the threat of party closure and expand its voter base.⁵ However, from the end of the second term onwards, the JDP gradually shifted towards an "exclusionary" populism, leveraging ethnic and religious polarisation to consolidate its voter base amidst declining clientelist resources and a deepening economic downturn.

A clarification is in order. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013) convincingly demonstrate that inclusionary populism also includes exclusionary elements. In parallel, I propose that the JDP's policy agenda has incorporated exclusionary populism since its inception, albeit becoming more pronounced once it successfully weakened the secular civilian and

1 The JDP enjoyed a series of resounding victories in legislative elections until the June 2015 elections, when it failed to secure a parliamentary majority due to the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) surpassing the world's highest electoral threshold of 10% (Arslantaş, Arslantaş & Kaiser, 2020; Aslan 2022a; Aslan, 2022b; Bölükbaşı, 2024). However, in the November 2015 snap elections, the JDP regained its dominant position in the midst of an unprecedented political turmoil. In the June 2018 elections, the JDP once again fell short of a legislative majority, but its electoral alliance with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) enabled it to maintain its legislative dominance. It is worth noting that under "a la Turca" presidential system, the significance of the controlling legislative diminished, as most of the legislative powers were transferred to the executive branch, specifically the President (Tokatlı 2020).

2 See, for instance, Hadiz, 2014; Park, 2018.

3 See, for instance, Yıldırım, 2009; Arslantaş & Arslantaş, 2024a.

4 See, for instance, Türk, 2018; Jakobson et. al, 2023; Canveren & Kaiser, 2024.

5 A similar conceptual framework is used in at least three recently published studies. Gürsoy's paper (2021) argues that the JDP case does not align with any existing typologies inspired by the Latin American and European context. Erçetin and Boyraz's (2023) paper focuses exclusively on the JDP's exclusionary policies and examines the response of the CHP during the 2019 local elections. Finally, Ayan-Musil (2021)'s study shows how the JDP's inclusionary populism signalled the authoritarian transformation from the second term onwards.

military bureaucracy and consolidated its position within the political system through a series of resounding electoral victories.

This paper is structured as follows. The first section introduces the contested concept of populism in the context of right-wing politics. The second section highlights the shift in the JDP’s policies from inclusionary to exclusionary populism. The last section concludes and summarises the major findings of this research.

Populism As a Contested Concept

The surge in populism studies can be attributed to the electoral success of populist parties and their appealing focus on specific issues.⁶ The populist parties have gained substantial influence, exerting a “blackmail potential” (Sartori, [1976]2005) that affects the functioning and stability of the party system. A notable example is the UK’s Independence Party, which mobilised mass support for the country’s exit from the EU. However, its subsequent branding as the Brexit Party did not yield the same success in the 2019 snap elections. Nonetheless, this case exemplifies the extent of influence that populist parties may have on the future of politics (Freedon, 2017; Cox, 2017).

In contrast to the approaches that conceptualise populism as a “political strategy” (Weyland, 2001), “discourse” (Laclau, 2005), or “political communication style” (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007), this paper adopts an ideational approach that has at least two advantages over the alternatives. First, the ideational approach has more explanatory power in explaining the populist parties in highly polarised societies. Second, the ideational approach recognises the role of the clientelist distribution of public resources in favour of the political and economic elites as one of the sources of the populist uprising. Within this framework, the ideational approach defines populism as “an ideology that views society as fundamentally divided into two homogenous and antagonistic groups: ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’.” It argues that politics should be an expression of the general will (*volonté générale*) of the people” (Mudde, 2004, p. 543).

Populist parties are pragmatic and adapt to evolving political dynamics. This adaptability is sometimes driven by political failures, while at other times, it stems from elite divisions or changing international environments. For example, in Latin America, the dominant form of populism shifted from “classical” to “neoliberal” populism due to ineffective distributive policies and deteriorating macroeconomic indicators.⁷

Mudde and Kaltwasser’s (2013) distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary populism provides an alternative framework to analyse populist transformations. By examining each category’s material and political dimensions, this framework connects populist policies to the quality of democracy. While the material dimension pertains to the distribution of state resources and the provision of specific benefits to targeted groups, the political dimension refers to including or excluding particular groups from the political system.

6 In comparison to the 1960s, the average vote share of populist parties increased from 5.4% to 12.4%; and their average seat rose from 4.0% to 12.2% (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

7 In contrast to “classical” populist leaders like Peron in Argentina, Cardenas in Mexico, and Vargas in Brazil, who advocated for import substitution and redistributive politics, neoliberal populists such as Salinas in Mexico, Menem in Argentina, and Fujimori in Peru, embraced the policy of the deregulation of the market (Levitsky, 2003).

Inclusionary populism, which mainly fits into the cases in Latin America, is chiefly economic and targets the lower classes with the promise of redistributive politics. It also emphasises restoring the rule of the people representing the “heartland” (Taggart, 2004).⁸ Inclusionary populists often form alliances that span different social classes, including some previously antagonistic elites. The JDP’s forming of an informal alliance with the ultra-nationalist/secularist Patriotic Party (Vatan Partisi), whose members were imprisoned during the early 2010s (previously Workers Party) within the scope of Ergenekon operations against the secular establishment, on the eve of the 2023 presidential election illustrates this strategy.⁹

In contrast, exclusionary populism centres its strategy around excluding ethnic and religious minorities from the economic, political, and social spheres. To ensure that exclusionary populists enhance political polarisation, which is crucial for consolidating their voter base. Additionally, their discourse often targets political elites, portraying them as a corrupt group solely motivated by self-interest.

Although populism, with its inclusive rhetoric, may well address feelings of alienation resulting from politics (Canovan, 1999), the rise of populist leaders or parties often leads to an erosion of democratic norms and processes (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Figures like Orbán in Hungary, Kaczyński in Poland, and Maduro in Venezuela exemplify how populist rulers create conditions conducive to an authoritarian transition. Under Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkey is another addition to this list.

Inclusionary Populism

Populist parties often emerge and gain strength during times of rapid mobilisation and economic and political crises (Knight, 1998; Laclau, 2005). In line with this pattern, the JDP came to power following Turkey’s most severe financial crisis in 2001. The 2002 snap elections witnessed the highest electoral volatility in the post-1980 period, as former coalition partners, namely the Democratic Left Party (DSP), Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and Motherland Party (ANAP), failed to surpass the 10% electoral threshold.¹⁰ While these parties were substantially weakened, if not completely dismantled, by the 2001 economic crisis, the elections presented a unique opportunity for parties like the JDP to thrive.

As a populist party, the JDP took important steps to address its existential crisis. Notably, Article 68 of the Turkish Constitution allowed for the dissolution of parties engaging in anti-secular activities, leading to the closure of the JDP’s predecessors, such as the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) or the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) (Arslantaş & Arslantaş, 2024b). Thus, adopting an inclusionary populist programme was more of a necessity rather than a choice. Within this framework, the JDP’s implementation of a reformist agenda to become an EU member and its ability to attract moderate centre-right figures like Köksal Toptan

8 For Taggart (2004, p. 274), the heartland “represents an idealised conception of the community they serve. It is from this territory of the imagination that populists construct the ‘people’ as the object of their politics.”

9 Ergenekon operations started in 2007 with the finding of grenades and bombs in a house in Ümraniye. The organisation allegedly aimed to overthrow the JDP government with violence. As a result of the operations, hundreds of journalists, politicians and army personnel were arrested. After the retrial of the suspects, all detainees were released in 2019 (BBC, 2019).

10 Even more dramatically, the total vote share of these parties declined from 53.3% to 14.6%.

and Cemil Çiçek helped soften its image in the eyes of sceptical voters. As Öniş (2012) argues, this strategy enabled the government to implement a comprehensive neoliberal reform programme in a favourable international market context. The reform process also weakened the guardians of the old regime and constructed a new regime (Polat, 2016), which was then propagated under the “new Turkey” brand.

In broad terms, the JDP’s early government programmes included strong political and material inclusion elements. Political inclusion involved enhancing representation channels for those who feel marginalised due to their beliefs or identities (Boyraz, 2018). Besides, the JDP aligned itself with loyal civil society organisations, particularly religious charities and religious women’s organisations, to attract new members (e.g., Zencirci, 2015; Doyle, 2018). These policies strengthened the ties between the party leadership and conservative voters. Furthermore, the enactment of EU harmonisation packages garnered support from liberals and some social democrats.

Despite these attempts, the Kurdish issue was the most notable obstacle in executing an inclusionary populist strategy. The armed conflict between the state and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which had claimed tens of thousands of lives, has remained unresolved since the late 1980s. In its early years, the JDP’s Kurdish policy aligned mainly with the status quo. The Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) operations, which resulted in the imprisonment of over 7.000 people, including high-ranking officials from the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) (Cumhuriyet, 2011), tend to verify this despite some reforms being enacted along the path to EU membership.

The JDP’s approach to the Kurdish issue underwent a significant change after it successfully overcame the closure case in 2008 and began to neutralise the secular establishment. With the confidence of its parliamentary majority and loyal voter base, Erdoğan initiated a “Kurdish Opening Process” to disarm the PKK and negotiate a peaceful solution to the matter. While this move initially led to a ceasefire, the hope for a permanent solution quickly faded for both parties due to the escalation of the violence. As a pragmatic party, the JDP’s major concern during the opening process was its fluctuating vote share. Public surveys indicated that the JDP lost votes to the nationalist MHP and the pro-Kurdish HDP due to the opening process. Since the HDP passing the electoral threshold (10%) would potentially prevent the JDP from forming a single-party government, the party leadership decided to end the reform process (Özpek & Mutluer, 2016; Grigoriadis & Mutluer, 2016; Yener-Roderburg, 2022).

On the other hand, the JDP’s efforts for material inclusion aimed to expand its popularity among urban poor communities. In this regard, the government merged SGK (Social Security Institution) hospitals with Bağ-Kur (Social Security Organisation for Artisans and the Self-employed) hospitals, eliminating disparities in healthcare access among different socioeconomic groups.¹¹ Furthermore, the scope and amount of social assistance for vulnerable populations increased (Bezmez & Yardımcı, 2010). Conditional

¹¹ There are similarities with the early years of the administrations of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia in terms of the policies they implemented to improve the living conditions of the lower classes. These policies included healthcare reform, expansion of education facilities, housing initiatives, and pension programmes (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013).

Cash Transfer programmes¹² (Aytaç, 2014), the distribution of green cards (Çelik, 2010)¹³, and the construction of affordable housing by the TOKI (Housing Development Administration of Turkey) (Marshall et al., 2016) all contributed to the party's popularity among voters. It is worth noting that these social benefits were often distributed through clientelistic means, which contradicts the principles of a social welfare state (Özdemir, 2020). Party and municipal officials in several field studies frequently emphasised that the continuation of social benefits was contingent upon supporting the JDP (Kılıçdaroğlu, 2020; Arslantaş & Arslantaş, 2022). This observation in the field aligns with data from the Democratic Accountability Linkage Project (DALP), which identifies the JDP as the most clientelist party in Turkey.

Excessive reliance on material resources to appeal to voters might also be counterproductive. During economic downturns, the availability of clientelist resources may shrink, leading to a loss of popularity for the incumbent party. This, for instance, occurred in Mexico during the early 1980s, when the shrinking clientelist resources contributed to the decline of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (Magaloni, 2006).¹⁴ This also happened in the aftermath of the financial setback in Turkey in 2008. The shrinking of public resources, which would otherwise be used to influence swing voters, played a role in losing local elections to the opposition candidates in key metropolitan municipalities in Turkey in 2019. This included metropolitan areas such as Istanbul, Ankara, Antalya, Adana, and Mersin.

The JDP's inclusionary populism included elements of exclusionary populism as well. This became particularly evident towards the end of the first term, as Erdoğan frequently expressed discontent with the Kemalist judges and ambassadors, labelling them as alienated "monşerler" (Habertürk, 2009). In response, the secular establishment's counter efforts further accelerated the exclusionary populist turn. Notably, the political turmoil surrounding the selection of the President prompted the military and civilian bureaucracy to post an e-memorandum on its website by the military, led by Yaşar Büyükanıt, accusing the JDP's presidential candidate Abdullah Gül of being anti-secular. Simultaneously, the Constitutional Court annulled the first round of the Presidential vote in the parliament. These institutional pressures left the JDP leadership with no choice but to call for snap elections in July 2007. As expected, this move increased the JDP's vote share to 46.0 % by capitalising on the perception of being a victim (Polat, 2009). While this electoral success strengthened the JDP, the secular bureaucracy made a final attempt by initiating a party closure case in March 2008. In July, the Constitutional Court ruled not to ban the JDP but

12 Conditional Cash Transfers are a form of social welfare programmes that involve providing cash payments to individuals or families living in poverty, contingent upon meeting certain criteria related to health, nutrition, or education.

13 Green card holders, who are individuals with legal permanent residency in a country, often receive exemptions from paying for public health services due to their vulnerable situation. The number of green card holders significantly increased over time, indicating the clientelist nature of this policy. In 2019, the number of green card holders reached 8.6 million (T24, 2019; Turgil et al., 2019).

14 During the 1970s, Mexico experienced a significant shift from an import-substitution model to neoliberalism, which had adverse effects on the economy, including exacerbating the economic downturn and initiating the privatisation of state-owned enterprises. This transition reduced public resources previously allocated for clientelist purposes. Despite the implementation of extensive social programmes such as PRONASOL, the PRI witnessed a decline in popularity throughout the 1990s. Ultimately, these factors contributed to the PRI's electoral defeat in the 2000 presidential elections (Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2007).

reduced its treasury grant by half (Hürriyet, 2008). These developments empowered the proponents of revanchism within the JDP ranks.

The findings of this section are summarised in Table 1. As the next section will demonstrate, when these developments were combined with intensified internal and external constraints, the JDP’s populism underwent significant changes from the end of the second term onwards.

Table 1
Summary of the findings (inclusionary populism)

Inclusionary Populism		Dynamics	Result
Political Inclusion	Material Inclusion		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhancement of the representation channels for the excluded masses (mostly conservatives) • endorsement of loyal civil society organisations • EU reforms to persuade liberals and moderates • preparation of infrastructure for the Kurdish-Opening Process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • based on the redistributive strategy • mainly targeted the urban poor • unification of the health system • expansion of welfare provisions, especially for the most vulnerable classes • expansion of social housing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • absence of credible alternative parties • fear of party closure • favourable international economic environment • reformism • neoliberalism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • mixed results • The weakening of civilian and military bureaucracy • emergence of Turkey as a regional “model” country • counter-attack: the party closure case • playing the victimisation card • landslide electoral victories • preparation of psychological and legal grounds for exclusionary populism

Exclusionary Populism

The transition from inclusionary to exclusionary populism was a strategic response by the JDP governments to the deteriorating domestic and international conditions. One factor was the economic setback from 2008 onwards, which led to a decline in public resources available to finance and sustain the expanding clientelist network. In this context, the JDP resorted to boost ethnic and religious polarisation to maintain support from its voter base.

Another catalyst for the exclusionary populist turn was the eruption of the Gezi protests in June 2013, which highlighted public dissatisfaction and the revelation of corrupt relationships between the JDP leadership and loyal businessmen, as revealed by the 17-25 December 2013 operations. The dispersion of strategic voting among opposition voters, particularly a shift of some urban CHP voters to the HDP to surpass the electoral threshold, intensified the pressure on the JDP administration. As electoral polls at the time showed, the JDP lost its legislative majority in the June 2015 elections. However, since the coalition talks between the JDP and CHP failed, snap elections were called for November 2015. A series of deadly terrorist attacks between June and November 2015 popularised a security-focused approach among government circles and enhanced social and political polarisation, which reached new heights after the failed coup attempt in July 2016.

The state of emergency, implemented immediately after the coup attempt to punish the perpetrators (Gülenists), remained in force for two years. Despite initial claims that it was temporary, the JDP government used the state of emergency as a legal basis to suppress the legal opposition in both parliament and the streets. During this period, a number of decree laws were enacted, resulting in the expulsion of approximately one-fourth of the judiciary, one-tenth of the police force, and 7% of the military personnel. Seven hundred academics were also dismissed, including 400 who signed a declaration criticising the government for the situation in the Kurdish provinces. Furthermore, over 50 publishing houses and magazines and more than 60 TV and radio stations were shut down (Deutsche Welle, 2018; Cumhuriyet, 2018). The decree-laws also paved the way for a regime transition by transferring most legislative powers to the President (Qumar, 2017). The referendum on transitioning to a presidential system in April 2017 was contentious, with over 2 million unsealed votes counted as valid despite legal provisions against such practises (Taş, 2018).

The international context of the JDP's exclusionary populism is also worth noting. The suspension of Turkey's EU membership process, primarily due to barriers imposed by Sarkozy and Merkel over the Cyprus issue, weakened international leverage in the authoritarian transition (Müftüler-Baç, 2018). This led to increased public support for the EU membership process, as the narrative of foreign conspiracies found a receptive audience among the population. According to the Metropol survey, support for EU membership dropped from 75.9% in March 2005 to 43.0% in December 2012 (Diken, 2021).

The political turmoil following the Arab Spring destabilised domestic politics in Turkey and contributed to increased social and political polarisation. This, in turn, fuelled anti-immigration sentiments and xenophobia, particularly among the lower socioeconomic classes, as refugees often worked informally for low wages. The instances of physical attacks against refugees in urban slums exemplify this trend. For example, a KONDA survey showed a decline in the percentage of people willing to live with Syrians in the same apartment or neighbourhood, dropping from 41% to 21% between 2016 and 2019 (Euronews, 2019). Another survey conducted in Istanbul indicated weak interaction with Syrian refugees, with 78% of respondents stating that they had no contact with Syrians (Evrensel, 2020).

As stated, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013) associate exclusionary populism with the radical-right ideology. While the JDP's exclusionary populism - coloured by Islamism and nationalism—was not as apparent in its first term due to the party's closure threat and favourable international conditions, it began to crystallise at the end of its second term. It became clear that the JDP's aim was not to prioritise a pluralistic representation of society but to bless the majority rule (Mudde, 2007).¹⁵ From this perspective, the recently popularised discourse of “national will” (*milli irade*) refers more to “uniformity” than to “plurality.” Such a narrow vision of democracy contradicts the basic principles of democratic representation that safeguard minority rights.

15 The White Turks vs. The Black Turks dichotomy, as described in the literature (Demiralp, 2012; Ferguson, 2014; Ergin, 2016), provides a useful framework for understanding the notion of majority in the Turkish context. This framework differentiates between two groups: White Turks, who are typically associated with an urban, cosmopolitan background and a more liberal or secular outlook, and Black Turks, who have a provincial background and tend to hold more conservative views.

As a populist party, the JDP used mass rallies and referendums to consolidate power and discourage opposition political activism (Selçuk, 2016). These events have served as platforms for the party to rally its supporters and demonstrate its strength. During the Gezi Park protests in June 2013, President Erdoğan’s warnings to mobilise his supporters against the protesters highlighted this approach. However, in the current phase of exclusionary populism, the JDP has become more cautious about relying on referendums.¹⁶ The narrow passage of the 2007 Presidential referendum and Erdoğan’s close victory in the 2018 Presidential elections raised concerns among JDP elites about the potential risks and uncertainties associated with the referendums. The party leadership recognises that holding referendums can be divisive and may not always produce the desired outcomes, posing potential challenges to the party and its leader.

The JDP’s exclusionary populism relies on two main pillars, namely, religious and ethnic exclusion. With regard to religious exclusion, the JDP first attacked and undermined the power of the secular establishment. Most notably, hundreds of high-ranking military officials, journalists, and political figures were imprisoned through a series of judicial operations, including “Ergenekon” (2008) and “Balyoz” (2010). Based on fabricated pieces of evidence, the imprisoned figures were blamed for overthrowing the JDP government by force. On several occasions, Erdoğan also targeted secular industrialists, organised under the Turkish Industry & Business Association (TUSIAD), and expressed open support for the conservative Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD) (Yağcı, 2018). In addition to the steps that weakened the secular sectors, the JDP government heavily invested in Sunni religious organisations to make religion more visible in the public and private spheres. In this regard, the government increased the budget of the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) and Imam-Hatip Schools (Adak, 2021) and endorsed religious waqfs such as Ensar and Türgev as well as the youth organisations (Yabancı, 2021).

In terms of ethnic exclusion, the JDP reversed its “Kurdish Opening Process,” which was once a symbol of its inclusionary populism, leading to a resurgence of violent conflict and eroding prospects for peace. Additionally, the JDP formed a political alliance with the ultra-nationalist MHP, which signalled a return to the “national security state” of the 1990s.¹⁷ This shift had electoral consequences for the JDP, as it weakened its ties with Kurdish voters, resulting in losses in metropolitan areas in the 2019 local elections.

Most recently, the JDP’s exclusionary populism has been characterised by the motto of “native and national” (yerli ve milli). This rhetoric, which emphasises nativism, is a typical feature of exclusionary populism and excludes groups that are not considered “native” or “national.” In addition to targeting the secular establishment, Alevis, secular Kurds, and religious minorities, the JDP’s exclusionary rhetoric builds against the

¹⁶ Up until now, the JDP has been successful in winning all the referendums. These referendums have played a significant role in shaping the country’s political landscape. The 2007 referendum, for example, introduced a public vote procedure for the election of the President. The 2010 referendum resulted in the restructuring of judicial institutions and increased political control over them. The 2017 referendum marked a pivotal moment as it signalled the transition to a Turkish-style presidential system, altering the political system’s dynamics.

¹⁷ The concept of the “national security state” (see, e.g., Cizre, 2003) provides a valuable framework for understanding the dynamics of Turkish foreign policy during the 1990s. However, in this context, I applied the concept to domestic politics.

Table 2
Summary of the findings (exclusionary populism)

Exclusionary Populism		Dynamics	Result
Political Exclusion	Material Exclusion		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “native and national” discourse • Targeting of the secular bureaucracy (“monşerler” discourse and Ergenekon/Balyoz operations) • Repression of contenders (Gezi Park protests) • the halting of the reform process • Dismissing opponents from the public bureaucracy (after July 15) • prioritisation of the security agenda • reverting of the Kurdish-Opening Process • foreign conspiracy (dış güçler) discourse • rise in anti-immigration sentiments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • discrimination against secular capital • endorsement of loyal capital • maintenance of welfare provisions • the clientelist network became more exclusionary 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2008 economic crises • Arab Spring • mounting polarisation • violent terrorist attacks between June-November 2015 elections • Failed coup attempt (July 2016) • state of emergency • The persistent economic downturn (currency shocks and soaring inflation) • refugee crises 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • decreasing popularity of the JDP • strategic voting among oppositional voters • Splits within the JDP (e.g., DEVA and Gelecek) • dealignment of urban Kurdish voters • strengthening of control over the civilian and military bureaucracy • institutionalisation of one-man rule with the transition to a la Turca presidential system • forming an alliance with the nationalist MHP • the halting of the EU membership process • Loss of metropolitan municipalities to the CHP (2019)

external actors. The dissemination of conspiracy theories, influenced by the notion of “Sevres Syndrome,”¹⁸ has found resonance among right-wing voters due to its promotion through formal and religious education.

The JDP’s exclusionary populism appears less visible in its policy towards Syrian refugees. This can be attributed to several interconnected factors. First, the refugees are often exploited as a source of cheap labour in Turkey’s developing economy, benefiting specific sectors such as textiles and construction (Yalçın, 2016; Öztürk, Serin & Altınöz, 2019). This policy also appeases the conservative classes, including tradespeople and artisans, who have been negatively affected by economic downturns since 2008. Furthermore, the refugee policy aligns with the culturalist view of the JDP that seeks to revive Ottomanism in the Middle East and position Erdoğan as a leader of the ummah (the global Muslim community). Lastly, the JDP instrumentalize the refugees as a means to deter European Union intervention in Turkey’s internal affairs (Saatçioğlu, 2020).¹⁹

The JDP’s exclusionary populism, as summarised in Table 2, has profoundly affected the properties of the party system and the political regime (Arslantaş & Arslantaş, 2020c).

18 The Sevres Syndrome refers to a perceived sense of paranoia within the Turkish state tradition. It is characterised by the belief that Western powers and internal adversaries, including Islamists and Kurds, are constantly conspiring against Turkey’s national interests. This syndrome revitalises the role of the security bureaucracy in politics.

19 The most recent studies on the subject include Polat (2018), Balkılıç & Teke (2021), and Tank (2021).

First, there has been an extended polarisation within Turkish society, as documented by various studies and surveys (See, e.g., Konda surveys since 2010; Esmer & Beek, 2019; Arbatlı & Rosenberg, 2021; Mete-Dokucu & Just, 2021). Second, the link between Erdoğan and the JDP’s voter base has become more direct and less institutionalised, particularly after the transition to a presidential system. This has weakened the JDP as a party and reinforced the personalisation of politics recently (Baykan, 2018). Third, the civilian bureaucracy has come under the control of the JDP-led government, as illustrated by the trajectory of institutions like the Court of Accounts (Özbudun, 2015; Cengiz, 2020). Judges who exposed irregularities and corruption have faced exile, indicating the importance of institutional protection for sustaining a clientelist network.²⁰ Finally, the government has tightened its authoritarian control over the (centre) media, either through the sale of media outlets to loyal businesspeople or through financial and legal pressures on regulatory bodies such as RTUK (Yeşil, 2018; Yıldırım, Baruh & Çarkoğlu, 2021). Taken together, the regime has turned into electoral authoritarianism recently (Arslantaş & Kaiser, 2023).

Conclusion

This paper highlighted the JDP’s changing faces of populism. It argues that the JDP initially pursued an inclusionary populist programme focused on redistributive policies but shifted towards exclusionary populism driven by Islamism and nationalism due to shrinking clientelist resources and worsening economic indicators.

The JDP’s adoption of exclusionary populism adversely affected domestic and external politics. In domestic politics, it led to the unification of opposition parties from different backgrounds against the JDP, resulting in the defeat of the JDP-MHP alliance in metropolitan areas during the 2019 local elections. In foreign policy, Turkey’s strained relations with neighbouring countries and the EU deterred foreign direct investment and deepened economic and financial crises. It also indirectly influenced the rise of the extreme-right populist parties in Europe, making Turkey’s EU membership unlikely soon.

The persistence of populist rule in Turkey is a subject of ongoing debate. First, the deepening economic crises and increasing authoritarian control failed to bring alternation of power, although it led to more effective opposition coordination and divisions within the JDP ranks. Accordingly, Erdoğan maintained his role as the leading figure of the Islamist-nationalist alliance based on the results of the May 2023 elections. Second, the fact that the opposition candidate, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, left aside its liberal tone regarding refugees before the run-off elections in May 2023 increased the legitimacy of the JDP’s exclusionary populist policies despite its destructive consequences on the future course of democracy.

Further research avenues can explore how the JDP’s populism differed under parliamentary and presidential systems and investigate the shift from inclusionary to exclusionary populism in other populist governments. Comparative studies with similar

²⁰ Another institution adversely affected by the exclusionary populism turn was the Constitutional Court, whose jurisdictions have not been implemented by low-degree courts in several instances, particularly relating to the trials of prominent journalists, politicians, and businesspeople including Selahattin Demirtaş, Mehmet Altan, and Osman Kavala (See, e.g., Birgün, 2018).

cases in the Middle East, such as Morocco and Tunisia, would also contribute to a better understanding of the unique dynamics of populism in Turkey.

Peer-review: Externally peer-reviewed.

Conflict of Interest: The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

Grant Support: The author declared that this study has received no financial support.

References

- Adak, S. (2021). Expansion of the Diyanet and the Politics of Family in Turkey under JDP Rule. *Turkish Studies*, 22(2), 200-221.
- Arbatlı, E., & Rosenberg, D. (2021). United We Stand, Divided We Rule: How Political Polarisation Erodes Democracy. *Democratisation*, 28(2), 285-307.
- Arslantaş, D., Arslantaş, Ş., & Kaiser, A. (2020). Does the Electoral System Foster a Predominant Party System? Evidence from Turkey. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 26(1), 125-143.
- Arslantaş, Ş., & Arslantaş, D. (2020a). Fransa’da Değişen Siyasal Paradigma Çerçevesinde Radikal Solun Yükselişi. *Marmara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Dergisi*, 8(1), 1-26.
- Arslantaş, Ş., & Arslantaş, D. (2020b). Almanya’da Popülist Alternatif: Die Linke Örneği. *Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 38(3), 415-439.
- Arslantaş, D., & Arslantaş, Ş. (2020c). Keeping Power through Opposition: Party System Change in Turkey. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 62, 27-50.
- Arslantaş, D., & Arslantaş, Ş. (2022). How does Clientelism Foster Electoral Dominance? Evidence from Turkey. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, 7(3), 559-575.
- Arslantaş, D., & Kaiser, A. (2023). The ‘Competitive Authoritarian’ Turn in Turkey: Bandwagoning versus Reality. *Third World Quarterly*, 44(3), 496-512.
- Arslantaş, Ş., & Arslantaş, D. (2024a). Populism and Crisis: Evidence from the Periphery of Europe. *Mediterranean Politics*, 29(3), 285-306.
- Arslantaş, D., & Arslantaş, Ş. (2024b). From “Permanent Opposition” to “Power”: Anti-Systemic Parties in Turkey. *Party Politics*, 30(3), 409-419.
- Aslan, M. Ç. (2022a). The Impact of the Nationalist Action Party’s Realignment with The Ruling Party on the Demography and Ideological Self-Placement of the Nap Voters: Comparison of the (June) 2015 and the 2018 Parliamentary Elections. *Marmara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Dergisi*, 10(2), 222-239.
- Aslan, M. Ç. (2022b). Rasyonel Tercih Yaklaşımı Rehberliğinde Belirleyici Aktörlerin Ülke Seçim Barajı Oranı Tercih: Türkiye Örneği. *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, 77(4), 757-778.
- Ayan Musil, P. (2021). Revisiting the Concept of Moderation in the Age of Populism: The JDP Case of Turkey. *Middle East Law and Governance*, 15(4), 435-461.
- Aytaç, S. E. (2014). Distributive Politics in a Multiparty System: The Conditional Cash Transfer Programme in Turkey. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(9), 1211-1237.
- Balkılıç, Ö., & Teke Lloyd, F. A. (2021). Does Islamic Inclusion of Syrians Represent a Real Challenge to Europe’s Security Approach?: Dilemmas of the JDP’s Syrian Refugee Discourse. *Turkish Studies*, 22(3), 357-379.
- Baykan, T. S. (2018). *The Justice and Development Party in Turkey: Populism, Personalism, Organisation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Baykan, T. S. (2024). *Populism as Governmental Practise: Spatial, Operational and Temporal Dynamics*. New York: Routledge.
- BBC. (2019, July 1). Ergenekon Davasında Karar Açıklandı: Hüküm Sonrası Kim Ne Dedi?. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-48830230>
- Bezmez, D., & Yardımcı, S. (2010). In Search of Disability Rights: Citizenship and Turkish Disability Organisations. *Disability & Society*, 25(5), 603-615.
- Birgün (2018, January 11). Mehmet Altan ve Şahin Alpay’ın Tahliye Kararı Reddedildi. Retrieved from <https://www.birgun.net/haber/mehmet-altan-ve-sahin-alpay-in-tahliye-talebi-reddedildi-199613>
- Börlükbaşı, M. (2024). From Fragmentation to Stability and Back Again? Analysing Turkish Party System (1991-2023). In Kandemir, N. B. (Eds.). *Academic Studies in Social Sciences And Humanities* (pp. 55-65). Ankara: Serüven Yayınevi.
- Boyras, C. (2018). Neoliberal Populism and Governmentality in Turkey: The Foundation of Communication Centres during the JDP Era. *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 44(4), 437-452.
- Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy. *Political Studies*, 47(1), 2-16.
- Canveren, Ö., & Kaiser, A. (2024). Exploring Populism in Erdogan’s Discourse on Turkey–European Union Relations. *Czech Journal of International Relations*. Online first. <https://doi.org/10.32422/cjir.822>

- Cox, M. (2017). The Rise of Populism and the Crisis of Globalisation: Brexit, Trump and Beyond. *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 28, 9-17.
- Cengiz, F. Ç. (2020). Proliferation of Neopatrimonial Domination in Turkey. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 47(4), 507-525.
- Çelik, A. (2010). Muhafazakâr Sosyal Politika Yönelimi: Hak Yerine Yardım-Yükümlülük Yerine Hayırseverlik. *İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 42, 63-81.
- Cizre, Ü. (2003). Demythologising the National Security Concept: The Case of Turkey. *The Middle East Journal*, 213-229.
- Cumhuriyet. (2011, December 8). KCK'da Ağır Bilanço. Retrieved from <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/kckda-agir-bilanco-304038>
- Cumhuriyet. (2018, July 16). İki Yıllık OHAL'in Bilançosu: Demokrasi Ayaklar Altında. Retrieved from http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/yazi_dizileri/1028893/iki_yillik_OHAL_in_bilançosu_Demokrasi_ayaklar_altinda.html
- Demiralp, S. (2012). White Turks, Black Turks? Faultlines beyond Islamism versus Secularism. *Third World Quarterly*, 33(3), 511-524.
- Deutsche Welle. (2018, July 18). Türkiye'de OHAL'in Bilançosu. <https://www.dw.com/tr/türkiyede-ohalin-bilançosu/a-44705773>
- Diken. (2021, February, 7). AB Üyelğine Destek Yüzde 60'a Ulaştı. <https://www.diken.com.tr/turkiyenin-abyeligine-destek-yuzde-60a-ulasti/>
- Doyle, J. L. (2018). Government Co-Option of Civil Society: Exploring the JDP's Role within Turkish Women's CSOs. *Democratisation*, 25(3), 445-463.
- Erçetin, T., & Boyraz, C. (2023). How to Struggle with Exclusionary Right-wing Populism: Evidence from Turkey. *Democratisation*, 30(1), 78-100.
- Ergin, M. (2016). *Is the Turk a White Man? Race and Modernity in the Making of Turkish Identity*. Leiden: Brill.
- Esmar, Y., & Beek, U. V. (2019). Identity Politics: Extreme Polarisation and the Loss of Capacity to Compromise in Turkey. In Beek U.V. (Eds.) *Democracy under Threat: A Crisis of Legitimacy?* (pp. 121-146). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Euronews (2019 July 29). Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Bakış 3 Yılda Büyük Oranda Olumsuz Yönde Değişti. <https://tr.euronews.com/2019/07/29/suriyeli-siginmacilara-bakis-3-yilda-buyuk-oranda-olumsuz-yonde-degisti>
- Evrensel (2020, June 15). İstanbul'un Suriyelilere Bakışında Kırmızı Alarm. <https://www.evrensel.net/yazi/86554/istanbulun-suriyelilere-bakisinda-kirmizi-alarm>
- Ferguson, M. (2014). White Turks, Black Turks and Negroes: The Politics of Polarisation. In Özkırımı, U. (Eds.) *The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey: #occupygezi* (pp. 77-88). Palgrave Pivot, London.
- Freedon, M. (2017). After the Brexit Referendum: Revisiting Populism as an Ideology. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 22(1), 1-11.
- Greene, K. F. (2007). *Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratisation in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Grigoriadis, I. N. and Dilek, E. (2018). Struggling for the Kurdish vote: Religion, Ethnicity, and Victimhood in the JDP and BDP/HDP Rally Speeches. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 54(2), 289-303.
- Gürsoy, Y. (2021). Moving beyond European and Latin American Typologies: The Peculiarities of JDP's Populism in Turkey. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 51(1), 157-178.
- Habertürk (2009, February 2). 'Monşerler' Tartışması. Retrieved from <https://www.haberturk.com/polemik/haber/126178-monserler-tartismasi>
- Hadiz, V. R. (2014). A New Islamic Populism and the Contradictions of Development. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 44(1), 125-143.
- Hürriyet (2008, July 30). JDP Kapatılmadı. Retrieved from <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/JDP-kapatilmadi-9546038>
- Jakobson, M. L., Umpierrez de Reguero, S., & Yener-Roderburg, I. Ö. (2023). When Migrants Become 'The People': Unpacking Homeland Populism. *Contemporary Politics*, 29(3), 277-297.
- Jagers, J. and Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as Political Communication Style: An Empirical Study of Political Parties' discourses in Belgium. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(3), 319-345.
- Kaya, A. (2020). Right-wing Populism and Islamophobia in Europe and their Impact on Turkey-EU Relations. *Turkish Studies*, 21(1), 1-28.
- Kılıçdaroğlu, K. (2020). Change in Political Party Strategy and Organisation in Turkey: The Republican People's Party in Government and in Opposition. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 20(4), 593-615.
- Knight, A. (1998). Populism and Neo-populism in Latin America, Especially Mexico. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 30(2), 223-248.
- Laclau, E. (2005). *On Populist Reason*. London and New York: Verso.
- Levitsky, S. (2003). *Transforming Labour-based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Magaloni, B. (2006). *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Marschall, M., Aydoğan, A. and Bulut, A. (2016). Does Housing Create Votes? Explaining the Electoral Success

- of the JDP in Turkey. *Electoral Studies*, 42, 201-212.
- Mete-Dokucu, H., & Just, A. (2022). Party System Polarisation in Developing Democracies: The Case of Turkey, 1950–2018. *Turkish Studies*, 23(3), 331-353.
- Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, 39(4), 541-563.
- Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser, C. R. (2013). Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America. *Government and Opposition*, 48(2), 147-174.
- Müftüler-Baç, M. (2018). Remoulding the Turkey-EU Relationship. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 17(1), 119-128.
- Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2019). *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Öniş, Z. (2012). The Triumph of Conservative Globalism: The Political Economy of the JDP Era. *Turkish Studies*, 13(2), 135-152.
- Özpek, B. B. and Mutluer, O. (2016). Turkey and the Kurdish Question: The Last Exit Before the Bridge. *Iran and the Caucasus*, 20(1), 127-141.
- Özbudun, E. (2015). Turkey's Judiciary and the Drift towards Competitive Authoritarianism. *The International Spectator*, 50(2), 42-55.
- Özdemir, Y. (2020). JDP's Neoliberal Populism and Contradictions of New Social Policies in Turkey. *Contemporary Politics*, 26(3), 245-267.
- Öztürk, L., Serin, Z. V., & Altınöz, H. (2019). Challenges and Obstacles for Syrian Refugee Women in the Turkish Labour Market. *Societies*, 9(3), 49, 1-10.
- Park, B. (2018). Populism and Islamism in Turkey. *Turkish Studies*, 19(2), 169-175.
- Polat, N. (2016). *Regime Change in Contemporary Turkey: Politics, Rights, Mimesis*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Polat, R. K. (2009). The 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey: Between Securitisation and Desecuritisation. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 62(1), 129-148.
- Polat, R. K. (2018). Religious Solidarity, Historical Mission, and Moral Superiority: Construction of External and Internal 'Others' in JDP's Discourses on Syrian Refugees in Turkey. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 15(5), 500-516.
- Qamar, M. M. (2017). The Turkish Referendum, 2017. *Contemporary Review of the Middle East*, 4(3), 319-327.
- Saatçioğlu, B. (2022). The EU's Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Battleground among Many Europes. In Buhari, D., Kaunert, C. & Gülmez, S.B. (Eds.). *Transforming Europe through Crises* (pp. 1-16). Routledge: London.
- Sartori, G. (2005[1976]). *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Scheiner, E. (2006). *Democracy without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-party Dominant State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Selçuk, O. (2016). Strong Presidents and Weak Institutions: Populism in Turkey, Venezuela and Ecuador. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 16(4), 571-589.
- T24 (2019, September 24). Yeşil Kartlı Sayısı 8 Milyon 626 Bine Ulaştı. <https://t24.com.tr/haber/yesil-kart-livatanandas-sayisi-8-milyon-628-bine-ulasti,840695>
- Taggart, P. (2004). Populism and Representative Politics in Contemporary mic. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9(3), 269-288.
- Tank, P. (2021). Between Human and State Security: Turkey's Syria Policy under the Justice and Development Party (JDP). *The International Spectator*, 56(4), 86-100.
- Taş, H. (2018). Contained Uncertainty: Turkey's June 2018 Elections and Their Consequences. (GIGA Focus Nahost, 4). Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies - Leibniz-Institut für Globale and Regionale Studien, Institut für Nahost-Studien. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-58552-6>
- Tirgil, A., Dickens, W. T., & Atun, R. (2019). Effects of Expanding a Non-Contributory Health Insurance Scheme on Out-of-pocket Healthcare Spending by the Poor in Turkey. *BMJ Global Health*, 4(4), 1-10.
- Tokatlı, M. (2020). Auf dem Weg zum* Präsidialsystem Alla Turca*": Eine Analyse Unterschiedlicher Regierungsformen in der Türkei seit 1921. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag.
- Weyland, K. (2001). Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics. *Comparative Politics*, 34(1), 1-22.
- Yabancı, B. (2021). Work for the Nation, Obey the State, Praise the Ummah: Turkey's Government-oriented Youth Organisations in Cultivating a New Nation. *Ethnopolitics*, 20(4), 467-499.
- Yağcı, M. (2018). The Political Economy of Central Banking in Turkey: The Macroprudential Policy Regime and Self-undermining Feedback. *South European Society and Politics*, 23(4), 525-545.
- Yalçın, S. (2016). Syrian Child Workers in Turkey. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 15(3), 89-98.
- Yener-Roderburg, I. Ö. (2022). Diasporas' Political Mobilisation for a "Homeland" Political Party: The Case of Turkey's Peoples' Democratic Party in Germany and France. [Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Duisburg-Essen.
- Yeşil, B. (2018). Authoritarian Turn or Continuity? Governance of Media through Capture and Discipline in the JDP Era. *South European Society and Politics*, 23(2), 239-257.

- Yıldırım, D. (2009). JDP ve Neoliberal Popülizm. Uzgel, I., & Duru, B. (Eds). *JDP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu* (pp. 66-107). Ankara: Phoenix.
- Yıldırım, K., Baruh, L., & Çarkoğlu, A. (2021). Dynamics of Campaign Reporting and Press-party Parallelism: Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism and the Media System in Turkey. *Political Communication*, 38(3), 326-349.
- Zencirci, G. (2015). From Property to Civil Society: The Historical Transformation of Vakifs in Modern Turkey (1923-2013). *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 47(3), 533.



End of the Quest: Rising “Russian Civilisation” Concept In Russian Politics

Araştırın Sonu: Rus Siyasetinde Yükselen “Rus Medeniyeti” Kavramı

Osman Tekin¹

Abstract

Following the dissolution of the USSR, the Russian Federation’s search for a new strategy to replace the ideology-based politics of the Soviet era became a key issue during the post-Soviet period. In the 1990s, Russian politics found itself in turmoil as it struggled to devise coherent and effective strategies. The focus of this study will be on conceptual suggestions, discussions, and the transformation of Russian foreign policy at the end of the Cold War. Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, the ascendancy of the Russian civilisation concept has played a significant role in shaping contemporary Russian politics. Drawing inspiration from the ideas of prominent Russian philosophers such as Danilevskii and Leontyev, President Putin has found powerful arguments in his works. Through the influence of his philosophies and perspectives, Putin has navigated the complexities of Russian politics and brought an end to the quest for a new strategy in Russian politics in the 21st century. Their insights have solidified the importance of the Russian civilisation concept and its integration into the political discourse in Russia. As a result, Russia has found a sense of direction and purpose rooted in its historical and cultural identity.

Keywords: Russia, Russian civilisation, Danilevskii, Putin, Russian foreign policy

Öz

SSCB’nin dağılmasının ardından, Sovyet döneminin ideoloji temelli siyasetinin yerine Rusya Federasyonu için yeni bir strateji arayışı, Sovyet sonrası dönemde kilit bir konu haline gelmiştir. 1990’larda Rus siyaseti, tutarlı ve etkili bir strateji bulma mücadelesi verirken kendini kargaşa içinde buldu. Bu çalışmanın odak noktasını, kargaşa döneminde ve Vladimir Putin sonrasında ortaya atılan kavramsal öneriler, tartışmalar ve Soğuk Savaş’ın sona ermesinden bu yana Rus dış politikasında yaşanan dönüşüm oluşturmaktadır. Putin’in liderliğinde Rus medeniyeti kavramının yükselişi, çağdaş Rus siyasetinin şekillenmesinde önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Danilevskii ve Leontyev gibi önde gelen Rus düşünürlerin fikirlerinden ilham alan Başkan Putin, bu düşünürlerin fikirlerinde işe yarar argümanlar bulmuştur. Bu düşünürlerin felsefelerinden, bakış açılarından faydalanarak Putin, Rus siyasetinin karmaşıklığı içinde yol alabilmiş ve 21. yüzyılda Rus siyasetinde yeni bir strateji arayışına son verebilmiştir. Rus filozofların fikirleri çağdaş Rus medeniyeti kavramının güncellik kazanmasına ve ülkenin siyasi söylemine entegre edilmesine yardımcı olmuştur. Sonuç olarak Rusya, kökleri tarihi ve kültürel kimliğine dayanan bir yön ve amaç duygusu bulmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rusya, Rus Medeniyeti, Danilevskii, Putin, Rus dış politikası

1 Corresponding Author: Osman Tekin, MGIMO University, Institute for International Studies, Moscow, Russia.
E-mail: osmantkn.13@gmail.com ORCID: 0000-0001-5989-1408

To cite this article: Tekin, O. (2024). End of the quest: rising “Russian civilisation” concept in russian politics. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 33(2), 241–260. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2024.33.1430860>



Introduction

The governance of foreign policy by states depends on several factors, such as history, social values, civilisation and ideology. States generally use a combination of external and internal factors to direct their foreign policy strategies (Kosolapov, 1999). Russian politics and foreign policy contain some aspects of the history, traditions, and values of Russian civilisation. In recent history, Russian politics has experienced dramatic transformations in its structure, such as; imperial strategy of the Russian Empire, the ideology-based politics of the USSR, and the complicated structure and quest for strategy in the foreign-policy sphere of the Russian Federation. Although Russia has developed different state structures in the last 300 years, the transfer of strategic thought has continued in fundamental aspects. The Soviet Union was founded during a revolution against the Russian imperial regime, but it had carried the traces of some nationalist and imperialist foreign-policy strategies of the imperial regime over time. Finally, the Russian Federation also adopted and implemented some foreign policy strategies from both the imperial and Soviet periods, although not in the same way but with different interpretations.

The Russian Federation has become on the world stage by inheriting a state culture that has been undisputed as one of the leading actors in international relations for the last three hundred years. As a historical and social consciousness, this fact has taken place among ordinary citizens and governmental elites in Russia. This fact stood out as one of the most important factors shaping the political stance and foreign policy of the new Russian state. On the other hand, another historical fact is the special place of European civilisation in Russian social and political values. Organic and subsequently formed ties with Europe are undeniable in Russian history. Andrei Pavel Tsygankov views the European and distinct civilisation structure of the Russian state as historical dualism, which emphasises Russian European and Asian structures in its culture (Tsygankov, 2016). Consequently, historical dualism has always existed since the establishment of the Russian Empire under the leadership of Peter I. In this respect, this historical dualism, which exists in Russian history, forms the basis for domestic and foreign policy debates on the determination of a new political stance and foreign policy understanding of Russia, which has emerged as a new actor in international relations as the heir of the Soviet Union. This leads us to understand and analyse conceptual discussions on Russian politics since the 1990s, to understand Russian politics and evaluate Russian aspirations in the post-Cold War period.

The confusion and quest to adjust the new Russian policy entailed the accumulation of several concepts on the basis of modernist and civilisations suggestions. The core of this study will be shaped by conceptual suggestions, discussions, and its journey from the Atlanticist liberal approach to the Russian civilisation concept in Russian politics since the end of the Cold War. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and abandonment of communist ideology as a form of government and foreign policy strategy have raised a famous question for the new Russian state; what is the Russian Federation? What will be the new political stance and foreign policy strategy of Russia? What types of approaches or philosophy will be included in the new Russian foreign policy strategy? The Russian quest to determine the main directions of a new comprehensive political stance and strategy has contained a quest to respond to these questions. In this study, firstly, what kinds of approaches that have become predominant in Russian politics. Then, as the main

topic of this research, we will examine how the Russian civilisation concept has advanced and ended this quest in Russian politics under the leadership of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.

Conceptual Discussions in the Russian Politics throughout 1990s

The non-ideological structure of the new Russian state has confused the construction of a new stance of Russia. The new state had to deal with structural political, economic, social, and security crises. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the modern Russian state and society have experienced the stress of possible disintegration within the Russian Federation, leading to a sense of disorientation and division in terms of worldview. The most significant weakness of Russian society and its political culture has been the absence of a nation-state identity throughout its history. (Nikonov, 2020) To find proper ways to overcome this state of mind, Russia had to decide which policy should be implemented on internal and external issues.

The first decade of the Russian Federation has seen many debates, arguments, concepts, and theoretical approaches to find the most appropriate strategy for Russia. From a theoretical perspective, idealism/liberalism/neoliberalism (Zagorski & Slobin & Solodovnik & Khrustalev, 1992), realism and neorealism (Kosolapov, 2002; Kulagin, 2002), procommunism (Zyuganov, 1995; Tsipko, 1996; Sakwa, 1998; Flikke, 1999), and right radical approaches (Barygin, 1995; Kuzmin 2007; Belenkin 1997) were used by political scientists and political figures to explain the new stance of the Russian Federation. In addition, several concepts such as Atlanticism, peaceful coexistence, pluralism, Eurasianism, pragmatism, multipolarity, *derjavnost/derjavniki*, civilised Eurasia, and slavophile arguments were laid down by Russian scholars throughout this period (Sergunin, 2016). Debates on these theoretical and conceptual explanations of the new Russian political stance also contained discussions on a new Russian foreign policy strategy. Throughout the 1990s, some of these conceptual and theoretical approaches dominated each other through the effects of internal and external factors. First, liberal-neoliberal approaches and atlanticism concept had become predominant position (Bogaturov, 2017). Then, realist/neorealist approaches and Eurasianism, *derjavnost*, *veliki dermal* (great power), pragmatism, multi-polarity, and pluralism concepts reached a peak with the rise of Yevgeny Primakov, Sergei Stankevich, and Gennady Zyuganov in Russian politics (Sergunin, 2016). Isolationist, slavophile and civilised Eurasia concepts also grew in this period (Zeleneva, 2023). At the end, the insufficiency of one-sided theoretical and conceptual perspectives entailed increasing constructivist, liberal constructivist theoretical approaches with pragmatic, statist modernisation and pluralist concepts-based strategies during the first term of the presidency of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin (Tsygankov, 2016).

Russia's post-Soviet endeavours initiated a process reminiscent of the intellectual debates of the 19th century before the Bolshevik Revolution in the early 20th century. In the 19th century, there had been philosophical debate about Russia's mission, ideals, and character, emphasising modernist/pro-western and conservative/Russian civilisation. In the post-Soviet era, the pre-Soviet era of empires was no longer in effect, and the international system generally embraced the nation-state structure. However, as Nikonov

highlights, Russia had no prior experience of the nation-state structure, nor had it been a part of its political culture. During the Soviet era, any notion that emphasised the Russian identity and concept was rejected, and therefore, Russia did not know how to build a state in the post-Soviet era. This led to a practical re-ignition in Russian politics in the 1990s when the intellectual debate over what Russia was like in the 19th century. This led to a struggle for supremacy in Russia in the 1990s between Atlanticist and liberal views, which viewed Russia as part of European civilisation, or should be part of it, conservative and nationalist views, and Eurasianist, nationalist, and civilisationist views, which argued for the uniqueness of Russian civilisation. At the core of all this turmoil and the struggle for supremacy was the aim to give post-Soviet Russia an identity, ideal, and mission.

Towards the end of the 18th century and throughout the 19th century, discussions revolved around whether Russia was part of Europe, opposed to Europe, or constituted a civilisation distinct from Europe, at the centre of philosophical, historical, linguistic, and literary studies. Leading these debates were philosophers, writers, and intellectuals such as Aleksandr Radishchev, Nikolai Karamzin, Pyotr Chaadaev, Nikolai Danilevskii, Konstantin Leontyev, Alexei Khomyakov, Aleksandr Pushkin, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and Vladimir S. Solovyov, who championed pro-Western/liberal, nationalist, Pan-Slavic, and Eurasianist ideas (Narochnitskaya, 2005)

Modernist and Westernist Conceptualizations of Russian Politics

Liberal modernist and westernism ideas seem to have started with Alexander Radishchev, educated in the French Enlightenment and atheism, who emphasised compassion and humanity. Liberals were in significant numbers in the ranks of Westerners who resented serfdom, autocracy, bureaucracy, backwardness, and ignorance and called for Britain and France to follow their example (Nikonov, 2021). Pyotr Chaadaev was a pioneer of this Westernist ideas of Russian intellectuals.

Pyotr Chaadaev's Philosophical Letters, originally published in French in 1831 and the first of which was published in Russia in 1836 in the journal *Teleskop*, according to Andrzej Walicki, known for his studies on Russian history and philosophy, have an importance that initiated intellectual debates in Russia in the 19th century (Walicki, 2014). In his six Philosophical Letters, Chaadaev discussed Europe, Russia, faith, and the development of societies (Chaadaev, 1969). In the only letter published in Russia, Chaadaev argued that European society stood out as an advanced civilisation compared to Russia and served humanity, whereas Russia had no development or accumulation that contributed to humanity either in its history or at that time (Chaadaev, 1969). Studies and discourses against the ideas put forward by Chaadaev, who was declared a "maniac" and kept under house arrest by the order of Emperor Nicholas I after his article was published in *Teleskop*, also contributed to the intellectual development of conservative and nationalist ideas in Russia (Nikonov, 2021).

However, the Westernisation policies that had begun in Russia under Peter the Great and peaked under Catherine the Great in the 18th century gave way to more conservative and nationalist policies under Nicholas I in the 19th century. The restriction of Chaadaev by the Emperor himself, the closure of the *Telescope* journal, in which the first of his Philosophical Letters was published, and the exile of its editor to Siberia led to a process in which Nicholas I was personally involved (Walicki, 2014). During the reign of Nicholas

I, rather than Russia becoming a part of European civilisation, the concept of Russian civilisation as a distinct and unique entity and its place in the international system was more prominent in Russian politics.

The revolutionary constitutional ideas that emerged after the French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars did not allow Russia to completely isolate itself from the political developments in Europe. On the other hand, Russia did not intend to completely isolate itself from the developments in Europe. During the reign of Alexander II, serfdom was abolished in 1861, and some constitutional arrangements were made under the monarchy (Riasanovsky, 2019). These developments, however, were not implemented in Russia due to the dominance of liberal or Westernist ideas but by political authority following common intellectual and social demands. Nevertheless, the intellectual debate on liberal or Westernist ideas led by Radischev and Chaadaev in terms of the development of Russian politics played an important role in the partial modernisation of Russia in the 19th century.

In the 20th century, Westernist and liberal ideas in Russia evolved into the development of revolutionary and socialist ideas among Russian intellectuals. This process was led by Alexander Herzen and the "Narodniks", of which he was a part, which emphasised socialist ideas and included many members of the Russian intelligentsia. The Narodniks, who also participated in the process leading up to the Bolshevik Revolution, developed socialist views based on intellectual debates that desired Western modernisation, just like liberals (Nikonov, 2021). Another prominent name in this process with respect to Herzen was Vissarion Belinsky (Riasanovsky, 2005). During the Soviet period, which was based on Russian socialism and communist ideology established after World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution, liberal ideas did not gain significant ground.

However, the Soviet political model has undergone dramatic changes throughout the last years of the union. Gorbachev was the leader of that historical change in the Soviet political structure and foreign policy strategy, which had severely contained attempts to re-integrate with the West and provided openness to the Soviet political structure to show its goodwill and sincerity to the Western alliance. Gorbachev's policy conceptualised as "New Thinking" that included great shifts from the classical Soviet nationalist-communist approach.

Symptomatically, New Thinking was not quite new, if it was influenced by American neoliberal interdependence theories. Gorbachev's and Yakovlev's foreign policy advisers, such as Nikolai Kosolapov and Georgi Shakhnazarov, read Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane Transnational Relations and World Politics (1971) applied its basic assumptions to designing the foreign-policy speeches of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. (Tsygankov & Tsygankov, 1999, p. 48)

However, Gorbachev's manoeuvres had included equal partnership and sincerity to end ideologic conflicts between poles. As a successor to Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin also began his career, as the last President of RSFSR and the first President of the Russian Federation, to pursue and improve integration with the Western political system with the ideas of Gorbachev about counting Russia as an equal partner in the new world order.

Modernisers place the emphasis on Russia's imperatives of modernisation and associate civilisation with modern human achievements. This approach tends to adjust Russian

cultural values to those of the West, evaluating the West as the pioneer of modernity or the most proper and progressive civilisation in the contemporary world. This means the returning European roots of the Russian Empire which institutionalised with great reforms in the 18th century. In this sense, Modernisers have consistently supported Russia's strong integration with European-Atlantic economic, political, and even security institutions. Throughout the first years of the Russian Federation, President Boris Yeltsin and his ministers and advisers like Andrey Kozyrev, Yegor Gaidar, and Anatoly Chubais thought that the best way to salvage Russia and resolve the tough problems was to form strategic partnerships and cooperate with Western institutions and adapt the West-type state structure and market as soon as possible. (Bogaturov, 2017)

...the new Russian leaders saw their country as an organic part of Western civilisation, whose "genuine" Western identity was hijacked by Bolsheviks and the Soviet system. (Tsygankov, 2007, p. 383)

Prominent historians and philosophers, such as Vasili Klyuchevski and Pavel Milyukov, have argued that the evolution of the Russian Empire is not the same as that of European states, but it would be experienced in a similar process to reach civilised state and society (Tsygankov, 2007). In this respect, practises of the neo-liberal theory were implemented due to its fame as a well-suited approach in the new world order for all states in the world after the end of the Cold War.

The Modernist/Westernist coalition in Russia completely advocated the superiority of the Western capitalist system. In addition to liberal-minded leadership, intellectuals, and human rights activists, the coalition contained some figures from the Communist nomenklatura. By the leadership of the Yeltsin, members of the new elite desired to resolve successfully the problems of the Russian state, but solving these structural problems in the short term was unrealistic. Their aspirations mostly included rapid economic and political change that would provide Russian political and economic standards at the same level as those of the European-Atlantic bloc. Modernisers thought the "Western victory" at the end of the Cold War would direct societies and states to prefer a Western-type liberal and capitalist new world order that would be the sole way for the development of states. In this context, Russia would have solved all its major structural problems in the political, economic, and social spheres with the help of the Western institutions like International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Rutland, 2013). Furthermore, European and American banks also provided credits and loans to Russia to establish its market economy with the privatisation of state institutions (Rutland, 2013). This Western-originated theoretical and conceptual approach to Russian policy has not been approved by Russian society. We can see this clearly when we look at the percentage of votes received by the nationalist and communist parties in the 1995 Parliamentary Elections in Russia (Russian Federation Parliamentary Chamber: Gossudarstvennaya Duma, 1995). Under the leadership of Gennady Zyuganov, the Communist Party (KPRF) managed to increase its number of seats in the Russian National Assembly DUMA by 115 compared to the previous election, thereby securing more than one-third of the total number of seats (450). On the other hand, the Democratic Choice of Russia – United Democrats (DVR – OD), led by Yegor Gaidar, known as a pioneer of liberal and Westernist policies, lost 53 seats compared to the 1993 elections and only managed to secure 9 seats (Russian Federation Parliamentary Chamber: Gossudarstvennaya Duma, 1995).

Civilisationist/Statist Conceptualizations of Russian Politics

The Russian Empire's foreign policy approach mostly relied on an idea that included the civilisational and historical distinctiveness of Russians as the heirs of the Roman Empire and Byzantium. The French Revolution in 1789 has created two different camps in the Europe; constitutionalists and monarchists. The Russian Federation was one of the pioneers of the form of monarchy that relied on the strong leadership of Tzar and a loyal society, which was bound by its traditional values and Orthodox Christianity. Russian Emperor Nicholas I was the pioneer of the strong monarchy form (Riasanovsky, 2005). His political vision had risen with strong leadership and the preservation of orthodox values and the autocratic structure of government throughout the first half of the 19th century. However, the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922 brought about a different form of government based on communist ideology. Despite the dramatic change of the form of the government, "socialist fatherland" (Tsygankov, 2016), concept of Joseph Stalin and the nationalist vision of Nicholas I, show a common perspective in Russian foreign policy; isolation from any foreign intervention to the government style and protection of the strong state body with undeniable commitment to a strong and wise leader. In this regard, philosophical debates and quests in Russian politics, especially after the constitutionalist revolutions in Europe, have focused heavily on the identification of Russian political orientation. Nikolai Danilevskii is one of the most important scholars whose arguments are still being used by Russian academicians and officials, even by Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin (Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, 2013).

