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
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İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dekanlığı
Dergi Yazı Kurulu Başkanlığı
İstanbul Üniversitesi Merkez Kampüsü,
34452 Beyazıt/Fatih, İstanbul, Türkiye
+90 (212) 440 00 00 - 12236
sbfdergi@istanbul.edu.tr
<https://jps.istanbul.edu.tr/>

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alex_kukhianidze@yahoo.com

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andrea1.locatelli@unicatt.it

Rajiv NAYAN

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İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye
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Research Article

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Misrepresenting Muslims? Critical Perspectives on Migration Policy Change in Sweden 2015-2023



Joakim Johansson¹  & Ingemar Elander² 

¹ Mälardalen University, Department of Economics and Political Science, Västerås, Sweden

² Örebro University/Mälardalen University, School of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences/Department of Economics and Political Science, Örebro/Västerås, Sweden

Abstract

Drawing upon an analytical combination of critical security studies (CST) and intersectional theory (IT), we in this article focus on migration policy in Sweden 2015-2023 with a particular focus on representations of Islam and Muslims. Using thematic analysis, arguments, and statements raised by key political actors, i.e., the Swedish Government and the radical-right/retrotopian party Sweden Democrats, we study the threats as perceived to legitimize the Swedish Government's turn to a more restrictive stance. Exploring the official, justifying points of this policy turn, we also exemplify our approach by referencing policy repercussions related to the Russian attack on Ukraine. Outstanding findings in the material include continuous attempts to de-masculinize Muslim men who are constructed interchangeably as welfare recipients, violent and eager terrorists, exponents of criminal behavior in general, or failing in their role as protectors of women and children. All in all, these findings are representations of a particular 'Swedish' culture, the welfare state and individual responsibility implicating a mission to save a national 'We' from a foreign 'Them' built around negative stereotypes of Muslims. In addition to illustrating the analytical strength of securitization theory, we also demonstrate the complementary capacity of intersectional theory for an analysis of migration policy change.

Keywords

migration • Muslims • security • intersectionality • gender



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✉ Corresponding author: Joakim Johansson joakim.johansson@mdu.se



Misrepresenting Muslims? Critical Perspectives on Migration Policy Change in Sweden 2015-2023

After a period of rather generous migration policy, Sweden around 2015 turned toward becoming more and more restrictive as accentuated by the so-called Tidö Agreement 2023 between the four party liberal-conservative government and its allied populist, radical right party - the Sweden Democrats.¹ Following the Eastern uprisings ('Påskupploppen') in 2022, Sweden gained a reputation as a country where Quran burnings are legally allowed and conceived appropriate behavior by segments of the electorate and, so far, acceptable by the majority of political parties. Thus, the Quran burnings are recent expressions of a trend in a country not so long ago associated with multiculturalist policies and relative tolerance toward religious minorities but where intolerance against Muslims has become more common in Swedish society, triggered and legitimized by the Sweden Democrats, largely regarding 'Muslims' and radical 'Islamists' as synonymous.

However, the Diversity Barometer (Ahmadi et al., 2018) reported an increase in negative attitudes toward cultural diversity and attitudes toward Muslims in Sweden from 2005 to 2014. Later investigations, as well as the experiences of Muslims living in Sweden, have revealed a similar pattern. The 'no handshake' incident occurring in Sweden in 2016 is illuminating. Just after being nominated to the executive position of the Green Party, a Muslim man greeted a female journalist by putting one of his hands on his heart instead of shaking his hands. Exposing himself to criticism from feminists within his party (Ibrahim, 2016), the Minister for Upper Secondary Education and Knowledge (Holmqvist, 2016), proclaimed feminists outside party politics, as well as the Swedish Prime Minister, and after the heated debate in the media following this, the Muslim man withdrew from executive positions the day after. While the debate clearly indicated that there is no such thing as a particular Muslim view on handshaking, the reactions followed a well-established pattern where Muslim men and women are deprived of any possibility to claim religion to be relevant for them as politicians. They are tolerable only when they are not visible as Muslims. They might then be read as 'good' Muslims with the special task of disciplining 'bad' Muslims (Johansson & Darvishpour, 2020).

In the present article, Swedish migration policy change since 2015 is analyzed with a particular focus on representations of Muslims, which we consider a fresh take on the process whereby Swedish migration policy was substantially more restrictive (Fernandez, 2020). What arguments were raised in support of a more restrictive migration policy? How can these arguments be understood as gendered at the intersections between ethnicity and religion? We approach the topic from perspectives partly drawn from previous research on Muslims in Sweden (Elander et al., 2015), critical securitization theory (Elander et al., 2022), and intersectional theory (Johansson & Darvishpour, 2020). The purpose is threefold. First, an analytical combination of IT and CST is argued and constructed. Second, the potential of the approach is illustrated through a study of the changes in Swedish migration policy since 2015. Third, a concluding reflection is presented on the relevance of combining the two approaches in future studies.

Literature review

A rich scholarly literature exists on both Muslims and migration policy in Western politics in the 21st century. Cesari (2009) established a connection between attitudes toward Muslims in Europe and migration

¹Tidö is the name of a castle in eastern Sweden, where the new four-party coalition entered into a post-election agreement with the Sweden Democrats.



policy: 'Most Muslims [in Europe] are immigrants or have an immigrant background' (p. 2). She referred to figures indicating that Muslims constitute a substantial part of the population in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Belgium. Evidenced by Goździak and Mårton (2018) on anti-Muslim sentiments and rhetoric in Poland and Hungary—countries with virtually no Muslim population—Europe also has examples of 'Islamophobia without Muslims' (p. 130). The authors also indicated that the connection between attitudes toward Muslims and migration policy in Europe was strengthened by the European refugee crisis that appeared in late autumn 2015, with migrants coming from countries with predominantly Muslim populations. The policy responses in the various European countries (in general toward more restrictive measures) and the problem representations and discourses accompanying the measures taken have been studied intensely and extensively in national as well as cross-national contexts.

Exploring contemporary fears of Islam and Muslims in Europe and migration policy change, the critical security studies framework (Browning & McDonald, 2013) has proven extremely useful. Cesari (2009) illuminated the process whereby a 'Securitization of Islam in Europe' was taken place in the West after 9/11 as Muslims increasingly were associated with terrorism (and vice versa). Evranos (2023) studied the securitization of Islam in France. Moreover, referring to terrorist acts in the West from 9/11 and on, Huysmans (2006) critically approached European migration policy as a means of solving security problems. Bigo (2002) did less of the terrorism context but was successful in establishing a perspective on how immigration increasingly appears a security concern by technologies, administrative practices, the habitus of certain groups of professional workers, and neoliberal governmentality in a risk society trying to cope with unease. To this end, we can add many studies that apply a critical security studies lens to migration policy change in specific European country contexts.

Kaya and Tecmen (2019) conducted a discourse analytical study on manifestos and speeches of the ways in which five populist parties in Europe, Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany, National Front (FN) in France, Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands, Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy, and Golden Dawn (GD) in Greece, employ fear of Islam as a political instrument to mobilize their supporters and to mainstream themselves. The authors claim that these parties have recently generated a civilizational discourse to expand their electorate. Acknowledging the difficulties of pin-pointing M5S on any left-right scale, Kaya and Tecmen represent a research interest in right-wing populist/radical right political parties, a major force in migration policy change during last decades all over Europe. Considering the often very straightforward and open aversion against Islam and Muslims in the rhetoric or policy proposals of those political parties, critically studying these parties is valuable. In our view, however, studies in right-wing populist/radical right political parties often come at the expense of neglecting the articulation of prejudices and negative attitudes toward Muslims in mainstream politics. For some researchers (Johansson & Dashti, 2024; Bauer et al., 2023) this motivated them to study attitudes toward (Muslim) migrants by critically studying civic integration programs. This research also has great value. However, critically studying civic integration programs runs the opposite risk of leaving right-wing populist/radical right political parties aside investigations.

In our view, a particular strength of the critical security studies framework in relation to our research interest in representations of and attitudes toward Muslims and migration policy is its capacity to accommodate engagement with mainstream politics as well as with populist/radical right politics. However, while feminist approaches to security studies constitute a major strand within critical security studies, gender dimensions relating to attitudes toward Muslims and the hardening of migration policy in Europe (Goździak and Mårton, 2018) are somewhat under-researched. What is especially needed are more studies that draw on

insights from masculinity studies (Kimmel, 2017) that engage critically with the making of men as gendered beings, which includes acknowledging male privilege and power over women, differences among men (and women), and the costs of masculinity for men. Acknowledging differences within gender categories such as 'women' or 'men', intersectional theory (Crenshaw, 2013) has been particularly useful in taking those differences seriously, investigating them rather than making them invisible. Regarding the concern with ethnicity/race within intersectional theory, there is a body of research available that emphasizes the ethnification/rasification of anti-Muslim and anti-Islam rhetoric and sentiments, hence reproducing white supremacy over that perceived of as non-white. There is also a well-established scholarship on racialised masculinity (Norocel et al., 2020; Ferber, 2019; Kimmel, 2017).

Conceptual and Methodological Frameworks

We are primarily interested in how Muslims are being represented in Swedish national policy-making rather than their self-representation, although we give two brief examples of Muslim self-representation just to clarify the contrast between the two angles Muslims equated with 'Islamists' versus 'Muslims' in less radical versions. Even when not self-identifying as Muslims, some migrating from Muslim-dominated countries are nevertheless regularly positioned as 'islamists', i.e. stigmatized. For example, in Sweden 'Muslims' in general have been and are still often synonymously referred to as 'radical islamists', thus disregarding that in reality the label may include a wide range of possible Muslim self-identifications (NN1). Thus, some people identify with their religion, while others see themselves as cosmopolitans, connected to various cultures worldwide. All these identifications may also be complemented by identification with a particular nation, e.g., Sweden, Iran, Palestine, or Israel, and there are also generational differences. Indeed, religion can be a strong driver for collective action, as illustrated by individuals and groups of believers taking faith-based action on issues of welfare and social justice, or by terrorist groups inspired by fundamentalist interpretations of a particular religion (Herrington, 2021). Individual Muslims then choose different strategies to express their faith in terms of being 'retreatist', 'engaged' or 'essentialist/antagonistic' (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2011). In other words: 'Islamic imaginaries are highly diversified /.../ they should never be reduced to a mere anti-Western, anti-modern, ultimately anti-global resistance. They present us with various articulations of the global game of matching conflict and cohesion through civility' (Salvatore, 2016, p. 291).

According to data compiled by the Agency for Support for Faith Communities, there are probably around 450 000 inhabitants in Sweden being 'cultural Muslims' whereof one third being members of Muslim associations of various kinds (Larsson 2014, p. 114, 139). Just to illustrate the falseness of stereotyping most Muslims as outright Islamists, we give one male and one female illustration. An outstanding example of a non-Islamist, even non-confessional Muslim, in Sweden is Murrahem Demirok, son of a Turkish working-class immigrant, member of the Swedish Parliament and in February 2023 elected as chairman of the originally agrarian-nationalist Center Party². He says, 'I am not a believer. Religion has never succeeded in catching me. But I have my roots in a Muslim culture and call myself a cultural Muslim /.../ My life had been much simpler if I had never called myself a cultural Muslim, but I won't deny my origin, my family or who I am' (Murrahem Demirok as quoted in Orrenius, 2023). A Muslim woman working as a student curator contrasts this picture:

²The Center Party in the latest election to the Parliament 2022 received 7,1 per cent of the votes, as compared to 0.4 per cent by the outright Muslim party Nyans.



There is nothing making me as unsafe as when the Sweden Democrats repeat their hatred against Muslims, and the government parties just keep silent. Hatred that inspires those who burn Qurans, want to close mosques and say Muslims cannot become Swedes /.../ and want to reduce ourselves to two sorts of Muslims – the kind Muslim and the extremely dangerous Muslim /.../ I wonder whether people reflect upon how absurd it would be if other Swedes were also divided into two groups (Deland, 2023).

This quote illustrates how the trope through which anti-Islam sentiments express itself by the binary Good Muslim/Bad Muslim (Mamdani, 2002) – ‘the kind Muslim and the extremely dangerous Muslim’ in the quote – might be identified and experienced as threatening by an ordinary Muslim living her life on a non-elite level in contemporary Swedish society.

Regarding ‘security’, we focus on the making of security positions, i.e. ‘securitizations’ (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998) through constructions of a threat, reference objects worthy of protection, the need for emergency measures and departures from ‘normal’ politics and established rules of the game. ‘Securitization’ then is a rhetorical device that legitimizes policy change. This perspective has proven relevant in previous research on attitudes toward Islam, migration, and migration policy in the West (Cesari, 2009). Although research also shows the relevance of other interpretive frameworks for the understanding of migration policy change (Hagelund, 2020), we believe that CST is particularly relevant to our study as it draws upon insights from both the Copenhagen School approach ‘logic of exception’ (Buzan et al., 1998) and the Paris School ‘logic of routine’ (Bigo & McCluskey, 2018; Bigo, 2002), thus illuminating a crucial tension characterizing the insecure position of Muslims in Swedish migration and reception policy.

Applying the CST framework empirically in our study on Swedish migration policy, our focus is on locating and analyzing constructions of ‘threats’ and ‘reference objects’. Threats are conceived of in a broad sense and need not be ‘existential’ to be included in our analysis. The reference objects we study include state, nation, culture, ethnicity/race, civilization, neo-liberal subjects as well as gendered identities with a particular focus on masculinity.

The intersectional theory (IT) emphasizes the interplay between gender and other axes of power (Crenshaw, 2013). Applying this theoretical framework empirically in our study on Swedish migration policy, our focus is on the interplay between gender, race/ethnicity, and religion. Regarding gender focus is on the social construction of men, where we draw on Multi-Dimensional Theory (Mutua, 2012), capturing some of the precarious, non-additive positions of ethnic minority men related to the interplay between gender and ethnicity. For example, being subjected to ethnic profiling, some groups of ethnic minority men are at the greatest risk to be abused by the police as compared to any other category of people. Hence, in some situations, being a man cannot compensate for being disadvantaged by ethnicity/race, but only make things worse as stereotypes can be both gendered and ethnified/rasified. We also make use of the concept ‘de-masculinization’ (Ferber, 2019) to demonstrate that the masculinities of some groups of men are often dependent on making other groups of men appear as less than ‘real men’. Ethnicity/race is a typical case in point, which we also will draw on in our empirical study, as the white masculinity of ethnic majority men might be partly dependent on the de-masculinization of non-white ethnic minority men. Compared to the similar concept ‘feminization’, ‘de-masculinization’ has the advantage of making the reader more attentive toward relations among men, and the identity work, hierarchy making, and competition that often accompany these relations.

The study period is from 2015 to 2023. The sources are print newspaper articles in the four major Swedish dailies, Dagens Nyheter, Aftonbladet, Expressen, and Svenska Dagbladet, as well as the ‘Tidö agreement’



between the government parties and the right-wing Swedish Democrats party. Article search was conducted in the database of Retriever research and based on the use of words such as 'migration', 'migrants', 'migration policy'. In processing the material, the articles generated were scanned manually to identify those containing arguments and statements from key political actors. The key political actors we draw upon are the Swedish Democrats' (SD) party leader Jimmie Åkesson and the same party's Chairman of the Parliamentary [Riksdag] Committee of Justice Richard Jomshof, the current government's Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, and former government representatives, Prime Minister Stefan Löfven, Minister of Finance Magdalena Andersson, and Minister of Justice Morgan Johansson. Both debate articles signed by key political actors and news articles containing interviews with them were included. The articles fulfilling the selection criteria were read several times.

The data generated were qualitative and analyzed using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2021). Thematic analysis is 'a method for identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data' (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 6). There are different ways to conduct thematic analysis; ours is a reflexive and critical one. It is reflexive in that it emphasizes the interpretation of data as a creative rather than a mechanical process and in that it acknowledges the active role of theory in any empirical investigation. The proposed method is critical because it identifies the latent aspects of the data beyond its semantic content, that is the words used. This involves identifying the underlying ideas, assumptions, and conceptualizations and ideologies that shape and affect semantic content. The themes we detected emerged from an interplay between theory and 'data'. The coding was performed manually. Early on, we identified 'threats toward the welfare state' as one of the major themes, but as it later turned out when we engaged more with the literature on Muslims as a security concern in the West, we became less convinced that it qualified as one of the major themes and made it a less central, although still relevant, concern of the empirical analysis. By contrast, the liberal subject was identified as a major theme much later in the analytical process, as we tried to make sense of recent events in Swedish migration policy related to the Tidö agreement.

Dagens Nyheter, Aftonbladet, Expressen, and Svenska Dagbladet are the Swedish dailies with the most readers. Their readers come from all over Sweden. All four are published both in paper and online formats, with readers increasingly consuming online versions. Aftonbladet and Expressen are evening newspapers and have a younger audience compared to Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet, which are morning newspapers and have older audiences.

The Representation of Muslims in Swedish Migration Policy

In November 2015, Prime Minister Stefan Löfven announced the transition from the EU's most generous migration policy to a restrictive policy comparable to other EU countries. What followed next marks a radical shift from the open-hearted rhetoric that Conservative Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt expressed as recently as 2014 (Byström & Frohnert, 2017; Rosén, 2014). 'Temporary' border controls were introduced. The decision was then extended on many occasions, specified to be in line with minimum standards under EU law (Fridolfsson & Elander, 2021; Schierup & Scarpa, 2017; SOU, 2020). At the beginning of May 2018, the government officially announced that it would seek permanent restrictions on immigration (Dagens Nyheter, 2018). Partly because of several decided restrictive measures, the number of asylum seekers has decreased by 150,000 in a few years. In the summer of 2021, a decision was made to change the migration legislation

³A notable exception to the development described here is the new law that entered into force on 1 July 2018 – the so-called high school law – and which concerns minor asylum seekers provided they had arrived before 24 November 2015, waited for more than 15

in the Parliament, which meant further tightening the restrictive stance.³ The number of asylum seekers during 2023 was approximately 12,000 (Migrationsverket, 2024).

Securing Sweden and Western civilization

The tightening of migration policy from 2015 onwards can partly be understood from a problem definition arguing that, in particular, Muslim immigrants were considered to pose a severe threat to 'Swedish values' and 'Swedish culture'. Islam and Muslims were described by the Sweden Democrats as 'our biggest foreign threat' (Åkesson, 2009; see also Åkesson, 2010; Orrenius, 2021). The Sweden Democrat leader at the party's yearly meeting 2023 even suggested forbidding the building of new mosques and other Islamic symbols as well as tearing down existing ones 'where anti-democratic, anti-Swedish, homophobic, antisemite propaganda or information about Swedish society are disseminated' (Åkesson, as reported by Knutson, 2023). The current Sweden Democrat Chairman of the Riksdag Committee of Justice (notably not member of the government!) Richard Jomshof says: 'This is about Islam becoming an ideology threatening our society, our democracy. We have to surpass the binary reflex stating that criticizing a religion is the same as being an enemy to freedom of religion' (Jomshof as quoted in Dagens Nyheter, 2024, Nyheter, p. 10).⁴

A statement from the Sweden Democrat party leader Jimmie Åkesson in connection with the refugee flow caused by Russia's war in Ukraine expresses precisely the point of view that, based on cultural and religious distance to Sweden, there is a difference between 'deserving' and 'non-deserving' refugees:

The more distant the culture a group of individuals come from, the greater the problems this group poses for the society they come to. [Coming from a] Christian and largely Western country in our immediate area [...] I am convinced that the Ukrainian women and children do not, to any appreciable extent, come up with clan structures, gang crime, oppression of honor, organized grant fraud, or demands for religious privileges (Åkesson, 2022).

Referencing Imogen Tyler (2006) and Sara Ahmed (2004), we here notice a reproduction of the 'abject' migrant, which reflects how the Sweden Democrats leader understands himself as part of an imagined, national 'we'. This 'we' will then be associated with attributes defined in the opposite of the 'abject' migrant, who is portrayed as an undesirable, threatening figure in contrast to the image of the 'good migrant', for example, migrants from Ukraine who are constructed as white rather than non-white, and as above all as Christian non-Muslims and not a threat to Western culture and values. The SD party leader summarized the situation in Sweden in 2015 when restrictive migration policy measures were decided upon, saying 'When the whole population of the West is walking around and is afraid that it can collapse on any street corner, at any time, then it's in practice a state of war in which we are.' (interview with Åkesson in Brandel, 2015).

It can be problematized to what extent the 'we' implicated in the quote is a national rather than a European or even civilizational 'we'. While prominent Swedish Democratic party representatives as we have seen expressed at least some worries about threats to Swedish nation and society, the shift in right-wing populist

months on decision on their first application and were now ready to go to high school. This softening of the restrictive policy must be seen against the background that the government was dependent for its continued existence on parties that were critical of the new, restrictive migration policy post-2015.

⁴The current coalition inaugurated in late autumn 2022 includes three political parties: the Moderate Party, the Liberal Party, and the Christian Democrats. However, to get a majority of votes in parliament, they base their governing position upon negotiated support (The Tidö Agreement) from the Sweden Democrats, i.e. an exceptional arrangement in the history of Swedish parliamentarism, as the government is dependent upon an outside party being free to criticize and without governing responsibility. Just a few years before the 2022 election, leading representatives of the three parties in government said they would never make such an agreement with a party like the Sweden Democrats with their radical nationalist anti-Zionist or even anti-Jewish historical record (Hellström & Nilsson, 2010).

rhetoric toward emphasizing Western civilization rather than nation as that worth protecting (Brubaker, 2017; Kaya & Tecmen, 2021) is also identifiable in the sources we refer to above. In this context are Islam and Muslims portrayed as inconsistent with and therefore provocations and serious threats toward a Western civilization seen as fostering liberal values of secularism, tolerance, democracy, freedom, liberty, gender equality and gay rights. This dichotomization is false in that it builds on an extreme oversimplification of Islam and Muslims, the views and attitudes among radical Islamists being read as evidence of a one and only true Islam and Muslim position, when there in reality are numerous ways of understanding Islam. It also draws upon a very idealized, equally homogenizing view on Westerners, where, in reality, nonliberal views on gender equality, gay rights, and Christian nonsecular politics are common in most Western countries and in some of them, also clearly part of public policy.

From initially being a theme associated primarily with Sweden Democrats (SD) in Swedish politics, the imagined threat from Islam and Muslims against Swedish culture and Swedish nation-building has also been taken up by other parties (Kristersson, 2020; Busch Thor & Ekling, 2020). Considering the Swedish governments during this period of change in Swedish migration policy, securing Swedishness was a major concern. In particular were threats toward the Swedish welfare state caused by migration emphasized, which indirectly, though the association in Swedish national conscience of the welfare state with Swedishness, also became an issue about Swedishness. In a December 2017 newspaper interview, the Minister of Finance emphasized the threat to the Swedish welfare state from immigration:

A welfare state cannot be expanded at any time. We saw this very clearly in 2015, and that is where I think we can be self-critical [...] It is obvious that other European countries have more opportunities for housing and education. You get faster management and housing opportunities if you are looking for another European country (as quoted in Dagens Nyheter, 2017).

According to the current as well as the previous Social Democratic-led government, securing the Swedish welfare state in a time of global refugee crisis requires a radical change in immigration policy (NN5). This is due to the perceived lack of financial and administrative capacity of public institutions in addressing the situation. The Swedish governments also referred to the dismissive approach to receiving migrants taken by other EU countries (Greussing & Boomgaarden, 2017), thereby reproducing notions about Swedish exceptionalism in terms of being 'a humanitarian super power'. Further concerns about Swedishness included emphasizing the value of international collaboration, social rights, and the Swedish work strategy. As virtually all asylum seekers appearing at Swedish territorial borders 2015-2022 migrated to Sweden from countries with predominantly Muslim populations, the radical hardening of migration policy in Sweden during this period were even when not explicitly motivated in such terms largely measures increasing distance toward Muslims.

Muslims Working on Their Selves and Securing the Liberal Subject

While the distinctions between 'good' and 'bad' migrants mentioned overall is in line with and draw on the notion of a clash *between* civilizations, another trope whereby anti-Muslim and anti-Islam sentiments is expressed is by rather emphasizing clash *within* civilizations. Mamdani (2002) discussed how distinctions between 'good' and 'bad' Muslims were made in the West in the context of terrorism after 9/11. Maira (2009) included women in the discussion on the productive role of distinctions between 'good' and 'bad' Muslims and showed the wider relevance of that binary. What is achieved by using this binary is placing individual



choice and responsibility at the center of discussions about Muslim conditions in society. Like the clash of civilizations rhetoric this is a way in which unjust social structures, colonialism, racism and discrimination are made invisible and can continue to reproduce itself. In what follows, the applicability in contemporary Swedish policy development regarding migration and Muslims is illustrated.

The current government, in its agreement with the right-wing/retrotopian Sweden Democrats, states that it will push immigration policy several steps further in a restrictive direction, implying that asylum should not be accepted in case an immigrant shows signs of 'improper conduct' ['bristande vandel/levnadssätt'] in a wide sense (Tidöavtalet, 2022). Not only having committed crime should be a reason for refusal to stay in Sweden. 'Improper conduct' could also be 'subsistence fraud' [bidragsfusk], 'anti-democratic talk' and contact with individuals and networks practicing or promoting violence. The government has launched a committee to present a detailed package of restrictive measures to be decided at the beginning of 2025. The Minister of Gender Equality states that 'only Swedish citizens have an unconditional right to stay in Sweden' and the committee should even consider the possibility of making individuals 'stateless' (Carp, 2023).

By introducing 'improper conduct' as a ground for non-acceptance to stay in Sweden, individual responsibility was introduced in the security discourse, hence legitimizing even more restrictive migration policy. Discourse focusing on migrants' individual responsibility coexists with discourse emphasizing other policy measures. Following its position as a free-riding support party to the government, the Sweden Democrats step-by-step raised demands for still more restrictive policy measures like bringing in military troops into the streets, enforcing suspected/potential criminals not leaving home and life-time imprisonment for as young as 13 year old criminals.

Indeed, there are Muslims who view it socially and politically desirable to separate Muslims from non-Muslims, i.e. 'extremists [who] articulate and aggregate dissenting voices, thereby amplifying the perceptions that globalization and discourses on terror are directed against them' (Nesbitt-Larking, 2010, p. 152). However, Muslims in Sweden are generally first- or second-generation immigrants, as in other societies employing various strategies of retreat, civil engagement, or sometimes essentialism (NN1). In this context, mosques are important not only as sacred places in a strictly religious sense but also as intellectual and social hubs for Muslims: places for creating both bonding and bridging social capital. Notably, this overall picture does not exclude the fact that there are also signs of fundamental Islamism popping up, especially in extraordinary cases such as the war between Hamas and the state of Israel. Whether such activism is related to interventions orchestrated by the state of Iran, the Egyptian Brotherhood, or other external sources or not is debated. For example, a heated debate has been held following a recently accepted PhD thesis on the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Association in Sweden (Egyptson, 2023). Notably, although the scientific quality of the thesis has been questioned (it passed with the votes 2-1 by the scientific board), the author himself says: 'I do not regard Muslims as a threat to Sweden. There are many good Muslims fighting against Islamism [...] many Sweden Democrats do not see the difference between Islam and Islamism.' (Sameh Egyptson, cited in Orrenius, 2023).

Securing White Masculinity

Professional migrants, to a very large extent Muslim men of war age, who maybe have been refugees from war, are a completely different matter than [Ukrainian] women and children who come by ferry from Poland. and not to any appreciable extent coming up with clan structures, gang crime, oppression of honor, organized grant fraud, or demands for religious privileges (Åkesson, 2022).