A critic of the Russian pro-Western tendency, Danilevskii stood up for internalising and cultivating Russia's indigenous institutions and its capability to progress in a different way from European civilisation. In this sense, Danilevskii could be called the first prominent figure to "systematically" counter-react to the West-centred, universalist approach and to defend the distinctiveness and uniqueness of the Russian civilisation that must be recognising as main thinking (Narochnitskaya, 2005). In this regard, his classification of civilisations as "historico-cultural types" rely on this unique feature of civilisations throughout the world. He argued that there is no civilisation (against universality claims of European civilisation) to become universal and homogenise other civilisations and cultures inside it. There are several different types of cultures, and they exchange their values and traditions throughout history. This is the richness of humanity (Danilevskii, 2011). Besides, Danilevskii was the pioneer of the argument that argued that Russia is not part of the European civilisation. Because their history is different at core; European Civilisation is the continuation of the Roman-Germanic Civilisation and Russian civilisation is the continuation of the Orthodox-Byzantium Civilisation (Danilevskii, 2011).

Danilevskii's "all humanity" (vsechelovechestvo/всечеловечество) as a distinct foreign policy concept that could be consubstantiated with the multipolarity-based politics of Russian foreign policy. This generally explains cross-cultural relations, unlike the clash of civilisation theory of Samuel Huntington. His main evaluations about interactions of civilisations were more than Samuel Huntington. In his famous book "Russia and Europe", Danilevskii argues that Slavic civilisation younger and more

energetic than European civilisation and it was still on its way to progress (Danilevskii, 2011). Christianity had already been abandoned by European civilisation, and the statist approach has emerged since the French Revolution in Europe. In this situation, Russia also has to follow policy that should be prioritised protection and integration of the Slavic people and consolidation of state power to struggle with European states in the Eurasian territory. In this regard, he proposed a tough struggle between states on foreign policy issues. (Danilevskii, 2011)

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, his renowned book “Russia and Europe” was edited and published in Russia in 1991, and its first edition had a 70.000 sales volume. It has been a handbook in Russian academic studies. (Woodburn, 2013). In recent Russian academic studies, the most well-known Eurasianist, nationalist, or Slavophil thinkers, such as Gennady Zyuganov, Natalya Narochnitskaya, Andrey Kortunov, and Alexander Dugin, have been dramatically affected by the ideas of Danilevskii, and they do not deny the importance of the ideas of Danilevskii for the current Eurasianist approach (Tsygankov, 2017). Andrey Pavel Tsygankov, a prominent scholar on Russian foreign-policy studies, emphasised the importance of the ideas of Danilevskii to Russian thinkers like Vadim Tsymbursky, Gennady Zyuganov, and Natalia Narochnitskaia. He highlights their praise to the arguments of Danilevskii about Russian civilisation concept in their studies (Tsygankov, 2017).

To sum up, Danilevskii’s philosophy mostly focused on the priority of Russian national and traditional values over Russian policy and the unique structure of Russian civilisation. In the end, this discussion ended because of the rise of communist ideology to the throne of the Russian Empire. Although the communist ideology in the USSR was divergent, discussions over the Western and unique roots of Russian identity and Russian civilisation have continued infrequently throughout Soviet rule on Russian land. “World Revolution” and “living together in peace” Marxist understanding of the Vladimir I. Lenin’s and the “Communism in one nation” strategy of Joseph Stalin even contained parts of the chronic identity and civilisation debates in Russian history. Furthermore, after the death of Stalin, the structure of Russian relations with “Other (West)” became a question that emerged in Soviet history. The abandonment of Stalinist policy caused the essence of the reshaping of Russian policy towards the West and the rest. In the 1970s, Lev Gumilev, a well-known historian and anthropology expert, an exponent of Eurasianist ideas in the USSR, was also inspired by the philosophy of Danilevskii. Gumilev also claimed that European civilisation distinct culture and it is not compatible with Russian civilisation. Therefore, it should not be mixed with Russian civilisation (Bassin, 2016). Pre-Russian Federation period, civilisationist and nationalist concepts and arguments were shaped as stated above in brief. Accumulation of the concepts of that approach has inspired ideas of post-Soviet civilisationist and nationalist new approaches in Russian politics.

The main problem with the Russian Federation during the post-Soviet period was the clear explanation of “what is Russia?” What is its mission and place in the new world? What are the ideals of the new Russian state?”. In his renowned study “The Clash of Civilisations”, Samuel P. Huntington classified the Russian Federation as one of the “torn country” with Turkey and Mexico. (Huntington, 1993) prescribed the “torn country” concept as a nation that “has a single predominant culture which places it in one

civilisation, but its leaders want to shift it to another civilisation.” (Huntington, 1993) Reforms of Peter the Great in Russia and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey could be given as examples of this. While the definition of Huntington has been a controversial issue, growing Russian identity discussions after the dissolution of the USSR have always been a real case. Russian European identity and the unique structure of its roots have been contesting whether one identity can overcome another. The last period of the USSR and the first years of the Russian Federation had met that need.

From an Eurasianist and conservative perspective, the answer to that question is clear; Russia is a unique civilisation with its European and Asian roots and multi-ethnic/multi-religion structure, which has been governed by consolidated executive power like the regime in Tzarist/Imperialist Russian times. In this sense, there should not be any confusion about what Russia is about or its character. Slavophil arguments also share similar approaches, with some exceptions (Hughes, 2000). In some resources, the Slavophil approach in the 20th and 21st centuries has also been classified from an Eurasianist perspective. However, they were separated from each other by the modern, democrat, or new Eurasianist perspective and radical Eurasianist perspective (Walicki, 1975). The main separation between Slavophil arguments and modern Eurasianists is civilisation. According to Slavophiles, Russia is neither European nor Asian state. She has its unique civilisation and must isolate herself from the European civilisation to protect its uniqueness. Distinctive discourses on the Russian state and civilisation have also been used by Neocommunist and right radical components of the Russian state and society. The main and common arguments in this regard are sovereignty, self-sufficiency, and self-limitation when using one’s own resources (Tsygankov & Tsygankov, 1999)

At the end of the USSR, Russians’ main expectations from the drastic transformation of the state structure were the resolution of economic collapse and poor living conditions. However, unlike the recovery of the structural problems of the Russian state, predomination by the wild capitalist, neoliberal Atlanticist approach has caused a worsening of the conditions of society. Furthermore, the loss of the great power statue of the Russian state and Western attitude towards the Russian state and the Russian statue as defeated, weak, and needy were perceived by most of the Russian people as humiliation of Russia by the West (Trenin, 2006). Immediate and disproportional integration of Western values with ignorance of Russian traditional and civilisational values met counter-reaction from society, security, and political elites.

Throughout the first years of the 1990s until the anti-Yeltsin Parliament case in 1993, some radical right groups like Memory of the Nation (Pamiat Naroda - память народа) and the National Salvation Front (Front Natsionalnogo Spasenia - Фронт национального спасения) had emerged in Russian politics. These groups also had some supporters in parliament, but their influence in Russian politics had diminished sharply after the parliament shelling incident in 1993 (Blakkisrud, 2022). However, counter-reactions of these groups to Westernist/Modernist perceptions during the first years of the new Russian politics with the predominance of liberal perceptions established by Prime Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev served as Minister of Finance and then First Deputy Prime Minister, Yegor T. Gaidar drastically affected President Yeltsin’s perceptions (Arbatov, 1993). Rising nationalist and traditionalist demands from Russian society was raising in the pre-

election process. In addition, the continuation of uncertainties about the adjustment of the new Russian state flag, national march, or symbol in the post-Soviet period were also substantial issues in Russian politics in the 1990s. There was a search for a new national idea. Nikonov describes an interesting development in this search process as follows:

A special review page was opened in the government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and I was also there. (Nikonov,2021)

Boris Yeltsin issued an order to his advisors to solve these issues and create a new, consistent Russian national strategy after the 1995 parliament elections in Russia. However, their suggestions about creating a nation-state or federal multi-ethnic and multi-religion structure in Russian politics and governance were not placed in consistent and solid ground at all. However, these attempts gained national and traditional values and civilisations approaches in Russian politics and government elites. Therefore, as an opposite argument of the Western-based theoretical-conceptual approach, Eurasianist, neo-communist, Slavophil, and right radical discourses have risen with growing nationalist feelings of the society after the sharp failure of Western-supported approaches, in Russia. The victory of the communist party in the 1995 parliament elections and the appointment of Yevgeny Primakov as a foreign minister has proved that Eurasianist leaning in the Russian politics.

Throughout the last years of the 1990s, the predominance of Eurasianist, Neocommunist, and Slavophil arguments in Russian society and Russian politics has reflected and echoed the return to the imperialist policy of the Russian Empire. However, it did not correspond to the entire strategy of the Russian Empire. The Russian political stance and strategy has mainly relied on the regaining of the deserved Russian great power statue in international relations, consolidation of the integration with former Soviet republics (CIS countries), promoting the multi-polar structure of the world in the post-Cold War period, balancing the hegemony of the US by gaining cooperation with non-Western countries such as China, India, and the Muslim world, and putting forward the great history of the Russian state (Zonova & Reinhardt, 2014). Although some positive responses from society were received, these perspectives did not remedy the chronic problems of the post-Soviet Russian state. In particular, continuation of the rising economic discrepancies with the skyrocketing effect of shock therapy, the quest for new concepts, paradigms, and methods resurfaced in the Russian Federation. The concrete results of this can be seen in the fact that in the 1999 elections, the Communist Party led by G. Zyuganov, the biggest winner of the previous elections in 1995, lost 44 seats in the Duma; the party of V. Zhirinovskiy, the leader of the nationalist wing, lost 34 seats, and Y. Primakov's reputation in Russian politics came to an end (Russian Federation: Parliamentary Elections Gossovudarstvennaya Duma, 1999). New figures like Sergei Shoigu's Unity Party (was supported by Yeltsin and Putin) and unknown independent candidates took 178 of the 450 seats in Duma. That was the clear prove of the quest of the society for new figures and approaches in Russian politics. The lack of new political figures was also one of the main problems for Russia's salvation in this ideological and structural turmoil.

The gradual shift from the idealist/liberal paradigm to the Eurasianist/realist approach has contained several internal and external factors. However, the change and emergence of Russian policy cannot be separated from the expectations and sensitivities of Russian

society and Russian statuses in international relations (Tsygankov, 2022). Throughout the last decade of the 20th century, Russian political stance and foreign policy strategy were in a complicated situation and that had entailed the destabilisation of the Russian politics for both of the internal and external cases. It might be called a “try and fail” method, which involves a reflexive and uncertain strategy that generally shows itself with critical changes and unpredictable turns. Therefore, none of these theoretical and conceptual approaches could not explain and direct Russian politics throughout the 1990s. Because Russian political, economic, and social problems are still ongoing. Russia’s political, economic, and social problems continue. Following the economic crisis in 1999, living standards in the country had plummeted, and NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia against Russian opposition and without UN Security Council approval had dealt a major blow to Russia’s “great power” narrative. In addition, the most important issue was that Russia’s identity, mission, and ideals in the new world order had not yet been established on a concrete basis. Leading Russian intellectuals, such as Yuriy Mamleev (Mamleev, 2020), Andrei Kokoshin (Kokoshin, 2012), Vyacheslav Nikonov (Nikonov, 2014, 2019) and Vadim Medzhuev (Medzhuev, 2001) argued that the Russian people must first be convinced of a mission and ideals. If the Russians are convinced of this, they will have the wisdom to endure all kinds of economic and political difficulties.

The Ascendancy of Vladimir V. Putin’s Impact on Russian Politics

The predominance of any specific conceptual and theoretical perspective on Russian policy has led to the need for new perspectives that can ensure the sustainability and stability of the Russian state across all spheres. Andrei P. Tsygankov, a well-known Russian scholar, has conducted extensive research on post-Soviet Russian studies. According to Tsygankov, one of the main reasons for the failure of liberal and realist perspectives and concepts in Russian foreign policy is the lack of a comprehensive approach to critical issues within the field of new Russian studies, as well as a misinterpretation of the aspirations of Russian society. The dominance of any singular perspective often results in a lack of well-rounded arguments that consider contrasting ideas (Tsygankov, 2022). In this context, it became necessary to establish more comprehensive and robust perceptions and concepts to foster a consistent political understanding and form of governance. The late 1990s witnessed the continuation of the crisis in the post-Soviet era. Under these circumstances, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was appointed Prime Minister by President Yeltsin, and subsequently, on 31 December 1999, Boris Yeltsin resigned in his traditional New Year’s speech as the Russian President. Russia held presidential elections on March 26, and then President Vladimir V. Putin served as the second president of the Russian Federation.

Interestingly, one day before Boris Yeltsin’s resignation, Putin’s article titled “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium” was published in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, a renowned Russian newspaper. The article outlined Putin’s perceptions and approaches, which largely focused on the unity of Russia’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious population under the rubric of a strong Russian state (Putin, 1999). Vladimir Putin’s personal trajectory offered some indication of his potential nationalist inclinations. However, he also expressed certain some Westernist positions, such as advocating for strong cooperation with Western powers and highlighting the European roots of Russia during his speech in the Bundestag

of the Federal Republic of Germany in 2001. Putin's stance on cooperation with the West depended on the principle of equal and reliable partnership.

Within the Russian political landscape, Putin's political vision and career took various approaches. This presents an opportunity to establish consistent political methods for the Russian Federation both domestically and in foreign affairs. The key to resolving existing problems and restoring Russia's reputation is the creation of a systematic working system. This study argues that a systematic approach involves a clear and proper definition of current problems in order of importance, identification of the most suitable solutions, and successful implementation of those solutions. While theory-based organisational models in the social sciences affect the rule of a state, like in the communist ideology-based regime era under the USSR, the systematic working style in Russian politics under Putin primarily focused on rational and pragmatic solutions (Afanasieva & Bitieva, 2019). These solutions were often based on threat perceptions, consolidating central administrative power, and addressing economic issues during his first eight years in the Kremlin. The need for a systematic political vision emerged from the failures of attempts to develop paradigm-based policies throughout the 1990s. The prevalence of conflicting modernist and civilisationist concepts and approaches intensified the consequences of the USSR's disintegration rather than remedying them. Various theoretical and practical forms were attempted within short intervals of less than 10 years, resulting in the emergence of new chaotic problems.

The new government, led by Vladimir Putin, has primarily focused on correct diagnosis of Russia's problems. The priority was to resolve national values, the anthem, and identity for the satisfaction of Russian society. The reintroduction of the double-headed eagle from the Byzantine Empire as the symbol of the Russian army and the USSR anthem as the Russian national anthem with updated lyrics came to the fore (Baker & Glasser, 2005). Second, the Russian language and culture acquired a global and regional mission, especially in the field of post-Soviet geography. In this context, the Rosstrudnichestvo organisation was founded in 2008, and its work was initiated to promote and teach Russian language and culture abroad (Portal gosudarstvennykh uslug Rossiyskoy Federatsii - Портал государственных услуг Российской Федерации).

Third, the multi-ethnic and multi-religious heterogeneous structure of Russia has been analysed and care has been taken to ensure that no ethnic or religious identity is subjected to positive or negative discrimination in politics and social life. In Putin's articles, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* contains this sensitive issue. Fourth, the sanctity of the concepts of sovereignty and independence is emphasised. In the 1990s, Russia failed to implement its national budget in Duma without approval from the IMF due to joint economic programmes (Nikonov, 2014). Therefore, one of the first things that the Putin administration did in its first two terms was to reassert its economic freedom and sovereignty by settling its IMF debts earlier than planned in 2006 (Sakwa, 2007). In addition to economic freedom, the perception of political sovereignty based on strong military power and historical victories was also brought to the fore, and victory against the Nazis in World War II, also known as the Great Patriotic War, was considered a symbol of national pride and sovereignty (Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii - Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации, 2023).

Fifth, under Putin’s administration, the problem of population declines in Russia and the need to restore the Orthodox Church’s reputation in the eyes of the public at an institutional level have been observed. In this context, with the law enacted in 2007 on population, child incentives and allowances were put into effect, and the political and traditional reputation of the Russian Patriarchate was acknowledged, and the political and social realm was given to turn it into one of the unifying elements of Russian society that has existed throughout history. Finally, regarding the debates about the construction of the current regime and political values in Russia, Vladimir Putin emphasised in 2005 that Russia should find its own path through its own values and history to build a democratic, free, and fair society in the Russian Federation (Poslaniye Federal’nomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii - Послание Федеральному Собранию Российской Федерации, 2005). During this period, Vladislav Surkov, one of Vladimir Putin’s advisers, also claimed that Russia could develop its own understanding of democracy around the sovereign state authority and put forward the concept of “sovereign democracy” (Krastev, 2006).

Furthermore, one of Vladimir Putin’s significant achievements, along with his colleagues during his first term, was the development of a presidential programme that appealed to both elites and ordinary citizens. This programme involved synthesising existing concepts and paradigms that emerged in the 1990s. For instance, while emphasising Russia’s European identity for modernisation and integration with the West, Putin also highlighted the unique structure of Russian culture, which encompasses various ethnic and religious elements. Additionally, Putin defined the status of the new Russian state as a “normal great power” (Tsygankov, 2007). Indeed, Putin’s approach corresponded to the desires of Westernist/Modernist elites who supported integration and cooperation with the West, as well as his aspirations to be recognised as a “Great Power” by using the term “normal” to define Russia. This appeal to the concept of a great power also resonated with ordinary Russian citizens and statist/civilisationist elites, expressing their national pride and attachment to Russia’s historical identity (“Memory and Pride”, 2020).

Strengthening the Concept of “Russian Civilisation” in Political Discourse

After the 2012 presidential election, Vladimir Putin reclaimed the presidential seat he held from Dmitry Medvedev. An analysis of Putin’s final days in his initial years in the Kremlin, as well as some developments during Medvedev’s presidency, can help us understand the reasons and aspirations behind the rise and consolidation of Russian civilisation in Russian politics. The Russian presidential election occurred amid various local, regional, and global events. These included massive protests in Russian cities against the government’s rule, allegations of fraud in the Duma (Russian Parliament) elections, the Arab Spring, NATO’s controversial intervention in Libya, and disagreements with the West regarding the new European security concept and the continued enlargement of NATO and the EU.

Throughout his presidency from 2000 to 2008, Putin’s Russia has mainly tried to adopt a non-aggressive policy towards the West and focused on consolidating sustainable economic development and central power. He also sought pragmatic cooperation with Western powers in certain areas and established new partnerships with non-Western states and organisations. Russia could not pose itself against globalisation trend in material

sphere, unlike ideational trends (Safranchuk & Lukyanov, 2021a). However, this does not mean that he had never voiced Russian grievances regarding Western politics. Especially globalisation trend in the ideational sphere for the promotion of neoliberal values has become the centre for Russian counter-stance towards US-leading Western powers. This ideational resistance of Russia has come forward for Russian desires regarding a transition to a multipolar world order from the US-led unipolar world order (Safranchuk & Lukyanov, 2021b). Therefore, in the last years of his second term, Putin has begun to adopt a more assertive stance towards the West, embracing nationalist, realist, and security-based policies in the field of foreign policy. This shift was characterised by increased investments in the defence industry, the promotion of Russian national and traditional values on both domestic and regional scales, following the creation and consolidation of non-Western regional and global initiatives like BRICS, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the delivery of notable speeches criticising Western attitudes towards Russia. One prominent example is Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, where he expressed strong opposition to the US-led Western centric unipolar world order, NATO expansion, and Western violations of state sovereignty and international law in favour of its interests and concerns (Выступление И Дискуссия На Мюнхенской Конференции По Вопросам Политики Безопасности, 2007). An understanding of Putin's critics and concretisation of theoretical Russian resistance towards the US-led Western hegemony might be observed in Russian attempts for leading BRICS with organising first ministerial and extended agendas in 2006 and 2009 in Russia (Denisov & Kazantsev & Lukyanov & Safranchuk, 2019).

If we analyse Putin's first eight years as the Russian President, one of his main goals can be seen as reaffirming Russia's position and status as a European great power. However, his beliefs and mindset began to change at the beginning of 2008 due to reasons mainly outlined above, despite his support for Dmitry Medvedev, who was perceived as having a more Western-oriented and liberal policy approach, during the presidential elections in March. This development has generally been interpreted as Putin's last attempt to give the West a chance to shape Russian position in cooperation with Western powers. However, during his subsequent four years as prime minister, he also tried to strike a balance with Medvedev's rule.

Before his first presidential term, Putin wrote another article that was published in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* two months before the 2012 presidential elections (Putin, 2012). This article focused on various issues, including the multi-ethnic and multi-religious nature of Russian society and the concept of Russian identity. Putin expressed concern about the potential rise of ethnic nationalist aspirations, even if they were based on Russian ethnicity.

During the run-up to the 2012 presidential election, the most prominent national security challenges for Russia were as follows:

- Internal and external migration and the risk of increasing ethnic Russian nationalism.
- The potential threat posed by radical Islamic movements, which have been

gaining momentum during the Arab Spring in the Middle East. There was concern that these movements could pose a threat to Russian territories and neighbouring regions.

- The apprehension that the Arab Spring movements might extend to Russian territories, potentially serving as a new colour revolution threat.

These issues were significant considerations during that period.

In the midst of these circumstances, highlighting Russian identity as a diverse, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious society and preserving its traditions within a changing world became a paramount political issue for the Russian state under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. At the end of 2013, Putin delivered an annual speech at the Valdai Club, where one of the main outcomes was the need to move away from the idea of Russia as the successor of the USSR and instead embrace the concept of Russian civilisation as the guiding principle of Russian strategy.

During his speech, Putin acknowledged the rapidly evolving global landscape and its impact on states, societies, and cultures (Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, 2013). He emphasised the importance of developing a new strategy to safeguard Russian interests, values, traditions, and the diverse nature of Russian society. In this context, he introduced the concept of the “state-civilisation,” drawing on the arguments of Russian philosophers and authors such as Nikolai Danilevskii, Konstantin Leontyev and Fyodor Dostoyevsky. These thinkers provided insights into the character of the Russian state and its harmonious relationship with Russian society. Overall, Putin’s aim was to assert Russia’s unique identity and position in the world while adapting to the challenges and changes in the contemporary international system and the new character of the Russian state. (Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, 2013).

Indeed, with the onset of the Ukrainian crisis at the end of 2013, Russia’s stance became more aggressive, protective, and firm. The gradual deterioration of Russian-US relations after NATO’s beyond authorised intervention to Libya and the end of the reset policy between them in 2012 has served as catalyst for adoption of civilisation-based politics in domestic and foreign affairs by Russia (Safranchuk, 2018). Colour revolutions, NATO enlargement, and the potential membership of Ukraine and Georgia in NATO have not been viewed as national security concerns by Russia. They have consistently been seen as threats to the erosion of the Russian civilisation in Eurasia. While Huntington expected a clash of civilisations in his well-known article, he did not anticipate the emergence of the Russian civilisation concept. From the Russian perspective, Western policy towards Russia also has perceived Russia from this perspective, and it has been one of the reasons for their reckless, irrational, and pervasive approach towards Russia since the end of the Cold War.

As a result, the Russian civilisation concept has significantly influenced security approaches in Russian politics, particularly following the Ukrainian crisis. Russia has adopted a tough and assertive political stance in its neighbouring regions and has actively sought to reshape certain aspects of the international order with the aim of creating a more balanced and multipolar structure. Examples of this include the annexation or in Russian context “accession” of Crimea, Russia’s involvement in Syria and various conflicts in

the Middle East, the deepening of ties with China and other emerging powers, and the establishment of clear red lines in the name of national security and the protection of national and traditional values against external interventions. Instead of continuing the quest for political stance, identity, and mission of Russia in the post-Soviet period, the Russian decision to follow strategy that centred Russian civilisation concepts and values entailed a more decisive and assertive foreign policy understanding, which is summarised above.

In a 2021 article published on the Kremlin's website, Vladimir Putin made statements that were interpreted by different parties. Some perceived it as reflecting Russia's emergence of imperialist desires, while others argued that Putin was emphasising the historical ties and common values between Russia and Ukraine. Putin highlighted the unique structure of Russian civilisation and its historical connections with Ukraine and Belarus. He also claimed that Ukraine and Belarus were part of the same Russian state civilisation and should be reunited (Putin, 2021). This signalled a more assertive Russian political attitude and a stronger protectionist attitude against Western involvement in Russia's neighbouring regions.

Russia provided similar signals before the pro-Western protests in Ukraine emerged in 2013. However, Western disregard for Russian aspirations, combined with the growing Russian assertiveness, eventually led to Russia's large-scale military intervention in Ukraine. In his well-known speech on February 24, 2022, just before the intervention, Putin highlighted the erosion of the Russian civilisation in "Russian historical lands" and the vulnerabilities faced by Russian people beyond Russia's borders as some of the most significant threats to Russia (Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 2022). The instrumentalization of the Russian civilisation concept has generally corresponded to a more assertive policy and new aspirations in Russian politics. The direct state-to-state conflicts in Ukraine cannot be seen merely as an issue of identity; they encompass various complex factors.

Indeed, the concept of "Крепость Россия - Крепость Россия" (Russian fortress) was derived from the studies of Konstantin Leontyev and has gained prominence in Russian discourse. This concept was invoked by Sergei Karaganov, a notable Russian scholar, in his explanations of the Ukrainian Crisis. Karaganov argued that the conflict in Ukraine represents a confrontation between Western liberal civilisation and Russian Orthodox civilisation. He defined Russia as the last fortress protecting the national traditional values of Orthodox Christianity, asserting that the preservation of Russian civilisation was crucial for the moral progress of humanity ("Крепость Россия". Skol'ko Let Prodlitsya Konfrontatsiya s Zapadom? – "Крепость Россия". Сколько Лет Продлится Конфронтация С Западом?, 2022).

These new concepts and perceptions help to explain the underlying logic of Russian politics in the 21st century. Attempting to understand Russian politics solely through concepts originating from the West will hinder a comprehensive understanding of its motives and strategies. The emergence of these concepts reflects the distinct perspective and aspirations of the Russian state and its role in preserving its cultural, religious, and historical identity.

Conclusion

The identity and mission confusion experienced in Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union reminded the intellectual debates in the 19th century of Russian history, and this reminder and intellectual accumulation played a key role in ending the quest for a new strategic mind in contemporary Russia. Although the Westernist/modernist and Civilisationist/conservative debates that took place in the 1990s were weaker than the 19th century in Russia in terms of intellectual accumulation, their impact on Russian politics was more intense and short-lived due to a lack of central and undisputed authority like Russian Empire. However, the rise of Vladimir V. Putin with accurate diagnosis and effective resolution of Russian critical problems and consolidation of central power, Putin created a unique method that was formulated with the synthesis of intellectual and political discussions of the Westernist and Civilisationist arguments in Russian politics. Throughout Russia’s ongoing quest for a new strategy, the gradual rise of escalations with the West and the gain of cooperation with the rest have also been key components of this transition and transformation period in Russian politics. However, pointing out that intensifying disagreements with the West and diversifying partnerships towards the rest as the sole or most important aspect of the mounting Russian civilisation concept in Russian politics is a reductionist approach. It’s historical experiences and build ups in Russian elites and ordinary citizens must not be ignored. Therefore, some key developments on the deterioration of Russian and Western relations are mentioned in brief in this research; in order to focus historical and intellectual aspects of rising Russian civilisation concept under the leadership of Vladimir V. Putin.

This study claims that the rise of the Russian Civilisation concept in Russian politics has put an end to the search for ideals, identity, and missions in Russian politics. However, the effort to create a unique understanding of strategy, civilisation and culture through the concept of Russian civilisation is not a completed process; on the contrary, it is still in the developmental stage. Nikolai Danilevskii posited that European civilisation had reached its pinnacle following the Renaissance, Reformation and Industrial Revolution, but it had entered a period of decline marked by cultural and moral erosion. He further suggested that Russian civilisation, in contrast, was in the nascent stages of ascent and poised to achieve greatness (Danilevskii, 2011). According to civilisationist academic and political figures in Russian politics, the Bolshevik Revolution and the Soviet Era disrupted this trajectory, halting the developmental course of Russian civilisation and even regressing it under a materialist ideological framework. Nonetheless, contemporary Russia endeavours to reassert its distinct values and aspirations through tangible approaches and concepts. Thus, there is potential for a resurgence that aligns with Danilevskii’s foresight regarding the continued maturation of Russian civilisation and political thought.

Peer-review: Externally peer-reviewed.

Conflict of Interest: The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

Grant Support: The article presents the research financially supported by MGIMO University, project No. 2025-04-04.

References

«Крепость Россия». Сколько Лет Продлится Конфронтация С Западом? — Россия В Глобальной Политике. Retrieved 10 May 2023, from <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/krepost-rossiya-i-zapad/>

- Выступление и дискуссия на Мюнхенской конференции по вопросам политики безопасности (Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy). (2007, February 10). kremlin.ru. Retrieved from <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>
- Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации, утверждена Президентом Российской Федерации В.В. Путиным 31 марта 2023 года (Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, approved by the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin on March 31, 2023), <https://www.mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/1860586/>
- Портал государственных услуг Российской Федерации, <https://rs.gov.ru/about-foiv/>
- Послание Федеральному Собранию Российской Федерации (Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation), (2005). Президент России (President of Russia). Retrieved on March 15, 2024, from <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931>
- Afanasiyeva, E. V. & Bitieva, Z. R. (2019). Внешняя Политика России в Период Президентства В.В. Путина (Russia's Foreign Policy during the Presidency of V.V. Putin), *Voprosi Politologi*, 9-11(51), 2490-2495.
- Arbatov, A., (1993). Russia's foreign policy alternatives. *International Security*, 18(2), 5-43.
- Baker, P. & Glasser, S. (2005). *Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin's Russia and the End of Revolution*, Scribner; First Edition.
- Barugin I. N. (1995) Основные тенденции эволюции современных российских крайне правых // Политико-правовое устройство реформируемой России: планы и реальность. Вып. 3. СПб. (Main trends in the evolution of modern Russian far-right // Political and legal structure of reformed Russia: plans and reality. Vol. 3. St. Petersburg), p. 74-86.
- Bassin, M. (2016). *The Gumilev Mystique: Biopolitics, Eurasianism, and the Construction of Community in Modern Russia* (1st ed.). Cornell University Press.
- Belenkin B. (1997) Российские периодические издания о национал-экстремизме, 1992-1996: библиографический указатель Материалы к изучению современного национал-экстремизма (Russian Periodicals on National-Extremism, 1992-1996: Bibliographic Index Materials for the Study of Modern National Extremism) Zvenia Publication.
- Blakkisrud, H. (2022). Russkii as the New Rossiiskii? Nation-Building in Russia After 1991. *Nationalities Papers*, 51(1), 64-79.
- Bogaturov, A. D. (2017). *Международные отношения и внешняя политика России (Contemporary International Relations and Russia's Foreign Policy)*. Aspekt Press, Moscow.
- Carleton, G., (2011). History Done Right: War and the Dynamics of Triumphalism in Contemporary Russian Culture. *Slavic Review*, 70(3), 615-636.
- Chaadaev, P. (1969) *Philosophical Letters and Apology of a Madman*, Translated and Introduced by Mary-Barbara Zeldin, Knoxville, Tennessee.
- Danilevskii, N. (2011). *Rossia i Evropa, Vzglyad na Kulturnyye i Politicheskiye Otnosheniya Slavyanskogo Mira k Germano-Romanskomu (Russia and Europe, A View of the Cultural and Political Relationship of the Slavic World to the Germanic-Romanic)*. Institute of Russian Civilisation, Moscow.
- Denisov, I., Kazantsev, A., Lukyanov, F., & Safranchuk I. (2019). *Shifting the Strategic Focus of the BRICS and Great Power Competition, Strategic Analysis*.
- Flikke, G. (1999). Patriotic Left-Centrism: The Zigzags of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 51(2), 275-298.
- Fukuyama, F. (1989). The End of History? Centre for the National Interest, 18(3-18).
- Hartley, J. M. (1992). Is Russia part of Europe ? Russian Perceptions of Europe during the reign of Alexander I. *Cahiers Du Monde Russe Et Soviétique*, 33(4), 369-385.
- Hughes, M. (2000) 'State and Society in the Political Thought of the Moscow Slavophiles'. *Studies in East European Thought*, 52, 159-183.
- Huntington, S. P. (1993). The Clash of Civilisations? *Foreign Affairs*, 72(3), 22.
- Kokoshin, A. (2012). *Real'nyy Suverenitet v Sovremennoy Miropoliticheskoy Sisteme (Real Sovereignty in the Contemporary World Political System)*, *Yevropa*, <https://www.litres.ru/book/andrey-kokoshin/realnyy-suverenitet-v-sovremennoy-miropoliticheskoy-sistem-3004585/>
- Kosolapov N. A., *Контуры нового миропорядка (Contours of the New World Order)*, *Vneshnyaya politika i bezopasnost' sovremennoy Rossii. 1991-2002 (Foreign Policy and National Security of Contemporary Russia 1991-2002)*, Exe. Edit. Tatiana A. Shakleina, 4 / 93-114, Moscow, Московский Государственный Институт Международных Отношений (Университет) Мид России Российской Ассоциация Международных Исследований Ино-центр (Информация. Наука. Образование.), 2002.
- Kosolapov, N. (1999). *Analiz Vneshney Politiki: Osnovnyye Napravleniya Issledovaniy (Analysis of the Foreign Policy: the Main Research Directions) Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya*, 2, 77-85.
- Krastev, I. (2006). "Sovereign Democracy", Russian-Style. *Insight Turkey*, 8(4), 113-117.
- Kulagin, V. M., & Mir, V. XXI veke: mnogopolyusnyy balans ili global'nyy Pax Democratica? (The world in the 21st century: a multipolar balance of power or a global Pax Democratica?), *Vneshnyaya politika i bezopasnost' sovremennoy Rossii. 1991-2002 (Foreign Policy and National Security of Contemporary Russia 1991-2002)*, Exe. Edit. Tatiana A. Shakleina, 4 / 145-162, Moscow, Московский Государственный

- Институт Международных Отношений (Университет) Мид России Российская Ассоциация Международных Исследований Ино-центр (Информация. Наука. Образование.), 2002.
- Kuzmin A. (2007) Праворадикальное движение в современной России: особенности идеологии и перспективы развития. Часть 2 (Right-wing radical movement in modern Russia: peculiarities of ideology and prospects of development. Part 2), Политическая экспертиза: ПОЛИТЭК (Political Expertize: POLITEX), p. 99-109.
- Mamleev, Y. V. (2020). *Rossiya Vechnaya (Eternal Russia)*, Traditsiya Press
- Medzhuev V. (2001). *Russkaya Tsvivilizatsiya–Utopiya Ili Real'nost (Russian Civilization–Utopia or Real?)*, Edit. Khoros, V. G., & Krasilshikov, V. A. *Postindustrial'nyy Mir i Rossiya (Postindustrial World and Russia)*, Editorial URSS, Moscow, pp. 587-601.
- Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. (2013, September 19). President of Russia. <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243>
- Memory and Pride. (2020, November 5). Retrieved from <https://www.levada.ru/en/2020/11/05/memory-and-pride/>
- Narochnitskaya, N. A. (2005). *Россия и русские в мировой истории (Russia and Russians in World History)*. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 2005
- Nikonov, V. (2014). *Rossiskaya Matritsa (Russian Matrix)*, Russkoe Slovo Publication, Moscow
- Nikonov, V. (2021). *Russkaya Tsvivilizatsiya (Russian Civilisation)*, Prosveshenie Publications, 2021.
- Putin, V. V. (1999, December 30). Россия на рубеже тысячелетий. ng.ru. Retrieved from https://www.ng.ru/politics/1999-12-30/4_millenium.html?utm_source=pocket_saves
- Putin, V. V. (2012, January 23). Владимир Путин. Россия: национальный вопрос. (Vladimir Putin, V.V. “Russia: National Question” ng.ru. Retrieved from https://www.ng.ru/politics/2012-01-23/1_national.html?utm_source=pocket_saves
- Putin, V. V. (2021, July 12). Article by Vladimir Putin “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians“. Kremlin.ru. Retrieved from <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181>
- Putin, V. V. (2022). “Россия - это не просто страна, а отдельная цивилизация” (Russia is not only a contry, a Different Civilisation), Высказывания Владимира Путина. ТАСС. <https://tass.ru/info/15972421>
- Riasanovsky, N. V. (2005). *Russian Identities; A Historical Survey (New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press.*
- Riasanovsky N. V. and Steinberg M., (2019). *A History of Russia*, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press; 9th edition.
- Russian Federation Parliamentary Chamber: Gossudarstvennaya Duma. (1995, December 17). Russian Federation: parliamentary elections Gossudarstvennaya Duma, 1995. <http://archive.ipu.org/>. Retrieved from http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2263_95.htm
- Russian Federation: parliamentary elections, 1999. http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2263_99.htm
- Rutland, P. (2013). Neoliberalism in Russia. *Review of International Political Economy*, 20(2), April 2013, 332-362.
- Safranchuk, I.A. (2018). Russian-U.S. Relations: Torn between the Practical and Ideational Agendas Desperate Clash of Perceptions.” *Russia in Global Affairs* 16/4: 96-119, 2018.
- Safranchuk, I. A., & Lukyanov, F. A. (2021) Современный Мировой Порядок: Структурные Реалии И Соперничество Великих Держав (The Modern World Order: Structural Realities and Great Power Rivalries), Polis. Political Studies. 2021. No. 3. P. 57-76. (In Russian)
- Safranchuk, I. A., & Lukyanov, F. A. (2021) Современный Мировой Порядок: Адаптация Акторов К Структурным Реалиям (The Contemporary World Order: The Adaptation of Actors to Structural Realities). Polis. Political Studies. 2021. No. 4. P. 57-76. (In Russian)
- Sakwa, R. (1998) Left or right? The CPRF and the problem of democratic consolidation in Russia. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 148(1-2), 128-158.
- Sakwa, Richard (2007). *Putin: Russia's Choice*. Routledge, London.
- Sergunin, A. (2016). *Explaining Russian Foreign Policy Behaviour: Theory and Practise*. ibidem-Verlag Stuttgart.
- Trenin, D. (2006). Russia Leaves the West. *Foreign Affairs*, 85(4), 87–96.
- Tsipko, A. (1996). Why Gennady Zyuganov's Communist Party Finished First. In: *Demokratizatsiya*, 4(2), 185-199.
- Tsygankov, A. P. (2007). Finding a Civilisational Idea: “West,” Eurasia,” and “Euro-East” in Russia’s Foreign Policy. *Geopolitics*, 12(3), 375–399.
- Tsygankov, A. P. (2016). Crafting the State-Civilization Vladimir Putin’s Turn to Distinct Values. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 63(3), 146–158.
- Tsygankov, A. P. (2017). In the Shadow of Nikolai Danilevskii: Universalism, Particularism, and Russian Geopolitical Theory. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 69(4), 571–593.
- Tsygankov, A. P. (2022). *Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers; Sixth Edition, London.
- Tsygankov, A. P., and Tsygankov, P. A. (1999). Pluralism or isolation of Civilisations? Russia’s foreign policy discourse and the reception of Huntington’s paradigm of the post-cold war world. *Geopolitics*, 4(3), 47–72.
- Walicki, A. (1975). *The Slavophile Controversy (Oxford, Clarendon Press.*

- Walicki, Andrzej (2014). *The Flow of Ideas: Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to the Religious-Philosophical Renaissance, Eastern European Culture, Politics, and Societies*, Edited by Irena Grudzinska-Gross and Andrzej W. Tymowski, Volume 7, Peter Lang Edition.
- Woodburn, S. M. (2013) 'Translator's Introduction', in Danilevskii, N. Ia, *Russia and Europe: The Slavic World's Political and Cultural Relations with the Germanic-Roman West* (Bloomington, IN, Slavica).
- Zagorski A. & Zlobin A. & Solodovnik S. and Khrustalev M. (1992). *Russia in a New World. International Affairs*, 7,3–11.
- Zonova, T. & Reinhardt, R. (2014). *Main Vectors of Russia's Foreign Policy (1991-2014)*, *Rivista Di Studi Politici Internazionali* 81, no. 4 (324): 501–516.
- Zyuganov, G. (1995). *Russia and the Contemporary World. Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 2(2), 117–131.

SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences

RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

The People’s Republic of China’s Strategy in The Three Sea Domain: The East China Sea, South China Sea, Indian Ocean, and The US’s Struggle for Presence in This Region

Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti’nin, Doğu Çin Denizi, Güney Çin Denizi ile Hint Okyanusundaki Stratejisi ve ABD’nin Bölgedeki Varlık Mücadelesi

Murat Kağan Kozanhan¹ 

Abstract

China is consolidating its presence in the region through strategies it is implementing in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. These strategies ensure the distant defense of its homeland and challenge the United States’ struggle for dominance in these three maritime areas. China is implementing the “Active Strategic Counter Attack Against Exterior Lines (ASCEL) Concept” in the East China Sea, which is the first region of these maritime areas. Second, China is developing its retaliatory capabilities in the South China Sea. Third, in the Indian Ocean; China is investing heavily in military technology and in the ports of some of the states with which it has close relations in the region to use them as a support area. In this study, qualitative research techniques are used to analyze China’s activities in the East China Sea, South China Sea and Indian Ocean where China has implemented a three-region maritime strategy. This study aims to evaluate the PRC’s practices in the Indo-Pacific Region against the United States’ efforts to exist in the region and the policies of the two countries in the three maritime areas where both countries confront each other in a way that could lead to a hot conflict by utilizing document analysis, content analysis and discourse analysis methods.

Keywords: People’s Republic of China, East China Sea, South China Sea, Indian Ocean, Naval Strategy

Öz

Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti (ÇHC)’nin, Doğu Çin Denizi, Güney Çin Denizi ile Hint Okyanusu’nda uyguladığı stratejilerle, bölgede varlığını pekiştirmekte, anayurdunun uzak savunmasını sağlamakta ve bahse konu üç deniz alanında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin hakimiyet mücadelesine meydan okumaktadır. ÇHC, bahse konu deniz alanlarının; ilk bölgesi olan Doğu Çin Denizi’nde “Dış Hatlarda Aktif Stratejik Karşı Saldırıları Konseptini” uygulamakta, Güney Çin Denizi’nde, misilleme yeteneklerini geliştirmekte ve Hint Okyanusunu bölgede yakın ilişki kurduğu bazı devletlerin limanlarına ve askerî teknolojiye yoğun yatırımlar yaparak, bir destek alanı olarak kullanmak amacındadır. Bu çalışmada, nitel araştırma teknikleri kullanılarak ÇHC’nin; Doğu Çin Denizi, Güney Çin Denizi ve Hint Okyanusu’nda üç bölgesel deniz stratejisini, uluslararası literatürde Hint-Pasifik alanı olarak da adlandırılan bölgede Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin var olma çabalarını ve bu kapsamda her iki ülkenin sıcak bir çatışmaya varacak biçimde karşı karşıya geldiği söz konusu deniz alanlarındaki politikalarını doküman analizi, içerik analizi, söylem analizi yöntemlerinden faydalanarak değerlendirmeye hedeflemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti, Doğu Çin Denizi, Güney Çin Denizi, Hint Okyanusu, Deniz Stratejisi

1 Corresponding Author: Murat Kağan Kozanhan (Asst. Prof. Dr.), National Defense University, Naval War Institute, İstanbul, Türkiye. E-mail: kagan.kozanhan@msu.edu.tr ORCID: 0000-0003-1747-4723

To cite this article: Kozanhan, M. K. (2024). The People’s Republic of China’s strategy in the three sea domain: the East China Sea, South China Sea, Indian Ocean, and the US’s struggle for presence in this region. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 33(2), 261–276. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2024.33.1500318>

Introduction

Due to the nature of the Asian-Pacific region being in a very intertwined state, regarding the control of maritime jurisdiction zones and trade routes, there is great competition between both the littoral states themselves and the global actors that are trying to secure their interests in the area. The western states' hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, which began with the age of discovery, mostly went into the control of the United States of America (USA) after the Second World War. In the early 2000s, with the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s departure from being a regional power both in the economic and military sense and evolving into a global actor, it began to fill in the power vacuums in the region and employ more effective and expansive strategies in its nearby seas which are the East China Sea, South China Sea and Indian Ocean. However, not wanting to lose its dominance in the region, the United States, with its allies, has employed a strategy of containing the PRC by creating new organisations and alliances.

The naval strategy that China uses in the East China Sea, South China Sea and Indian Ocean shows many similarities to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)'s activities during the Cold War in their surrounding seas. PRC's activities, trainings, tactics, systems, and equipment have been shaped with inspiration from the Soviet Navy, and its effects are still being felt (Martin N. Murphy, Toshi Yoshihara, 2015, 13-39). Therefore, the naval strategy employed by the PRC since its inception has been viewed as the legacy of the USSR. China has consistently been growing every year with its reforms implemented. In the final quarter of 2023, China's economic growth was revealed to be 5.2 percent, this has pushed China to be the world's biggest exporter and its second-largest economy (Tolga Demiryol, January 26, 2024). When considering the relation between PRC's economic growth during the last 20 years, it's defense spending, it can be seen that it's perplexing goals in the defense sector has now become easier for China. As a regarding policies that PRC's will follow on the course of becoming a global power; PRC has begun expanding its claims in the surrounding seas (the East China Sea and South China Sea). In addition, China, in hopes of both preventing the USA's containment policy and securing regional interests, has defined a parallel strategy in the Indian Ocean with the Belt and Road Initiative. With this strategy, China tries to further its presence in its surrounding seas in a more expansive way and tries to conduct the defense of the Chinese Mainland beginning from the Indian Ocean. PRC strategy that is employed in the surrounding seas as it mentioned; in the East China Sea, Anti Access and Area Denial (A2AD)" is implemented, in the South China Sea is the creation of artificial islands in order to cement its regional ownership and improve its military retaliation capabilities and the PRC invests in the ports of states which it maintains close relations in the Indian Ocean. It aims to use these maritime areas as both an economic and military asset to support its navy and to improve its military capabilities.

With the PRC's emergence as an economic power, repeated crises have occurred between the USA and the PRC; effects the PRC's relations with global and regional powers, especially regarding trade, geopolitics, and international law. In order to shine a light on the subject, primarily, the PRC's "Three-Region Maritime Strategy" will be taken into consideration, and the main factors for the creation of this strategy will be examined, subsequently, within the framework of this strategy employed by the PRC;

The activities performed in the East China Sea, South China Sea and Indian Ocean and the practices in these seas will be examined. Second, the USA's activities, similar to their strategy to contain Soviet naval power, aimed at preventing the expansion of the PRC in the East China Sea, South China Sea, Indian Ocean and its actions within the framework of approaching the problem of pressuring PRC will be discussed.

China's Three-Region Maritime Strategy

The PRC dominates the nearby seas, including the East China Sea, South China Sea and Indian Ocean, consolidating its position of power and devising a strategy. With its three-region maritime strategy, the PRC is working to cement its presence in its surrounding seas and to bolster its presence in adjacent waters. With this strategy, the PRC defies the United States, which has interests in the region, and expand its area of control. The effort spent by the PRC in this strategy can be compared to the struggle between the USSR and the USA during the cold war. Trying to gain supremacy in a bipolar world state, the USSR understood the importance of controlling and effectively using the seas, and with this in mind, improving its navy, it began deploying it to the maritime areas of strategic importance within its regions of interest and influence at the time (Sergey G. Gorshkov, *The Sea Power of the State*, 1990, p.64). The USSR, in order to strengthen its strategic position and its related defense gave importance to its navy and started developing a blue-water navy capable of waving its flag in the world's regions of interest and influence.

The strategies that were used by the USSR during the cold war to maintain control of the seas are being used today by the PRC, in accordance with Mahan's naval power theories to protect its national interests, to maintain control of the open seas far out from the Chinese mainland, and to improve its naval units' operation capabilities in surrounding seas. With this purpose, the PRC has begun improving its navy, which is their most important asset in the context of the naval strategy that they have implemented. Since the beginning of the 1990's PRC Navy (People's Liberation Army Navy) has made serious progress and has converted its modernisation plan into an expansion plan (Kozan Erkan, July 30th 2019). Similar to the USSR's naval strategy during the cold war, the PRC has also begun to evolve its naval forces from a coastal to a blue-water fleet. The PRC, wanting to increase its naval presence in regions far out from its mainland has deemed it necessary to improve its aircraft carrier fleet and, in this framework, purchased the sister platform of the Kuznetsov, the Varyag, which was stuck with its sleds due to her construction not being completed yet (Cenk Ozgen, November 2018, p.32), and after her modernisation works, entered her into service in 2012 as the CNS Liaoning. The most important factor that made this adaptation necessary is the USA's and the US Navy's increasing activities in the East China Sea and the South China Sea surrounding the PRC (Liu Huaqing, *Memoirs of Liu Huaqing*, 2004, p.439). One of the USA's most important actions in the region was the renaming of the USA Pacific Command (PACOM) to the USA Indian-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). This change made in May 2018 signifies the importance of the connection between the Indian and Pacific Oceans in relation to National Defense Strategy (Koyuncu, 2021, p.18). Additionally, this is seen as a move that will increase the US Navy's presence in the region. The PRC who thoroughly analysed the strategy used by the USA towards the USSR Navy during

the Cold War, has had a better response to a similar strategy being used against them by the USA. Additionally, the PRC has the capability of seizing the initiative in a possible combat engagement with the USA and its allies.

The PRC's and the USSR's similarities in maritime policies and related strategies are also interesting. First, like the USSR, the PRC is also a growing continental power that draws strength from land-based resources.

Second, both actors developed their navies in the framework of Mahan's "Maritime Control Theory", being aware of the importance of sea power. Third, both countries have created defense strategies against the United States and allies. (Kohji Kuhura, 2022, p.16). Additionally, since its establishment in 1949 until 1960 when China-USSR relations deteriorated, the Chinese Navy has received support and been influenced by the Soviet Navy in the context of sea power and maritime strategy (Kohji Kuhura, 2022, p.17). Just as it was important for Russia, who today is the descendant of the Soviet Navy and the USSR, to show their presence and dominance in the Baltic Sea and the Arctic region to maintain Russian interests and achieve their goals in the Cold War era, it was equally important in a geostrategic sense for the Chinese Navy to operate in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Indian Ocean.

The East China Sea

The region commonly referred to as the China Sea in this paper includes the East and South China Seas. Presently, there have been disagreements between littoral states about sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction in these waters. While the sovereignty issues between the PRC and Japan continue in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, the situation is more complex. Strategically, The PRC starts its defensive lines towards possible threats to their mainland in the East China sea. This strategy is similar to the USSR's design of East Europe as a buffer zone and a forward operating area to create a defensive line against possible attacks from the West (Claire Wallace, Elena Sidorenko and Oxana Chmouliar, 1997, p.3). The Taiwan Island in the East China Sea also holds a high level of strategic importance in the region. Taiwan plays an important role for the USA in Asia-Pacific geopolitics to limit the PRC's operational capability and to implement the containment policy towards the PRC (Ayşe Kurban, September 9, 2022). While China views the Taiwan issue as an internal affair, the United States uses Taiwan as a vehicle for a strategy of keeping the PRC under control and containing it. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and the 2001 Hainan islands issue have been important factors for the PRC's development of its strategy. In particular, the USA's deployment of its navy in the region on the side of Taiwan and its pressuring of China during the 1995 Taiwan crisis have been great lessons for China to learn the importance of having a strong navy. Additionally, since then, China has started its defensive lines on the East coast line of the Chinese Mainland through the manmade islands in the South China Sea far out from its mainland, against the USA and its allies' activities in the region and possible attacks. Today, the approach displayed by the PRC towards the USA in the Asia-Pacific region was implemented on the line from the Black Sea to the North Pole by the USSR during the Cold war, and subsequently been implemented by Russia in Syria in a highly persuasive way. (Evren Mercan, 2022, p.561).

It can be surmised that China and the USSR have differing perceptions of threats. This is because while China expects threats from the sea, the USSR expects threats from land-based areas. However, striking similarities can be observed when comparing the defense strategies of the two countries (Kohji Kuhara, 2022, 18). China has implemented what can be defined as a forward defensive line or buffer zone in the East China Sea, similar to what the USSR created between it and the Western Bloc. China effectively applies what can be defined as an A2AD capability, the Active Strategic Counterattacks on Exterior Lines (ASCEL) concept in the East China Sea. China has improved this capability through the hypersonic missiles it produces and through its naval units, whose numbers are increasing by the day. The primary strategy defined in the ASCEL concept of China was to handicap the USA's potential military interventions and future military presence in the island chains, bringing together Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and the Japanese islands, including the disputed maritime zones in the region (Evren Mercan, 2022, 561). The first phase in China's ASCEL concept is the prevention of threats about 1000 nautical miles from the Chinese Mainland in the Pacific Ocean through the use of the JL and Dong Feng series medium- and long-range hypersonic speed ballistic/nuclear guided missiles, the Yingji series ballistic missiles for ground and naval targets, and the HQ series guided missiles for air targets.

The second phase involves containing the threat via naval units and aircraft and their exclusion from the operating area.

The Chinese Mainland, being surrounded by Japan's islands in the East China Sea, affects China's Naval and commercial ships exiting the area. At the same time, China is experiencing problems with other neighbouring states about islands and maritime jurisdiction. The disputed islands in the East China Sea and their surrounding rocks and reefs located on important sea routes or waypoints play a preventative role in the exit of the Chinese Navy into the Pacific Ocean. Thus, to maintain its ASCEL activities, China's naval units should use the critical waypoints between these islands. In the event of tension or conflict, the deployment of guided munitions, missiles, and submarines to and around critical islands and the creation of minefields, Chinese naval units' maneuverability will be inhibited when traversing critical routes.

To prevent airborne threats just as they would like to prevent seaborne threats in the East China Sea, China carries out its air defense from the Japanese Islands to the open seas, using the S-300 and S-400 Air Defense Systems that it has procured from Russia and the HQ series air defense systems that it has developed itself (Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, August 24, 2018).

Furthermore, since 2008, Chinese naval units have carried out operations in narrow waters like Okinawa-Miyako Islands line, the Osumi Strait, Tsugaru, and the Soya Strait, in the southern regions of Japan (Japan Ministry of Defense, August 2023). These activities by China in the East China Sea are meant to grant China the control of the seas and air superiority, making it easier for Chinese naval units to access open waters in the event of tension or armed conflicts. In summary, China sees the East China Sea as a defensive line and, in the framework of the ASCEL concept, practises creating a defensive line in the region to increase its manoeuvrability in critical sea routes and to determine what course its navy will follow to exit into open waters during tensions that can occur in the region.

It is a more difficult process to create and maintain a defensive line at sea than on land. Due to the sea not having a stable nature, the operating area is constantly changing due to seasonal and weather conditions, and defensive lines need to be larger. Therefore, to maintain control over this vast area, China must increase the number of its naval units and deploy many weapon systems developed to implement its ASCEL concept at strategic points in the ECS.

The South China Sea

The South China Sea, unlike the East China Sea, is surrounded by many more littoral states. China, Malesia, Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei and the Philippines which have the most dynamic economies in the world, share a coast with this sea. The PRC and Japan which have the largest economies in the region fulfil their energy and raw material needs (about 80%) through sea transport in this maritime zone. When taking a look at the industries, manufacturing in the region and the related raw materials needs, it can be seen that 27.6% of the world's sea commerce takes place in the South China Sea (UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, 2023). There are also problems with the determination of maritime jurisdictions and the ownership of islands in the region between China and other littoral states. Rich hydrocarbon reservoirs and fishing activities in the region are the most important factors of the emergence of areas of contention. With the beginning of the declaration of independence of the Philippines in 1970, Vietnam in 1956 and Malesia in 1979 in the Spratly and Paracel islands region, has begun coming into light as a regional crisis zone. (Cengiz Topel Mermer, South China Sea the Rough Curve of China Who Defied the USA Hegemony, 2022, 9). China backs its claims of ownership of a large portion of the South China Sea and the islands on historical grounds. China claims that it has controlled the South China Sea since the Xia Dynasty, which ruled China from 2183 to 1752 BCE. In 1979, The Nationalist Party of China (Kuomintang), has "designated a region as being under the sovereignty of China and drawn on maps of the South China Sea eleven-dash lines also containing the Spratly Islands". On official documents of the PRC after its conception in 1949, this map showing China's claims in the Sea is actually from an eleven-dash line map published by the Chinese Republic in 1935 (Peter Dutton, "Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea", Autumn 2011, 3). China has reached a verbal agreement with Vietnam regarding the Gulf of Tonkin maritime borders. As a jest to the Vietnamese regime, China constricted its area and removed two-dash lines from the map. Thus, a map known as "the nine-dash line" map. The nine-dash line map still has its validity.




Figure 1. China's Eleven and Nine-Dash Lines, in the South China Sea
 Source: <https://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/thediplomat-blv1.jpg>

In accordance with international law, China has also made its claims eligible in its domestic legislation. After, China signed the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), its claims and tactics in the South China Sea; have become clearer in the diplomatic, political and military sense. Since 2013, China has started improving the islands; the rocks and reefs that could not be inhabited have been filled, raised and pushed on top of the sea level. At the same time, they have been enlarged and made into artificial islands, and it has begun using them for economic and military purposes. In this context, it has been confirmed that there were artificial islands built by China on the Cuarteron, Fiery Cross, Gaven, Hughes, Johnson, Mischief and Subi reefs (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2016).



Figure 2. The Conversion of the Cuarteron Reef by China into an Artificial Island
Cuarteron Reef (21.02.2014) Cuarteron Reef (26.05.2022)

Source: <https://amti.csis.org/cuarteron-reef/>

To maintain control in the broad maritime zone, China operates its defense system in the East China Sea in a way that it can support its activities in the South China Sea. China uses the artificial islands it has built in the South China Sea to house its naval units, create a forward operating base and detect, identify and intercept ships and submarines belonging to other actors in the region. Due to this, China has built ports, helicopter pads and airstrips and placed satellite communications equipment, naval/air reconnaissance radars, and weapons for naval and air targets. China's actions here show similarities with the USSR, creating a zone for its ballistic missile submarines (Nuclear Armed Missiles Submarine-SSBN) with nuclear missile capability against the USA in the Okhotsk Sea during the Cold War (Kohji Kuhara, 2022, 21).

China, which shares a coast with the South China Sea and the East China Sea, maintains its maritime control most easily in the South China Sea. In times of tension and warfare, during an operation carried out by China; naval units; ships and submarines need bases where they can receive water columns to a sufficient depth that the operation is carried out in and logistics support from bases. Also, during an operation, the storage that a submarine uses far away from the enemy's intelligence and reconnaissance range helps keep the submarine in stealth is its most important feature. The South China Sea is the most suitable maritime zone for this because of the proximity of Japan and South Korea and the East China Sea, which is not deep enough to support submarine operations (Hiroshi Ichikawa and Robert C. Beardsley, "The Current System in the Yellow and East China Seas", 2022, 77). Due to this, for their ships and submarines, China creates submarine storage facilities and forward deployment areas to be able to cause a surprise effect and for stealth during potential tensions that can arise. China, wanting to have effective maritime control in the area, builds submarine bases for its navy and especially the nuclear submarines (SSBN) and them to support its ASCEL concept through its artificial islands and the bases it has built on them.

In summary, China is building artificial islands in the South China Sea to maintain maritime control and is using these islands for military and commercial purposes (Matthew P. Funairole, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Brian Hart, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 04 August, 2021). China gives weight to its submarine operations

to be able to apply its ASCEL concept in the region and plans to improve, especially its defenses against the US Navy's Anti-Submarine Warfare. China sees the South China Sea as a core national interest and establishes a defensive line for the Chinese Mainland beginning from the South China Sea.