Recalling to statements from Sweden Democrat party leader Jimmie Åkesson in connection with the refugee flow caused by Russia's war in Ukraine, the abject and insecure migrant can also be understood as gendered. In the quote from the SD party leader, traditional notions of masculine and feminine are reproduced in that (some) women and children are made worthy of protection, while masculinity is linked to the role of defender of (some) women and children. Åkesson also has something to say here about 'Muslim men of war age, who maybe have been refugees from war' (Åkesson, 2022). In their context, such statements can be interpreted as attempts to de-masculinize Muslim men who, through migration, are implied to have failed in their role as protectors of women and children. Conversely, the care of Ukrainian women and children becomes part of the SD leader's re-masculinization of himself as a good protector.⁵ Such nationally and ethnically coded male-protector masculinity and the distinction between 'good' and 'bad' men implies a way of trying to distinguish between a desirable, Swedish masculinity and an undesirable non-Swedish masculinity typically attributed to Muslim men.

While protective masculinity is clearly at stake here, we would argue that gender, in line with intersectional theory, needs to be understood as intersecting with race/ethnicity. Therefore, the de-masculinization efforts of the SD-leader might be fruitfully thought of as articulating the superior position of a white man relative to non-white men, and white masculinity as superior to non-white masculinities. This does not exclude that there are also national, civilizational, Christian, secular, or whatever other aspects there are of this dichotomization and hierarchization of men, but as other possible reference objects are vague and often in conflict with each other, what in the end seems to be the issue is white supremacy, and more specifically in context of intersectional theory, white masculinity.

It should be emphasized that Muslim women and children are not clearly understood as worth protection in relation to such ethnically coded male-protector-masculinity. Emphasizing in an interview in 2015 that a significant number (if not most) most of the people who at the time sought asylum were potential terrorists threatening Swedes' physical integrity and physical security, the SD party leader said that '[t]he proportion of terrorists among children and women is probably lower than among men' while also adding: 'But you cannot be sure' (Åkesson, quoted by Brandel, 2015). The fear of Muslim women expressed here can be related to what Goździak and Márton (2018) refer to as a 'fear that Muslim women will bear lots of children and the local population will be outnumbered' (p. 135). Hence, the expressed fear of Muslim women in anti-Muslim rhetoric and sentiments also seem in the end to be an aversion to perceived threats from those perceived as non-white.

Turning to mainstream politics, the de-masculinization of Muslim men also involved constructing them as welfare recipients, as the Minister of Finance did in 2017 as refugee migrants, many of them unaccompanied male migrants, were collectively portrayed in these terms (as quoted in Dagens Nyheter, 2017). In the spring of 2016, white masculinity entered mainstream politics in Sweden in connection with the 'no to handshake scandal' that flared up at the time. Following the unfamous comments from Social Democratic Prime Minister Stefan Löfven in media that 'men in Sweden must take women in hand', this resulted in the withdrawal of the Muslim Green Party politician Yasri Khan from party politics (NN4). The notion of fundamental differences in attitudes toward gender equality issues between ethnic Swedes and migrants from countries with predominantly Muslim populations was then already an integral part of civic integration programs ('Samhällsintroduktionen') targeting new arrivals (Bauer et al., 2023). Before that, it had also been

⁵Regarding the protector role masculinities, the distinctions between 'good' and 'bad' men and its colonial aspects see Spivak, 1988, famously addressing the issue of 'white men saving brown women from brown men'.



an integral part of the extensive discussion about honor-related violence that in Sweden saw the light of day after the murder of Fadime in 2002⁶ and which, among other things, resulted in public-funded initiatives in the state and civil society with men's group activities for migrant men. To this need to be added the recurring reproduction since 9/11 2001 of the figure of the culturally doped Muslim terrorist in Swedish news media reporting (Ghersetti & Levin, 2002). All in all, rather than being seen as an exceptional element in Swedish politics, particularly attributed to the Sweden Democrats, negative representations of Islam and Muslims have become part of the mainstream.

Muslim men were not explicitly mentioned in the Tidö agreement on 'inappropriate conduct'. Muslim men were, however, indirectly referred by the context of simultaneous discussion on gang shootings and street violence and stereotypical images of those men as particularly dangerous threats to the security of non-Muslim Westerners. However, as illuminated above in statements from the SD party leader about Muslim women (and children) as potential terrorists, Muslim women (and children) were also perceived as security threats. At a minimum, they were thought to legitimize all kinds of inappropriate conduct attributed to Muslim men. Hence, while traditionally being denied agency of their own, they were also required to behave more properly to avoid a non-acceptance of stay in Sweden.

Conclusions and reflections

What arguments did key political actors raise in support of a more restrictive migration policy in Sweden 2015-2023? How can these arguments be understood as gendered at the intersections between ethnicity and religion? These are the main research questions that we addressed in our study. We approached these questions by combining critical securitization theory and intersectional theory with a particular focus on masculinity. The arguments expressed by key actors concerned perceived threats to the welfare state, Swedish culture and values, and therefore Swedishness, as well as Western civilization, where Muslims often explicitly (typically by Swedish Democrats leaders) but as often implicitly (by government representatives) are included in problem representations in terms of threats to deal with. The arguments can be understood as gendered in terms of de-masculinizing male migrants from countries having predominantly Muslim populations by constructing them as dependent on welfare benefits, de-masculinizing Muslim men by constructing them as cowards and failing to live up to the norms of protective masculinity, and by constructing Muslim men as non-white threats toward (all kinds of) women, hence as threats toward Swedish/Western gender equality values. Hence, in addition to the various reference objects mentioned, the threats posed by Muslims also concerned gendered identities, racialized identities, and white supremacy.

Given the widespread associations between Muslims and terrorism in the West after 9/11, it may seem safe to use critical security theory in this analysis. However, there are many ways of conducting critical security studies, and we do think that some paths are more fruitful than others for throwing light on contemporary aversion in Europe against Islam and Muslims as well as the turn toward more restrictive migration policy. First, we find it important to avoid privileging the state as the primary object to be secured in 'securitizations'. True, Muslims are repeatedly constructed as threats toward states, but they are also often increasingly constructed as threats toward many other 'things', be it Western civilization, Europe, whiteness, gender identities or whatever. In fact, it is often extremely unclear what in the end will be secured against perceived Muslim danger, where inconsistencies and the use of vague concepts are rule rather than exception.

⁶Fadime Şahindal, a Kurdish-Swedish human rights activist was born 1975 in Elbistan, Turkey. On January 21, 2002, she was murdered by her father as a case of honor-related violence. He was then punished with life in prison.



One way to make sense of securitizations is to see them as (in the end unsuccessful) ways to cope with ontological insecurity. Securitizations in the West involving Muslims need, however, also be understood as acts of racialization and ethnification of non-white people, hence as acts where white supremacy over non-whites, and the history of colonialism it draws on, are reproduced and legitimized. Essentializing the difference between groups and making invisible its dependence on a history of asymmetric power relations between those groups, securitization contributes to de-politization of societal problems where its history of asymmetric power relations between different groups is made invisible. In recent political agreements on Swedish migration policy, it also manifests through the logic of a neoliberal governmentality appealing to the wish to be included in majority society by passing as a 'good Muslim' clearly differentiated from the 'bad Muslim' by 'appropriate behavior'. Beyond securing neoliberal governmentality by appealing to 'the free will' of Muslims, framing the whole discussion on 'appropriate behavior' in terms of a security problem for the majority population make the segregation, social and economic injustices and the economic system and political ideologies that reproduce them invisible.

We further argue that a fruitful way to conduct critical security studies is to engage with intersectional theory. From the perspective of intersectional theory, gender is regularly at stake in securitizations targeting Muslims, just as ethnicity is, and these aspects intersect, resulting in specific positions of privilege, vulnerability, or both. In particular, intersectional theory provides new insights regarding the precarious positions of Muslim men in the context of stereotypical images of them as eager to terrorism or other forms of dangerous violence. Just as ethnicity and gender together shape specific vulnerable positions for black men who are at the greatest risk of being subjected to racial profiling by the police (Mutua, 2012), we suggest this is also the case for Muslim men. Within critical security studies, men (as gendered beings) and masculinity are somewhat under-researched, particularly Muslim men and masculinity. We argue that an intersectional perspective focusing on the interplay between gender and ethnicity is crucial for making sense of the positions and vulnerability of Muslim men in contexts where they are perceived as security threats. That is not to deny the precarious positions of Muslim women in intersections between gender and ethnicity, some of which we also touched upon in the findings, but rather to suggest more research on the costs of masculinity for men. The example of the Swedish Democrats party leader in a debate article portraying Muslim men 'in war age' as less masculine also suggests that masculinity indeed is a complex issue regarding Muslim men, as many stereotypical portrayals of them as extremely dangerous rather construct them as too masculine. Such tensions in white masculinity discourse between construing Muslim men as too masculine or lacking masculinity are worth exploring further.

The study of media representations is crucial. When studying print-media representations, media assume the status of a meta-player and a primary political player. This is because the other political players mentioned are, in the end, represented and filtered by the media. Further critical consideration of media representation is needed. This includes the perspective first introduced by Marxism, implying that media representation always serves the interests of dominant social groups. In the West, some of these groups are non-Muslim whites. There are different opinions about to what extent Media influences our attitudes by determining the content and shape of the news. Most research on media representation agrees, however, that media at least draws attention to certain directions, sets the agenda of the content of a public debate, denotes and classifies phenomena, and offers identification points (Johansson & Darvishpour, 2020).

In recent years, hate, prejudice, and discrimination against its Muslim minorities have damaged Sweden's international reputation. This country has for a long time (starting with labor market migration from

Turkey in the 1960s) hosting more Muslims relative to its population than almost any other European country while also gaining reputation from the 1970s and on for its multiculturalist policies as well as its liberal and generous policy on refugee migration. The right-wing populist party The Sweden Democrats, which has been represented in the Swedish Parliament [Riksdag] since 2010 and is now the second largest party with representatives in government office, has been key to this development. Thus, Sweden may be well on its way to join forces with many other Western societies where Islamophobia and negative attitudes toward Muslims are increasingly being institutionalized as part of mainstream politics (Goździak & Márton, 2018; Kaya & Tecmen, 2021; Cesari, 2009). Considering the radical shifts in Swedish official migration policy, the last ten years are also a reminder of both the logic of exception and the logic of routine in critical securitization analysis.



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Author Details **Joakim Johansson (Assoc. Prof. Dr.)**

¹ Mälardalen University, Department of Economics and Political Science, Västerås, Sweden

 0000-0003-1205-2521  joakim.johansson@mdu.se

Ingemar Elander (Senior Prof. Dr.)

² Örebro University/Mälardalen University, School of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences/ Department of Economics and Political Science, Örebro/Västerås, Sweden

 0000-0002-7737-5850  Ingemar.Elander@oru.se

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Research Article

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The Russian-Ukraine War and the Uses of Naval Mines in the Black Sea: The Legal Consequences in Turkey



Mouhamed Bachir Diop¹  

¹ İstanbul Gelisim University, Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, İstanbul, Türkiye

Abstract


Stray mines in the Black Sea (BS) have sparked substantial debates. Despite the various areas of concern, this matter also warrants a legal perspective. Given that Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine are the primary countries significantly involved, each has developed a distinct legal personality under international law. Therefore, it is important to refer to international law to elucidate this complex issue. This study examines the legal intricacies of the stray mine situation in the BS region by focusing on legal aspects. It also considers other relevant factors, particularly the potential legal implications for Turkey. In the context of this study, we argue that Turkey's geopolitical position, along with its international commitments, places it in a significant role and brings it into close engagement with other nations, especially amid the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. In this study, I will discuss the general framework of international law governing the use of naval mines in international conflicts, particularly in the event of war between Russia and Ukraine. Despite the existence of international customs, several international agreements, including the International Montreux Convention concerning the Strait of Istanbul, play a substantial role in this issue.

Keywords

Black Sea • Naval Mines • Russia • Turkey • Ukraine • War



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✉ Corresponding author: Mouhamed Bachir Diop mbdiop@gelisim.edu.tr



The Russian-Ukraine War and the Uses of Naval Mines in the Black Sea: The Legal Consequences in Turkey

The main concern of international law is the regulation of intertwined relations arising within the international community. In fact, the differing interests of states imposed great pressure on the international community to determine the consensual nature of many concepts, principles, and rights to control the process of these states. The outbreak of the Russian-Ukraine war is one of the most significant factors that affected the political, security, and geopolitical map of the BS. Turkey attempted to hold the stick in the middle, taking into account the interests binding it with both sides. Indeed, the major factor that increases the paramount position of Turkey is Turkey's strategic position in the region. Additionally, Turkish control over the most important straits adjacent to the region makes it a mandatory passage for different ships. Despite Turkey's categorical refusal since 2014 to accept Russia's annexation of Crimea, it insisted on the necessity to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine. However, Turkey did not implement economic sanctions against Russia due to the secession of Lugansk and Donetsk.

Nonetheless, the conflict has witnessed a turning point after some reports indicated that naval mines were deployed by Ukraine off the coast to counter any possible landing of Russian troops. While the Ukrainians denied these rumors and accused Russia, the Turkish forces announced the neutralization of an old naval mine found in the Istanbul Strait, which led to the temporary suspension of ship passage in the strait for several days. Likewise, Romania detected a sea mine washed away from its coasts on the BS. Regardless of the difficulty of identifying the responsible party from the belligerent countries, the fact proves that the BS region has been exposed to naval mines of unknown origin. Although the use of naval mines is an old tradition, the contemporary context makes the scene different, especially when the use of these mines exceeds the scope of the belligerent parties to neutral countries. This study examines the use of stray naval mines in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war considering international maritime law. In particular, this study shed light on the legal consequences of the use of these mines in the BS region in Turkey.

The General Framework

The world's civilization history has experienced magnificent exertions to impose restrictions on violence, and many institutional forms have been crystallized to reduce conflict, which is the essence of a peaceful human civilization. The fathers of international law contributed decisively to the adoption of rules, stemming the effects of war by anchoring strict rules in positive law (Bugnion, 2002: 525). Therefore, They were convinced that the law of nature contained principles suitable for the process of ruling nations, referring to the famous expression of Paret: "Nations ought to do to one another in peace, the best, and in war, the least possible evil" (Cavaleri, 2005: 9). While the 20th century witnessed the emergence of international legal rules to restrict wars, the 21st century heralds the need to develop new rules to end the horrors of recurrent wars.

The Russian-Ukraine war is undoubtedly categorized as an international war not only due to the direct involvement of the armed forces of the two states in the hostilities but also due to its potential and magnitude international repercussions. Consequently, it dictates the implementation of international law rules related to international war. The purpose here may not be to put a finger on the violator of international law rules so much as to focus on the laws of war when they interfere with international maritime law. More

precisely, the legality of the use or potential use of naval mines in the region from both sides—Russia and Ukraine—on the other hand, its impact on a neutral party, which is Turkey. As expected in the logic of wars, geographical and geostrategic nature has a direct impact on military choices; accordingly, the geographical interdependence of Russia and Ukraine formed a key factor in the scope of this war. This clearly indicates the secret of the conflict and the sharp rivalry between Russia and Ukraine, as well as the significant real effect due to the strategic position of Turkey.

Strategic Position of the Black Sea

The BS region is the largest inland sea in the world, and it occupies the far southeast of Europe. Six countries of Eurasia; surround the BS: Turkey, Russia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, and Ukraine. It constitutes one of the most geopolitically significant sites in broader Eurasia (Shahi, 2022: 5). It has sunk through many ups and downs. One of the most prominent stations was the end of the six-year war of 1774, in which Russia guaranteed access to the BS (Agoston & Masters, 2009: 6). The geographical location near the “new gray areas” places the BS at a high level on a strategic scale because of the new protagonists and the critical “military balance”. More than 30 regional initiatives were launched after the fall of the USSR. These organizations are variable in geometry and overlap with other international structures such as the EU and NATO (Snegur, 2014: 320). Many subsequent radical changes have characterized the complexity of the region, especially after the accession of the coastal countries—Bulgaria and Romania—to the EU and NATO. On the other hand, the Russian war on Ukraine in 2007, besides the annexation of Crimea in 2014, culminated by the current conflict, constituted a core element in the political and security of the BS. Russia’s aspirations to annex Istanbul and Canakkale straits have persisted ever since, through the Crimean War at the end of the 19th century, and a repeat attempt in WW I. However, the West’s support for Turkey halted Russian ambitions, which faded significantly after the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and the addition of a later amendment to the Montreux Convention of 1936, which organized Turkey’s control of the Istanbul and Canakkale straits.

Triangular Interaction

The sharp conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire in the mid-seventeenth century is a witness to the first harbingers of the influence struggle that would flare up in the BS. The recent successive conflicts in the BS clearly demonstrate the geostrategic and historical influence of many regional powers. Russia launched a huge naval fleet in the region, and Ukrainian armed forces are also remarkably involved on its regional coasts. Meanwhile, Turkey recently announced a huge gas reserve in the region, in addition to the US armed maneuvers over the BS. As a result, the current context of the region indicates an important interaction symbolized in the triangular Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian triangular.

Russian expansionism

The coastline retained by Russia in the BS in 1991, located between the Taman peninsula and the Georgian border, represents approximately 400 km of the shoreline. Based on the eternal Russian doctrine of protecting the Slavic Orthodoxy, the Russian obsession to expand its influence in the BS did not stop (Atland & Kabanenko, 2020: 290). Following the Russo-Georgian conflict of August 2008, Moscow de facto extended its Pontic Sea interface by creating a military protectorate over Abkhazia. Thus, Russia gains less than 200 km of additional coastline at the BS (Delanoë, 2014: 2). The Ukrainian independence posed a great geopolitical dilemma for Russia, according to Brzezinski (1997: 46) “It has deprived Russia of its dominant position on the Black Sea”. Meanwhile, Russia seeks to impose its international and regional standing by

ensuring the achievement of its geostrategic goals by maintaining a geopolitical influence not only over the BS but also in the sensitive areas adjacent to the BS. Besides, the Mariupol port occupies an important strategic position for Russia with respect to its proximity to the Sea of Azov distributed between the Russian and Ukrainian shores and the Kerch Strait separating the Russian mainland and the Crimean Peninsula. Russia has paid attention to the military institution to maintain its position by taking a set of measures that included ameliorating personnel and equipment. The new army and fleet structure was ratified from 2008 to 2020, which includes fundamental changes in the armed forces' structure.

On the other hand, the Kremlin's neo-imperial policy vis-à-vis what it calls the "near abroad" theory causes additional geo-economic interest with Russia's gas pipeline projects. The Blue Stream, South Stream, and then Turkstream projects linking Russia to Europe are vivid examples of the enormous Russian interest. Accordingly, Snegur (2014) argued that Russia would therefore always have had a particular eye on Sevastopol, but its attitude was to be transformed into a real strategic watch of NATO maneuvers in the BS – Partnership for Peace, annual Sea Breeze maneuvers since 1997, and the frequent visits of the USS Vella Gulf (CG-72) equipped with the US Navy Egis combat system in Odesa, Batumi. In 2010, the Russian State Armaments Program 2020 expected substantial upgrades to the BS Fleet. Remarkably in 2015-2016, the Russian BS Fleet delivered the first of six planned conventional submarines and the first of six planned Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates (Adzinbaia, 2017: 5). As a result, Ukraine, Romania, and Georgia feel deeply insecure simply because of their proximity to Russia, with whom they have historical and territorial disputes. Notably, only Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Bulgaria maintain a steadily sufficient peaceful relationship with all parties in the region.

Turkish Preoccupation

BS security and stability are significant priorities for Turkish national security. Turkey's attentiveness is to bond a group of ethnically and ideologically contradictory countries in the BS, squeezing the 2001 project launched by the BS countries. The initiative has an economic and political aspect and seeks to promote peaceful multilateral coexistence in the region. The Turkish approach relies upon a "zero problem strategy," which is the key to slightly pursuing its national interests. In addition, it will revive what it considers a palatable justification for joining the EU. Based on these developments, Turkey launched the "BLACKSEAFOR" initiative with the participation of the most influential countries in the region. Since October 2001, it has activated the most important functions undertaken by "BLACKSEAFOR" in addition to organizing humanitarian missions, providing relief to disaster victims, locating mines, and combating terrorism (Vasiliev, 2010: 6).

However, Turkey has never been enthusiastic about any attempts to disrupt the Montreux Straits Convention, despite the insistence of the United States and NATO for many years. In contrast, Turkey adopted an independent BS policy that would protect the status quo by maintaining a mutual balance with Moscow and other key powers. The Soviet status suddenly changed radically after Russian intervention in Georgia and then its recent invasion of Crimea. Moscow modernized its BS navy and armed the region heavily, taking advantage of Crimea's strategic position. During the multiplicity of actors and contradictory interests in the region, the significant Turkish role is likely confirmed in response to the necessity of geographical and political interdependence with the rest of the countries in the region. In this regard, Turkey undertakes to play a balanced role in preserving its vital interests and fulfilling its international legal obligations. According to the Montreux Convention of 1936, Turkey is responsible for ensuring the maritime safety of its naval ships and for deciding appropriately on potential legal cases relating to warships. As a member of NATO, Turkish

policy emphasizes the necessity of Russia's involvement – albeit relatively—besides the neighboring non-NATO countries in the responsibility of maintaining maritime security in the BS region (Neset, et. al., 2021: 31).

Ukrainian Duality

Ukrainian geolocation has sparked different perspectives. Brzezinski (1994) defines Ukraine as a "pivotal state" in Europe and insists on the imminence of its integration into the Western camp to prevent a re-emergence of the Russian empire, claiming that it cannot be stressed strongly enough that “without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire” (Masters, 2022: 10). Another side of geopoliticians like Huntington adopts the idea of weighting the perspective of geocultural analysis, which places Ukraine, as a secondary regional state at the fourth level of a uni-multipolar system governed by the clash of civilizations dominated at the first level by the United States (Corduban, 2004: 38). The dual position and geopolitical characteristics of Ukraine affected its relationship with the active states in the BS.

The Ukrainian zone in the BS occupies one-quarter of the whole sea and most of its northern part. The shallow-water area includes most of the wide North-Western Odesa Shelf located to the west of the Crimea Peninsula as well as the Pre-Crimea Shelf and PreKerch Shelf, which occupy the relatively narrow offshore zone to the south of the Crimea Mountains and the Kerch Peninsula, which is a part of the Crimea Peninsula (Stovba, et. al, 2020: 54). As noted by Atland & Kabanenko, (2020), a large part of Ukrainian politics relied on the priority of building national cohesion and regional coexistence by linking the Tatar minority in Crimea with Turkey as a response to Russian expansionist policies. Over the past decade, before Russia annexed Crimea, Ukraine has largely succeeded in crystallizing this policy. Indeed, Ukraine has moved beyond the idea of regional leadership to establish broad economic cooperation with vital states in the region (Shelest, et al. 2020: 38). Basically, this situation makes Crimea in the strategic depth of Ukraine, but the turmoil and the interaction of forces in the region have certainly made Crimea in the midst of a long-term competitive area. The Ottoman dominion lasted for a long time, followed by Russian control until the middle of the 18th century in 1917, and then re-attachment in 2014 (Sarıkaya, 2017: 39). To Anticipate all possibilities, the Russian side intensified its military maneuver in the region, especially in recent years, by deploying three warships equipped with highly advanced missiles and loaded with anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles. The Russian plan was to increase the number of warships to 30 by 2020 for various missions and purposes (Çelikpala & Erşen, 2018: 80). Undoubtedly, this constitutes the direct curtailment of any significant influence of Ukraine in the region.

Russia's Pre-emptive Strike to the Annex of Crimea

Russia still relies deeply on military force as an indispensable tool to ensure the success of specific foreign policy achievements. As a result, the Soviet Union reinforced its military build-up in Ukraine in the spring of 2021 (Gressel, 2021: 4). From the perspective of realists, confirming that no institution can protect states from one another. Accordingly, most states have become anxious about the possibility of being subjected to a serious threat or attack. Some realists argue that if an act can be defended through either reason or in terms of pragmatic state interests, then it has some validity (Shane, 2011: 79). The Russian glorious strategy, implemented by Vladimir Putin, is fundamentally about restoring Moscow's power and influence in the international arena. This is what makes the Putinist view in harmony with the view of neoclassical realism.

Of the naval bases and approximately twenty-six seaports that the Soviet Union had in the BS at the time of its disappearance, 19 were in Ukraine, 4 were still in Russia, and 3 were in Georgia. The loss of Crimea, the main installation of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, was seen by Russia as a major strategic challenge (Delanoë, 2014: 3). In terms of size, the Crimean Peninsula covers approximately 27,000 km²; therefore, the Russian annexation of it makes it gain a maritime zone bigger three times than the Crimean landmass (Wojtowicz, 2015: 91). This strategic location is weightily estimated by Russia. For instance, in a potential military escalation event, the distribution of missile systems in the area may block a large part of the BS. Given Crimea's strategic position—in the case of limited war or other types of escalation—it has a high probability of being the main theater for military operations and the projection of forces to control the region and the Istanbul Straits (Adzinbaia, 2017: 5). Furthermore, given the essence of peremptory norms in international law, acts of aggression are categorically prohibited to all states regardless of any contradictory treaty, obligation or eventual limitations not complying with international law norms. Apart from the basic norms of the *Jus cogens*, it is noteworthy that both Russia and Ukraine are bound by the UN Charter. In particular, Ukraine and Russia are signatories of specific legal instruments in which Russia has expressed its express recognition of Ukrainian territorial integrity. The urgent steps taken by Russia from 2014 until the outbreak of the war are sufficient to recognize present and upcoming Russian trends in the region as a whole.

After annexing Crimea, Russia regained extensive sovereignty over the coast and the Sevastopol port. Through the absorption of the peninsula, Russia recovered almost 1,000 kilometers of additional coastline with ports like Feodosia and Kerch, which were estimated to be larger than the Russian Pontic ports (Delanoë, 2014: 3). Additionally, the reintegration of Crimea into Russia, the possibility of deploying S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air defense systems and, in the future, S-500, would guarantee Moscow's capability to prevent, a hypothetical extension of the deployment of the American shield in Eastern Europe (Hazemann, 2017: 45). Russia's strategic interest in remilitarizing the peninsula goes beyond a mere troop buildup. In addition, the Russian army sought to achieve goals in Crimea that could not only be considered a staging ground for the invasion of Ukraine. Russia has also tried pre-empting its rival powers in the region, such as NATO.

The Black Sea Region and the Use of Naval Mines

A naval mine is a sophisticated weapon used to destroy the military equipment of the opposing side. It is advantageous to complicate or interrupt operations or transport in destructive effects when implemented for offensive purposes. Some historians have traced the history of the use of naval fleets to BC, particularly during the era of the Cretans and ancient Egyptians. They recorded a sea battle in 1210 BC when the fleet of the Hittite king Sublioma II burned the Cretan fleet ships (Vego, 2010: 73). During the American Civil War, the Confederates used water mines extensively to repress the Union (Sthanapati & Chattopadhyay, 2021: 20). However, the most common use of sea mines was observed during the Russia-Japan war of 1905, during which many sea mines were poured into the open sea for the first time. In this war, hydrostatic mines were used for the first time, and a minesweeping operation was carried out for the first time (Sprance, 2004: 6). In recent incidents in the region during World War I, as a result of the mine lines placed in the Canakkale Strait, the allied forces could not pass the strait and suffered many casualties (Ariker, 2019: 490).