The Indian Ocean

Units of the PRC's Navy aim to use the Indian Ocean as a base/shelter or a support area against the USA's containment policy against the PRC. The Indian Ocean presents the first line of defense against the prevention of hostile forces' combat and logistics support in the strategy that China applies. A similar situation to the US Navy posing a threat to the southern front of the USSR and the Soviet Navy through its 6th Fleet during the Cold War, the 5th Fleet of the US Navy in the Arabian Sea posed a threat to the Indian Ocean and ultimately the PRC through the South China Sea. Due to this, the PRC tries to prevent actors it views as a threat, at the farthest range from its mainland, and to bolster its presence and improve its deterrence capabilities to counter the US' containment policy.

China, within the framework of its ASCEL concept, is attempting to prevent potential threats from the Indian Ocean and to secure maritime trade routes coming from the Indian Ocean, however due to the scale of the area, this approach is not as easy as it seems. Given this fact, the PRC requires a large fleet, including aircraft carriers to operate in the Indian Ocean. In this context, China is making an effort to develop naval units, such as aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, frigates etc. and forge agreements with states that share a coast with the Indian ocean and protect its military and commercial presence in the region. Although their methods might differ, the PRC's approach to the Indian Ocean is similar to the Soviet Union's strategic approach to the Mediterranean. However, there are some points for which this approach differs. The PRC aims to maintain influence and access in the Indian Ocean through trade, with its tremendous economic might and other economic activities rather than martial prowess (James E. Fanell, "China's Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure: Pathway to Hegemony", 2019, 9). China, with this strategy that it uses, is not only limited by the regions in question but effectively uses a mutual economic development project "Maritime Silk Road" that it bases on the win-win principle, within its "Belt and Road initiative" according to their interests in specific areas of the world.

The PRC gains political influence and create local infrastructure, primarily through its support to countries with which it has financing and development projects. Later, with this advantage, it aims to secure especially the ports it has built/modernised and managed for the host country to gain military and logistical access for itself (James E. Fanell, "China's Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure: Pathway to Hegemony", 2019, 19). The PRC intends to gradually expand the ports that it has taken over the management of in overseas countries, starting from the Indian Ocean and have them be always useable by their Navy. The PRC is signing cooperation deals in underdeveloped and developing countries through the "Belt and Road Project" and granting large loans to support projects that help economic development. This creates political and economic problems for countries with weak economies, although the PRC convinces these states with a win-win relationship it is argued that it heavily burdens these states and causes

them to be dependent to the PRC. (Serdar Yılmaz, “The Financial Capacity of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ and the Debt Diplomacy Used by China”, 2020, 633). Additionally, China procures a large portion of its energy from hydrocarbon reserves in the Middle East and transports these resources to its mainland through the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Strait via the Indian Ocean-Far East maritime trade route. Due to the need for hydrocarbon resources mainly gathered from the Middle East and transported through the Indian Ocean-Far East maritime trade route, the PRC is also planning alternate routes in case of unfortunate events or tensions or conflicts that can occur in the region.



Figure 3. Belt and Road Initiative of the PRC and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Source: <https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/behind-chinas-gambit-pakistan>

To reduce its dependency on the Malacca Strait, the PRC has begun to search for alternate trade routes. One of these alternate trade routes connects the PRC’s exclusive economic zone of Kashgar to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port. On the route that makes up an important section of the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ that links China to the Middle East and Africa, the PRC aims to transport the goods it produces in its interior regions to Gwadar Port, and then export them to the world by sea. The Gwadar Port on this route with a promising future has room to dock 2 to 3 ships with 50 DWT and it is planned for it to have 150 ships and 400 million tonnes of cargo by 2045 (Yeşim Demir, China’s Silk Road Project: Gwadar Port, 2022, 105). China, which carries out most of its petroleum and gas imports via sea, intends to use Gwadar Port as an energy allocation site. In this context, with Gwadar Port being the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’s (CPEC) exit point to the Indian Ocean, it is a geostrategic point of importance for China to fulfil its petroleum and gas needs without being dependent on the Malacca Strait. Due to this, the PRC gives importance to the development of this port by investing in it and storing the incoming petroleum and transporting it to the Chinese Mainland through a pipeline (Gökтуğ Çalışkan, The Gwadar Port’s Strategic importance: China’s New Military Base, 2022). Aside from being used by

China for strategic purposes, the Gwadar Port presents economic advantages for Pakistan as well. The Gwadar Port, which presents a country-wide and region-wide economic development, is important for Pakistan for both improving its relationship with the PRC and showing the PRC as a force with it against its nemesis India. The PRC intends to use Gwadar Port which is the final point in its “Pearl Line Strategy” in the West, to observe and manage the US’s activities and maritime operations in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean and as a base to provide logistical and munition support in peacetime and as a forward operating base in wartime. It is estimated that the number of dual-purpose bases with both commercial and military use by China will increase in the future. To provide security to these ports, make access easy, maintain effective maritime control and to provide force protection and logistics capabilities, the PRC entered its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning (CV 16), into service in April 2018 and conducted its first task group operation in the Philippines Sea just East of Taiwan (Franz-Stefan Gady, ‘Chinas 1st Carrier Strike Group Reaches Initial Operational capability’, 05 June 2018). The PRC has entered its second aircraft carrier Shandong (CV 17) into its navy’s inventory. Lastly, it is planned for the first of the PRC Navy’s new generation nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, Fujian (CV 18), to join the PRC Navy within 2025 as its third aircraft carrier (Eurasiantimes, Six Aircraft Carriers by 2035 – China’s Ambitious Plan for PLAN As It Looks to Counter US, Cut Indian Influence, 10 March 2024). It is predicted that the Chinese Navy will possess 80 destroyers, 140 frigates and corvettes, 10 SSBNs, 16 SSNs, 46 diesel submarines, 6 aircraft carriers by 2040 (Congressional Research Service, China Naval Modernisation: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities, 30 January 2024 (11)). The PRC, with a large navy, will have the capability to prevent threats from the Indian Ocean, implement its ASCEL doctrine in adjacent seas and conduct any activity to maintain maritime control in the region.

The US struggle to keep their presence in the region against the PRC’s strategies in the East China Sea, South China Sea and Indian Ocean

The PRC’s growth as both an economic and a military power greatly disturbs the United States which is in a global power position and it counters the PRC with economic and military reactions. The point of these reactions by the US is to prevent the expansion of the PRC in the East and South China Seas and the Indian Ocean and to maintain the US’ superiority in the region. The Soviet maritime strategy during the Cold War has structural similarities with the maritime strategy the PRC uses today; that involves the East China Sea, South China Sea and Indian Ocean. Furthermore, the US who conducted activities in the framework of controlling Soviet naval power and its strategy to contain the Soviets, conducts a similar strategy today to curb the PRC’s expansion and to deter the PRC from its goal. Since 2005, the US has been closely monitoring the PRC’s development and activities. The US Navy which does not want to lose its control over the Pacific, has greatly increased the chances of a clash or conflict with PRC navy units. The US’s support and alliance with countries such as Taiwan, the Philippines, South Korea etc. being related to their issues with the PRC has also increased the chances of an armed conflict in the region. Despite all these negativities, the USA and the PRC have been in efforts to put in place mechanisms in many areas relating to Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea-CUES and other measures to provide trust and have been coming together to prevent

potential conflicts and any negative events that can arise (Sam Lagrone, Document: Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, 17 June, 2014 3:16 PM - updated: 22 August 2016 12:00 PM.). The US, showing a similar approach to the USSR during the Cold War, used gunboat diplomacy to increase its presence to prevent the PRC's expanse in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Indian Ocean. The US expects its strong allies (Japan, South Korea and Australia) to share the burden and forge economic and security deals with these countries. Due to the PRC's economic and military development and activities in the Pacific, the US has designated the PRC as the primary long-term strategic threat and has shifted its priorities in planning and capabilities to counter the PRC. (CNO NAVPLAN, 202, 2).

Due to the PRC Navy gaining strength day by day, expanding its activities in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Indian Ocean, building artificial islands and weaponizing them, and being seen as the closest rival to the USA in terms of economy, the USA views the PRC as the highest-value strategic threat. Therefore, the US has designated a strong and decisive counter-reaction strategy against the PRC's interference in and activities in the seas. In response to the PRC's maritime jurisdiction claims by the PRC in the East China Sea, South China Sea and Indian Ocean and the military activities that it conducts in these maritime areas, the US Navy, conducts joint drills and activities with Indian, Japanese and Australian Navies named Trident, Malabar, Trilateral (US Navy Official Web Site, 11 November 2022, US Forces Japan, 21 November 2002, Dzirhan Mahadzır, Japan, Australia Drill Together in South China Sea for Trident Exercise, 27 June 2023). Additionally, the US makes defense and security deals with allies and creates alliances like AUKUS and intends to control the policies and presence of China in the region. The US primarily presents its response in the framework of international law and argues that most of China's activities and claims in the South China Sea do not have any basis in international law.

The US shares the PRC's activities and claims in the East China Sea, South China Sea and Indian Ocean with the international public and holds a firm political stance alongside its allies against the PRC in the region. Also, to stop its military and political loss of power in the region, the US shows teeth and presence with its navy and to maintain its presence in the region, signs defense and security deals with its allies in the region and conducts joint drills. The PRC, which is growing in both economic and military terms, fills in the US gap by implementing strategic approaches and policies. The PRC develops its navy not only just to conduct its maritime control during a crisis with the US but also to show the international public that the US Navy is weaker than the PRC Navy, especially in the PRC's adjacent maritime areas. The PRC's military and economic growth are similar, making it difficult for the US to balance the situation on its own. Force disparity lies at the heart of the US strategy and it requires the support of its allies in the region for the long-distance superiority of force. The United States plans to share this burden with its allies and other countries with common interests in the region. Due to this, the US has been trying to bring the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which operates outside the region, into the negotiations. Thus, during the 32 nd NATO visit in 28-30 July, for the first time, Australian, Japanese, New Zealander and South Korean leaders were invited. In the report released after the Brussels visit in 2021 and later in NATO's

2022 “NATO New Strategy Document” accepted in the 2022 Madrid Summit, China was classified as a threat for the first time. In the 13 th article of the document in question, it is stated that; “The policies that China implements are counter to NATO’s interests, security and values, and that China uses political, economic and military vehicles to increase its global weight however it is emphasized that the uncertainty relating to China’s strategy, intentions, and military strength still stands. They have made evaluations that the PRC has conducted activities against the international establishment in seamanship, space, and cyberspace, that there is a deepening cooperation between China and Russia and that this is against NATO’s values and that the PRC uses its economic power to create dependencies and increase its hegemony in this context. (NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, 2022, p.5). However, in 2021 the EU-China trade volume surpassing the USA-China trade volume and China becoming the EU’s largest trade partner (Gökhan Tekir, NATO-Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Rekabeti, 2023, p.334) shows that the EU countries that make up NATO are in a close economic relationship with the PRC. This situation also caused tensions in alliances with the PRC. The US, raising geopolitical competition with the PRC to the highest level, has placed the PRC at the top of the list in its National Security Strategy Report and has concentrated on how to effectively compete with the PRC (US National Security Strategy, 2022, p.23).

The US conduct economic and military deals with allied countries in the Indian-Pacific region to reduce the load. In this context, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have critical responsibilities to effectively respond to the defense line in the East China sea from the strategy used by the PRC in the surrounding seas. The US, in order to strengthen its position in the South China sea to counter the PRC’s submarines, increases it’s “Anti-Submarine” capabilities, supports allied countries and littoral states in this context and helps them in increasing their capabilities. Therefore, the US, being aware of the geographic and strategic importance of the artificial islands built by the PRC, intends to create alliances with other regional countries and exploit their geographic advantages. The US, just like how it has supported Japan during the Cold War, has made a great effort to support the littoral states in this region, especially in terms of their maritime operating capabilities.

The PRC continues to increase its regional influence in the Indian Ocean via the silk road aspect of the “Belt and Road initiative” started in 2013. If India uses its regional sea power and stance by siding with the United States in the future, in a possible engagement with the PRC, the PRC will need to expand the deployment of its navy units in this context. This deployment will require a large amount of operational activity from the PRC Navy. The US, becoming closer with India, aims to reduce the PRC’s current advantages and force more costs on them to implement an attrition strategy. By uniting with the countries it has close ties and cooperation with and creating a coalition to limit the PRC in the East China Sea, South China Sea and Indian Ocean.

Conclusion

Although it does not display a very stern stance in its mutually dependent relationship with the PRC, the United States clearly shows that it is in a heavy strategic competition with China in its economic and military activities and the policies it implements. After

World War 2, in the bipolar world order, the US won its battle against the USSR and has been left as the sole world power. However, at the beginning of the 2000s, the US, in order to counter the PRC and keep the PRC as the sole dominant power, began pressuring the PRC using a by using a approach similar to the containment strategy it had used against the USSR during the Cold War. However, the PRC has shown up against the US as a much more resilient rival than the USSR in many respects and by designing unique strategies. Because the PRC has used its strategy in the East China Sea, South China Sea and Indian Ocean effectively, it cannot be said that the United States' policies and strategies against the PRC have been successful. In the framework of the strategy implemented by the PRC in the seas in question, the ASCEL Concept in the South China Sea has created an effective defense line to prevent threats from the East. In particular, the speed and range of supersonic munitions produced by China have made it difficult for naval units to enter the region, especially the US aircraft carriers.

The artificial islands created by the PRC in the South China Sea and the military bases and submarine storage facilities built on them have given the PRC Navy control over a large area of this geography and freedom of operations. In the framework of the "Belt and Road Initiative" it has implemented in 2013 both the economic and supportive use of the ports for its naval units, it is evaluated that the PRC has designated this region as a support area to maintain forward maritime control. Since the PRC has deemed the Indian Ocean as the centre of mass to hinder the enemy's warfighting and logistics support during a potential threat situation, it has been working to increase its presence and deterrence in the Indian Ocean. Due to this, alongside the Gwadar Port that it runs, it is foreseen for it to conduct similar applications in other ports in the region. It seems difficult for the United States to counter the strategic moves made by the PRC on its own in the three fronts of the East China Sea, South China Sea and Indian Ocean. Because of this, the US is attempting to form strong alliances and even use NATO in the region to prevent the PRC. Rising global competition escalated by the day, and a new Cold War, in which the United States was at a disadvantage, occurred. If the US is unable to fill the power vacuums in the region effectively and continues without changing its policies in its fight against the PRC, it will be clear that a new monopolar world order in which the PRC is dominant will occur in the near future.

NOTES:

1. A2AD: This concept is defined as the capability of preventing the use of a specific region at sea by hostile units. It is the act of engaging hostiles through long range guided munitions and missiles deployed on land by Navy and Air Force assets.

2. The AUKUS alliance was formed by the US, Australia and the United Kingdom in the 16th of April 2021. The pact that has been titled as the most important foreign policy move has the aim of a deep integration of "science, technology, industrial bases and supply lines" in the context of "improvement of mutual capabilities and the sharing of technology" in the fields of "security and defense" that will be developed between the three countries. However, the first goal of the pact has been considered deemed to be to procure a nuclear submarine for Australia "as soon as possible". *Siyaset Ekonomi*

ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı Web Page, <https://www.setav.org/aukus-pakti-cine-karsi-yeni-cephe/>

Peer-review: Externally peer-reviewed.

Conflict of Interest: The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

Grant Support: The author declared that this study has received no financial support.

References

- Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, China's New Spratly Island Defenses, (13 December 2016) <https://amti.csis.org/chinas-new-spratly-island-defenses/>
- "CNO NAVPLAN", America's Navy, January (2021), <https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/11/2002562551/-1/-1/1/CNO%20NAVPLAN%202021%20-%20FINAL.PDF>
- Congressional Research Service, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities, (30 January 2024), <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33153.pdf>.
- Çalışkan, G., (26 Mart 2022), Gwadar Limanı'nın Artan Stratejik Önemi: Çin'in Yeni Askeri Üssü Olur mu?, Ankara Kriz ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Merkezi, <https://www.ankasam.org/gwadar-limaninin-artan-stratejik-onemi-cinin-yeni-askeri-ussu-olur-mu/>.
- Demir, Y. (2022). Çin'in Deniz İpek Yolu Projesi: Gwadar Limanı, Yüzyüncü Yıl Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 55, 101-117. DOI: 10.53568/yyusbed.1111817. 101-117.
- Demiryol, T. (26 Ocak 2024). "Çin ekonomisi nereye gidiyor?", *Dünya Gazetesi*, <https://www.dunya.com/kose-yazisi/cin-ekonomisi-nereye-gidiyor/716609>.
- Dutton, P. (Autumn 2011, 64 4). "Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea", *US Naval War College Review*, p. 42-67. <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss4/>
- Fanell, J., E. (2019). Asia Rising: China's Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure: Pathway to Hegemony", *Naval War College Review*, 72(1), 11-29.
- Funaiole, M. P. (4 August 2021). Bermudez Jr., Joseph S., and Hart, Brian, *Center For Strategic and International Studies*, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/glimpse-chinese-ballistic-missile-submarines>
- Gady, F. S. (2018). "China's 1st Carrier Strike Group Reaches Initial Operational Capability", *The Diplomat*, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/chinas-1st-carrier-strike-group-reaches-initial-operational-capability/>. Access date: 05 June 2018
- Gorshkov, S. G. (1990). *Devletin Deniz Gücü*, (çev. Orbay Ergün), Harp Akademileri Basımevi, İstanbul.
- Huaqing, L. (2004). *Memories of Liu Huaqing*. Chinese People's Liberation Army Press, Beijing.
- Ichikawa, H. and Beardsley, R. C., (2022). The Current System in the Yellow and East China Seas. *Journal of Oceanography*, 58, 77-92. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015876701363>.
- Japan Ministry of Defense, China's activities in the East China Sea, Pacific Ocean, and Sea of Japan, (August 2023). Available online: https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/pdf/ch_d-act_a.pdf.
- Kozan, E. (2019), Çin Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu Deniz Kuvvetleri'ne Bakış," *Defence Türk*, <https://www.defenceturk.net/cin-halk-kurtulus-ordusu-deniz-kuvvetlerine-bakis>.Erişim tarihi: 30 Temmuz 2019.
- Kohji, K. (2022). Countering China's "Trident" Strategy—Frustrating China's Aims in the East and South China Seas and the Indian Ocean. *Naval War College Review*, 75(2), 1-23.
- Koyuncu, M. C. (2021). Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Hint Pasifik Bölgesinde Çin'i Çevreleme Politikası. *Bölgesel Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 5(1), 13-47.
- Kurban, A. (2022). Çin-ABD Rekabetinde Tayvan Sorunu", <https://www.insamer.com/tr/cin-abd-rekabetinde-tayvan-sorunu.html>. Erişim tarihi: 09 Eylül 2022
- Lagrone, S. Document: Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, (17 June, 2014 3:16 PM - updated: 22 August 2016 12:00 PM.), <https://news.usni.org/2014/06/17/document-conduct-unplanned-encounters-sea>
- Mahadzır, D. (2023), Japan, Australia Drill Together in South China Sea for Trident Exercise, US Naval Entitute, Retrieved from <https://news.usni.org/2023/06/27/japan-australia-drill-together-in-south-china-sea-for-trident-exercise>, Access date: 27 June 2023
- Mercan, E. (2022). Modern Deniz Harbi'nde Yeni Bir Paradigma: A2/AD Yaklaşımı. *Karadeniz Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 14(27), 555-576. <https://doi.org/10.38155/ksbd.1144403>.
- Mermer, C. T. (2022, 81). *ABD Hegemonyasına Meydan Okuyan Çin'in Zorlu Virajı Güney Çin Denizi*, Stratejik Papor, TASAM. https://tasam.org/Files/Icerik/File/G%C3%BCney_%C3%87in_Denizi_CTM_son_pdf_4d8897a8-7b00-4bd0-af76-03b6b4478ca9.pdf
- Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance, "China's Anti-Access Area Denial" <https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/misile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-misile-threat/china/china-anti-access-area-denial/>
- Murphy, M. N.,& Yoshihara, T. (2015). Fighting the Naval Hegemon: Evolution in French, Soviet, and Chinese

- Naval Thought. *Naval War Collage Review*, 68(3), 13-39.
- NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, Available at: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf
- Özgen C. (2018). Türk Deniz Kuvvetleri Açısından Uçak Gemisi Tedarikinin İncelenmesi, *Savunma Bilimleri Dergisi*, 17(2), 21-59. <https://doi.org/10.51290/dpusbe.1259924>
- Tekir, G. (2023). NATO-Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Rekabeti, *Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 77, 330-349. <https://doi.org/10.51290/dpusbe.1259924>.
- UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, “*Facts and Figures on Asia*”, <https://unctad.org/press-material/review-maritime-transport-2023-facts-and-figures-asia>.
- US Forces Japan, Japan Provides Asset Protection for Australian and US Ships in Trilateral Exercise, (21 November 2002), <https://www.usfj.mil/Media/Press-Releases/Article-View/Article/3224204/japan-provides-asset-protection-for-australian-and-us-ships-in-trilateral-exerc/>
- The Euroasian Times, Six Aircraft Carriers By 2035 China’s Ambitious Plan For PLAN As It Looks To Counter US, Cut Indian Influence, (10 March 2024), <https://www.eurasiantimes.com/six-aircraft-carrier-by-2035-chinas-ambitious-plan/>
- US National Security Strategy, October 2022 (12 October 2022), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>
- US Navy Official Web Site, Japan hosts Australia, India, U.S. in Naval Exercise Malabar 2022 (11 November 2022), <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3216935/japan-hosts-australia-india-us-in-naval-exercise-malabar-2022/>
- Wallace Claire, Sidorenko Elena and Chmouliar Oxana, “*The Central European Buffer Zone*”, Institute for Advanced Studies and University of Derby, (September 1997), <https://www.sre.wu.ac.at/ersa/ersaconfs/ersa98/papers/262.pdf>
- Yılmaz, S. (2020). Bir Kuşak Bir Yol Projesinin İktisadi Kapasitesi ve Çin Tarafından Uygulanan Borç Diplomasisi. *Iğdır Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 24, 631-648.



The Problem of Freedom of Expression in the Public Sphere of Social Media: Descriptive Analysis of the Echo Chamber Effect

Sosyal Medya Kamusal Alanında İfade Özgürlüğü Problemi: Yankı Fanusu Etkisi Üzerine Betimsel Bir Analiz

Hüseyin Köse¹ , Bahar Balcı Aydoğan² 

Abstract

The echo chamber effect is a phenomenon where people with similar ideas, beliefs, and manners intensify their ideas and thoughts with the pleasure of being approved, whereas people with opposing ideas and beliefs sink into silence. This is one of the biggest barriers to the development of a free and democratic environment for ideas and beliefs, and it is crucial for the democratic perspective on the freedom of expression on social media. This issue is a serious problem because the oppressive view and opinion environment strengthens practices that exclude diversity. This research aimed to descriptively examine tweets in terms of their significant hints provided through the creation of the echo chamber. The hashtag “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” (#Socialmedialaw)-related tweets were selected as the trending topics. Through descriptive analysis, this study also attempted to describe how the echo chamber concept affected and shaped the belief and idea posts on X. According to the analysis’s findings, the new regulation on social media intensified the echo chamber effect by strengthening some predetermined attitudes and beliefs and weakening others by separating the legislation from its context and content.

Keywords: Echo chamber effect, X, #SUSyalMedyaYasası, freedom of expression, NodeXL

Öz

Yankı fanusu etkisi, benzer fikir, kanaat veya tutumlara sahip kişilerin onanın da verdiği hazla kendi fikir ve düşüncelerini pekiştirirken, karşıt görüş, fikir ve kanaatlere sahip kişilerin suskunluğa gömülmeleri olgusudur. Bu durum, düşünce ve kanaat ikliminin özgürce ve demokratik biçimde oluşumu önündeki en ciddi engellerden biri olup, düşünce ve ifade özgürlüğünün sosyal medya kamusal alanındaki demokratik görünümü açısından önemlidir. Konu, baskıcı görüş ve kanaat ortamının farklılığı dışlayıcı pratikleri güçlendirmesi bakımından ciddi bir problemdir. Bu çalışmada, X mecrasından yapılan paylaşımların betimsel analizi amaçlanmıştır. Çalışmada bu amaçla trend topic olarak “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” hashtagli X paylaşımları seçilmiştir. Çalışmada ayrıca betimsel analiz tekniğiyle yankı fanusu kavramının X ortamındaki kanaat ve düşünce paylaşımlarını etkileme ve şekillendirme süreci betimlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Yapılan analiz sonucunda, yeni sosyal medya yasa düzenlemesinin gerek içeriği gerekse kapsamı bakımından bağlamından kopararak ön belirlenmiş bazı görüş ve kanaatleri daha da güçlendirdiği ve bu durumun da yankı fanusu etkisini arttırdığı bulgulanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yankı odası etkisi, X, “#SUSyalMedyaYasası, ifade özgürlüğü, NodeXL

1 Corresponding Author: Hüseyin Köse (Prof. Dr.), Ataturk University, Faculty of Communication, Department of Journalism, Erzurum, Türkiye. E-mail: huseyink180@yahoo.com ORCID: 0000-0001-5697-9009

2 Bahar Balcı Aydoğan (Lecturer, Dr.) Muğla Sıtkı Koçman University, Ula Ali Koçman Vocational High School, Department of Marketing and Advertising, Muğla, Türkiye. E-mail: baharbalci@mu.edu.tr ORCID: 0000-0003-3207-5595

To cite this article: Kose, H., & Balci Aydogan, B. (2024). The problem of freedom of expression in the public sphere of social media: descriptive analysis of the echo chamber effect. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 33(2), 277–317. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2024.33.1438504>

Introduction

The public sphere of social media is a virtual space where various discourses echo within each other. In particular, regarding political participation, users should be able to be easily involved in different political concept networks within social media platforms. From a positive perspective, it can be argued that new communication platforms, by maximizing participation and expanding the framework of political and intellectual experience, offer greater opportunities for equal participation by the masses. As a result, they partially replace traditional media in publicity. Because users on these platforms are often not open to opposing ideas, they generally fail to demonstrate the virtue of tolerance towards these ideas. This assumption, which remains relevant, is worth testing. Indeed, in terms of democratic communication, pluralistic public spheres and freedom of expression and the perspective and horizon-dulling effect of similar ideas and opinions come into play precisely at this point. “Knowledge, which refers to facts and phenomena that the human mind can comprehend, is technically a public commodity in terms of the benefits it can bring to humanity.” To a large extent, echo chambers, where the public nature of information is undermined, can “increase social polarization, reduce the production of public knowledge and prevent the dissemination of information” (Sunstein, 2007, p.44). Moreover, it can even be said that this homogeneous climate of ideas, opinions, and beliefs is quite appealing to users due to its tremendous sense of security. However, the idea of an echo chamber where similar views and thoughts gather in the same ranks while different voices are swiftly expelled from public perception remains devoid of diversity and continues to be a serious obstacle to the democratic nature and promise of the public sphere of social media. “The lack of diversity of thought and the fact that people often speak and listen only to those who share their own opinions leads to the formation of different speech communities, and this is a major problem for democracy” (Sunstein, 2007, p.44). When people only hear their own voices, this can lead to social polarisation, fanaticism, hatred, violence, and isolation (Sunstein, 2007, p.44).

This issue is important in terms of providing some clues about the possibilities for social media users with different views and opinions to express themselves without exclusion and thus shed light on the boundaries of freedom of expression in the public sphere of social media. The phenomenon of the echo chamber effect in the public sphere of social media has brought to the forefront a significant issue concerning the narrowing of the possibilities for freedom of expression. In addition, it weakens the potential for diversity of voices and democratic participation, as it gives rise to the suppression, silencing and marginalization of opposing views through the proliferation of hate speech, threats, and intimidation. Therefore, it poses a crucial problem regarding the relationship between new media and democracy. This study aims to describe the formation process of the echo chamber effect on X by examining the issue within the context of the ‘Press Law Proposal and Amendments to Certain Laws Concerning Press, Social Media and Internet Journalism’ which was approved by the Justice Commission of the Turkish Parliament on June 16, 2022. The focus is on identifying the most influential actors and their relatively weaker counterparts surrounding them in tweets posted under the hashtag “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” by analysing the network positions of these actors within the X sphere. To this end, a descriptive analysis was conducted on X posts using the hashtag “#SUSyalMedyaYasası”, which became quickly a trend topic after the enactment of the

legislation. In this study, it is also considered a significant issue that users on the mentioned network, falling prey to the echo effect, may overlook the actual context and fail to recognize the benefits of the new social media law in terms of preventing unregulated activities online and protecting vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. Therefore, this issue is considered a serious concern.

This study is considered to hold original value in the field of new media sociology in general and specifically regarding the echo chamber effect on social media in Turkey. The political polarization in Turkey has been tried to reveal using data obtained using the NodeXL Program. This study reflects the political view of Turkey. The new social media law in Turkey has been discussed by X users. Therefore, it is expected to contribute to the existing literature on communication sciences.

Echo Chamber Effect and the Formation of Echo Chambers in the Public Sphere of Social Media

Network Science is the study of complex networks composed of various nodes and the connections (edges) between nodes (Barabási & Albert, 1999). Nodes represent the basic building blocks of the network. Different entities such as people, organizations, and proteins can represent nodes (Barabási & Albert, 1999, p. 510). The edge represents the connections between nodes. These links represent interactions between two or more nodes, such as information exchange (Freeman, 1979, p. 220). The concept of centrality measures the relative importance of nodes in a network. Degree Centrality refers to the number of other nodes to which a node is directly connected (Freeman, 1979, p. 220); Betweenness Centrality refers to how often a node is located on the shortest paths between other nodes (Freeman, 1979, p. 221); and Closeness Centrality refers to the average distance of a node from all other nodes in the network (Freeman, 1979, p. 224). Network science uses various methods to analyze and model networks. Some of the main network science methods are as follows: Graph Theory plays a fundamental role in mathematical modeling and network analysis (Newman, 2003). Centrality Measures are metrics used to determine the importance of nodes in a network (Freeman, 1979). Cluster Analysis analyzes the division of nodes in a network into natural groups and the structure of these groups (Girvan & Newman, 2002). Graph Algorithms are used to solve various problems in networks, such as shortest path, largest flow, and maximum connectivity (Dijkstra, 1959). Scaling and Growth Models are mathematical models used to explain the growth and evolution of networks. They are used to explain phenomena such as scale-free networks (Barabási & Albert, 1999). Social Network Analysis seeks to understand human behavior by focusing on social connections (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

The filter bubble refers to the personalization of users' online experiences and is the result of how algorithms work. Algorithms track and store many data such as users' past web browsing history, search queries, click actions, like/dislike attitudes, and purchase history, thus tracking and storing users' online behavior. Algorithms deliver content/information based on these evaluations, thus narrowing the range of information users encounter in a virtual environment. As a result, the network becomes personalized, and selective exposure may occur (Pariser, 2011, p. 45; Bozdag, 2013, p. 213). The concept of "selective exposure" which constitutes an important aspect of cognitive dissonance,

is based on the fact that “individuals use information sources that are incompatible with their own opinions” to evaluate different options and obtain information before the decision, and they use information sources compatible with their own opinions “to confirm their decision” during the post-decision stage (Kah & Lee, 2016, p. 387 as cited in Yücel & Çizel, 2018, p. 152). In parallel to the selective exposure paradigm, echo chambers refer to closed ecosystems in which users circulate the same information only by meeting individuals with similar attitudes in the same network where they reinforce their worldviews and beliefs. At the same time, different opinions were excluded (Pariser, 2011, p. 9). Both concepts can be barriers to encountering different perspectives and ‘other’ ideas. For example, Sunstein examined the effects of echo chambers on democracy and discussed how individuals are more radicalized in like-minded groups (Sunstein, 2007). Indeed, while the filter bubble narrows the way in which users are exposed to different information, it also serves as an important phenomenon that plays a role in the formation of echo chambers. Pariser points out that some people may be trapped in information bubbles or echo chambers; however, he also highlights the fundamental difference between the two concepts: “One can read only left-leaning blogs and websites, listen only to left-leaning radio, and watch only left-leaning television,” which precisely describes the filter bubble. Pariser also coined the term “filter bubble” as an act of limiting one’s own worldview, pointing out that avoiding different views can lead to an echo chamber lock-in. The reason Pariser defines the term “filter bubble” as “a unique information universe for each of us” is that users strive to build their own unique [and to some extent “smooth”] worlds in personalized networks (Pariser, 2011, p. 9).

Cinelli et al. (2021) discussed the pleasure derived from being approved in their article entitled “The Echo Chamber Effect on Social Media”. As a result, individuals are relieved of the effort required to check their own beliefs in reality and instead find pleasure in reinforcing similar thoughts. According to the authors, an echo chamber is a phenomenon where user opinions on a subject are strengthened due to repeated interactions with information sources that have similar tendencies and attitudes. In other words, an echo chamber is the reinforcement of one’s own ideas and beliefs by a like-minded audience, motivated by the pleasure derived from being approved (Cinelli et al., 2021, p.1)

Bruns explained the concept of a filter bubble based on optional filtering as follows: “When a group of participants selectively chooses to communicate with each other, independent of the network structures underlying their connections, and excludes external influences from this process, a filter bubble emerges.” The more consistently participants adhere to such practices, the higher the likelihood that their own views and information will circulate among the group members rather than information that comes from external sources” (Bruns, 2017, p.3).

Based on this assessment, it should be noted that the use of artificial intelligence systems to generate filters based on user data traces left in the virtual environment implies the manipulation of thoughts towards a certain direction. Indeed, the personalized customization of data traces left in the virtual environment through technology, which results in users not encountering content outside their areas of interest, distinguishes the concept of filter bubble from the concept of echo chamber. When the concepts of echo chamber and filter bubble are considered together, the following assessment can

be made: The echo chamber and filter bubble effects selfishly reinforce the sense of ‘us’ and, as a result, construct the identity of the ‘other’ and situations of ‘otherness’. Thus, a mass of like-minded individuals who reinforce their own thoughts on a particular agenda effectively build a barrier against truth and refrain from engaging with ‘other’ perspectives. Marginalization manifests itself precisely because of such escape. According to Bruns, the more flawlessly the connectivity between participants is shaped (in other words, the more connections are established within the group and severed with outsiders), the representation of external perspectives or the ‘others’ diminishes and becomes isolated. As a result, the opinions of group members circulate more extensively within their circle (Bruns, 2017, pp.3-4).

Berger and Milkman stated: “Viral content is driven in part by physiological stimulation. Content that evokes high arousal (such as surprise) or low arousal (such as sadness) arousal becomes more viral” (Berger and Milkman, 2012, p. 192). Online social networks can increase the intensity of emotional synchronization on a global scale, (Coviello et al., 2014, p. 1). Furthermore, this study investigated how emotional contagion can be measured and understood in large-scale social networks. Indeed, the researchers emphasized the importance of the emotional dimension and underlined that emotional reactions on online platforms play a critical role in creating viral effects. Social media platforms are effective tools for coordinating collective actions, such as protests organized to demand democratic representation. In this respect, individuals and groups that consciously develop content creation and dissemination strategies that target emotional responses can be effective online (González-Bailón et al., 2011, p. 102). According to Berger and Milkman (2012), emotional content (laughing, crying, fear, amazement, anger, stubbornness) is shared faster and widely than objective content. Hence, content that contains feelings of anger and hope can play a role in strengthening individuals’ dominant attitudes and values and turning them into viral content. Researchers who provide experimental evidence of large-scale emotional contagion through social networks state that users influence each other’s emotional states through the content that they produce (Berger and Milkman, 2012, p. 192). It has been observed that people produce less positive and more negative content when positive expressions are reduced, whereas the opposite pattern emerges when negative expressions are reduced. These results provide important empirical evidence for the existence of emotional contagion in social networks (Kramer et al., 2014, p.8789). Briefly, group identity, belonging, social acceptance, and the pleasure of being approved by the majority may also effectively reflect individuals’ emotional reactions to issues of public concern. In this regard, individuals who participate in echo chambers may adopt the emotional reactions of the majority or may strengthen their emotionally ingrained attitudes and reactions. In this study, it was observed that users gave strong emotional reactions through the messages they construct in the ‘#SUSyalMediaLaw’ network. Users emphasize that contrary to the tangible benefits the new law will bring to democracy and freedom of expression, it will be used to shut down alternative channels of expression, such as newspapers, magazines, and televisions, which are considered to be the media of the “other.” While users who are concerned about belonging and social acceptance frequently state that the government does not want citizens who think freely and speak their minds boldly, they almost never mention the role that the law will play in preventing unethical attacks against groups such as children, women, the elderly, youth,

and members of political minorities, who are often the most disadvantaged segments of the social media public sphere.

Similarly, in their article “Avoiding the Echo Chamber About Echo Chambers”, Andrew Guess and his colleagues (2018) highlighted how technology makes polarization incredibly easy and creates sharp divisions. According to the authors, “echo chambers, filter bubbles and information cocoons are ideologically homogeneous patterns of news and media consumption” (Guess et al., 2018, p.3). Therefore, audiences consuming penetrated thoughts must gather at extremes.

The implicit suggestion here is that “you may not see information that contradicts your own beliefs” or metaphorically, “you can go on an information diet.” (Dutton et al., 2017, p. 18). Attributing this type of one-sided information threat to citizens relying solely on social media for acquiring knowledge about public issues and they emphasizing that social media strengthens citizens’ pre-existing perspectives and that their potential for falling into echo chamber effects is high, draw attention to the powerful mission assumed by information that reinforces consciousness. According to this perspective, echo chambers and filter bubbles can reinforce pre-existing beliefs or lead to flawed understanding of various subjects.

Pariser (2011) is expressing here is that algorithms place certain filters in front of us based on our web traffic, including what we like, dislike, or actions we perform in the virtual realm. To break free from this simplistic code, one needs to neutralize entrenched judgments and strive to be in the midst of a diversity of thoughts. However, the situation is different in practice because, according to common belief, social media users tend to find it more reassuring to be in the company of content that supports their existing views, avoiding content that could challenge their established beliefs and potentially shake them to the core (Pariser, 2011, p.51).

This is clearly confirmation bias. This is one of the significant obstacles hindering the development of users’ intellectual horizons in the realm of social media. Although there is indeed diversity of thoughts in the public sphere of social media, the number of individuals who are aware of this diversity is quite limited. Maccatrozzo, in her study titled “Burst the Filter Bubble: Using Semantic Web to Enable Serendipity” draws attention to the role played by both personalized networks and semantic web features in the formation of echo chambers (2012, pp.391-398). According to Maccatrozzo (2012), an excessively personalized network with filters significantly hinders serendipitous encounters and interactions. Maccatrozzo explained the effect created by the filter bubble by emphasizing the concept of serendipity. According to this perspective, while browsing through bookshelves, one may chance upon an interesting book on a randomly looked shelf. This is an unexpected encounter. It makes a serendipitous discovery. However, filter bubbles undermine the quality and depth of utilizing virtual environments that are full of commercial information (Maccatrozzo, 2012, pp.391-392).

Due to algorithms, information remains dormant in the obscure corners of virtual platforms. Moreover, due to the filter bubble, information that is not actively sought remains inaccessible, and at the same time, it echoes within the bubble due to the workings of the semantic web. According to Pariser (2011): You may think you are the captain

of your own destiny, but personalization can lead you towards a form of informational determinism. A network infrastructure where what you clicked on in the past determines what you will see next can trap you in a static, continuously narrowing plane. In other words, it can lead to an infinite you-loop (Pariser, 2011, p.14).

Purpose and Method

The echo chamber effect, resulting from the increasing resonance of identical voices in the public sphere of social media, represents one of the biggest obstacles to the pluralistic and democratic nature of the public sphere. This issue is a serious problem, as it not only raises questions about the relationship between democracy and freedom of expression in the public sphere of social media and reinforces exclusionary practices that marginalize differences created by oppressive views and opinions. In the study, an analysis of X posts with the hashtag “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” was conducted, which emerged shortly after the introduction of the new media law and quickly became a trend topic. “#SUSyalMedyaYasası”. What is meant to be expressed with the phrase “SUS” is the idea that the relevant law has the purpose of encouraging social media users to silence through the pressure to be created. Here, “sus!” expresses a prohibitive imperative mood. The reason why “sus” is written in majuscule form is to draw attention to imposition, and there is also a pun in this form of writing to evoke the word “social”. This analysis provides concrete evidence for the formation of the echo chamber effect. The selected tweets were examined using descriptive analysis techniques. The descriptive analysis method is the process of analyzing data descriptively in qualitative research. This method generally reveals the views, experiences, and perceptions of the participants (Creswell, 2013, p. 183). In this method, data are handled descriptively, organized, classified, and presented in a meaningful manner. The aim is to provide a detailed and comprehensive approach to the research topic. Descriptive analysis involves the direct description and interpretation of the data. Coding the data, identifying themes, and presenting these themes with meaningful integrity were among the stages of this method (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 56). In this way, the researchers presented the information obtained from the data to the reader structured and tried to find answers to the research questions. The use of descriptive analysis in research provides rich and in-depth data analysis. This method contributes to a better understanding and interpretation of research findings (Patton, 2002, p. 453).

X posts with the hashtag “#SUSyalMedyaYasası”, which quickly became a trending topic after the enactment of the relevant law, constitute the universe of the study. In this context, a total of 20,036 data were analyzed in this study, focusing on X posts with hashtags. This research aims to analyze the position of actors in the network on platform X and identify the most influential actors and the relatively weaker ones around them. The scope and limitations of the research were determined in line with this purpose.

Data were collected using the NodeXL Pro software, which is used for social network analysis. The research is based on a descriptive analysis of tweets shared on the X platform on June 1, 2022 using the hashtag “#SUSyalMedyaYasası”. The sample of the research is based on determining the dominant opinion in the network by selecting the most and least influential actors among the 7,150 actors who shared tweets on the X platform with

the hashtag “#SUSyalMedyaYasası”. Tweets are short messages (up to 280 characters in length) posted by users on social media platform X. They can include text, images, videos, and links and are often used to share news, personal thoughts, announcements, and other information (Boyd, et al. 1., 2010: 1). Tweets contain text, images, videos, and links and are often used to share news, personal thoughts, announcements, and a variety of other information (Boyd, et al., 2010: 1). The 18000 data limit in NodeXL Pro is applicable to tweets. The total data set of 20,036 includes Mentions, MentionsInRetweets, Replies to, Retweets, and Tweets; thus, the total data set was greater than 18,000 (NodeXL, 2024).

NodeXL is an Excel-based program that is frequently used in social science research. After configuring specific settings in the NodeXL Pro version, various analyses of concepts such as network graphs, nodes, and connections, can be performed within the desired topic context. The program also allows performing descriptive statistics, network statistics, and clustering (NodeXL, 2022). The NodeXL program has the capability to fetch tweets posted within the last 7 days from the X platform, allowing access to approximately the most recent 18,000 tweets shared through the program. To prepare the data for descriptive analysis, certain selection criteria were established. To closely observe the echo chamber effect, the most influential actors within the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” network were selected, and their shared tweets and responses to those tweets were examined; thus, the first selection process was completed. Furthermore, similar tweets shared from the same account were excluded from the analysis, whereas different tweets from the same account were included in the analysis. Similarly, tweets with the same content shared from different accounts were also included in the analysis. The numerical data of the selected tweets, along with network visualizations, were presented in detail in the finding section. During the study, network visualizations were created by taking into account the entire set of 20,036 data. Thus, an attempt was made to provide a comprehensive overview of the network by considering all the included and excluded messages in the analysis. Reliability and validity; NodeXL’s features, such as dynamic filtering, grouping, and clustering, allow networks to be analyzed in greater detail. For example, a study by Hansen et al. (2010) analyzed 500,000 Facebook users and found that users with high betweenness centrality play a critical role in information diffusion. These analyses support the reliability and validity of NodeXL’s statistical tools. The open-source nature of NodeXL and its large user base allows the software to be continuously updated and improved. This open-source nature allows users to customize the software to their specific needs and add new features. Furthermore, NodeXL’s integration with Microsoft Excel allows users to easily manage data input and output, thereby accelerating data manipulation and analysis processes. For example, Smith et al. (2009) used NodeXL’s Excel integration to quickly and efficiently calculate node centrality and network density in a 1,000,000-person network analysis.

In NodeXL, the concept of “in-degree” refers to the number of incoming links to a node. In social network analysis, the sum of the direct links received by a node from other nodes. In other words, is the number of edges directed towards a node. Mathematically, the “in-degree” of a node in the graph is expressed as follows:

$$\text{in-degree}(v) = \sum_{\mu \in V} A(u, v)$$

Here:

- The node v is the node calculated within a degree.
- The node set V represents all nodes in the graph.
- $A(u,v)$ is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if there is an edge (link) from node u to node v and 0 otherwise.

This concept is an important indicator in social network analysis because it can help determine how popular or influential a node is (Freeman, L. C., 1979, pp. 215-239; Wasserman, S., & Faust, K., 1994, pp. 173-178; Newman, M. E. J., 2010, pp. 157-160).

In NodeXL, “out-degree” refers to the number of links leaving a node. In social network analysis, it is the sum of the direct connections of a node to other nodes. In other words, is the number of edges leading from a node. Mathematically, the “out-degree” of a node in a graph is expressed as follows:

$$\text{out-degree}(v) = \sum_{\mu \in V} A(v, \mu)$$

Here:

- Node v is the out-of-degree computed node.
- - The node set V represents all nodes in the graph.
- - $A(v,u)$ is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if there is an edge (link) from node v to node u and 0 otherwise.

This concept is an important indicator in social network analysis because it can help determine the extent to which a node interacts with other nodes (Freeman, L. C., 1979, pp. 215-239; Wasserman, S., & Faust, K., 1994, pp. 173-178; Newman, M. E. J., 2010, pp. 157-160).

In NodeXL, the concept of “geodesic distance” refers to the length of the shortest path between two nodes in a graph. The distance determines the number of direct or indirect links between nodes. In social network analysis, geodesic distance is used to understand the spread of fast information or interactions in the network. Mathematically, the geodesic distance $d(u,v)$ between two nodes uu and vv in the graph given by as

$$d(u,v) = \min (l_1 + l_2 + \dots + l_k)$$

Here:

- $d(u,v)$ is the geodesic distance between nodes u and v .
- l_i is the length of the edges (links) between u and v .
- \min selects the shortest among the lengths of all possible paths between u and v (Freeman, L. C., 1979, pp. 215-239; Wasserman, S., & Faust, K., 1994, pp. 173-178; Newman, M. E. J., 2010, pp. 157-160).

In NodeXL, the concept of betweenness centrality measures the importance and influence of a node on the shortest paths between other nodes in the network. A node with high betweenness centrality can control the flow of information or communication between other nodes and thus plays a key role in the overall structure of the network. Mathematically, the betweenness centrality $CB(v)$ for a node vv is defined as

$$C_B(v) = \sum_{s \neq v \neq t} \frac{\sigma_{st}(v)}{\sigma_{st}}$$

Here:

- σ_{st} represents the total number of shortest paths between nodes s and t .
- $\sigma_{st}(v)$, represents the number of people passing through node v on the shortest paths between s and t .
- $\sum_{s \neq v \neq t}$ indicates aggregation over all pairs of nodes s and t , where ss and tt are not the same nodes as vv (Freeman, L. C., 1979, pp. 215-239; Wasserman, S., & Faust, K., 1994, pp. 173-178; Newman, M. E. J., 2010, pp. 157-160).

“Eigenvector centrality” is a centrality measure used to quantify the importance of a node. Eigenvector centrality is calculated based on the importance of a node to the nodes it directly connects to. If a node has high eigenvector centrality, the other nodes connected to it are generally important. The mathematical formula for eigenvector centrality is as follows:

$$x_i = \frac{1}{\lambda} \sum_j A_{ij} x_j$$

Here:

- x_i , represents the eigenvector centrality of node i .
- λ is the largest eigenvalue (first principal eigenvalue).
- A_{ij} , equals 1 if there is a connection between nodes i and j and 0 otherwise.
- $\sum_j A_{ij} x_j$, multiply the nodes j that are directly connected to node i by the centrality of the eigenvector x_j of node j and sum.

Research Findings related to “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” Tagged Tweets

When the national and international literature is reviewed, various scientific studies on the concept of the “Echo Chamber” have made a significant contribution to the field. Akyüz and his colleagues (2021), who tried to determine for what purposes university students use new media and what their attitudes are on issues related to the construction, public circulation, and consumption processes of disinformation or fake/false news, concluded that university students doubt the accuracy criteria of political and security news and tend to believe fake news because of the “avoidance of research” and “political polarization” (Akyüz et al., 2021, p.216). The findings of our study coincide with those of Akyüz et al. (2021). Hence, it can be seen that X users are concerned about who will decide the accuracy/confirmation criteria of the news and disinformation issues with the law in question. It can be stated that this concern stems more from political polarization. This is because X users define the new law as the government’s law to silence public opinion.

Seval Yurtçiçek Özaydın and Ryosuke Nishida’s article “Fragmentation and Dynamics of Echo Chambers of Turkish Political Youth Groups on Twitter” (2021) on the dynamics of echo chambers of Turkish political youth groups’ Twitter (X) followers is one of the studies that confirmed the dynamics of echo chamber formation on social media on an

issue where ideological purification is sharp. Analyzing 5.5 million interactions between 2016 and 2018 on the tweets of the official youth organizations of Turkey's ruling and main opposition parties and the relatively independent Turkish Youth Union found that strong echo chambers were formed as a result of these interactions and that, with some small-scale exceptions, the parties polarized by exposing their ideological propositions. The findings that users generally follow two fragmented groups—the ruling and the opposition—and that the content shared is discussed in line with their political leanings confirm the tendency towards group polarization and extremism.

Serpil Yılmaz's master's thesis entitled "Echo Chamber Design in Social Networking Sites: The Case of Twitter" (2022) not only focused on the relationship of echo chambers to phenomena such as "othering," "polarization," and "cyber-balkanization" in the field of art, but also problematizes the tendency of Twitter users to use social media platforms to create echo chambers. The findings were obtained through interviews with 20 Twitter users.

Selected among the students at Sakarya University, as well as through observation and document analysis, the study concludes that Twitter has a manipulative design, that it emphasizes political discourses and ideological structures in terms of its purpose of use, and that the political content and provocative hashtags that are opened lead to political polarization and marginalization. The study also emphasizes that algorithms reinforce group membership, which serves to create echo chambers, ignore personal mistakes, and legitimize violence.

In another study on this topic, different social media platforms are analyzed to investigate how the flow of information affects the formation of echo chambers. A comparative analysis of more than 100 million posts on Gab, Facebook, Reddit, and X, especially on the controversial topics of "gun control, vaccination, and abortion," is conducted. The researchers state that their analysis focuses on two main issues. The first one is the homophilic (homosexual-loving) nature of the network, and the second one is the bias in the information published from like-minded sources. According to the results of this research, clustering among homophilic users dominates online dynamics. However, a direct comparison of news consumption on Facebook and Reddit revealed a higher level of discrimination against Facebook (Cinelli et al., 2021, p.1).

Another study concluded that echo chambers are stronger in offline social networks and that exposure to similar thoughts and information reinforces partisanship and polarization. However, the study also pointed out that consuming a one-way information diet does not always have negative consequences (Guess et al., 2018, p. 15). Hence, in our study conducted with the hashtag '#SUSyalMedyaYasası,' as in the aforementioned research, we concluded that the new social media law regulation was taken out of context in terms of both its content and scope, further strengthening some views and opinions, and this situation increased the echo chamber effect. In another study investigating the echo chamber effect, it was stated that X users form preferential groups/clusters. The study found that structuring individual accounts on the basis of shared ideology does not create clusters that polarize and exclude others (Bruns., 2017, P.9). In order to understand the echo chamber effect, the study recommends choosing more strategic topics, for example, conducting the research at a strategic time, "such as during an Australian federal or state

election or a period of intense partisan debate” (Bruns., 2017, p.9). (Bruns., 2017, p.9). Thus, in our study, with a similar concern in mind, the hashtag ‘#SUSyalMedyaYasası’ was strategically chosen to measure the echo chamber effect in Turkey.

Another scientific study in the related literature investigated mainstream news, alternative news, and online political activism. Because of the research, it was concluded that users resolve their cognitive dissonance by consuming information that supports their pre-existing beliefs or engaging in an information diet. It is especially important to note that “people who embrace a conspiracy theory in one area, such as the ‘non-existent’ link between vaccines and autism, tend to embrace the corpus of all other complete theories” (Quattrociocchi., 2017, p.63). This study overlaps at a similar point with our study conducted in the context of the hashtag ‘#SUSyalMedyaYasası’: The law regulating the virtual environment in legal terms is also understood by the masses in the context of various complementary theories rather than on the basis of a relatively pluralistic and democratic climate of opinion.

In a study conducted by Flaxman et al. (2016), to clarify the concerns of some academics that technological developments increase exposure to different viewpoints and that technological developments cause ideological discrimination, the web browsing histories of 50,000 users who regularly read online news in the USA were analyzed. The study found that “social networks and search engines play an important role in increasing the average ideological distance between individuals, that the majority of online news consumption consists of visiting the home pages of mainstream news sources, and that this consumption serves to soften the potential effects (both positive and negative) of recent technological changes” (Flaxman et al., 2016, p. 298). Unlike Flaxman et al.’s findings, in our study conducted in the context of the hashtag ‘#SUSyalMedyaYasası,’ we conclude that polarization increases as ideological distance increases.

In another scientific study, the hypothesis that the probability of being in an echo chamber decreases as individuals’ exposure to different forms of media increases and that the probability of being in an echo chamber decreases as political interest increases was tested. According to the results of the study, participants with no political interests experienced the echo chamber effect. Participants without political interests were less likely to be in the echo chamber because they had different media habits. In addition, participants on the extreme left or extreme right of the political spectrum are more likely to be in the echo chamber (Dubois and Blanki, 2018, p. 739). In our study, although we obtained similar clues about users clustered on the left and right political spectrum, we did not include the issue of whether users were exposed to different forms of media; therefore, we did not make such a measurement.

In another study examining the effects of filter bubbles and echo chamber on radicalization, a Randomly Assigned Controlled Trial (RCT) was conducted in X, where participants were randomly exposed to “filter bubble” (personalization algorithm) pressure. The results of this study suggest that the echo chamber effect may be due to the filter bubble and that more research is needed on online network structures for radicalization (Wolfowicz et al., 2023, p. 119). Based on a similar need, in our study, we wanted to test whether the selected topic creates a radicalization in the tendencies of X users to determine whether filter bubble pressure operates among users with different

views on a topic such as law, which is not directly political but has strategic and critical importance in the Turkish political conjuncture, taking into account the breadth of coverage and influence of effective political discourse in Turkey.

In this study, we found 20,036 connections among 7,150 actors in the tweets shared with the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” tag. The analysis revealed that the diameter of the network (Maximum Geodesic Distance) was 13. This represents the longest distance along the shortest path between any two nodes. In other words, any user’s message in a network can reach another user through a maximum of 14 intermediaries. For example, a user posted a tweet, and other users retweeted it. This action propagates in a chain-like manner, reaching up to the 14th user. Thus, a user’s message can reach a maximum of 14 users, and it ends with the 15th person. Furthermore, as the “Maximum Geodesic Distance” distances from the “Average Geodesic Distance”, it can be said that information spreads more slowly. On the contrary, in the opposite case, it can be stated that it spreads faster. In network analysis, the ‘Maximum Geodesic Distance’ was calculated as 13, while the “Average Geodesic Distance” was found to be 4.058472. According to this result, if users do not encounter a different argument that leads them to change their attitudes and beliefs up to the 13th node, they may get lost in the echo chamber effect. In other words, it takes significant time for new information to reach a user.

In this study, the maximum “In-Degree” value in the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” network created by X users was 1205, and the maximum “Out-Degree” value was 77. According to these values, there is a difference in the interaction coming from and going to the actors in the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” network. The difference between the “In-Degree” and “Out-Degree” values indicates activity within the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” network. In other words, the interaction within the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” network is high. One of the remarkable results that emerged from this analysis is the “Betweenness Centrality” value. “Betweenness Centrality” indicates the importance of each node in bridging different sections of the network. In other words, it points to nodes that, if deleted, would decrease communication and interaction within the network. In the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” network, the maximum value for “Betweenness Centrality” was 11,788,476.790. If the user with the highest “Betweenness Centrality” value is removed from the network, this means that communication and interaction in the network will weaken, leading to disruption of the network’s structure. In this study, the maximum value of “Eigenvector Centrality” was calculated as 0.345. The ‘Eigenvector Centrality’ value is determined based on the weight of the respective user and its neighbours in the network. Based on this value, it is possible to identify the most prestigious and influential user in the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” network, who holds the highest power and reputation. When the actor with the highest Betweenness Centrality value in the network, y***** (dark green color and other colors clustered around it), is deleted, the interaction, communication, and density in the network decrease significantly. The total number of messages analyzed decreased from 20,036 to 7150. In addition, when we observe the network, the network does not disintegrate, but the intensity of the interaction shifts to that of the second actor. However, the intensity of communication outgoing from and incoming to the second actor decreased by 64.31% compared to the first actor. In order to strengthen the findings of this study, apart from the betweenness centrality value, we also investigated different

in-degree and out-degree users to measure the node/edge importance. In this manner, the most influential actor was removed from the network, and the network was observed again. The graphs presented below support the claims and conclusions of the study.

Table 1

Interaction Data for The Two Most Influential Users In The Interaction Table According To The Betweenness Centrality Value

Vertex	Subgraph	Color	Shape	Size	Opacity	Image	file	Visibility	Label	Label Fill	Label Color	Label Position	Tooltip	Degree	In-Degree	Out-Degree	Betweenness Centrality	Closeness Centrality	Eigenvector Centrality
3	y [redacted]						https://pbs.twimg.com								1205	60	11788476,790	0,371	0,345
4	y [redacted]						https://pbs.twimg.com								397	1	6455356,747	0,249	0,000




Figure 1. The interaction network graph of user yigido**, which is the most influential actor according to the betweenness centrality value




Figure 2. The interaction network graph of the zeki** user, which is the second most influential actor, according to the betweenness centrality value

Table 2
Interaction data for the two most influential users in the interaction table

Vertex	Subgraph	Color	Shape	Size	Opacity	Image File	Visibility	Label	Label Fill Color	Label Position	Tooltip	Degree	In-Degree	Out-Degree	Betweenness Centrality	Closeness Centrality	Eigenvector Centrality
y								https://pbs.twimg.co					1205	60	11788476,790	0,371	0,345
								https://pbs.twimg.co				624	18	6005138,232	0,322	0,119	



Figure 3. The interaction network graph of user yigido**, which is the most influential actor according to the in-degree value




Figure 4. The Interaction Network Graph of The İlk** User, Which Is The Second Most Influential Actor According To The In-Degree Value

Table 3

Interaction Data for The Six Most Influential Users In The Interaction Table According To Out-Of-Order Values

	Vertex	Subgraph	Color	Shape	Size	Opacity	Image	File	Visibility	Label	Label Fill	Label Color	Label Position	Tooltip	Degree	In-Degree	Out-Degree	Betweenness Centrality	Closeness Centrality	Eigenvector Centrality	
2																					
3										https://pbs.twimg.com/profile_images/1178847679012121600/y...						23	77	3009842,615	0,346	0,058	
4										https://pbs.twimg.com/profile_images/1178847679012121600/y...				sons		297	76	1828871,289	0,351	0,204	
5										https://pbs.twimg.com/profile_images/1178847679012121600/y...				sane		25	63	189397,857	0,307	0,076	
6										https://pbs.twimg.com/profile_images/1178847679012121600/y...				y		1205	60	11788476,790	0,371	0,345	




Figure 5. The interaction network graph of user lale**, which is the most influential actor according to the out-of-degree value




Figure 6. The Interaction Network Graph Of User Sonsuzluk**, The Second Most Influential Actor, According To The Off-Degree Value

Table 4

According to the betweenness centrality value, the interaction data of the two most influential users in the betweenness centrality table formed after the data of the most influential user, *yigi***, in the interaction table are removed.

Labels				Graph Metrics									
Vertex	Label	Label Fill Color	Label Position	Tooltip	Degree	In-Degree	Out-Degree	Betweenness Centrality	Closeness Centrality	Eigenvector Centrality	PageRank	Clustering Coefficient	Reciprocated Vertex Pair Ratio
4					624	18	5983786,137	0,320	0,135	0,009	0,001	0,006	
5					397	1	5914300,303	0,248	0,000	0,008	0,000	0,000	



Figure 7. Network graph of user *ilk***, the most influential user in the betweenness centrality table, formed after removing the data of user *yigi***, the most influential user in the interaction table according to the betweenness centrality value



Figure 8. Network Graph Of User Zek**, The Second Most Influential User In The Betweenness Centrality Table, Formed After Removing The Data Of User Yigi**, The Most Influential User In The Interaction Table According To Betweenness Centrality Value

Table 5
 The Interaction Data Of The Two Most Influential Users In The Within-Order Table Formed After The Data Of The Most Influential User Yigi** In The Interaction Table According To The Betweenness Centrality Value Are Removed

Vertex	Subgraph	Color	Shape	Size	Opacity	Image	File	Visibility	Label	Label Fill	Label Color	Label Position	Tooltip	Degree	In-Degree	Out-Degree	Betweenness Centrality	Closeness Centrality
1							https://pbs.twimg.com/profile_images/1310111111111111111/ilk_57Direnene_dov		ilk_57Direnene , döv					624	18	6005138,232	0,322	
2							https://pbs.twimg.com/profile_images/1310111111111111111/zekibahceSaldim_cayı		zekibahceSaldim cayı					397	1	6455356,747	0,249	




Figure 9. Network graph of user ilk**, the most influential user in the within-degree table, formed after removing the data of user yigi**, the most influential user in the interaction table according to the betweenness centrality value




Figure 10. The Network Graph Of User Zek**, The Second Most Influential User In The Within-Degree Table, Was Formed After Removing The Data Of User Yigi**, The Most Influential User In The Interaction Table According To The Betweenness Centrality Value

Table 6

Interaction Data Of The Two Most Influential Users In The Out-Of-Order Table Formed After Removing The Data Of The Most Influential User Yiğit** From The Interaction Table According To The Betweenness Centrality Value.

	Vertex	Label	Label Fill	Label	Position	Tooltip	Degree	In-Degree	Out-Degree	Betweenness Centrality	Closeness Centrality	Eigenvector Centrality	PageRank	Clustering Coefficient	Reciprocated Vertex Pair Ratio
4								23	76	2354962,486	0,330	0,062	0,000	0,043	0,032
5								296	75	1909590,036	0,337	0,236	0,002	0,023	0,105




Figure 11. The Network Graph Of User Lal**, The Most Influential User In The Out-Of-Degree Table, Was Formed After Removing The Data Of User Yiğit**, The Most Influential User In The Interaction Table According To The Betweenness Centrality Value




Figure 12. Network Graph Of User Son**, The Second Most Influential User In The Out-Of-Degree Table, After Removing The Data Of User Yigi**, The Most Influential User In The Interaction Table According To The Betweenness Centrality Value

In this study, network visualizations were created using the selected settings and calculations in the NodeXL program, and the “Fruchterman-Reingold Algorithm” was used for this process. “Fruchterman-Reingold” is one of the most commonly used algorithms for social network visualizations. Networks consist of different nodes, and the relationship between these nodes is called “connection” or “link”. Connections can be either ‘directed’ or “undirected”. The “Fruchterman-Reingold Algorithm” can successfully visualize both directed and undirected networks (Fruchterman, & Reingold,

1991). The “Fruchterman-Reingold Algorithm” was used in the network visualizations which are presented below, and descriptive analyses were conducted, and the vertex size was calculated according to the weight in the “Eigenvector Centrality”. The “Eigenvector Centrality” determines the influence and importance of a node in a network (Newman, 2010). In this context, the influence and importance of a node depend not only on its neighbouring nodes but also on how influential they are within their nodes. According to this power direction, it can be seen that some users are left outside the map, and there is a clustering towards the centre of the visualization. In other words, it can be concluded that the most influential actors in the network are gathered towards the centre through this algorithm, whereas the less influential actors remain on the periphery. In the following section, a more detailed descriptive analysis of the findings is presented, accompanied by the network visualizations of these findings.

Network Visualization and Descriptive Analysis of ‘#SUSyalMedyaYasası’

It is observed that the tweet receiving the highest interaction in the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” network, based on the ‘In-Degree’ value, is the post by the user ‘y*****’ which states, “Let justice prevail, even if doomsday comes #SUSyalMedyaYasası”. In other words, in the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” network, the user ‘y*****’ receives the highest number of interactions based on the “In-Degree” value. The network visualization and descriptive analysis of the interactions received by the account ‘y*****’ are as shown in Figure 13.




Figure 13. In-Degree Fruchterman-Reingold network visualization for the user ‘y*****’

‘y*****’ account shared 5 tweets. The account received 76 responses. According to the descriptive analysis conducted based on the tweet selection criteria mentioned above, the messages shared by the “y*****” account are as follows: “Yaşar Nuri Öztürk 🙏👉 #SUSyalMedyaYasası, #PricesIncreased, From where to where. #SUSyalMedyaYasası, #WeHaveSeenThis, From where to where. #SUSyalMedyaYasası, I only applaud Melek Mosso 🙏👉 #SUSyalMedyaYasası.” The visuals attached to the tweets of the user ‘y*****’ are presented in Figures 1a and 1b.



a.



b.

Western countries do not want Turkey enlightened by Atatürk’s prescription. However, they fully support a Turkey poisoned and paralysed by religious propaganda.
Yaşar Nuri Öztürk

Once a time, we used to produce sugar beets. We would make sugar and sell it to the world.

Image 1 a, b. ‘The visuals attached to his/her tweets by the user ‘y*****’

The user ‘y*****’ touches upon the topics currently on the agenda in Turkey in his/her tweets. Indeed, it is possible to infer this from the visual (sugar beets) attached to the expressions “prices increased, from where to where, we have seen this”. In addition, in the user’s tweet that says “I only applaud Melek Mosso”, his/her reaction can be seen regarding the cancellation of Melek Mosso’s concert at the Isparta International Rose Festival, which was scheduled to take place on June 3, 2022, for moral reasons. The user draws attention to the effect of the Western world on Turkey and claims that Turkey has transformed into a society of atomized individuals through ‘religious propaganda’ by using a quote from Yaşar Nuri Öztürk to support his/her argument. The user ‘y*****’ is the most prominent user in the ‘#SUSyalMedyaYasası’ network based on the ‘In-Degree’ value, receiving the highest number of interactions. This user especially associates the hashtag ‘#SUSyalMedyaYasası’ with the problems related to the economy and artists in Turkey and also underscores that the Western world desires a Turkey that is isolated from the principles and values of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Whether or not other users share similar discourses and thoughts with the user named ‘y*****’ in their interactions with the messages of the user named ‘y*****’ is an important statistic in terms of

revealing the echo chamber effect. In this context, some of the responses to the tweets of ‘y*****’ are as follows:

“Nowadays, the country’s sources of livelihood are no longer industry, agriculture, and animal husbandry; Traffic fines, paid military service, construction amnesty, fuel, alcohol, and cigarette price increases, and taxes.” We have become a society enslaved to daily price increases, with bills piling up. What should we do now? Should we only speak truth in our afterlife? #SUSyalMedyaYasası”

“We will call wrong as wrong and crooked as crooked. We will not cower or fear. We will not stay silent. We won’t be afraid. #SUSyalMedyaYasası”

“This is a psychological manipulation. #SUSyalMedyaYasası. What is the criterion for distinguishing real news from misleading information that deceives the public? Citizens complain about poverty and are not able to make ends meet, the media reports, and the president says there is no one struggling. Now, which of this information is the true news?#SUSyalMedyaYasası”

“Hooray, now @news won’t be able to deceive people with manipulation and fake news anymore.” We’re already writing the truth. That is why we are not afraid of #SUSyalMedyaYasası!!”

“THEY DON’T LIKE PEOPLE WHO THINK, SPEAK AND QUESTION 🗣️🗣️
DOWN WITH DESPOTISM, LONG LIVE FREEDOM ! #SUSyalMedyaYasası”

“#LPG 4,49 ₺ 11,40 ₺ #Gas 7.80 ₺ 25.30 ₺ #Diesel fuel 7.26 ₺ 24.50 ₺
#SUSyalMedyaYasası”

“Price increase Ok, Well done... #SUSyalMedyaYasası”

“Gezi is not just an event.” Gezi is our pride. #Gezi9yaşında #SUSyalMedyaYasası”

“Will the #SUSyalMedyaYasası be applicable to the trolls who claim that the slogan “EVERYWHERE IS TAKSİM” chanted at the Maltepe People’s Rally, is twisted on social media as “EVERYWHERE IS TAKSİM”? Or is the regulation being made only for the opposition? “#SUSyalMedyaYasası 🗣️ Sometimes a single silent frame speaks too much. 🗣️”

It can be observed that the responses from other users to the tweets from the account ‘y*****’ overlap with each other. Indeed, authors emphasize that individuals feel less isolated in the online environment; however, they still observe the general climate of public opinion out of fear of being socially isolated and sometimes adopt discourses that align with those of the authorities, refraining from expressing their true thoughts (Liu and Fahmy, 2011, p.47). In other words, adherence to conformity operates strongly in the online realm. This situation, as in the case of the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” network, easily leads to the echo chamber effect. Indeed, as users respond to the actor ‘y*****’ in the discussion, they make various inferences about the nature of the new social media law, but these inferences closely align with statements made by the main actor almost identically. Social media users provide a series of anecdotal evidence in inferences regarding Turkey’s recent prospects. Users emphasize that the nature of the law is not capable of addressing the deficiencies in Turkey’s social media public sphere. On the contrary, they argue that there is an attempt to hinder discussions about significant social events and

developments in Turkey, and highlight the media's failure to bring current issues to the agenda. In particular, in the past, headlines that expressed reactions when price increases occurred could be seen on social media. Nowadays, it's like the government's bulletin board, with everything simply labelled as 'price increase'. In her tweet "Price increase Ok, Well done... #SUSyalMedyaYasası" the user subtly referred to agenda-setting theory, accusing the media of constructing the agenda. They criticise/criticize the media for to stimulate critical thinking, create a platform for meaningful discussions on specific issues and channel public reactions into institutional political platforms. However, they do not mention the positive contributions that this law could bring to the public sphere of social media. They view this law as a 'suppression law' and a 'silencing law' in short.



Image 2. Tweet is over.

The phrase “the tweet is over” is included in Image 2. The phrase “the tweet is over” should be understood as an implied and somewhat ironic response by the user, which can be interpreted as “I have run out of things to say”, “that’s it for my defense”, “okay, I’m done”, etc. In the messages received by the user ‘y*****’, it is evident that there is a prevailing belief that the social media law is being enacted to prevent criticism of the government in economic, cultural, and political matters, and to suppress citizens’ freedom of expression. On the other hand, another observed result is that opposition users tend to harbour the suspicion that social media law is enacted solely to intervene in their activities. Furthermore, it should be noted that the message “Let justice prevail, even if doomsday comes #SUSyalMedyaYasası” shared from the account of the user ‘y*****’ in the presented network visualization is a retweet. The user ‘y*****’ responded to the message with a ‘self-loop’ characteristic shared from the account ‘h*****’, which states, “Stay silent about poverty!” Stay silent about inflation! Stay silent about injustices! Stay silent about lies and plundering! We will not stay silent #SUSyalMedyaYasası”. The term ‘self-loops’ refers to ‘self-contained messages. The circles in Figure 14 represent self-loop messages. The red circle in the network diagram represents the user ‘h*****’. Both the user ‘y*****’ and the user ‘h*****’ attached an image titled ‘Justice for Ezgi’ to their messages (Image 3). This image calls for justice for women who have fallen victims of murder. It is possible to see this image and the call-to-action in many tweets on the ‘#SUSyalMedyaYasası’ network. Users are concerned that the new social media legislation will also hinder such calls to action.



Image 3. Justice for Ezgi visualization of the user ‘h*****’.




Figure 14. The Fruchterman-Reingold network (self-loops)

The prominent actor in the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” network based on the “Out-Degree” value is the user ‘1*****’. The user ‘*****’ shared 4 posts from his/her account. Users interacted with the actor ‘1*****’ who had the highest number of interactions with others through 100 posts. The tweet of the user ‘1*****’ as follows: “Those who board the boat of a godless imposter, shamelessly proclaiming ‘Let’s kill the great leaders to save the world’ and leading this country to the edge of the abyss, Turkish history will never forgive you! #SUSyalMedyaYasası.” Other tweets shared by the user ‘1*****’ are as follows: “Don’t we have a single patriotic representative in the parliament? #SUSyalMedyaYasası #SosyalMedyayaKelepce. It seems they are more afraid of the truth. #SUSyalMedyaYasası #SosyalMedyayaKelepce.” The highest number of connections based on the ‘Out-Degree’ value was directed towards the account named ‘1*****’. This user expresses that lawmakers should react to the new social media




Figure 15. The Out-Degree Fruchterman-Reingold network visualization of the user ‘!*****’

According to the given data, it can be observed that the account with the highest content production is the account of the user ‘!*****’. The messages constructed by other users whose tweets were received from this account are as follows:

“After exercising your freedom of expression, you will no longer be free. #SUSyalMedyaYasası.”

“Enough is enough!” Solve the problems of citizens. Pro-government websites, bootlicking media, especially A News, spread false news all day long. First, fix them. Are you also going to silence us? Say NO to censorship law #SUSyalMedyaYasası”

“Our problem is that we are trying to seek justice through this platform. The problem will be solved with the unity of our people, that unity that includes all 81 provinces—rightists, leftists, nationalists, and Muslims. Only then can we prevent threats against those who want to speak the truth. Wake up. #SUSyalMedyaYasası”

“They don’t want anyone to learn the truth.” It’s clear and straightforward: any sharing that the government dislikes can now lead to imprisonment... #SUSyalMedyaYasası”

“We were supposed to establish a national and local social media platform, but instead, a law was introduced to silence national and local individuals on social media. From where to where ... #SUSyalMedyaYasası”

“#SUSyalMedyaYasası the sustenance of pharaohs is indifference and silence... As silence persists, oppression will grow and become insurmountable.”

“‘#SUSyalMedyaYasası’ Start with your trolls because it is your trolls who are spreading the biggest lies, uttering unspeakable profanities and crossing all limits with their tweets. #SosyalMedyayaKelepce”

When the above tweets and similar posts in this context, which could not be included here, are analyzed descriptively, users can be said to imply that the new social media law will not intervene with pro-government media, but rather emphasize that the real target is oppositional posts. Moreover, they highlight that mainstream media distorts societal truths and manipulates the masses, causing them to disconnect from the true issues in the country. These users, who are concerned that expressing the truth will be considered a crime, argue that the government is trying to prevent the public from learning the truth. Users who express that this law is a law of silencing also approach the notion that the law will serve as a measure against unethical attacks targeting the most vulnerable groups in the public sphere of social media, such as children, women, the elderly, youth, political minorities, disadvantaged groups, etc., with scepticism. One particularly remarkable issue here is the ambiguity regarding the criteria for determining the accuracy/verification of news. Indeed, users are heavily concerned because it is the political power that ultimately decides whether information, which is claimed to manipulate the masses, carries a distortion purpose or not. This situation raises serious concerns. In general, it can be emphasized that users believe that discussions and statements about the deteriorating state of the economy are truly being silenced. Users in the ‘#SUSyalMedyaYasası’ network are also offering solutions and suggestions regarding this issue. In this regard, it is expressed that an ideology-free approach is necessary despite the threat of silencing. It is stated that by genuinely believing in and expressing what one knows and thinks while avoiding offensive language, one can also escape the grip of censorship. If these paths are not chosen, it is emphasized that just like television screens, social media will become a silenced public sphere. Such a situation significantly casts a shadow over the nature of the public sphere of social media.

Another value analyzed in this study, as previously mentioned, is the ‘Eigenvector Centrality’ value. This value is determined based on the weight/power that the user and their neighbours possess in the network. It is possible to identify the most prestigious actor in the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” network, who has greater power and reputation than others, on the basis of this value. In this study, the most prominent actor in the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” network is seen to be the user ‘y*****’ both in terms of ‘Eigenvector Centrality’ value and ‘In-Degree’ value. Therefore, the focus shifted to the second most influential actor according to the ‘Eigenvector Centrality’ value. In this study, the second most influential actor was the user ‘s*****’. Accordingly, 5 tweets were shared from the account named ‘s*****’ and these tweets are as follows:

“The more taboos there are in a country, the less freedom there exists.” Aziz Nesin said, ‘We will solve Turkey’s problems.’ What have you been waiting 20 years to solve them for 20 years? Come and be silent!!!! #SUSyalMedyaYasası. The resistance of those who do not submit is 9 years old. Darkness fades away, Gezi remains....! #Gezi9Yaşında 🙄 #SUSyalMedyaYasası.” When the content of these tweets is examined, it can be seen that the user emphasized that the political government could not solve vital problems

and made reference to the Gezi Park events. The network visualization of this user is presented in Figure 16.



Figure 16. Eigenvector Centrality network visualization of the user 's*****'

During the analysis process, 105 responses were received from other users who interacted with the user named 's*****'. Tweets shared by users are as follows:

“Social media law contains provisions that restrict freedom of thought and expand state surveillance and control. You seem to think that if we remain silent, the issue will disappear. But what if history remains silent? If history remains silent, then truths will not be silenced. #SUSyalMedyaYasası social media will not be shut down!”

“The government, by increasing the wages of the retired, workers, and public servants once a year, and by raising the prices of electricity, natural gas, and gasoline 10 times a year, is introducing the law of #SUSyalMedyaYasası, hoping that we will not write or speak about it. If you remain silent today, if you stay quiet, you will never be able to speak again...”

“Until today, they only banned the truth. Those who try banning everything are afraid of certain things. We will see, we will hear, and we will put our words into writing....!!! #SUSyalMedyaYasası”

“I will not be silent, I will not give up, Never and ever, I will not be afraid. #SUSyalMedyaYasası”

“If disinformation is the case, A Haber and the troll accounts are in trouble ..(!) #SUSyalMedyaYasası.”

As evident from the above tweets, the tweets from the account ‘s*****’ suggest that the new social media law will pose barriers to freedom of expression. Other users who interact with the account ‘s*****’ also share similar thoughts with him/her. The new social media law is perceived by users as a sanction that restricts freedom of thought and opinion. With this law, there is a prevailing concern that it will establish an effective surveillance mechanism, particularly within pro-government circles, over public opinion. On the other hand, the analysed tweets of the users share a common view regarding the purpose of the new social media law. They believe that the law will suppress criticism of opposition groups regarding the country’s economy. In addition, these users also expressed concern that the new social media law will only impose sanctions on opposition voices, worsening the fear of selective targeting. Especially among opposition users, pro-government users engaging in ‘trolling’ behaviour, emphasizing that the first intervention should target politically aligned users supporting the government. In particular, from the tweet “If disinformation is the case, A Haber and the troll accounts are in trouble (!) #SUSyalMedyaYasası”, it can be understood that the new social media law is being approached by opposition users from a partisan perspective.

The tweet shared by another user, “If the media belongs to the sultan, social media is ours...!! 🙌 #SUSyalMedyaYasası” confirms the belief that mainstream or widespread media are under the control of groups financed by the political government. On the other hand, this indicates that new communication platforms have relatively escaped the grip of monopolized ownership and various structural determinants, such as dependence on official announcements and advertisements, paper aid, tax cuts, and so on, which serve as sources of income for traditional media.

Another notable result that stands out in the analysis section is related to the “Betweenness Centrality” value. As mentioned previously, “Betweenness Centrality” indicates the importance of each node in bridging different sections of the network. In other words, the actor with the highest Betweenness Centrality value keeps the nodes that provide interaction, communication, and density in the network together. In the ‘#SUSyalMedyaYasası’ network, the maximum value of “Betweenness Centrality” was found to be 11788476.790. According to Betweenness Centrality, the user ‘y*****’ emerges as the most influential actor. This actor is also the most influential according to

the mentioned “Eigenvector Centrality” and “In-Degree” values. Therefore, the focus shifted to the second most influential actor according to the “Betweenness Centrality” value. ‘Betweenness Centrality’ is an important measure because if users with the highest or close to the highest value are removed from the network, The density in the network’s information system decreases significantly.

In other words, if a user has a high “Betweenness Centrality” value, it can be said that this actor serves as the information hub of the network. In this context, the tweets of users who control information exchange and communication as the information hub in the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” network are of great importance. In this regard, the user named ‘z*****’ is the most influential actor in the network “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” after ‘y*****’. The tweet shared by the actor is as follows: “Ekrem is in Van, buses are on the roof... HDP IS WHAT THE CHP IS #SUSyalMedyaYasası.” The user ‘z*****’ sent 1 message from his/her account, and the number of interactions received by this user was 397. The network visualization of the user named ‘z*****’ (Figure 17) and the content he/she used to support his/her tweet are presented in Figure 18.




Figure 17. Betweenness Centrality network visualization of the user ‘z*****’



Image 18. Of an accident attached to his/her tweet by the user ‘z*****’

In the analysis, it was found that out of the users who interacted with the actor ‘z*****’, 397 of them said, “Ekrem is in Van, buses are on the roof... HDP IS WHAT THE CHP IS #SUSyalMedyaYasası. These data confirmed the echo chamber phenomenon. Indeed, users detached the ‘#SUSyalMedyaYasası’ hashtag from its original context and constructed it solely by supporting the expressions of the actors they followed. Moreover, in these messages, without presenting any arguments, they argue that CHP is the same as HDP, which they directly associate with terrorism. In this regard, both the HDP and the CHP are being coded as two factions that betray the country. As expressed by Suler (2005, p.184) stated, users in virtual environments believe that they can share expressions involving profanity, violence, bullying, perversion, lies, threats, and hate without facing consequences. As demonstrated in this example, users perceive online fiction differently from offline realities, leading them to act as though online

discourse has no tangible consequences in the real world. Social media is often perceived as a public space where ethical and moral principles are ignored and where identity and differences are disregarded (Suler, 2005, pp.186-187).

Results and Suggestions

In this study, the maximum geodesic distance in the #SUSyalMedyaYasası network formed by X users with 20,036 connections and 7,150 actors was 13. This represents the longest distance along the shortest path between two nodes. In other words, a message from one user in the network can be sent to another user through a maximum of 14 intermediaries. In addition, the farther the “maximum geodesic distance” is from the “average geodesic distance,” the slower the information travels. In contrast, the closer it gets, the faster the information spreads. In the network analysis, the “Maximum Geodesic Distance” was calculated as 13, while the “Average Geodesic Distance” was found to be 4.058472. According to this result, if users do not encounter arguments that change their attitudes and beliefs until the 13th node, they may become lost in the echo chamber effect. In other words, it may take a long time for new information to reach the user. In this respect, it is concluded that the information circulating in the #SocialMediaLaw network generally carries similar attitudes and beliefs.

In network analysis, the maximum in-degree value was 1205, and the maximum out-degree value was 77. The in-degree value indicates the highest number of interactions. According to this value, users argue that the law is trying to prevent the discussion of important social events and developments in Turkey. Complaining about the media’s failure to put the public’s problems on the agenda, users see the media as a bulletin board for the government. According to the “In-Degree” value, users perceive the law as a “law of suppression,” in short, a “law of silence.” The “Out-Degree” value refers to the most outgoing connections. According to this value, users stated that the new social media law will not affect pro-government media. In addition, the mainstream media is believed to distort social facts and manipulate the masses. X users are sceptical about the idea that the law can also serve as a measure against unethical attacks against children, women, the elderly, youth, and the most vulnerable groups in the social media public sphere.

In this study, the “Betweenness Centrality” value was found to be 11,788,476,790. If a user with this value is removed from the network, communication and interaction in the network will reduce. In other words, Betweenness Centrality indicates the importance of each node in bridging different parts of the network. In this study, the maximum value of “Eigenvector Centrality” was calculated as 0.345. The Eigenvector Centrality value is determined by the weight of the user and its neighbors in the network. Based on this value, it is possible to identify the most prestigious and influential user of the #SocialMediaLaw network with the highest power and reputation. If the actor with the highest “Betweenness Centrality” value is removed from the network, the interaction, communication, and density in the network decrease significantly. In fact, the interaction decreased by 64.31% when this actor was deleted. The messages sent and the replies received by the user with this value are similar. The hashtag “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” is used out of context and associated with expressions containing hate speech.

The “Eigenvector Centrality” value was calculated as 0.345, indicating the most prestigious and influential users. In the messages posted according to this value, it can

be seen that the new social media law will be used as a sanctioning tool that restricts freedom of thought and opinion and will operate like a surveillance mechanism to sanction dissenting voices.

The results obtained in the current study can be summarized as follows: While the new social media law aims to prevent the creation of illegal content from fake accounts that foster hatred and discrimination based on national origin, religious beliefs, class differences, sexism, disabilities, and ageism, and users engage in insults, defamation, or disparagement of institutions or individuals, users within the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” network have disregarded this purpose entirely. Instead, they predominantly engage in partisan debates on various issues concerning the country through the hashtag, creating a sharp polarization with their different discourses.

It has been revealed that users within the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” network believe that their messages primarily aim to prevent the use of “troll/fake/false accounts”. Furthermore, it has been observed that users perceive the law within a partisan cognitive framework and emphasize that the law has been enacted to shut down media outlets such as newspapers, magazines, television channels, etc., which they perceive as the media of the “other”.

In addition, users who believe that the new law violates democracy and freedom of expression argue that the government intends to enact this law as a serious obstacle to the free formation of public opinion. This viewpoint was also supported by the most influential actors within the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” network and the other users clustered around these actors.

In the “#SUSyalMedyaYasası” network, similar voices are often echoed, and individuals under the influence of the echo chamber effect tend to overlook the contribution that the law can make to the public sphere of social media. Consequently, the topic is being discussed in entirely different contexts, thereby leading users to frequently express the belief that the government does not want citizens to think freely and express their thoughts boldly.

Due to the echo chamber effect, users who describe the law as the ‘silence law’ hardly mention unethical attacks targeting the most vulnerable segments, including children, women, the elderly, youth, members of political minorities, and other disadvantaged groups, which the law promises to prevent.

When evaluated from the perspective of critical media literacy, it can be concluded that users do not perceive the law as contributing to the development of important and positive values such as tolerance, empathy, and understanding pluralism. However, they appear to be quite conscious of the media’s responsibilities towards the public.

Summing up the expressed points so far, it can be said that users hold a perspective suggesting that the new social media law will only impose sanctions on individuals with dissenting thoughts and opinions, while no intervention will be made towards the supporters of the government. In fact, one of the remarkable results of this study is related to the issue of who will decide on the accuracy/confirmation criteria of the news. In this regard, users often state that the issues expressed in the law should be clarified more clearly.

In light of all these results, it should be suggested that, in addition to internalizing human rights, freedom of expression, democratic values, tolerance, and understanding pluralism, it is also possible to avoid the echo chamber and filter bubble effects by engaging in various social media practices. In this regard, some applications such as PolitEcho, which reveals the political tendencies of Facebook users' friends on social media; Public Broadcasting Service, which measures whether the audience is inside an echo chamber and to what extent; FlipFeed, which flips political views on X by showing users different news, perspectives, comments, photos, etc., to break polarization among users with entrenched beliefs; Read Across The Aisle, which allows users to read news from various sources and see their political leanings/directions to demonstrate political bias; and Escape Your Bubble, which paints content related to individuals and views that Facebook users want to be more accepting of are some examples in this context. All these applications are actually data curators. The applications listed above are trying to reduce the effect of echo by doing what social media users should normally do on their behalf. Through these applications, users can prudently review their thoughts or fabricate more accepting opinions. In summary, these applications can be considered to make significant contributions to creating a relatively pluralistic and democratic climate of opinion in the public sphere of social media, by breaking the echo chamber effect. Recommendations for researchers and interested parties; this study is limited to X data; the impact of the new social media law on public opinion can also be analyzed on other social media platforms (Facebook, Instagram, Reddit, etc.). By analyzing the demographic information (age, gender, geographical location, etc.) of users who tweet, we can investigate whether there are demographic criteria in the echo chamber effect.

Peer-review: Externally peer-reviewed.

Conflict of Interest: The authors have no conflict of interest to declare.

Grant Support: The authors declared that this study has received no financial support.

Author Contributions: Conception/Design of study: H.K., B.B.A.; Data Acquisition: H.K., B.B.A.; Data Analysis/ Interpretation: H.K., B.B.A.; Drafting Manuscript: H.K., B.B.A.; Critical Revision of Manuscript: H.K., B.B.A.; Final Approval and Accountability: H.K., B.B.A.

References

- Akyüz, S. S.; Kazaz, M. & Gülnar, B. (2021). İletişim fakültesi öğrencilerinin sahte/yalan haberlerle ilgili görüşlerine yönelik betimleyici bir çalışma. *Selçuk İletişim*, 14(1), 216-239.
- Barabási, A.-L. & Albert, R. (1999). Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks. *Science*, 286(5439), 509-512.
- Berger, J. & Milkman, K. L. (2012). What makes online content viral?, *Journal of Marketing Research*, 49(2), 192-205.
- Bonacich, P. (1972). Factoring and weighting approaches to status scores and clique identification. *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 2(1), 113-120.
- Boyd, D., Golder S. & Lotan, G. (2010). Tweet, tweet, retweet: Conversational aspects of retweeting on Twitter. In 2010 43rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (pp. 1-10). IEEE.
- Bozdog, E. (2013). Bias in algorithmic filtering and personalisation. *Ethics and Information Technology*, 15(3), 209-227, s. 213.
- Bruns, A. (2017). Echo chamber? What echo chamber? Reviewing the evidence. in 6th Biennial Future of Journalism Conference, September (FOJ17). 2017-09-15. Retrieved from <https://eprints.qut.edu.au/113937/>
- Cinelli, M., De Francisci Morales, G., Galeazzi, A., Quattrociocchi W. & Starnini, M. (2021). The echo chamber effect on social media. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 118(9), e2023301118.
- Cinelli, M., Morales, G. D. F., Galeazzi, A., Quattrociocchi W. & Starnini, M. (2021). The Echo Chamber Effect on Social Media, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 118(9), 1-8. Retrieved from <https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.2023301118>

- Coviello, L., Sohn, Y., Kramer, A. D., Marlow, C., Franceschetti, M., Christakis NA. & Fowler, J. H. (2014). Detecting emotional contagion in massive social networks. *PLoS one*, 9(3), e90315.
- Creswell, J. W. (2013). *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches* (4th ed.). Sage Publications.
- Dijkstra, E. W. (1959). A note on two problems in connexion with graphs. *Numerische mathematik*, 1(1), 269-271.
- Dubois, E. & Blank, G. (2018). The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating effect of political interest and diverse media. *Information, communication & society*, 21(5), 729-745.
- Dutton, W. H., Reisdorf, B. C., Dubois, E. & Blank, G. (2017). Search and politics: The use and impact of searches in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the United States. Retrieved from https://ora.ox.ac.uk/catalog/uuid:2ccc8e9b-ccc1-4339-9916_84715a62066c/download_file?file_format=application%2Fpdf&safe_filename=Blank%2Bet%2Bal%2C%2BSearch%2Band%2Bpolitics.pdf
- Flaxman, S., Goel S. & Rao, J. M. (2016). Filter bubbles, echo chambers, and online news consumption. *Public opinion quarterly*, 80(S1), 298-320.
- Freeman, L. C. (1979). Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification. *Social Networks*, 1(3), 215-239. doi:10.1016/0378-8733(78)90021-7
- Fruchterman, T. M. & Reingold, E. M. (1991). Graph drawing by force-directed placement. *Software: Practise and experience*, 21(11), 1129-1164.
- Girvan, M. & Newman, M. E. (2002). Community structures in social and biological networks. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 99(12), 7821-7826.
- González-Bailón, S., Borge-Holthoefer, J., Rivero A. & Moreno, Y. (2011). Dynamics of protest recruitment through an online network. *Scientific reports*, 1(1), 1-7.
- Guess, A.; Nyhan, B.; Lyons, B. & Reifler, J. (2018). Avoiding the Echo Chamber About Echo Chambers. Knight Foundation. Retrieved from https://kf-site-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media_elements/files/000/000/133/original/Topos_KF_White-Paper_Nyhan_V1.pdf
- Hansen, D. L., & Shneiderman, B. & Smith, M. A. (2010). *Analysing Social Media Networks with NodeXL: Insights from a Connected World*. Morgan Kaufmann.
- Jorgensen, R. F. & Zuleta, L. (2020). Private Governance of Freedom of Expression on Social Media Platforms: EU content regulation through the lens of human rights standards, *NORDICOM Review: Nordic Research on Media and Communication*, 41(1), 51-68. <https://doi.org/10.2478/nor-2020-0003>
- Kramer, A. D., & Guillory, J. E. & Hancock, J. T. (2014). Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks. *Proceedings of the National academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 111(24), 8788-8789, 2008.
- Liu, X. & Fahmy, S. (2011). Exploring the Spiral of Silence in the Virtual World: Individual Willingness to Express Personal Opinions Online versus Offline Settings, *Journal of Media and Communication Studies*, 3(2), 45-57. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.5897/JMCS.9000031>
- B. D. Loader & Mercea, D. (2011). Networking Democracy? Social Media Innovations and Participatory Politics. *Information, Communication and Society*, 14(6), 757-769. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1080/01369118X.2011.592648>.
- Maccatrozzo, V. (2012). Burst Filter Bubble: Using a Semantic Web to Enable Serendipity, P. Cudré-Mauroux, J. Hefflin, E. Sirin, T. Tudorache, J. Euzenat, M. Hauswirth, J. X. Parreira, J. Hendlar, G. Schreiber, A. Bernstein, and E. Blomqvist (Eds.) *The Semantic Web-ISWC 2012* (pp. 391-398). Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35173-0_28
- Miles, M. B. & Huberman, A. M. (1994). *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook* (2nd ed.). Sage Publications.
- Newman, M. E. (2003). The structure and function of complex networks. *SIAM review*, 45(2), 167-256.
- Newman, M. E. J. (2010). *Networks: An Introduction*. Oxford University Press.
- NodeXL (2024). Retrieved from <https://www.smrfoundation.org/nodexl/>
- Pariser, E. (2011). *The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding from You* (London: The Penguin Press).
- Patton, M. Q. (2002). *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods* (3rd ed.). Sage Publications.
- Quattrociocchi, W. (2017). Inside the echo chamber. *Scientific American*, 316(4), 60-63.
- Scott, M. (25.01.2022). Fringe social media networks sidestep online content rules. Retrieved from <https://www.politico.eu/article/fringe-social-media-telegram-extremism-far-right/>
- Smith, M., Shneiderman, B., Milic-Frayling, N., Rodrigues, E., Barash, V. et al., (2009). Analysing (social media) networks with NodeXL. *Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Communities and Technologies*.
- Suler, J. (2005). The Online Disinhibition Effect, *International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies*, 2(2), 184-188. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1089/1094931041291295>.
- Sunstein, Cass R. (2007). *Republic.com 2.0*. Princeton University Press, 2007.
- Wasserman, S. & Faust, K. (1994). *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wolfowicz, M., Weisburd D. & Hasisi, B. (2023). Examining the interactive effects of the filter bubble and the echo chamber on radicalisation. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, 19(1), 119-141.

Yücel, E. & Çizel, B. (2018). Bilişsel Uyumsuzluk Teorisi Üzerine Kavramsal Bir İnceleme: Satın Alma Perspektifi. *Journal of Yasar University*, 2018, 13/50, 150-16



Labour Policies of the Centre Right in the Neoliberal Era: The True Path Party*

Neoliberal Dönemde Merkez Sağ'da Emeğe Dair Politikalar: Doğru Yol Partisi

Caner Yacan¹

Abstract

This study examines the labour policies of the True Path Party (TPP) to better understand the centre-right's role in establishing neoliberalism in Turkey. Using a historical-comparative method, the article reveals significant changes in the Party's labour policies from its establishment in 1983 to Süleyman Demirel's Presidency (1983-1993). It is thought that a comparative examination of the period from the establishment of the Party to Demirel's Presidency can reveal the dilemmas and continuities experienced in the Party's labour policies depending on the neoliberal perspective. The TPP produced discourses aimed at gaining the support of labour immediately after its establishment in opposition to the structural conditions of the labour market in which it was born. These discourses expressed by the TPP are objections to the suppression of wage income, which is the most important element that ensures the sustainability of the accumulation process during the military rule (1980-1983) and the first civilian government following it and led by the Motherland Party. After becoming the head of the TPP (1987), Demirel brought to the fore the large inequalities in income distribution, argued for an effective labour market regulation to create full employment, and emphasised the relationship between poverty, wealth, and income distribution, which policymakers refrained from mentioning in the neoliberal process. However, during the Party's rule, it lost the support of many worker organisations, especially unions affiliated with Türk-İş.

Keywords: True Path Party, Labour Policies, Hüsametdin Cindoruk, Süleyman Demirel, Centre-right

Öz

Çalışmada, Türkiye'de 1980'li yıllarda berraklaşan neoliberal hegemonya inşa mücadelesinde merkez sağın emeğe dair politikaları, Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP) merkeze alınarak incelenmiştir. Böylece neoliberal süreçte Parti'nin emek politikalarında yaşanan değişimin ortaya çıkarılması amaçlanmaktadır. Belirtilen amaca ulaşabilmek için çalışmada tarihsel karşılaştırmalı araştırma yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Partinin kuruluşundan Demirel'in Cumhurbaşkanlığına kadar geçen dönemin karşılaştırmalı olarak incelenmesinin, neoliberal bakış açısına bağlı olarak Parti'nin emek politikalarında yaşanan kopuklukları, ikilemleri ve süreklilikleri ortaya koyabileceği düşünülmektedir. DYP, içinde doğduğu emek piyasasına dair yapısal şartlara karşı, kuruluşundan hemen sonra emeğin desteğini almaya yönelik söylemler üretmiştir. DYP tarafından dile getirilen bu söylemler 24 Ocak ile başlayarak, cunta ve Anavatan Hükümeti tarafından devam ettirilen birikim sürecinin sürdürülebilirliğini sağlayan en önemli öge olan ücret gelirlerinin bastırılmasına bir karşı çıkış niteliğindedir. Demirel ise partinin başına geldikten sonra neoliberal süreçte politika yapıcılarının söylemekten imtina ettiği gelir dağılımındaki büyük eşitsizlikleri, tam istihdamı yaratabilmek için gerekli işgücü piyasası yönetimini, yoksulluğun servet ve gelir dağılımı ile olan ilişkisini ön plana çıkartmıştır. Ancak Parti iktidarı süresince özellikle Türk-İş'e bağlı sendikalar başta olmak üzere, birçok işçi örgütlenmesinin desteğini kaybetmiştir. DYP vaat ettiği 12 Eylül'ün çalışma hayatına getirdiği izleri silmekten oldukça uzak kalmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Doğru Yol Partisi, Emek Politikaları, Hüsametdin Cindoruk, Süleyman Demirel, Merkez Sağ

* This study is derived from the doctoral thesis titled "The Identity Crisis on the Center Right And Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony: The True Path Party" prepared at Istanbul University Institute of Social Sciences.

1 Corresponding Author: Caner Yacan (Dr.), The Ministry of Education, Osmaniye, Türkiye. E-mail: caneryacan@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0002-8529-9587

To cite this article: Yacan, C. (2024). Labour policies of the centre right in the neoliberal era: the true path party. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 33(2), 319–338. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2024.33.1435612>



Introduction

The True Path Party (TPP) was established under historical conditions that may seem similar at first glance to its predecessor, the Justice Party, and faced similar problems. Founded in 1961, the Justice Party took its place in the political scene after the Democrat Party was closed down after the 1960 military coup and managed to become its main heir. The True Path Party (1983) was also established after the 1980 military coup and tried to prove to its followers that it was the main heir of the Democrat Party-Justice Party tradition. However, this similarity that appeared at first glance under historical conditions revealed a completely different historical agenda when the strong structural changes that emerged in the global economy were considered. The values, assumptions, and ideas of neoliberalism, which were the dominant paradigm of the 1980s, were quite foreign to political parties before 1980.¹

In this context, this study examines the labour policies of the TPP to better understand the role of the centre-right in the establishment of neoliberalism in Turkey. It reveals the significant changes in the labour policies of the party during the period from the establishment of the True Path Party to the Presidency of Süleyman Demirel (1983-1993). The selection of the TPP as the object of research in this study is based on the fact that the Party serves as a bridge connecting the pre- and post-1980 periods. The Party has been in decision-making positions during both the construction of neoliberal hegemony in the 1980s and the crisis of neoliberal hegemony in the 1990s. While tracing the labour policies of the TPP will, on the one hand, reveal the impact of the post-1980 neoliberal perspective on labour policies, it will also make visible the objections coming from a section of the centre-right against the neoliberal perspective and the potential of this section to have a positive impact on the mobilisation of organised labour. Additionally, this review will help us understand the changing face of TPP in its labour policies after coming to power.

In this respect, the aim of this research is to reveal what kind of change took place in the party's policies regarding labour in the neoliberal process and what effect the party's discourse and actions had on the gains of labour in this period. To achieve the stated purpose, a historical comparative research method was used in the study. The fact that the historical comparative research method is suitable for making sense of the combination of social factors (Neuman, 2013, pp.604-616) reveals the necessity of adopting such a method in this study, which aims to make sense of a certain period. In order to systematically make sense of the True Path Party's approach to labour policies during the opposition and government periods, reliable data were sought through historical comparative analysis. In particular, historical processes were elaborated through case studies, and concrete historical details were examined in depth.

In this context, the research argument is as follows: 'In the period from the founding of the Party to Demirel's Presidency, the Party's discourse and policies regarding labour differed from the Motherland Party, another centre-right force. The True Path Party's

1 Kaya Erdem, Minister of Finance during the period (1983-1989), emphasised that academics, bureaucrats, and politicians of the period were far from the needs of an export-oriented economy. According to Erdem, the report requested by the World Bank during this period, which showed what kind of subsidies would be applied to exports in the country, could not be provided by the State Planning Organisation and universities due to a lack of knowledge on this subject (Sağım Solum Tarih, 24.01.2016).

reference to both the social state approach and full employment, differentiating itself from the ruling Motherland Party during the opposition period, emphasises the import substitution development model. This attitude of the TPP, at a time when both the social state and the concept of full employment were being eroded, was, on the one hand, related to the strength of the labour movement in this period, and on the other hand, it was based on the centre-right's perspective from the political economy of the 1960s. This situation enabled the Party to gain the consent of many workers' organisations, especially unions affiliated with the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions² (Türk-İş), while the Party was in opposition. However, the strategic selectivity³ applied by the TPP towards labour when it was in power caused unions' support for the TPP to decrease day by day. During this period, the TPP began the process of articulation with neoliberal labour policies.⁴ In this study, the discourses of the Party elites and the Party policies are systematically discussed on a historical basis through the Party's printed documents and newspapers of the period (Tercüman, Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, 1983-1993). It is possible to find a very rich field of study in the literature dealing with labour policies between 1983 and 1993 (Adaman, Buğra and Insel, 2009; Akkaya, 1999; Boratav, 1990; Boratav, Yeldan and Köse, 2000; Cam, 2002; Doğan, 2020; Doğan, 2018; Doğan, 2015; Karahanoğulları, 2019; Özgün, 2014; Yeldan, 1995). However, it can be said that these studies do not comparatively analyse the change in a party and the resulting transformation in the party's relations with labour. As a matter of fact, the original aspect of the study is the comparative analysis of the TPP's relations with labour in different periods and, in this context, revealing the transformation in the party's mechanisms of persuading its voters.

Historical Background

The True Path Party was founded on the thesis that it was the continuation of the centre-right tradition, at a time when moves towards the establishment of neoliberal hegemony were intensifying. This situation necessitates that the study of the True Path Party should focus on the dominant neoliberal parameters in Turkey at the time the True Path Party was legally born. The January 24 Decisions,⁴ symbolised as a turning point in Turkey's transition to neoliberalism, expected an export-based accumulation strategy. The Programme determined the structural framework of the transition from Keynesian to monetarist economic policies. The first steps of this framework were the devaluation of the Turkish lira, the removal of control mechanisms on prices and restrictions on imports, the liberalisation of trade, and the promotion of exports (Baysan ve Blitzer, 1990, p.10). Although no direct reference to the labour market in the programme, the transition to an export-oriented growth model and the creation of a surplus value in this context necessitated a reduction in wages and a restriction of domestic demand. In this respect, the Programme had a perspective that enabled the transformation of class relations by strengthening international and domestic capital against labour. In this way, on the one hand, an opportunity was created for domestic capital, strengthened by protectionist

2 Founded in 1952, it is Turkey's largest labour confederation.

3 The struggle between political and social actors determines which actors, identities, and action governments will privilege. Jessop (2005, p.173) calls this situation strategic selectivity.

4 A neoliberal programme, known as the "January 24 Decisions," was introduced in Turkey for the first time in 1980.

economic policies, to compete in the international market, and on the other hand, international capital was encouraged to invest in the country (Özgün, 2014, pp.91-93).

As a matter of fact, the regulation of the labour market was a priority on the agenda of the 1980 military regime, which played a vital role in the applicability of the January 24 Decisions, along with political authoritarianism and depoliticisation. Class-based politics, which was seen as a tumour for the junta administration, which attributed the current crisis to the political strength of the working class, had to be ended (Akça, 2011, p.28; Yalman, 2004, pp.44-50). In this context, the first thing the junta did was to eliminate collective structures that could hinder the market perspective by closing down major union confederations, except the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türk-İş), which was far from radical unionism. The measures taken against the Progressive Trade Union Confederation of Turkey (DISK) were particularly severe. The Confederation's assets were confiscated, and its leaders were tried for the death penalty (Adaman, Buğra ve İnel, 2009, pp.173-174). In fact, this attitude adopted against DISK was also an indicator of the hostility towards the class-centred organisational mobility of labour. As a result, union density decreased from 27% in 1979 to 9.5% in 1985 (Cam, 2002, p.108). In addition, the 1982 Constitution and the 1983 Labour Law, the status of wage labour vis-à-vis capital. Because the Labour Law that was put into effect has seriously narrowed the limits of the right to strike and limited action to collective bargaining disputes. In this case, the strike could have been banned and postponed. For example, strikes approved by military authorities were postponed for reasons that could be flexible in any direction, such as 'national security'. Although unions were prohibited from engaging in political activities or having formal or informal relations with political parties, the Supreme Arbitration Board, which was established to resolve disputes between employees and employers, took on the task of keeping wage demands under control (Yeldan, 1995, pp.54-55). It consisted of members, five from the state bureaucracy, two from Türk-İş, one from the Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (TİSK), and one from the state as an employer. This membership profile ensured the sustainability of the government policy, which centred on austerity. For example, wage settlements could be regularly made at nominal increases below annual inflation rates (Boratav, 1990, pp.209-210).

With all these interventions, on the one hand, surplus value rates could be increased, and on the other hand, organised labour was removed from the political sphere and deprived of political pressure. As a matter of fact, a comparison with the late 1970s more clearly reveals the rapid decline in wages after 24 January and therefore the increase in surplus value rates. Between 1975 and 1979, organised labour was able to increase its share of industrial value added from 28% to 37% by constantly increasing wage demands (Yeldan, 1995, p.48). On the other hand, the real wage of a worker who earned 1851 TL in the manufacturing industry in 1979 dropped to 1422 TL in 1980, whereas a worker who earned 1656 TL in the private sector in 1979 could earn 1198 TL in 1980 (Karahanoğulları, 2019, p.435). In the three years under the junta rule, real wages followed a moderate course with a slight increase rate. This model of military social relations was also compatible with the demands expressed by TİSK before the coup. In the late 1970s, TİSK complained about the participation of unions in politics, wage increases, short working hours, union pluralism, and the lack of legal criteria to prevent strikes. Similarly, during this period,

the IMF was proposing suspending the collective bargaining system for five years. Thus, the coup restructured the institutional structure between labour and capital in favour of employers (Doğan, 2020, pp.169-179; Doğan, 2018, pp.264-266).

The Centre of Resistance Against Neoliberal Labour Policies on the Centre-Right: Hüsametdin Cindoruk Era

The Özal administration does not respect labour. Inflation affects workers' pockets.

Hüsametdin Cindoruk (DYP 1. Büyük Kongresi Raporlar, 1985)

After the coup, the parties were allowed to return to the political scene in Turkey in April 1983. Even after the transition to democracy, the authoritarian attitude towards labour continued. The transition to civilian rule did not lead to the removal of the restrictions imposed by the 1982 Constitution and the laws enacted by the military administration on the democratic rights and freedoms of the working class (Bedirhanoğlu ve Yalman, 2010, pp.111-113). Even though the military rule was over, 24 Decisions were in power, and the policies of the January 24 were still in effect. The pro-market policy implemented by the Motherland Party Government made temporary employment a norm day by day, and the contracted personnel and subcontractor system was increasingly moving to the centre of employment policies. This mechanism, which does not provide a guarantee against dismissals, started with the recruitment of white-collar workers as contracted personnel before privatisation, and was later expanded to blue-collar workers (Boratav, 1990, pp.209-212; Cam, 2002, pp.95-97; Yörük, 2018, pp.320-322).

The reduced possibility of finding a secure job caused a kind of disintegration in the moral economy of workers. The government, on the other hand, fed this disintegration through mechanisms such as publicly announced lockouts, the vilification of workers fighting for their rights, the smearing of SOEs, an increase in the retirement age, the establishment of free zones where strikes were banned for 10 years, and reductions in wages. During this period, there was a continuity in the junta administration's and the civil administration's perspective on the unions. The ruling Motherland Party Government not only did not tolerate union activities but also approached unions with a hostile attitude. This signified a new relationship style for an organisation that had a tradition of conducting business through informal ties with politicians and relying on lobbying activities to improve the rights of its members (Doğan, 2020, pp.138-140). In the political arena of the 1960s, the close relations established with the centre-right tradition played an important role in political bargaining, and thus the centre-right gained the support of many unionist groups within Turk-Is. Because of this mutualist relationship, 4 union leaders in Türk-İş were elected as members of parliament from the Justice Party list in the 1965 elections (Demirel, 2017). The Motherland Party Government, on the other hand, rendered this populist policy unfounded. The summits held every three months between members of the government headed by the Prime Minister and the largest trade union confederation in the 1960s and 1970s were reduced to a minimum during the Motherland Party Government from November 1983 to October 1991, and Türk-İş's search for dialogue generally resulted negatively (Önder, 2016, pp.31-32).

Faced with this new attitude, the Union first wanted to revive its old habits and communicate with the centre-right opposition. During this period, the closure case filed

against the centre-right representative TPP, which originated in the 1960s, had just been rejected by the Constitutional Court, and the party was approved for continuing its political life. However, the close contact that Türk-İş wanted to establish with the TPP got stuck with the Public Prosecutor's Office. 17 union presidents, who paid a courtesy visit to Chairman Hüsamettin Cindoruk⁵ after the 1st Grand Congress of the TPP, were summoned to testify on the grounds that they were involved in politics (Cumhuriyet, 05.06.1985). It could be seen that behind this attitude lay the fear of establishing a dialogue that could revive old norms between the TPP, which is the continuation of the Justice Party, and Türk-İş. Because TPP increased the dose of its discourse aimed at gaining the support of labour immediately after its establishment in contrast to the structural conditions of the labour market in which it was born. This situation was the main source of motivation for the rapprochement between the Party and Türk-İş. As a matter of fact, at the 1st Grand Council Meeting of the TPP, held on February 4, 1984, Ziya Hepbir (DYP 1. Büyük Divan Toplantısı (1984), one of the founders of the Party, who was also a trade unionist, expressed the problems of workers and unions as follows:

With the amendment made in Law No. 506, the retirement conditions of workers have become more difficult. Workers' housing loans have increased from 5% to 15%. Workers treated on an outpatient basis are charged a 20% drug fee. The weight and effectiveness of workers in the management of social security institutions have been reduced. The Trade Union Law No. 2821 made it difficult for workers to become members of the union by introducing the requirement to become a member through a notary... It placed limits on the activities of union leaders... Law No. 2822 does not allow workers to exercise their right to collective bargaining, which is their only means of protecting their rights in return for their labour. The right to collective bargaining, which seems to exist on paper, has been rendered inoperative by the restrictions imposed... The right to strike has also been made obsolete by the same law. As a result of the reduction of national and general holidays by 5.5 days, the income earned by workers from the work they do on these days has been eliminated... The purchasing power of workers has declined... No effort is being made to re-determine the minimum wage.

The Party's approach to workers' problems was remarkable in the five declarations prepared to be delivered to the public in open air and hall meetings to be held in the provinces and districts for the local elections of 25 March 1984. According to the Party, the government stood by and turned its back on workers' rightful demands for higher wages. Employees' social rights are being taken away for various reasons. The Party also emphasised the suppression of wages in its rallies, claiming that workers were earning less than what they had been receiving 15 years ago. Minimum wages should be redetermined and wages should be increased fairly. On the other hand, the government was irresponsibly spending state resources on importing luxury goods and aiding bankrupt companies and was committing injustice by turning its back on workers' rights (Sosyal Devlet Mitingi Beyannamesi, İşte Doğru Yol Mitingi Beyannamesi, Doğru Yol Partisi 1 Yaşında, 1984).

The decline in real wages of labour was discussed more comprehensively at the Party's Grand Congress (1985) and was expressed with examples from real life that the worker felt every day: "While an unskilled worker who has been working for 3 years had to work

5 Hüsamettin Cindoruk began his political career in the Democrat Party and continued his political career in the Justice Party. After the coup and with the closure of the Justice Party, he was subject to compulsory residence by the National Security Council. He was elected chairman of the TPP on May 14, 1985.

3 hours 36 minutes in 1980 to buy 1 kg of beef, he had to work 8 hours 21 minutes in 1985. The same worker had to work 2 h 44 min in 1980 and 7 h 49 min in 1985 to buy 1 kg of white cheese. In the last year, the real income of workers has decreased by 2 times” (DYP 1. Büyük Kongresi Raporlar, 1985). The statements of Hüsamettin Cindoruk, who was elected as the Chairman of the Party at the congress, almost created the feeling that the TPP would provide the political environment of the 1960s for workers:

Turkish workers are devastated. TPP has clear promise to Turkish workers. Interventions against the free collective bargaining agreement system, which is the most important basis for evaluating the reward of our workers’ labour, will be eliminated... Necessary measures will be taken to ensure that the right to strike is exercised without interference. Attitudes and behaviours that make retirement more difficult aim to eliminate the right to severance pay, and acquired workers’ rights are opposed. By establishing the necessary legal regulations to regulate the minimum wage according to current conditions, the minimum wage will cease to be a poverty wage (DYP 1. Büyük Kongresi Raporlar, 1985).

As a matter of fact, before the 1986 midterm elections, the Party was promising workers that they would not settle for development with cheap labour, and that union and collective bargaining rights would be rearranged and workers would be compensated for their efforts. In addition, it was stated that changes in line with a democratic system would be made in the Trade Union Law⁶ and the Collective Labour Agreement, Strike and Lockout Law⁷, and that the minimum wage would be excluded from taxes and that supports to increase the purchasing power of workers’ wages would be provided (DYP 1986 Ara Seçim Beyannamesi, 1986; DYP’nin Doğru Görüşünden Parçalar, 1985). During this period, unions showed great interest in events such as meetings, symposiums and conferences organised by the Party, and the similarity between the discourses of the TPP and unions increased daily. The speech made by Trade Unionist Nuri Sabahçı at the “Youth and Greater Turkey Symposium” organised by the Party was a kind of expression of this similarity (Doğru Yol Partisi Gençlik ve Büyük Türkiye Sempozyumu, 1986).

With Trade Union Law No. 2821, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Strike and Lockout Law No. 2822 were enacted to the detriment of employees by making radical changes. These laws need to be revised for employees... In a comparison among OECD member countries, Turkey ranks first in terms of wage-price imbalance. In recent years, this imbalance has worsened to the detriment of employees... Real wages fell by 35% compared to 1980... The factors that are reflected to the consumer and accelerate inflation to some extent through the prices increased by employers actually arise from the price policy followed by employers, not from the wage policy followed by unions. Employer and capital circles and the government want to blame rising prices on wage increases and say that this prevents investments and increases prices...

In fact, all the discourses expressed by the TPP and Türk-İş were objections to the suppression of wage income, the most important element that ensured the sustainability of the accumulation process that started on January 24 and was continued by the Motherland Party Government. Real wages fell by 52.1% for all workers between 1979 and 1985, whereas this decline was 28.6% for manufacturing workers. When looking at labour productivity during this period, positive growth rates were noticeable, which revealed that workers’ wages decreased much more than the value they added (Boratav, 1990,

6 No. 2821.

7 No. 2822.

pp.207-208). Similarly, the share of wage income in GDP decreased from 33% in 1979 to 18% in 1985 (Celasun, 1990, p.42). Thus, while national competitiveness was increased by keeping wages under pressure, capital accumulation, the cost of which was largely paid by labour, could be continued.

The government, on the other hand, had to resort to authoritarianism increasingly day by day to protect this fundamental claim on which the accumulation regime it implemented was based. As a matter of fact, with the regulation coming into force after being published in the Official Gazette on January 4, 1986, advisory boards to be formed under the chairmanship of governors and district governors could take measures to prevent the formation of crowds in strike areas, and workers could not organise meetings or entertainment during strikes. Strike spokesmen were required to be reported to the civil authorities, and banners such as “There is a strike in this workplace” were prohibited from being hung in workplaces. In addition to all these, the fact that gendarmerie and commando units, as well as local security forces, could be used in strikes under the statute demonstrated the government’s fear of the workers’ political mobilisation in this period. In June 1985, the Government increased the authority of the police over meetings held by unions in accordance with Law No. 3233.

Türk-İş Chairman Şevket Yılmaz opposed this regulation as follows: “Turkey is being turned into a police state in the name of democracy. In addition to these restrictions, the statute makes strikes virtually impossible. As a precaution, the administration will apply pressure and violence, similar to the practise in countries where state terrorism is dominant, with its gendarmerie, police, and special strikebreaking forces formed under the name of the ‘ready force’.” In response, governors postponed the protest rallies that Türk-İş was planning to hold in Manisa, Samsun, Gaziantep, and Zonguldak, claiming that they could disrupt public order. With his response to this decision made by the authorities, “We are being forced to do illegal things, democracy is becoming questionable”, Yılmaz was, in a way, admitting the need for the militancy of labour, which Türk-İş was not used to at all (Tercüman, 05.09.1986-15.09.1986).

In the same period, Cindoruk spoke to the workers in Zonguldak, where Türk-İş could not organise a rally, and in a way, he represented Türk-İş through his discourses. According to Cindoruk, the Özal administration did not respect labour and made the workers’ struggle for survival difficult because of inflation. The government remained silent despite the cries of workers who had become 50% poorer in the last 5 years. On the other hand, while the Prime Minister was establishing close relations with employers, he was refraining from giving even 10 minutes to labour leaders. Özal wanted to eliminate workers’ rights and tried to provoke workers against unions. Cindoruk called the governors who postponed Türk-İş meetings as ‘partisans’ and stated that these practises would suit the head of an employer union rather than a Prime Minister (Tercüman, 17.09.1986). Similar to Cindoruk, Türk-İş President Yılmaz said a few days later, “If peace and tranquillity are truly desired in the country, the Prime Minister must realise that he is not a representative of an employer union” (Tercüman, 22.09.1986). Thus, perhaps for the first time in the country’s political history, both the centre-right opposition and the top of the Türk-İş were accusing the government of defending favouring the capitalist class. A few days later, it was brought to the agenda that the criterion of implementing non-partisan

policies within Türk-İş had become obsolete and that workers were asked not to give a vote of confidence to this government in the by-elections to be held in 10 provinces on September 28, 1986 (Tercüman, 26.09.1986).