The fast evolution of war technology and the uncontrolled use of open seas have caused the widespread practice of sea mines, consequently creating enormous international concerns in terms of ensuring the innocent passage of ships regardless of their various status and nature. Vego (2010) asserted that laying mines on the sea has always posed a serious threat to the survival of large surface warships. Today we

witnessed that naval forces do not consist only of battleships and cruisers, but large parts of them also consist of large numbers of destroyers, torpedo boats, gunboats, and mines capable of targeting logistics centers, command and control centers, air defenses, and vital infrastructure (Bowen, 2022: 3).

Legal framework of using naval mines

International humanitarian law constitutes a set of principles that guarantee the fundamental rules of war. Some principles, including methods of warfare used in armed conflicts, have been expressly set out in many conventions and protocols. These rules establish the concept of the necessity of adhering to the limit of proportionality during wartime. This principle is of paramount importance when it concerns the law of the sea. In the second half of the 20th century, the principle of sea freedom was regulated by limited international conventions. After the first sea conference held in Geneva, to draw up an appropriate Convention, the UNCLOS III signed in 1982 became mandatory for 154 States and considered the “Basic legal framework of the maritime law”. This is the fruit of significant efforts that lead to the codification and progressive development of international law. With over 400 articles it is the most comprehensive and detailed convention that the international community has attempted and successfully achieved within the framework of the UN (Treves, 2008: 1). Article 87 of UNCLOS III regulates the legal regime of high seas and ensures that all states, whether they have a coast or not the followings:

- a) Freedom of navigation on high seas
- b) Freedom to fly over high seas
- c) The freedom to fish,
- d) The right to construct artificial islands and other facilities permitted by international law under Part VI of the 1982 UN Convention;
- e) The right to lay underwater cables and pipelines under section VI of the 1982 UN Convention
- f) Scientific research freedoms under sections VI and XIII.

The Ukraine and the Russian Federation are the parties to UNCLOS. Their legal status constitutes the legal basis for Ukraine’s allegation that various unauthorized activities of Russia have subsequently violated Ukraine’s rights under the UNCLOS (Jia, 2021: 684). Whereas the provisions relating to sea mines were directly addressed in the Hague Conference in 1907, which requested that the sea mines must be adjusted to be ineffective within an hour if the chain was broken and dragged for any reason. At the conference of Geneva, it was also proposed that the straits connecting the open seas should be free for the passage of commercial ships during wartime and not be closed with mines.

It is noteworthy that the regime that regulated the use of mines during armed conflict was the 1907 Hague Convention VIII. The VIII Protocol of the Hague Convention of 1907 limited the use of mines and prohibited their planting off coasts and ports. As a result, mine development imposes great legal responsibility on the country. In addition, customary rules related to the rules of neutrality and the sea are at the forefront of international law that concern the regulation of the issue of mines laid by belligerent countries. Russia and Ukraine are parties to the 1907 (XIII) Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval Warfare (Hague 13) and UNCLOS III (Pedrozo, 2022).

Hague VIII Convention of 1907

The Hague VIII Convention, relevant to the laying of automatic submarine mines signed in 1907, was an attempt to reconcile various humanitarian and military interests and to protect innocent shipping during and after conflict by reducing the indiscriminate potential effects of sea mines. Moreover, it aimed to recon-

cile commercial interests and naval priorities. Undoubtedly, it is the only treaty in international law that directly and explicitly treats sea mines. The fact that Russia and Ukraine are not parties to this agreement does not affect much since the agreement is an internationally recognized customary international law designed to regulate the use of naval mines. Haines, (2014) argued that the rules in the 1907 Convention cover all forms of naval mines, as soon as the mine consists of explosive devices placed in the water, at the seabed or the subsoil of the sea, with the intent of damaging or sinking ships or preventing ships from entering the area, the provisions of the Convention shall immediately be applied.

Article 2 of the treaty explicitly prohibits the laying of spontaneous contact mines off the coasts and ports of the enemy to intercept merchant ships. If this article restricted the ban on merchant ships only, Article 1 did not include this restriction. In addition, the agreement obligated the belligerent states to take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of ship navigation. Furthermore, the rules of international maritime law have regulated the relationship and rights of belligerent and neutral parties. These rules granted rights to the neutral state, including the inviolability of exposure to the territorial waters of a neutral state (Pedrozo, 2022). Hence, the State must, before undertaking an activity that may have a detrimental impact on the environment of another State, ascertain whether there is a risk of significant transboundary harm, which would trigger the obligation to carry out an impact assessment on the environment (Dubois & Kerbrat 2018: 3).

Corfu Strait Case

In the Judgment of April 9, 1949, in the Corfu Strait case, the Court declared the Republic of Albania responsible, under international law, for the naval mine explosions that took place on October 22, 1946, in Albanian waters, and the resulting damage and loss of life to the prejudice of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (I.C.J., 1949: 245). The incident of the Strait of Corfu and the decision of the International Court of Justice related to this case set an important precedent in the international judiciary. The resolution established general principles on which international norms regarding naval mines were based. The court's decision upheld the following principles:

a) State responsibility: The court held Albania responsible for its failure to inform Britain of the dangers of mines in its territorial waters.

b) Right of innocent passage: In this case, the court has admitted the responsibility of States for an internationally wrongful act by omission and thereby established a precedent for the award of damages for material injury.

c) Limits of sovereignty over territorial waters: The Court established international standards for defining the strait and addressed the illegality of restricting the passage of ships in times of peace unless the treaty provided otherwise. By enshrining the principle of freedom of maritime navigation, the court clearly emphasized the necessity of respecting the obligation of every state's right and not being a source of threat to this principle. Indeed, the State is required to implement all the means at its disposal to prevent activities that take place on its territory or in any area under its jurisdiction from causing significant damage to another state. Therefore, due diligence, from which the Court deduced the principle of prohibition as a "customary rule", the principle has recently taken root and has led to the establishment of the principle of prohibition on a state to allow its territory to be used for purposes of acts contrary to the rights of other states as stipulated in the Strait of Corfu.

Legal Consequences

The Straits of Istanbul and Canakkale, which facilitate access to the BS and open seas, are subject to Turkish sovereignty. Only the Istanbul Strait is classified as the second busiest strait after the Malacca Strait, and it is four times more crowded than the Panama Canal and three times more crowded than the Suez Canal (Kodak & Istikba, 2021: 296). Turkey also has full control of the longest coastline and the largest maritime sovereignty area in the BS region. The geographical interdependence of the region impels the Turkish state to debate stray naval mines, including those in Russia and Ukraine. Turkish involvement is strengthened due to Turkey's control of the straits, which are considered a bridge between European and Asian continents. This status entails international legal responsibility and requires Turkey to fulfill its obligation to guarantee maritime navigation safety in its territorial waters. Turkish commitments would be achieved given that Turkey respects all international obligations stipulated in international treaties to which Turkey is a party or provided by international customary law.

Stray mines in the Black Sea

According to the reports of the Russian Hydrological Institute, the mines laid by Ukraine in the ports of Odesa, Ochakov, Chernomorsk, and Yuzhny were disposed of their moorings affected by the storm and moved uncontrollably. The number of these mines, estimated at 420, has been classified as one of the YM and YRM categories, while other reports revealed that the stray mines were one of the R-421-75 categories (Reuters, 2022). Russia issued an official "coastal warning" declaration through the international system (NAVAREA) to confront the danger of stray mines in the BS (International Maritime Organization, 2022: 3). The Ukrainian has firmly denied Russia's allegations in an official statement published by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, emphasizing that these mines were not registered in its navy (MFA, 2022). Turkey took the issue seriously and urged to close the Istanbul Strait for hours and stop maritime traffic, taking into account the danger of the presence of naval mines and the potential maritime disaster or obstructing maritime traffic in the strait for a longer period. These so-called stray, displaced, or intentionally displaced mines have posed a great danger in the BS and in the Istanbul Strait because the general influx in the BS is heading toward the Istanbul Strait under the influence of the Danube River, which means the existence of a high probability of drifting stray mines—if any—to the Istanbul Strait. According to Yaycı (2022), these types of mines, YRMs, were used to prevent landings from the sea. He argued that these mines, produced in the Soviet period, weighed about 30 kilograms and contained 3 kilograms of active explosives. The weapon explodes upon partial contact and is intended to destroy the live forces of the enemy. Although the YM has been successfully applied to sonar systems, the YRM is more difficult to locate due to its small size. Destroying a mine or finding and removing it can take months or even years.

Turkey's Legal Responsibility

Free and safe transportation of goods is crucial for uninterrupted maritime trade and development of the world economy. This would be roughly achieved after ensuring the "freedom of navigation," which is a worthy emanation from the "freedom of the high seas" principle. Any obstruction of this principle would be considered an undermining of the rules of international maritime law due to the dire consequences that may be experienced between states. The general principle of international law considers inland waters as a part of the territory of the coastal state. Consequently, the sea area that constitutes inland waters, such as ports, bays, gulfs, and closed seas, is an extension of the land country. Based on these legal principles, Turkey is

legally responsible for ensuring the safety of maritime navigation in its territorial waters. This responsibility requires guaranteeing the innocent passage of ships within the framework of international law.

Turkey's international commitment

The international customary law has basically endorsed in times of peace for all states the right to send their warship through the straits used for international navigation to link two different parts of high seas, without prior permission from the state bordering the strait, provided that the passage is innocent unless another international agreement stipulates otherwise (I.C.J., 1949: 4). In this aspect, stature or the size of the strait is unconsidered, but rather the geographical factor, which is the fact that it is a link between two parts of the high seas and the fact that it is used for international navigation (Oral & Öztürk, 2006: 17). As a result of legal evolutions and increased interest relying on the codification of the law of the sea, UNCLOS I has clarified the meaning of the international strait and stipulated the freedom of innocent passage of foreign ships in the international strait. According to the Montreux Convention, Turkey has the power to regulate the transit of naval warships through the Istanbul and Canakkale Straits. This agreement also gave Turkey legal competency to close the strait to military warships during wartime.

Turkey's international commitment to innocent passage

The right to an innocent passage is fundamental in international maritime law. According to Article 17 of the UN Convention, the right to innocent passage through territorial waters for ships of all states existed. This includes two elements: the "passage" and its "innocence" through the territorial sea to coastal and non-marine states (Hakapää, 2015: 3). In addition, Goresius acknowledged the recognition of the authority of the state even over the coastal waters closest to its shores (Rusli, 2012: 105). Therefore, the coastal state is responsible for abstaining from all types of dangers related to transportation in its territorial waters using all appropriate means. Both UNCLOS I and III treaties also laid down in international judicial decisions. Although Turkey is not a party to these two conventions, most of the principles contained therein have become binding rules for nonparty states. In addition, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation of 1988 gives full jurisdiction to coastal states to take all necessary measures against anyone who has caused damage to a ship while passing through its territorial waters.

Turkey's Commitment vis à vis Montreux Convention

Under the Montreux Convention signed in 1936, Turkey extended its control over the straits leading to the BS. Indeed, the Convention has regulated the transit of naval warship laws in peace and wartime. It also guarantees the free passage of civilian ships in times of peace and limits the passage of ships not belonging to the BS countries. The Agreement enhances Turkey's full sovereignty and control over its straits (Delanoe, 2014: 369), after being restricted by the provisions of the previous Treaty of Lausanne. Meanwhile, it constitutes the main framework related to international passage in the Istanbul Strait, but the regulation of safe passage in the Istanbul Strait has been left to Turkey, as can be understood from the text of the Convention. As stated in the Montreux Convention, the main purpose of the treaty was to ensure the security of Turkey and the riparian countries and to create safe passage conditions. To create the necessary conditions for safe passage, Turkey can make arrangements without violating international law. Consequently, the transition must in any case be innocuous and devoid of offensive character (Rusli, 2012: 13). According to Article 4, Turkey is obligated to guarantee "freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits" if it is not belligerent. The freedom of transit provided for in the Montreux Convention has corresponded to the innocent passage

provided for in the Law of the Sea conventions UNCLOS I and III, which has legally entailed Turkey's obligation to ensure the security of its straits.

Conclusion

The Russian-Ukraine war is one of the biggest crises that the European continent has experienced since World War II. This will inevitably have multifaceted repercussions on the entire global system as a result of the dimensions of the war and the subsequent tensions and the nature of the active forces in shaping its economic, military, and political features. Given its political geography, Turkey is one of the most important regional powers that may be targeted by the consequences of this war.

Regarding the use of naval mines in the BS region as a result of the war between Ukraine and Russia, double legal responsibility has implicated Turkey as a state. Certainly, Turkey has assumed the status of a non-belligerent state in this war; consequently, it is Turkey's obligation to take into consideration the rules of international law related to its legal status, especially the Montreux Convention, in which Turkey has appeared to be one of the major parties. In addition, because the naval mines discovered by Turkey were sourced from a third-party, the situation became more complicated. In fact, determining the legal consequences of Turkish responsibility entails a focus on the general principles of relevant international law rules, particularly international conventions, customary rules, and international jurisprudence related to this context.

The laying of naval mines constitutes a clear violation of international law. International responsibility is directly related to the warring countries of Russia and Ukraine. The nature of this legal breach included the obstruction of the safety of innocent passage, which is a peremptory rule endorsed by international customary law. In addition, the violation constitutes an assault on the territorial waters of a neutral country. Turkey's legal responsibility for the stray mine has been implicated in terms of Turkey's full obligation to ensure a necessary safe passage in the straits and waters under its sovereignty.



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Author Details

Mouhamed Bachir Diop (Asst. Prof. Dr.)

¹ İstanbul Gelisim University, Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, İstanbul, Türkiye

 0000-0003-2273-4243  mbdiop@gelisim.edu.tr

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From Neighbors to Potential Members: Is the War in Ukraine a Critical Juncture for the European Union's Enlargement Policy?



Seven Erdoğan¹  

¹ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan University, FEAS, Department of International Relations. Rize, Türkiye

Abstract

In the aftermath of the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine (the Associated Trio) immediately submitted their applications for membership of the European Union (EU). In response to the Associated Trio's formal membership applications, the EU granted candidate status to Moldova and Ukraine in 2022 and to Georgia in 2023. In doing so, the EU has made clear that it is prepared to offer more than symbolic solidarity to neighbors invaded or threatened by Russian aggression. This article critically examines the implications of the war in Ukraine for EU enlargement policy. It seeks to determine whether the inclusion of the Associated Trio in the enlargement agenda symbolizes a shift in the EU's overall approach to enlargement. This article uses historical institutionalism's critical juncture concept as a theoretical framework. Throughout the study, a qualitative method is used to analyze the EU's official documents and the available literature in a descriptive and interpretive way. The article concludes that the EU's decision to rethink its long-fatigued enlargement policy following the war in Ukraine appears to be a critical juncture that holds the potential to shape the future landscape of enlargement.


Keywords


European Union • Enlargement Policy • War in Ukraine • Associated Trio



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 Corresponding author: Seven Erdoğan seven.erdogan.edu.tr



From Neighbors to Potential Members: Is the War in Ukraine a Critical Juncture for the European Union's Enlargement Policy?

Since its emergence in 2014, the Ukraine crisis has posed many challenges for the European Union (EU). It has led to many policy reconfigurations, especially in the areas of trade, aid, energy, and external relations (Moravcsik, 2016). For example, in this new context, the end of the EU's high dependence on Russian energy sources has become a matter of urgency for the EU's energy policy (Stockemer, 2023). After the escalation of the crisis into a war in 2022, the challenges posed by the crisis have had a major impact on EU foreign policy. More fundamentally, the crisis has had important consequences for the EU's enlargement policy.

The EU's enlargement potential has been negatively constrained in the last two decades, when the Union has been in a constant struggle to cope with several simultaneous or successive crises, such as the debt crisis, the migration crisis and Brexit, which has also been defined as a situation of polycrises (Rhinar, 2019; Zeitlin, Nikoli & Laffan, 2019). Meanwhile, the integration of the Western Balkan countries into the EU has been marked by a number of less remarkable decisions, which have meant limited progress toward membership in general. With the war in question, the EU decided to launch a new enlargement wave involving three old Eastern Partnership countries, also known as the "Associated Trio." What happened in the long-forgotten area of enlargement was not only unprecedented but also a great surprise, especially after Croatia became the last country to join the EU in 2013. Following this historic decision, the ongoing EU membership process was also discussed.

The aim of this study is to determine to what extent the Ukrainian war has caused a change in the EU enlargement policy in terms of agenda and methodology by using descriptive and interpretative qualitative methods. To improve the understanding of developments in enlargement policy after the Ukrainian war, this article uses a theoretical framework based on the critical concept of historical institutionalism. In this way, by linking its research agenda with its conceptual framework, the study elaborates on the research question 'Does the EU's response to the new realities in its neighborhood mean a shift in the European Union's enlargement policy after the war in Ukraine?'

The article proceeds as follows. First, the concept of critical juncture is presented in such a way as to show that it is a useful tool for analyzing foreign policy changes during crises and for opening up political space for these changes. Second, the dominant dynamics of the EU enlargement process before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine were presented as states of fatigue. Third, the developments in EU enlargement after the war in Ukraine were identified. Fourth, the factors and developments covered in the previous two sub-titles are discussed comparatively from the perspective of critical junctures. Finally, the study concludes by stressing that despite some unexpected decisions to include new countries in the EU's enlargement agenda after the war in Ukraine, it is still too early to define the war as a critical juncture because of uncertainties about the next steps in creating a new path.



A Tool for Understanding Change: The Critical Juncture Concept

Although we are living in a period of unprecedented change, our understanding of change is very inferior to our understanding of fundamental long-term regularities (Keohane, 2008)

The critical juncture is one of the few concepts in political science that has been mobilized for the study of moments of political change that lead political agencies to rethink prevailing institutional configurations. In general, it defines a moment in time that brings about a wholesale questioning of the status quo by weakening the oppressive limits of structural constraints that have operated as mechanisms offering legitimacy to the status quo of previous critical juncture and prevented action to make a new beginning (Ewing & Krawatzek, 2022; Ikani, 2021; Soifer, 2012). With the integration of this concept into Historical Institutionalism¹, the theory has largely escaped accusations of being a theory of continuity with a poor capacity to understand change (Sorensen, 2023).

The critical juncture concept was developed by Lipset and Rokkan in 1967 in their study of comparative politics (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). However, the first comprehensive statement of the concept is made by Collier and Collier (1991), in which a critical juncture is defined as a period of significant change that typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries. In the aftermath of this study, the use of the concept by academics expanded (Capoccia, 2016). In the later conceptualizations of the critical juncture concept, especially in the ones made after the turn of century, the significance given to the interests, ideas, emotions, discourse, and agency was enhanced (Smith, 2021).

Critical junctures cannot be considered the only source of change because some antecedent conditions generally play a causal role in the outcomes of critical junctures (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). This means that critical junctures generally operate with some critical antecedents that act as factors or conditions that increase the pressure for change when a critical juncture emerges. They lead actors to believe that they are reaching a certain threshold (Slater & Simmons, 2010). The events or developments identified as critical junctures may occur as a result of both exogenous and indigenous factors, or because of the combination and interaction of the two (Hogan, 2019).

By focusing on the criticality of particular junctures, the concept distinguishes between historical moments. The critical juncture is identified as a moment that produces long-term and transformative effects. Others are classified as historical moments that ensure the continuation of the existing order (Soifer, 2012). The destructive effects of these times in terms of dominant ideas, legitimacy approaches, or framing attempts, or their radical consequences on the established order, reflecting an equilibrium achieved after a choice of path at a past moment of critical juncture, motivate us to identify them as crisis situations (Donatella et al, 2020; Hogan 2019). As a result, critical junctures are often associated with sudden and transformative change rather than incremental change through ongoing adjustments and adaptations (Sorensen, 2023). In these moments, existing institutional mechanisms are seen as inadequate to handle the situation at hand (Ikani, 2021).

The choice made at the moment of a critical juncture generally has important future outcomes and may even precipitate later crises (Haydu, 1998; Mahoney, 2001). The legitimacy of existing institutions is undermined during critical junctures. This creates openings for entrepreneurs to reshape existing institutions and encourages the emergence of new innovative arrangements, which generally mean a significant divergence

¹A political theory that argues that the timing and sequence of events shape political processes.

from the past (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007; Katznelson, 2014; Berntzen, 2020; Krisch & Yıldız, 2023). Critical junctures are the choice points at which a particular option is adopted from two or more alternatives (Mahoney, 2001). These junctures are critical because once an option is selected, it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives are still available (Mahoney, 2022). Critical junctures lead to the elimination of some previous alternatives by making them less legitimate and attractive in the eyes of agency (Hogan, 2019). Pierson (2004) explains the period following a critical juncture through the mechanism of the “lock-in effect,” whereby a process of path dependency that shapes the subsequent trajectory operates in a way that makes alternative structures less likely to triumph (Pierson). Therefore, critical junctures are also path-creating moments. A new path is created, and path dependency is formed.

Enlargement of the EU before the War in Ukraine: Living in a State of Fatigue

There has been a widespread view that the EU has been suffering from severe enlargement fatigue since the completion of the 2004 and 2007 big bang enlargements (O’Brennan, 2014). It has been widely argued that the achievement of EU membership by many members before getting ready and fully prepared for accession played a crucial role in the emergence of this enlargement fatigue (Szołucha, 2010). Enlargement fatigue, however, is as old as EU enlargement itself. It is not a new phenomenon nor specific to the period following the big bang enlargement. France’s reluctance to British membership in the 1960s, in view of its potential influence on EU integration, was the first expression of enlargement fatigue (O’Brennan, 2014).

The reason for both the emergence and deepening of this problem was once again frequently identified as the absorption capacity, which refers to the EU’s ability to absorb new member states institutionally, procedurally and materially without creating problems in the pace and functioning of the integration process (Emerson et al, 2006; Börzel, Dimitrova & Schimmelfennig, 2017). From this perspective, enlargement has been framed as a risk with the potential to upset the delicate balance of the European construction, notably through the disruption of its internal cohesion with the integration of new members into the decision-making structures (Sjursen, 2012). These growing concerns and prejudices about the forthcoming enlargements led to the dominance of the intergovernmental approach in the accession process and was described by Hillion (2010) as the creeping nationalization of EU enlargement. At the time of Albania’s application for membership in 2009, Germany indicated that it would not allow a request for an opinion from the Commission until there was formal approval by the Bundestag (Emerson & Blockmans, 2022). Additionally, the increasing number of benchmarks, each of which required unanimous approval, slowed the pace of accession.

The stalemate of the last two decades is making it difficult to claim that the enlargement lies at the very core of EU integration. Enlargement, which has been told as a success story or as the EU’s most powerful foreign policy tool, has lost much of its salience (Grabbe, 2006). Politicians talked on it less, and issues related to enlargement found limited space in EU decision-making processes under pressure from Euroskeptic movements (Economides, Featherstone & Hunter, 2024). The rising negative feelings associated with the enlargement pushed the EU to find a way to hold the enlargement process at a slow pace, without realizing the ideal of membership; therefore, accession became a tool rather than a goal (Domaradzki, 2023). In other words, after its big bang enlargement, the EU has changed significantly, both in terms of policy content and institutional set-up, and this new EU has decided to relate to its new members with instruments that mean less than accession. The accession countries (including Turkey and the Western Balkans) have been negatively affected by their exposure to the EU operating under the influence of enlargement

fatigue. Enlargement fatigue has undermined membership credibility in potential members' eyes. It has also destroyed their willingness to reform to conform to EU standards (Szolucha, 2010). Because of the continuing stalemate in the accession process, progress reports became stagnation reports. They have also been officially renamed as "country reports."

After the deadlock in the EU's enlargement policy, the Union designed new policy alternatives, such as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP), to build closer ties with neighboring countries, many of which were post-Soviet states, and achieve stability in its immediate neighborhood without offering the promise of membership (Eriş, 2012). Neither of these tools did not create a significant improvement in the picture by making the region more stable (Dabrowski, 2022). Partnership and Association Agreements have been signed with these countries in order to strengthen their ties to the EU. In addition, the citizens of these countries enjoy visa-free movement within the EU. That means there were political, economic, and social ties have already been operating between the parties. As far as the alignment of these countries with EU standards is concerned, such intensive cooperation with the EU has remained poor and slow. It has even been argued that the EU's choice of this kind of policy approach has left the region vulnerable to Russian influence and aggression, leaving it as a gray zone between Russia and Europe (Karjalainen, 2023).

When the EU was under influence enlargement fatigue, the pace of enlargement slowed down and enlargement policy lost its credibility and consistency. This paved the way for anti-EU narratives, democratic backsliding, and illiberal developments in the accession countries (Bechev, 2022). After observing the negative effects of this fatigue, the EU took several steps to give the faltering enlargement policy a kiss of life. It has adopted a new or revised methodology, aimed, in particular, at ending the delays in democratization in the Western Balkans by 2020. Within this new methodology, the main innovation was the grouping of the enlarged chapters into six clusters with the aim of working on all chapters simultaneously. Among the clusters, the political criteria cluster was defined as the *primus inter pares*, the first to be opened and the last to be closed, thus setting the pace of the whole process. However, despite its initial intention of making EU enlargement policy more credible, predictable and dynamic, the new methodology has not resulted in a fundamental change in the accession process. The policy continued to suffer from a high degree of unpredictability, a lack of a tailor-made approach, and a lack of coherence between negotiating chapters (Jačimović & Shaipova, 2023).

Enlargement of the EU after the War in Ukraine

After the failure of its neo-imperial attempts to peacefully establish control over the internal and external affairs of post-Soviet countries with the past twin enlargements of the EU and NATO (Rabinovych & Pintsch, 2024), Russia launched an invasion campaign against Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine (also known as the Associated Trio after signing a joint memorandum to promote the cooperation among themselves and with the EU), as former participants of the EU's EaP mechanism, including no membership perspective, submitted their membership applications to the EU within a week of this invasion campaign.

The EU's first formal response to the appeals of the Associated Trio, which were former Eastern partners, came with the Versailles Declaration on 11 March. The declaration gave the green light for the examination of the applications of the Associated Trio, stated that the Council recognized the European aspirations and the European choice of them and invited the Commission to present its opinion on these applications in

accordance with the relevant provisions of the treaties for all three countries (European Council, 2022a). This was the beginning of a new chapter in EU relations.

Just three months after the Associated Trio applied for membership, the European Commission produced opinions in 17 June 2022, including an assessment of the capacity of each country to meet the criteria for EU membership set by the European Councils of Copenhagen in 1993 and Madrid in 1995 (European Commission, 2022a). The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen (2022a), concluded the official presentation of the Opinions in the following manner: ‘We all know that Ukrainians are ready to die from the European perspective. We want them to live with us in the European dream.’

The EU has acted with unprecedented speed on membership applications in four months, with the European Council (2022b) of 23-24 June granting official candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova and a European perspective to Georgia. In the Commission’s opinion, left-behind Georgia was invited to achieve a better level in terms of political criteria through reforms related to judicial independence, media freedoms, anticorruption, de-oligarchization of state and economy, and overcoming political polarization (European Commission, 2022a). Georgia was also declared a candidate for EU membership in December 2023, following the adoption of expected reform measures (European Council, 2023a).