The rapprochement between Türk-İş and TPP was increasing with the congresses of Türk-İş in 1986. In a way, these congresses could be read as self-criticism of the coup period, during which unionists who praised the coup period were liquidated one by one. Members such as Mustafa Başoğlu and Çetin Göçer, who were elected to the administration in their place, were closely associated with the TPP. Although the new administration consisted of moderates, it displayed an oppositional stance against the ruling party. This perspective clearly emerged in the referendum on restoring the political rights of banned politicians. The Confederation offered unconditional support for lifting the prohibition. It was known that the closeness of Yılmaz and his friends to former Prime Minister Demirel, who would return to the political arena after the ban was lifted, played an important role in this support given by Türk-İş. After the narrow victory, former politicians along with Demirel were invited back to the political stage, and some union leaders' efforts to join the TPP increased (Doğan, 2020, pp.225-236).

Guarantee of Unions: Demirel is in Opposition

“[Demirel] will become a communist if there is another coup.”

Aziz Nesin

The results of the referendum⁸ not only restored the political rights of the banned politicians but also encouraged the Özal administration that it could continue its power through an early election. In this context, the government decided to hold general elections in 1987, without giving the former leaders the opportunity to organise strong opposition. After Demirel became the head of the Party, TPP continued its supportive attitude towards labour. In its 1987 election manifesto, the Party defended full employment, declaring that it would eliminate unemployment through industrialisation. The Party stated that workers had to work more or consume less every day in order to survive, and emphasised that income inequality affected millions of people who fell below the poverty line in the country, and that many workers continued to live below the poverty line even after receiving their salaries. While doing so, it was striking that the Party addressed the dimensions of poverty through the language of numbers and revealed the deprivation deemed suitable for workers in daily life: “A worker who could buy 1 kg of meat by working 4 hours and 30 minutes in 1980 was forced to work 2 hours and 40 minutes longer to buy the same meat in 1987”. In addition, the Party addressed workers as follows in its 1987 election manifesto (DYP 1987 Seçim Beyannamesi, 1987):

Our Working Brothers:

You, too, bore the brunt of the inflation policies. Increases in your wages lagged behind inflation. Restrictions have been placed on your collective bargaining and union rights... Under the TPP government, the right to collective bargaining and union rights will be adopted as the basic institutions of the free democratic order. Collective agreements will be established between employee and employer unions without resorting to administrative

8 The session was held on September 6, 1987, to discuss whether the 10- and 5-year political bans imposed by temporary Article 4 of the 1982 Constitution should be lifted.

intervention by the state. Unions will be able to work with full freedom to protect workers' rights and interests of economic and social nature. All restrictions on union elections and management will be eliminated. With the belief that the right to collective bargaining is extremely useful and sufficient for determining workers' wage levels and social rights, a development policy based on cheap labour will not be allowed. Workers' wages in the public sector will never be allowed to lag behind inflation, and the private sector will be supported in the same direction, provided that the right to collective bargaining is retained. The minimum wage will be at least 100,000 TL at today's prices and will be completely tax-exempt. Workers will be given free notebooks, pencils, and books for their primary and secondary school children... Unemployment insurance will begin... General regulations will be made for the benefit of all workers.

As such, TPP highlighted large inequalities in income distribution and the need to create full employment and drew attention to the relationship between poverty and income distribution, which policymakers refrained from mentioning in the neoliberal process. Therefore, the party highlighted the political economy of the 1960s characterised by a Keynesian policy framework.⁹ In this context, the TPP promised to reduce the tax burden on fixed income earners, and insurance and tax amounts would be excluded from the net minimum wage payment. This Party attitude was also accepted by Türk-İş, and Türk-İş executives stated that they saw Demirel as the guarantor of their union (Tercüman, 17.08.1988).

Demirel's opening speech at the TPP Regular Grand Congress almost expressed his longing for a compromise established between capital and labour in the Keynesian economic model. According to Demirel, the government of the period made a wrong choice between labour and capital by reducing the effectiveness of labour and placing profit and productivity on the back of labour. The economic and social rights of workers and employers can only be protected through free trade unionism. On the other hand, the government was suppressing union voices and causing the collective bargaining system to fail. Thus, working life is a scene of unfair practises. Demirel stated that the government could not bring permanent solutions to working life without changing the Trade Union Law and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Strike, and Lockout Law, which remained unchanged since the time of military rule (DYP Olağan Büyük Kongresi, 1988).

However, the government did not share the same thoughts with Demirel. The government hoped that it can gain support from non-collective, individualised labour by creating a populist wave without touching neoliberal disciplinary mechanisms. In 1988, the government's growth strategy, which was based on the suppression of wages, depreciation of the TL, and the granting of significant subsidies to exports, reached its political and economic limits. National income per capita declined for two consecutive years, and the inflation rate reached 75%. The decline in real wage rates reached 25% between 1980 and 1988, whereas real profits reported by the 500 largest companies almost doubled during this period. It was becoming increasingly difficult to establish reactionary distribution policies on which the model was based sustainable in the current field of social struggle (Yeldan, 1995, pp.54-55; Boratav, Yeldan ve Köse, 2000, p.3; Boratav ve Yeldan, 2001, pp.5-6). As a matter of fact, the 1989 local elections showed once again

⁹ In the Keynesian period, increasing welfare policies and achieving full employment occupied an important place in competition between parties (Jessop, 2005, pp.281-282).

that the Motherland Party was losing power. While one of the main interconnected factors in this loss of votes and reputation is the emergence of different political options in the political arena with the return of banned politicians, another was that it broke the silence of the working class against the neoliberal policies put into place. These two dynamics, supporting each other, played an important role in the disintegration of the Motherland's power.

Just before the 1989 local elections, the negative outcome of the collective bargaining negotiations held by public workers affiliated with Türk-İş with public employers initiated a collective mobilisation called "Spring Actions". There were creative methods in the action repertoire of the movement, which was attended by nearly 600,000 workers and sometimes gained a spontaneous character: "work slowdown, late start of work, mass visits, service and food boycott, beard boycott, silent march, work stoppage, sit-in, road closure to traffic, mass divorce application" (Saraçoğlu, 2019, p.807). The strikes were also supported by the TPP. Demirel, who visited Türk-İş in early March in 1989, emphasised that "almost all working people in Turkey are below the poverty line." According to Demirel, the government's wage increases below the inflation rate were hindering social peace and causing great problems within the country along with increasing unemployment (Cumhuriyet, 03.04.1989-04.04.1989). Türk-İş President Yılmaz, on the other hand, complained about the government to Demirel, stating that the government had not fulfilled any of its promises so far. However, Türk-İş remained away from the "no vote for Motherland Party" style of behaviour that it had adopted against the government in previous elections and referendums (Cumhuriyet, 06.04.1989-10.04.1989). Özal, on the other hand, initially took an attitude towards this situation, blaming the workers' organisations and ignoring the demands of the unions. Because, as Doğan (2020, p.254) stated, "the austerity policy was the trademark of the Özal administration, and if there was no election defeat on the horizon, the government had no intention of throwing this principle aside." However, the loss of votes in the local elections of March 1989 caused chaos in the Motherland government, and State Minister Cemil Çiçek, as the minister responsible for public collective agreements, was assigned to direct negotiations with Türk-İş. During this period, losses in Iron and Steel alone due to strikes reached 600 billion (Milliyet, 12.08.1989).

The current process forced the government to adopt populist regulations. As a matter of fact, at a time when the inflation rate was 75%, the Motherland Party Government was willing to give public employees a 141% wage increase. Thus, the 10-year period of decline in real wages, which had now become permanent, came to an end. However, the question that needed to be answered this point was how this distribution shock could be financed. In other words, how would the phenomenon of "giving to labour/the poor without taking from capital/the rich" be handled? The answer for the period was the liberalisation of the capital account. Increased capital inflows due to the convertibility of TL enabled the increasing distribution demands to be met without giving rise to huge increases in inflation and at the same time alleviate inflationary pressures by cheapening import costs. However, this situation would open the door to crises that would arise later with the reversal of capital accounts (Boratav, Yeldan ve Köse, 1999, pp.28-29). As a result of the congresses held in the second half of 1989, Türk-İş was securing itself

against the cracks in the Motherland Party Government and was adapting its headquarters to a new government that had not yet been established. Because the new headquarters of Türk-İş resembled a coalition sympathetic to the TPP.

The political mobilisation of labour, which rose with the 1989 Spring Actions, reached its peak again with the resistance of Zonguldak mine workers towards the end of 1990.¹⁰ The dispute stemmed from the failure to conclude collective agreement negotiations between the General Mine Workers' Union affiliated with Türk-İş and the Turkish Hard Coal Enterprises. However, the basis of the disagreement was that the Özal administration did not consider the coal basin to have investable standards under international competition conditions. The mines that had been producing coal for 161 years were wanted to be closed down due to high costs. Against this, approximately 48,000 workers, who were not accustomed to market conditions, decided to strike, and Demirel declared that he supported the mine workers, saying "it is foolishness to make inflation a state policy and then say that we did not crush the workers" (Cumhuriyet, 30.11.1990). The Party stated that it was behind Türk-İş's decision not to work on January 3 and its decision to walk from Zonguldak to Ankara on January 4. After the Ankara Labour Court deemed the January 3 protest illegal, Demirel said, "It is not possible to consider the actions of hundreds of thousands of people as a crime and impose penalties." According to Demirel, the main issue to focus on was the dynamics that forced the workers to participate in such a movement. The workers mobilisation, in his view, was a manifestation of the problems of the people (Cumhuriyet, 01.12.1990-07.01.1991). However, the rising class struggle was interrupted by an extraordinary situation on January 26, 1991. The Zonguldak miners' strike was postponed because of the Gulf War (Cumhuriyet, 27-28.01.1991). The figure agreed upon because of subsequent negotiations was lower than the figure offered by the government a few months ago. Despite this, real wages of public workers increased by approximately 200% between 1989 and 1991 (Yeldan, 1995, p.56).

The culmination of TPP's effort to convince labour of its own hegemony project was the 1991 election manifesto titled "A New Turkey on the Morning of October 21". With its election manifesto, the party virtually attacked the neoliberal disciplinary mechanisms implemented by the Motherland Party Government against labour. According to the programme (DYP Seçim Bildirgesi, 1991), the existing government, with its unfair policies, passed over workers like a tank, creating livelihood problems instead of welfare. In particular, income inequality caused by neoliberal policies was systematically addressed in the programme: "It is known that in Turkey, the top 10% receive 43% of the Gross National Product (GNP). This situation puts our country among the 8 countries with the worst income distribution among the 121 countries in the world..."

In addition, the Party's strategy regarding real wages differed from the government's perspective of suppressing wages. The Party did not see real wages and salaries as the main reason for chronic inflation and therefore believed that the fight against inflation would not pit labour and capital against each other. Because the share of labour in GNP was already much lower than in western countries. In order to reduce public debt, salaries

10 According to the number of strikes and the number of workers participating, 1990 was a boom year. For detailed information on strike participation and the number of working days lost during strikes between 1985 and 1997, see: Akkaya, 1999, pp.4-5.

and wages, which are important items of public expenditure, would not be restricted; on the contrary, they would be updated according to current conditions, and the living standards of wage earners would be raised. The tax burden of the wage earner segment will not be increased, and this gap will be closed with taxes allocated from other segments in proportion to income. The minimum wage will be excluded from taxes and will also be exempted from new taxes.

The Party's perspective on working life was based on updating the state structure, which was institutionalised through both the 1982 Constitution and the basic laws put into effect by September 12. In this context, the Party emphasised that the regulations, practises and restrictions, which it described as the September 12 law would be quickly abolished and a fully democratic employee-employer environment would be established. For this purpose, obstacles to workers' rights and freedoms are removed, and a market economy that improves workers' living conditions and centres on the principles of the social state and social justice is implemented. Stating that a harmonious system would be established in employee-employer relations brought corporatism to mind. However, stating that the Trade Unions Law, the Collective Labour Agreement Strike Lockout Law, and the Labour Law¹¹ regarding working life would be amended in a way compatible with the democratic regime, brought the Party closer to a solidarist corporatism.¹² In addition, while it was heralded in the Declaration that the working hours of professional groups working under harsh conditions, such as mining, would be shortened, priority would be given to a balanced income distribution and the spread of wealth among the base in order to ensure labour peace. Payment appropriate to human dignity, unemployment insurance, and social insurance coverage for everyone were among the objectives of the Party. Thus, one of the main objectives was to correct the balance that was disturbed by workers after 24 January (21 Ekim Sabahı Yeni Bir Türkiye, 1991).

However, how this populist rhetoric used both in the election manifesto (1991) and in the squares would be shaped as a result of power relations, conflicts of interest, and social struggles at different spatial scales. Considering the country's integration into capitalism and the resulting inadequacy in domestic and foreign savings rates, the argument that the share of labour in GNP could be brought to western standards and sustainable economic growth could be maintained seemed quite ambitious. An important question mark was how the capital-labour conflict would be replaced by harmonious working relations within the free market economy that TPP claimed to defend. As a matter of fact, these contradictory claims by the party were also reflected in the results of the general election held on October 20, 1991. TPP was the leading party in the 10 wealthiest provinces, which received the largest share of national income, and in the 10 poorest provinces, which received the smallest share (Milliyet, 08.11.1991). The government formed by the TPP and the Social Democratic People's Party (SPP), which attacked the neoliberal hegemony project of the Motherland Party from the right and left after the general elections, under the Prime Ministership of Demirel, known for his motto "yesterday is yesterday, today is today" (Bora, 2018), gave the chance to test all these promises while in opposition.

11 No. 1475.

12 Solidarist corporatism is a solidarity approach that opposes class separation and, at the same time, advocates equality of interests between classes. For a detailed explanation of solidarist corporatism, see (Parla, 2009, pp.97-112). Taha Parla also defines the policies of the Social Democratic People's Party (SPP), which was the main opposition party in 1989, as "solidarist corporatism". (Parla, 2009, p.11).

Articulation to Neoliberalism: Demirel is in Power

“Slave order, slave order, down with the Demirel order”.

Türk-İş

The TPP and SPP promised social justice to workers oppressed during the neoliberal structural adjustment process. Organised labour had a significant role in the success of both parties in the elections. The social opposition directed against the neoliberal policies, which started with the January 24 decisions and continued uninterruptedly with the junta administration and then the Özal government, spread to other parts of the country in waves under the leadership of organised labour, as Denizer¹³ stated in Zonguldak (Cumhuriyet, 01.12.1990). Now, the country’s largest labour confederation, Türk-İş, which had a major share in the organisation of this opposition, announced that the promises made by the TPP and SPP to labour were almost the same. According to the Confederation, SPPs and TPPs could offer more consistent and balanced solutions to the problems of the working class (Cumhuriyet, 24.10.1991).

However, the coalition was not very successful in its first test. The 25-30% increase in the salaries of civil servants and pensions in the new year, in an environment where inflation reached 70%, was not found sufficient by civil servant organisations such as the Labour Union of the Labourers of Education and Science. The unions stated that the government did not keep its promise to them and announced that they would respond to the government through organised actions. As a matter of fact, soon civil servant actions spread in the centre of the demand for union rights, with strikes and collective bargaining agreements, and 7 civil servant unions decided to organise rallies under the name of “union rights of public employees” in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir on January 26 (Cumhuriyet, 01.01.1992-08.01.1992).¹⁴

During this period, Türk-İş Chairman Yılmaz repeated his wishes for civil servants to be accorded union rights that covered all freedoms. In addition, Yılmaz reminded that just a month after coming to power, the government described price increases in a wide range of items—from basic needs to general consumer goods—as inevitable; therefore, the government made statements demanding sacrifices from all segments of society. However, according to Yılmaz, “Sacrifice cannot be demanded from poor budgets for years, from the masses of people who have been oppressed under economic policies and are increasingly driven to despair.” With this discourse, Türk-İş was stating in advance to the government that it did not want to encounter such an attitude in the collective agreements covering 623,651 workers to be made during the year. The Confederation gave the government until the end of May to change its constitutional and legal provisions regarding working life, as promised before the election (Cumhuriyet, 06.01.1992).

On the other hand, right after Yılmaz’s statements, Demirel organised a meeting with the participation of 32 union managers from 28 business lines that make up the Türk-İş Presidential Board and agreed to hold similar meetings frequently with the participation of himself and a minister. In response to Yılmaz’s statement, “We will continue to support you if your actions are the same as what you promised to the citizens,” Demirel stated

¹³ Şemsi Denizer is the organiser of the Great Miners’ strikes held in 1990-1991 and the president of the relevant union.

¹⁴ For the unionisation movement of public employees, see Doğan, 2015.

that Yılmaz was correct in his demands and that they would not give up their promises (Cumhuriyet, 09.01.1992). Demirel, far from being confrontational, was in a way signalling that he could make concessions towards organised labour with this soothing rhetoric. In addition, Demirel showed how much the government cared about the unions, against Özal's perspective of not caring about unions. In this way, Türk-İş regained its prestige and opened the doors to Ankara's lobbying.

In a report prepared by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) on Turkey during this period, it stated that the government welcomed the changes planned in the constitution and laws. In addition, the government was asked to return the assets of DİSK and its affiliated unions (Cumhuriyet, 14.01.1992). DİSK was reopened in 1991 and Kemal Nebioğlu was elected as its president during this period. Although the confederation did not have the power it had in the 1970s, it was still active in various business lines and demanded from the government that the fundamental rights of labour, such as organisation, collective bargaining, and strike, be made functional (Cumhuriyet, 25.01.1992). Similarly, Hak-İş stated that the new government increased the future expectations and hopes of the society and emphasised that the first thing should be a constitutional amendment (Cumhuriyet, 23.01.1992).

Against this background, the government's first economic package, announced by the Minister of State responsible for the economy, Tansu Çiller, did not satisfy the demands of workers. According to Türk-İş President Yılmaz, the package was just a recommendation, and low-income people could not tolerate waiting for the 6-month period that was stated to be needed to reduce inflation (Cumhuriyet, 21.01.1992). In addition, the lack of any preparations in the package regarding the exclusion of the minimum wage from tax and the inclusion of articles for the privatisation of SOEs created concern among unions that the promises made to them would not be fulfilled. In particular, the promise in the package that "If workers working in SOEs leave voluntarily and take another job in the same region, there will be a 75% reduction in income tax for 10 years" reveals that the stabilisation programmes initiated by the Motherland Party Government and centred on reform in the public sector were not abandoned.

During this period, the first event that pushed Türk-İş, DİSK and Hak-İş confederations to act together against the government was related to the legalisation of May 1 as "Labour Day". The Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (TİSK) stated that the one-day wages of workers who did not work on May 1 would be reduced. In response, the confederations asked the government to declare May 1 as a "labour day" through joint press releases (Cumhuriyet, 01.05.1992). However, this discussion revealed an important crack in the TPP-SPP coalition. Although the bill proposal was intended to be purified from left-wing elements and legalised as "Employees and Spring Festival" instead of "Labour Day" in order to gain the consent of TPP MPs, the proposal was rejected by the joint efforts of TPP and opposition MPs. In the discussions held in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the opposition and TPP agreed on the idea that May 1 could be celebrated as a medical day, environment day, mother's day, but it was not right to celebrate it as a national holiday by highlighting a special group. SPP MP Ercan Karakaş, who brought the proposal, stated that May 1 was declared a holiday as "Spring and Flower Day" in 1925 and was celebrated with this name until September 12, and that they only added

the word “Employees” in front of it. The answer given by TPP MP Mehmet Çebi almost reflected the Party’s corporatist perspective, which prioritises the unity of the state with all its components (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 10.03.1993);

No one is against holding a spring festival on May 1; However, it is hideous to present this discrimination. Why? Is Eid al-Adha banned for workers, Republic Day banned, and May 19 banned?.. We all celebrate the same holiday; why isn’t another vacation on the agenda? This vacation also has a history. If we evaluate this according to its history, I do not mean that this vacation is not appropriate for this nation. But, as I said, every vacation is everyone’s holiday; It is the expression of a united society that is together in joy and sorrow. Moreover, this vacation has caused some wounds to this nation in its time; I do not see the need to open a new wound.

Perhaps the most important series of events regarding labour and where the class conflict became clear during the TPP-SPP coalition period was the process of enacting the ILO conventions. Because of the restrictions imposed on union rights after September 12, Turkey did not even comply with the agreements it signed with the ILO. The TPP, on the other hand, was giving assurance, both in the government protocol and programme and in its own special programme, that the prohibitive order of September 12 on union rights would be eliminated. However, the new draft labour law, which was only the first step taken by the government within the scope of Convention No. 158 to meet ILO standards, was harshly criticised by employers. In particular, the principles of opening a judicial remedy against unfair and arbitrary dismissal of workers, as well as reinstatement and compensation included in the draft, have prompted employers to act jointly. As a matter of fact, employer organisations such as TİSK, the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD), the Aegean Chamber of Industry (EBSO), the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, and the Izmir Chamber of Commerce opposed this draft, which allowed intra-class conflicts to be put aside with similar discourse (Cumhuriyet, 14.01.1992-15.03.1992).

According to TİSK, where these discourses are jointly represented, the draft was nothing but dynamite placed at the foundations of the economy, and every means had to be tried to prevent it from becoming law. In this context, employers were first looking for ways to create a rift within the coalition so that the proposal would not be referred to parliament. TİSK President Baydur explained that he saw the draft occupational safety law as a part of the SPP, but that the draft was intended to be attributed to the government. The fact that there was no clear response from the TPP against TİSK, which based its general strategy on preventing the draft from reaching parliament by forcing the TPP, made the situation even more complicated for the government. As a matter of fact, Demirel did not answer the questions asked to him about the subject. The unions agreed that they would not hesitate to use their collective power if the proposal was blocked. Hak-İş argued that TİSK wanted to prevent the draft from becoming law by pitting coalition parties against each other. DİSK attributed the reason employers remained away from even discussing the draft to the fact that all their demands were included in the law and constitution on September 12. Türk-İş President Yılmaz, however, wanted to draw attention to the power created by the organised solidarity of labour against the intense pressure exerted by employers to prevent drafts from becoming law (Cumhuriyet, 15.03.1992-15.06.1992).

However, because TPP deputies did not participate in the ILO convention negotiations

held in the Parliament on November 19, 1992, the quorum could not be reached, and then the Minister of Labour Mehmet Moğultay left the Parliament, stating that he would resign. After these discussions, the conventions were accepted only in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on November 25, 1992, thanks to Demirel. However, ILO Convention No. 158, which brought judicial guarantees to workers against dismissals, was vetoed by President Özal and sent to the Parliament for a second discussion (Cumhuriyet, 15.06.1992-15.12.1992). Although the contract was brought back to the agenda of the parliament without any change, it could only be put into force on January 4, 1995.

All this strategic selectivity (Jessop, 2005, p.173) implemented by the Party was causing unions to intensify their criticism of the TPP on a daily basis. The project adopted by the party when it came to power gained the consent of many worker organisations, especially unions affiliated with Türk-İş. At this point, DISK stated that the time they had given to the government had expired. Hak-İş explained that they were looking at the future with despair. Türk-İş's disappointment was manifested in its new motto "Slave order, slave order, down with the Demirel order". The unions agreed that action against the government should be taken as soon as possible. As the TPP's first 500 days of power were coming to an end, the drafts enacted into law, other than the ILO Conventions, were far from erasing the traces of September 12 on the working life that the TPP had promised. No changes towards democratisation could be made in the Trade Unions Law, Collective Bargaining Agreement, Strike and Lockout laws; studies on the unionisation of civil servants remained at the draft level, and the Draft Law on Job Security could not be passed by the Council of Ministers (Cumhuriyet, 08.12.1992-24.03.1993). However, during Demirel's term as Prime Minister, the decade-long erosion in real wages was reversed. When real wages in 1985 were taken as a basis of 100 points, real wages increased to 136 in 1990, 193.9 in 1991, 199.8 in 1992, and 203.5 in 1993 (Özgün, 2014, p.100). This situation revealed that the neoliberal perspective, which sees labour as the most important element of cost and focuses on reducing wages, was not shared by the True Path Party during this period.

Conclusion

The TPP was founded after the 1980 military coup and attempted to continue its political life under the authoritarian order created by the September 12 regime under the influence of strong structural changes in the global economy. The Motherland Party Government, which came to power after the transition to civilian rule, was motivated to develop and protect this neoliberal order, which was structured under the dominance of supranational financial institutions and implemented through the military regime. The most important of TPP's main tools was the suppression of labour. TPP, on the other hand, argued that 'a healthy balance of labour, capital and enterprise' should be established during this period. In this context, TPP was producing discourses aimed at gaining the support of labour against the structural conditions of the labour market in which it was born. During the opposition period, the party was opposed to the suppression of wages, which was the most important element that ensured the sustainability of the accumulation process continued by the junta and the Motherland Party Government, starting from January 24. TPP argued that there was a significant decrease in workers' wages and living standards. The Party

stated that they would not settle for development with cheap labour and promised workers that their union and collective bargaining rights would be reorganised.

TPP was, in a way, referring to the political economy of the 1960s by highlighting the large inequalities in income distribution, full employment, and the relationship between poverty and income distribution, which policymakers avoided mentioning in the neoliberal process. During the period from its establishment until it came to power, the TPP called out to workers, the oppressed of the neoliberal system deepened by the Motherland Party Government. In this context, the election manifesto titled “A New Turkey on the Morning of October 21” published by the Party in 1991 constituted the highest point of the Party’s emphasis on social welfare. However, the Party’s discourses reminded of the proverb “Only God Almighty can give without taking”, which Borotav, Yeldan, and Köse (2000, p.28) used to understand populism in Turkey. TPP was looking for ways to give without taking despite the evolving balance of power. Because ‘how the distribution demands will be met in favour of the popular classes, that is, by giving to the labour/poor without taking from the capital/rich’ remained unclear in the TPP’s discourses. The main concern was how the promises made to labour would be met in an environment in which domestic and foreign debt reached 470 trillion in the currency of the period, the treasury had a cash deficit of 72 trillion, and the budget had a cash deficit of 32 trillion. The answer to this question will be determined by social power relations and sectoral and class struggles of interest.

As a matter of fact, during its rule, the party lost the support of many worker organisations, especially unions affiliated with Türk-İş. During the first 500 days of the TPP’s rule, the drafts enacted into law, other than the ILO Conventions, were far from erasing the traces of September 12 on working life that the TPP promised. No changes towards democratisation could be made in the Trade Unions Law, Collective Bargaining Agreement, Strike and Lockout laws, studies on the unionisation of civil servants remained at the draft level and the Draft Law on Job Security could not be passed by the Council of Ministers. Issues such as wage increases below the inflation rate and the freezing of wages were on the agenda again, and neoliberal moves towards unionisation could not be prevented. This situation was an indicator of TPP’s transition to the process of integrating into neoliberal labour policies.

However, the period during which the party was in opposition was a stance against the process of oppression of labour, which started with the February 24 period, continued with military tutelage, and continued with the Özal administration. This situation presents an important originality in the struggle to build neoliberal hegemony in Turkey. The practical effects of neoliberalism have not been reflected in the same way everywhere, and in Turkey, a segment of the centre-right has had a positive impact on the mobilisation of organised labour against policies in this context. The discourses put forward by the TPP during this period continue to offer stimulating tools to guide today’s politicians in their fight against neoliberalism. This situation demonstrates that this social process cannot be fully understood without considering the unique local characteristics of each country, and this area of originality still awaits the attention of new researchers who can contribute to the intellectual, political, and administrative knowledge.

Peer-review: Externally peer-reviewed.

Conflict of Interest: The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

Grant Support: The author declared that this study has received no financial support.

References

- Adaman, F., Buğra, A. ve İnsel A. (2009). Societal context of labor union strategy: the case of Turkey. *Labor Studies Journal*, 34. Cilt, 2. Sayı, 168-188.
- Akça, İ. (2011). 1980'lerden bugüne Türkiye'de siyaset ve hegemonya: bir çerçeve denemesi. *İktisat Dergisi*, No. 515-516, 25-35.
- Akkaya, Y. (1999). 1990'lı yıllarda Türkiye'de grevler. *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, Cilt 54, Sayı:2, 1-34.
- Baysan, T. ve Blitzer C. (1990). Turkey's trade liberalization in the 1980s and prospects for its sustainability. Arıcanlı T. ve Rodrik D. (der.), *The Political Economy Of Turkey Debt, Adjustment and Sustainability* (pp.9-37). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bedirhanoglu, P. ve Yalman, G. L. (2010). Reflections on the neoliberal transformation in Turkey. Saad-Filho, A. ve Yalman, G. (der), *Economic Transitions to Neoliberalism in Middle-income Countries* (pp.107-128). Routledge.
- Bora, T. (2018). *Cereyanlar: Türkiye'de Siyasi İdeolojiler*, İletişim Yayınları.
- Boratav, K. (1990). Inter-class and intra-class relations of distribution under 'structural adjustment': Turkey during the 1980s, Arıcanlı T. ve Rodrik D. (der.), *The Political Economy Of Turkey Debt, Adjustment and Sustainability* (pp.199-230). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Boratav, K. ve Yeldan, E. (2001). Turkey, 1980-2000: financial liberalization, macroeconomic (in)-stability and patterns of distribution, <http://yeldane.bilkent.edu.tr/B&YCEPA2002.PDF> 04.01.2021.
- Boratav, K., Yeldan, E.ve Köse A. H. (2000). Globalization, distribution and social policy: Turkey, 1980-1988. *CEPA and The New School for Social Research, Working Paper Series*, No:20.
- Cam, S. (2002). Neo-liberalism and labour within the context of an 'emerging market' economy— Turkey. *Capital & Class*, 26(2), 89-114.
- Celasun, M. (1990). Fiscal aspects of adjustment in the 1980s, Arıcanlı T. ve Rodrik D. (der.), *The Political Economy Of Turkey Debt, Adjustment and Sustainability* (pp.37-60), Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, Ü. (2002). From ruler to pariah: the life and times of the True Path Party. B. Rubin and M. Heper (der.), *Political Parties in Turkey* (pp.82-101). London: Frank Cass&Co. Ltd.
- Demirel, T. (2017). *Adalet Partisi İdeoloji ve Politika*, İletişim Yayınları.
- DYP'nin Doğru Görüşünden Parçalar (Ekonomi), DYP Ekonomi ve Mali İşler Başkanlığı, Ankara, 1985.
- DYP Bir Yaşında (23 Haziran 1983-23 Haziran 1984), DYP Yayınları No: 3, Ankara.
- DYP 1. Büyük Divan Toplantısı, 1984.
- Doğru Yol Partisi Neyin Mücadelesini Yapıyor?, DYP Yayınları No: 1, Onur Ofset, Ankara, 1983.
- Doğru Yol Partisi Tüzük ve Programı, DYP Yayınları, Ankara, 1983.
- Doğru Yol Partisi Tüzük ve Programı, DYP Yayınları, Ankara, 1985.
- DYP 1. Büyük Kongresi Raporlar, 14-15 Mayıs 1985.
- DYP I. Büyük Kongre Vesikaları, DYP Yayınları No: 6, Kurtuluş Ofset, Ankara, 1985.
- DYP Anayasa Mahkemesinde, DYP Yayınları No: 5, Ankara, 1985.
- DYP Cumhuriyet Medeniyeti'nin Üç Temeli: Hürriyet, Güven ve Refah Dün Üçü de Beraberdi... Yine Beraber Olacak! Doğru Yol Partisi 1986 Ara Seçim Beyannamesi.
- DYP 1986 Ara Seçim Beyannamesi, Ankara, 1986.
- DYP Niçin Vardır? Ne İster? DYP'nin İleri Hedefleri, DYP Basın ve Propaganda Başkanlığı, Ankara, 1987.
- DYP 1987 Seçim Beyannamesi, Büyük Türkiye Programı, Ankara, 1987.
- DYP Süleyman Demirel, Türk Demokrasisi Meydan Okuyor (1989 Mali Yıl Bütçesi Vesilesiyle TBMM'de 9 ve 23 Aralık 1988'de Yaptığı Konuşmalar), Ankara DYP Basın ve Propaganda Başkanlığı.
- DYP Genel Başkanı Süleyman Demirel'in 25.8.1988'de İstanbul'da, 24.12.1988'de Ankara'da Gençlerle Yaptığı Konuşmalar, Sorulara Verdiği Cevaplar, Doğru Yol Basın ve Propaganda Başkanlığı, 1989.
- Doğru Yol Partisi Genel Başkanı Süleyman Demirel, "Bugünkü Siyasi İktidar Neleri ile Övünüyor, Mes'elenin İç Yüzü Nedir?", 4 Ocak 1989.
- Doğru Yol Partisi Gençlik ve Büyük Türkiye Sempozyumu, DYP İstanbul İl Başkanlığı, 1986.
- DYP Genel Başkanı Süleyman Demirel'in Kongre Açış Konuşması: 14-15 Mayıs 1988 DYP Olağan Büyük Kongresi, DYP Yayınları, Doğu Matbaacılık, Ankara, 1988.
- Doğru Yol Partisi İstanbul 3. Olağan il Kongresi, İstanbul İl Başkanlığı Faaliyet Raporu, 1990.
- Doğru Yol Partisi Genel Başkanı Süleyman Demirel'in DYP III. Büyük Kongresi'ni Açış Konuşması 24- 25 Kasım 1990, DYP Yayınları, Ankara, 1990.
- DYP Seçim Bildirgesi, 21 Ekim Sabahı Yeni Bir Türkiye, DYP Yayını, Ankara, 1991.
- DYP Genel Başkanı Süleyman Demirel'in Ege ve 19 Mayıs Üniversitesi Öğrencilerine Yaptığı Konuşma, DYP

- Gençlik Komisyonları Yayınları:2, 1991.
- DYP-SHP Koalisyon Protokolü, Koalisyon Hükümetleri, Koalisyon Protokolleri, Hükümet Programları ve Genel Kurul Görüşmeleri Cilt 2.
- Doğan, M. G. (2020). *Neoliberalizm, işçiler ve direniş, Özal'a karşı geleneksel sendikacılığın mücadelesi (1986-1991)*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- (2018). Örgütlü işçi hareketinin sindirilmesi. İ. Akça, A. Bekmen, B. A. Özden (der.), *Yeni Türkiye'ye Varan Yol. Neoliberal Hegemonyanın İnşası* (pp. 261-279), İletişim Yayınları.
- (2015). 1980 sonrası sendikal hareket: Türkiye'de sendikacılığın kuğu şarkısı. Y. D. Çetinkaya ve M. Ö. Alkan (der.), *Tanzimat'tan Günümüze Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi 1839-2014 Yeni Yaklaşımlar Yeni Alanlar Yeni Sorunlar*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Jessop, B. (2005). *Hegemonya, Post-Fordizm ve Küreselleşme Ekseninde Kapitalist Devlet*, İletişim Yayınları.
- Karahanoğulları, Y. (2019). Türkiye'de neoliberalizmin kuruluş süreci: 1980-1994. *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, Cilt:74, No:2, 429-464.
- Neuman, L. (2013). *Toplumsal araştırma yöntemleri*, Yayın Odası.
- Önder, N. (2016). *The economic transformation of Turkey. neoliberalism and state intervention*, I. B. Tauris.
- Özgün, S. D. (2014). *The political economy of labour market reforms Greece, Turkey and the global economic crisis*, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Parla, T. (2009). *Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de korporatizm*, Deniz Yayınları.
- Saraçoğlu, C. (2019). Tank paletiyle neoliberalizm. Atılğan, G. vd. (der), *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Siyasal Hayat* (pp.747-869), Yordam.
- TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 10.03.1993.
- Yalman, G. (2004). Türkiye'de devlet ve burjuvazi: alternatif bir okuma denemesi. N. Balkan ve S. Savran (der), *Sürekli Kriz Politikaları 2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye 1* (pp.44-75), Metis Yayınları.
- Yeldan, E. (1995). Surplus creation and extraction under structural adjustment: Turkey, 1980-1992. *Review of Radical Political Economics*, Vol. 27(2), 38-72.
- Yörük, E. (2018). Neoliberal hegemonya ve tabana dayalı siyaset: İslamcı hareket ve Kürt hareketi. İ. Akça, A. Bekmen, B. A. Özden (der.) *Yeni Türkiye'ye Varan Yol. Neoliberal Hegemonyanın İnşası* (pp. 319-335), İletişim Yayınları.

Newspapers:

Tercüman, Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, 1983-1993



Problem of Unemployment in Türkiye at the Focus of Unemployment of Educated People and Underutilisation (1991-2023)

Eğitimli İnsan İşsizliği ve Atıl İşgücü Odağında Türkiye’de İşsizlik Sorunu (1991-2023)

Ali Osman Balkanlı¹

Abstract

In societies, unemployment is both an economic, social, and political problem. For this reason, to reduce unemployment is among the main goals of governments all over the world. When it think with Okun Act, this target is also related to economic growth. This goal has always been a valid goal. However, during the development process of the world economy after the 1990s and the 2000s, the production conditions and importance of the workforce have changed significantly compared to the past. In order to analyse the unemployment experienced in the world economy and in Türkiye after 1990, it is necessary to analyse this change process experienced by the world economy. In this context, the first part of this paper is devoted to examining basic concepts such as labour force, employment, and unemployment, and examining changes in the world economy. In the second part of this article, the development of unemployment in terms of countries, country groups, and Türkiye in the world economy in the 1990s and thereafter, and the development of the resources allocated to education in terms of GDP, public expenditures and labour underutilisation are examined. Because of this investigation, it has been determined that unemployment in Türkiye has a chronic increasing trend from 1991 to 2023 but in here especially underutilisation and educated people’s unemployment has increased more intensively.

Keywords: Labour, Unemployment, Educated-people’s unemployment, Macroeconomic structure, Underutilisation

Öz

Toplumlar için işsizlik hem ekonomik, hem toplumsal hem de politik bir sorundur. Bu nedenle işsizliğin azaltılması tüm dünyada hükümetlerin temel hedefleri arasında yer almaktadır. Okun Yasası ile düşünüldüğünde bu hedef ekonomik büyümeyle de ilişkilidir. Hükümetler için bu hedef önceliği her zaman geçerli olmuştur. Ancak 1990’lı yıllardan sonra ve 2000’li yıllarda dünya ekonomisinin gelişim sürecinde üretim koşulları ve işgücünün önemi ise geçmişe göre önemli ölçüde değişmiştir. Dolayısıyla, 1990 sonrasında dünya ekonomisinde ve Türkiye’de yaşanan işsizliği analiz edebilmek için dünya ekonomisinin yaşadığı bu değişim sürecini analiz etmek gerekmektedir. Bu bağlamda makalenin ilk bölümü işgücü, istihdam ve işsizlik gibi temel kavramların incelenmesine ve dünya ekonomisindeki değişimin incelenmesine ayrılmıştır. Makalenin ikinci bölümünde 1990’lı yıllar ve sonrasında dünya ekonomisinde işsizliğin ülkeler, ülke grupları ve Türkiye itibarıyla gelişimi, eğitime ayrılan kaynakların GSYH ve kamu harcamaları açısından gelişimi ve işgücünün yetersiz kullanımı araştırılmıştır. Araştırma sonucunda Türkiye’de işsizliğin 1991 yılından 2023 yılına kadar kronik bir artış eğilimi gösterdiği ancak burada özellikle genç işsizliğinin ve atıl işgücü işsizliğinin yakın dönemde daha yoğun bir şekilde arttığı tespit edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İşgücü, İşsizlik, Eğitimli-insanların işsizliği, Makroekonomik yapı, Atıl işgücü

1 Corresponding Author: Ali Osman Balkanlı (Assoc. Prof. Dr.), Istanbul University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of Politics and Public Administration, Istanbul, Türkiye. E-mail: aobalkan@istanbul.edu.tr
ORCID: 0000-0003-1074-9069

To cite this article: Balkanlı, A. O. (2024). Problem of unemployment in turkiye at the focus of unemployment of educated people and underutilisation (1991-2023). *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 33(2), 339–352.
<http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2024.33.1488639>

Introduction

Governments' primary targets are increasing economic growth, creating new job opportunities, and reducing unemployment. In this context, governments have the task of creating economic policies to decrease unemployment. These policy goals of governments had a great chance of being achieved before the 1980s because economies could implement policies that were largely unaffected by the outside world during this period. However, in the 1990s and later, as countries opened up to the outside world, national economies became more interconnected, and national economic policies became influenced by the outside world. As a result, like other economic policies, policies aimed at increasing employment are increasingly being affected by the outside world and the world economy. Therefore, the global economic conjuncture and the economic policies/directions of major countries have begun to affect countries more. For example, in these years, countries' ability to control imports in customs decreased according to past circumstances under the effect of custom agreements, emerging in the direction of GATT. It reduced the ability of these countries to protect their industries. Although it has been claimed that these regulations will support the exports of these countries, this is not true for every country. This situation increased unemployment for some countries that had not increased exports during this period.

Other thema for the investigating period are the changing economic ideology in 1990s (Especially after 1980s) in the world. The neoliberal ideological orientation that emerged in the world economy in the 1990s manifested itself not only in economic policies and economic structure regulations. Along with the changes in the legal system, changes have also occurred in economic law and labour law. While the economic and legal structures are changing, the changes that occur in these areas have also brought change and differentiation in economic activities, business conditions, and job opportunities for the workforce. With the effect of this change, enterprise and capital factors became more mobile in the global economy.

This period was during which the bargaining power of the workforce weakened. It should be emphasised that these developments are not related to only neo-liberal economic policies, but also developments in technology and automation impact this change and its weakening. Under the influence of technology and automation developments that have emerged over time and the increase in the "availability of machines instead of labour force at different stages of production", there has been a decrease in the "tendency to be obliged to the labour force in production" for entrepreneurs. These changes led to a weakened economic condition of the labour force in production during this period. In this process, which started in the 1990s (we can essentially attribute the beginning of this process to the invention of the computer processor in the late 1970s (Balkanlı,2019), the fact that technology and automation supported by technology reduced the place and importance of the workforce in production. These changes have concretely revealed their effect on unemployment. For example, this situation can be understood more easily when considering applications such as Industry 4, which involves automation and management techniques.

At the other side, there was also remarkable development in these years: Some developed countries, which were at the forefront in industrial development before the

1980s, moved their industrial production largely to Asian countries (being relatively cheap labour factor), within 1980s and 1990s while they tended to prioritise R&D and technological development and produce sophisticated products.

Method of Research and Concepts

Research Material, Scope and Method

Since the focus of the article is to investigate the unemployment and underutilisation problem in the case of Turkiye, after the concepts are detailed, unemployment and underutilisation data of Turkiye are researched and comparatively analysed in the second part of the article.

In this study, the time-data comparison-cross-check analysis method was used according to years and countries. The question of the research is how unemployment develops at the focus of educated people's unemployment and of the general unemployment and of the underutilisation in Turkiye, at the globalised conditions. For this reason, the period between 1991 and 2023 was specifically chosen.

Concepts

Labour Force and Employment

The concept that explains the labour supply in terms of the number of people in a country is labour force. The supply of labour force, which is important in the production cycle, is determined by many factors (Zaim, 1992:79). The labour force is the productive part of the general population that is over the age of 15 and under the age of 65, has accepted the current wage level in the markets, and is willing and able to work. Population groups not included in the labour force are those who never work and those who cannot work at all, that is, the elderly, children, housewives, students, and disabled people who cannot work. In this regard, when examining societies economically, it can be said that the population over a certain age is divided into three groups in terms of labour force: those who are employed, the unemployed, and those who are not included in the labour force (Apaydın, 2018:164). Underemployment situations that occur in periods/situations in which the effect of periodic and seasonal changes are high, along with the effect of the structural weakness of the economy, occur in two forms: (i) visible underemployment and (ii) invisible underemployment (Serter, 1993:19/42-43).

The types of Unemployment

Work experience, education, and qualification status of the workforce are important in separating and classifying the workforce. At this point, workers can be divided into three groups, with the most basic distinction: qualified, semi-skilled, and unskilled. According to Turkstat (TUIK), "labour force includes the working-age population who supply or want to supply labour for the production of economic goods and services in the relevant reference period. In determining the workforce, activities that contribute to the production of goods and services are essential. Labour force refers to the sum of those employed and unemployed". (Turkstat, 2024). According to the definition of Turkstat, the labour force participation rate is the ratio of the labour force to the working-age population. The

unemployment rate is the ratio of the number of openly unemployed to the number of labour forces.

In cases where unemployment is divided into open and hidden unemployment, open unemployment refers to people who are willing and able to work but cannot find a job or cannot work even though they are looking for a job by accepting current and passing wages (Serter, 1993:10). It is possible to see demand fluctuations, unemployment caused by technology, and fluctuations in the labour market (frictional unemployment) among the causes of unemployment in developed countries. The causes of unemployment that are valid in developed economies are also valid in developing economies. However, in developing economies, structural problems in underdeveloped industries and other production sectors are more decisive for unemployment.

Those in the following situation are defined as openly unemployed: (i) Those who are eligible for employment because their employment contract has ended or been temporarily suspended but cannot have a job and are looking for a paid job; (ii) Persons who have never been employed before or who are available to work for a certain period of time whose status is not dependent on them; (iii) People who do not currently have a job and are available to work, even though they have made an agreement to start a new job at a later date within a certain period; (iv) Those who are employed temporarily and for an indefinite period without any payment are considered unemployed (Zaim, 1992: 138-139; Serter, 1993: 10-13; Ekin, 1971: 29). There are many reasons (seasonal, technological, cyclical, incidental, structural) for open unemployment, and some are especially related to developing country conditions (Zaim, 1992: 135/149; Ersel, 1999: 14; Tatoğlu, 2010: 12; Serter, 1993: 10; Ekin, 1971: 222/235; Etçi and Karagöl, 2019: 67).

Labour Underutilisation

At the point of determining unemployment in economies, apart from the narrow definition of unemployment, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has proposed the concept and methodology of broadly defined unemployment. ILO calls widespread unemployment as labour underutilisation. These definitions and calculations by the International Labour Organisation were put forward at a meeting held in Genoa in 2013 (ILO, 2013:3).

According to ILO labour underutilisation refers to mismatches between labour supply and demand, which represents an unmet need for employment among the population. Measures of labour underutilisation includes to (i) time-related underemployment (If the working time of persons in employment is insufficient, while they are willing and available to engage) (ii) unemployment (iii) potential labour force. (means to persons who not in employment and who express an interest for work but for whom existing conditions limit their active job search and/or availability) (ILO, 1963:13).

In Türkiye, Turkstat (TUIK), TÜRKİSK, TÜSİAD and DİSK have defined and calculated the expanded unemployment rate /idle workforce. According to the DİSK Research group's definition, widespread unemployment comprises five elements. First, narrowly defined (standard) unemployed individuals were included in the calculation. Second, those who are not looking for a job but are ready to work were divided into two groups and were included in the calculation [(i) Those who have lost hope of finding a job (ii) Other

individuals who are not looking for a job but they are ready to work at any time when they called]. The third factor considered in defining broad unemployment is seasonal workers. These are also accepted as an extended unemployed element. The other group included in the calculation is time-related underemployment (Çelik et al.,2021:326). All elements used to define expanded unemployment are included in Turkstat's expanded unemployment calculation (DISK,2024:1). Broad unemployment is an important concept because it shows the labour force that is idle in an economy and therefore largely unemployed.

Analysis of Unemployment in Türkiye: General and Educated People's Unemployment

Increasing of Unemployment and Educated People's Unemployment

Starting in the 1970s, the world economy began to open up to the outside world, starting with developed countries. This trend emerged one step later in developing economies. The 1990s saw the world economy move to global economic conditions. For this reason, the development of unemployment rates in countries from the 1990s onwards to the present also provides an explanation for globalisation and unemployment-employment relations. At this point, when we look at the table below, we can see that although there are increases in unemployment in some countries with globalisation, there is no tragic increase in unemployment rates in these countries, except for a few countries. In addition, in some countries (especially developed countries), there have been significant decreases in unemployment. As can be seen in the table below, while there is a significant decrease in unemployment in developed countries, it is necessary to talk about an increase in varying rates, not a decrease, in the country groups ranging from middle-income countries to underdeveloped countries. Inferring from this, it can be said that while there were more positive developments regarding unemployment in developed economies in the 1990s and thereafter, more negative developments were experienced in developing economies.

Unemployment in the world economy as a whole was 4.99% in 1991 and increased to 5.27% in 2022. However, the significant decrease in the unemployment rate from 1991 to 2022 is noteworthy in India, which is a developing economy. On the other hand, in China, which rose to fame in the world economy in the 1980s, the unemployment rate significantly increased from 2.37% to 4.98%. During this period, the unemployment rate in Türkiye increased. Thus, while the unemployment rate in Türkiye was 8.11% in 1991, it increased to 9.4% in 2023. According to these data, it can be said that Türkiye is an economy where unemployment increased under the influence of internal and external dynamics during the transition to the global economy that started in the 1990s.

Another notable difference between developed and developing economies in the 1990s and 2000s is the course of resource allocation by countries to education expenditures. While the share allocated to education in public expenditures was 13.5% on a global scale in 2000, it decreased to 12.7% in 2021. When examined in detail, it has been seen that the share allocated to education in public expenditures decreased in OECD countries, the USA, Central European countries, Baltic countries, Japan, and Latin America. A decrease in the share is also observed in Türkiye and many other countries. In the period investigated, there is generally a decrease in the share allocated to education in public expenditures. This trend can also be seen from the decrease in the share of education in public expenditures from 11.2% to 11% in high-income countries. But, interestingly, during this period, the

share of education expenditures in public expenditures increased in Germany. In a period when knowledge, technological developments and research and development activities are at the forefront, the decrease in the share allocated to education in public expenditure seems surprising. However, in here, two factors must be considered.

First, the aim of economic policies in the orbit of the dominant neoliberal ideology, starting from the 1980s, to reduce the weight of the government on the economy should be seen as a factor here. In this case, while public education was being standardised (and also, while the process of family participation in education expenses was expanding with the spread of parent-teacher associations, instead of government expenditures), (secondly factor) families began to prioritise private sector education for education, and “a process in which private sector education was prioritised in finding jobs for educated people” was entered.

In a period when the information society comes to the fore, a decrease in the share allocated to education in public expenditures is a major dilemma. However, this is also a fact: while there was a decrease in the share of education expenditures in public expenditures during this period, there was no decrease in the share of education expenditures in GDP. Even in some countries and country groups, there have been notable increases in the share of education expenditures in GDP.

Table 1

Development of Unemployment Rates in World and Turkiye, (1991-2022, %)

Countries	1991	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2017	2020	2021	2022
Albania	10,31	14,61	19,02	15,97	14,09	17,19	13,62	12,8	12,59	11,69
Argentina	5,44	18,8	15,00	11,51	7,71	7,58	8,35	11,5	8,74	6,81
Bulgaria	11,1	11,1	16,22	10,08	10,28	9,14	6,16	5,12	5,27	4,27
Canada	10,32	9,49	6,83	6,76	8,18	6,95	6,43	9,66	7,53	5,28
Central Europe&Baltics	9,527	10,72	12,41	12,06	9,90	7,82	5,30	4,37	4,49	4,01
China	2,37	3,00	3,26	4,52	4,53	4,65	4,47	5,00	4,55	4,98
Germany	5,32	8,16	7,92	11,17	6,97	4,62	3,75	3,86	3,64	3,14
European Union	8,595	11,05	9,82	9,62	9,85	10,02	8,12	7,04	7,02	6,15
France	9,13	11,83	10,22	8,88	9,28	10,35	9,41	8,01	7,86	7,31
United Kingdom	8,55	8,69	5,56	4,75	7,79	5,3	4,33	4,47	4,826	3,73
Hungary	8,50	10,17	6,56	7,19	11,17	6,81	4,16	4,25	4,05	3,61
India	6,83	7,00	7,85	8,70	8,30	7,89	7,73	7,86	6,38	4,82
Iran, Islamic Rep.	11,1	9,89	11,69	11,81	13,68	11,17	12,23	9,69	9,28	8,82
Italy	10,1	11,66	10,83	7,73	8,36	11,9	11,21	9,20	9,50	8,07
Latin America and the Caribbean	6,11	7,93	9,46	8,23	7,21	6,68	8,04	10,2	9,2	6,90
Least developed countries:(UN Clas)	4,52	4,49	4,69	4,82	4,86	4,96	5,16	5,86	6,02	5,36
Low income	4,75	4,68	5,05	4,61	4,83	5,02	5,27	6,04	6,11	5,61
Lower middle income	5,78	6,22	6,83	6,88	6,46	6,53	6,48	6,86	6,24	5,01
Low and middle income	4,46	5,37	5,98	6,26	5,95	5,92	6,00	6,61	6,15	5,42
Turkiye	8,11	7,24	6,3	10,63	10,66	10,24	10,82	13,1	11,98	10,43
United States	6,8	5,65	3,99	5,08	9,63	5,28	4,36	8,05	5,35	3,65
World	4,99	5,83	6,14	6,37	6,39	6,06	5,93	6,60	6,06	5,27

Source: <https://data.worldbank.org> (Access: 09.02.2024)

While the ratio of educational expenditures to GDP worldwide was 4% in 2000, it increased to 4.2% in 2021; in OECD countries, it increased from 4.8% to 5%, from 1991 to 2021. During this period, an increase in educational expenditures in GDP is more evident in developing economies. For example, in East Asian and Pacific countries, the ratio of educational expenditures to GDP was 2.3% in 1995 and increased to 3% in 2021. In the low-income countries group, while this share was 2.6% in 2000, it increased to 3.1% in 2022. In Lower-Middle income countries, the rate was 2.8%, but it increased to 3.2% in 2022 (www.worldbank.org,2024). These data show that, although the share of education expenditures in public expenditures decreased in the world in the 1990s and 2000s, the share of education expenditures in GDP did not decrease (to a large extent) in terms of countries and even increased in some countries and country groups. This determination is also valid for Türkiye. So much so that the share of education in GDP in Türkiye (while the share of education in public expenditures decreased from 10.6% in 2011 to 8.81% in 2021) was 2.3% in 1995 and increased to 2.8% in 2021 (www.worldbank.org,2024).

The increase in educational expenditure/GDP ratio in Türkiye is similar to the situation seen in many countries. Over time, private educational institutions began to be opened in Türkiye instead of public (central government) educational institutions, and their share in the education system increased. Here, it is necessary to highlight the vocational training course activities of metropolitan municipalities such as Istanbul and Ankara as training events. These institutions have provided widespread education in their regions, and the educational activities of these institutions are in high demand. These institutions have aimed to make their students professional at work by providing them with direct vocational training through the educational activities they conduct. A significant portion of those trained here have been employed as certified personnel in the areas of expertise in which they completed their training. From this perspective, it can be said that these activities of metropolitan municipalities must have been included in the total educational activities (as educational activities of local government institutions) as well as educational institutions of the central government and private sector educational institutions (as educational activities in national income calculations).

In here, another thema is time for finding job for unemployed people. An environment of increasing unemployment, those who are unemployed enter to tend to look for a job very quickly.

In Türkiye case, unemployed people largely search for a job, especially within 1-2 months after leaving their job. So that, as of 2021, 1,261,000 out of 2,697,000 people looking for a job out of 3,919,000 unemployed people were starting to look for a job in the first 1-2 months. 814,000 people continued to look for a job within 3-5 months. Again in the same year (2021), 424,000 unemployed people continued to look for a job within a period of 6-8 months. 199,000 of the unemployed continued to look for work within 9-11 months. As of 2022, 2,724,000 out of 3,582,000 unemployed people were looking for a job, while 1,405,000 of this job-seeking population started to look for a job within the first 1-2 months. At the same year, 832,000 unemployed people continued to look for a job till to 3 to 5 months. 365,000 of these unemployed people continued to look for work till to 6-8 months. At the same year (in 2022), 121,000 unemployed people were in

search of a job for 9-11 months. Of course, there are those who are looking for a job for a longer period of time, but this is the time when the unemployed started looking for a job within a 1-year period (www.tuik.gov.tr). Here, it is understood from these data that in general, unemployed people are looking for a job as soon as possible (inside of 1-2 months) in Türkiye.

The educational status of those employed in Türkiye is important in terms of revealing the education-employment relationship (Murat and Şahin, 2011:43-59). What is seen at this point is that the highest employment rate is among the illiterate, and when comparing the groups grouped according to education and employment rates within these groups, a full correlation between education and employment opportunities cannot be established. For example, the employment rate of the workforce with high school and higher education is lower than that of the workforce with high school education. However, it should be emphasised here that the number of uneducated people in the total workforce is quite low, whereas the number (population) of educated people in the workforce is quite high. These data are not surprising considering that some young people do not attend university education during their transition from high school to university.

In this context, when we look at the data for 2020, the number of illiterate workforce members is 774,000. The workforce with less than high school education (secondary education) comprises 14,802,000 people. The workforce with high school education comprises 3,317,000 people. The amount of workforce with vocational and technical high school graduates is 3,619,000. The amount of workforce with higher education levels is 3,619,000. The employment distribution of this workforce for 2022 was as follows: the number of illiterate people was 810,000. The employment level of those with lower than high school education was 13,939,000. The employment of the high school-educated workforce was 13,939,000 people. The employment of the high school educated workforce was 3,997,000 people. The employment figure of the vocational or technical high school-educated workforce was 3,515,000 people. The employment level of the workforce with higher education was 8,492,000 people (www.tuik.gov.tr). According to Turkstat data, the unemployment rate of the workforce as of 2022 was 6.25% for the illiterate, 9.23% for the workforce with less than high school education, the non-employment rate for the workforce with a high school education is 12.71%, the employment rate for the workforce with a vocational or technical high school education is 11.30%, and higher education the employment rate of the employed workforce was 11.27%.

Here, “hypothetically, assuming that those with the same year of education are subject to employment in the same year”, it is seen that the phenomenon of being out of employment is weak in percentage terms for those who are illiterate. In this study, those with less than high school education, on the other hand, as the level of education increases, the phenomenon of being out of employment increases and that the workforce with higher education is unemployed (the rate of unemployment is 11.27% for higher educated people). People with high school education have a unemployment rate of 12.71. However, here, it should be considered that quality increases with education, and the element of choosing a job and being selected for a job comes to the fore. It should also be considered here that the number of people with higher education levels is much higher than those who are illiterate. Considering these two issues, it can be understood that as education levels increase, the unemployment rate may also increase (Kavak,1997:24).