The war in Ukraine served as a catalyst, prompting the EU to take urgent action and reaction. The EU has demonstrated that when necessary, it can act with great speed. The Baltic countries, Sweden and Poland, played a crucial role in the process with their strong support for the accession process of the Associated Trio (Dubský, Kočí & Votoupalová, 2024). In the history of EU enlargement, no other country has been awarded candidate status as fast as Ukraine or Moldova, less than four months upon application. The politics rather than the technocratic approach prevailed in the decisions on the accession of the Associated Trio. The provision of a membership perspective to them did not happen because of their good record of reforms; instead, it happened as an expression of the EU’s geopolitical reaction to the changing security environment in Europe. In other words, with its decision, the EU sent a strong signal to Russia to end its aggression and strengthen its position as a stability promoter (Lippert, 2022).

In this rapid mobilization, a high level of empathy with Ukrainian people, both at the political and public levels, played a crucial role. Accordingly, the tendency to view Ukraine as a member of the European family and its attack as an attack on the whole family is widespread among European political elites and publics (Kaveshnikov, 2022). The President of the European Commission also made an emotional statement about Ukraine in September 2022: ‘You are part of our family, your future is in our Union, and our Union is not complete without you.’ Besides, in the same statement, the President also underlined the necessity of fighting for democracy, because, from her perspective, what was happening in Ukraine was part of a larger confrontation between democracy and autocracy (Leyen, 2022b). Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its disregard for international law are linked to the ongoing debate about the transformation of the international system, which is driven primarily by challenges to the liberal world order, particularly the rise and growth of nondemocratic states (Cross & Karolewski, 2017). In this process, Russia has been framed as a common and imminent threat and foe posing a challenge the EU, to the security of its citizens, its core principles and values, including democracy, and the European model, and this has provided a narrative for the new round of enlargement (European Council, 2022a; Härtel, 2024).

The rapid decisions on the membership of the Associated Trio to the EU without asking for fulfilling many conditions, combined with the unfulfilled membership hopes of years, caused frustration at the side of Western Balkan countries (Camille, 2022; Belle, 2022). Moreover, the EU’s declining credibility became even

more problematic as China and Russia sought to assert their influence in the region through their own plans and visions (Gaarmann, 2023; Alesina, 2022). As a result, the EU was under the obligation of making decisions to boost the long-forgotten accession processes of the Western Balkans. In this vein, Albania and North Macedonia made progress in the accession negotiation, with the initiation of an *acquis* screening process (European Commission, 2022b), and Bosnia and Herzegovina gained candidate status in 2022 (General Affairs Council, 2022). The decision for Bosnia and Herzegovina was also taken despite the country's limited progress in reforms related to EU accession. In the same year, Kosovo achieved the long-awaited ideal of visa liberalization. Furthermore, the EU-Western Balkan summit occurred in Tirana on December 6, 2022. The Union held a high-profile meeting outside its territory for the first time. It was intended to signal its strong commitment to the region (European Commission, 2022c).

Recent Enlargement Developments from a Critical Juncture Perspective

As mentioned above, the aim of this study was to examine the war in Ukraine as a critical juncture that motivated the Associated Trio to apply for EU membership. Under this title, the dynamics of EU enlargement are examined by comparing the period before and after the war in Ukraine and by applying the theoretical mindset offered by the concept of critical juncture.

The EU's response to the membership aspirations of the Associated Trio was shaped by several antecedent conditions. First, the EU has been always very sensitive to changing geopolitical realities since the inception of the integration (Samadashvili, 2022). For example, the EU reacted to the end of the Cold War by adopting the famous Maastricht Treaty, including the institutionalization of foreign policy cooperation under the framework of a common foreign and security policy, and by launching a big bang enlargement aiming to end the Cold War division of Europe. Second, when Russia attacked Georgia in 2008 and recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent entities or invaded Crimea of Ukraine in 2014 by acting against the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the EU did not show a strong reaction (Karjalainen, 2023). For instance, the EU's response to Russia's incursion into Georgia was to develop the EaP as part of the ENP. After several ENP revisions, the EU finally concluded that security threats in the neighborhood and the return of geopolitics to Europe made it impossible to continue with the ENP (Ikani, 2019). This may be because the EU's weak response to Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, and its continued aggression against Ukraine in the Donbass, is seen as a factor in Russia launching a full-scale war against Ukraine on February 24, 2022 (Rabinovych & Pintsch, 2024). Third, from the outset, EU member states, such as Poland, Sweden and Germany, have long been of the opinion that there should be a political distinction between the EU's approach to its eastern and southern neighbors (Ikani, 2021). Therefore, the eastern and southern components of the ENP have very different dynamics. While the possibility of EU membership was not formally promised to eastern neighbors, such a possibility was clearly not on the horizon for southern neighbors (Elsuwegeand & Loo, 2017). Hence, the Ukraine may have been considering this application before the war, but the war created an additional motivation and made this application an urgent one for Ukraine. This critical move by Ukraine has made membership application a necessity for the other two members of the Associated Trio facing the Russian threat. Therefore, an expected change can be observed that has been discussed for years. What is unexpected is the EU attitude, which is a symbol of a larger change, as there is a shift from neighborhood policy to enlargement policy.

Until the war, the EU remained highly reluctant to consider eastern enlargement, and there was also a high level of reluctance about the ongoing enlargement processes, including the Western Balkan countries and Türkiye. Despite the EU member states' declarative dedication to the enlargement agenda, enlargement

did not turn into an issue of EU priority (Jaćimović & Shaipova, 2023). The Russian attack on Ukraine in 2022 changed the cost-benefit calculations for enlargement in EU capitals. Urgent security imperatives, which have been operating at the expense of the EU's comfort zone, have forced EU member states to gather their political will and make long-awaited decisions in the field of enlargement. In other words, the ice of the enlargement stalemate has finally broken. For the first time after the completion of the big bang enlargement in 2007, 2022 became the most eventful year for EU enlargement. EU member states, willingly or unwillingly, have taken historical decisions that represent a radical change from previous positions. Moreover, what is happening at the political level is also supported by European publics, and it can even be argued that this change in public attitudes toward enlargement has enabled leaders to make these critical decisions (Nakashidze, 2024).

A new type of framing, which led EU leaders to question the legitimacy of previously chosen institutional mechanisms for dealing with Russia both globally and in the common neighborhood, emerged after the war in Ukraine. The Versailles Declaration, issued after the informal meetings of EU leaders on 11 March 2022, underlined that "Russia's war of aggression constitutes a tectonic shift in European history." (European Commission, 2022a). By approaching the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the largest armed conflict in Europe since the end of the Second World War, from the perspective of global power competition and the return of war to the European continent, the EU came to the point of not only responding to Russian aggression in Ukraine but also to Russia, who is a geopolitical rival and a common foe, aiming to establish a so-called sphere of influence in order to maintain control over the future shape of the international system (European Union, 2022). Since then, it has become urgent for the EU to regain its lost status as a transformative power by rethinking the Union's role in its neighborhood and on a global level.

According to the critical juncture theoretical framework, what comes next after a critical moment is the construction of a new path. With the official decisions taken for integrating the Associated Trio into the enlargement agenda, the Union made a very quick start (Kaveshnikov, 2022). From now on, the EU has to support its new position by taking further steps and demonstrating its political will. Otherwise, this moment, which still has the value of being a critical juncture, has the potential to turn into a simple political gesture. Forging a new path, which is long, would undoubtedly pose significant challenges for the EU. In 2023, EU leaders gathered in Granada to mark the start of the process to define the Union's general political directions and priorities for the years to come, setting a strategic course of action to shape our common future for the benefit of all. In this meeting, enlargement was stressed as a geostrategic investment in peace, security, stability, and prosperity (European Council, 2023b).

The EU is not ready for a rapid enlargement on the basis of geopolitical grounds, as it ignores the shortcomings of the accession countries. The integration continues to have many internal problems, and member states continued to have different views about the direction of the integration process (Domaradzki, 2023). There are still EU member states, such as France, reluctant to further enlarge the Union, or at least to enlarge without deepening (Sapir, 2022). These member states can put forward political proposals that could be an alternative to enlargement with a looser level of integration, which means more than association but less than membership. There is also a debate over staged membership (Anghel & Džankić, 2023). These measures can reduce the opposition of reluctant member states and lessen the need for reform of existing policies and benefits (Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2017).

Conclusion

The EU has often used its enlargement policy as a geopolitical tool in the past, notably when it expanded to the post-Soviet countries of Central and Eastern Europe or when it decided to ensure stability in the Western Balkans after the break-up of Yugoslavia. In other words, the EU has used enlargement decisions to respond urgently to major international developments in its neighborhood. Therefore, the EU's response to Russia's attack on Ukraine can be seen as a clear expression of the old reflex. With the long-awaited membership applications from the Associated Trio arriving a few weeks after the attack, the Union decided to rethink its relations with them and made an institutional shift in relations, moving them from neighborhood policy to enlargement policy. Beyond this critical institutional shift is the predominance of a long fatigue in the enlargement sphere before its revival after the war in Ukraine. It would be the first time for the EU to manage two enlargement rounds, namely the Western Balkans and the Associated Trio, which include two regions with diverse historical, societal and geopolitical influences. In the aftermath of the landmark decisions on enlargement, which, at least for the time being, appear to be a critical juncture, it is now time to chart a new course in order to once again repeat the successful transformation stories of EU enlargement.



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Author Details **Seven Erdoğan (Assoc. Prof. Dr.)**

¹ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan University, FEAS, Department of International Relations. Rize, Türkiye

 0000-0001-9991-2074  seven.erdogan.edu.tr

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Research Article

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Examination of China-Kenya Economic Relations between 1993 and 2003



Esra Sarioğlu¹ & George Maangi²

¹ Gaziantep University, Department of International Relations, Gaziantep, Türkiye

² University of Nairobi, Diplomacy and International Studies, Nairobi, Kenya

Abstract

The contemporary international system is characterized by social, economic, and political interactions. The most significant of these are economic integration and globalization, which have brought together various actors in the international system, particularly states. In this regard, states develop foreign policies that seek to achieve their respective national interests and are informed by domestic, regional, and international conditions. Economic relations are essential tools that states deploy to achieve their national interests. The People's Republic of China has been notably effective in Africa, and its developing diplomatic and economic ties with Kenya, located in the east of Africa, have made it a vital strategic partner. Since 1978, the two countries have established strong economic relations, including bilateral trade, economic investments, and foreign aid. This study examines the economic relations between the two countries from 1993 to 2003, leading up to Kenya's President Mwai Kibaki's government's adoption of the "Look East Policy." This article analyzes the initiatives and their consequences that characterized the economic relations between the two countries during the period under review. The study relies primarily on secondary data from official documents, policy documents, newspapers with the highest circulation in both countries, and scientific literature on the subject. Between 1993 and 2003, China-Kenya relations gained economic momentum, and during this decade, steps were taken to strengthen bilateral relations. Additionally, the development of diplomatic and economic relations during this period created a more significant interactions between China and Kenya. These interactions also allowed the two countries to gain economic benefits and a bond over shared interests.

Keywords

China · Kenya · Trade · Investment · Foreign Aid



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✉ Corresponding author: Esra Sarioğlu esra.sarioglu@yahoo.com



Examination of China-Kenya Economic Relations between 1993 and 2003

Kenya and China relations began on December 14, 1963, when China opened its embassy in Nairobi just two days after Kenya's independence. Despite this good start, the relations were disrupted in 1966 after the Kenyan government made allegations of China sponsoring a coup in Kenya, followed by demonstrations culminating in the two countries severing their diplomatic relations. The Diplomatic relations were restored in 1978 by President Daniel Moi, marking the beginning of intense collaborations in trade, investment, and technology exchange between the two governments (Patroba, 2012). This relationship was encouraged in the 1990s, which set the stage for President Mwai Kibaki's government's adoption of the 'Look East Policy' in the early 2000s. In this policy, China's engagement and presence in Kenya increased exponentially, with more financial and technical aid being given to Kenya, particularly in infrastructure projects. State visits by President Kibaki of Kenya and Hu Jintao in 2005 and 2006 cemented these relations by constructing oil exploration and mining projects in motion by Chinese companies in Kenya (African Business, 2011). Several other deals were signed in subsequent years, and President Kibaki's 2008 Vision 2030 initiative reinforced the two nations' economic relations (Kenya Vision 2030).¹ The period covered in this study is 1993-2003. It is important to understand the establishment of China-Kenya economic relations and the kind of economic relationship that existed between the two countries before the 2003 presidency of President Hu Jintao. This study examined China-Kenya economic relations between 1993 and 2003 to help readers understand this relationship and contribute to the literature.

From 1993 to 2003, Kenya received significant development aid. Significant Chinese aid has also been used to promote trade, infrastructure expansion, and industrial development. It was stated that the Kenyan government welcomed China's approach towards development aid because it was seen as a tool to help improve the country's difficult social and economic situation (Elmi, 2012, p. 2). Aid played an essential role in bilateral relations between China and Kenya during the reign of President Daniel Arap Moi. For instance, during a visit to China in September 1980, President Moi, in his speeches, stated that he had traveled with the Kenyan delegation to China to "seek development aid and to strengthen the relations between Kenya and China." He added that the country had what it wanted in terms of aid. An official in the president's entourage speaking about the various high-level and elite negotiations stated, "From now on, you are going to see much activity between Kenya and China ... Things will now go very fast. " (Daily Nation, 1980, p. 4). As Moi explained, after 1980, China-Kenya relations deepened, and both trade and aid between the two countries increased significantly. During Moi's state visit to China in 1980, a new economic and technical cooperation agreement was established. This agreement brought China's expertise in agriculture and energy expertise to rural projects. The most significant project was the construction of the National Sports Complex in Nairobi, which included a 60,000-seat stadium, a gym, a swimming pool, and a boarding house. For these projects, China provided a six-year, interest-free loan of ¥70 million (KSh350 million), with a budget of KSh300 million allocated specifically for the sports complex (Sun, 2023 p. 131).

It is worth noting that this initiative has seen many infrastructural projects being executed, major among them being the Nairobi- Thika Highway and the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), which are viewed as the bedrock of achieving the Vision (Tripathi et al., 2021). In 2017, an upgrade was done to Kenya-China bilateral relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership by Kenya's President, Uhuru Kenyatta, and

¹Vision 2030 sought to transform Kenya "into a rapidly industrializing middle-income nation by 2030.



his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2017). This was meant to deepen cooperation in various areas and increase people-to-people exchanges to enhance bilateral relations (Xinhua, 2017).

Economic relations are embedded in the concept of economic diplomacy. According to Baine and Woolcock, economic diplomacy refers to procedures and techniques for international decision-making on cross-border economic activities like migration, aid, lending, investment, import, and export, pursued by national and non-national actors. (Bayne and Woolcock, 2017). Governments use resources to promote a country's economic interests and growth through international engagement with relevant actors. Due to globalization, economic diplomacy is deeply intertwined with domestic policymaking because it has increased economic interdependence between countries. Economic diplomacy is central to countries' foreign policies, which advance and achieve their interests through trade, investment, and technical support. In this way, a country's economic resources and relations are leveraged to attain its strategic foreign policy goals globally. Countries enter bilateral agreements where they outline areas of cooperation and the corresponding benefits to the parties involved. Moreover, the states align their national policies with the negotiated agreements so as to ensure that the international agreements support their national development goals and exhibit goodwill for credibility. These economic diplomacy pursuits are not the monopoly of states and their agents but incorporate all actors in international relations, including non-state actors. Notably, non-state actors, specifically non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations (MNCs), and international organizations play a crucial role in economic diplomacy by shaping economic policies and interactions between countries. International organizations like the World Trade Organization, World Bank, and IMF impact economic diplomacy by setting rules, norms, and standards that countries must adhere to. This influence of non-state actors has defied the traditional state-centric model of diplomacy, whereby governments interact and negotiate with various stakeholders, not just other states, to effectively execute economic diplomacy. Kenya- China economic diplomacy has been characterized by several bilateral agreements and infrastructural developments with China's Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), established in 2003, which offers a platform to strengthen ties between China and African countries.

Since independence, Kenya has been one of Africa's most stable economic and strategic countries. Since the 1990s, the nation's economy has grown progressively, creating an enlarged market for global merchandize. Consequently, Kenya has become an important conduit and gateway for foreign investors to cooperate in investment and trade with Africa (Farooq et al., 2008, p. 408). The country has notable economic relations with many other nations worldwide, both in the Global North and the Global South. In particular, China's presence in Kenya's economy is featured in trading, investment, and manufacturing undertakings, with most Kenyans importing Chinese products. Since the 2000s, Kenya has been developing new economic collaborations with Asian nations. After taking power in 2002, the NARC government² shadowed a "Look East" strategy³ that targeted strengthening trade partnerships with Eastern nations. Consequently, the government engaged in economic and trade relations with five countries, including Singapore, Japan, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and China; however, the primary economic partner was China (Mullinge, 2012, p. 2).

²The NARC government came to power in 2002, led by President Mwai Kibaki.

³Under the Look East policy, Kenya has shifted its investment setting to favor the Sino-Indian-Persian triumvirate instead of its customary partners, the United States and Europe. This change resulted in significant investment from China in infrastructure development.

Methodology

This study provides a detailed account of the economic partnership between the Republic of Kenya and the People's Republic of China between 1993 and 2003. Its main objective is to highlight the major economic activities that characterized these relations and to determine the intensity and corresponding impact of the two nations' association.

Research Design and Data Sources

This study uses a descriptive research design to provide a detailed account of the economic relations between the Republic of Kenya and the People's Republic of China between 1993 and 2003. This study systematically describes the dynamics and implications of the relations between the two countries. In the analysis of the economic relations between China and Kenya between 1993 and 2003, the impact of Chinese investment, trade, and aid on the economic development of Kenya, its effect on China-Kenya relations during this period, and the related implications are assessed.

This study is based on secondary data that includes case studies of various trade initiatives and projects undertaken during the period. The data used in the analysis are drawn from public pronouncements made by officials of the two governments, policy documents, countries' newspapers, and academic literature. The analysis of this secondary data focuses on initiatives undertaken in these relations, their contributions, and their impact on the various sectors of the economies of both countries during the period. The Kenyan and Chinese governments' reports and statistics, which include official publications from government agencies, provide the necessary account of the relationship. On the other hand, academic sources are obtained from academic databases, which include data repositories, journals, and peer-reviewed articles, and provide high-quality, reliable data on the research topic. For data collection, a systematic review of the existing literature from the sources indicated shall be conducted to compile relevant studies and datasets.

Limitations of the Study

In this study, the limitations of relying on secondary data are inevitable. Since the researchers do not have control over how the data is collected and analyzed, concerns about the reliability and validity of the data may arise. The errors and biases of the original researchers during data collection may also affect the results. Therefore, secondary data were ensured to be consistent with the research objectives and assessed for relevance to the original purpose of data collection and research questions. In addition, the reliability of the data sources was verified using reputable peer-reviewed publications and government reports.

Economic Relations Between China and Kenya

Mutual Trade Between China and Kenya

China is a growing global market for services and goods. It is also an alternative source of technology. Trade between Kenya and China grows every year. Global trade is recognized as a crucial tool for industrialization and economic development. (Morrison et al., 2008). Kenya's imports from China gradually increased compared to the subnormal growth in exports to the People's Republic of China, reaching an average of 29.3 million dollars in 1994. After 1995, when Chinese imports increased by five-fold, trade between China and Kenya increased significantly (Chege, 2008, p. 24). Kenya's real GDP increased by 1.9% from 1994 to 2003, whereas income per head in Kenya reduced by 0.6% during a similar period. Therefore, the expeditious rise in

Kenya's imports from China did not emerge from Kenya's rising incomes but from two factors: liberalization of the exchange rate and China's industrial modernization. In 1996, while receiving the Chinese Assistant Minister for Foreign Trade Liu Ziang, the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry chairman, Kassim Owango, stated that Kenya would form a joint committee to examine the goods that Kenya could export to China in bulk to narrow the trade imbalance. Mr. Owango stated that with innovation, the country could export tea to China with modifications to suit Chinese tastes. Mr. Ziang noted that China's 1.3 billion population offered Kenya an excellent opportunity to sell its commodities. Mr. Owango urged Chinese entrepreneurs to take a more vigorous role in Kenya's local economy by investing in industry and trade. He added that Kenyan consumers had built brand loyalty to Chinese products, including farm implements, bicycles, and lanterns. He commended the quality of Chinese products. Mr. Ziang stated that China could import more goods from Kenya to decrease the trade imbalance (Ngigi, 1996, p. 12).

In December 1996, President Moi received China's Vice-Minister for Foreign Trade and Economic Development, Mr. Kiangdong. Mr. Kiangdong was in Kenya for the 1996 Chinese Commodity Fair (Ngigi, 1996, p. 12). The Kenyan president thanked China for holding the event in Kenya because it offered the Kenyans a chance to understand what China manufactures to reinforce trade collaboration between the two nations. The President also stressed that China and Kenya had signed numerous protocols associated with cultural exchanges and were now moving towards stronger economic relations. (Daily Nation, 1996), President Moi thanked China for its development collaboration, particularly in road construction. The president added that African countries' marginalization was due to economic weaknesses. Despite Africa having many resources, the continent needed more resources to exploit them. The president also hoped that the Chinese national airline would begin operating from Nairobi to allow smooth exports from Kenya. During the Chinese Trade Fair at the Kenyatta International Conference Center in Nairobi in 1996, Kenya's Minister for Commerce and Industry welcomed joint ventures between Kenya and Chinese entrepreneurs as an initial step towards industrialization. The minister stated that Kenya imported 5.8 billion shillings worth of goods from China and exported 77.8 million shillings worth of goods to China. The minister announced that a delegation of local businesspeople and officers from the Export Promotion Council and the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry would participate in a business fact-finding visit to China in May 1996 (Daily Nation, 1996). Like its African colleagues, Kenya has experienced significant trade development with China. Kenya is viewed by China as an open space for the African region and has attracted special attention in its African economic strategy. Kenya is a peaceful country with stable institutions, making it a perfect regional stage for investors from China to grow their investments. China has provided favorable aid to Kenya for various development projects. Onjala avers that trade between China and Kenya picked up correctly in the mid-90s when there was a growth in importation from China (Onjala, 2008). In the second half of the 1990s, imports increased rapidly. These changes were not associated with limited growth in Kenya's real GDP or a decline in per capita income. Instead, economic liberalization programs and China's industrial modernization have influenced Kenya's rapid import growth. As China's products exported to Kenya diversified and offered competitive prices, the trade balance changed in favor of China. The liberalization of Kenya's exchange rate was also a section of economic liberalization backed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. (Chege, 2008, p. 24). This move led numerous Kenyans, excluding intermediaries, to travel to China for the first time to acquire goods directly.

The full liberalization of the exchange rate, which was part of Kenya's economic liberalization program, enabled Kenyan citizens and firms to buy foreign currency for importing products at a reduced total price than previously. Chinese exports to Kenya comprised machinery, building equipment and materials, drugs,

textiles, agricultural tools, capital goods, and household electrical appliances. On the other hand, Kenya's exports to China comprised leather goods, coffee, and black tea. (Embassy of PRC) Kenyan traders and firms began traveling to mainland China to acquire products directly instead of using intermediaries, such as old state trading corporations. The Maasai Ostrich Farm in Kenya and China's National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation signed a contract for the joint operation of the ostrich farm in 1997. The contract stated that the Chinese owned 40% of the farm with an investment of US\$1 million. Dollars in cash and equipment, whereas Kenyans owned the remaining of the shares, using the ostriches and land as investments. In 1998, Kenya exported 104 red-neck ostriches to China. Ostriches are resistant to disease, large, and fast growth. Chinese experts noted that introducing red-neck ostriches would encourage the development of China's ostrich-rearing sector and improve cooperation in agriculture between China and Kenya (Xinhua, 1998). In 1999, Kenya and China made a significant milestone in their trade relations by signing the Sino-Kenya Economic Cooperation Document. Under the agreement, China was to offer economic aid to Kenya (Xinhua, 1999). Mr. Sun Guangxiang, China's vice-minister for foreign trade and economic cooperation, stated that China valued economic collaboration with Kenya and was making strides to balance the advancement of two-way trade. The Chinese were to establish a trade and investment center in Kenya to provide services to the Chinese business community conducting business in Kenya and investing in Kenya. Mr. Sun stated that China encouraged its companies to invest in Kenya by opening plants to assemble and process machines and light-industrial goods. The Chinese project in Kenya is expected to increase Kenyans' incomes. The products assembled and processed by the Chinese will be exported to surrounding nations after satisfying Kenya's local requirements. In June 1999, the Kenyan Minister for Industrial Cooperation, Mr. Andrew Kiptoon, welcomed a Chinese delegation led by Mr. Xu Bingjin.⁴ The Kenyan minister stated that Chinese technology was suitable for Kenya and cheaper than goods from other parts of the globe. He welcomed China's plan to build a trade and investment center in Nairobi. Mr. Xu stated that the Sino-Kenya economic collaboration and trade enjoyed sustained growth, with a trading volume in 1998 standing at 120 million US dollars (Xinhua, 1999a).

In 1999, over 150 businesspeople and entrepreneurs from China and Kenya met to seek joint ventures and business opportunities between the two nations (Xinhua, 1999b). The talk began with a short introduction to China's electronics and machinery by Fan Shande.⁵ Fan stated that China had developed a comprehensive and modern electric and mechanical industry, exporting goods to more than 180 countries and regions globally. Mr. Fan further stated that China's electronic and mechanical products were most appropriate for the needs of developing nations such as Kenya. The Chinese government inspired its companies to transfer and invest in technology and equipment to other nations. Such trade talks are important for strengthening economic diplomacy. The business community from Kenya gained significant value from the conference since the Chinese transferred their knowledge of electronic and mechanical manufacturing. With Chinese support, Kenyan small enterprises will continue to grow. Kenya and China have experienced rapid trade and economic expansion cooperation over the years, which will have a bright future based on mutual benefit and equality principles. Within Kenya, small-scale entrepreneurial investment from China is growing, usually foreshadowed by the construction specialized shopping malls that stock Chinese retail products. The prospects for technology transfer are real. (Kaplinsky, et. al., 2007). Kenya's Vice-President, Prof George

⁴Xu Bingjin was the head of the delegation organized by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation to hold talks with the Kenyan Minister for Industrial Cooperation, Mr. Andrew Kiptoon.

⁵Fan Shande held the position of Deputy Head of the Department responsible for the import and export of mechanical and electronic products under the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. The meeting was organized and funded by the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry under the leadership of Kassim Owango.



Saitoti, invited more Chinese to invest in Kenya via the EPZ programs. By investing in Kenya, he said Chinese entrepreneurs would benefit from the 400 million people market provided by COMESA member nations (Malalo, 1999, p. 5).

Kenya and China's trade value reached \$186.37 million in 2002, a 29% increase over the previous year (Xinhua, 2003). Chinese exports took up \$180.576 million, while imports took up \$5.798 million. The jointly beneficial partnership between Kenya and China saw more than 20 Chinese organizations doing business in Kenya, including the China Import and Export Corporation for Complete Sets of Equipment, China Road Bridge Construction Corporation, Jiangsu International Economic and Technological Cooperation Co., Sichuan International Economic and Technological Cooperation Co. Ltd, etc. (Embassy of the PRC of Kenya, 2004).

Figure 1

Kenya-China Exports and Imports 1993–2003



Source: Kenya Investment Promotion Center

The figure shows annual data of exports from mainland China to Kenya (Ksh 000) between 1993 and 2003. Although exports followed a low and fluctuating course between 1993 and 1997, a significant increase started in 1998 and reached a peak in 2000. There was a significant decrease in 2001 due to the dot-com bubble burst and the September 11 attacks, which led to economic uncertainties worldwide. However, it recovered from 2002 and reached its highest level in 2003 as a result of an increased demand of Chinese goods as well as establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) platform, which promoted trade and investment opportunities that benefited both countries. This trend shows that China achieved significant growth and stability in its trade relations with Kenya after 1998.