Table 2

Changes in the Shares of Education Expenditures/Public Expenditures (1995-2021, %)

Country Name	1995	2000	2005	2010	2011	2015	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Argentina	n. d.	16,2	15,8	15,0	15,2	14,0	13,3	12,5	12,5	12,4	12,3
Bulgaria	11,4	9,82	11,3	9,89	9,99	9,69	10,1	9,54	10,5	9,46	10,6
Central and Baltic countries	11,4	11,2	12,1	11,2	10,6	10,5	10,8	11,3	11,8	10,6	10,9
Germany	7,51	8,53	8,78	9,11	9,51	9,64	9,48	9,64	9,72	9,2	8,85
East Asia and the Pacific	n. d.	n. d.	n. d.	16,8	14,7	15,2	15,1	15,4	15,2	12,8	13,1
Europe and Central Asia	10,9	11,9	12,3	11,5	11,4	11,6	11,1	11,5	11,8	10,7	10,9
European Union	10,9	11,2	12,1	11,2	10,9	10,5	10,6	10,9	10,8	10,4	10,7
Finland	11,3	12,2	12,5	12,1	12,0	11,0	10,5	10,4	10,5	10,2	10,2
France	10,5	10,8	10,4	9,92	9,74	9,59	9,55	9,57	9,48	8,82	8,88
United Kingdom	11,4	13,2	13,4	13,2	12,7	12,3	12,3	12,1	12,0	10,7	11,2
Greece	8,0	8,32	9,24	7,82	8,2	7,68	8,03	8,46	8,36	7,54	7,11
High income	11,3	12,1	12,5	12,6	12,4	11,8	12,0	12,0	11,9	10,9	11,0
India	n. d.	16,7	11,2	11,8	13,6	16,3	13,5	n. d.	15,0	14,7	14,6
Iran, Islamic Rep.	14,5	20,6	21,9	19,3	20,2	18,6	20,3	21,1	21,2	22,7	n. d.
Israel	n. d.	15,7	15,0	16,4	16,5	18,1	18,2	18,1	18,1	15,7	18,4
Low income	n. d.	15,1	n. d.	16,2	15,1	16,0	14,2	16,3	14,2	14,7	15,7
OECD members	11,3	12,6	12,5	12,6	12,2	12,1	12,2	12,1	12,0	10,9	11,1
Pakistan	10,3	8,49	13,8	11,9	10,9	13,2	12,1	12,2	11,6	10,8	7,82
Romania	9,81	8,14	10,9	8,24	10,3	8,5	8,51	9,1	10,1	8,8	8,14
Russian Federation	n. d.	8,36	11,2	9,77	9,63	2,2	9,5	10,0	9,29	8,94	n. d.
Türkiye	n. d.	n. d.	n. d.	10,6	11,4	11,8	10,8	10,7	11,2	9,31	8,81
United States	15,9	18,0	16,7	15,6	15,5	16,1	15,9	15,8	15,5	12,7	n. d.
World	n. d.	13,5	14,1	13,6	14,2	14,5	14,3	14,4	14,1	12,8	12,7

Source: www.data.worldbank.org, (n.d.:no data) (Access:20.01.2024)

According to the Turkstat data above, by looking within oneself data on the educated workforce, an evaluation can be made not by comparing the education focus with the employment of the relevant education group but by directly looking at total employment (as the labour force participation rate). In this context, the labour force participation rate can be viewed from the education dimension (Erdoğan and Okudum,57). When looked at accordingly, it can be seen that (with 2022 data) the labour force participation rate of the illiterate is 30.6%, of those with less than high school education is 65.9%, of those with high school education is 72.1%, of those with vocational or technical high school education is 81.5%, and of those with higher education is 85.1%. While the employment rate of the illiterate was 27.1%, it was 60.0% for those with less than high school education, 64.9% for those with high school education, 74.4% for those with vocational or technical high school education, and 78.0% for those with higher education. When we look at the total employment level and education-unemployment relationship, we find that the unemployment rate is 11.6% for those who are illiterate, 8.9% for those with less than high school education, 10.0% for those with high school education, and 8.7% for those with vocational or technical high school education. The unemployment rate of higher educated people is 8.3%. (www.tuik.gov.tr).

Table 3

Employment by sector (+15 age, 1.000 person, %)

Year	Total	Agri.	Industry	Const.	Services	Total	Agri.	Industry	Const.	Service	GDP %
1991*	19 288	8.348	2 934	975	6.198	100	43.3	15.2	5.1	32.1	0,3
2000*	21 580	7.769	3.810	1.364	8.637	100	36.0	17.7	6.3	40.0	6.3
2005	19,350	4,945	4,140	1,096	9,176	100	25,5	21,4	5,7	47,4	9.0
2006	19,710	4,612	4,299	1,182	9,624	100	23,4	21,8	6,0	48,8	7.0
2007	20,000	4,410	4,388	1,228	9,975	100	22,0	21,9	6,1	49,9	5.0
2008	20,400	4,445	4,524	1,237	10,193	100	21,8	22,2	6,1	50,0	0.8
2009	20,530	4,783	4,153	1,299	10,299	100	23,3	20,2	6,3	50,2	-4.8
2010	21,810	5,073	4,619	1,423	10,696	100	23,3	21,2	6,5	49,0	8.4
2011	23,170	5,289	4,855	1,672	11,350	100	22,8	21,0	7,2	49,0	11.2
2012	23,740	5,156	4,891	1,714	11,977	100	21,7	20,6	7,2	50,5	4.8
2013	24,486	5,039	5,133	1,788	12,525	100	20,6	21,0	7,3	51,2	8.5
2014	25,770	5,220	5,339	1,913	13,302	100	20,3	20,7	7,4	51,6	4.9
2015	26,500	5,357	5,345	1,916	13,884	100	20,2	20,2	7,2	52,4	6.1
2016	27,130	5,287	5,295	1,991	14,552	100	19,5	19,5	7,3	53,6	3.3
2017	28,075	5,401	5,394	2,108	15,171	100	19,2	19,2	7,5	54,0	7.5
2018	28,691	5,282	5,686	2,012	15,711	100	18,4	19,8	7,0	54,8	3.0
2019	28,042	5,096	5,572	1,566	15,808	100	18,2	19,9	5,6	56,4	0.8
2020	26,695	4,737	5,482	1,546	14,930	100	17,7	20,5	5,8	55,9	1.9
2021	28,797	4,948	6,143	1,777	15,928	100	17,2	21,3	6,2	55,3	11.4
2022	30,752	4,866	6,663	1,846	17,378	100	15,8	21,7	6,0	56,5	5.6
2023	31.632	4.695	6.711	1.997	18.230	100	14.8	21.2	6.3	57.6	4.5

Source:www.tuik.gov.tr,(Agri:Agriculture, Const.:Construction), *TUIK, “İstatistik Göstergeler, 1923-2013”, s.133/635;https://avys.omu.edu.tr/storage/app/public/demetozy/131408/%C4%B0statistik%20G%C3%B6stergeler%20T%C3%BCrkiye%201923-2013.pdf (Access:20.05.2024)

In the education-employment relationship, the long-term development of the industrial and services sectors and employment contributions should be considered. It should be noted that the industrial sector in Türkiye is a sector that has reached $\frac{1}{4}$ share of the national income, even though it is an industry with high import dependency and (in long-term analysis) no significant share increases have occurred since the 1980s. Therefore, the place of the industrial sector has special importance in terms of the employment of the workforce.

In 1991, the industry sector's employment share was 15.2%, the agricultural sector's employment share was 43.3%, and the services sector's share was 32.1%. As of 2023 data, the industrial sector's share was 21.2% , the agricultural sector's 14.8%, and the services sector's 57.6% in total employment. When examining employment shares according to production sectors, the share of the services sector in labour force employment had the highest annual levels from 1991 to 2023. However, it must say here, in general, sectors' employment shares tremendously changed from 1991 to 2023.

Table 4

Main labour force indicators in Türkiye (1.000 persons, %)

Years	Population 15 years or older	Labour force	Employment	Unemployment	Not in the labour force	Labour force participation rate (%)	Employment rate (%)	Unemployment rate (%)
1991*	36.869	21.010	19.288	1.723	15.859	57.0	52.3	8.2
1995*	41.176	22.286	20.586	1.700	18.890	54.1	50.0	7.6
2000*	46.211	23.078	21.581	1.497	23.133	49.9	46.7	6.5
2005	48.700	21.447	19.409	2.038	27.253	44.1	40.1	8.2
2006	49.620	21.777	19.936	1.841	27.843	43.8	40.0	8.8
2007	50.509	21.781	19.745	2.036	28.728	44.3	39.9	8.9
2008	51.252	22.828	20.236	2.592	28.424	44.5	40.0	9.9
2009	52.203	23.875	20.955	2.921	28.328	45.5	39.6	13.0
2010	53.337	24.550	22.067	2.483	28.787	46.3	41.2	10.1
2011	54.362	25.339	23.232	2.107	29.023	47.2	42.9	9.0
2012	55.315	26.396	24.158	2.238	28.919	47.1	43.2	10.6
2013	56.394	26.908	24.472	2.436	29.487	48.0	43.8	8.9
2014	57.326	28.787	25.703	3.083	28.539	50.2	45.2	9.9
2015	58.214	29.741	26.610	3.130	28.474	51.1	45.7	10.5
2016	59.068	30.701	26.995	3.706	28.367	51.9	46.2	10.9
2017	60.222	31.710	28.452	3.258	28.512	52.7	47.2	10.9
2018	60.895	32.202	28.238	3.963	28.693	53.1	47.3	10.9
2019	61.839	32.432	28.131	4.301	29.407	52.9	45.7	13.8
2020	63.038	30.794	26.823	3.970	32.244	49.1	42.7	13.2
2021	64.094	33.496	29.815	3.680	30.599	51.4	45.2	12.0
2022	65.026	35.089	31.556	3.533	29.937	52.4	46.7	10.5
2023	65.637	35.049	32.020	3.029	30.588	53.3	48.3	9.4

Source: www.tuik.gov.tr *TUIK, "İstatistik Göstergeler, 1923-2013", s.126. <https://avys.omu.edu.tr/storage/app/public/demetozy/131408/%C4%B0statistik%20G%C3%B6stergeler%20T%C3%BCrkiye%201923-2013.pdf> (Person numbers are years's 4.Quarterly numbers and values are yearly values), (Access:05.03.2024)

Türkiye's population of people aged 15 years and over was 36.869.000 in 1991, and employed persons was 19.288.000. In the same year, labour force participation rate was 57% and unemployment rate was 8.2%. In 2023, the population aged 15 years old and over is 35.049.000 and labour force participation rate was 53.3, the employment rate was 48.3%, and the unemployment rate was 9.4%. As if confirming Okun's law, it has been observed that unemployment also (exhibits a negative trend and) increases in years when GDP growth decreases or is negative. This is not interesting. Okun's law explains that a decline in production in an economy directly affects unemployment.

Increasing Problem of Labour Underutilisation in Türkiye

According to Turkstat, the wide unemployment rate (Labour Underutilisation) is calculated adjusted for seasonal effects and includes time-related underemployment, potential workforce, and unemployed people (www.tuik.gov.tr). According to Turkstat's calculations, the general unemployment rate decreased from 9.9% in 2014 to 9.4% from 2014 to 2023. The integrated rate of time-related underemployment and unemployed increased from 11.9% to 15.4%, and the integrated rate of the unemployed and potential labour force increased from 15.5% to 17.3%. While the underutilisation rate was 17.4% in 2014, it increased to 22.8% in 2023.

The number of people not included in the labour force in Türkiye was 30,345,000 as of 2022 (www.tuik.gov.tr). When we look at the reasons why those who are not included in the labour force in Türkiye cannot participate in the labour force (be unemployed), we see that the reasons are as follows. 1,648,000 people of this population who are not included in the labour force are those who have no hope of finding a job. As of the same year, the number of people who could start working but were not looking for a job was 1,176,000. The number of people who are looking for a job but are not starting work is 91,000. The number of people engaged in household chores (housewives) is 9,982,000 people. Of these 30,345,000 people, 4,807,000 of whom are not included in the workforce are students. 5,073,000 people are retired. The number of people who are unable to work (disabled people who do not work) was 4,925,000. Those without any reason are 2,643,000 people (Turkstat,2024).

Table 5

Unemployment Rates and Composite Measure of Labour Underutilisation in Türkiye (%)

Years	Unemployment rate	The combined rate of time-related underemployment and unemployment	Combined unemployment rate and potential labour force	Composite measure Of labour underutilisation*
2014	9,9	11,9	15,5	17,4
2015	10,3	11,9	15,7	17,1
2016	10,9	12,4	16,2	17,6
2017	10,9	12,1	15,7	16,8
2018	10,9	12,1	15,3	16,5
2019	13,7	14,8	18,1	19,1
2020	13,1	17,0	21,9	25,4
2021	12,0	16,8	20,0	24,4
2022	10,4	14,6	17,4	21,3
2023	9,4	15,4	17,3	22,8

Source: www.tuik.gov.tr,* Labour Underutilisation is cleaned from seasonal effects, (Access:20.05.2024)

Interpretation of Findings and Conclusion

Unemployment in Türkiye continued to rise in the 2000s. In a narrow sense, unemployment increased from 6.3% in 2000 (8.2% in 1991) to 9.4% in 2023. While broad unemployment was 17.4% in 2014, it increased to 22.8% in 2023. In this process, an increasing population in the economy is largely employed in the service sector. In this perspective, high levels of narrow and broad unemployment, on the one hand, are a source of negative social inequality, and on the other hand, they have forced governments to develop policies aimed at increasing employment.

This negativity experienced by Türkiye was a situation experienced by many developing economies during this period. To understand this negative trend in unemployment, it is necessary to consider the world economy, especially the 1990s. The world economy entered a transformation process in the 1990s. In this transformation process, while positive developments were experienced in unemployment in a significant number of developed economies, unemployment rates continued to increase in their negative trend in most developing economies.

When we examine the transformation that took place to analyse this differentiation, we find that at the centre of the transformation is the new information-oriented structuring that gained strength in developed countries in the 1990s. The beginning of this transformation dates back to the 1970s. Developed economies began to open their economies to the outside world in the mid-1970s and tried to reduce legal barriers between countries. This process, with the support of a liberal economic orientation, has brought about restructuring in all areas of the economy (in which the private sector is at the forefront).

This period (especially the 1990s and after) is a period in which production techniques and technology began to develop tremendously. In the 2000s, significant advances in both production and product development emerged worldwide. While new developments in production and marketing has increased, the importance of non-highly qualified workforce in production has weakened. As a result, employment opportunities for low-qualified workers have become more difficult than before. This situation has brought importance to education in world societies (especially in terms of workforce). In a sense, changing economic conditions have increased the “tendency of the workforce to become human capital”. From this perspective, it can be understood why unemployment rates have shown a positive development in developed and developing economies that attach importance to education and prioritise it (vice versa). However, it should be noted that the education mentioned here is not standard education but an education structure that allows high-level qualification.

In the 2000s, when the concept of “information society” came to the fore, employment/unemployment rates also developed positively in societies that attached importance to education. On the other hand, in economies that attach less importance to education, unemployment rates continue their negative course. The world economy unemployment rate data also show this trend.

At this point, when we look at Türkiye, it can't be said that Türkiye does not attach importance to education, and that workforce education is low at this point. However, training quality is not widespread, and training intensity is not high. The reason for educated unemployment is largely due to this. Within the framework of public policies supporting the opening of new universities, the number of higher education students has increased significantly over the years. As a result of this, although the “crowded workforce” with higher education has high unemployment within itself (in terms of the employment rate of the higher educated workforce), in terms of the employment of the numerical crowd, it is not bad (though not good) in total employment. However, when looked at as a whole, it appears that unemployment in Türkiye is in a chronic increasing trend from 1991, (from 2000s) to 2023. This negative situation exists as both narrow and broad unemployment, idle workforce/underutilisation. These data show that Türkiye has a clearly employment/unemployment problem.

In result, in terms of reducing unemployment in Türkiye, although increasing and expanding education in general is an important effort, there is a need to go one step further and further increase the quality of education. At this point, it should be noted that it is necessary not only to increase the number of university graduates in higher education, but also to create/develop long-term policies that take into account the economy's needs for intermediate/specialist/technical personnel. (e.g. technicians/health-medical specialists, etc.).

Peer-review: Externally peer-reviewed.

Conflict of Interest: The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

Grant Support: The author declared that this study has received no financial support.

References

- Apaydın, F. (2018). Türkiye’de İşsizliğin Karakteristiklerinin Karşılaştırmalı Analizi “, Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi Sayı:1, Sayı:30,159-200, <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/518743> (Access:03.02.2024).
- Balkanlı, A. O. (2019). Ekonomik Gelişme ve Uluslararası Ticarete NANOelektronik, Eğitim ve İnsan Sermayesinin Etkenliğinin Değişimi ve Endüstri 4.0 Devrimi. *Journal of Current Researches on Business and Economics*, 9(1), 107-132, Doi:10.26579/jocrebe-9.1.7 (Access:01.02.2024)
- Çelik, A., Beyazbulut, D., & Kandaz, Z. (2021). Türkiye’de ve Dünyada Alternatif İşsizlik Hesaplamaları: Geniş Tanımlı İşsizlik ve Atıl İşgücü. *Emek Araştırma Dergisi (GEAD)*, 12(20, Aralık, 321-352, <http://emekarastirma.org/uploads/dergi/3018.pdf>, (Access:20.02.2024).
- Erdoğan, R., & Okudum, R. (2015). Türkiye’de İşgücünün Bölgesel Analizi. *Eastern Geographical Review*, 33, <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/27058>, (Access:20.02.2024).
- Ersel, B. (1999). “Türkiye’de İşsizlik ve İşsizlik Sigortası”, Dilek Matbaası.
- Etçi, H., & Karagöl, V. (2019). Türkiye’de İstihdam Ve İşsizlik: 2000-2018. *Munzur Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 7(14) ,(Bahar), <http://dergipark.gov.tr/tusbd>, 159-200, (Access:23.02.2024). <https://arastirma.disk.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/geni%C5%9F-tan%C4%B1ml%C4%B1-metodoloji.pdf>, (Access:19.02.2024).
- <https://dergipark.gov.tr> (Access:01-29.02.2024).
- <https://researchgate.com> (Access:01-29.02.2024).
- https://enstitu.ibb.istanbul/portal/egitim_dallari.aspx?dalId=15, (Access:01.03.2024)
- <https://www.ankara.bel.tr/kulturel-hizmetler/belmek>, (Access:01.03.2024)
- <https://www.ibbmleslefabrikasi.com>, (Access:01.03.2024).
- <http://www.tuik.gov.tr> (Access:10.02.2024-24.02.2024)
- <http://worldbank.org> (Access:12.02.2024-29.02.2024)
- Kavak, Y. (1997). Eğitim, İstihdam Ve İşsizlik İlişkileri. *Hacettepe Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, 13: 21-26. <http://www.efdergi.hacettepe.edu.tr/yonetim/icerik/makaleler/1200-published.pdf>, (Access:25.02.2024).
- I.L.O.https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---stat/documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_230304.pdf (Access:27.02.2024).
- Murat,S., & Şahin, L. (2011). AB’ye Uyum Sürecinde Genç İşsizliği. İ.T.O. Yayınları, Yay. No.2011-35. (İstanbul,2011).
- Serter, N. (1993). Genel Olarak ve Türkiye Açısından İstihdam ve Gelişme. İstanbul Üniversitesi, İktisat Fakültesi Yayın No:540.
- Tatoğlu, F.Y. (2010). Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği Ülkelerinde İşsizlik ve Büyüme. Sahaflar Kitap Sarayı Yay. TUIK, “İstatistik Göstergeler, 1923-2013” ;<https://avys.omu.edu.tr/storage/app/public/demetozy/131408/%C4%B0statistik%20G%C3%B6stergeler%20T%C3%BCrkiye%201923-2013.pdf> (Access:20.05.2024).
- Türkay, O. (1968). Gizli İşsizlik. Ankara Üniversitesi, S.B.F. Yayınları, No.219.
- Zaim, S. (1992). Çalışma Ekonomisi. Filiz Kitabevi.

Corporate Hedging and IPO Underpricing in Türkiye

Türkiye’de Kurumsal Riskten Korunma ve İlk Halka Arzlarda Düşük Fiyatlandırma

Yusuf Aytürk¹ , Caner Akbaba² 

Abstract

The initial public offerings (IPO) phenomenon remains one of the most nebulous and sophisticated issues in the financial industry. Numerous studies in different countries provide significant evidence by addressing various aspects of underpricing of IPOs. Information asymmetry between investors and issuers is a prominent reason for the extent of underpricing. Issuers tend to disclose more information to reach a fair equilibrium price in the market. Hedging instruments are the most widely used financial risk management tools that can decrease information asymmetry. The relationship between corporate derivatives use and information asymmetry has been investigated through value relevance channels in secondary markets. However, researchers have recently started to analyse the impact of hedging using various markets, such as debt markets, mergers and acquisitions, and IPOs. Moreover, increasing interest in real assets and initial public offerings due to a high inflationary environment can provide further evidence for IPO underpricing, especially in emerging markets. For this purpose, this study investigates the impact of financial risk management using financial derivatives on short-term IPO performance (i.e., IPO underpricing) in the Turkish IPO market. Employing a sample of 287 Turkish IPOs between 2008 and 2023, we find that financial derivatives use negatively affects the level of IPO underpricing.

JEL Codes: G12, G32,

Keywords: Financial derivatives, Valuation, Initial public offerings, Underpricing, Türkiye

Öz

İlk halka arz olgusu finans sektöründeki en belirsiz ve karmaşık konulardan biri olmaya devam etmektedir. Farklı ülkelerde yapılan bir dizi çalışma, ilk halka arzlardaki düşük fiyatlandırmanın çeşitli yönlerini ele alarak önemli kanıtlar sunmaktadır. Yatırımcılar ve ihraççılar arasındaki bilgi asimetrisi, düşük fiyatlandırmanın en önemli nedeni olarak gösterilmektedir. Piyasada gerçeğe uygun fiyat dengesine ulaşmak için ihraççılar daha fazla bilgi açıklama eğilimindedir. Riskten korunma araçları, bilgi asimetrisini de azaltabilen ve en yaygın kullanılan finansal risk yönetim araçlarındandır. Kurumsal türev araçların kullanımı ve bilgi asimetrisi arasındaki ilişki ikincil piyasalarda genellikle değer ilişkisi aracılığı ile araştırılmıştır. Ancak, araştırmacılar son zamanlarda borç piyasası, birleşme ve devralmalar ve ilk halka arzlar gibi çeşitli piyasaları kullanarak riskten korunmanın etkisini analiz etmeye başlamışlardır. Ayrıca, yüksek enflasyonist ortam nedeniyle reel varlıklara ve ilk halka arzlara yönelik artan ilgi, özellikle gelişmekte olan piyasalardaki ilk halka arzların düşük fiyatlandırması için daha fazla kanıt sağlayabilmektedir. Bu amaçla çalışmamız, finansal türev araçlar aracılığıyla finansal risk yönetiminin ilk halka arzların kısa vadeli performansı, diğer bir deyişle Türkiye halka arz piyasasında ilk halka arzların düşük fiyatlandırılması üzerindeki etkisini araştırmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, çalışmamızda 2008 ile 2023 yılları arasında Türkiye’de gerçekleşen 287 ilk halka arzdan oluşan bir örneklem kullanarak, finansal türev araç kullanımının ilk halka arzlarda düşük fiyatlandırma düzeyini negatif yönde etkilediğini tespit etmekteyiz.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Finansal türev araçlar, Değerleme, İlk halka arzlar, Düşük fiyatlandırma, Türkiye

1 Corresponding Author: Yusuf Aytürk (Assoc. Prof.), İstanbul University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of Business Administration, İstanbul, Türkiye. E-mail: yayturk@istanbul.edu.tr ORCID: 0000-0002-5630-6602

2 Caner Akbaba (PhD., Res. Assist.), Muğla Sıtkı Koçman University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Business Administration, Muğla, Türkiye. E-mail: canerakbaba@mu.edu.tr ORCID: 0000-0001-8849-1622

To cite this article: Ayturk, Y., & Akbaba C. (2024). Corporate hedging and IPO underpricing in Türkiye. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 33(2), 353–373. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2024.33.1514089>

Introduction

Corporate hedging using financial derivative instruments is a widely used risk management tool in companies. The value relevance of corporate hedging in different markets has been investigated. Early studies (Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Bartram, et. al, 2011, and Panaretou, 2014) focused on the characteristics of hedgers and the effect of risk management on pricing in secondary markets. Recently, we observed research focusing on debt markets (Chen and King, 2014), initial public offerings (Qiao et. al, 2020), and mergers and acquisitions (Chen et. al, 2017). The main channels leading to the value relevance of hedging are tax advantage (Smith and Stulz, 1985), lower volatility (Leland, 1998), and a decreasing level of information asymmetry (Dadalt, et. al, 2002, DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995).

The value relevance of hedging has been investigated in the Turkish equity market using Tobin's Q approach (Ayurk, et. al, 2016; Danisman and Demirel, 2019). The IPO puzzle, i.e., underpricing issues in Turkish IPOs has been also widely analysed in Borsa Istanbul (Kiyamaz, 2000; Durukan 2002; Bildik and Yılmaz, 2008; Oran et. al, 2013; Gökkaya and Açıkgöz; 2017; Avcı et al., 2020; Tanyeri et al., 2022; İlbasmış, 2023). Although studies have covered both the effect of corporate derivatives on firm value and the IPO puzzle, research has yet to comprehensively examine the effect of hedging on the IPO market in Borsa Istanbul, Türkiye. Following the reasoning of Qiao et al. (2020), it is worth studying the value relevance of hedging in a primary market setting where the level of information asymmetry is expected to be relatively high. Tobin's Q ratio is used as a proxy for firm valuation in secondary markets, whereas underpricing is a direct measure of value in IPO markets. This study examines the underpricing levels of hedgers and non-hedgers in the Turkish IPO market.

Earlier studies revealed that IPO underpricing is largely caused by significant information asymmetry regarding the issuer firm's value. Therefore, IPO firms intentionally underprice their offer prices to encourage uninformed investors of potential returns to purchase these shares (Rock, 1986). DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) and Dadalt et al. (2002) indicated that using financial derivatives or hedging instruments signals about the quality of financial reports and reduces information asymmetry between managers and investors. Reducing asymmetric information helps uninformed investors make better investment decisions. Furthermore, Breeden and Viswanathan (2016) stated that managers are likely to use hedging as a strategy to improve investors' understanding of managerial competence. This reduction in information asymmetry positively affects firm valuation; hence, the use of financial derivatives may generate higher firm value. Because an initial public offering is a value-determination process, an IPO firm that uses financial derivatives may be less exposed to asymmetric information whose offer price may be closer to the initial market price. As IPO underpricing is widely seen as a form of compensation for less informed investors to offset the risk of trading against those with superior information (Carter and Manaster, 1990; Cohen and Dean, 2005), issuers will be exposed to less underpricing by using financial derivatives. Consequently, we hypothesise that using financial derivatives reduces underpricing by decreasing information asymmetry in IPO firms.

Although the finance literature contains a large number of studies on the impact of hedging on firm value, there is a dearth of research on the impact of hedging on IPOs,

where firm value is critical to investors and firms. Because there is scant empirical evidence on how the use of hedging instruments impacts the extent of IPO underpricing, we specifically investigate the role of hedging instruments in reducing IPO underpricing using a sample of Turkish IPO data. We prefer to use Turkish IPO data to test our hypothesis for several reasons. Initially, the ownership structure among publicly traded firms in Türkiye is highly concentrated with family, corporate, or foreign ownership, while protection systems for small investors are relatively poor. The presence of highly concentrated ownership that results in a lack of transparency and disclosure practises, provides us with an appropriate ground to test information asymmetry in IPOs. Moreover, in terms of derivatives use, as Khediri (2010) clarifies, the control of a firm's equity by block shareholders may lead outside investors to believe that derivatives are used for purposes other than risk management and value maximisation, thus preventing them from fairly evaluating the hedging policies of Turkish firms. Secondly, Türkiye's geopolitical position, which is one of the most significant points that distinguishes Türkiye from other emerging markets, and the extreme volatility in macroeconomic indicators (especially inflation rates) create an environment that makes risk management crucial, and this situation directly affects the short-term performance of Turkish IPOs.

In the current research, we analyse 287 Turkish IPOs from 2008 to 2023 to test whether the use of hedging instruments reduces the level of IPO underpricing. After applying both univariate and multivariate analyses, we find strong evidence of the value relevance of hedging in the Turkish IPO market. Companies using financial derivatives have significantly lower levels of underpricing, which is a positive effect of hedging on firm valuation.

Our study is composed of five sections. The next section discusses the related literature and develops our main hypothesis. Section 3 describes data, variables, and main characteristics of the Turkish IPO market. Section 4 presents the main empirical results of univariate and multivariate analyses. Section 5 concludes the study.

Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

Numerous theories have been developed in the finance literature to determine the factors that affect firm value. In this context, it is very imperative to reduce the information asymmetry between internal and external investors (Özcan, 2021). In this study, we hypothesise that using financial derivative instruments (hedging) decreases the level of IPO underpricing, in other words, using financial derivative instruments results in higher firm valuation and brings the offer price closer to the equilibrium market value by reducing information asymmetry.

The origins of corporate hedging theories can be traced to Modigliani and Miller's (1958) theorem, which asserts that in a perfect capital market, corporate hedging does not enhance corporate value because shareholders have individually achieved the same hedging outcomes. However, leaving aside the assumption of perfect capital markets, hedging is seen as beneficial in that it helps mitigate costs such as expected taxes, underinvestment, and financial distress that make future cash flows uncertain and difficult to predict (Nguyen and Liu, 2014). In addition, using financial derivative instruments, namely, hedging, plays a decisive role in influencing firm financing and investment decisions, ultimately affecting corporate value (Campello et al., 2011).

Different theories exist in the literature regarding why hedging impacts firm value. Smith and Stulz (1985) stated that risk management leads to a decrease in the present value of expected bankruptcy costs; thus, market imperfections benefit corporations in increasing firm value. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) argued that one of the prominent tools to reduce asymmetric information is the use of hedging instruments, which can point not only to managerial competence and commitment to risk management but also to hedging reduce the variability of a firm's earnings. Thus, the use of hedging instruments reduces the noise in the information available to uninformed shareholders and enables them to make more informed portfolio decisions. Similarly, Dadalt et al. (2002) provided evidence that both using and the extent of hedging contribute to firm value by reducing information asymmetry.

There are also studies in the literature that examine the exact relationship between financial derivatives and firm value. Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Allayannis and Weston (2001), Kim et al. (2006), and Allayannis et al. (2012) reported strong evidence that employing derivatives for corporate risk management leads to significant value premiums.

Amount of research also used samples from the Turkish equity market to measure the impact of hedging on firm value. While hedging is usually considered a value-enhancing activity, studies in Türkiye exhibit mixed findings. Ayturk et al. (2016) examined Turkish non-financial firms between 2007 and 2013 and indicated that firm value appeared to be positively related to derivative use by employing Tobin's Q ratio. However, they could not report significant hedging premiums or discounts for the sample. Senol et al. (2017) examined 248 observations in Borsa Istanbul from 2008 to 2015, and they similarly did not obtain significant evidence regarding the impact of financial risk management on firm value. These findings were supported by evidence presented by Akpınar and Fettahoglu, (2016) and Danisman and Demirel (2019). Ayturk et al. (2016) attributed this result to two reasons; first is the lack of disclosure quality of derivative use leads to information asymmetry, and second, highly concentrated ownership among Turkish firms. Despite these findings, several studies have established a positive relationship between hedging and firm value. Ece and Sari (2020) conducted a study exploring how hedging impacts firm value in Türkiye. They analysed this relationship using two dependent variables: Tobin's Q and the natural logarithm of market value. Their findings revealed a statistically significant positive relationship between these firm value measures and derivative use. Demirci (2023) used data from 70 non-financial listed firms in Borsa Istanbul (BIST) between 2010 and 2021 to examine the effect of derivative use on firm value separately for smaller and larger firms. He found that derivative use is more beneficial for smaller firms than for larger firms in terms of enhancing value.

IPO underpricing is one of the most observed and controversial phenomena through which an issuer firm determines its offer price to be below its fair market value. Although IPO underpricing may provide higher returns for investors in the short term, it may result in higher company costs (Carter and Manaster, 1990). Starting from the 1970s, the IPO phenomenon has been examined throughout numerous research and has been explained by various theories (Logue, 1973; Ibbotson, 1975; Ritter, 1984; Rock, 1986; Ruud, 1993; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Roosenboom, 2012; Zhou and Sadeghi, 2019; Mazumder and Saha, 2021); however, to date, there has been no

common agreement about the IPO underpricing phenomenon (İlbasmış, 2023). While a number of reasons have been proposed to explain the phenomenon of underpricing in initial public offerings, studies have focused on several theories involving various aspects of the relationships between issuer firms, investors, and the underwriters who assist firms in going public (Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995). On the other hand, Ritter and Welch (2002) states that theories addressing the IPO underpricing phenomenon fall into two categories: asymmetric and symmetric information. Theories based on asymmetric information have received substantial support and recognition in the IPO underpricing literature. Conversely, theories based on symmetric information have not been widely accepted as the main factor influencing underpricing. The first category is based on the information asymmetry among participants (investors and IPO firms) involved in IPO transactions. Rock's (1986) winner's curse model claimed that IPO underpricing arises from uneven information between investors. Informed investors subscribe to attractive IPOs, but uninformed investors demand all IPOs. IPOs that have a higher potential for higher returns can be oversubscribed by informed investors, but uninformed investors can end up with attractive IPOs with a few portions. Extending Rock's (1986) model, Beatty and Ritter (1986) argued that underwriters are better informed about the market than IPO firms, and underwriters maintain underpricing equilibrium in the market. They also demonstrate that the extent of underpricing rises with the level of ex ante uncertainty regarding firm value. Similarly, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) claimed that investors who hold optimistic views about a firm's value are reluctant to disclose this information during the book-building process because doing so would prompt underwriters to increase the offer price. The consensus in the literature is that ex ante uncertainty is fundamental to the IPO process, and increased uncertainty eventually results in greater IPO underpricing (Ljungqvist, 2007).

Signaling studies posit that underpricing is a useful way for investors to evaluate a company's quality and helps them make difference between high-quality and low-quality companies. It is assumed that an IPO firm knows more about its future cash flows than investors. To address this asymmetric information problem and signal the true value of the firm, the issuer offers shares at a deliberate discount and keeps some of the newly issued shares in its portfolio. This is inevitably the best strategy for low-quality issuers because these issuers cannot afford to leave money on the table during their IPOs (Welch, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Allen and Faulhaber, 1989).

IPO underpricing is also one of the most observed and controversial phenomena in Türkiye like in other emerging markets. A number of studies have been conducted on short-term underpricing anomalies for years in Türkiye. Studies on IPO underpricing in Türkiye have generally been conducted using data from the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) and Borsa Istanbul (BIST). These studies cover an extensive period from the early 1990s to the present. In those studies, factors that could have an explanatory factor on short-term IPO underpricing have been tried to pull out by using both the characteristics of companies that went public in Borsa Istanbul and other market factors. A significant amount of previous research on IPO underpricing in Türkiye has proved the existence of asymmetric information and signaling theory. A seminal study in this field is Kiyamaz (2000), in which he investigated the performance of 163 IPOs for various industries from

1990 to 1996 and reported that the extent of underpricing on the first day was 13.1%. He asserted that key factors affecting underpricing include firm size, rising stock markets between the public offering date and the first trading day, institutional ownership, and self-issued offerings. These findings align with the theory of asymmetric information. Institutional investors are likely to decrease information asymmetry between the issuer and potential investors, thereby reducing the need for the issuer to set significantly lower offer prices to ensure a successful IPO.

In another study that sets out to determine underpricing for Turkish firms, Durukan (2002) supported the winner's curse hypothesis that underwriters deliberately discount the offer price to reward informed investors. Additionally, she claimed that lowering the level of uncertainty about IPOs results in lower returns. Size and age of the issuer firm were effective factors in IPO underpricing. Bildik and Yılmaz (2008) also revealed the existence of underpricing in IPOs from 1990 to 2000, and the factors of the number of investors and the earnings-to-price ratio are estimates of the initial underpricing of IPOs. Deliberate discount on offer price is determined as another prominent factor in IPO underpricing. Oran et al. (2013) presented that the only variable that explains underpricing in Turkish IPOs is the initial public offering discount, and they indicated that fair value estimates of underwriters were statistically different from the realised market values. Similarly, Tütüncü and Acar (2019) found that initial returns on IPOs are negatively associated with the deliberate discount rate implied by the underwriter. Moreover, Gökkaya and Açıkgöz (2017) examined 173 Turkish IPOs within the period 1998-2013 and set out that the extent of underpricing is determined by the ratio of institutional investors and foreign investors participating in the IPO and underwriter reputation. Avcı et al. (2020) analysed the IPOs in Borsa Istanbul between 2010 and 2019 and showed a statistically significant underpricing existence, consistent with the findings of previous studies in Borsa Istanbul. They also concluded that underpricing does not depend on the issuer's industry.

Additionally, some studies have delved into specific features of underpricing IPOs. For example, Yüksel and Yüksel (2006) indicated that trading volume has an impact on IPO underpricing. Küçükkoçaoğlu (2008) compared three different methods of IPOs (book-building, fixed-price offer, and sale through the stock exchange). He found 11.47%, 7.01%, and 15.68% underpricing levels for each IPO method, respectively. He also provided a significant relationship between pre-IPO market returns and underpricing and argued that firms generally prefer "hot market" periods for IPOs.

Recent studies have contributed considerable evidence to the IPO literature. Tanyeri et al. (2022) analysed Turkish IPOs from 1990 to 2020 and found 9% IPO underpricing level on average, which is lower than in other emerging countries. Shares offered at fixed prices and by larger firms are subject to lower underpricing. They also display that the level of underpricing is impacted by the changing economic and regulatory situation in Türkiye. İlbasmış (2023) indicated that IPOs conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic exhibited greater underpricing. Conversely, an average IPO firm that is older, possesses more assets, generates higher proceeds, experiences higher trading volume on its first day, and is anticipated to have lower post-IPO volatility tends to have less underpricing at its initial public offering.

Beginning with the early study of DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), the positive effect of

corporate hedging on information asymmetry was demonstrated by Dadalt et al. (2002), Kim et al. (2006), and Allayannis et al. (2012). Reducing information asymmetry is one of the main channels through which the value relevance of corporate derivatives use can be explained, and this relationship is also valid in Türkiye (Akpınar and Fettahoglu, 2016; Danisman and Demirel, 2019; Ayturk et al., 2016). The IPO setting is a type of financial market that has an inherently high degree of information asymmetry, and high information asymmetry leads to underpricing phenomenon in IPOs, as stated by Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Benveniste and Spindt (1989). Based on the aforementioned theoretical arguments that the main denominator of IPO underpricing is information asymmetry and that derivative use (hedging) enhances firm value by lowering information asymmetry, we can argue that hedging reduces the level of underpricing in initial public offerings. Recently, Qiao et al. (2020) found that IPO firms using hedging experience lower price revisions and underwriting fees, supporting the argument that hedging reduces information asymmetry. Moreover, they provide strong evidence that hedging significantly decreases IPO underpricing, particularly for firms with higher informational opacity. In addition to short-term performance, for the long-term performance, Nguyen and Liu (2014) found that hedger IPO firms consistently outperformed non-hedgers over the 5-year period following the quotation. Following related studies, we propose a direct relationship between the use of financial derivatives and firm value in an IPO setting, and our study sets out to test the following hypothesis:

***Hypothesis:** Underpricing in initial public offerings is negatively associated with corporate hedging.*

Data and Methodology

The current situation of the Turkish IPO market, the dataset, and the variables employed in this study are explained in this section.

Turkish IPO Market

Pursuing the liberalisation programme at the beginning of the 1980s, Capital Market Law Number 2499 came into force to regulate and supervising capital markets in Türkiye. The new exchange market, the Istanbul Stock Exchange (İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsası - İMKB), initiated operations on December 26, 1986. Following the publication of the new Capital Markets Board Law Number 6362 on December 30, 2012, Borsa İstanbul A.Ş. was established with the aim of consolidating all exchanges operating in the Turkish capital markets under one roof. In summary, İMKB was superseded by Borsa İstanbul with its registration on April 3, 2013.

The shift in global economic activity towards emerging economies has a greater impact on capital market transactions in these countries. In Türkiye, the development of capital instruments and the completion of regulatory infrastructure have paved the way for attracting more foreign investors to the market. Despite the financial crises of 2008, 2014, and 2017 and the COVID-19 pandemic, which affected the entire world in 2020, Borsa İstanbul continues to grow and increase its trading volumes. In fact, as of 2023, Borsa İstanbul, which facilitates the trading of shares for 539 companies, has achieved a market capitalisation of 338 billion US dollars. This significant market capitalisation reflects

the robust growth and investor confidence in the Turkish equity market. Additionally, trading volume reached 1.317 billion US dollars, positioning the equity trading volume to market capitalisation ratio at a leading 390%. This high ratio indicates a vibrant trading environment with substantial liquidity, which attracts both domestic and international investors and ensures efficient price discovery in the market (TSPB, 2024).

The rapid development of Turkish financial markets and the interest it has attracted has led to an increase in initial public offerings (IPOs), which allow companies to raise higher capital at minimum cost while improving corporate governance, transparency, and credibility. IPO figures for both global and Türkiye are provided in Figure 1.




Figure 1. IPO Trends in Türkiye and Global¹

As seen in Figure 1, both numbers and the proceeds of IPOs fluctuated throughout the period 2008-2023. Although the number of initial public offerings decreased, especially after the 2008-2009 global crisis period, the number and size of public offerings increased

¹ IPOs in global data were derived from the Global IPO Trends Reports issued by Ernst and Young from 2019 to 2024.

in 2010. However, concerns about global economic growth due to the Eurozone debt crisis and the downturn in equity markets profoundly affected global IPO activity in 2011 and 2012. In the subsequent period, increased confidence in the markets and a faster pace of fundraising ensured that companies' demand for IPOs continued to increase. From Türkiye's standpoint, it is noteworthy that an almost similar process was followed, but a significant slowdown in IPOs occurred, especially in the period between 2014 and 2018 due to economic troubles. Moreover, it is observed that the number of IPOs was procyclical, reaching its lowest level during the crisis years of 2001-2002, 2008-2009, and the year of the failed coup in 2016 (Tanyeri et al., 2022, p. 334). IPOs, which have slowed down due to the COVID-19 pandemic, experienced the most active period of recent years in the world and Türkiye in 2021 due to the launch of COVID-19 vaccines and government incentive programmes. Especially in Türkiye, the number of IPOs reached record levels. During this period, it is noteworthy that the IPOs of companies operating in the technology sector dominated IPO activities in terms of both the number of transactions and proceeds. Based on the report of Ernst and Young Global IPO Trends, after a stunning rise in both IPO volumes and proceeds in 2021 and in both 2022 and 2023, the preference for tight monetary policies and the uncertainties that emerged in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, along with rising inflation, indicates a sharp decline in IPOs globally. On the other hand, the increase in IPOs in emerging markets cannot sufficiently offset the lacklustre performance of large offerings in developed countries.

In comparison to the IPO activities over the past five years in Türkiye, the number and revenue of IPOs in 2023 have exhibited a remarkable surge, accounting for 4% and 3% of the global IPO market in terms of volume and proceedings, respectively. Türkiye's IPO market is experiencing an upsurge as companies with limited options for new financing sources due to hiking interest rates seek to leverage investors' eagerness for new high-yield issuances. Notably, nearly 100% of newly listed companies in Türkiye have surpassed their offering prices, achieving positive returns (EY, 2024).

The IPO process in Türkiye is divided into three main phases: deciding to go public, preparing for the IPO, and executing the final IPO process. One of the crucial stages is determining the IPO price. Setting a fair and reasonable IPO price is vital for the successful execution of the IPO and the subsequent performance of the shares. To determine this price, an underwriter prepares a price determination report that measures the company's value. This report outlines the valuation methods used based on a company's structure and operations in accordance with the International Valuation Standards (IVS). The price determination report is published along with the prospectus before the public offering. Additionally, intermediary institutions can provide their opinions on valuation methods, assumptions, and public offering prices on the Public Disclosure Platform (Borsa Istanbul, 2013).

Pursuant to the Capital Markets Board's Communiqué on the Sale of Capital Market Instruments numbered II-5.2, published in the Official Gazette dated June 28, 2013, and numbered 28691, three methods can be employed by underwriters for the sale of capital market instruments through public offering: *the book-building method, sales without book-building, and sales at stock exchange*. The book-building method refers

to collecting investor demands for capital market instruments being offered to the public and executing the sale of a portion of these demands that are fulfilled in accordance with predetermined procedures and principles. Under the book-building method, underwriters may prefer to offer shares by using either a fixed price, book-building with a price range, or book-building with price bids. The sales without book-building method is the sale of shares of public corporations, whose shares are not traded on the stock exchange, by offering their shares to the public by themselves or through underwriters at a certain price through a procedure to be determined in the prospectus. The sales method at the stock exchange refers to the sale of shares on the stock exchange within the framework of stock exchange regulations. IPO firms in Türkiye can use these three methods. However, previous studies have shown that the most preferred method among these methods is the fixed price method (Küçükkocaoğlu, 2008; Tanyeri et al., 2022).

Dataset and Variables

Our data comprise 287 IPOs in Borsa Istanbul between 2008 and 2023. Although there were 290 IPOs in the period, 3 of them were filtered out due to a lack of information. We obtain data on offering specifics such as the offer value, closing prices, underwriter of the deal, IPO proceeds, deliberate discount rate, firm size, and hedge instrument from the Borsa Istanbul Datastore database (Borsa Istanbul, 2024) and IPO prospectuses declared in the Public Disclosure Platform (Kamuyu Aydınlatma Platformu, 2024).

We provide detailed descriptions of variables in our model through relevant literature (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002; Kiyamaz, 2000; Durukan, 2002; Yüksel and Yüksel, 2006; Roosenboom, 2012) and their expected signs in terms of firm, IPO, and market-specific characteristics in Table 1. There are two dependent variables in our study: initial return on the 1st trading day (Underpricing) and 10th trading day (Underpricing, 10 days). We calculate the initial return of the offered share, which is underpricing as a percentage difference between the first trading day closing price and the offer price of the share $[(1^{\text{st}} \text{ trading day closing price} - \text{offer value}) / \text{offer value}]$ (Durukan, 2002; Roosenboom, 2012). We calculate underpricing for the 10th trading day's closing price using the same equation $[(10^{\text{th}} \text{ trading day closing price} - \text{offer value}) / \text{offer value}]$. Companies in Borsa Istanbul are generally traded in three different stock markets, namely the Star, Main, and Submarket, depending on their size. Circuit breaker features are shaped according to these three markets. The circuit breaker threshold applied in the Star market, where IPO firms are typically traded, is 10%. In other words, a daily upside cap of 10% exists in Borsa Istanbul. Therefore, the underpricing level for the 10th day is also added as the main dependent variable in our regression analysis.

The main independent variable in our model that we employed to measure derivative use by IPOs is *Hedger*. As required by IFRS 7 Financial Instruments, companies must disclose the nature and extent of risks resulting from the use of financial instruments in their financial reports. In addition, IPO firms are required to accompany their last 3-year audited financial reports to their IPO prospectuses. We understand whether an IPO firm uses derivative instruments by examining these financial reports. Hereby, we define a firm as a hedger that uses derivative instruments; if it does not, we define it as a non-hedger. Following Qiao et al. (2020), we factor in year and industry fixed effects because

IPO underpricing seems more responsive to economic situations and there is a tendency to aggregate IPO underpricing within sectors.

Table 1
Variables and Definitions

Dependent Variables		
	Definition	
Underpricing	Underpricing is the initial return of the offered share as a percentage difference between the first trading day closing price and the offer price of the share $[(1^{\text{st}} \text{ trading day closing price} - \text{offer value}) / \text{offer value}]$	
Underpricing, 10 days	We calculate Underpricing, 10 days, as a percentage difference between the closing price of the share on the 10 th day and the offer price $[(10^{\text{th}} \text{ trading day closing price of the share} - \text{offer value}) / \text{offer value}]$	
Independent Variables		
Firm Specific Variables	Definition	Expected Sign
Hedger	Hedger is defined as an IPO firm reporting a hedging instrument in the last financial report before the IPO. It is a dummy variable that takes “1” for hedger and otherwise is “0”.	–
Firm Size	In general, it seems easier to value larger IPO firms than smaller ones because their cash flows are more stable and predictable (Ritter, 1984; Beatty and Ritter, 1986). In our study, firm size is total assets derived from the balance sheet ending one financial year before the IPO. To mitigate the inflation effect that could distort results, most studies on Turkish companies’ IPOs, including those by Kiyamaz (2000), Durukan (2002), and Yüksel and Yüksel (2006), employed USD total assets.	–
Company Age	As a firm’s age increases, the associated risk decreases, making predicting future cash flows and dividends more challenging for younger firms (Kim and Ritter, 1999). Firm age is the number of years from the date of establishment of the firm until the IPO date. We use the natural logarithm of one plus firm age as in Roosenboom (2012).	–
Industry	Industry indicates the sector in which the IPO firm operates. We use industry as a categorical variable for each IPO firm.	

IPO Specific Variables	Definition	Expected Sign
Underwriter Reputation	The reputation of the marketing underwriter indicates the anticipated level of “informed” investor activity. Reputable underwriters are typically linked to lower-risk offerings. Thus, IPOs conducted by prestigious underwriters result in lower underpricing (Carter and Manaster, 1990). Underwriter reputation is the market share of the lead underwriter in a given year. Following the methodology of Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) and Roosenboom (2012), market share is computed as the sum of gross proceeds from all IPOs led by the underwriter divided by the total proceeds raised during the year.	-
Participation	Following Roosenboom (2012), we define participation as the number of shares sold by existing shareholders divided by the number of outstanding shares before the IPO. In IPOs, as the share sales of existing shareholders increase, valuation estimates become less biased and the extent of underpricing decreases (Oran et al., 2013).	-
Price Discount	Underwriters apply deliberate price discounts to set final offer prices and apply higher price discounts for riskier IPOs that have higher valuation uncertainty (Roosenboom, 2007). Offer price discount is the price discount applied by the appraisal obtained from the underwriter’s price determination report.	+
Dilution Factor	IPO firms’ desire to go public with a higher number of newly issued shares leads to more biased valuations also results in lower underpricing (Roosenboom, 2012). The dilution factor is determined as the number of newly issued shares divided by the number of existing shares outstanding before the IPO.	-
Oversubscription	Investors who are unable to fully realise their subscription during an IPO may desire to realise their demand on the pricing day, thereby resulting in higher underpricing. As in Roosenboom (2012), we included the oversubscription variable in our model. The oversubscription rate indicates the number of times the IPO was oversubscribed. We calculate oversubscription by dividing the total number of shares demanded by the number of shares offered on the IPO.	+
IPO Size	The IPO proceeds are equal to the number of shares sold in the IPO multiplied by the offer price in USD terms. We use the natural logarithm of the USD proceeds. IPO size is expected to have a negative impact on underpricing because larger IPOs signal better performance of the issuer’s projections and help reduce uncertainty (Klova 2017).	-

Market Specific	Description	Expected Sign
Post-pricing Market Volatility	During the post-pricing period, additional information may emerge from the secondary market, resulting in market volatility. Because IPOs are more sensitive to market volatility, investors may demand higher premiums to compensate for that risk. Following Roosenboom (2012), we calculate post-pricing market volatility as the standard deviation of daily BIST100 market index returns during the period between setting the offer value date and the first trading day of the offered share.	+
Post-pricing Market Return	Investors are more sentiment to market returns, and abnormal returns in the market make investors more eager to earn excess returns. Thus, in line with Roosenboom (2012), we include post-pricing market return in the model. We calculate post-pricing market return as the BIST100 market index buy-and-hold return during the period between setting the offer value date and the first trading day of the offered share.	+

The summary statistics of the sample are presented in Table 2. The mean initial return (Underpricing) among our sample is 6.36% and at the end of the 10th trading day (Underpricing, 10 days) is 33.87%. As a 10% circuit breaker threshold applied in Borsa Istanbul, the initial return of the 123 IPOs in our sample was clustered under +/-10% initial return. The mean value of firm size (total assets) is reported as \$221.26 million within the range of \$0.55 million to \$10,908.22 million. Company age is 17.30 on average; the oldest company is 68 and the youngest is just approximately 2 years old at the IPO date; thus, we can say that younger firms are more eager to go public than others. The mean value of the percentage of existing shareholder sales during the IPO (Participation) is 10.56%, and the capital increase rate (Dilution) is 26.59%. Summaries of other IPO-specific characteristics are as follows; the mean value of Underwriter Reputation is 10.50%, indicating that 10% of IPOs in terms of IPO size were underwritten by only one underwriter. The IPO size was \$56.44 million on average, and the maximum value was \$1,917 million. For the price discount, the mean value is 21.97%, implying that underwriters applied a 21.97% discount on the offer value before going public. The average oversubscription rate was 6.30 Furthermore, we realise that 60% of the IPO firms in our sample are clustered among 5 industries, and the remaining companies are allocated to other industries.

Table 2
Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Underpricing	287	0.0636	0.0982	-0.3094	0.5875
Underpricing, 10 days	287	0.3387	0.5315	-0.4136	1.7059
Hedger	287	0.2230	0.4170	0.0000	1.0000
Firm Size (million \$)	287	221.26	790.89	0.550	10,908.22
Log of Firm Size	287	7.7761	0.6486	5.7461	10.0378
Company Age	287	17.3067	12.3248	0.0194	68.4611
Log of (1+Company Age)	287	1.1449	0.3595	0.0084	1.8417
Underwriter Reputation	287	0.1050	0.1352	0.0019	1.0000
Participation	287	0.1056	0.1328	0.0000	0.9910
Price Discount	287	0.2197	0.0810	0.0000	0.5188

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Dilution	287	0.2659	0.2309	0.0000	1.9820
IPO Size (million \$)	287	56.44	141.68	1.45	1,917.88
Log of IPO Size	287	7.3413	0.5567	6.1641	9.2828
Oversubscription	287	6.2980	14.1521	0.0000	130.4808
Post-pricing Market Volatility	287	0.0154	0.0086	0.0044	0.0510
Post-pricing Market Return	287	0.0048	0.0558	-0.1952	0.1621

The number of IPOs, underpricing, and the sum of IPO size (proceeds) in USD terms from 2008 to 2023 is tabulated annually in Table 3. A significant increase in both the volume and size of IPOs, especially during the post-COVID-19 period, is clear, as more than 50 companies are going public every year during the relevant period. Allocation of IPOs throughout the years posits that the volume of IPOs is procyclical, with the number plummeting during crises and boosting during recovery periods.

Table 3
Distribution of IPO Companies by Year

Years	# of IPO Companies	%	Underpricing (Avg)	Underpricing, 10 days (Avg)	IPO Size (\$)	%	# of Hedgers
2008	1	0.35%	0.0044	-0.0435	1,917,884,371	11.84%	1
2009	1	0.35%	0.1259	0.1748	6,174,189	0.04%	0
2010	21	7.32%	0.0523	0.1408	2,132,706,179	13.17%	5
2011	27	9.41%	0.0734	0.1284	843,780,846	5.21%	6
2012	26	9.06%	0.0395	0.1042	346,922,141	2.14%	7
2013	18	6.27%	0.0715	0.1024	757,260,243	4.68%	2
2014	13	4.53%	0.0239	0.03389	321,351,720	1.98%	1
2015	6	2.09%	0.0858	0.0618	37,766,492	0.23%	1
2016	2	0.70%	-0.0700	-0.0675	117,138,219	0.72%	0
2017	3	1.05%	-0.0142	0.0144	462,502,638	2.86%	1
2018	9	3.14%	-0.0619	-0.0474	1,561,080,655	9.64%	3
2019	6	2.09%	0.0150	0.0565	45,541,185	0.28%	1
2020	8	2.79%	0.0854	1.0948	671,799,663	4.15%	1
2021	52	18.12%	0.0623	0.3061	2,483,517,602	15.33%	15
2022	40	13.94%	0.0896	0.5329	1,195,658,221	7.38%	9
2023	54	18.82%	0.0937	0.7313	3,296,478,048	20.35%	11
Total	287	100.00%	0.0636	0.3387	16,197,562,410	100.00%	64

Table 4 compares the characteristics of hedgers and non-hedgers. There are 64 hedgers and 223 non-hedgers in the sample. In terms of both Underpricing and Underpricing 10 days variables, the difference between hedgers and non-hedgers is evident. As expected, the extent of underpricing will be lower for hedger IPO firms. Moreover, in line with the literature, we find that larger firms are more likely to hedge than others, where Table 4 reveals that hedgers have a higher mean value for total assets and IPO size (Géczy et al., 1997; Haushalter, 2000). Table 4 also indicates that older firms prefer to use derivatives more than young firms.

Table 4
Characteristics of Hedgers and Non-hedgers

Variable	Hedgers					Non-hedgers				
	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Underpricing	64	0.0406	0.0921	-0.1595	0.3862	223	0.0703	0.0991	-0.3094	0.5875
Underpricing, 10 days	64	0.2147	0.4693	-0.3537	1.5891	223	0.3743	0.5438	-0.4136	1.7059
Firm Size (million \$)	64	486.29	1,494.26	4.52	10,908.21	223	145.21	382.29	0.557	3,952.76
Log of Firm Size	64	8.0873	0.6650	6.6557	10.0378	223	7.6868	0.6168	5.7461	9.5969
Company Age	64	20.1068	15.3243	0.2722	66.7611	223	16.5031	11.2312	0.0194	68.4611
Log of (1+Company Age)	64	1.2042	0.3535	0.1046	1.8310	223	1.1278	0.3601	0.0084	1.8417
Underwriter Reputation	64	0.1400	0.1574	0.0080	1.0000	223	0.0950	0.1267	0.0019	1.0000
Participation	64	0.1056	0.1164	0.0000	0.4783	223	0.1056	0.1374	0.0000	0.9910
Price Discount	64	0.2353	0.0820	0.0980	0.4960	223	0.2152	0.0803	0.0000	0.5188
Dilution	64	0.1936	0.1608	0.0000	0.6609	223	0.2866	0.2438	0.0000	1.9820
IPO Size (million \$)	64	99.83	249.33	1.533	1,917.88	223	43.983	86.72	1.45	729.73
Log of IPO Size	64	7.5989	0.5561	6.1855	9.2828	223	7.2674	0.5356	6.1641	8.8632
Oversubscription	64	6.399	10.2842	0.0000	54.1448	223	6.2690	15.0997	0.0000	130.4808
Post-pricing Market Volatility	64	0.0145	0.0071	0.0054	0.0444	223	0.0156	0.0090	0.0044	0.0510
Post-pricing Market Return	64	-0.0036	0.0518	-0.1952	0.1087	223	0.0073	0.0568	-0.1685	0.1620

Empirical Results and Implications

The findings from univariate tests and multivariate models are presented in this section.

Univariate Analysis

Our sample is grouped into two categories: hedgers (issuers with financial derivatives) and non-hedgers (issuers without financial derivatives). We tested the difference between means of underpricing levels for two groups to analyse whether they were statistically different from each other or not. Underpricing levels for the first day and the first 10th day are used. Two sample *t*-test results are presented in Table 5.

Table 5
Univariate Analysis

Variable	Non-hedger Mean	Hedger Mean	Difference
Underpricing	0.0703	0.0406	0.0297**
			(2.1468)
Underpricing, 10 days	0.3743	0.2147	0.1596**
			(2.1310)

The *t*-test values are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. For clarity, the results of the Wilcoxon rank-sum and nonparametric *k*-sample tests are not reported. They are available upon request.

Our results show that differences for the first day and first 10th day underpricing levels are statistically significant at the 5% level. Wilcoxon rank-sum and nonparametric k-sample tests also indicate statistically significant differences for underpricing levels between hedgers and non-hedgers.

It can be seen that hedger firms have a 2.97% lower level of underpricing for the first day while it is 15.96% lower for the first 10th day. Univariate analysis results support our hypothesis that underpricing in IPOs is negatively associated with corporate hedging. As we defined earlier, underpricing means lower cost of equity for issuers or higher firm valuation. Our findings indicate that hedging is value-relevant and decreases underpricing in the Turkish IPO market. However, caution should be observed with univariate analysis results because they do not consider control variables. Therefore, further analysis of the data using multivariate analysis is required.

Multivariate Analysis

Univariate analysis indicates that underpricing is lower for issuers of financial derivatives. However, the effects of other variables on underpricing must be controlled. To test our main hypothesis regarding the relationship between underpricing and hedging, we run the following linear regression equation:

$$\text{IPO Underpricing Level} = \alpha + \beta \times \text{Hedger Dummy Variable} + \delta'X_i + \epsilon_i$$

IPO Underpricing Level is defined as the initial return of the offered share as the percentage difference between the 1st or 10th trading day closing price and the offer price of the share [(1st/10th trading day closing price – offer value)/ offer value]. Hedger is defined as an IPO firm reporting hedging instruments in the last annual report before the IPO. Hedger Dummy Variable is a dummy variable that takes “1” for hedger and otherwise is “0”. X_i denotes the control variables of firm size, company age, underwriter reputation, participation, price discount, dilution factor, oversubscription, IPO size, post-pricing market volatility, post-pricing market return, industry, and year.

Table 6
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis

Independent Variable	(1) Underpricing	(2) Underpricing, 10 days
Hedger	-0.0119 (-0.87)	-0.1328 (-1.97)**
Log of Firm Size	0.0024 (0.13)	0.1269 (1.68)*
Log of (1+Company Age)	-0.0243 (-1.20)	-0.0769 (-0.91)
Underwriter Reputation	0.1020 (1.58)	0.5007 (1.68)*
Participation Ratio	-0.0088 (-0.16)	0.1225 (0.76)
Price Discount	-0.090	-0.2629

Independent Variable	(1) Underpricing	(2) Underpricing, 10 days
	(-1.13)	(-0.79)
Dilution Factor	-0.0483	-0.1807
	(-1.36)	(-1.85)*
Log of IPO Size	-0.0689	-0.3839
	(-3.17)***	(-4.05)***
Oversubscription	0.0003	0.0038
	(1.95)*	(-1.31)
Post-pricing Market Volatility	-1.7480	-8.0178
	(-2.57)**	(-1.81)*
Post-pricing Market Return	-0.0350	-0.2831
	(-0.38)	(-0.55)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	287	287
R²	0.2683	0.4122
<p><i>The relationship between IPO underpricing level and corporate hedging (our hypothesis) is tested. We now run the following regression:</i></p> $\text{IPO Underpricing Level} = \alpha + \beta \times \text{Hedger Dummy Variable} + \delta'X_i + \epsilon_i$ <p><i>IPO Underpricing Level is defined as the initial return of the offered share as the percentage difference between the 1st or 10th trading day closing price and the offer price of the share [(1st/10th trading day closing price – offer value)/ offer value]. Hedger is defined as an IPO firm reporting a hedging instrument in the last annual report before the IPO. Hedger Dummy Variable is a dummy variable that takes “1” for hedger and otherwise is “0”. X_i denotes the control variables of firm size, company age, underwriter reputation, participation, price discount, dilution factor, oversubscription, IPO size, post-pricing market volatility, post-pricing market return, industry, and year.</i></p> <p><i>t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Both year and industry fixed effects are included in the models. We use robust standard errors for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) were checked for multicollinearity. All VIFs are less than 5.</i></p>		

Our findings from the two models are presented in Table 6. In the models, the main dependent variable is *Hedger*, which is theoretically expected to have a negative coefficient. *Hedger* has negative coefficients in both models, but the first one is not statistically significant, while the second is statistically significant for 10th day model. The Capital Markets Board of Türkiye has started to apply an equal distribution rule for individual investors and set a 10% upside cap for daily increases in Borsa Istanbul. Because of these two rules and unprecedented demand for IPOs from individual investors in Türkiye during 2019-2023, almost all IPOs after year of 2019 have 10% 1st day returns. More than half of our IPO data occurred during 2019-2023. The underpricing levels for IPOs after 2019 can be differentiated for the first 10th day underpricing levels. Therefore, we believe that the first 10th day underpricing level is a better measure for our sample of Turkish IPOs, and we focus on findings from Model 2.

Results of Model 2 indicate that *Hedger* has a negative coefficient of 0.1328 at the 5% significance level, implying that, on average, an issuer using a financial derivative instrument has 13.28% less underpricing than a non-hedger issuer. Considering an average IPO size of 221.3 million USD, our findings imply that, on average, issuers with financial derivatives have a 29.4 million USD higher valuation than non-hedger issuers.

Because of the estimated models, these findings support our hypothesis that using a financial derivative instrument decreases the level of IPO underpricing (higher firm valuation). Consistent with the current study of Qiao et al. (2020), we also find that

corporate hedging leads to higher firm valuation (lower underpricing) in the Turkish IPO market. Although they used the first-day underpricing level, Qiao et al. (2020) found a negative relationship between hedging measures (general hedging, interest risk hedging, and foreign exchange risk hedging) and the level of underpricing. Our findings are in line with the argument of Qiao et al. (2020) that hedging reduces asymmetry information and leads to a higher valuation. Nguyen and Liu (2014) found a positive relationship between currency risk management using financial derivatives and long-term IPOs. Chen et al. (2017) found a positive relationship between derivative usage and announcement return for an acquirer in cross-border acquisitions. These studies are also in line with our findings.

The main economic implication of our results is that shareholders of firms using financial derivatives can sell their new shares 13.28% more than non-hedgers in the Turkish IPO market. In other words, on average, existing shareholders of hedgers have 13.28% more cash inflows to their companies. On the other hand, new investors can earn 13.28% relatively more average return if they invest and hold a non-hedger firm's stock during the first 10 trading days in the Turkish IPO market.

In addition to the main dependent variable Hedger, we consider the effects of other control variables on the level of underpricing. Our estimated models indicate that there are limited explanatory variables for underpricing, which is also called an IPO puzzle. IPO Size is the only statistically significant variable in Model 2, with a negative coefficient of 0.3839. This finding indicates that underpricing level decreases as IPO size grows. In terms of the factors affecting underpricing, our findings indicate that very few variables have a significant effect, and these results confirm the existence of an IPO puzzle, which is consistent with previous Borsa Istanbul studies (Bildik and Yılmaz, 2008, Oran et al., 2013).

Conclusion

Following the theoretical argument that the use of corporate derivatives increases firm value, this study examines the impact of derivative use on IPO underpricing. For this purpose, we employ a sample of Turkish IPO firms from 2008 to 2023. We analyse 287 IPOs in the relevant period. To investigate the impact of derivative use on underpricing, we used both univariate and multivariate data analyses. First, we divide our sample into two groups as hedger (uses derivative instruments) and non-hedger (does not use derivative instruments). We conducted both univariate and multivariate analyses. The results of the analyses provide evidence that the use of derivatives reduces the underpricing of the initial public offering in Türkiye. In addition, our research shows that IPO size, participation ratio, dilution factor, and Post-pricing Market Volatility significantly affect underpricing, which is in line with expected signs in the literature.

We determine that Turkish IPOs are underpriced by 6.36% for the first trading day and 33.87% for the 10th trading day. The results of the univariate analysis indicate that hedgers are 15.96% less underpriced than non-hedgers for the first 10th trading day. After controlling for other factors, multivariate analysis results show that the difference in underpricing level between hedgers and non-hedgers is 13.28% for the first 10th trading day. In other words, on average, hedgers have a 13.28% higher valuation than non-hedger issuers in the Turkish IPO market.

These findings will contribute to the scant literature that compares the effects of using financial derivatives on IPO performance. Our study has important economic and financial implications. Economically, narrowing the gap between offer value and market price using derivatives contributes to a more efficient allocation of capital in the market, which enables firms to reach their financial needs by bearing lower cost of capital. For small investors, it is not easy to understand firms' risk profiles and risk management strategies. From a financial perspective, employing financial derivatives as a strategic instrument demonstrates a firm's improved sophistication in financial risk management and commitment to handling certain types of risks. Therefore, including derivative instruments in the IPO process will help uninformed small investors make better decisions among alternatives in the market by reducing asymmetric information. As a result, derivative use in IPOs not only represents advances in financial management but also contributes to broader market stability and economic growth. In the current research, we focus only on the impact of derivative use on short-term IPO performance. In future studies, it is worth investigating the effect of corporate derivatives on the long-term performance of IPOs in Türkiye. We used a dummy variable for corporate hedging. In future research, continuous variables can be calculated for general hedging and currency, interest rate, and commodity hedging.

Peer-review: Externally peer-reviewed.

Conflict of Interest: The authors have no conflict of interest to declare.

Grant Support: The authors declared that this study has received no financial support.

Author Contributions: Conception/Design of study: Y.A., C.A.; Data Acquisition: Y.A., C.A.; Drafting Manuscript: Y.A., C.A.; Critical Revision of Manuscript: Y.A., C.A.; Final Approval and Accountability: Y.A., C.A.

Note: The Editorial Management Board Members were not involved in the evaluation, peer-review and decision processes of the article. These processes were carried out by the Editor-in-Chief and the Co-Editor-in-Chief.

References

- Akpınar, O. & Fettahoglu, A. (2016). Does the use of derivatives affect firm value? Evidence from Turkey. *Journal of Transnational Management*, 21(2), 53-61.
- Allayannis, G., & Ofek, E. (2001). Exchange rate exposure, hedging, and the use of foreign currency derivatives. *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 20(2), 273-296.
- Allayannis, G., & Weston, J. P. (2001). The use of foreign currency derivatives and firm market value. *The Review of Financial Studies*, 14(1), 243-276.
- Allayannis, G., Lel, U., & Miller, D. (2012). The use of foreign currency derivatives, corporate governance, and firm value around the world. *Journal of International Economics*, 87(1), 65-79.
- Allen, F., & Faulhaber, G. R. (1989). Signalling by underpricing in the IPO market. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 23(2), 303-323.
- Avcı, B., Akdoğu, E., & Şimşir, S. A. (2020). *Borsa İstanbul ilk halka arz piyasa dinamikleri ve düşük fiyatlama*. Center of Excellence in Finance Araştırma Raporu. Sabancı Üniversitesi.
- Aytürk, Y., Gurbuz, A. O., & Yanık, S. (2016). Corporate derivatives use and firm value: Evidence from Turkey. *Borsa İstanbul Review*, 16(2), 108-120.
- Bartram, S. M., Brown, G. W., & Conrad, J. (2011). The effects of derivatives on firm risk and value. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 46(4), 967-999.
- Beatty, R. P., & Ritter, J. R. (1986). Investment banking, reputation, and the underpricing of initial public offerings. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 15(1-2), 213-232.
- Benveniste, L. M., & Spindt, P. A. (1989). How investment bankers determine the offer price and allocation of new issues. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 24(2), 343-361.
- Bildik, R., & Yılmaz, M. K. (2008). The market performance of initial public offerings in the İstanbul stock exchange. *BDDK Bankacılık ve Finansal Piyasalar*, 2(2), 49-75.
- Borsa İstanbul (2013). *IPO in Turkey and listing on Borsa İstanbul*. Retrieved April 20, 2024, from https://www.borsaisistanbul.com/datum/ilgili_dosyalar_eng/IPO_in_Turkey_and_Listing_on_Borsa_Istanbul_Details.pdf

- Borsa Istanbul Datastore. (2024). *Public offering data* [Data File]. Retrieved February 1, 2024, from <https://datastore.borsaistanbul.com/>
- Breeden, D. T., & Viswanathan, S. (2016). Why do firms hedge? An asymmetric information model. *The Journal of Fixed Income*, 25, 7–25.
- Campello, M., Lin, C., Ma, Y., & Zou, H. (2011). The real and financial implications of corporate hedging. *The Journal of Finance*, 66(5), 1615-1647.
- Carter, R., & Manaster, S. (1990, September). Initial public offerings and underwriter reputation. *The Journal of Finance*, 45(4), 1045-1067.
- Chen, J., & King, T. H. D. (2014). Corporate hedging and the cost of debt. *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 29, 221-245.
- Chen, Z., Han, B., & Zeng, Y. (2017). Financial hedging and firm performance: evidence from cross-border mergers and acquisitions. *European Financial Management*, 23(3), 415-458.
- Cohen, B.D., & Dean, T.J. (2005). Information asymmetry and investor valuation of IPOs: top management team legitimacy as a capital market signal. *Strategic Management Journal*, 26(7), 683-690.
- Dadalt, P., Gay, G. D., & Nam, J. (2002). Asymmetric information and corporate derivatives use. *Journal of Futures Markets*, 22(3), 241-267.
- Danisman, G. O., & Demirel, P. (2019). Corporate risk management practices and firm value in an emerging market: a mixed methods approach. *Risk Management*, 21(1), 19-47.
- DeMarzo, P. M., & Duffie, D. (1995). Corporate incentives for hedging and hedge accounting. *The Review of Financial Studies*, 8(3), 743-771.
- Demirci, N. S. (2023). The impact of derivatives use on firm value: do smaller firms benefit more? (Evidence from Borsa İstanbul). *Ege Academic Review*, 23(4), 605-616.
- Durukan, M. B. (2002). The relationship between IPO returns and factors influencing IPO performance: case of İstanbul stock exchange. *Managerial Finance*, 28(2), 18-38.
- Ece, O., & Sari, S. S. (2020). Relationship between corporate sustainability reporting and firm efficiency, productivity, and profitability and firm value: Evidence from Turkey. *Academic Studies*, 8(11), 83-114.
- Ernst and Young (2024). *Global IPO trends report*. Retrieved May 15, 2024, from https://www.ey.com/en_gl/insights/ipo/trends
- Géczy, C., Minton, B. A., & Schrand, C. (1997). Why firms use currency derivatives. *The Journal of Finance*, 52(4), 1323-1354.
- Gökkaya, V., & Açıkgöz, Ş. (2017). The variability of IPO initial returns in Turkey. *Ege Academic Review*, 17(1), 33-58.
- Grinblatt, M., & Hwang, C. Y. (1989). Signaling and the pricing of new issues. *The Journal of Finance*, 44(2), 393-420.
- Haushalter, G. D. (2000). Financing policy, basis risk, and corporate hedging: Evidence from oil and gas producers. *The Journal of Finance*, 55(1), 107-152.
- Ibbotson, R. G. (1975). Price performance of common stock new issues. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 2(3), 235-272.
- Ibbotson, R. G., & Ritter, J. R. (1995). Initial public offerings. In R. J. al., *Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science* (Vol. 9, pp. 993-1016). London: Elsevier Sciences B.V.
- İlbasmış, M. (2023). Underpricing and aftermarket performance of IPOs during the covid-19 period: Evidence from İstanbul stock exchange. *Borsa İstanbul Review*, 23(3), 662-673.
- Kamuyu Aydınlatma Platformu. (2021). *Search tool*. Retrieved from <https://www.kap.org.tr/en/bildirim-sorgu> on March 1, 2024.
- Khediri, K. B. (2010). Do investors really value derivative use? Empirical evidence from France. *The Journal of Risk Finance*, 11(1), 62-74.
- Kiyamaz, H. (2000). The initial and aftermarket performance of IPOs in an emerging market: evidence from İstanbul stock exchange. *Journal of Multinational Financial Management*, 10(2), 213-227.
- Kim, Y. S., Mathur, I., & Nam, J. (2006). Is operational hedging a substitute for or a complement to financial hedging?. *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 12(4), 834-853.
- Kim, M., & Ritter, J. R. (1999). Valuing IPOs. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 53(3), 409-437
- Klova, V. (2017). IPO underpricing: what about the shipping sector?. *Journal of Multinational Financial Management*, 42, 95-115.
- Küçükkoçaoğlu, G. (2008). Underpricing in Turkey: a comparison of the IPO methods. *International Research Journal of Finance and Economics*, 13(1), 162-182.
- Leland, H. E. (1998). Agency costs, risk management, and capital structure. *The Journal of Finance*, 53(4), 1213-1243.
- Ljungqvist, A. (2007). IPO underpricing. In B. E. Eckbo, *Handbooks in Finance, Handbook of Empirical Corporate Finance* (Vol. 1, pp. 375-422). North Holland: Elsevier.
- Ljungqvist, A. P., & Wilhelm, W. J. (2002). IPO allocations: discriminatory or discretionary? *Journal of Financial Economics*, 65(2), 167-201.
- Logue, D. E. (1973). On the pricing of unseasoned equity issues: 1965-1969. *The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 8(1), 91-103.

- Loughran, T., & Ritter, J. (2004). Why has IPO underpricing changed over time? *Financial Management*, 33(3), 5-37.
- Mazumder, S., & Saha, P. (2021). Covid-19: fear of pandemic and short-term IPO performance. *Finance Research Letters*, 43, 1-10.
- Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The Cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment. *The American Economic Review*, 48(3), 261–297.
- Nguyen, H., & Liu, M.-H. (2014). Effective derivative hedging and initial public offering long-run performance. *Accounting and Finance*, 54(4), 1263-1294.
- Oran, J. S., Aytürk, Y., & Akbaba, C. (2013). İlk halka arz bilmecesi: Türk sermaye piyasasından güncel bulgular. *Bankacılar Dergisi*, 24(87), 79-97.
- Özcan, A. (2021). Audit committee and firm value: an empirical investigation. *Muhasebe Bilim Dünyası Dergisi*, 23(2), 204-221.
- Panaretou, A. (2014). Corporate risk management and firm value: evidence from the UK market. *The European Journal of Finance*, 20(12), 1161-1186.
- Qiao, Z., Xia, C., & Zhang, L. (2020). Does corporate hedging affect firm valuation? Evidence from the IPO market. *Journal of Futures Markets*, 40(6), 895-927.
- Ritter, J. R. (1984). The “hot issue” market of 1980. *The Journal of Business*, 57(2), 215-240.
- Ritter, J. R., & Welch, I. (2002). A review of IPO activity, pricing, and allocations. *The Journal of Finance*, 57(4), 1795-1828.
- Rock, K. (1986). Why new issues are underpriced. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 15(1-2), 187-212.
- Roosenboom, P. (2007). How do underwriters value initial public offerings? An empirical analysis of the French ipo market. *Contemporary Accounting Research*, 24, 1217-1243.
- Roosenboom, P. (2012). Valuing and pricing IPOs. *Journal of Banking & Finance*, 36(6), 1653-1664.
- Ruud, J. S. (1993). Underwriter price support and the IPO underpricing puzzle. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 34(2), 135-151.
- Senol, Z., Karaca, S. S., & Erdogan, S. (2017). The effects of financial risk management on firm’s value: an empirical evidence from Borsa Istanbul stock exchange. *Financial Studies*, 21(4), 27-81.
- Smith, C. W., & Stulz, R. M. (1985). The determinants of firms’ hedging policies. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 20(4), 391-405.
- Tütüncü, L., & Acar, E. (2019). Deliberate discounts and underpricing of Turkish IPOs. *Maliye ve Finans Yazıları* (112), 225-240.
- Tanyeri, B., Öztürkcalı, B., & Tırtıroğlu, D. (2022). Turkish IPOs in a changing regulatory and economic environment. *Borsa İstanbul Review*, 22(2), 332-340.
- TSPB, Türkiye Sermaye Piyasaları Birliği. (2024, February). Retrieved June 1, 2024, from https://tspb.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Turkish_Capital_Markets-202402-TR.pdf
- Welch, I. (1989). Seasoned offerings, imitation costs, and the underpricing of initial public offerings. *The Journal of Finance*, 44(2), 421-449.
- Yüksel, A., & Yüksel, A. (2006). The link between IPO underpricing and trading volume: evidence from the Istanbul Stock Exchange. *Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, JEF*, 11(3), 57-78.
- Zhou, L., & Sadeghi, M. (2019). The impact of innovation on IPO short-term performance—evidence from the Chinese markets. *Pacific-Basin Finance Journal*, 53, 208-23

The Relation between Corruption and Tax Revenues: An Assessment of Transitional economies

Yolsuzluk ve Vergi Gelirleri İlişkisi: Geçiş Ekonomileri Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme

Nazlı Keyifli Şentürk¹ , Yüksel Bayraktar² , Ayfer Özyılmaz³ 

Abstract

Corruption affects many economic, political, and social indicators directly and indirectly. One of the economic costs of corruption is a decrease in tax revenues. In societies where corruption is high, administrators taking bribes for excess revenue may reduce tax administration performance. Therefore, corruption and taxes are closely related to each other. This study analyzes the impact of corruption on different tax types in 6 selected transition economies (Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Slovak Republic) in the 1998-2021 and Bootstrap Panel Granger causality method. According to this study, there is unidirectional causality from personal income tax to corruption in Slovakia, from corporate tax and VAT to corruption in Poland, from VAT and SCT to corruption in Hungary, and from VAT to corruption in Latvia. Additionally, there is a bidirectional causal relationship from corruption to personal income tax in Poland and from corruption to corporate tax in the Czech Republic and Hungary, but there is no causal relationship between corruption and VAT and SCT. Personal income and corporate taxes, which require a strong relationship between tax administration and taxpayers, are more affected by corruption than taxes such as VAT and SCT.

Keywords: Corruption, Tax Revenues, Granger Causality Analysis, Transition Economies

Öz

Yolsuzluklar iktisadi, siyasi ve sosyal birçok göstergelyi doğrudan ve dolaylı olarak etkilemektedir. Yolsuzluğun ekonomiyi yüklediği maliyetlerden biri de vergi gelirlerinde azalmaya neden olmasıdır. Yolsuzluğun fazla olduğu bir toplumda yolsuzluğa bulaşmış idarecilerin rüşvet yoluyla fazla gelir elde etme çabası vergi idaresinin gelir toplama performansını azaltabilmektedir. Dolayısıyla yolsuzluk ve vergi birbiriyle yakın ilişki içerisinde olan kavramlardır. Bu çalışma, 1998-2021 döneminde seçilmiş 6 geçiş ekonomisi (Estonya, Çekya, Macaristan, Polonya, Letonya ve Slovak Cumhuriyeti) özelinde yolsuzluğun farklı vergi türleri üzerindeki etkisini analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaçla Bootstrap Panel Granger nedensellik tahmin yönteminden istifade edilmiştir. Elde edilen sonuçlara göre, sırasıyla Slovakya'da kişisel gelir vergisinden yolsuzluğa, Polonya'da kurumlar vergisi ve KDV'den yolsuzluğa, Macaristan'da KDV ve ÖTV'den yolsuzluğa, Letonya'da KDV'den yolsuzluğa doğru tek yönlü nedensellik bulunmaktadır. İlaveten Polonya'da yolsuzluktan kişisel gelir vergisine, Çekya ve Macaristan'da yolsuzluktan kurumlar vergisine doğru tek yönlü nedensellik ilişkisi vardır ancak panel genelinde yolsuzluk ile KDV ve ÖTV arasında nedensellik ilişkisi yoktur. Çalışmada, vergi idaresi ile mükellef arasında sıkı ilişki gerektiren kişisel gelir vergisi ve kurumlar vergisi gibi vergiler vergi idaresi ile sıkı ilişki gerektirmeyen KDV ve ÖTV gibi vergilere kıyasla yolsuzluktan daha fazla etkilenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yolsuzluk, Vergi Gelirleri, Granger Nedensellik Analizi, Geçiş Ekonomileri

1 Corresponding Author: Nazlı Keyifli Şentürk (Assoc. Prof. Dr.), İzmir Katip Çelebi University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Finance, İzmir, Türkiye. E-mail: nazli.keyifli@ikc.edu.tr ORCID: 0000-0002-0589-8089

2 Yüksel Bayraktar (Prof. Dr.), Ankara University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of Economics, Ankara, Türkiye. E-mail: bayraktary@ankara.edu.tr ORCID: 0000-0002-3499-4571

3 Ayfer Özyılmaz (Assoc. Prof. Dr.), Kırıkkale University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Finance, Kırıkkale, Türkiye. E-mail: ozyilmazayfer@kku.edu.tr ORCID: 0000-0001-9201-2508

To cite this article: Keyifli Senturk, N., Bayraktar, Y., & Ozyilmaz, A. (2024). The relation between corruption and tax revenues: an assessment of transitional economies. *SiYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 33(2), 375–389. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2024.33.1470287>

Introduction

Taxation is the primary source of sustainable revenue for countries. It is not possible for the public to fulfil its basic obligation to citizens and to provide the necessary infrastructure for economic growth and development without taxation (Mahdavi, 2008:608). The state transfer income to the public by generating income through assets it owns and using its tax authority. Through taxation, a portion of individuals' income is collected from individuals and companies within the framework of the law, and social income is generated in this way (Stein, 1994:28-29). So much so that the state determines how many services it will provide to society and how much labour it will employ, mostly through taxation.

Taxation policies of countries with different structural conditions vary; therefore, tax revenues and types may differ between countries. In general, in developed countries, taxes on individuals and institutions predominate, but in developing countries, taxes on the production and sale of goods and services are higher. Differences between countries are not limited to tax implementation policies; the economic, social, and institutional consequences of applied taxation may also differ. The economic, social, and institutional infrastructure of a country can affect its taxation structure.

Problems such as corruption and poor governance in the sustainability of tax policies can shape tax performance and the tax structure of countries. Corruption may occur in the form of people not paying their taxes partially or completely, usually in collusion with public officials, or it may cause collections to differ between individuals and institutions for similar accruals. This, on the one hand, causes the tax base to shrink and public revenues to decrease, and on the other hand, causes tax injustices to occur. It can be said that this process is a priority problem for transition economies.

The main features of transition economies, most of which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, are the prevalence of corruption and the weakening of property rights (Şen and Kaya, 2020). Ensuring macroeconomic stability, liberalising foreign trade, and redefining the role of the state to promote growth and development in these countries. Many reforms have been implemented in economic, political, and social fields, such as the privatisation of state-owned enterprises (IMF, 2000). However, these countries, despite all policy measures, continue to experience corruption as one of the structural problems (Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2005). Furthermore, corruption is still considered one of the most critical problems facing economic development and democratisation in these countries (Svensson, 2005; Rose, 2001).

It is important to investigate the possible effects of corruption, which every country may face to some extent, on tax revenues and tax structures. This study focused on Transition economies, and although the tax systems of these countries are developing and adapting, they are still new. Starting from this point, the aim of this study is to investigate the possible relationship between tax revenues and corruption in 6 transition economies (Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Hungary, and Slovak Republic). The focus of this study is the lack of studies investigating the relationship with corruption using broad tax indicators in Transition economies, which are one of the country groups in which corruption is at the forefront. In this context, the study is expected to contribute to the

literature. For this purpose, the analysis period in the study was 1998-2021, and Kónya's (2006) bootstrapped panel Granger causality analysis was used.

The remainder of this article is organised as follows. The second chapter presents the theoretical framework and literature review. The third section focuses on the dataset for the variables used in the econometric analysis. The fourth section explains the methodology. The fifth section presents the empirical results. The results are presented in the sixth section.

Theoretical Background and Literature Review

Theoretical Background

Taxes are an important source of income for developed and developing countries. Therefore, even in countries that have income-generating natural resources and are tourism destinations, income taxes make a stronger contribution to the public economy. therefore, taxes are an important financial tool needed for the state to finance public expenditures, achieve the intended economic and social goals, and ensure social justice and security (Salman et al., 2022; Obara and Nangih, 2017; Şentürk, 2014).

Behaviours such as issuing illegal licences or demanding unfair money from taxpayers, stealing public treasury, and selling state-owned goods at black market prices constitute corruption. Corruption is of critical importance to the sustainability of tax revenues. Because individuals contribute to the sustainability of tax policies by declaring their income honestly if they believe that the process is fair and legitimate. However, tax collection and accrual processes that are not conducted effectively and transparently by the public or public employees can damage citizens' sense of justice and undermine the effectiveness of public expenditures. Moreover, it decreases future public revenues. (Alm, et al., 2016; Martini, 2014; Purohit, 2007; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).

In countries with high levels of corruption, tax revenues are not used to increase welfare but to serve the interests of certain individuals or groups (Monteiro, 2011). In fact, corruption is a social threat that disrupts social peace and causes the quality of the public sector to decrease in many areas. (Pellegata, 2012). The effects of corruption on taxes can occur directly and indirectly through different transfer channels. Corruptions; It affects many economic, legal, and cultural areas, such as income distribution, rule of law, inflation, public debt, law enforcement power, investment, economic growth, trust in government, and moral values. These parameters are sometimes effectively affected by purchasing power and sometimes by distrust of the public, and as a result, it can harm the tax system.

In the relationship between taxes and corruption, tax types are one of the determining parameters. Because each type of tax has a different reaction to corruption. The main factor affecting this is whether taxpayers have to deal with tax administration regarding the collection of taxes. For example, there is a close relationship with tax administration in collecting taxes on income, but there is no close relationship to collecting taxes on goods and services. The types of taxes collected on income are more transparent, and it may be more difficult to commit corruption in these taxes, especially in countries with institutionalisation. However, in indirect taxes, businesses can resort to corruption that

can lead to tax leakage. However, the weaker effect of taxes on taxpayers' perceptions may lead to priority given to indirect taxes (Şen and Kaya, 2023; Liu and Feng, 2015; Giray, 2005; Besley and McLaren, 1993).

The direction of corruption sometimes goes from individuals to governments. As a matter of fact, companies look for ways to pay as little tax as possible because they see taxes as a burden (Marjit et al., 2016). Thus, companies may resort to taking advantage of tax loopholes, evading taxes, or bribing tax officials assigned to audit companies to reduce or eliminate their financial burdens. In this case, these individuals may sometimes be punished by judicial authorities, and sometimes they may choose to share a part of the tax with the tax officer (Besley and Persson, 2013). In this regard, the existence of deterrent penalties may be a determining factor in whether public employees and individuals choose to follow these paths.

Corruption can sometimes cause individuals who are not prone to bribery to change their tax decisions. Individuals expect taxes paid to be returned to them in the form of public services. However, they do not want to pay taxes if they believe that the taxes collected are wasted by the state; the tax system is unfair; tax amnesties are frequently applied; and penalties and inspections are not high (Chan and Ramly, 2018). Thus, people who do not have a tendency to corruption may resort to methods such as under-declaring their income, over-declaring deductions, not filing proper tax returns, and avoiding taxes to avoid paying or under-paying income taxes (Alm et al., 2016).

A country that wants to increase tax collection must minimise or eliminate corruption. Because corruption can negatively affect tax allocation by rendering governments dysfunctional (Gupta and Verhoeven, 2001). Revenue losses caused by corruption-related inefficiency in tax collection may lead to reduced public sector investments and infrastructure services, high debt, and additional taxation. This directly imposes an additional financial burden on citizens (Marjit et al., 2016). For example, in countries where corruption is high, citizens may engage in business with bribes, which can be seen as a second payment for public services. Thus, taxes lose their importance, and citizens' costs for public service increase (Gediz Oral, 2009).

Literature Review

The relationship between corruption and macroeconomic indicators is a frequently discussed topic, and tax revenues are a prominent variable in this context. The general opinion in these studies is that corruption negatively affects tax revenue (See: Johnson et al., 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Ghura, 1998; Ajaz and Ahmad, 2010; Öricü et al., 2012; Bertinelli and Bourgain, 2016; Drif and Rawat, 2018; Abede and Fikre, 2020). However, these studies focused on one or a few tax types, and the literature-examining comprehensive tax types and the direction of this relationship is quite limited.

Thornton (2008) examined the relationship between tax revenues and corruption using different tax indicators for 53 Middle Eastern and African countries between 1984 and 2001. Corruption negatively affects taxes on social security, taxes on goods and services, and taxes on international commercial transactions. Beşkaya and Bağgiden (2008) analysed the relationship between corruption and tax components in Turkey for the period

1980-2005. Accordingly, corruption negatively affects corporate taxes, total tax revenues, personal income taxes, taxes on international trade, and transactions, but it has no effect on taxes on goods and services. However, Iman and Jacobs (2007) argued that corruption has a statistically insignificant impact on total tax revenues, property taxes, and indirect taxes on goods and services in 12 Middle Eastern countries. Additionally, taxes that require frequent interactions between tax administration and taxpayer are more affected by corruption than other types of taxation. Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) discussed the relationship between corruption and various types of tax revenues in 83 developed and developing countries. The authors concluded that corruption negatively affects personal income tax, corporate tax, value-added tax, social security premium income, and property taxes.

Many studies have investigated the impact of corruption on tax revenues and its relationship with more limited tax types, and one prominent indicator of these tax types is corporate tax. In this context, Kong et al. (2023), in a study on companies traded on the Chinese stock exchange, revealed that the fight against corruption reduced the extent of corporate tax evasion. Acet et al. (2022) examined the relationship between corruption, corporate tax revenues, and corporate tax rates in Turkey. The study concluded that there is no relationship between corporate tax revenues and corporate tax revenues/GDP and corruption, but the change in corporate tax rates affects the level of corruption. Örüçü et al. (2012) found a statistically significant and negative relationship between corruption and corporate tax revenues in 16 OECD countries, and Monteiro (2011) found a statistically significant and negative relationship between corruption and corporate tax revenues in 27 EU countries. Similarly, Kubato and Rihova (2009) concluded that corporate tax revenues are lower in OECD countries, especially countries with high corruption levels.

In addition to corporate taxes, the VAT is also a prominent tax indicator. For example, Pastusiak et al. (2022) analysed the impact of economic growth and governance quality on VAT deficits in 26 EU countries. According to the OLS and GMM results, governance effectiveness has a significant impact on VAT deficits in EU countries. In other words, the study concluded that combating corruption reduced the VAT deficit. Olexova et al. (2022),¹¹ They examined the impact of governance quality on the value-added tax deficit by using different governance indicators, including corruption, in Central and Eastern European countries. They found that corruption was a prominent indicator of VAT deficit. Sun (2021) analysed the relationship between corruption and corporate tax avoidance among 600,000 Chinese companies. According to the findings of this study, an increase in corruption affects tax avoidance significantly and positively. Mustapha et al. (2017) argued that in the 10 most corrupt countries, increasing corruption will lead to VAT revenues losses. Similarly, according to Pluskota (2022), corruption is a decisive factor in VAT deficits in 25 EU countries and Poland. This effect is positive for Poland and negative for EU countries. The fact that the tax system in Poland was reformed during the analysis period was decisive for these findings. In contrast, Permadi and Wijaya (2022) did not find any relationship between corruption control and VAT revenues in 19 Asian Countries. It is assumed that this result is because the low level of corruption control in panel countries cannot affect the collection of VAT revenues.

Investigating how tax revenues are affected by corruption using more specific indicators, Majerová (2016) analysed the impact of corruption and economic growth on the VAT

deficit in EU countries and found that corruption increased the VAT deficit. Sokolovska and Sokolovskyi (2015) suggested that corruption significantly and negatively affects VAT efficiency in 41 countries. In addition to these studies, Alm et al. (2016), who focused on tax evasion, investigated how potential bribes to tax officials affected the company's tax evasion decision by studying 16,000 companies in 32 countries. According to the study, corruption is a determining factor in companies' tendency to engage in tax evasion.

When the studies in the literature are generally examined, it is seen that although different tax types are studied, there is insufficient literature investigating the relationship between corruption and tax revenues in the context of different tax types in transition economies. In these countries where corruption is at high levels, it is important to determine which direction this relationship is for which tax type. In this context, this study is expected to fill the gap in the literature.

Data

In this study, the relationship between tax types and corruption in six transition economies (Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and the Slovak Republic) was investigated. For this purpose, the Bootstrap Panel Granger causality test suggested by Kónya (2006) was used in this study. The period 1998-2021 was taken as basis for econometric analysis. The beginning of the period was chosen based on data availability, particularly in line with the beginning of transition economies. The reason for choosing these countries is that no balanced dataset is suitable for econometric analysis of other transition economies excluded from the analysis. In addition, these countries are high-income countries according to the development classification established by the World Bank. Four tax instruments (personal income tax, corporate tax, value added tax and taxes on private goods and services) and corruption perception index variables were used in this study. Tax-related data were obtained from OECD's income statistics database. The independent variable of this study, the corruption perception index, was obtained from the Transparency International database. This index takes values between 0 and 100, with a value of 0 indicating high corruption in the country and a value of 100 indicating low corruption. To reduce variability in the data, the logarithms of all variables used in the econometric model were taken. The variables included in the model are described in Table 1.

Table 1
Variables ve Sources

Variables	Abs.	Source
Personal Income Tax	PIT	OECD Revenue Statistics
Value-added tax	VAT	
Corporation tax	CT	
Taxes on Private Goods and Services	PGST	
Corruption Perception Index	CPI	Transparency International

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the data used in this study. When the relevant table is evaluated, the average personal income tax, corporate tax, value-

added tax, and taxes on special goods and services are 15.170%, 6.929%, 23.094%, and 12.351%, respectively. The minimum and maximum personal income tax rates are 9.128% and 23.851%, respectively. Corporate tax is the lowest at 0.503%; It has the highest at 13.064%. However, value-added tax and taxes on special goods and services have the lowest values of 17.06% and 8.342%, respectively; It is seen that they have the highest values of 29.416% and 15.238%. The average corruption perception index variable is approximately 51. The min. and max. values of the same variable are 27 and 75, respectively.

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Obs.	Mean	Min.	Max.	Stand. Dev.
Personal Income Tax	144	15.170	9.128	23.851	3.870
Corporation tax	144	6.929	0.503	13.064	2.581
Value-added tax	144	23.094	17.06	29.416	2.736
Taxes on Private Goods and Services	144	12.351	8.342	15.238	1.495
Corruption Perception Index	144	50.708	27	75	9.722

Econometric Model ve Method

In this study, the Kónya (2006) bootstrapped panel causality test was used to determine the existence and direction of causal relationships between variables. Kónya's (2006) approach is a panel data estimation method that has advantages over other causality estimation methods in the literature. One of the advantages of the Kónya (2006) method is that it is based on seemingly uncorrelated regression (SUR) estimation that considers cross-sectional dependence between countries. Second, it does not require a common hypothesis for panel countries, based on a Wald test with bootstrap critical values calculated specific to each country. Another advantage is that there is no need for preliminary tests, such as unit root and co-integration. It is frequently preferred in the literature due to its advantages. Since Kónya's (2006) approach considers cross-sectional dependency and heterogeneity in estimation models, conducting relevant tests in the first stage of the econometric analysis is important.

The basic panel data models to be used for the cross-sectional dependence and homogeneity tests were as follows:

Model I:

$$PIT_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CPI_{it} + u_{it} \quad (1)$$

Model II:

$$CT_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 CPI_{it} + \gamma_{it} \quad (2)$$

Model III:

$$VAT_{it} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 CPI_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

Model IV:

$$PGST_{it} = \sigma_0 + \sigma_1 CPI_{it} + \mu_{it} \quad (4)$$

PIT, CT, VAT, PGST, and CPI denote personal income tax, corporate tax, value-added tax, taxes on private goods and services, and the corruption perception index, respectively.

The countries used in the analysis are indicated with the subscript “i” and the period with the subscript “t”. “ β ”, “ α ”, “ δ ” and “ σ ” indicate the constant terms in the models, and “u”, “ γ ”, “ ε ” and “ μ ” indicate the error terms.

The Bootstrap Panel Granger causality test suggested by Kónya (2006) was used. Since this test is based on the unrelated regression model (SUR), the models to be estimated are as in the equations (5-12) below:

Model I

$$PIT_{1,t} = \alpha_{1,1} + \sum_{i=1}^{mly_1} \beta_{1,1,j} PIT_{1,t-j} + \sum_{i=1}^{mlx_1} \gamma_{1,1,j} CPI_{1,t-j} + \varepsilon_{1,1,t} \quad (5)$$

$$CPI_{1,t} = \alpha_{2,1} + \sum_{i=1}^{mly_2} \beta_{2,1,j} PIT_{1,t-j} + \sum_{i=1}^{mlx_2} \gamma_{2,1,j} CPI_{1,t-j} + \varepsilon_{2,1,t} \quad (6)$$

Model II

$$CT_{1,t} = \alpha_{1,1} + \sum_{i=1}^{mly_1} \beta_{1,1,j} KV_{1,t-j} + \sum_{i=1}^{mlx_1} \gamma_{1,1,j} CPI_{1,t-j} + \varepsilon_{1,1,t} \quad (7)$$

$$CPI_{1,t} = \alpha_{2,1} + \sum_{i=1}^{mly_2} \beta_{2,1,j} CT_{1,t-j} + \sum_{i=1}^{mlx_2} \gamma_{2,1,j} CPI_{1,t-j} + \varepsilon_{2,1,t} \quad (8)$$

Model III

$$VAT_{1,t} = \alpha_{1,1} + \sum_{i=1}^{mly_1} \beta_{1,1,j} VAT_{1,t-j} + \sum_{i=1}^{mlx_1} \gamma_{1,1,j} CPI_{1,t-j} + \varepsilon_{1,1,t} \quad (9)$$

$$CPI_{1,t} = \alpha_{2,1} + \sum_{i=1}^{mly_2} \beta_{2,1,j} VAT_{1,t-j} + \sum_{i=1}^{mlx_2} \gamma_{2,1,j} CPI_{1,t-j} + \varepsilon_{2,1,t} \quad (10)$$

Model VI

$$PGST_{1,t} = \alpha_{1,1} + \sum_{i=1}^{mly_1} \beta_{1,1,j} PGST_{1,t-j} + \sum_{i=1}^{mlx_1} \gamma_{1,1,j} CPI_{1,t-j} + \varepsilon_{1,1,t} \quad (11)$$

$$CPI_{1,t} = \alpha_{2,1} + \sum_{i=1}^{mly_2} \beta_{2,1,j} PGST_{1,t-j} + \sum_{i=1}^{mlx_2} \gamma_{2,1,j} CPI_{1,t-j} + \varepsilon_{2,1,t} \quad (12)$$

Empirical Results

In this study, cross-sectional dependence and homogeneity tests were used before determining causal relationships between the variables. Table 3 presents the cross-sectional dependence and slope homogeneity test results for all models. As can be seen from the table, the H_0 hypothesis that “there is no cross-sectional dependence between cross-sections” is rejected for 6 transition economies (Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,

Poland and Slovak Rep.) at the 1% significance level for all models. This means that an increase or decrease in tax types and perceptions of corruption in any country analysed may also affect other countries. Therefore, panel countries should not ignore the policies of other countries in their policies on these variables. In addition, the H_0 hypothesis, expressed as “slope parameters are homogeneous”, is rejected for the panel countries at the 1% significance level in all estimation models. When the relevant table is evaluated, it can be seen that applying the bootstrapped panel Granger causality test to the panel sample. In other words, it can be seen that there is cross-sectional dependence in the panel countries, and the slope coefficients are not homogeneous.

Table 3
Cross-Section Dependency and Homogeneity Test Results

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV
LM	104.224***	134.985***	73.366***	191.039***
CD_{LM}	16.290***	21.906***	10.656***	32.140***
CD	8.440***	10.550***	2.160***	13.028***
LM_{adj}	10.803***	5.076***	3.038***	5.752***
$\tilde{\Delta}$	4.706***	5.615***	6.367***	3.652***
$\tilde{\Delta}_{adj}$	5.177***	6.003***	6.806***	3.904***

(***) indicates a 1% significance level

Kónya's (2006) causality test results are shown in Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7.

Table 4
Panel Causality Test Results for Personal Income Tax and Corruption Perceptions

$H_0 = \text{Personal Income Tax (PIT) does not cause corruption (CPI)}$					
Countries	Coef.	Wald Statistics	Bootstrap Critical Values		
			%1	%5	%10
Czechia	-0.316	4.071	10.352	6.485	4.791
Estonia	-0.060	0.580	20.028	11.442	9.176
Hungary	0.074	1.091	7.245	4.547	3.475
Latvia	-0.263	1.503	15.366	8.710	5.667
Poland	-0.109	0.855	7.097	4.312	3.162
Slovak Rep.	-0.369	9.190***	8.305	4.529	3.201
$H_0 = \text{Corruption (CPI) does not result in personal income taxes (PIT)}$					
Countries	Coef.	Wald Statistics	Bootstrap Critical Values		
			%1	%5	%10
Czechia	-0.090	0.378	4.831	3.141	2.225
Estonia	0.015	0.006	17.132	10.922	8.954
Hungary	0.201	0.946	12.548	7.523	5.712
Latvia	0.073	2.373	8.841	5.244	3.530
Poland	0.156	8.822**	9.238	5.774	4.267
Slovak Rep.	0.070	0.723	6.288	3.266	2.204

(***), (**), (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively

Table 4 presents the empirical findings of the bidirectional causal relationship between personal income tax and corruption perception. The H_0 hypothesis that we predicted as “personal income tax does not cause corruption” is rejected at the 1% significance level

for the Slovak Republic. In this country, personal income tax has a statistically significant and negative impact on corruption perceptions. No Granger causality relationship was found from personal income tax to perception of corruption for the 6 transition economies considered in this study: Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and Poland. In other words, there is no statistically significant relationship between personal income tax and corruption perception in these five countries. Table 4 also displays the results of the bidirectional causal relationship between corruption perception and personal income tax. According to econometric findings, the H_0 hypothesis, established as “Corruption does not cause personal income tax”, is rejected at the 5% significance level only for Poland, among the 6 transition economies. In this country, perceptions of corruption positively affect personal income taxes. For the remaining five countries (Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and the Slovak Republic), no statistically significant causal relationship was found between corruption perception and personal income tax.

Table 5
Panel Causality Test Results for Corporate Tax and Corruption Perceptions

$H_0 = \text{Corporate Tax (CT) does not engender corruption (CPI)}$					
Countries	Coef.	Wald Statistics	Bootstrap Critical Values		
			%1	%5	%10
Czechia	-0.040	0.082	6.134	3.727	2.762
Estonia	0.052	4.351	13.640	8.235	6.067
Hungary	-0.014	0.106	10.589	6.318	4.922
Latvia	-0.017	0.893	6.144	3.621	2.553
Poland	0.320	15.624***	10.605	6.628	5.083
Slovak Rep.	-0.203	2.072	37.513	25.108	19.953
$H_0 = \text{Corruption (CPI) does not result in corporate income taxes (CT)}$					
Countries	Coef.	Wald Statistics	Bootstrap Critical Values		
			%1	%5	%10
Czechia	-0.184	5.700**	7.348	4.970	3.878
Estonia	0.644	1.727	12.789	6.547	4.794
Hungary	0.943	5.236*	11.782	6.244	4.439
Latvia	-0.661	1.773	6.916	4.816	3.396
Poland	-0.130	1.874	10.594	5.559	4.063
Slovak Rep.	0.460	9.050	40.287	27.418	22.644
(***) , (**), (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively					

Table 5 presents the empirical results of the bidirectional causality relationship between corporate tax and corruption perception. Accordingly, the H_0 hypothesis “Corporate tax is not the cause of corruption” is rejected at the 1% significance level only for Poland. In this country, corporate tax positively affects corruption perception. For the remaining five countries (Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and the Slovak Republic), no statistically significant causal relationship between corporate taxes and perceptions of corruption. Additionally, the H_0 hypothesis “Corruption is not the cause of corporate tax” is rejected only in the Czech Republic and Hungary at the 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. The perception of corruption affects corporate taxes negatively in the Czech Republic and positively in Hungary. For the remaining four countries (Estonia,

Latvia, Poland and the Slovak Republic), no statistically significant causal relationship was found between corruption perception and corporate tax.

The empirical results of the bidirectional causality relationship between value-added tax and corruption perception are presented in Table 6. The H_0 hypothesis “Value added tax is not the cause of corruption” is rejected at a significance level of 10% for Hungary and Latvia and 1% for Poland. Value-added tax negatively affects corruption perceptions in Hungary and positively in Latvia and Poland. For the other three countries (Czechia, Estonia and Slovak Republic), no statistically significant causal relationship between value added tax and corruption perception. Table 6 also lists the results of the bidirectional causality relationship between corruption perception and value-added tax. The H_0 hypothesis “Corruption is not the cause of value added tax” could not be rejected for 6 transition economies. That is, no statistically significant causal relationship was found between corruption perception and value-added taxes in these countries.

Table 6

Panel Causality Test Results for Value-Added Tax and Corruption Perception

$H_0 =$ Value Added Tax (VAT) does not cause corruption (CPI)					
Countries	Coef.	Wald Statistics	Bootstrap Critical Values		
			%1	%5	%10
Czechia	0.381	2.942	19.056	12.501	9.488
Estonia	-0.058	0.180	5.262	2.789	1.905
Hungary	-0.409	10.419*	18.314	12.354	10.196
Latvia	0.364	5.745*	12.961	6.641	4.346
Poland	0.793	23.458***	15.668	9.703	7.775
Slovak Rep.	0.168	1.536	10.309	6.663	4.720
$H_0 =$ Corruption (CPI) does not result in value added tax (VAT)					
Countries	Coef.	Wald Statistics	Bootstrap Critical Values		
			%1	%5	%10
Czechia	0.090	1.601	24.392	16.569	13.321
Estonia	0.064	0.603	11.850	6.001	4.780
Hungary	-0.336	4.302	26.232	17.678	13.839
Latvia	0.067	1.546	15.563	10.244	7.707
Poland	-0.030	0.719	4.863	2.640	1.889
Slovak Rep.	-0.081	1.004	3.858	2.140	1.591

(***), (**), (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively

Table 7 presents the results of the causality analysis of the bi-directional relationship between taxes on private goods and services and perceptions of corruption. According to the table, the H_0 hypothesis “taxes on private goods and services are not the cause of corruption” is rejected only in Hungary. In this country, there is a positive relationship between taxes on private goods and services and corruption perceptions. In the remaining 5 countries (Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Poland and the Slovak Republic), no causal relationship was found between taxes on private goods and services and perceptions of corruption. In addition, the H_0 hypothesis established as “Corruption is not the cause of taxes on private goods and services” could not be rejected for 6 transition economies.

Table 7
Panel Causality Test Results for Taxes on Private Goods and Services and Their Perception of Corruption

H₀ = Private Goods and Services Taxes (PGST) do not engender corruption (CPI)					
Countries	Coef.	Wald Statistics	Bootstrap Critical Values		
			%1	%5	%10
Czechia	0.004	0.001	6.738	3.513	2.512
Estonia	0.082	1.735	10.401	6.377	4.761
Hungary	0.295	8.614**	8.831	6.647	5.160
Latvia	-0.140	0.469	19.965	12.642	9.579
Poland	-0.070	0.140	5.123	3.284	2.306
Slovak Rep.	0.030	0.088	12.974	7.578	5.651
H₀ = Corruption (CPI) does not result in taxes on private goods and services (PGST)					
Countries	Coef.	Wald Statistics	Bootstrap Critical Values		
			%1	%5	%10
Czechia	-0.103	1.342	8.212	5.319	4.042
Estonia	-0.142	0.426	15.278	9.045	6.987
Hungary	0.023	0.045	5.799	3.367	2.006
Latvia	-0.037	0.441	18.560	8.810	6.453
Poland	-0.057	1.586	10.524	6.641	5.429
Slovak Rep.	0.009	0.004	11.956	6.855	4.577

(***), (**), (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively

Conclusion

Corruption has different meanings in different cultures and is difficult to reveal and measure because it is illegal and secret. This can make it difficult to measure the impact of corruption on tax revenues. However, it cannot change the fact that corruption has a reducing effect on tax revenues, which is one of the most important costs it imposes on the economy. The decrease in taxes, which are the source of financing public expenditures, due to corruption undermines the effectiveness of the public authority and negatively affects macroeconomic balances and social welfare.

In this context, the relationship between corruption and tax revenues was analysed selected 6 transition economies for the period 1998-2021 using the bootstrapped panel Granger causality method. The empirical findings of the study reveal that there is a negative and unidirectional Granger causality relationship between personal income tax and corruption in the Slovak Republic and a positive and unidirectional Granger causality relationship between corporate tax and corruption in Poland. In this context, as personal income taxes increase, the corruption perception index decreases, implying that corruption increases. Tax avoidance in this country not only harms tax compliance in the country but can also reduce the progressive structure of personal income tax. In Poland, corruption increases as corporate taxes rise. These results may indicate that institutions do not fulfil their public obligations by paying bribes or by resorting to tax avoidance or evasion to provide various benefits. According to empirical findings regarding the relationship between corruption and personal income and corporate taxes, there is a positive and unidirectional Granger causality relationship from corruption to personal

income tax in Poland and a positive and unidirectional Granger causality relationship from corruption to corporate tax in the Czech Republic and Hungary. This means that as the corruption perception index increases—that is, as corruption decreases—personal income taxes in Poland and corporate taxes in Czechia and Hungary increase. Therefore, individuals and institutions not fulfilling their tax obligations through corruption not only reduce public tax revenues but also significantly increase countries' public financing deficits. Corruption can prevent taxes from spreading to the base. In order to eliminate this negative effect of corruption, tax compliance should be increased by taking measures to increase individuals' trust in public administration and the legal system. These findings are consistent with studies in the literature, such as Ghura (1998), Tanzi and Davoodi (2000), Iman and Jacobs (2007), Kubato and Rihova (2009), and Ajaz Ahmad (2010).

It has been determined that there is a positive and unidirectional Granger causality relationship between VAT and corruption in Poland and Latvia, a negative and unidirectional causality relationship between VAT and corruption in Hungary, and a positive and unidirectional Granger causality relationship between taxes on private goods and services and corruption. This means that as VAT increases, the corruption perception index decreases in Hungary, that is, corruption increases, whereas in Poland and Latvia, the increase in VAT reduces corruption. Additionally, an increase in taxes on private goods and services has reduced corruption in Hungary. The findings of this research show that the relationship between VAT and corruption differs in Hungary compared with Poland and Latvia. In addition, there is no causal relationship between tax revenue types and corruption in the panel countries of Czechia and Estonia. In all panel countries, corruption has no causal relationship with VAT and Taxes on Private Goods and Services. The factor that is effective in this regard is that indirect taxes, such as taxes on private goods and services, generally consist of registered activities, so there are relatively transparent processes, such as the use of invoices. In addition, the fact that taxpayers do not have a close relationship with tax administration and that tax administration does not have much discretion over such taxes may also be effective. These findings are compatible with studies in the literature, such as Beşkaya and Bağgiden (2008), Sokolovska and Sokolovskiy (2015), Majerová (2016), and Pluskota (2022).

These results show that different tax types exhibit different reactions to corruption. In general, direct taxes, such as declaration-based income and corporate taxes, which require close interaction between the individual and the tax administration, are more affected by corruption than indirect taxes, such as VAT taxes on Private Goods and Services. Corruption generally reduces state tax revenues and can disrupt countries' tax structures. For this reason, in countries where corruption is high, governments tend to turn to taxes that are less affected by corruption to protect tax revenues. However, this may negatively affect income distribution among people in society. As a matter of fact, the efficiency of a country's tax system depends on it being built on a fair structure and free from corruption. Based on the findings of this study, governments need to prioritise some issues to combat corruption, reduce corruption, and ensure efficient tax revenues. Accordingly, i) to improve citizens' tax awareness; ii) to combat tax evasion, audit rates and penalties should be reduced to act as a deterrent and to protect the competitiveness of companies; iii) professional tax administration personnel should be employed, satisfactory wages

should be provided, and internal control systems should be strengthened; iv) to prevent illegal transactions and create a secure invoicing system, e-government applications should be implemented, and transactions should be carried out in a secure environment.

Peer-review: Externally peer-reviewed.

Conflict of Interest: The authors have no conflict of interest to declare.

Grant Support: The authors declared that this study has received no financial support.

Author Contributions: Conception/Design of study: N.K.Ş., Y.B.; Data Acquisition: A.Ö.; Data Analysis/Interpretation: N.K.Ş., A.Ö.; Drafting Manuscript: N.K.Ş., Y.B., A.Ö.; Critical Revision of Manuscript: N.K.Ş.; Final Approval and Accountability: N.K.Ş., Y.B., A.Ö.

References

- Abebe, G. & Fikre, S. (2020). Econometric analysis of the effects of corruption on government tax revenue: Evidence from panel data in developed and developing countries. *European Business & Management*, 6(2), 28-35.
- Acet, H., Sönmez, A. & Acar, M. S. (2022). 1995-2019 yılları arasında Türkiye'nin yolsuzluk düzeyi ile kurumlar vergisi arasındaki ilişki. *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 47, 16-30.
- Ajaz, T. & Ahmad, E. (2010). The effect of corruption and governance on tax revenue. *The Pakistan Development Review*, 49(4), 405-417.
- Alm, J., Martinez-Vazquez, J. & McClellan, C., (2015). Corruption and firm tax evasion. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 124, 146-163.
- Bertinelli, L. & Bourgain, A. (2016). Tax mobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa: The impact of tax and business law reforms. *Economics Bulletin*, 36(3), 1805-1810.
- Besley, T. & McLaren J. (1993). Taxes and bribery: The role of wage Incentives. *The Economic Journal*, 103, 119-141.
- Besley, T. & Persson (2013), 'Taxation and Development', in: A. J. Auerbach, R. Economic Outlook: Focus on Transition Economies, 84-137. Washington D. C.: IMF.
- Beşkaya, A. & Bağgiden, M. (2008). The relationship between corruption and government revenues: A time series analysis of The Turkish case, 1980-2005. *Yapı Kredi Economic Review*, 67-84.
- Chan, S. & Ramly, Z. (2018). The role of country governance on value-added tax and inequality. *E+M Ekonomie a Management*, 21(4), 79-93.
- Chetty, M. Feldstein & E. Saez (eds.), *Handbook of Public Economics*, Vol. 5, Elsevier, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 1-82.
- Drif, I. & Rawat, A. S. (2018). Corruption, governance and tax revenue: Evidence from EAGLE countries. *Journal of Transnational Management*, 23(2-3), 199-133.
- Fisman, R. & Jakob, S. (2000). Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? firm -level evidence. *The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, 2485, 1-24.
- Ghura, D. (1998). Tax revenue In Sub-Saharan Africa: Effects of economic policies and corruption, IMF Working Paper, wp/98/135, 1-25.
- Giray, F. (2005). Yolsuzluk ve yolsuzluğun vergi yapısı üzerine etkileri. *İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 32, 111-137.
- Gupta, S. & Verhoeven, M. (2001). The efficiency of government expenditure: experiences from Africa. *Journal of Policy Modeling*, 23(4), 33-467.
- International Monetary Fund. 2000. "Transition: Experiences and Policy Issues." In World Johnson, S., Kaufman, D., Lobaton, P.Z. (1998). Regulatory discretion and the unofficial economy. *American Economic Review*, 88(2), 387-392.
- Kong, D., Zhang, Y. & Qin, N. (2023). Anti-corruption campaign and corporate tax evasion: evidence from China. *International Tax and Public Finance*, 20(3), 781-788.
- Kubatova, K. & Rihova, L. (2009), "Factors Affecting Revenues from Corporate Tax", <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/187759/1/896229866.pdf>, Erişim Tarihi: 27.03.2024.
- Liu, Y. & Feng, H. (2015). Tax structure and corruption: cross-country evidence. *Public Choice*, 162, 57-78.
- Mahdavi, S. (2008). The level and composition of tax revenue in developing countries: Evidence from unbalanced panel data. *International Review of Economics and Finance*, 17 (4), 607-617.
- Majerová, I. (2016). The impact of some variables on the VAT gap in the member states of the European Union company. *Oeconomia Copernicana*, 7(3), 339-355.
- Marjit, S., Seidel, A. & Thum, M. (2016). Tax evasion, corruption and tax loopholes. *German Economic Review*, 18(3), 283-301.
- Martini, M. (2014). Approaches to curbing corruption in tax administration in Africa. Berlin: U4 Anti-corruption

- Resource Centre. Transparency International.
- Monteiro, M. (2011). A panel data econometric study of corporate tax revenue in European Union: Structural, Cyclical Business and Institutional Determinants, U.Porto, FEP Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto.
- Mustapha, M. Z., Koh, E. H. Y., Chan, G. & Ramly, Z. (2017). The Role of Corruption Control in Moderating the Relationship Between Value Added Tax and Income Inequality. *International Journal of Economics and Financial*, 7 (4), 459-467.
- Obara, L.C. & Nangih, E. (2017). Tax compliance barriers and internally generated revenue in Nigeria: Empirical from small and medium enterprises in Port Harcourt metropolis. *International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences*, 7(4), 169-176.
- Olexová, C., Sudzina, F. & Cakoci, K. (2022). The VAT Gap in relation to the quality of governance in selected CEE countries. *Journal of Eastern European and Central Asian Research*, 9(3), 385-399.
- Oral, B. G. & Sayın, F. (2009). Mali yolsuzluğun yansımaları: Türkiye için eşbütünlüşme analizi. İstanbul Üniversitesi Maliye Araştırma Merkezi Konferansları, (s. 141-176). İstanbul.
- Örücü, A. İ., Aysu, A. & Bakırtaş, D. (2012). Yolsuzluğun Kurumlar Vergisi Gelirleri Üzerine Etkisi: OECD Ülkeleri Analizi. *Maliye Dergisi*, 539-556.
- Pastusiak, R., Bolek, M. & Pluskota, A. (2022). VAT gap determinants in the European Union. *Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne*, CXXII, 119-132.
- Pellegata, A. (2012). Constraining political corruption: an empirical analysis of the impact of democracy. *Democratization*, 20 (7), 1195-1218.
- Permadi, D. G. & Wijaya, S. (2022). Analysis of determinants of value added tax revenue in Asia. *Journal of Indonesian Educational Research*, 8(3), 622-631.
- Pluskota, A. (2022). VAT gap determinants in the European Union and Poland. *Ekonomia i Prawo, Economics and Law*, 21(3), 623-633.
- Purohit, M. C. (2007). Corruption in tax administration. İçinde Anwar S. (Eds.), Public sector governance and accountability series performance accountability and combating corruption, (pp.285-301). The World Bank.
- Rose, R. (2001). A diverging Europe. *Journal of Democracy*, 12(1), 93-106.
- Salman, R.T., Sanni, P., Olaniyi, T.A. & Yahaya, K.A. (2022). Governance transparency of tax revenue performance in West Africa. *Business Ethics and Leadership*, 6(1), 14-24.
- Sandholtz, W. & Taagepera, R. (2005). Corruption, culture, and communism. *International Review of Sociology: Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, 15(1), 109-131.
- Shleifer, A. & Robert W. V. (1993). Corruption. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108(3), 599-617.
- Sokolovska, O. & Sokolovsky, D. (2015). Munich Personal RePEc Archive of VAT efficiency in countries around the world. Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 66422.
- Stein, L. V. (1994). On Taxation. R.A. MUSGRAVE, ve A.T. PEACOCK (Eds.) içinde, Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, (5. Edition). New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Sun, Y. (2021). Corporate tax avoidance and government corruption: Evidence from Chinese firms. *Economic Modelling*, 98, 13-25.
- Svensson, J. (2005). Eight Questions about Corruption. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 19(3), 19-42.
- Şen, H. & Kaya, A. (2023). Do revenue-neutral tax swaps boost growth?. *Journal of Economic Policy Reform*, 26(4), 401-420.
- Şen, H. & Kaya, A. (2020). Are the twin or triple deficits hypotheses applicable to Post-Communist Countries?. *Panoeconomicus*, 67(4), 465-489.
- Şentürk, S. H. (2014). Vergiye gönüllü uyum sağlanmasında fayda ilkesinin rolü. *Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İİBF Dergisi*, 9(3), 129-143.
- Tanzi, V. & Davoodi, H. (1997). Corruption, public investment and growth, IMF Working paper, wp/97/139: 1-23.
- Tanzi, V. & Davoodi, H. (2000). "Corruption, Growth and Public Finances", IMF Working Paper, No. 182, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- Thornton, J. (2008). Corruption and the composition of tax revenue in Middle East and African Economies. *South African Journal of Economics*, 76(2), 316-320.
- World Bank (2005). Myths and realities of governance and corruption. Working Papers and Articles: Corruption.
- Zagainova, A. (2007). Challenges of anti-corruption policies in Post-Communist Countries. İçinde Bracking S. (Eds.), Corruption and Development The Anti-Corruption Campaigns, (pp.138-154). Palgrave Studies in Development.