According to the second figure, imports increased gradually between 1993 and 1995. Imports, which showed a slower increase between 1996 and 1998, accelerated from 1999 onwards and increased in 2000. Although there was a slight decrease in 2001, it increased again in 2002 and 2003. These data show that China's exports to Kenya have experienced a rapid growth trend since 1999, and the import volume is constantly increasing.

China's Investment in Kenya

One of the primary sectors of economic collaboration between Kenya and China is infrastructure development. China has invested and offered significant funding and technical help to build transportation infrastructure, including roads, schools, hospitals, and sports centers (Xinhua, 2000a). These investments have facilitated investment and trade between Kenya and China and have assisted in increasing economic development in Kenya. For instance, China Sichuan International Co-operation Limited received a tender to rehabilitate the Kenyatta National Hospital at 400 million Kenya shillings in 1995 (Daily Nation, 1998a, p. 44). The areas under rehabilitation comprised the primary kitchen gas system that was out of operation for 20 years. The World Bank, through its representative in Kenya, stated that they were satisfied with the quality of the project; however, the pace could have been faster. Another Chinese company, Chinese Roads and Bridges Company received a 2.4 billion tender to reconstruct Mombasa Road. According to the agreement, the Chinese company was to conduct emergency repairs and construct the road simultaneously. The road construction was to be piecemeal, taking approximately 20 km at a time to avoid traffic disruption (Mwangi, 1998, p. 2). The large number of Chinese companies investing in Kenya has resulted in increased employment rates. Numerous Chinese businesses employ more local workers than foreign workers; therefore, Kenyans directly benefit from such businesses. For instance, in 1998, the China and Bridge Road Construction Company hired over 800 local workers to construct the Malindi-Hola road. Significant capital investments in various Kenyan economic sectors also help enhance the economy. Moreover, these businesses offer employment and help Kenyans gain relevant experience to start their businesses in the future (Daily Nation, 1998a).

Other crucial cooperation sectors include telecommunications, tourism, and agriculture. China has offered Kenya technical help and funding for agricultural projects. This has helped enhance food security and enhance agricultural productivity. For instance, in 1998, the Daily Nation reported that Chinese investors would inject 1.2 billion shillings into the Kenya Farmers' Association. The funds would establish a farm machinery assembly plant, enhance farming methods and research, and pay the association's accumulated debts. The investors appreciated the association officials' significant measures to fight corruption (Daily Nation, 1998b). In 2001, Kenyan farmers benefited from a planned fruit and vegetable processing and export project. The Chinese government sponsored the venture, which targeted Nyeri's Mathira division. China's Economic and Commercial Counselor, Mr. Xiaochuan Zhu, stated that their tour was to establish cooperation

in the light goods sector, handicraft, food, and grain processing for export. The counselor added that China possessed food processing machinery and a ready market for Kenyan products in China (Daily Nation, 2001). China's investment in Kenya's energy sector has enabled the country to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels, contributing to Kenya's efforts to combat climate change. In 2000, China donated \$160,000 to implement a pilot solar energy program in rural Kenya to alleviate power shortage (Xinhua, 2000b). China has played a crucial role in improving Kenya's telecommunications infrastructure and in enhancing access to information and connectivity. In 2001, Kenya's state-owned telecommunications company, Telkom Kenya Ltd., launched a prepaid calling card system in East Africa. The equipment required to make this happen was offered by China's Huawei Technologies Company Ltd. The equipment allows for premium services, virtual private network services, universal private telecommunication, free phone calls, and prepaid card calling. Kenya noted that the technology would benefit customers and the public by creating value for shareholders, better and more convenient cost usage management, and greater flexibility (Xinhua, 2001a).

Kenya has encountered a developing Chinese presence in its service and manufacturing industries. Since 2000, Chinese companies in Kenya have exported and produced numerous products, including solar panels, ostrich farming, bicycle building, mushroom growing, and wheat and maize processing. As of 2000, nine Chinese firms had established businesses in Kenya; between 2001 and 2002, there were eighteen new businesses registered, and in 2003 there were eleven new businesses. The investment rate has also varied. The Chinese Huangpai Grain Processing Limited spent US\$924,000 in capital costs in 2000, while the Chinese supermarket chain Horizon Ivato Supermarket Limited made US\$11,154,000 in capital costs in 2003 (Ombaba et.al., 2012). Between 2001 and 2002, seventeen Chinese investments were founded in Kenya, and in 2003, there were eleven new companies started. The Chinese wholly owned the companies. Eighty-two percent of the companies are in the service sub-sector, while the rest are in manufacturing. The company's capital investments were foreign, averaging 1.3 million US dollars per company, and most were invested in the service industry (Chege, 2008). Chinese investments in Kenya display significant positive factors. According to a World Bank report, on average, Chinese businesses employ three hundred and sixty locals, which is higher than other foreign-invested companies in Kenya. Additionally, China offered substantial aid and low-interest loans to fund the maintenance of the Moi International Sports Center, the expansion of Eldoret Hospital, and the construction of the Gambogi-Serem highway. (Farooq et al., 2018, p. 408) The positive effects are also witnessed within government and infrastructure projects. Previously, government construction projects within Kenya were characterized by inefficiency, which took too much time due to procrastination, corruption, and shoddy work. Several Kenyans were impressed by how quickly the Chinese worked and how quickly they finished tasks, including building and road construction. Therefore, compared to government projects, Chinese personnel demonstrated that their projects could be completed cheaply and quickly (Njuguna, 2010).

Table 1

Chinese Direct Investments in Kenya between 1995 and 2003

Year	Company Name	Activity	Capital Cost Kshs (in millions)
1995	Nanjing Agricultural University, People's Republic of China	Egerton University Horticulture Department	15
1997	Kenya News Agency (KNA)	Modern news equipment	2
1998	China Sichuan International Co-operation Limited	Rehabilitation of the Kenyatta National Hospital	400
	China Roads and Bridges Company	Reconstruction of Mombasa Road	2400



Year	Company Name	Activity	Capital Cost Kshs (in millions)
	Chinese consortium	Revival of the Kenya Farmers' Association	1200
	China Road Construction Company	Malindi-Garsen Road	473.7
2000	Sun Yu Enterprises, Ltd.	Petrol and diesel extraction from plastic waste	3.41
	Victory River Co., Ltd.	Export and import of goods	30
	Tisco Kenya Ltd.	Bicycle plant	50
	Crown Sea Enterprises, Ltd.	Shoe production	60
	Chinese Huangaoi Grain Processing	Processing rice oil, wheat, and maize	60.04
	Kenya Fulu Industrial Ltd.	Solar panels and televisions	15
	Hgy International Co., Ltd.	Export and import of Chinese goods	16
	Neo Smart suppliers Co. Ltd	Fabrication of PU shoes	16
	Penguin Grain and Oil Processing Machinery	Selling and importing milling machinery	15
2001	Youngstar International Ltd.	Fabrication of mosquito nets	8.2
	East Hegenoy Trade Co.	Export and import of goods	14
	Peng and Huo Medical Co.	Chinese clinic	1.26
	Dong Fang Dev. Ltd	Export and import of goods	11.5
	Double Leopard enterprises	Manufacturing motorcycles	55.4
	China Victory King Stone Material Co.	Making ballast	68.5
	Nantong Yuanxt Co., Ltd.	Export and import business	16
	Thai Star Restaurant, Ltd.	Chinese restaurant	4
	Chang Sheng International, Ltd.	Exporting and growing mushrooms	16
2002	Tabasa Food Company	Making sausages	3
	China Flying Dragon (K) Ltd.	Chinese furniture	11.5
	Newland Industries, Ltd.	Creating candles from wax	46
	Famonar Ltd	Manufacturing cigarettes	14
	Chinese Center for the Promotion of Trade,	Trade and investment promotion	140
	Famous Pharmaceuticals	Intravenous fluids	60
	Laibao (K) import and export Dev. Ltd.	Spare parts of the VCO and radio assembly	5.4
	An-Ning Holding, Ltd.	Distribution and production of textiles	16
2003	Super Beauty Parlor Ltd	Beauty parlor	10
	China Farm Products	Processing and importation of farm products	10
	Tianchi Health Products	Multi-Level marketing of food production	10
	Henan Company (K) Ltd	Exporting coffee	10
	Changhong Electronics (E.A) Ltd	Production and assembly of electronic goods	80



Year	Company Name	Activity	Capital Cost Kshs (in millions)
	For Your Chinese Restaurant	Restaurant	11
	Baus Optical Co., Ltd.	Optical lens manufacturing	26.8
	Phoenipaper Ltd	Production of Paper Products	4
	The china San Yuan (Kenya) Ltd.	Processing farm products	10
	China Agricultural Technology Co.	Imports	10
	Horizon Ivato Supermarket, Ltd.	Supermarket	725

Source: Authors' compilation from various Kenyan Newspapers.

China's Foreign Aid to Kenya

The term "foreign aid" refers to several assistance one nation provides to another through donations. Governmental and non-governmental organizations comprise the donors and recipients. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) provides the definition of foreign aid that is widely accepted. As per their guidelines, foreign aid also refers to foreign assistance, encompassing financial flows, technical assistance, and commodities aimed at promoting economic development and welfare. Moreover, foreign aid can be provided in the form of grants or subsidized loans (Radalet, 2006, p.4). China's foreign aid practices differ from those of Western countries. According to Jiang, China's aid is characterized by the principles of "equality and mutual benefit, no strings attached, non-interference in internal affairs, and promotion of self-reliance in aid recipient countries" (Jiang, 2016 p. 81-108). It is important to consider some caveats when analyzing the use of Chinese aid. One of these caveats is the limited clarity surrounding the rationale behind China's use of aid. The availability of the information is somewhat questionable, and it is not clear whether China is deliberately withholding this information from the public, making interpretation difficult. However, Ombaba et al. They emphasized the importance of China's assistance in developing political and economic ties between Kenya and China (Ombaba et al., 2012 p. 533).

Until the mid-1990s, some Chinese developmental assistance was effective in supporting African liberation movements. In the late 1990s, China turned its attention to debt reduction, investment promotion, and human resource development. China's assistance to Kenya primarily focused on specific projects, as reported by multiple news sources and scholarly literature. China has provided Kenya with various assistance and aid projects throughout diplomatic relations. These entities constitute an integral component of a comprehensive package agreement alongside other collaborative ventures involving Kenya. (McCormick et al., 2007). The nature of China's developmental assistance to Kenya exhibits notable distinctions compared to the aid provided by Western donors. There exists a distinction in the terms and conditions that are imposed, as well as in the concept of tying. China's approach to internal governance issues, democracy, and human rights in Kenya differs from that of Western countries (Tull, 2006).⁶ China ties its assistance to purchasing materials from China and using Chinese organizations. Regarding technical training and scholarships, relevant ministries in Kenya make decisions. China does not contribute to donor coordination undertakings but instead functions independently (Kamau, et. al. 2009, p. 1586-1612). Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan stated that Chinese aid to Kenya has no strings attached. The foreign minister was in Kenya for a three-day visit. He further stated that Chinese assistance to Kenya was founded on the country's requirements. Mr.

⁶According to Tull (2006), by giving aid without conditions, China has offered an appealing substitute to conditional aid from western countries' aid. China has acquired valuable diplomatic will to protect its global interests.

Tang commented at the Kenyan Foreign Affairs Ministry, where Minister Dr. Bonaya Godana received this gift. Mr. Tang and Dr. Godana signed a memorandum of understanding to bring about new development between Kenya and China. Mr. Tang's visit aimed to improve investment and trade (East African Standard, 1999, p. 4). The inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) from China to Kenya can be influenced by a range of factors, such as macroeconomic and macro-political conditions, as well as the quality of local institutions and the business environment in Kenya and the surrounding region. The interrelationship between trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) among Chinese enterprises in Kenya can generate favorable spillover effects in the country. These effects can be observed through the attraction of investments in infrastructure and related services and through the transfer of intangible assets such as managerial expertise and technological advancements that often accompany FDI (Broadman, 2006, p. 292). Additionally, higher FDI diversification has increasingly occurred in numerous investment fields. Investments from Chinese individuals have been in telecommunications, power plants, construction, transport, tourism, and retail ventures. Globally, the availability of foreign companies often significantly influences a host country's participation in global trade. This is because increased import and export are frequently linked to FDI. A crucial possible by-product of China-Kenya public relations is that Kenyan companies might become exposed to the exchange of technological advances or improved skills (Broadman, 2006, p. 324).

The relationship between China and Kenya was viewed as mutual, with Kenya serving as the market for Chinese manufactured products and as a source of raw materials for Chinese manufacturing. However, Kenya received increased unconditional foreign aid from China. Research has indicated that even though very limited bureaucracies accompany Chinese aid, such aid is often accompanied by certain conditions based on China's national interests, for instance, access to markets, development of export-free zones, and others (Callaghy, 1995, p. 51). Notably, the bilateral agreements between the two countries facilitated their continued cooperation in various programs and trade enhancement. China's investments in Kenya were and continue to be in infrastructural developments. A 2001 bilateral agreement on the promotion and protection of investment was signed between the two countries, which enhanced the legal framework for Chinese investments in Kenya. Kenya's economy was liberalized in the late 1990s and early 2000s, leading to a huge flow of Chinese products into the Kenyan market (Githaiga, 2021).

China offered nonmonetary and monetary assistance to Kenya. Development assistance from China supports investments in tariff exemptions, human relief, technical and academic training, plant and equipment, and infrastructure. The projects mainly involved the construction of a malaria center, drugs, and medicine for fighting malaria, the renovation of an international sports center, and water and road construction projects. In 1993, the Chinese government offered Kenya general commodity aid of 59 million shillings to close the budget deficit. The Kenyan government stated that the commodities would be shipped from China and sold within the country in an open market to raise extra funds for the state. The Commodity aid brought the sum of Kenya's grants to 396 million shillings from China. The Finance Minister, Mr. Musalia Mudavadi, stated that Kenya appreciated the interest-free loans and grants the Chinese government offered. The minister mentioned that Chinese aid had set up a sports complex in Kasarani, which allowed Kenya to host the 4th All-Africa games (AAG). The Chinese help also empowered Kenyans to train in agriculture and fishing. The minister also added that Kenya pursued policies that would inspire domestic savings and export promotion to guarantee sustainable development. Mr. Mudavadi stated that the Kenyan government backed the discussions between the Chinese and the Ministry of Health on developing a joint venture for producing drugs (Nduati, 1993). In 1993, Kenya received aid totaling 247 million shillings to help upgrade the Eldoret and Uasin Gishu Memorial Hospital, general commodity aid, and purchase food and drugs. (Daily Nation, 1993,



p. 12). In 1994, Kenya received a development loan totaling 350 million shillings (Daily Nation, 1994, p. 2). In 2002, China offered Kenya loans totaling 800 million shillings for constructing the Kipsigak Shamkhokho road and buying gai (East African Standard, 2002, p. 3). The Chinese government offered Kenya an interest-free loan of 262 million shillings and two grants of 42 million and 75 million shillings in 1998. This loan was used to finance construction of the Kima-Emusutswi road in Western Kenya. The 42 million grant was used to supplement road construction, and 75 million was used to rehabilitate the gymnasium and replace the scoreboard and other minor repairs at the Moi International Sports Center, Kasarani. Kenya received several loans and grants from China to help in various development projects within the country (Daily Nation, 1998, p. 12).

In 1996, China partnered with the Kenyan government to finance a 986 million shilling glass factory in Kenya. The Chinese Ambassador, Mr. Chen Pingchu, stated that China would offer 870 million shillings for the glass project (Onditi, 1996). The funds were part of the 1 Kenya and China's 104.4 million subsidized loan agreements. Pingchu stated that the project would integrate private sector investments from both nations. The entire capital for the glass sheet factory project was USD 17 million; however, the Chinese investment was USD 15 million. Mr. Pingchu also added that the project would help in transferring technology from China to Kenya, which was the foundation of good relations. In the relationship between China and Kenya, mixed loans were not less popular than concessional loans with interest rates (Brautigam, 2011, p. 175). However, in 2002, Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji announced that China would offer Kenya a 500 million shillings interest-free loan to construct the Kipsigak-Serem-Shamakhokho Road. The Prime minister also said that his government would offer Kenya 3 million dollars to purchase grain. The Prime Minister disclosed the information while he was touring Parliament Buildings with the National Assembly Speaker, Mr. Francis Ole Kaparo. Although most loans boast zero interest rates, Kenya will still have to pay them back in full in the future. These future financial relations reinforce the relationship between the two countries since Kenya will not be pressured to pay higher amounts due to interest (East African Standard, 2002). According to Kipngetich, (2008), foreign direct investment from China has become vital, as illustrated by two major factors. One factor is that the weakening of Kenya's keenness to attract direct foreign direct investment has been taken over by Chinese FDI inflows, constituting a crucial proportion for Kenya. The second factor is that the Chinese adoption of novel policies to Kenya with closer financial ties has grown Chinese enterprise presence in Kenya. Chinese FDI inflows have been vital because they go along with technological transfer using innovation and managerial skills; therefore, Kenya benefits from Chinese FDI. The Chinese have diversified their FDI and can invest in telecommunication and power plants, construction, transport, tourism, and retail services. These investments lead to employment creation for Kenyans (Kipngetich, 2008). Generally, economic diplomacy between Kenya and China has been featured in cooperation and benefits. China has offered substantial backing for Kenya's economic growth, whereas Kenya has offered a friendly environment for Chinese trade and investment. As Kenya and China continue to strengthen their economic relations, their economic diplomacy may become a vital factor in their bilateral relations.

Table 2

Chinese Direct Investments in Kenya between 1995 and 2003

Year	Aid type	Project	Amount Ksh. (in millions)
1993	Relief	Somali refugees in Kenya	22
	Loan	Upgrading of the Eldoret and Uasin Gishu Memorial Hospital.	482
	Grant	General Commodity Aid.	59



Year	Aid type	Project	Amount Ksh. (in millions)
	Grant	Drugs and Food.	28
1994	Loan	Development Loan.	350
	Grant	Commodity Grant	59
	Grant	Laboratory equipment at Egerton University	17.2
	Grant	Egerton University Funding	10
1996	Grant	Commodity grant	104.4
	Loan	Glass factory	870
1998	Loan	Construction of the Kima-Emusutswi Road	262
2001	Grant	Solar power to 20 schools in Baringo	13
	Grant	Construction of the Kima-Emusutswi Road	42
	Grant	Rehabilitate the gymnasium and replace the scoreboard and other minor repairs at the Moi International Sports Center, Kasarani.	75
2002	Loan	Kipsigak Shamkhokho Road.	500
	Grant	Purchasing grain.	219
2003	Loan	Gambogi Serem Road.	3100
	Loan	Kasarani Sports Ground Maintenance.	39
	Grant	Various Training Courses in China.	300
	Grant	Tractors Purchase.	66

Source: Authors' compilation from various Kenyan Newspapers.

According to this data, most of the financial assistance to Kenya has been directed toward development and infrastructure projects. In particular, projects such as road construction and hospital renovation were financed through large-scale loan agreements. Various grants were also provided for sectors such as education, agriculture, and energy. The construction of roads, railways, and power plants has facilitated Kenya's development goals and improved connectivity within the region. The improved infrastructure led to increased economic activity by reducing transportation costs and business time. This development has facilitated local industries' flourishing due to better access to markets and resources and, hence, overall economic growth.

Conclusion

Although relations between the People's Republic of China and Kenya, established in 1963, were in trouble for a while, they began to show themselves, with bilateral relations restored in 1978. Economic ties between the two countries progressed positively, especially until the 1990s. An examination of the study period, 1993-2003, shows that China has prioritized economic ties and diplomacy with Kenya. Economic acceleration occurred between 1993 and 2003. These past ten years have taken steps toward strengthening bilateral ties. The development of diplomatic relations with economic relations has led to increased contact between China and Kenya. The two countries have created both economic gain and an essential opportunity for the two nations to get to know each other. With the foundation laid during the period under study, the subsequent years post-2003 saw relations between the two countries significantly deepen in the 21st Century, anchored on mutual economic interests and strategic cooperation. The China-Kenya relations are characterized by a shared commitment to cooperation, development, and friendship that extends beyond



bilateral relations to incorporate broader regional and global dynamics (KBC- May 15, 2024). Like other African countries, Kenya has created a robust marketplace for China. China, which supports Kenya's development and economy, has succeeded in strengthening its position in Kenya in the coming years.

China is now Kenya's leading trading partner. The trade volume between the two countries has increased over the years. China is the largest bilateral lender to Kenya and a major source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). While China exports various goods to Kenya, Kenya also imports other goods. China's investments in Kenya have been directed toward infrastructure projects. For example, major projects such as China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which Kenya joined in 2017, facilitated the construction of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) that connected the Coastal Port City of Mombasa to Naivasha, with the final destination projected to be Malaba in Western Kenya. This major infrastructure project was financed and built by China and has helped modernize Kenya's infrastructure and improve its transportation network. Some China-Kenya collaborations have promoted technology transfer. China's presence in Kenya's telecommunications and construction sectors has enabled knowledge sharing in technology and expertise. Major infrastructure projects have employed thousands of people and increased economic activity. Trade expansion and investments from China have also increased Kenya's growth potential (Merics- 18, 2022).

China has made significant inroads into developing countries, particularly in Africa and Kenya. Both countries have made significant contributions to each other's economies through the exchange of goods and services and by aligning policies to support these efforts. The trade liberalization policy adopted by both nations has been a key factor in facilitating this. Furthermore, the modernization and specialization of products have also supported this venture. Kenya has benefited greatly from the investment made by China, which has supported its economic growth through loans and grants as well as foreign direct investments. This has had a positive impact on the employment of locals and the efficiency of project completion.

China has also shown generosity and unconditional support to Kenya, reciprocated in the positive media language displayed in Kenyan newspapers regarding the relationship between the two countries. The Look East Policy, which has become popular among many developing countries, is based on China's policy of non-interference with other countries' domestic affairs. Kenya has been a reliable partner in the infrastructure projects carried out as a basis for China's Belt and Road Initiative project, and the economic relations between the two countries have allowed them to get to know each other better. Overall, the economic relations between China and Kenya have been a significant beginning and structuring for the new era of partnership. However, it is worth noting that this economic relationship has its lipide, with debates emerging on Kenya's indebtedness to China, which has elicited the debt-trap conversation with concerns raised on Kenya's debt sustainability and the opaqueness of terms and conditions, including the collaterals attached. Moreover, the environmental impact of China's projects in Kenya has raised concerns with calls for transparency and environmental consciousness. Despite these concerns, the future outlook for the two countries' economic ties remains positive. Kenya is strategically located and its economy is vibrant, making it an attractive destination for any international actor, particularly China, in its geopolitical quest. With the upgrading of their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership and the two countries' national interests, their economic partnership is likely to deepen further.





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Author Details **Esra Sarioğlu (Asst. Prof.)**¹ Gaziantep University, Department of International Relations, Gaziantep, Türkiye 0000-0002-9049-3069  esra.sarioglu@yahoo.com**George Maangi (PhD(c))**² University of Nairobi, Diplomacy and International Studies, Nairobi, Kenya 0009-0005-8641-438X  georgemaangi@gmail.com

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Research Article

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The End of the Recurring Guerrilla in Mexico?



Lorena Martínez-Zavala¹  & Rosa Guadalupe Valerio-Francisco² 

¹ El Colegio de Puebla, Puebla, México

² Interamerican University, Department of International Relations, Puebla, México

Abstract

This research focuses on the historical emergence of guerrilla movements intended to overthrow the post-revolutionary Mexican State. The revolutionary process of 1910 consolidated a corporatist nation-state led by the ruling party (Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI), which had been in power for 70 years.

In 1999, Mexican writer Carlos Montemayor showed that Mexico has been characterized as a region with a marked and permanent presence of guerrilla movements. Twenty-five years later (2024), a dissipation of these expressions can be observed. The objective of this work is to analyze the internal and external processes that have generated this possible rest. Methodology: the research is qualitative, the phenomenological-hermeneutical method was used and a documentary investigation was carried out, returning to four elements: state violence, the reestablishment of institutions (AMLO's triumph in 2018), consolidation of revolutionary power and the strengthening of drug trafficking. Results: It is maintained that there is a rest in the guerrilla recurrence, the result of four processes: 1. The dissolution of guerrilla groups by the Mexican State. 2. The triumph of a center-left government in 2018. 3. A change in the Latin American paradigm involving guerrilla militants obtaining positions of popular representation and 4. Strengthening drug trafficking groups in the country.

Keywords

Guerrilla movements • Post-revolutionary Mexican state • Latin America



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✉ Corresponding author: Lorena Martínez-Zavala lorena.martinez@colpue.edu.mx, lorena.martinez.zavala@gmail.com



The End of the Recurring Guerrilla in Mexico?

Mexico has been characterized by the permanent presence of guerrilla movements seeking to overthrow the post-revolutionary Mexican State. This continuity is the reason Montemayor (1999) discussed the recurring guerrilla. When conducting a genealogy of the guerrilla movements that have emerged against the nation-state, it was found that these began to germinate in the 1940s with the outbreak of the Jaramillista movement in Morelos. The State put down this movement.

Subsequently, in the sixties and seventies, a cycle of guerrilla mobilization was generated at both the rural and urban levels. In the rural area, the Popular Guerrilla Group (GPG) emerged in Chihuahua, the National Revolutionary Civic Association (ACNR) led by Genaro Vázquez and the Execution Brigade of the Party of the Poor (BA-PDLP) of Lucio Cabañas, both of which were present in Guerrero. Note that these movements were the result of the erosion of legal and institutional means of demand and popular participation (Martínez-Zavala, 2011).

As for the urban guerrilla groups, the Revolutionary Action Movement (MAR), the National Liberation Forces (FLN), the September 23 Communist League (LC23S), among others, emerged; which were the result of the ideological radicalization of the student sector of higher secondary and higher education (Martínez-Zavala, 2011). The Latin American context claimed the seizure of political power through revolutionary struggle through processes such as the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the triumph of the Sandinista Revolution in 1979, the socialist government of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1970, and the guerrilla uprisings in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Colombia (Nolff, 1982; López and Rivas, 1999; Figueroa, 2003).

Unlike Latin American cases, Mexican State deactivated guerrilla movements. However, survivors of the GPG regrouped and formed the Peasant Workers' Revolutionary Party, the People's Union-Poor People's Party (PROCUP-PDLP), which became operational in the 1980s (Martínez-Torres, 2006; Montemayor, 2010). In these years, said guerrilla movement carried out actions of military harassment, clandestine work to consolidate support bases among the population, and provided support to Latin American guerrilla expressions such as the case of Nicaragua and El Salvador (EPR, 2005-09-09). The PROCUP-PDLP, based on a Marxist-Leninist ideology, formed the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR), which was present and operational in the 1990s.

In this period, a paradigm shift was experienced at both the national and Latin American levels: the consolidation of neoliberal projects and the erosion of socialism and communism. In Mexico, it seemed that the dominant power had managed to deactivate the guerrilla movements; However, two protest expressions emerged that opened a new cycle of mobilization and struggle: the emergence of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) and the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR). Both movements were present and operational in the first decade of the 21st century. They shared the consolidation of a more just world, but their strategies and conceptions of struggle were different (Martínez-Zavala, 2015).

The EZLN, adapting to the ideas of a globalized world and questioning the classic canon of popular struggle, was announced in 2005 in the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandona Jungle, a change in its fighting strategy. They left aside the classic vision of the Marxist guerrilla and proposed the consolidation of Good Government Boards and Autonomous Municipalities, whose dissolution was announced on October 5, 2023.

For its part, the EPR continued with the political-military strategy of a classic Marxist-Leninist guerrilla, conducting political-military actions governed by the Popular Revolutionary Democratic Party (PDPR). The EPR conducted a series of political-military actions from 1994 to 2007, years in which it activated committees



in states such as Guerrero (June 1996); Michoacán (August, 1996); Tabasco (September, 1996); Oaxaca (September, 1996); Chiapas (September, 1996); Hidalgo (October, 1996); Valley of Mexico (October, 1996); Veracruz (December 1996); Puebla (July 2003); Chihuahua (April 2005); and Guanajuato (July 2007). This activity was very irregular due to the internal crisis they suffered during the years 1997-1998, which was due to the detachment of militants who formed other guerrilla movements (Martínez-Zavala, 2015).

Subsequently, they were present in 2006 during the movement of the Popular Assembly of the People of Oaxaca (APPO), in which two main leaders disappeared. This generated a decantation of military action and presence, taking its actions to the political sphere with the formation of a mediating Commission that intervened in the search for its two militants and in the issuance of political statements (Martínez-Zavala, 2015).

Currently (2024), it seems that there is passivity in the actions of guerrilla movements in Mexico. Since 2018, their public appearances have been very limited and have consisted of the issuance of propaganda statements. This suggests the probability of *the end of the recurring guerrilla movement*. It is argued that this response responds to four causes. First, the dissolution of the guerrilla groups by the Mexican State. Second, it is the result of the triumph of a center-left government in 2018 that brought together social discontent and strengthened legal avenues for citizen participation. Third, a change in the Latin American paradigm: the consolidation of political power by leaders of Latin American guerrilla groups who have managed to obtain high-level popular representation positions such as the presidency of the republic. Fourth, the strengthening and expansion of drug trafficking groups in the regions of the country.

This research contributes to the current study of guerrilla movements in Mexico. A review of literature published during the years 2023 and 2024 was conducted using the keyword “guerrillas in Mexico”, and the publication of historical articles was found. Research related to the history of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) was conducted (Estrada, 2024, Harvey, 2024; Solís, 2024; Villafuerte, 2024); analysis of the convergences in the ideologies of the EZLN and Lopez Obradorism (Ackerman, 2024); articles on the history of the September 23 Communist League in the 1980s (García, 2024; Lechuga, 2024; Reyes, 2024); with respect to the movement of Lucio Cabañas Barrientos that took place in the 1970s (Fregoso, 2023; Guadarrama, 2024); a critique and a look from a gender perspective on the historical construction of the guerrilla in the country (Padilla and Fernández, 2024); research on the Revolutionary Action Movement (MAR) (Confino, 2024) and about the sick people of Sinaloa during the 1970s (Soto, 2024). This review highlighted the existing theoretical gap in relation to the current guerrilla movements in the country. This research has the interest of placing the possible end of the classic canon of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary struggle in Mexico as a popular alternative to generate social transformations.

Methodology

This research was based on a qualitative methodology, the phenomenological-hermeneutic method was used; since this method “emphasizes the science of phenomena. This lies in allowing and perceiving what is shown, as it is shown to itself and as it is shown for itself” (Fuster, 2019, p. 204). This method allows us to understand the phenomenon of the Mexican guerrilla in its complexity by analyzing the causes that have given rise to the apparent rest in the emergence of guerrilla movements in current times. It is assumed that there was a cessation in the emergence of guerrilla groups in Mexico from 2018 to date (2024) due to four social events: 1. State violence generated in previous years; 2. The political alternation that occurred in the 2018 elections and that caused the establishment of the hegemonic power of the institutions; 3. The

vindication of state power through the triumph of former guerrillas over the presidency of the republic and 4. Strengthening drug trafficking groups in the country. The documentary research technique was used to conduct this research. As a first step, from the perspective of grounded theory, four codes were established: 1. State violence; 2. Institutional reestablishment; 3. Ex-guerrillas in power; 4. Drug trafficking. Once the initial categories were selected, the information was collected, analyzed, and the document was written.

State Violence: The Dissolution of Guerrillas

Guerrilla movements are expressions that attempt to overthrow the State and establish themselves as ruling elites. When talking about the State, a sphere is conceived in which the relations of force between the dominant elite and subordinates are expressed. In this arena of dispute, the dominant elite strives to retain legitimacy by using domination and consensus. According to Villavicencio (2003), "the punitive function of the Social and Democratic State originates in its sovereignty to identify certain behaviors as punishable and establish the corresponding sanction" (p. 93). In this exercise of domination, they use violence to eliminate dissent and consensus to allow the rest of the population to accept the need for such acts.

Violence is a two-way process. According to Marx and Engels (cited by Domenach, 1981), violence is exercised from both social poles: by the dominant and the oppressed. Violence is understood as the "use of force, open or hidden, in order to obtain from an individual, or a group, something that they do not want to freely consent to" (Domenach, 1981, p.36). Violence is an act of power that is exercised to achieve certain objectives. It has an impact on the behavior of the other, not only as a result of its execution; but, with the warning of being carried out (Figuerola, 2001).

The history of contemporary Mexico has been plagued by violent actions that seek the permanence of the dominant power and dissolve expressions of dissidence. In response to this, popular sectors became radicalized to the point of establishing counterpower through revolutionary violence. The first expression generated against the post-revolutionary Mexican State was the Jaramillista movement; which emerged in Morelos and was the result of a gradual erosion of the legal channels used by the population to open democratic spaces. The leader of the movement, Rubén Jaramillo, was a member of the Zapatista movement. His ideas were based on agrarian reform that would provide peasants with the rights of equality and freedom.

During the administration of Lázaro Cárdenas, the Jaramillistas contributed to the consolidation of the nation-state. Later, they joined the project directed by Manuel Ávila Camacho; however, the latter abandoned the agrarian plan, sparking peaceful mobilizations, petitions, and strikes in sugar mills. The local elite responded by repressing these actions, triggering the first guerrilla uprising. In 1943 and 1944, Jaramillo visited various towns in Morelos and Puebla to establish support bases. However, in 1945, the Jaramillista movement rejoined the legal sphere, thanks to an amnesty led by Lázaro Cárdenas.

The Jaramillista movement sought to participate in local elections; it founded the Morelense Agrarian Workers Party (PAOM) and nominated Rubén Jaramillo as a candidate for governor of Morelos. The Jaramillistas, accused electoral fraud, took up arms for five years, returned to the legal path through another amnesty, and participated again in the 1957 electoral process. Again, they accused fraud, which is why they carried out a mobilization that was repressed by the government. Finally, in 1962, Rubén Jaramillo was murdered along with his family (Martínez-Zavala, 2011).

Consistent with the Jaramillista movement, guerrilla groups emerged in the 1960s and 1970s as a result of the erosion of institutional means of popular struggle. In the states of Chihuahua and Guerrero, the Popular

Guerrilla Group (GPG), the National Revolutionary Civic Association (ACNR), and the Execution Brigade of the Party of the Poor (PDLP) were created, which were made up of peasants and teachers who suffered acts of repression by the State.

Similarly, in the 1970s, urban guerrilla groups emerged as a result of the ideological radicalization of the student sector, which faced violence in 1968, 1971, and 1973. Among some guerrilla movements, the Revolutionary Action Movement (MAR), the National Liberation Forces (FLN), and the Communist League September 23 (LC23S), were annihilated by the dominant elite. Each of these groups experienced the persecution, torture, and murder of their leaders and militants. Ramírez-Cuevas (2004) documented that a strategy used by state forces was to generate paranoia among guerrillas by executing those suspected of being traitors.

In the 1980s, former guerrilla fighters who survived state persecution formed the People's Union Peasant Workers Party (PROCUP). This movement carried out harassment actions against state, financial, and commercial institutions. The previous learning enabled them to overcome the attacks of the state to such a degree that they formed the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR), an armed wing with which they consolidated committees in various regions of the country and managed to be operational in the 1990s and during the first years of the 21st century (Martínez-Zavala, 2011).

The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) was publically launched in 1994, claiming itself as a Marxist guerrilla movement that sought to overthrow power through revolutionary violence. The impact and dissemination of this approach had internationally generated civil society organizations to monitor state actions; a phenomenon that gave rise to a more covert and cautious combat strategy on the part of the State. In 2005, the EZLN announced a change in the paradigm of struggle, abandoning the classic revolutionary revolt and establishing an alternative form of government that proposed the formation of government Juntas and ideological propaganda work.

For its part, the EPR conducted military harassment actions, placing it in the focus of national security institutions. Through various intelligence actions, the State confronted the guerrilla movement, causing casualties at all levels of its organizational structure, including the leaders of the General Command. Undoubtedly, the forced disappearance of two key guerrilla leaders generated a weakening of the movement's strength and capacity for action. An aspect that, together with the internal disagreements evidenced in the separation of militants to form new guerrilla organizations, generated a decline in the EPR and a weakening to establish itself as a counterweight. Currently, the presence of the movement has been reduced to the issuance of statements that establish an opinion on the situation in the country and limited ideological and dissemination work.

The violence exercised by the State has generated two reactions throughout the history of the guerrillas in the country. On the one hand, the violence exerted against social movements that sought to establish demands through institutional channels gave rise to the radicalization of popular sectors that saw armed struggle as the only possible way to generate necessary social changes. On the other hand, the systematic and specific violence, both material and symbolic, against the guerrilla groups contributed, along with other elements, to the interruption of the emergence of guerrilla movements in contemporary times, achieving social control by the State with respect to these types of expressions of dissent.



Recomposition in Popular Vote Credibility: The Triumph of a Center-Left Government in 2018

As noted above, the guerrilla movements in Mexico were the result of two processes. The first process refers to the response to the gradual erosion of institutional avenues for citizen participation. The second process refers to the radicalization of a popular sector that—due to its ideology—considers revolutionary violence as the most feasible way to establish another type of social organization.

It can be observed in the history of rebel Mexico that the popular perception of fraud in the electoral elections has been decisive in the ideological radicalization of a sector of the population. This, in addition to the violence exercised by the State against non-conformists, generates a breeding ground for radical dissidents.

It is true that the State has managed to deactivate the various guerrilla expressions; However, these struggles have had an impact on the power of the dominant elite, whose hegemony was established unevenly in the different regions of the country (Martínez-Zavala, 2015). This characteristic has generated various levels of mobilization and different means of popular expression, but correspondingly, the erosion of the ruling party allowed an alternation in political and leadership positions at both the local, state, and federal levels.

Since 2000, Mexico has experienced political change in the presidency of the republic. In both 2000 and 2006, the candidate of the National Action Party (PAN) won; in 2012, the candidate of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) won; and in 2018, the candidate of the National Regeneration Movement party (MORENA) won. During the six-year term of Vicente Fox (2000-2006) there was activity by guerrilla movements such as the EPR and its offshoots the ERPI, the FARP, the EVRP, the CCRP-CJ28J and TDR-EP; which considered this triumph as a continuation of the policies and previous governments. The FARP stated the following:

It is a lie that the transition to democracy is taking place; what is clearly seen is that financial capital moved its ideological, economic, propaganda, and political machinery to achieve a “change”; but a simple change of post. (FARP, 2000- 07- 24)

Felipe Calderón's six-year term was a period in which the EPR had high political-military activity. The objective of this action was to demand the appearance alive of two key leaders of the guerrilla group who disappeared during the maelstrom generated by the Popular Assembly of the People of Oaxaca (APPO). One of the operations with the greatest resonance were the explosions in the PEMEX pipelines in Celaya, Salamanca, Coroneo, and Valle de Santiago, Guanajuato, on July 5, 2007 and in Querétaro on July 10, 2007.

Subsequently, in 2008, the EPR requested the formation of a Mediation Commission composed of public figures recognized for their career in defense of human rights in the country. The Said Commission undertook dialogue actions and legal procedures to determine the whereabouts of the two EPERRA militants; However, over time and as a result of the wear and tear generated by the slow actions of government agencies, the Mediation Commission ceased to be a central figure in the guerrilla group's search for negotiation (Martínez-Zavala, 2015).

During the six-year term of Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018), EPER's actions were reduced to the issuance of statements in which they expressed their political position regarding a specific issue. It should be noted that both the PRI candidate's campaign and his government were marred by protests against student, teacher,

and popular mobilizations, among others, who were dissatisfied with the return of the PRI to power. One of the movements with the greatest popular presence was the one led by Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who was accused of having won the presidential elections in 2006-2012 and 2012-2018.

López Obrador participated again in the presidential election for the period 2018-2024, the year in which he won after his third attempt (2006, 2012, 2018). Navarrete (2023) warns that this victory was achieved—in part—due to the concerted discourse he maintained with the social movements opposed to the government. Said author pointed out that the MORENA candidate placed conflict issues on his political agenda “such as canceling the new airport in Texcoco, repealing the educational reform, removing pensions from former presidents, among others” (p. 347).

Concordantly, Anguiano (2019) asserted that the victory achieved in 2018 was based on the ability of the Morenista candidate to incorporate leaders of antagonistic ideologies. López Obrador added the following points to his campaign:

Friends and enemies of mining extractivism, defenders of the environment and long-standing promoters of transgenic seeds, neoliberals and developmentalists, supporters of the San Andrés Accords on indigenous rights and culture inspired by the EZLN, along with farmers, paramilitaries and defenders of executors of the Acteal massacre, in Chiapas; sinister characters suspected of links to organized crime and enthusiastic newcomers to state politics. PRI members, PAN members, PRD members, former members of all parties and prominent figures of the power mafia. (Anguiano, 2019, p.144)

Anguiano (2019) stated that the 2018 presidential succession occurred in a worn-out political and social context, with a “long crisis of the State [...], the degradation of national life and the loss of legitimacy of state institutions” (p. 125). Undoubtedly, this context allowed the López Obrador leadership to integrate the discontent of large and diverse sectors of the population. Moreover, this victory represented the restoration of electoral bodies and the credibility that voters can exercise vertical accountability through casting their votes.

It is argued that López Obrador’s victory filled the political vacuum that Roderos (2014) notes as one of the characteristics of representative democracies that experience a distancing between leaders and the population, due to “the real inability of public officials to respond.” to the needs and demands of citizens” (p.164). This process generated the restoration of the hegemony of the Mexican State, which to date (2024) is primarily sustained by the generation of consensus among the population. It is stated that this phenomenon of containment and consensus has had an impact on the germination of guerrilla movements as a strategy used by certain sectors of the population to convey their demands and generate a counterweight to the dominant power.

The consensus established by the López Obrador government responds to two areas: material and ideological. The material is being built through agreements established by the federal government with groups that, in previous periods, served as counterpowers, such as the National Coordinator of Education Workers (CNTE) (Flores, 2024), some parents of the 43 Normalistas disappeared on September 26, 2014 (Guerrero, 2024), as well as among the poor and vulnerable population through the delivery of economic support to older adults, people with disabilities, young students and women heads of family. Regarding the ideological sphere, through political propaganda and the morning speeches issued by the President of the Republic on

open television and radio channels, it is widely accepted that this government fights corruption, enrichment, nepotism, injustice, and inequality. (Flores and Amador, 2022).

The Guerrilla in Power

The third element that affects the interruption of the recurrent emergence of guerrilla movements is linked to the reconfiguration of powers and leadership in Latin America. In the region, there has been a search for peace between the guerrillas and the State; as well as a trend of militants who have joined the legal route, obtaining political leadership positions at important levels such as the presidency of their countries. This generates a change in the paradigm of struggle and builds a spirit of the times (*Zeitgeist*) that strengthens the sovereignty of institutions.

Undoubtedly, the case of Nicaragua with the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was the result of the push generated by the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959. The FSLN began operations in the 1960s as a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla movement. that overthrew the Somoza government and established itself as a hegemonic power, ruling in 1979 and 1990. In 1983, the FSLN was established as a party and participated in the presidential elections, obtaining victory in 1984 and losing the elections in 1990 (Martí i Puig, 2002).

The movement remained as a party and returned to the electoral contest, winning elections in 2007, 2011, 2016, and 2021 with the candidacy of Daniel Ortega, who has been in power for four consecutive terms. Journalistic reports indicate that in the 2021 election process, Ortega won with 75% of the votes; but in this case, there was 80% abstentionism (Arciniegas, 2021). Since the first period, the said government has enjoyed good acceptance by countries and international organizations. Cuadra (2022) maintains that his arrival “coincided in time with a trend of political change in Latin America that was favorable to his purposes: the existence and arrival to the Presidency of a series of leftist governments through electoral means” (párr. 16).

Likewise, during this push, José “Pepe” Mujica obtained the presidency of the Republic of Uruguay from 2010 to 2015. Mujica was a member of the National Liberation Movement-Tupamaros (MLN-T), an organization that was operational in the decades of the sixties and seventies, which sought to overthrow the government of Jorge Pacheco Areco. Several leaders, including Pepe Mujica, were arrested and imprisoned for twelve years. Upon leaving, in the 1980s, the ex-militants abandoned the armed struggle and joined the electoral struggle, obtaining victory with Pepe Mujica in 2008 (Schmal, 2011).

Brazil is another Latin American country that has experienced the presence of guerrilla groups seeking to overthrow the military dictatorship that was established from 1964 to 1985. The National Liberation Command (COLINA) was a Marxist guerrilla movement that sought to overthrow power through an armed struggle and to consolidate a communist country. Dilma Rousseff was a leader of that organization. She was imprisoned for two years and later joined the institutional struggle until she obtained the presidency of Brazil during the period 2011-2016 (Pattaro and Delfini, 2017).

Similarly, El Salvador was under the leadership of Salvador Sánchez Cerén, who was a member of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and served as president from 2014 to 2019. This guerrilla movement underwent a process of ideological and organizational transformation from an armed group in the 1970s to a political party in the 1990s (Martínez-Álvarez, 2011). As Pérez-Salazar (2014) very correctly points out, the triumph of Salvador Sánchez Cerén in 2011, “is linked to a new phenomenon in Latin America: that of people who took up arms against the State and who now, thanks to The peace processes carried out in the region in recent decades come to power through democratic means” (párr. 3).



Finally, in Colombia, Gustavo Petro, a former activist of the April 19 Movement (M-19), won the presidency of his country from 2022 to 2026. The M-19 was an urban guerrilla that suspended its armed activities in the 1990s. In a formal act before delegates and representatives of the Latin American governments, Commander Carlos Pizarro ordered: "For Colombia, for peace, leave weapons!" (Grabe, 2010, p.1). The triumph of Gustavo Petro represented the consolidation of the first left-wing president in that country and the continuation of the peace treaties (de los Reyes, 2022).

Strengthening Drug Trafficking Groups in the Country

Martínez-Zavala (2015) warned that hegemonic power was established unevenly in the various regions of the country, leaving pockets or power vacuums that became spaces of dispute both by guerrilla movements and by drug trafficking groups that settled with the purpose of weaving networks among the population, controlling areas and strengthening their power. In the case of the state of Michoacán, the capacity for popular cooptation was greater by drug trafficking groups than by the *eperrista* guerrillas that sought to establish support bases in the area during the 1990s. This was because the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas offered the population a better life when the revolutionary struggle triumphed. On the other hand, drug trafficking groups, in the best of cases, offered an immediate solution to the poverty and precariousness in which the population found themselves.

Currently, the ability of drug trafficking groups to incorporate residents of various regions into their ranks continues to be a tangible reality. In 2023, the civil society organization International Crisis Group (2024) interviewed one of the leaders of the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación, who, when asked about what the losses they had suffered due to the open war between different organizations for the control of various areas of the country, answered: "There is always human filling" (p. 20).

According to what is documented by the International Crisis Group (2024), the strategies undertaken by previous governments for 20 years have not managed to reduce the actions and operations of drug trafficking groups; In fact, the strategy undertaken in this six-year term, which has consisted of "allowing greater room for maneuver to criminal groups in exchange for a reduction in visible violence" (p. 20), has generated a strengthening, growth and expansion of drug trafficking groups in the country. This, without a doubt, has impacted the operational and growth capacity of guerrilla movements because of two phenomena.

The first event has to do with the capacity of drug trafficking organizations to co-opt the population, either as members of their cartels or as part of the population that serves as the basis of support and protection. It has been documented that "to present themselves as more benevolent and responsive than the state or rival illegal groups, these groups distribute money and food, build infrastructure [...], organize community events, and assume the role of arbitrators in citizens' everyday disputes" (International Crisis Group, 2024, p.22). Through these strategies, the population perceives that economic and social problems can be resolved immediately.

A second phenomenon that is impacting the ability of guerrilla movements to gather—a result of the economic and social impact that drug trafficking has in the various regions of the country—consists of the displacement of the population due to the violence generated between opposing drug trafficking groups that are fighting. control of various territories. A recent example is the "serious humanitarian crisis [that] has been unleashed in southern Mexico, where more than 600 people from some Chiapas towns have fled the violence of criminal cartels and have crossed into Guatemala" (Morán and Menchú, 2024, párr. 1).

Conclusions

Violence is a phenomenon that has permeated the history of Mexico and Latin American countries. Violence is exercised by the state and by the population who see in armed struggle the possibility of establishing themselves in power. This perspective was part of a cycle that opened with the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, and that sought to be replicated in Mexico and other Latin American countries.

In the Mexican case, the guerrilla groups failed to achieve the objective of overthrowing the State and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. The State managed to deactivate these groups, but this dissolution did not eliminate the idea in a sector of the population that an alternative for change was found through armed means. Thus, the history of contemporary Mexico is marked by the constant emergence of guerrilla movements, a phenomenon Montemayor (1999) called *the recurrent guerrilla* in Mexico.

This study maintains that this persistence was the result of the lack of legal and institutional means that the population had to exercise counterpower. These struggles, despite having been dissolved, opened democratic spaces, producing political alternations in high-level leadership positions, such as obtaining the presidency of the republic.

Since approximately 2010, there has been a cessation in the emergence of guerrilla groups in Mexico; which invites us to question whether the end of the recurring guerrilla movement in the country has been reached. In this work, it is argued that yes, and that this is the result of four aspects that have strengthened the hegemony of the State. First, the dominant power was able to violently deactivate dissidents. Second, it is the result of the capacity for restoration and institutional strengthening that Andrés Manuel López Obrador brought with it for the 2018-2024 presidential period. This event generated a belief in society that there is vertical accountability; That is, the population can choose the leaders of the country. A third element responds to Latin American guerrilla militants who have left the armed path and have chosen to join institutional means. It seems that we are experiencing a Latin American cycle that abandons the use of revolutionary violence as an alternative to establishing itself as a hegemonic power, turning to legal and constitutional actions that allow the construction of democratic spaces. This phenomenon strengthens at the Latin American level the ideology of establishing changes from the structures of the modern State; Added to the fact that this process has generated geopolitical changes, establishing counterpowers that support democratic movements that seek to establish themselves in power through electoral processes, such as the triumph of López Obrador in 2018. Finally, the fourth element consists of the capacity growth of drug trafficking groups, which has generated a decrease in guerrilla expression for two reasons. First, the violence caused by the drug war has caused the displacement of residents seeking refuge and who, in previous processes, were the ones who served as support bases for the guerrilla groups. Second, drug traffickers have a greater capacity to co-opt the population because of the immediate economical solution they offer. This set of events gives rise to a pause in the recurrent emergence of the guerrilla in Mexico; which, as Montemayor (1999) points out, had been an action to which certain sectors of the population had constantly resorted, considering it the only or the most viable to carry out social transformations. Undoubtedly, this research has the limitations of research that focuses on recent history. One of these limitations is that it is only possible to use public sources, articles, essays, and newspaper notes to understand and analyze a phenomenon that is built in silence and survives from invisibility. This work maintains that the interruption of recurring guerrillas continues to occur during the government of Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo (2024-2030). The state struggle during that period did not involve revolutionary violence but rather violence between various drug trafficking groups.





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Author Details

Lorena Martínez-Zavala (Prof. Dr.)¹ El Colegio de Puebla, Puebla, México

0000-0003-0836-7344

lorena.martinez@colpue.edu.mx, lorena.martinez.zavala@gmail.com

Rosa Guadalupe Valerio-Francisco (Bachelor's Degree)² Interamerican University, Department of International Relations, Puebla, México

0009-0002-3573-8622

valeriofrancisco.rosag29@gmail.com

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Research Article

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Effects of Inflation, Foreign Direct Investment, Energy Consumption, and Trade Openness on CO2 Emissions: Panel Data Analysis for Developing Countries



Mehmet Emre Ünsal¹  

¹ Istanbul University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of Economics, Istanbul, Türkiye

Abstract

This study investigates the drivers of CO2 emissions in developing countries, with emphasis on the nexus role exerted by key economic variables such as inflation, FDI, energy use, and trade openness. This is a panel study covering 1990-2020 for nine developing countries: Brazil, India, Türkiye, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Due to heteroscedasticity detection, the method Huber-Eicker-White is used for estimation to estimate the coefficients correctly. The results indicate that FDI, energy use, and openness to trade significantly positively influence CO2 emissions. In contrast, inflation significantly influences CO2 emissions negatively. Considering that FDI, investment, energy use, and trade openness have a positive effect on CO2 emissions, governments are always encouraged to focus on energy efficiency and renewable energy transitions by offering incentives. Inversely, the negative relationship between inflation and carbon dioxide emissions indicates that using inflationary periods as an opportunity to adopt green technology.


Keywords

CO2 emissions • inflation • FDI • energy consumption • trade openness



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 Corresponding author: Mehmet Emre Ünsal mehmet.unsal@istanbul.edu.tr



Effects of Inflation, Foreign Direct Investment, Energy Consumption, and Trade Openness on CO2 Emissions: Panel Data Analysis for Developing Countries

Fossil fuel combustion is the major source of CO₂ emissions, followed by deforestation, industrial processes, and specific agricultural practices, which altogether contribute to the atmospheric CO₂ concentration (Paraschiv & Paraschiv 2020). CO₂ plays a fundamental role in the greenhouse effect. However, its anthropogenic increase and that of other greenhouse gases have enhanced the effect, leading to an accelerated rate of global warming (Bayraktar et al., 2023). Elevated CO₂ levels in the atmosphere are associated with considerable changes in climate patterns. This includes an increase in average global temperatures (Rehan & Nehdi, 2005). Moreover, a key feature of CO₂ is its persistence in the atmosphere. Certain fractions of released CO₂ can endure for thousands of years, indicating that present-day emissions have lasting effects on the climate system (Archer et al., 2009). In contrast, the significant increase in the levels of CO₂ in the atmosphere during modern times is primarily due to human activities, which contrasts sharply with the natural changes that occurred in atmospheric CO₂ levels in the past. This rate of increase has been especially rapid since the start of the industrial revolution (Salam & Noguchi, 2005). Additionally, CO₂ emissions are measured by mass. Monitoring such emissions is integral to understanding and managing the anthropogenic impact of climate dynamics (Dixon & Romanak, 2015). Reducing CO₂ emissions is crucial to combating climate change, as highlighted by international agreements such as the Paris Agreement. Key mitigation strategies include shifting to renewable energy sources, improving energy efficiency, and adopting policies that promote sustainable development (Dong et al., 2018). In essence, CO₂ emissions are a focal concern in the realm of environmental and climatological sciences, primarily because of their significant role in intensifying the greenhouse effect and driving anthropogenic climate change. Addressing these emissions is imperative for mitigating the adverse impacts of global warming.