AMAÇ KAPSAM

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, siyaset bilimi, kamu yönetimi, uluslararası ilişkiler, alanlarında uluslararası ve disiplinlerarası makaleler yayınlamaktadır. Dergi, aşağıda belirtilen konuları kapsamak ile birlikte sadece bu konular ile kısıtlı değildir:

- Siyaset biliminin tüm alt disiplinleri, siyaset teorisi, siyaset felsefesi, politik davranış, siyasi kurumlar ve siyasi tarih
- Kamu yönetiminin tüm alt disiplinleri,
- Uluslararası ilişkiler ile ilgili tüm konular: uluslararası hukuk, iktisat, etik, strateji, felsefe, kültür, çevre, güvenlik, terör, bölgesel çalışmalar, küreselleşme ve diğer konular,

Dergi, yukarıda adı geçen disiplinlerin çeşitli yönlerini inceleyen, İngilizce yazılmış araştırma esaslı makalelerin yanında teorik ve kavramsal makaleleri yayınlamaktadır. Ayrıca, dergi uluslararası alandaki akademisyenlerin konuk editörlüğünde çeşitli temalar ile ilgili özel sayılar yayınlamaktadır.

EDİTORYAL POLİTİKALAR VE HAKEM SÜRECİ

Yayın Politikası

Dergiye yayımlanmak üzere gönderilen makalelerin içeriği derginin amaç ve kapsamı ile uyumlu olmalıdır. Dergi, orijinal araştırma niteliğindeki yazıları yayınlamaya öncelik vermektedir. Genel İlkeler Daha önce yayımlanmamış ya da yayımlanmak üzere başka bir dergide halen değerlendirmede olmayan ve her bir yazar tarafından onaylanan makaleler değerlendirilmek üzere kabul edilir. Ön değerlendirmeyi geçen yazılar iThenticate intihal tarama programından geçirilir. İntihal incelemesinden sonra, uygun makaleler Editör tarafından orijinaliteleri, metodolojileri, makalede ele alınan konunun önemi ve derginin kapsamına uygunluğu açısından değerlendirilir. Bilimsel toplantılarda sunulan özet bildirimler, makalede belirtilmesi koşulu ile kaynak olarak kabul edilir. Editör, gönderilen makale biçimsel esaslara uygun ise, gelen yazıyı yurtiçinden ve /veya yurtdışından en az iki hakemin değerlendirmesine sunar, hakemler gerek gördüğü takdirde yazıda istenen değişiklikler yazarlar tarafından yapıldıktan sonra yayımlanmasına onay verir. Makale yayımlanmak üzere Dergiye gönderildikten sonra yazarlardan hiçbirinin ismi, tüm yazarların yazılı izni olmadan yazar listesinden silinemez ve yeni bir isim yazar olarak eklenemez ve yazar sırası değiştirilemez. Yayına kabul edilmeyen makale, resim ve fotoğraflar yazarlara geri gönderilmez. Yayımlanan yazı ve resimlerin tüm hakları Dergiye aittir.

Telif Hakkında

Yazarlar dergide yayımlanan çalışmalarının telif hakkına sahiptirler ve çalışmaları Creative Commons Atıf-GayriTicari 4.0 Uluslararası (CC BY-NC 4.0) olarak lisanslıdır. CC BY-NC 4.0 lisansı, eserin ticari kullanım dışında her boyut ve formatta paylaşılmasına, kopyalanmasına, çoğaltılmasına ve orijinal esere uygun şekilde atıfta bulunmak kaydıyla yeniden düzenleme, dönüştürme ve eserin üzerine inşa etme dâhil adapte edilmesine izin verir.

Açık Erişim İlkesi

Dergi açık erişimlidir ve derginin tüm içeriği okura ya da okurun dahil olduğu kuruma ücretsiz olarak sunulur. Okurlar, ticari amaç haricinde, yayıncı ya da yazardan izin almadan dergi makalelerinin tam metnini okuyabilir, indirebilir, kopyalayabilir, arayabilir ve link sağlayabilir. Bu

BOAI açık erişim tanımıyla uyumludur.

Derginin açık erişimli makaleleri Creative Commons Atıf-GayriTicari 4.0 Uluslararası (CC BY-NC 4.0) olarak lisanslıdır.

İşleme Ücreti

Derginin tüm giderleri İstanbul Üniversitesi tarafından karşılanmaktadır. Dergide makale yayını ve makale süreçlerinin yürütülmesi ücrete tabi değildir. Dergiye gönderilen ya da yayın için kabul edilen makaleler için işleme ücreti ya da gönderim ücreti alınmaz.

Hakem Süreci

Daha önce yayınlanmamış ya da yayınlanmak üzere başka bir dergide halen değerlendirmede olmayan ve her bir yazar tarafından onaylanan makaleler değerlendirilmek üzere kabul edilir. Gönderilen ve ön kontrolü geçen makaleler iThenticate yazılımı kullanılarak intihal için taranır. İntihal kontrolünden sonra, uygun olan makaleler baş editör tarafından orijinallik, metodoloji, işlenen konunun önemi ve dergi kapsamı ile uyumluluğu açısından değerlendirilir. Baş editör, makaleleri, yazarların etnik kökeninden, cinsiyetinden, cinsel yöneliminden, uyruğundan, dini inancından ve siyasi felsefesinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirir. Yayına gönderilen makalelerin adil bir şekilde çift taraflı kör hakem değerlendirmesinden geçmelerini sağlar.

Seçilen makaleler en az iki ulusal/uluslararası hakeme değerlendirmeye gönderilir; yayın kararı, hakemlerin talepleri doğrultusunda yazarların gerçekleştirdiği düzenlemelerin ve hakem sürecinin sonrasında baş editör tarafından verilir.

Hakemlerin değerlendirmeleri objektif olmalıdır. Hakem süreci sırasında hakemlerin aşağıdaki hususları dikkate alarak değerlendirmelerini yapmaları beklenir.

- Makale yeni ve önemli bir bilgi içeriyor mu?
- Öz, makalenin içeriğini net ve düzgün bir şekilde tanımlıyor mu?
- Yöntem bütünlüklü ve anlaşılır şekilde tanımlanmış mı?
- Yapılan yorum ve varılan sonuçlar bulgularla kanıtlanıyor mu?
- Alandaki diğer çalışmalara yeterli referans verilmiş mi?
- Dil kalitesi yeterli mi?

Hakemler, gönderilen makalelere ilişkin tüm bilginin, makale yayınlanana kadar gizli kalmasını sağlamalı ve yazar tarafında herhangi bir telif hakkı ihlali ve intihal fark ederlerse editöre raporlamalıdır. Hakem, makale konusu hakkında kendini vasıflı hissetmiyor ya da zamanında geri dönüş sağlaması mümkün görünmüyorsa, editöre bu durumu bildirmeli ve hakem sürecine kendisini dahil etmemesini istemelidir.

Değerlendirme sürecinde editör hakemlere gözden geçirme için gönderilen makalelerin, yazarların özel mülkü olduğunu ve bunun imtiyazlı bir iletişim olduğunu açıkça belirtir. Hakemler ve yayın kurulu üyeleri başka kişilerle makaleleri tartışamazlar. Hakemlerin kimliğinin gizli kalmasına özen gösterilmelidir.

YAYIN ETİĞİ VE İLKELER

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, yayın etiğinde en yüksek standartlara bağlıdır ve Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE), Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), Open Access Scholarly Publishers Association (OASPA) ve World Association of Medical Editors (WAME) tarafından yayınlanan etik yayıncılık ilkelerini benimser; Principles of Transparency

and Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing başlığı altında ifade edilen ilkeler için adres: <https://publicationethics.org/resources/guidelines-new/principles-transparency-andbest-practice-scholarly-publishing> Gönderilen tüm makaleler orijinal, yayınlanmamış ve başka bir dergide değerlendirme sürecinde olmamalıdır. Her bir makale editörlerden biri ve en az iki hakem tarafından çift kör değerlendirmeden geçirilir. İntihal, duplikasyon, sahte yazarlık/inkar edilen yazarlık, araştırma/veri fabrikasyonu, makale dilimleme, dilimleyerek yayın, telif hakları ihlali ve çıkar çatışmasının gizlenmesi, etik dışı davranışlar olarak kabul edilir. Kabul edilen etik standartlara uygun olmayan tüm makaleler yayından çıkarılır. Buna yayından sonra tespit edilen olası kuraldışı, uygunsuzluklar içeren makaleler de dahildir.

Araştırma Etiği

Dergi araştırma etiğinde en yüksek standartları gözetir ve aşağıda tanımlanan uluslararası araştırma etiği ilkelerini benimser. Makalelerin etik kurallara uygunluğu yazarların sorumluluğundadır. - Araştırmanın tasarlanması, tasarımın gözden geçirilmesi ve araştırmanın yürütülmesinde, bütünlük, kalite ve şeffaflık ilkeleri sağlanmalıdır.

- Araştırma ekibi ve katılımcılar, araştırmanın amacı, yöntemleri ve öngörülen olası kullanımları; araştırmaya katılımın gerektirdikleri ve varsa riskleri hakkında tam olarak bilgilendirilmelidir.
- Araştırma katılımcılarının sağladığı bilgilerin gizliliği ve yanıt verenlerin gizliliği sağlanmalıdır. Araştırma katılımcıların özerkliğini ve saygınlığını koruyacak şekilde tasarlanmalıdır.
- Araştırma katılımcıları gönüllü olarak araştırmada yer almalı, herhangi bir zorlama altında olmamalıdır. - Katılımcıların zarar görmesinden kaçınılmalıdır. Araştırma, katılımcıları riske sokmayacak şekilde planlanmalıdır.
- Araştırma bağımsızlığıyla ilgili açık ve net olunmalı; çıkar çatışması varsa belirtilmelidir.
- Deneysel çalışmalarda, araştırmaya katılmaya karar veren katılımcıların yazılı bilgilendirilmiş onayı alınmalıdır. Çocukların ve vesayet altındakilerin veya tasdiklenmiş akıl hastalığı bulunanların yasal vasisinin onayı alınmalıdır.
- Çalışma herhangi bir kurum ya da kuruluştaki gerçekleştirilecekse bu kurum ya da kuruluştan çalışma yapılacağına dair onay alınmalıdır.
- İnsan ögesi bulunan çalışmalarda, “yöntem” bölümünde katılımcılardan “bilgilendirilmiş onam” alındığının ve çalışmanın yapıldığı kurumdaki etik kurul onayı alındığı belirtilmesi gerekir.

Yazarların Sorumluluğu

Makalelerin bilimsel ve etik kurallara uygunluğu yazarların sorumluluğundadır. Yazar makalenin orijinal olduğu, daha önce başka bir yerde yayınlanmadığı ve başka bir yerde dilde yayınlanmak üzere değerlendirmede olmadığı konusunda teminat sağlamalıdır. Uygulamadaki telif kanunları ve anlaşmaları gözetilmelidir. Telifle bağlı materyaller (örneğin tablolar, şekiller veya büyük alıntılar) gerekli izin ve teşekkürle kullanılmalıdır. Başka yazarların, katkıda bulunanların çalışmaları ya da yararlanılan kaynaklar uygun biçimde kullanılmalı ve referanslarda belirtilmelidir. Gönderilen makalede tüm yazarların akademik ve bilimsel olarak doğrudan katkısı olmalıdır, bu bağlamda “yazar” yayınlanan bir araştırmanın kavramsallaştırılmasına ve dizaynına, verilerin elde edilmesine, analizine ya da yorumlanmasına belirgin katkı yapan, yazının yazılması ya da bunun içerik açısından eleştirel biçimde gözden geçirilmesinde görev yapan birisi olarak görülür. Yazar

olabilmenin diğer koşulları ise, makaledeki çalışmayı planlamak veya icra etmek ve / veya revize etmektir. Fon sağlanması, veri toplanması ya da araştırma grubunun genel süpervizyonu tek başına yazarlık hakkı kazandırmaz. Yazar olarak gösterilen tüm bireyler sayılan tüm ölçütleri karşılamalıdır ve yukarıdaki ölçütleri karşılayan her birey yazar olarak gösterilebilir. Yazarların isim sıralaması ortak verilen bir karar olmalıdır. Tüm yazarlar yazar sıralamasını Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu'nda imzalı olarak belirtmek zorundadırlar. Yazarlık için yeterli ölçütleri karşılamayan ancak çalışmaya katkısı olan tüm bireyler “teşekkür / bilgiler” kısmında sıralanmalıdır. Bunlara örnek olarak ise sadece teknik destek sağlayan, yazıma yardımcı olan ya da sadece genel bir destek sağlayan, finansal ve materyal desteği sunan kişiler verilebilir. Bütün yazarlar, araştırmanın sonuçlarını ya da bilimsel değerlendirmeyi etkileyebilme potansiyeli olan finansal ilişkiler, çıkar çatışması ve çıkar rekabetini beyan etmelidirler. Bir yazar kendi yayınlanmış yazısında belirgin bir hata ya da yanlışlık tespit ederse, bu yanlışlıklara ilişkin düzeltme ya da geri çekme için editör ile hemen temasa geçme ve işbirliği yapma sorumluluğunu taşır.

Editör ve Hakem Sorumlulukları

Baş editör, makaleleri, yazarların etnik kökeninden, cinsiyetinden, cinsel yöneliminden, uyuğundan, dini inancından ve siyasi felsefesinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirir. Yayına gönderilen makalelerin adil bir şekilde çift taraflı kör hakem değerlendirmesinden geçmelerini sağlar. Gönderilen makalelere ilişkin tüm bilginin, makale yayınlanana kadar gizli kalacağını garanti eder. Baş editör içerik ve yayının toplam kalitesinden sorumludur. Gereğinde hata sayfası yayınlamalı ya da düzeltme yapmalıdır. Baş editör; yazarlar, editörler ve hakemler arasında çıkar çatışmasına izin vermez. Hakem atama konusunda tam yetkiye sahiptir ve Dergide yayınlanacak makalelerle ilgili nihai kararı vermekle yükümlüdür.

Hakemlerin araştırmayla ilgili, yazarlarla ve/veya araştırmanın finansal destekçileriyle çıkar çatışmaları olmamalıdır. Değerlendirmelerinin sonucunda tarafsız bir yargıya varmalıdırlar. Gönderilmiş yazılara ilişkin tüm bilginin gizli tutulmasını sağlamalı ve yazar tarafında herhangi bir telif hakkı ihlali ve intihal fark ederlerse editöre raporlamalıdırlar. Hakem, makale konusu hakkında kendini vasıflı hissetmiyor ya da zamanında geri dönüş sağlaması mümkün görünmüyorsa, editöre bu durumu bildirmeli ve hakem sürecine kendisini dahil etmemesini istemelidir. Değerlendirme sürecinde editör hakemlere gözden geçirme için gönderilen makalelerin, yazarların özel mülkü olduğunu ve bunun imtiyazlı bir iletişim olduğunu açıkça belirtir. Hakemler ve yayın kurulu üyeleri başka kişilerle makaleleri tartışamazlar. Hakemlerin kimliğinin gizli kalmasına özen gösterilmelidir. Bazı durumlarda editörün kararıyla, ilgili hakemlerin makaleye ait yorumları aynı makaleyi yorumlayan diğer hakemlere gönderilerek hakemlerin bu süreçte aydınlatılması sağlanabilir.

YAZILARIN HAZIRLANMASI

Dil

Dergide İngilizce dilinde makaleler yayınlanır.

Yazıların Hazırlanması ve Gönderimi

Aksi belirtilmedikçe gönderilen yazılarla ilgili tüm yazışmalar ilk yazarla yapılacaktır. Makale gönderimi online olarak <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/siyasal> üzerinden yapılmalıdır. Gönderilen

yazılar, yazının yayınlanmak üzere gönderildiğini ifade eden, makale türünü belirten ve makaleyle ilgili bilgileri içeren (bkz: Son Kontrol Listesi) bir mektup; yazının elektronik formunu içeren Microsoft Word 2003 ve üzerindeki versiyonları ile yazılmış elektronik dosya ve tüm yazarların imzaladığı Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu eklenerek gönderilmelidir.

1. Çalışmalar, A4 sayfada üst, alt, sağ ve sol taraftan 2,5 cm. boşluk bırakılarak, 12 punto Times New Roman harf karakterleriyle ve 1,5 satır aralık ölçüsü ile hazırlanmalıdır.
2. Çalışmalar 4500 - 8500 sözcük arasında olmalı ve sayfa numaraları sayfanın altında ve ortada yer almalıdır.
3. Yazar/yazarların adları çalışmanın başlığının hemen altında sağa bitişik şekilde verilmelidir. Ayrıca yıldız dipnot şeklinde (*) yazarın unvanı, kurumu ve e-posta adresi ve telefonu sayfanın en altında dipnotta belirtilmelidir.
4. Giriş bölümünden önce 180-200 kelimelik çalışmanın kapsamını, amacını, ulaşılan sonuçları ve kullanılan yöntemi kaydeden İngilizce ve Türkçe öz yer almalıdır. Çalışmanın İngilizce ve Türkçe başlığı İngilizce özet üzerinde yer almalıdır. İngilizce ve Türkçe özet altında çalışmanın içeriğini temsil eden 3-5 adet İngilizce ve Türkçe anahtar kelime yer almalıdır.
5. Çalışmaların başlıca şu unsurları içermesi gerekmektedir: İngilizce ve Türkçe başlık, öz ve anahtar kelimeler; ana metin bölümleri, son notlar ve kaynaklar.
6. Metin içi alıntılama ve kaynak gösterme için APA (American Psychological Association) kaynak sitilinin 6. versiyonu kullanılmalıdır. APA 6 stili hakkında bilgi için; <http://jps.istanbul.edu.tr/tr/content/yazarlara-bilgi/kaynaklar> sayfasını ziyaret edebilir veya Yazarlara Bilgi'nin Kaynaklar başlığı altında ilgili açıklama ve örnekleri inceleyebilirsiniz.
7. Çalışmalarda tablo, grafik ve şekil gibi göstergeler ancak çalışmanın takip edilebilmesi açısından gereklilik arz ettiği durumlarda, numaralandırılarak, tanımlayıcı bir başlık ile birlikte verilmelidir. Tablolara ait başlık üstte, Şekiller'e ait başlık altta yer almalıdır. Demografik özellikler gibi metin içinde verilebilecek veriler, ayrıca tablolar ile ifade edilmemelidir.
8. Yayınlanmak üzere gönderilen makale ile birlikte yazar bilgilerini içeren kapak sayfası gönderilmelidir. Kapak sayfasında, makalenin başlığı, yazar veya yazarların bağlı oldukları kurum ve unvanları, kendilerine ulaşılabilecek adresler, cep, iş ve faks numaraları ve e-posta adresleri yer almalıdır (bkz. Son Kontrol Listesi).
9. Kurallar dâhilinde dergimize yayınlanmak üzere gönderilen çalışmaların her türlü sorumluluğu yazar/yazarlarına aittir.
10. Yayın kurulu ve hakem raporları doğrultusunda yazarlardan, metin üzerinde bazı düzeltmeler yapmaları istenebilir.

KAYNAKLAR

Derleme yazıları okuyucular için bir konudaki kaynaklara ulaşmayı kolaylaştıran bir araç olsa da, her zaman orijinal çalışmayı doğru olarak yansıtmaz. Bu yüzden mümkün olduğunca yazarlar orijinal çalışmalarını kaynak göstermelidir. Öte yandan, bir konuda çok fazla sayıda orijinal çalışmanın kaynak gösterilmesi yer israfına neden olabilir. Birkaç anahtar orijinal çalışmanın kaynak gösterilmesi genelde uzun listelerle aynı işi görür. Ayrıca günümüzde kaynaklar elektronik versiyonlara eklenebilmekte ve okuyucular elektronik literatür taramalarıyla yayınlara kolaylıkla ulaşabilmektedir.

Kabul edilmiş ancak henüz sayıya dahil edilmemiş makaleler Early View olarak yayınlanır ve

bu makalelere atıflar “advance online publication” şeklinde verilmelidir. Genel bir kaynaktan elde edilemeyecek temel bir konu olmadıkça “kişisel iletişimlere” atıfta bulunulmamalıdır. Eğer atıfta bulunulursa parantez içinde iletişim kurulan kişinin adı ve iletişimin tarihi belirtilmelidir. Bilimsel makaleler için yazarlar bu kaynaktan yazılı izin ve iletişimin doğruluğunu gösterir belge almalıdır. Kaynakların doğruluğundan yazar(lar) sorumludur. Tüm kaynaklar metinde belirtilmelidir. Kaynaklar alfabetik olarak sıralanmalıdır.

Referans Stili ve Formatı

SIYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences, metin içi alıntılama ve kaynak gösterme için APA (American Psychological Association) kaynak sitilinin 6. edisyonunu benimser. APA 6. Edisyon hakkında bilgi için:

- American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American Psychological Association (6th ed.). Washington, DC: APA.
- <http://www.apastyle.org/>

Kaynakların doğruluğundan yazar(lar) sorumludur. Tüm kaynaklar metinde belirtilmelidir. Kaynaklar aşağıdaki örneklerdeki gibi gösterilmelidir.

Metin İçinde Kaynak Gösterme

Kaynaklar metinde parantez içinde yazarların soyadı ve yayın tarihi yazılarak belirtilmelidir. Birden fazla kaynak gösterilecekse kaynaklar arasında (;) işareti kullanılmalıdır. Kaynaklar alfabetik olarak sıralanmalıdır.

Örnekler:

Birden fazla kaynak;

(Esin ve ark., 2002; Karasar 1995)

Tek yazarlı kaynak;

(Akyolcu, 2007)

İki yazarlı kaynak;

(Sayiner ve Demirci, 2007, s. 72)

Üç, dört ve beş yazarlı kaynak;

Metin içinde ilk kullanımda: (Ailen, Ciambune ve Welch 2000, s. 12–13) Metin içinde tekrarlayan kullanımlarda: (Ailen ve ark., 2000)

Altı ve daha çok yazarlı kaynak;

(Çavdar ve ark., 2003)

Kaynaklar Bölümünde Kaynak Gösterme

Kullanılan tüm kaynaklar metnin sonunda ayrı bir bölüm halinde yazar soyadlarına göre alfabetik olarak numaralandırılmadan verilmelidir.

Kaynak yazımı ile ilgili örnekler aşağıda verilmiştir.

Kitap

a) Türkçe Kitap

Karasar, N. (1995). *Araştırmalarda rapor hazırlama* (8.bs). Ankara: 3A Eğitim Danışmanlık Ltd.

b) Türkçeye Çevrilmiş Kitap

Mucchielli, A. (1991). *Zihniyetler* (A. Kotil, Çev.). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

c) Editörlü Kitap

Ören, T., Üney, T. ve Çölkesen, R. (Ed.). (2006). *Türkiye bilişim ansiklopedisi*. İstanbul: Papatya Yayıncılık.

d) Çok Yazarlı Türkçe Kitap

Tonta, Y., Bitirim, Y. ve Sever, H. (2002). *Türkçe arama motorlarında performans değerlendirme*. Ankara: Total Bilişim.

e) İngilizce Kitap

Kamien R., & Kamien A. (2014). *Music: An appreciation*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education.

f) İngilizce Kitap İçerisinde Bölüm

Bassett, C. (2006). Cultural studies and new media. In G. Hall & C. Birchall (Eds.), *New cultural studies: Adventures in theory* (pp. 220–237). Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.

g) Türkçe Kitap İçerisinde Bölüm

Erkmen, T. (2012). Örgüt kültürü: Fonksiyonları, öğeleri, işletme yönetimi ve liderlikteki önemi. M. Zencirkıran (Ed.), *Örgüt sosyolojisi kitabı* içinde (s. 233–263). Bursa: Dora Basım Yayın.

h) Yayıncının ve Yazarın Kurum Olduğu Yayın

Türk Standartları Enstitüsü. (1974). *Adlandırma ilkeleri*. Ankara: Yazar.

Makale

a) Türkçe Makale

Mutlu, B. ve Savaşer, S. (2007). Çocuğu ameliyat sonrası yoğun bakımda olan ebeveynlerde stres nedenleri ve azaltma girişimleri. *İstanbul Üniversitesi Florence Nightingale Hemşirelik Dergisi*, 15(60), 179–182.

b) İngilizce Makale

de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (1999). The discursive construction of national identity. *Discourse and Society*, 10(2), 149–173. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926599010002002>

c) Yediden Fazla Yazarlı Makale

Lal, H., Cunningham, A. L., Godeaux, O., Chlibek, R., Diez-Domingo, J., Hwang, S.-J. ... Heineman, T. C. (2015). Efficacy of an adjuvanted herpes zoster subunit vaccine in older adults. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 372, 2087–2096. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1501184>

d) DOI'si Olmayan Online Edinilmiş Makale

Al, U. ve Doğan, G. (2012). Hacettepe Üniversitesi Bilgi ve Belge Yönetimi Bölümü tezlerinin atf analizi. *Türk Kütüphaneciliği*, 26, 349–369. Erişim adresi: <http://www.tk.org.tr/>

e) DOI'si Olan Makale

Turner, S. J. (2010). Website statistics 2.0: Using Google Analytics to measure library website effectiveness. *Technical Services Quarterly*, 27, 261–278. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07317131003765910>

f) Advance Online Olarak Yayımlanmış Makale

Smith, J. A. (2010). Citing advance online publication: A review. *Journal of Psychology*. Advance online publication. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a45d7867>

g) Popüler Dergi Makalesi

Semerçioğlu, C. (2015, Haziran). Sıradanlığın rayihası. *Sabit Fikir*, 52, 38–39.

Tez, Sunum, Bildiri

a) Türkçe Tezler

Sarı, E. (2008). *Kültür kimlik ve politika: Mardin’de kültürlerarasılık*. (Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi). Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara.

b) Ticari Veritabanında Yer Alan Yüksek Lisans Ya da Doktora Tezi

Van Brunt, D. (1997). *Networked consumer health information systems* (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. (UMI No. 9943436)

c) Kurumsal Veritabanında Yer Alan İngilizce Yüksek Lisans/Doktora Tezi

Yaylalı-Yıldız, B. (2014). *University campuses as places of potential publicness: Exploring the politicals, social and cultural practices in Ege University* (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from: Retrieved from <http://library.iyte.edu.tr/tr/hizli-erisim/iyte-tez-portali>

d) Web’de Yer Alan İngilizce Yüksek Lisans/Doktora Tezi

Tonta, Y. A. (1992). *An analysis of search failures in online library catalogs* (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley). Retrieved from <http://yunus.hacettepe.edu.tr/~tonta/yayinlar/phd/ickapak.html>

e) Dissertations Abstracts International’da Yer Alan Yüksek Lisans/Doktora Tezi

Appelbaum, L. G. (2005). Three studies of human information processing: Texture amplification, motion representation, and figure-ground segregation. *Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B. Sciences and Engineering*, 65(10), 5428.

f) Sempozyum Katkısı

Krinsky-McHale, S. J., Zigman, W. B., & Silverman, W. (2012, August). Are neuropsychiatric symptoms markers of prodromal Alzheimer’s disease in adults with Down syndrome? In W. B. Zigman (Chair), *Predictors of mild cognitive impairment, dementia, and mortality in adults with Down syndrome*. Symposium conducted at American Psychological Association meeting, Orlando, FL.

g) Online Olarak Erişilen Konferans Bildiri Özeti

Çınar, M., Doğan, D. ve Seferoğlu, S. S. (2015, Şubat). *Eğitimde dijital araçlar: Google sınıf uygulaması üzerine bir değerlendirme* [Öz]. Akademik Bilişim Konferansında sunulan bildiri, Anadolu Üniversitesi, Eskişehir. Erişim adresi: <http://ab2015.anadolu.edu.tr/index.php?menu=5&submenu=27>

h) Düzenli Olarak Online Yayınlanan Bildiriler

Herculano-Houzel, S., Collins, C. E., Wong, P., Kaas, J. H., & Lent, R. (2008). The basic nonuniformity of the cerebral cortex. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 105, 12593-12598. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0805417105>

i) Kitap Şeklinde Yayınlanan Bildiriler

Schneider, R. (2013). Research data literacy. S. Kurbanoglu ve ark. (Ed.), *Communications in Computer and Information Science: Vol. 397. Worldwide Communalities and Challenges in Information Literacy Research and Practice* içinde (s. 134-140). Cham, İsviçre: Springer. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03919-0>

j) Kongre Bildirisi

Çepni, S., Bacanak A. ve Özsevgeç T. (2001, Haziran). *Fen bilgisi öğretmen adaylarının fen branşlarına karşı tutumları ile fen branşlarındaki başarılarının ilişkisi*. X. Ulusal Eğitim Bilimleri Kongresi’nde sunulan bildiri, Abant İzzet Baysal Üniversitesi, Bolu.

Diğer Kaynaklar

a) Gazete Yazısı

Toker, Ç. (2015, 26 Haziran). 'Unutma' notları. *Cumhuriyet*, s. 13.

b) Online Gazete Yazısı

Tamer, M. (2015, 26 Haziran). E-ticaret hamle yapmak için tüketiciyi bekliyor. *Milliyet*. Erişim adresi: <http://www.milliyet.com.tr>

c) Web Page/Blog Post

Bordwell, D. (2013, June 18). David Koepp: Making the world movie-sized [Web log post]. Retrieved from <http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/page/27/>

d) Online Ansiklopedi/Sözlük

Bilgi mimarisi. (2014, 20 Aralık). Vikipedi içinde. Erişim adresi: http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bilgi_mimarisi

Marcoux, A. (2008). Business ethics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*. Retrieved from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-business/>

e) Podcast

Radyo ODTÜ (Yapımcı). (2015, 13 Nisan). *Modern sabahlar* [Podcast]. Erişim adresi: <http://www.radyoodtu.com.tr/>

f) Bir Televizyon Dizisinden Tek Bir Bölüm

Shore, D. (Senarist), Jackson, M. (Senarist) ve Bookstaver, S. (Yönetmen). (2012). Runaways [Televizyon dizisi bölümü]. D. Shore (Baş yapımcı), *House M.D.* içinde. New York, NY: Fox Broadcasting.

g) Müzik Kaydı

Say, F. (2009). Galata Kulesi. *İstanbul senfonisi* [CD] içinde. İstanbul: Ak Müzik.

SON KONTROL LİSTESİ

Aşağıdaki listede eksik olmadığından emin olun:

- Editöre mektup
 - ✓ Makalenin türü
 - ✓ Başka bir dergiye gönderilmemiş olduğu bilgisi
 - ✓ Sponsor veya ticari bir firma ile ilişkisi (varsa belirtiniz)
 - ✓ İstatistik kontrolünün yapıldığı (araştırma makaleleri için)
 - ✓ İngilizce yönünden kontrolünün yapıldığı
 - ✓ Yazarlara Bilgide detaylı olarak anlatılan dergi politikalarının gözden geçirildiği
 - ✓ Kaynakların APA6'ya göre belirtildiği
- Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu
- Daha önce basılmış ve telifle bağlı materyal (yazı-resim-tablo) kullanılmış ise izin belgesi
- Kapak sayfası
 - ✓ Makalenin türü
 - ✓ Makalenin Türkçe ve İngilizce başlığı
 - ✓ Yazarların ismi soyadı, unvanları ve bağlı oldukları kurumlar (üniversite ve fakülte bilgisinden sonra şehir ve ülke bilgisi de yer almalıdır), e-posta adresleri
 - ✓ Sorumlu yazarın e-posta adresi, açık yazışma adresi, iş telefonu, GSM, faks nosu
 - ✓ Tüm yazarların ORCID'leri

- Makale ana metni
 - ✓ Makalenin İngilizce ve Türkçe başlığı
 - ✓ Özetler: 180-200 kelime İngilizce ve Türkçe
 - ✓ Anahtar Kelimeler: 3-5 adet İngilizce ve Türkçe
 - ✓ Makale ana metin bölümleri
 - ✓ Finansal destek (varsa belirtiniz)
 - ✓ Çıkar çatışması (varsa belirtiniz)
 - ✓ Etik Kurul İzni (varsa belirtiniz)
 - ✓ Teşekkür (varsa belirtiniz)
 - ✓ Kaynaklar
 - ✓ Tablolar-Resimler, Şekiller (başlık, tanım ve alt yazılarıyla)

AIM AND SCOPE

The Journal accepts and publishes both international and interdisciplinary articles on the fields of political sciences, public administration, international relations. The journal covers, but are not limited to, following topics:

- all subfields of political science, including political theory, political philosophy, political behavior, political institutions and political history,
- all subfields of public administration,
- all topics pertaining to international relations: including law, economics, ethics, strategy, philosophy, culture, environment, security, terrorism, regional studies, globalization and other topics

The Journal publishes theoretical, conceptual as well as research-based articles concerning various aspects of aforementioned disciplines in English language. Turkish manuscripts are published along with an extended abstract in English. Moreover, it publishes special issues on various themes in collaboration with co-editors from the international academic community.

EDITORIAL POLICIES AND PEER REVIEW PROCESS

Publication Policy

The subjects covered in the manuscripts submitted to the Journal for publication must be in accordance with the aim and scope of the journal. The journal gives priority to original research papers submitted for publication.

General Principles

Only those manuscripts approved by its every individual author and that were not published before in or sent to another journal, are accepted for evaluation.

Submitted manuscripts that pass preliminary control are scanned for plagiarism using iThenticate software. After plagiarism check, the eligible ones are evaluated by editor-in-chief for their originality, methodology, the importance of the subject covered and compliance with the journal scope.

Short presentations that took place in scientific meetings can be referred if indicated in the article. The editor hands over the papers matching the formal rules to at least two national/international referees for evaluation and gives green light for publication upon modification by the authors in accordance with the referees' claims. Changing the name of an author (omission, addition or order) in papers submitted to the Journal requires written permission of all declared authors. Refused manuscripts and graphics are not returned to the author.

Copyright Notice

Authors publishing with the journal retain the copyright to their work licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International license (CC BY-NC 4.0) (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>) and grant the Publisher non-exclusive commercial right to publish the work. CC BY-NC 4.0 license permits unrestricted, non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Open Access Statement

The journal is an open access journal and all content is freely available without charge to the user or his/her institution. Except for commercial purposes, users are allowed to read, download, copy, print, search, or link to the full texts of the articles in this journal without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author. This is in accordance with the BOAI definition of open access.

The open access articles in the journal are licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) license.

Article Processing Charge

All expenses of the journal are covered by the Istanbul University. Processing and publication are free of charge with the journal. There is no article processing charges or submission fees for any submitted or accepted articles.

Peer Review Process

Only those manuscripts approved by its every individual author and that were not published before in or sent to another journal, are accepted for evaluation.

Submitted manuscripts that pass preliminary control are scanned for plagiarism using iThenticate software. After plagiarism check, the eligible ones are evaluated by Editor-in-Chief for their originality, methodology, the importance of the subject covered and compliance with the journal scope. Editor-in-Chief evaluates manuscripts for their scientific content without regard to ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation, citizenship, religious belief or political philosophy of the authors and ensures a fair double-blind peer review of the selected manuscripts.

The selected manuscripts are sent to at least two national/international referees for evaluation and publication decision is given by Editor-in-Chief upon modification by the authors in accordance with the referees' claims.

Editor-in-Chief does not allow any conflicts of interest between the authors, editors and reviewers and is responsible for final decision for publication of the manuscripts in the Journal.

Reviewers' judgments must be objective. Reviewers' comments on the following aspects are expected while conducting the review.

- Does the manuscript contain new and significant information?
- Does the abstract clearly and accurately describe the content of the manuscript?
- Is the problem significant and concisely stated?
- Are the methods described comprehensively?
- Are the interpretations and conclusions justified by the results?
- Is adequate references made to other Works in the field?
- Is the language acceptable?

Reviewers must ensure that all the information related to submitted manuscripts is kept as confidential and must report to the editor if they are aware of copyright infringement and plagiarism on the author's side.

A reviewer who feels unqualified to review the topic of a manuscript or knows that its prompt review will be impossible should notify the editor and excuse himself from the review process.

The editor informs the reviewers that the manuscripts are confidential information and that this is a privileged interaction. The reviewers and editorial board cannot discuss the manuscripts with other persons. The anonymity of the referees is important.

PUBLICATION ETHICS AND PUBLICATION MALPRACTICE STATEMENT

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences is committed to upholding the highest standards of publication ethics and pays regard to Principles of Transparency and Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing published by the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE), the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), the Open Access Scholarly Publishers Association (OASPA), and the World Association of Medical Editors (WAME) on <https://publicationethics.org/resources/guidelines-new/principles-transparency-and-best-practice-scholarly-publishing>

All parties involved in the publishing process (Editors, Reviewers, Authors and Publishers) are expected to agree on the following ethical principles.

All submissions must be original, unpublished (including as full text in conference proceedings), and not under the review of any other publication synchronously. Each manuscript is reviewed by one of the editors and at least two referees under double-blind peer review process. Plagiarism, duplication, fraud authorship/denied authorship, research/data fabrication, salami slicing/salami publication, breaching of copyrights, prevailing conflict of interest are unethical behaviors.

All manuscripts not in accordance with the accepted ethical standards will be removed from the publication. This also contains any possible malpractice discovered after the publication. In accordance with the code of conduct we will report any cases of suspected plagiarism or duplicate publishing.

Research Ethics

The journal adheres to the highest standards in research ethics and follows the principles of international research ethics as defined below. The authors are responsible for the compliance of the manuscripts with the ethical rules.

- Principles of integrity, quality and transparency should be sustained in designing the research, reviewing the design and conducting the research.
- The research team and participants should be fully informed about the aim, methods, possible uses and requirements of the research and risks of participation in research.
- The confidentiality of the information provided by the research participants and the confidentiality of the respondents should be ensured. The research should be designed to protect the autonomy and dignity of the participants.
- Research participants should participate in the research voluntarily, not under any coercion.
- Any possible harm to participants must be avoided. The research should be planned in such a way that the participants are not at risk.
- The independence of research must be clear; and any conflict of interest or must be disclosed.
- In experimental studies with human subjects, written informed consent of the participants who decide to participate in the research must be obtained. In the case of children and those under wardship or with confirmed insanity, legal custodian's assent must be obtained.
- If the study is to be carried out in any institution or organization, approval must be obtained from this institution or organization.
- In studies with human subject, it must be noted in the method's section of the manuscript that the informed consent of the participants and ethics committee approval from the institution where the study has been conducted have been obtained.

Author Responsibilities

It is authors' responsibility to ensure that the article is in accordance with scientific and ethical standards and rules. And authors must ensure that submitted work is original. They must certify that the manuscript has not previously been published elsewhere or is not currently being considered for publication elsewhere, in any language. Applicable copyright laws and conventions must be followed. Copyright material (e.g. tables, figures or extensive quotations) must be reproduced only with appropriate permission and acknowledgement. Any work or words of other authors, contributors, or sources must be appropriately credited and referenced.

All the authors of a submitted manuscript must have direct scientific and academic contribution to the manuscript. The author(s) of the original research articles is defined as a person who is significantly involved in "conceptualization and design of the study", "collecting the data", "analyzing the data", "writing the manuscript", "reviewing the manuscript with a critical perspective" and "planning/conducting the study of the manuscript and/or revising it". Fund raising, data collection or supervision of the research group are not sufficient roles to be accepted as an author. The author(s) must meet all these criteria described above. The order of names in the author list of an article must be a co-decision and it must be indicated in the [Copyright Agreement Form](#). The individuals who do not meet the authorship criteria but contributed to the study must take place in the acknowledgement section. Individuals providing technical support, assisting writing, providing a general support, providing material or financial support are examples to be indicated in acknowledgement section.

All authors must disclose all issues concerning financial relationship, conflict of interest, and competing interest that may potentially influence the results of the research or scientific judgment. When an author discovers a significant error or inaccuracy in his/her own published paper, it is the author's obligation to promptly cooperate with the Editor to provide retractions or corrections of mistakes.

Responsibility for the Editor and Reviewers

Editor-in-Chief evaluates manuscripts for their scientific content without regard to ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation, citizenship, religious belief or political philosophy of the authors. He/She provides a fair double-blind peer review of the submitted articles for publication and ensures that all the information related to submitted manuscripts is kept as confidential before publishing.

Editor-in-Chief is responsible for the contents and overall quality of the publication. He/She must publish errata pages or make corrections when needed.

Editor-in-Chief does not allow any conflicts of interest between the authors, editors and reviewers. Only he has the full authority to assign a reviewer and is responsible for final decision for publication of the manuscripts in the Journal.

Reviewers must have no conflict of interest with respect to the research, the authors and/or the research funders. Their judgments must be objective.

Reviewers must ensure that all the information related to submitted manuscripts is kept as confidential and must report to the editor if they are aware of copyright infringement and plagiarism on the author's side.

A reviewer who feels unqualified to review the topic of a manuscript or knows that its prompt review will be impossible should notify the editor and excuse himself from the review process.

The editor informs the reviewers that the manuscripts are confidential information and that this is a privileged interaction. The reviewers and editorial board cannot discuss the manuscripts with

other persons. The anonymity of the referees must be ensured. In particular situations, the editor may share the review of one reviewer with other reviewers to clarify a particular point.

MANUSCRIPT ORGANIZATION

Language

The language of the journal is English.

Manuscript Organization and Format

All correspondence will be sent to the first-named author unless otherwise specified. Manuscript is to be submitted online via <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/siyasal> and it must be accompanied by a cover letter indicating that the manuscript is intended for publication, specifying the article category (i.e. research article, review etc.) and including information about the manuscript (see the Submission Checklist). Manuscripts should be prepared in Microsoft Word 2003 and upper versions. In addition, Copyright Agreement Form that has to be signed by all authors must be submitted.

1. The manuscripts should be in A4 paper standards: having 2.5 cm margins from right, left, bottom and top, Times New Roman font style in 12 font size and line spacing of 1.5.
2. The manuscripts should contain between 4500 and 8500 words and the page numbers must be at the bottom and in the middle.
3. The name(s) of author(s) should be given just beneath the title of the study aligned to the right. Also the affiliation, title, e-mail and phone of the author(s) must be indicated on the bottom of the page as a footnote marked with an asterisk (*).
4. Submitted manuscripts must have an abstract between 180 and 200 words (English and Turkish), before the introduction, summarizing the scope, the purpose, the results of the study and the methodology used. The titles (English and Turkish) of the study should appear above the abstracts. Underneath the abstracts, 3 to 5 keywords (English and Turkish) that inform the reader about the content of the study should be specified.
5. The manuscripts should contain mainly these components: title, abstract and keywords (in Turkish and English); body text with sections, footnotes and references.
6. The manuscripts should contain mainly these components: title, abstract and keywords (in Turkish and English); body text with sections, footnotes and references. The APA (American Psychological Association) reference style should be used for in-text citation and references list. For information and samples on the APA 6 style please refer to <http://jps.istanbul.edu.tr/tr/content/yazarlara-bilgi/kaynaklar> section in the Information for Authors.
7. Tables, graphs and figures can be given with a number and a defining title if and only if it is necessary to follow the idea of the article. The title of table should be placed above the table; caption of figure should be placed beneath the figure. Features like demographic characteristics that can be given within the text should not be indicated as tables separately.
8. A title page including author information must be submitted together with the manuscript. The title page is to include fully descriptive title of the manuscript and, affiliation, title, e-mail address, postal address, phone and fax number of the author(s) (see The Submission Checklist).

9. Authors are responsible for all statements made in their work submitted to the Journal for publication.
10. The author(s) can be asked to make some changes in their articles due to peer reviews.

REFERENCES

Although references to review articles can be an efficient way to guide readers to a body of literature, review articles do not always reflect original work accurately. Readers should therefore be provided with direct references to original research sources whenever possible. On the other hand, extensive lists of references to original work on a topic can use excessive space on the printed page. Small numbers of references to key original papers often serve as well as more exhaustive lists, particularly since references can now be added to the electronic version of published papers, and since electronic literature searching allows readers to retrieve published literature efficiently. Papers accepted but not yet included in the issue are published online in the Early View section and they should be cited as “advance online publication”. Citing a “personal communication” should be avoided unless it provides essential information not available from a public source, in which case the name of the person and date of communication should be cited in parentheses in the text. For scientific articles, written permission and confirmation of accuracy from the source of a personal communication must be obtained.

Reference Style and Format

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences complies with APA (American Psychological Association) style 6th Edition for referencing and quoting. For more information:

- American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American Psychological Association (6th ed.). Washington, DC: APA.
- <http://www.apastyle.org>

Citations in the Text

Citations must be indicated with the author surname and publication year within the parenthesis. If more than one citation is made within the same parenthesis, separate them with (;).

Samples:

More than one citation;

(Esin, et al., 2002; Karasar, 1995)

Citation with one author;

(Akyolcu, 2007)

Citation with two authors;

(Saymer & Demirci, 2007)

Citation with three, four, five authors;

First citation in the text: (Ailen, Ciambrune, & Welch, 2000) Subsequent citations in the text: (Ailen, et al., 2000)

Citations with more than six authors;

(Çavdar, et al., 2003)

Citations in the Reference

All the citations done in the text should be listed in the References section in alphabetical order

of author surname without numbering. Below given examples should be considered in citing the references.

Basic Reference Types

Book

a) Turkish Book

Karasar, N. (1995). *Araştırmalarda rapor hazırlama* (8th ed.) [Preparing research reports]. Ankara, Turkey: 3A Eğitim Danışmanlık Ltd.

b) Book Translated into Turkish

Mucchielli, A. (1991). *Zihniyetler* [Mindsets] (A. Kotil, Trans.). İstanbul, Turkey: İletişim Yayınları.

c) Edited Book

Ören, T., Üney, T., & Çölkesen, R. (Eds.). (2006). *Türkiye bilişim ansiklopedisi* [Turkish Encyclopedia of Informatics]. İstanbul, Turkey: Papatya Yayıncılık.

d) Turkish Book with Multiple Authors

Tonta, Y., Bitirim, Y., & Sever, H. (2002). *Türkçe arama motorlarında performans değerlendirme* [Performance evaluation in Turkish search engines]. Ankara, Turkey: Total Bilişim.

e) Book in English

Kamien R., & Kamien A. (2014). *Music: An appreciation*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education.

f) Chapter in an Edited Book

Bassett, C. (2006). Cultural studies and new media. In G. Hall & C. Birchall (Eds.), *New cultural studies: Adventures in theory* (pp. 220–237). Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.

g) Chapter in an Edited Book in Turkish

Erkmen, T. (2012). Örgüt kültürü: Fonksiyonları, öğeleri, işletme yönetimi ve liderlikteki önemi [Organization culture: Its functions, elements and importance in leadership and business management]. In M. Zencirkıran (Ed.), *Örgüt sosyolojisi* [Organization sociology] (pp. 233–263). Bursa, Turkey: Dora Basım Yayın.

h) Book with the same organization as author and publisher

American Psychological Association. (2009). *Publication manual of the American psychological association* (6th ed.). Washington, DC: Author.

Article

a) Turkish Article

Mutlu, B., & Savaşer, S. (2007). Çocuğu ameliyat sonrası yoğun bakımda olan ebeveynlerde stres nedenleri ve azaltma girişimleri [Source and intervention reduction of stress for parents whose children are in intensive care unit after surgery]. *Istanbul University Florence Nightingale Journal of Nursing*, 15(60), 179–182.

b) English Article

de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (1999). The discursive construction of national identity. *Discourse and Society*, 10(2), 149–173. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926599010002002>

c) Journal Article with DOI and More Than Seven Authors

Lal, H., Cunningham, A. L., Godeaux, O., Chlibek, R., Diez-Domingo, J., Hwang, S.-J. ... Heineman, T. C. (2015). Efficacy of an adjuvanted herpes zoster subunit vaccine in older adults. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 372, 2087–2096. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1501184>

d) Journal Article from Web, without DOI

Sidani, S. (2003). Enhancing the evaluation of nursing care effectiveness. *Canadian Journal of Nursing Research*, 35(3), 26–38. Retrieved from <http://cjr.mcgill.ca>

e) Journal Article with DOI

Turner, S. J. (2010). Website statistics 2.0: Using Google Analytics to measure library website effectiveness. *Technical Services Quarterly*, 27, 261–278. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07317131003765910>

f) Advance Online Publication

Smith, J. A. (2010). Citing advance online publication: A review. *Journal of Psychology: Advance online publication*. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a45d7867>

g) Article in a Magazine

Henry, W. A., III. (1990, April 9). Making the grade in today's schools. *Time*, 135, 28–31.

Doctoral Dissertation, Master's Thesis, Presentation, Proceeding

a) Dissertation/Thesis from a Commercial Database

Van Brunt, D. (1997). *Networked consumer health information systems* (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 9943436)

b) Dissertation/Thesis from an Institutional Database

Yaylılı-Yıldız, B. (2014). *University campuses as places of potential publicness: Exploring the political, social and cultural practices in Ege University* (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from Retrieved from: <http://library.iyte.edu.tr/tr/hizli-erisim/iyte-tez-portali>

c) Dissertation/Thesis from Web

Tonta, Y. A. (1992). *An analysis of search failures in online library catalogs* (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley). Retrieved from <http://yunus.hacettepe.edu.tr/~tonta/yayinlar/phd/ickapak.html>

d) Dissertation/Thesis abstracted in Dissertations Abstracts International

Appelbaum, L. G. (2005). Three studies of human information processing: Texture amplification, motion representation, and figure-ground segregation. *Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B. Sciences and Engineering*, 65(10), 5428.

e) Symposium Contribution

Krinsky-McHale, S. J., Zigman, W. B., & Silverman, W. (2012, August). Are neuropsychiatric symptoms markers of prodromal Alzheimer's disease in adults with Down syndrome? In W. B. Zigman (Chair), *Predictors of mild cognitive impairment, dementia, and mortality in adults with Down syndrome*. Symposium conducted at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Orlando, FL.

f) Conference Paper Abstract Retrieved Online

Liu, S. (2005, May). *Defending against business crises with the help of intelligent agent based early warning solutions*. Paper presented at the Seventh International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems, Miami, FL. Abstract retrieved from http://www.iceis.org/iceis2005/abstracts_2005.htm

g) Conference Paper - In Regularly Published Proceedings and Retrieved Online

Herculano-Houzel, S., Collins, C. E., Wong, P., Kaas, J. H., & Lent, R. (2008). The basic nonuniformity of the cerebral cortex. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 105, 12593–12598. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0805417105>

h) Proceeding in Book Form

Parsons, O. A., Pryzwansky, W. B., Weinstein, D. J., & Wiens, A. N. (1995). Taxonomy for psychology. In J. N. Reich, H. Sands, & A. N. Wiens (Eds.), *Education and training beyond the doctoral degree: Proceedings of the American Psychological Association National Conference on Postdoctoral Education and Training in Psychology* (pp. 45–50). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

i) Paper Presentation

Nguyen, C. A. (2012, August). *Humor and deception in advertising: When laughter may not be the best medicine*. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Orlando, FL.

Other Sources

a) Newspaper Article

Browne, R. (2010, March 21). This brainless patient is no dummy. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 45.

b) Newspaper Article with no Author

New drug appears to sharply cut risk of death from heart failure. (1993, July 15). *The Washington Post*, p. A12.

c) Web Page/Blog Post

Bordwell, D. (2013, June 18). David Koepp: Making the world movie-sized [Web log post]. Retrieved from <http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/page/27/>

d) Online Encyclopedia/Dictionary

Ignition. (1989). In *Oxford English online dictionary* (2nd ed.). Retrieved from <http://dictionary.oed.com>

Marcoux, A. (2008). Business ethics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.). *The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*. Retrieved from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-business/>

e) Podcast

Dunning, B. (Producer). (2011, January 12). *in Fact: Conspiracy theories* [Video podcast]. Retrieved from <http://itunes.apple.com/>

f) Single Episode in a Television Series

Egan, D. (Writer), & Alexander, J. (Director). (2005). Failure to communicate. [Television series episode]. In D. Shore (Executive producer), *House*; New York, NY: Fox Broadcasting.

g) Music

Fuchs, G. (2004). Light the menorah. On *Eight nights of Hanukkah* [CD]. Brick, NJ: Kid Kosher.

SUBMISSION CHECKLIST

Ensure that the following items are present:

- Cover letter to the editor
 - ✓ The category of the manuscript
 - ✓ Confirming that “the paper is not under consideration for publication in another journal”.
 - ✓ Including disclosure of any commercial or financial involvement.
 - ✓ Confirming that the statistical design of the research article is reviewed.
 - ✓ Confirming that last control for fluent English was done.

INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

- ✓ Confirming that journal policies detailed in Information for Authors have been reviewed.
- ✓ Confirming that the references cited in the text and listed in the references section are in line with APA 6.
- Copyright Agreement Form
- Permission of previously published copyrighted material if used in the present manuscript
- Title page
 - ✓ The category of the manuscript
 - ✓ The title of the manuscript
 - ✓ All authors' names and affiliations (institution, faculty/department, city, country), e-mail addresses
 - ✓ Corresponding author's email address, full postal address, telephone and fax number
 - ✓ ORCIDs of all authors.
- Main Manuscript Document
 - ✓ The title of the manuscript in English and Turkish
 - ✓ Abstract: 180-200 words in English and Turkish
 - ✓ Keywords: 3 to 5 words in English and Turkish
 - ✓ Main article sections
 - ✓ Grant support (if exists)
 - ✓ Conflict of interest (if exists)
 - ✓ Ethics Committee Approval
 - ✓ Acknowledgement (if exists)
 - ✓ References
 - ✓ All tables, illustrations (figures) (including title, description, footnotes)



Istanbul University
İstanbul Üniversitesi

Journal name: SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences
Dergi Adı: SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences

Copyright Agreement Form
Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu

Responsible/Corresponding Author <i>Sorumlu Yazar</i>	
Title of Manuscript <i>Makalenin Başlığı</i>	
Acceptance date <i>Kabul Tarihi</i>	
List of authors <i>Yazarların Listesi</i>	

Sıra No	Name - Surname <i>Adı-Soyadı</i>	E-mail <i>E-Posta</i>	Signature <i>İmza</i>	Date <i>Tarih</i>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				

Manuscript Type (Research Article, Review, etc.) <i>Makalenin türü (Araştırma makalesi, Derleme, v.b.)</i>	
--	--

Responsible/Corresponding Author: <i>Sorumlu Yazar:</i>	
---	--

University/company/institution	<i>Çalıştığı kurum</i>	
Address	<i>Posta adresi</i>	
E-mail	<i>E-posta</i>	
Phone; mobile phone	<i>Telefon no; GSM no</i>	

The author(s) agrees that:
The manuscript submitted is his/her/their own original work, and has not been plagiarized from any prior work, all authors participated in the work in a substantive way, and are prepared to take public responsibility for the work, all authors have seen and approved the manuscript as submitted, the manuscript has not been published and is not being submitted or considered for publication elsewhere, the text, illustrations, and any other materials included in the manuscript do not infringe upon any existing copyright or other rights of anyone. İSTANBUL UNIVERSITY will publish the content under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) license that gives permission to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format other than commercial purposes as well as remix, transform and build upon the material by providing appropriate credit to the original work.
The Contributor(s) or, if applicable the Contributor's Employer, retain(s) all proprietary rights in addition to copyright, patent rights.
I/We indemnify İSTANBUL UNIVERSITY and the Editors of the Journals, and hold them harmless from any loss, expense or damage occasioned by a claim or suit by a third party for copyright infringement, or any suit arising out of any breach of the foregoing warranties as a result of publication of my/our article. I/We also warrant that the article contains no libelous or unlawful statements, and does not contain material or instructions that might cause harm or injury.
This Copyright Agreement Form must be signed/ratified by all authors. Separate copies of the form (completed in full) may be submitted by authors located at different institutions; however, all signatures must be original and authenticated.

Yazar(lar) aşağıdaki hususları kabul eder
Sunulan makalenin yazar(lar)ın orijinal çalışması olduğunu ve intihal yapmadıklarını, Tüm yazarların bu çalışmaya asıl olarak katılmış olduklarını ve bu çalışma için her türlü sorumluluğu aldıklarını, Tüm yazarların sunulan makalenin son halini gördüklerini ve onayladıklarını, Makalenin başka bir yerde basılmadığını veya basılmak için sunulmadığını, Makalede bulunan metnin, şekillerin ve dokümanların diğer şahıslara ait olan Telif Haklarını ihlal etmediğini kabul ve taahhüt ederler. İSTANBUL ÜNİVERSİTESİ'nin bu fikri eseri, Creative Commons Atıf-Gayri Ticari 4.0 Uluslararası (CC BY-NC 4.0) lisansı ile yayınlamasına izin verirler. Creative Commons Atıf-Gayri Ticari 4.0 Uluslararası (CC BY-NC 4.0) lisansı, eserin ticari kullanım dışında her boyut ve formatta paylaşılmasına, kopyalanmasına, çoğaltılmasına ve orijinal esere uygun şekilde atıfta bulunmak kaydıyla yeniden düzenleme, dönüştürme ve eserin üzerine inşa etme dâhil adapte edilmesine izin verir.
Yazar(lar)ın veya varsa yazar(lar)ın işverenin telif dâhil patent hakları, fikri mülkiyet hakları saklıdır.
Ben/Biz, telif hakkı ihlali nedeniyle üçüncü şahıslarca vuku bulacak hak talebi veya açılacak davalarda İSTANBUL ÜNİVERSİTESİ ve Dergi Editörlerinin hiçbir sorumluluğunun olmadığını, tüm sorumluluğun yazarlara ait olduğunu taahhüt ederim/ederiz.
Ayrıca Ben/Biz makalede hiçbir suç unsuru veya kanuna aykırı ifade bulunmadığını, araştırma yapılırken kanuna aykırı herhangi bir malzeme ve yöntem kullanılmadığını taahhüt ederim/ederiz.
Bu Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu tüm yazarlar tarafından imzalanmalıdır/onaylanmalıdır. Form farklı kurumlarda bulunan yazarlar tarafından ayrı kopyalar halinde doldurulacak sunulabilir. Ancak, tüm imzaların orijinal veya kamitlanabilir şekilde onaylı olması gerekir.

Responsible/Corresponding Author; <i>Sorumlu Yazar;</i>	Signature / İmza	Date / Tarih
	/...../.....