The factors influencing carbon dioxide emissions are multiple and varied, but each comprises one or more of many other factors interlaced together in a complex way to shape total emissions. Understanding these elements is crucial for devising effective climate change mitigation strategies. The identified major determinants are: Fossil fuel-based energy use, economic growth and industrialization, population size and urbanization, technology and energy efficiency, energy mix composition, regulatory policies and environment governance, and foreign trade and global production chains (Sharma, 2011). The leading cause of CO₂ emissions is energy use, particularly the burning of fossil fuels. These fuels are mainly used for electricity generation, transportation, and industrial processes (Apergis & Payne, 2010). Similarly, economic activities, particularly industrial production and CO₂ emissions, are also closely related. Greater economic development and industrialization generally go hand in hand with more energy consumption and higher emissions. The type and efficiency of the economy can also make an important difference in this regard (Asumadu-Sarkodie & Owusu, 2016). Besides, demographic processes contribute to the emissions of CO₂. For instance, a large population implies high energy and resource use, resulting in higher emissions. Further, urbanization affects emissions because urban areas are viewed as illustrating higher energy use than rural areas (O'Neill et al., 2012). Moreover, technological change plays a dual role in influencing the rate of CO₂ emissions. While some technological changes have indeed brought about energy efficiency and reduced emissions, other technological changes, especially those involving fossil fuel-based technologies, could raise the level of emissions (Khan et al., 2023). Some technological changes tend to increase emissions. The mix of energy types used by a nation again determines its CO₂-related emissions. The use of renewable

energy sources correlates with diminished emissions, whereas reliance on fossil fuels is linked to increased emissions (Long et al., 2015). Similarly, governmental policies and regulations aimed at the reduction of emissions, which encompass strategies such as carbon pricing, energy efficiency standards, and controls on industrial emissions, play a crucial role in determining the trajectories of national CO2 emissions (Dehdar et al., 2022). The dynamics of international trade also influence CO2 emissions through the manufacturing and transportation of goods. Global supply chain configurations can lead to the geographical redistribution of production and associated emissions (Fan et al., 2021).

This study investigates how inflation, FDI, energy consumption, and trade openness affect CO2 emissions in developing countries. To achieve this purpose, Panel Data Analysis is conducted using data from the economies of Brazil, India, Türkiye, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Pakistan from 1990 to 2020. The study is organized into the following sections: Introduction, theoretical framework, literature review, methodology and dataset, findings, and conclusion.

Theoretical Framework

The macroeconomic factors influencing carbon dioxide emissions include various factors at both national and international levels that significantly impact the quantity of CO2 emitted into the atmosphere (Ozyilmaz et al., 2023). These factors should be considered when assessing the environmental impacts of macroeconomic activities. The primary macroeconomic determinants include gross domestic product, investment, inflation, foreign direct investment, energy consumption, degree of industrialization, energy intensity of the economy, energy portfolio composition, trade openness and global economic integration, urbanization processes, fiscal and regulatory policies and technological innovation (Tsauroi, 2020). Gross Domestic Product (GDP) represents the aggregate economic output of an economy. A significant relationship can be observed between gross domestic product (GDP) and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, as increased GDP frequently aligns with augmented energy usage and heightened emissions. Nevertheless, this relationship is influenced by fluctuations that depend on the energy efficiency and the structure of the energy mix within the economy (Myszczyzyn & Suproń, 2021). The degree of an economy's industrialization serves as a critical factor influencing CO2 emissions. Industrial sectors are major contributors to CO2 emissions and are highly reliant on fossil fuels. In general, the transition from an agrarian economy to an industrially structured system is positively related to increasing CO2 emissions (Dong et al. 2019). Economies that consume energy intensively emit high levels of CO2. Reductions in energy intensity, which can be achieved through technological changes and efficiency improvements, are crucial for the abatement of emissions. The composition of energy sources employed by an economy significantly affects its carbon dioxide emissions. Economies that predominantly use fossil fuels are correlated with elevated levels of CO2 emissions, in contrast to those that exhibit a greater dependence on renewable or nuclear energy (Danish et al., 2020). The pace and nature of urbanization have meaningful repercussions on CO2 emissions. Metropolitan regions generally demonstrate greater per capita energy usage than rural regions; however, they also offer potential for enhanced energy efficiency and advanced public transportation networks (Zhang et al., 2017). Governmental initiatives, such as carbon pricing strategies, subsidies for renewable energy, and environmental regulations, significantly affect CO2 emissions. Policies that encourage energy efficiency and the adoption of renewable energy sources play a crucial role in the mitigation of carbon emissions (Halkos & Tzeremes, 2013). The pace and scale of technological change and diffusion across various industries are crucial parameters. Technologically efficient improvements or the facilitation of cleaner alternatives could significantly lower the amount of

CO2 emitted (Du et al., 2019). This study investigates the effects of inflation, investment, foreign direct investment, energy use, and trade openness on CO2 emissions.

The relationship between inflationary trends and CO2 emissions includes a diverse set of economic and environmental factors, including macroeconomic slowdown, inflation-related effects on energy and raw material prices, consumer spending behaviors in inflationary circumstances, budgetary investments in green technology during periods of inflation and corresponding policy actions (Ahmad et al., 2021). Inflationary pressures frequently signal impending macroeconomic slowdowns or recessions. With the contraction in economic cycles, energy demand in industries and other sectors often falls simultaneously. This will reduce the levels of CO2 emissions in the atmosphere. Practical examples of such events are available during the 2008 financial crisis and in the initial stages of the COVID-19 pandemic (González-Álvarez & Montañés, 2023). Inflation is one of the driving factors that increases the cost of energy and its raw materials. This inflationary impact can split into two distinct pathways. On the one hand, it may serve as a catalyst for enhanced energy efficiency and the adoption of cleaner technological paradigms as entities seek cost optimization. On the other hand, if the inflationary surge extends to renewable energy domains, it could delay the transition to greener energy modalities (Khan et al., 2022). Inflation is generally associated with a squeeze on consumer expenditure, which could be positively linked to a reduction in CO2 emissions. However, if inflation significantly raises the relative costs of green products and technologies, it could dampen consumer demand for these environmental alternatives (Munksgaard et al., 2000). High inflation levels can negatively affect green technology investment in the public and private sector. Investment in green technology generally contributes to a substantial decrease in carbon dioxide emissions by encouraging the utilization of renewable energy sources, enhancing energy efficiency, and supporting sustainable industrial and economic methodologies (Kuang et al., 2022). Financial constraints may lead to reduced investment in R&D in sectors essential for mitigating CO2 emissions. The measures implemented by governments to combat inflation have considerable repercussions on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. For instance, policies favoring fossil fuel subsidies as a counterinflationary measure can result in an increase in CO2 emissions. Subsidies can also discourage investment in clean and renewable energy technologies (Arzaghi & Squalli, 2023).

The relationship between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and carbon dioxide emissions implicates a complex interaction among transnational capital flows, economic development pathways, and environmental outputs. This relationship is manifested in several dimensions: Technological transference and environmental norms, industrialization acceleration directly linked with economic expansion, the pollution haven hypothesis that talks about how markets relocate within countries due to changing policies for polluting firms between rich-poor nations (Blanco et al., 2013). FDI acts as a vehicle for transferring more advanced technologies and stricter environmental standards carried out by economies that are developed to those which remain developing. FDI can bring more advanced, cleaner, and efficient technology paradigms to the recipient countries, contributing positively to reduce CO2 emissions (Khan et al.) FDI often serves as a stimulant for industrialization and economic proliferation in host economies. This process has often been associated with higher CO2 emissions because it leads to increased energy requirements and industrial activity. However, the exact nature of the investment determines this factor since investment into renewable energy and green technologies promises growth in economic activities while lessening environmental degradation (Haug & Ucal, 2019). FDI may trigger structural shifts in the host country's economy. Capital invested in industries like services or high-tech manufacturing, which are generally characterized by lower CO2 emissions than old manufacturing industries, may lead to a shift toward an economic structure with low carbon reliance (Zhou et al., 2013). Another possibility is that FDI may influence environmental policy-

making and capacity building in host countries. Multinational corporations are likely to encourage stringent environmental regulations and practices and make various constructive contributions toward improving local abilities in managing environmental impact, perhaps reducing CO2 emissions (Neves et al., 2020).

The relationship between energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions is a critical facet in the discourse on environmental impact and has a statistically significant and strong relationship. It is explicable from various standpoints: Dependence on fossil fuels, shift to renewable and alternative low-carbon fuels, enhancement of energy efficiency, variations in economic structural and energy intensity, and demographic trends and urbanization burdens (Chen et al., 2016). The most influential factor catalyzing CO2 emissions is the global dependence, mostly on fossil fuel-based sources, for the fulfillment of energy needs. The combustion of these fuels releases enormous quantities of CO2, a major contributor to the greenhouse effect. Thus, the degree and type of energy consumption dependence on fossil fuels is a direct cause of CO2 emission rates (Hanif, 2018). Renewable energy sources and low-carbon alternatives, including nuclear energy, have relatively lower CO2 emissions than fossil fuels. A higher percentage of the energy supply from such resources is directly associated with a reduction in overall CO2 emissions (Jaforullah & King, 2015). The improvement in energy efficiency is associated with a reduction in the overall CO2 emissions. This includes technological changes, consumer behavior changes, and efficiency gains in industry, buildings, and transport systems (Tajudeen et al., 2018). The structure of an economy is strongly linked to a country's energy use and therefore its CO2 emissions. Highly industrialized economies or economies with heavy manufacturing dependence are also known to be highly energy-consuming and thus have high CO2 emissions, whereas purely service-based economies have lower consumption and therefore lower associated emissions. Energy intensity is an important measure because low energy intensity means low environmental impact (Namahoro et al., 2021). High population growth and high urbanization are associated with increased energy consumption and CO2 emissions. Urban centers, defined by their densely populated areas and robust economic activities, generally require increased energy consumption; however, they simultaneously offer prospects for enhancements in efficiency (Adusah-Poku, 2016).

The relationship between trade liberalization and carbon dioxide emissions is complex and multidimensional, with many economic, technological, and policy angles. From an analytical perspective, these may be approached through arguments related to industry specialization and comparative advantage mechanisms, international technology transfers and their diffusion, the effects of income and consumption behaviors, transportation and logistics factors, and global supply chains and production influences (Zhang et al., 2017). Openness to trade allows a nation to specialize in sectors with which it has a comparative advantage. If such specialization occurs on carbon-intensive sectors, the result would be increased CO2 emissions. However, when the specialization has low-carbon-intensive industries, it leads to decreased emissions (Andersson & Karpestam, 2013). Openness to trade creates pathways for the diffusion of clean technologies and practices. Countries with strict environmental rules and new green technologies may export these technologies and thus reduce global CO2 emissions (Afesorgbor & Demena, 2022). Trade liberalization can stimulate growth and boost incomes; a bigger pay will mean a greater demand for a greener environment and therefore for the severity of environmental policy (Karedla et al., 2021). Greater trade is likely to require more transportation; the latter reduces emissions, and the longer the transport distance, the more so. The ecological consequences are contingent on the types of transportation and the associated efficiency metrics (Timilsina & Shrestha, 2009). The worldwide interconnection of supply chains can enhance production techniques, which may reduce emissions per unit produced. Nevertheless, this improvement in efficiency might be

offset by a rise in total emissions if the scale of global production expands and if these supply chains are fundamentally energy-demanding (Fan et al., 2017).

Literature Review

Shpak et al. (2022) focused on the dependence of CO2 emissions on some macroeconomic indicators in the US and the Asia-Pacific region using data from 1970 to 2020. In this paper, using econometric approaches like correlation-regression analysis, the authors point out the multi-directional relationships among CO2 emissions and economic indicators, including GDP, export, import, inflation rate, and unemployment rate. The results indicate that carbon dioxide emissions in the United States have experienced a downward trend since 2009, whereas gross domestic product, exports, and imports have shown an upward trajectory. Furthermore, this research highlights a direct relationship between carbon dioxide emissions and the aforementioned economic indicators. It also assumes that inflation and unemployment significantly influence CO2 emissions, for which different regional and global evidence is also provided. All the relation measurements performed by several multiple regression models point to the coefficient of determination and Fisher's criteria as crucial indicators for the quality assessment of the models. Grolleau and Weber (2024) studied the interaction between inflation and CO2 emissions using data from 189 countries covering the period 1970-2020. They found that core inflation depresses CO2, but the effect remains so small that monetary policy cannot be a main measure to significantly reduce emissions. The authors' contribution was to the understanding of the economic-environmental relationship-that there is some complexity in those types of relationships, and depending on inflationary indications is not sufficient to bring improvements in environmental quality. This indicates the demand for a more holistic policy approach that would consider the weight of economic and environmental aspects. Musarat et al. (2021) investigated the relationship between inflation and CO2 emissions for Malaysia. This paper relies on data provided by the Malaysian government and focuses on the correlations between inflation rates, construction activities, and CO2 emissions. From the results, a drop in the inflation rate decreases the price of building materials, hence increasing construction activities and inadvertently increasing CO2 emissions, thus becoming a major hindrance to achieving environmental sustainability. This inverse relation between inflation and CO2 emissions underscores the need for great caution when formulating economic policy to adequately consider environmental aspects. The paper concludes by putting forward one special proposal about a CO2 emission calculator related to the construction industry in view of the absence of methods for calculating the emission due to construction activity and also about the need to introduce environmental considerations into economic and industrial policy-making. Mbassi et al. (2023) investigated the effect of inflation targeting on environmental pollution in developed and emerging market economies during the period 1980-2017. This study finds that conducting inflation targeting significantly reduces CO2, N2O, CH4, and total greenhouse gas emissions using a double-track econometric approach that combines parametric and non-parametric methods. Indeed, the estimate shows that this is the main channel of financial instability, as well as the level and stability of financial development. To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the first attempt to investigate the ecological consequences of inflation targeting; therefore, it extends previous studies by incorporating both parametric and non-parametric approaches. This study analyzes different channels that may affect how inflation targeting impacts environmental degradation and develops a wide set of pollution indicators for developed and developing economies.

Xie et al. (2020) used high-order panel regression analysis to analyze the effects of FDI on CO2 emissions in developing countries. They note that this interaction between FDI and CO2 emission is dynamic, with a

threshold effect-increasing CO2 emissions at first, hence supporting the hypothesis of a pollution haven; when the FDI surpasses its critical threshold value, this effect then reverses to support the hypothesis of a pollution halo. This, therefore, implies that at the initial stages of FDI inflow, there may be environmental degradation due to poor environmental regulation and the presence of high-polluting industries; however, with increased FDI, cleaner production and good environmental practices are promoted because economies will focus on qualitative investment. This study further explains the positive relation of CO2 emission with variables such as population growth, energy consumption, and trade openness, all of which contribute to environmental degradation. In conclusion, the findings provide insights into emerging markets toward sustainable development paths that balance economic growth with environmental protection. Essandoh et al. (2020) presented a detailed analysis of how international trade and FDI affect CO2 emissions, underlining the difference that exists between developed and developing countries. The results indicate that, regarding CO2 emissions, the autoregressive distributive lag model for 52 countries across 1991-2014 showed a negative long-run relationship with trade in developed countries and, correspondingly, a positive relationship with FDI inflows in developing countries. This study then examines the interrelationship that exists between international trade and the emissions transfer argument, considering individual effects of the pollution haven and pollution halo hypothesis induced through FDI, energy use, and renewable energy toward attaining environmental sustainability. Panel cointegration tests are used here along with the Dumitrescu-Hurlin panel causality test to see how the mentioned variables are related, pointing out that the developmental stages of a nation have been imperative in taking decisions over environmental and trade policies toward the effective control of global emissions. Sung et al. (2018) investigated whether FDI caused an increase in CO2 emissions in the Chinese manufacturing industry during the period 2002-2015. Estimating GMM for 28 manufacturing subsectors, they find that FDI positively influences the environmental quality of China, thus supporting the halo effect hypothesis. The panel framework analysis of various data properties and stationarity tests indicates that economic activities cannot be separated from environmental changes.

Wang et al. (2016) explored the relationship between economic growth and energy use with regard to CO2 emissions in China using data from 1990 to 2012. Using different types of econometric analysis, the authors find evidence of a co-integration relationship among the variables under consideration eventually. Thus, this paper indicates the need for sustainable development policies that balance economic growth with environmental concerns. The study also contributes to the literature by demonstrating how developing economies balance economic growth and environmental sustainability. Shafiei and Salim (2014) investigated, for the OECD countries and for the period 1980-2011, the impact of different types of energy-renewable versus non-renewable-on the emissions of gases related to CO2 using the STIRPAT model. Their analysis reveals the diverging roles of these types of energy, increasing and decreasing,, respectively, in emissions. The second part of the study goes ahead to explain the Environmental Kuznets Curve in the context of urbanization and emission; it, therefore, hypothesizes that increasing levels of urbanization reduce the levels of emission. This paper also calls for the implementation of renewable energy and sustainable urban development policies, mainly targeting developed countries. The present study provides important inferences related to energy use dynamics and environmental impact, thus underlining the need for strategic policy changes toward sustainability in the OECD countries. Chen et al. (2016) explored the interrelationship between economic growth, energy consumption, and CO2 emissions based on data from 188 countries, ranging from 1993 to 2010. Based on the Vector Error Correction Model, the results show that energy consumption has a negative effect on the GDP of the whole world and developing countries but not in developed nations. It also represents one-way causality from energy use to CO2 emission; hence, CO2 emissions may decrease with increasing

urbanization and development. The present work underscores the fact that although environmental regulations are required to mitigate the adverse effect of economic growth on the environment, in the tune of the global climate change and sustainable development, both developed and developing economies require a different policy angle. Al-Mulali et al. (2013) explore interrelations of urbanization, energy consumption, and CO2 emission in the MENA region within the period of 1980-2009. Employing the techniques of Pedroni co-integration tests and dynamic OLS tools, their study provides evidence for the presence of a bi-directional long-run relationship among these variables. It was indicated that urbanization significantly enhances energy consumption and CO2 emission; this was mentioned to be due to the dependence on fossil fuel resources. This research underscores the fact that, within the MENA region, the regulation of the rate of urbanization by urban planners and policymakers is essential, along with increasing energy efficiency and undertaking energy-saving measures that are an important perspective for balancing the strategy of urban growth and environmental sustainability within the MENA area.

Using data from nine African countries between 1990 and 2016, Dauda et al. (2021) empirically investigated the nexus of innovation, trade openness, and CO2 emissions. The results are presented in the form of an inverted U-curve. The rich methodological framework of the research, underlined by tests for cross-sectional dependence, positioned the positive contribution of renewable energy use and human capital to the decrease of emissions, recognized differential effects of trade openness, and accepted the hypothesis of the Environmental Kuznets Curve. The study results in a critical identification of how innovation relates to environmental policy and human capital development in the attainment of sustainable environmental goals in Africa, even though the study at the same time indicates its own limitations regarding country focus and reliance on patent laws as an innovation proxy, pointing toward avenues of future research. Mahmood et al. (2019) investigated the asymmetrical effects of trade liberalization on the CO2 emission of Tunisia during the period 1971-2014 and confirm the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis. In fact, the results show that although an increase in trade openness positively influences CO2 emissions but insignificantly, its decline does insignificantly influence such emissions, hence supporting the Pollution Haven Hypothesis. By using a non-linear ARDL, the authors have once again asserted that the relationship is indeed complex and interwoven, and hence, long-term environmental policy is crucial in Tunisia, one that effectively balances economic development with sustainability. The study is, therefore, significant in the analyses of how trade policy affects the differential quality of the environment, especially within the context of a developing economy like Tunisia. Mutascu (2018) examined the nexus between trade openness and CO2 emissions in France using wavelet tools throughout the period 1960-2013. This is a very important contribution as far as the methods used are concerned because the effects of this relation were analyzed in the time-frequency domain. This proves that the medium-run effects of CO2 emissions tend to influence trade openness, thereby showing that lenient environmental regulations may affect international trade. In return, long-term estimates indicate that trade openness affects gas emissions, implying a business cycle-driven interaction. This paper enhances the already rich literature in the area of reviewing a broad set of hypotheses on the relationship between trade and CO2 emissions with new theoretical dimensions and presents evidence that shows the time dimension and also economic conditions of the various periods. Dou et al. (2021) conducted an analytical review on the influence of openness to trade on CO2 emissions in relation to free trade agreements. The general evidence of the increase in CO2 emissions due to trade openness, although at a dampened rate since the FTA, underscores once more the fact that such agreements may be designed in ways to minimize their environmental impact. Further, their analysis segregates the import and export effects of emissions and finds evidence of increasing CO2 emissions by imports, whereas exports reduce CO2

emissions. This paper has contributed to filling the literature gap by analyzing the separate effects of both and by examining underlined mechanisms such as scale, technical, and structural effects. This underscores the complexity of the trade-environment relationship due to factors such as economic growth, technological change, and the details of trade policy that provide useful insight into policymakers and researchers concerned with the reconciliation of trade policies with environmental objectives.

This review of the related literature provides a wide-ranging overview of how CO₂ emissions relate to inflation, FDI, energy consumption, trade liberalization, and economic growth. The relationships derived from the literature are complex and indicate that while the use of energy and processes for industrialization always lead to increased CO₂ emissions, the effects of inflation and trade openness vary with different economic and regulatory environments. This method applies various methodical approaches, such as panel data analysis, autoregressive distributed lag models, and co-integration tests, to explain the time-series behavior of emissions. Further, it efficiently embeds the results regarding the Environmental Kuznets Curve, pollution haven, and pollution halo hypotheses, hence illustrating the possibilities of how FDI and trade could worsen or improve the environment. This literature review notes the key differences in CO₂ emissions drivers between developed and developing countries. In developed countries, economic growth ties to energy efficiency and cleaner technologies, with trade openness and FDI generally lowering emissions, whereas inflation has little effect because of stable policies. Economic growth, industrialization, and energy use in developing countries lead to higher emissions, often because of trade and FDI, in a way that operationalized the pollution haven hypothesis. Inflation cuts emissions by slowing economic activity but attracts lower clean technology investment because of stringent financial resources. Obstacles to the transition toward renewable energy include the relevance of policy solutions at the local level. This study tries to add to the growing body of literature on the determinants of the level of CO₂ emissions, considering inflation, FDI, energy consumption, and trade liberalization in developing countries. It considers panel data for nine countries—Brazil, India, Türkiye, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Pakistan—for the period 1990-2020, something larger than most of the studies so far considered, which majorly have focused on either economic growth or energy consumption.

Methodology and Dataset

Panel data analysis is an elaborated econometric method that includes data for a great number of entities over several time periods and provides the possibility of controlling entity and temporal effects. Checking can be performed for variations in the entities over time and between entities, thus enriching and making the results more accurate. The methodology has great significance in that it tends to resolve the problem of the unobserved variables for which variation across entities may exist but is invariant over time, thereby reducing the chances of biased results. Inflation of the number of data points due to panel data increases the statistical efficiency of the research study, facilitating better estimates of the associations among the variables. Another wider application of methodology falls within economics, finance, and social sciences to model dynamics at every level, from the change in behavior up to economic policy and trends. It usually encompasses in the analysis of panel data the fixed effects model, focusing on the changes that take place within the entities by means of controlling unobserved heterogeneity; the random effects model, assuming no correlation of the unobserved variable with the explanatory ones and thus allowing an analysis across entities; and the pooled OLS model, pooling all the observations without distinction across entities or periods (Yerdelen Tatoğlu, 2013). Panel data analysis offers a broad framework through which the complicated interactions among variables across different time periods and contexts can be examined.

This tool becomes a tool that researchers cannot use without understanding the intricacies associated with longitudinal data.

In the application part of this study; Panel Data Analysis is performed to determine the effects of inflation, FDI, energy consumption, and trade openness on CO2 emissions in developing countries. In this analysis, all data were obtained from the World Bank database. The variables are explained in Table 1.

Table 1

Variables

Variable	Explanation	Source of Data
CO2	CO2 Emissions	World Bank
GDP	Gross Domestic Product (constant prices)	World Bank
INV	Gross Fixed Capital Formation (constant prices)	World Bank
INF	Inflation (consumer prices, annual %)	World Bank
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment (constant prices)	World Bank
ENG	Energy consumption (kg of oil equivalent per capita)	World Bank
OPN	Trade Openness (the ratio of total trade to GDP)	World Bank

The panel data application part of this study continues with the Im-Pesaran-Shin Unit Root Test, F Test, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test, White's Test, and Wooldridge Test.

Findings

Table 2

Im-Pesaran-Shin Unit Root Test

Variables	Level		First Difference	
	Statistic	P-Value	Statistic	P-Value
CO2	-1.8647	0.0311	-7.6641	0.0000
GDP	1.7444	0.9595	-5.0384	0.0000
INV	0.7146	0.7626	-7.5361	0.0000
INF	-3.9186	0.0000	-9.9051	0.0000
FDI	-3.1425	0.0008	-9.6021	0.0000
ENG	1.9894	0.9767	-8.7098	0.0000
OPN	-3.5366	0.0002	-8.4501	0.0000

To prevent spurious regression in Panel Data Analysis, it is essential that the series used are stationary, meaning that they should not contain unit roots. As shown in the Im-Pesaran-Shin Unit Root Test results in Table 2, some series initially exhibited unit roots at a 1% significance level. However, these series became stationary after the first differences. Consequently, using the first difference values of the series eliminates the risk of spurious regression.

Table 3

F Test and Breusch-Pagan LM Test

Test	Statistic	P-Value
F Test	1.06	0.3907
Breusch-Pagan LM Test,	0.05	0.8190

Based on the F Test results presented in Table 3, the null hypothesis (H0) that unit effects are zero is accepted. Similarly, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test results indicate that the null hypothesis (H0) that the variance of the unit effects is zero is also accepted. These findings indicate that the pooled ordinary least squares model is appropriate for use in the Panel Data Analysis. Additionally, since the Pooled OLS Model was employed, it is necessary to test for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation although testing for cross-sectional correlation is not required.

Table 4*White and Wooldridge tests*

Test	Statistic	P-Value
White Test	90.56	0.0000
Wooldridge Test	1.768	0.2203

The white-test results (Table 4) reject the null hypothesis (H0) of homoscedasticity, indicating heteroscedasticity. Similarly, the Wooldridge Test results accept the null hypothesis (H0) that there is no first-degree autocorrelation, revealing that there is no autocorrelation problem in the model.

To perform the Panel Data Analysis in this study using the dataset that became stationary after first differencing and is appropriate for the pooled ordinary least squares model, which encounters heteroscedasticity issue, a suitable estimation method must be employed. The method recommended in the literature for such conditions is the Huber-Eicker-White Estimation model.

Table 5*Results of the Huber-Eicker-White Estimation*

Number of obs: 270				
Wald chi2: 1946.39			Prob > chi2: 0.0000	
R²: 0.7039				
Variable	Coefficient	z	P > z	Robust Std. Err.
GDP	0.704698	4.03	0.000	0.1748098
INV	0.4359625	8.34	0.000	0.0523021
INF	-0.0000138	-16.99	0.000	8.12e-07
FDI	0.0069957	2.28	0.023	0.0030705
EGN	0.6587467	3.51	0.000	0.1875357
OPN	0.0666464	2.85	0.004	0.0233441

The Huber-Eicker-White Estimation results shown in Table 5 indicate that the Wald chi2 Test is significant; therefore, the independent variables collectively have a significant impact on explaining the dependent variable. The coefficient of determination, R², reveals that the model accounted for 70.39% of the variance in CO2 emissions. The z-test results indicate that all coefficients have a significant effect on the dependent variable. As a result, in developing countries, GDP, FDI, investment, energy consumption, and trade openness have positive effects on CO2 emissions, whereas inflation has a negative effect on CO2 emissions.

Conclusion

CO2 mainly originates from burning fossil fuels, deforestation, and industrial processes. Human activities have significantly increased CO2 levels, leading to climate changes such as rising temperatures and extreme weather. CO2 remains in the atmosphere for thousands of years, meaning current emissions have long-

term effects. Efforts to reduce CO₂, like the Paris Agreement, focus on renewable energy, energy efficiency, and sustainable practices. Some of the important determining elements of CO₂ emissions identified in this study include energy use, economic progress, demographic factors, technology, energy sources, regulatory policies, and international trade. The consumption of fossil fuels—especially electricity, transportation, and industry—is the most dominant source of CO₂ emissions. Economic growth and industrialization result in high energy consumption and therefore high emissions, while the size and rate of urbanization of the population contribute significantly. It can be either increasing or decreasing, depending on how the technology is applied. The proportionality of renewable energy sources used in a nation's mix of energy is very vital for reducing emissions. Emission reduction through government policies is very important, and international trade affects CO₂ levels through the resultant global movement and production of goods.

This study investigates the influence of inflation, FDI, energy consumption, and trade openness on CO₂ emissions in developing countries, focusing on Brazil, India, Türkiye, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Pakistan, using panel data analysis for the period from 1990 to 2020. Several tests were conducted for the study variables: Im-Pesahan-Shin Unit Root Test, F Test, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test, White's Test, and the Wooldridge Test. It can be observed from the result of these analyses that the dataset, upon first-order differencing, has become stationary and thus, suitable for application in the pooled OLS model, although at the cost of prevailing heteroscedasticity. Therefore, an appropriate estimation technique for panel data analysis is required. Under these conditions, the Huber-Eicker-White Estimation model. The results of Huber-Eicker-White estimation provide the inference that all the independent variables contribute significantly to explaining the dependent variable, and each of the coefficient contributors has a significant impact on the dependent variable. The findings reveal that in developing countries, GDP, FDI, investment, energy consumption, and trade openness positively impact CO₂ emissions, whereas inflation negatively impacts CO₂ emissions. The analysis strengthens previous studies that showed that economic growth, industrial development, and energy use are major driving forces for CO₂ emissions. Other related papers also found evidence of the contribution of economic activities and trade liberalization to increased emissions. However, the negative effect of inflation on CO₂ emission was discovered by this research runoff, which contradicts previous studies, as its impact was shown to differ depending on economic conditions. The overall results of the study are congruent with general findings in the literature, which again emphasize the role of economic and energy policy in handling environmental degradation in developing countries. This study has some limitations like that a generalization of findings for any other region, apart from those studied, is not possible because the scope covers only nine developing countries. In addition, panel data across 1990-2020 can fail to capture all shifting economic and environmental circumstances and concentrating on only macroeconomic variables such as inflation, FDI, energy use, and trade openness. This study can miss other important variables like technological innovation.

Since the variables like GDP, FDI, investment, energy use, and trade openness contribute positively to explaining variations in CO₂ emissions, governments should focus on policies related to energy efficiency and the transition toward renewable energy resources. The application of financial incentives, subsidies, and regulatory frameworks may be used in the diffusion of clean energy technological innovations in industries, transport, and urban development. In general, policies should be directed at attracting sustainable economic growth through green investment, especially in sectors that are developing low-carbon technologies and infrastructure. This can also involve greening trade policies to support the environmental course by promoting green goods and services, imposition of carbon tariffs, and assurance of environmental protection within trade agreements. Improved environmental regulations and governance are crucial for

emission control, especially for highly energy-consuming industries and urban areas. This includes stringent emission standards, compelling companies to provide energy efficiency, and forcing businesses to be more transparent in disclosing their carbon emissions. Furthermore, the finding that inflation is detrimental to CO2 emissions indicates that inflationary periods offer an opportunity for green technologies and energy-efficient approaches to be developed with support for the right subsidies and fiscal policy. The fostering of international cooperation is crucial for acquiring advanced technologies and sharing best practices that are vital in reducing global emissions. With such a policy framework, developing countries can reduce the environmental impact of economic activities, thus realizing the twin goals of sustainable development and long-term economic growth.



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Author Details Mehmet Emre Ünsal (Assoc. Prof. Dr.)

¹ Istanbul University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of Economics, İstanbul, Türkiye

 0000-0002-0777-1399  mehmet.unsal@istanbul.edu.tr

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Research Article

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Important Personal Values and Other Variables Determining Trust in the UN among European Peoples



Mücahit Aslan¹  

¹ Doğuş University, Department of Foreign Languages, İstanbul, Türkiye

Abstract

The United Nations is becoming increasingly important as we approach a new phase in global governance because of the recent health, security, and economic crises that have emerged since the 2020s. In this conjecture, understanding the factors predicting trust in the UN is imperative. Designed to fill the gap in the relevant literature, this study employs the Eurobarometer 98.2 dataset to conduct a binary logistic regression analysis to measure the impact of personal values on trust in the UN among European peoples. Findings suggest that except for religion, all the values tested in this research are important predictors of trust in the UN. However, based on their higher $\exp(B)$ values and Wald statistics, values such as; human rights, equality, solidarity, and respect for the planet are more robust predictors of trust in the UN than values like the rule of law, respect for human life, peace, self-fulfillment, individual freedom, democracy, tolerance, and respect for other cultures. In addition to the personal values mentioned, this research also confirms the robustness of sociotropic and demographic variables such as economic insecurity, satisfaction with the political system, and education. Further research is needed to test the temporal and territorial significance of the findings.

Keywords

Trust in the UN • international institutions • global governance • personal values • European public opinion.



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✉ Corresponding author: Mücahit Aslan maslan@dogus.edu.tr



Important Personal Values and Other Variables Determining Trust in the UN among European Peoples

This research explores the determinants of trust in the UN among European peoples. In a time when global governance problems are increasingly visible in world politics, questions about the United Nations' role and what it should be are gaining increasing traction. Recently, the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Gaza wars have brought the UN to the center of discussion once more. The high and complex level of globalization that we have reached thus far shows that the violent unilateral actions of states and non-state actors are becoming increasingly unacceptable for the global community with each passing day. The legitimacy of using violence to contest and maintain hegemonic world orders is becoming an outdated perception in each successive generation. Multilateralism is all that we have to construct a just world system. If it is ever possible to develop a "cosmopolitan democracy" (Fukuyama & Held, 1996) in the current world system whose dramatic evolution we are all witnessing in real-time, it must surely take place under the institutional umbrella of the UN. However, in its current form, the United Nations is still far from adequate for the task.

If a better reformed UN is to play any greater role in global governance, the problem of legitimacy must be addressed, which is strictly linked to garnering public trust. Although public opinion's influence on international matters was previously given varying degrees of importance among different segments of the academic community (Holsti, 1992), there have been serious developments in this regard, especially after the 1990s. Individuals who are exposed to UN news in the media daily inevitably form opinions on the powers of the UN. Zürn et al. (2012) state that if international institutions expand their initiatives in policy areas, they inevitably incite politicization, which in turn causes resistance unless a sufficient level of legitimacy is secured (Zürn et al., 2012). The increasing skepticism toward institutions in Europe and the United States in recent years is a manifestation of this phenomenon. Mingo and Faggiano (2020) express that the increasing popularity of anti-establishment movements and the decline of trust in institutions that can be observed in the Western world are concerns for the future of global governance (Mingo & Faggiano, 2020). With the help of social media, conspiracy theories have reached an alarming level of popularity in recent years, contributing to this upward trend of distrust (Massou et al., 2023). According to Massou et al. (2023), individuals' perception of a threat to their own needs fosters conspiracy theories and negatively affects institutional trust (Massou et al., 2023). Therefore, the importance of trust in the legitimacy of international organizations cannot be ignored (Tallberg, & Zürn, 2019).

Regarding the legitimacy of governance, trust is a necessary component that shapes public attitudes toward policies (Cacciatore et al. 2018). Although trust research in general and trust research in international institutions have a long history, they have gained considerable momentum since the 2000s. These studies examine the definition of trust and related concepts (social capital etc.) along with factors that foster trust. Kao and Sapp (2022) assert that there is still no universal definition of trust. Understandably, the definition of trust depends on the context. Therefore, it is perfectly normal for the definition of trust to change depending on the needs of the research topic (Stals et al., 2024). However, the foremost conceptual distinction is between particularized trust and generalized trust (Verhoeven, & Ritzen 2023). Particularized trust is the trust that arises from direct relationships with other individuals. Generalized trust, on the other hand, defines trust in people and institutions with which an individual has no personal interaction. It is related to positive expectations from strangers (Bjørnskov, 2007). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that



both types of trust can have determinants that are common to all types of trust. Because of the scope of this research, I will only mention the previous literature on generalized trust. However, generalized trust also has its own nuances. Generalized trust entails social, political, institutional, and international trust (Brewer et al., 2005). Although institutional trust is a type of generalized trust, Daskalopoulou (2018) offers a distinction. While generalized trust is a belief in the “benign intent” of others, institutional trust is a more knowledge-based belief about the institutional performance of the organization in question (Daskalopoulou, 2018). Kao and Sapp (2022) mention variables such as “information, expectations, risk and agencies” as defining characteristics of institutional trust. Stals et al. (2024) remind that although trust in civil society organizations and international organizations is related to each other, they still have different dimensions. Brewer et al. (2004) emphasize the importance of the concept of international trust. This concept is used to express trust in other nations, not in individuals or domestic institutions (Brewer et al., 2004). International trust is a form of approach that may vary from country to country and even from period to period within a country (Brewer et al., 2004). Additionally, a distinction was made between personal and system trust. Personal trust is toward people, and system trust is in expert systems like banks and other complex institutions (Gilbert & Behnam, 2012). For a qualitative argument on different definitions of trust and different approaches to trust, see Delhey and Welzel (2012).

Ronald Inglehart pioneered studies of trust measurements in the 1970s, on which the World Values Survey (WVS) was later based. Since then, mixed results of different factors have been observed among factors affecting institutional trust. To give a brief overview, the following are mostly reported as the determinants of trust in international institutions: income inequality, level of economic development, utilitarian cost-benefit analyses, heuristics, domestic political institutions, globalization, “urban-rural splits,” religion, and ethnicity. According to Bjørnskov (2007), any institution that reduces income inequality gains trust. Similarly, Algan et al. (2017) state that major collapses in the economy trigger political polarization. Disagreeing with Inglehart and Norris (2016), they maintain that institutional distrust depends not on external factors but on the economic crisis itself. According to them, economic insecurity has a negative impact on values and beliefs, and these values and beliefs that are negatively affected by the economy can produce results that will worsen the economy. Admitting the reciprocal nature of the relationship, they fundamentally put more emphasis on economics (Algan et al., 2017). Confirming the findings in prior literature, Lipps and Schraff (2020) find similar results for the negative effects of inequality on trust in national institutions and through them in the EU.

On the other hand, Schlipphak (2014) finds that unlike Europe, in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, the influence of utilitarian cost-benefit analyzes is not evident when determining attitudes toward regional organizations, such as UNASUR and AU. Instead, the use of heuristics is reported to be a more powerful predictor of trust in those regions. Supporting the “logic of extrapolation” effect, Schlipphak (2014) concludes that individuals express trust in regional organizations to the extent that they trust their own country’s domestic political institutions (Schlipphak, 2014). A decade earlier, similar results were reported for the US public opinion on the effects of domestic politics on trust in an international organization (Brewer et al., 2004).

In addition to the above factors, Ecker-Ehrhardt (2012), cited in Lamprianou and Charalambous (2018), reveals that the inadequacy of a nation-state in solving global problems positively affects support for international institutions (Lamprianou & Charalambous, 2018). Besides, diverging from previous studies, Verhoeven and Ritzen (2023) do not report a negative relationship between globalization and institutional

trust (Verhoeven, & Ritzen 2023). Building on existing research, McKay et al (2023) argue that 'urban-rural splits' are an important factor dividing global politics. However, they found that the assumption that people living in rural areas have negative political trust levels is empirically supported only for developing countries, and a lack of political trust is not clear for the rural areas of highly-developed countries (McKay et al., 2023).

In some other studies, religion appears to be influential in terms of trust in international institutions. Citing various sources, Delhey and Welzel (2012) argue that some cultural legacies (Islam, Confucianism, communism) create a barrier to outgroup-trust because they are generally collectivist, while there is an opposite effect for Protestantism, which is more individualistic. As the level of "human empowerment" increases, liberated individuals gain the confidence to trust individuals outside their group (Delhey & Welzel, 2012). Alongside religion, ethnic differences also have a negative impact on generalized trust (Bjørnskov, 2007). However, Bjørnskov (2007) doesn't find any evidence for the effects of democracy, the rule of law, education, age, and political ideology on generalized trust (Bjørnskov, 2007).

As for the focus of this research, the factors that determine trust in the UN are surprisingly underexplored, and most of the existing studies have produced mixed results, either due to methodological differences, survey universe, or differences in the variables (Medve-Bálint & Boda, 2014) used in the research models.

Torgler (2008) conducted the first serious research on trust in the UN using data from 38 countries in the World Values Survey. In his research, in addition to the socioeconomic and demographic variables used in previous trust studies, he also explored the effects of variables such as globalization, geographic identification, and corruption. Since then, the following factors have been explored in the studies: age, education, occupation, gender, marital status, political interest, left-right ideology, religiosity, globalization, cosmopolitanism, corruption, identity, domestic institutions, EU, economic crisis, sociotropics, economic performance and democracy. The term sociotropics refers to respondents' perceptions of broader macro-economic conditions rather than personal or individual economic concerns when they form their attitudes toward international institutions. Sociotropic variables concern collective well-being rather than individual self-interest.

On the one hand, compared with older ages, young age has been reported to have a positive correlation with trust in the UN (Torgler, 2008; Arpino & Obydenkova, 2019; Kiratli, 2020). Moreover, education (Torgler, 2008; Diven & Constantelos, 2011; Arpino & Obydenkova, 2019), political interest (Torgler, 2008; Diven & Constantelos, 2011), cosmopolitanism (Torgler, 2008; Diven & Constantelos, 2011), pride in one's nationality, trust in domestic government institutions, 'extrapolation' and the 'capacity to deliver' (Diven & Constantelos, 2011; Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2015), religiosity and the country's globalization index (Torgler, 2008) have been found to positively affect UN trust. Furthermore, trust in the EU also correlates with and affects trust in the UN (Lamprianou & Charalambous, 2018). As for the importance of sociotropics, taking cues from the literature on the attitudes toward the EU, Kiratli (2020) finds in his research that a country's economic performance is an important determinant of attitudes toward the UN and NATO.

On the other hand, negative correlations were reported for financial crises (Arpino & Obydenkova, 2019), identification with local communities (Diven & Constantelos, 2011), being married (Torgler, 2008), and trust in the UN. Regarding occupations, gender (Torgler, 2008; Arpino & Obydenkova, 2019), left-right ideology (Diven & Constantelos, 2011; Arpino & Obydenkova, 2019), and corruption (Torgler, 2008; Arpino & Obydenkova, 2019), conflicting results were reported. Lastly, regarding the effects of "interest representation" (Dellmuth

& Tallberg 2015) and democracy (Arpino & Obydenkova, 2019) no evidence were reported to be found on trust in international organizations.

What is clearly missing in the literature on the determinants of trust in the UN so far is the effects of personal values. Unfortunately, I have not come across any academic research designed to explore the effects of important personal values on trust in the UN. There is actually a Glocalities survey (Karaca, nd) that mentions that certain values such as; having tolerant views toward other religions and cultures, being proud of one's nation, caring for the planet, having faith in technological progress, believing in the importance of networking, and socially responsible businesses have significant positive correlation with trust in the UN. In contrast, pessimistic and nostalgic feelings and feeling disconnected with the rest of the world are stated to have negative effects on trust in the UN. However, there is not enough information about the reliability of the research methods that they employed.

Taking all these factors into consideration, this article aims to test the effects of important personal values on trust in the UN by controlling for sociotropic and demographic variables. Therefore, this study posits the following hypothesis:

H1 = The personal values people state to have are important predictors of trust in the UN.

Method

For the measurement of trust in the UN, the Eurobarometer 98.2 (2023) survey dataset was used. This is because this dataset is the most recent survey at hand that includes variables for “trust in the UN” along with “personal values” covering 38 European countries. The survey universe comprises 27 EU countries and 11 non-EU countries (Türkiye, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, United Kingdom, Albania, Norway, Switzerland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and the Republic of Moldova. Number of Units: 37.793 aged 15 years and over. The unit of analysis is individual. The following details regarding the data collection specifications of the survey are provided on the official website of the EU Commission: Data Collection Period: 12.01.2023 - 06.02.2023. Stratified sampling methods using a combination of probability and non-probability techniques are reported to have been employed. The data collection modes include face-to-face interviews, computer-assisted interviews (CAPI/CAMI), self-administered questionnaires, web-based surveys (CAWI), and web-based interviews.¹

Dependent variable

In EU barometer surveys, citizens are asked whether they trust certain national and international institutions. The surveyors ask the citizens of European countries whether they trust the United Nations without providing any academic definition of the term and without asking what they understand by the word ‘trust’. Therefore, in the survey, the word “trust” is used based on its everyday meaning. To measure trust in the UN, there is only one item in the survey that is suitable to use as a dependent variable, and the original coding for that variable has three options with the following structure; *Trust in the United Nations: 1= tend to trust, 2= tend not to trust, 3 = don't know*. For the purposes of this research, those who do not express either a negative or a positive opinion about the UN are excluded. Then the variable was recoded as follows; *Trust in the United Nations: 0 = tend not to trust, 1 = tend to trust*. After recoding, the number of cases included in the analysis decreased to $N = 33.273$. With the help of this new binary outcome variable, the results can be deciphered more straightforwardly. Due to the binary nature of the dependent variable, binary logistic

¹Retrieved January 01, 2025, from https://search.gesis.org/research_data/ZA7953

regression analysis was chosen to explore the predictors of a unit change from “0= distrust in the UN”, to “1= trust in the UN”. The percentage of those who tend not to trust the UN is 38,3% and those who tend to trust the UN is 49,8% and the system missing is 12%. This unequivocally demonstrates that among European peoples, trust in the UN is quite higher than distrust.

Independent variables:

To provide brief descriptive statistics of independent variables included in the analysis; there are 13 items designated for important personal values in the dataset. Each personal value is coded as 0 = *not mentioned* and 1 = *mentioned*. Based on the data, 21.1% of respondents mentioned the rule of law as an important personal value. The percentages for the other personal values are as follows; respect for human life 30.8%, human rights 36.6%, individual freedom 24.2 %, democracy 25.7%, peace 43.4%, equality 16.6%, solidarity 17.5 %, tolerance 12.1%, religion 7.4%, self-fulfillment 8 %, respect for other cultures 9.6%, respect for the planet 10.7%

To assess the impact of the extrapolation argument, there are items in the Eurobarometer surveys designed to measure the level of attachment one states to feel towards their own country and the EU. Both of these variables are coded in the same fashion; *Attachment to country/European Union*: 1= *very attached*, 2= *fairly attached*, 3= *not very attached*, 4= *not at all attached*, 5= *don't know*. When the positive answers are taken together, the percentage for those who feel attached to their countries is 92%, and for those who do not feel attached is 8%. For attachment to Europe, positive identification is 52,7%, while not feeling attached to EU 45.2% and don't know is 2,2%. For political interest, there are three summary variables classifying respondents' level of political interest based on their answers to questions regarding whether and how much they discuss local, national, and European political matters. To avoid redundancies in the model, I only included the variables coded as; *political interest index: low*, and *political interest index: strong*. The percentages for these two variables are 15,7% and 20%, respectively.

Continuing with the effects of personal finances and sociotropic factors, four standard Eurobarometer questions are chosen, which are coded as; *financial situation*: 1= *very good*, 2= *rather good*, 3= *rather bad*, 4= *very bad*, 5= *don't know*. The items asking about the national economy's situation are also coded in the same way as financial questions. However, the variables for *expectations about the country economy* and *expectations about the country in general* are coded as; 1=*better*, 2=*worse*, 3=*the same*, and 4= *don't know*. 13% of the respondents express they have a very good financial situation, while 54,3% say rather good, 24,4% rather bad, 6,2 % , very bad, and 2.1% don't know. The numbers for the situation of the national economy are; very good, 6.1%; rather good, 32.6%; rather bad, 41.5%; very bad, 17.8%; and don't know 2%. The percentage of participants expecting the economy of their country will be better is 20,3% and the percentages for the other groups are; worse 40,3%, the same 35,7% and don't know 3,7%. Finally, for expectations about the country in general, the percentages are as follows: better, 21.3%; worse, 36%; the same 39,1% and don't know, 3.5%.

For the analysis of the impact of media on trust in the UN, I chose only three index variables because of data limitations. These variables are; *media use index= very high*, *media use index= very poor*, and *total internet use*; 1= *everyday*, 2= *often*, 3= *never*, and 4= *no internet access*. The percentages for high media use index is 29.2% and 24.6% for low media usage. For the Internet use index, the relevant figures are as follows: everyday, 81.8%; often, 6.9%; never 10%; no Internet access, 1.3%.

Finally, descriptive statistics of demographic variables are as follows; the age variable is scale data based on the actual age the respondents state for the relevant question. The overall age distribution of the total

37,793 participants can be roughly divided into 3 categories; 23% of the participants are between the ages of 15-34. 33% of participants are between the ages of 35-54 and 43% are aged 55 and over. So middle aged and elderly participants constituted the majority of the survey. Educational age is grouped into five categories. The first group comprises those who left school before the age of 16 and their percentage is 11.7%, the second group is 16-19 agers with 41,8%, the third group is 20+ with a percentage of 36,2, the fourth group is those who still study and they are 7,4% and the fifth group is those who have no formal education 0,7%. Regarding the gender variable, 48.6% of participants are male, 51.4% are female and 0.1 non-binary. The occupations of respondents are grouped into 18 classes. These are the corresponding percentages for each category; 4.9 percent of the participants are responsible for ordinary shopping, 7.4% are students, 5.8% are unemployed, 27.4% are retired, 1.1% are farmers, 0.1% are fishermen, 2% are professionals like lawyers etc., 2.9% are shop owners, 1.8% are business proprietors, 3.4% are employed professionals such as doctors, 1.6% are in general management, 7.5% are in middle management, 10% are employed position: at desk, 3.7% are employed position: traveling, 6% are employed position: service job, 1.6% are supervisors, 9.8% are skilled manual workers, 2.9% are unskilled manual workers. The type of community variable is a three-category variable, and those who say they live in rural areas are 34.8%, those living in small towns are 34%, and those living in big cities are 31.1%. Social class variable is a five category variable. 23.5% of respondents define themselves as working class, 15.8% as lower middle class, 50.1% as middle class, 7.8% as upper middle class, 1% as higher class, and the rest are "don't know". The last variable is the left-right ideological scale. This variable is coded as; from 1=left, 10 =right, refusal, and don't know. Most of the participants prefer to stay equidistant to both poles, which is why the percentage of those who choose numbers 5, 6, is 37,4 %, those who are on the left are 26,5% and those who are on the right are 24.9%, and the refusals are 4,7% and don't know are 6.5.

In order to conduct a binary logistic regression analysis, the dependent variable and the above listed independent variables are all included in the same model. Because all independent variables are categorical except for the exact age variable, while running the test, first categories were chosen as indicators. Therefore, for each variable, the first category is the reference group to compare the likelihood of other groups' belonging to the group that tend to trust the UN. The next section presents the results of the analysis.

Results

A binary logistic regression analysis was performed to explore the determinants of trust in the UN. In what follows, Table 1 exhibits the outputs of the analysis. In a binary logistic regression analysis, it is customary to interpret the results as follows; the change in the odds of the outcome variable is associated with a one-unit increase in the predictor variable. Therefore, the odds ratio (OR) of each independent variable signals its impact on the dependent variable by holding all other variables constant in the model. That is, the odds of a change from "0= tend not to trust the UN" to "1= tend to trust the UN" can be interpreted by looking at how far the odds ratio (exp (B)) is from the number 1. The values below 1 indicate a tendency toward belonging to the group that does not trust the UN, and the values above 1 indicate a sign of belonging to the group that trusts the UN.

As shown in the descriptive statistics of the model in Table 1, the model was statistically significant ($p < .001$) with an omnibus test of model coefficients of $\chi^2 = 4343,876$. The independent variables in the model explained approximately 23.2 % (Nagelkerke's R^2) of the variance in the dependent variable. After the system excluded the missing cases, the number of cases in the analysis decreased to $N = 22.959$. Overall, the model correctly predicted 68.8% of the cases, and its R-squared value signifies its moderate explanatory power. The

goodness of fit statistics, Hosmer-Lemeshow test is statistically non-significant ($p > .050$), which indicates the model's overall fit. To appreciate the magnitude of the effect of each predictor variable in the model, the $\exp(b)$ values and the Wald statistics will be taken into consideration while interpreting the results.

Table 1
Results of Binary Logistic Regression Model

Model ^a					
Predictors	b	SE	Exp(b) ^b (Wald)	95% C.I.	
				Lower	Upper
Important personal values					
Rule of law	,198	,044	1,219 (20,695)***	1,119	1,327
Respect human life	,201	,038	1,223 (28,386)***	1,136	1,317
Human rights	,266	,036	1,305 (53,138)***	1,215	1,401
Individual freedom	,180	,040	1,197 (20,144)***	1,107	1,295
Democracy	,351	,040	1,421 (77,370)***	1,314	1,536
Peace	,246	,037	1,278 (44,796)***	1,190	1,374
Equality	,314	,045	1,368 (47,763)***	1,252	1,495
Solidarity	,362	,044	1,437 (68,304)***	1,318	1,566
Tolerance	,238	,049	1,269 (24,037)***	1,154	1,396
Religion	-,006	,064	,994 (,009)	,877	1,127
Self-fulfillment	,216	,056	1,241 (14,842)***	1,112	1,386
Respect for cultures	,108	,052	1,114 (4,294)*	1,006	1,235
Respect for the planet	,372	,051	1,451 (53,137)***	1,313	1,603
Politics					
Political interest strong	-,048	,039	,953 (1,475)	,883	1,030
Political interest low	,124	,043	1,132 (8,444)**	1,041	1,232
Attachment to country (ref: very)			(16,830)**		
Fairly	-,053	,034	,949 (2,437)	,888	1,014
Not very	-,261	,067	,771 (15,283)***	,676	,878
Not at all	-,181	,153	,835 (1,402)	,619	1,126
Don't know	-,331	,430	,718 (,594)	,309	1,667
Attachment to the EU (ref: very)			(977,315)***		
Fairly	-,337	,045	,714 (55,360)***	,654	,780
Not very	-,975	,049	,377 (394,238)***	,342	,415
Not at all	-1,776	,067	,169 (695,479)***	,148	,193
Don't know	-,609	,146	,544 (17,468)***	,408	,723
Economics					
Financial situation (ref: very good)			(183,880)***		
Rather good	-,226	,051	,798 (19,773)***	,722	,881
Rather bad	-,622	,059	,537 (109,509)***	,478	,603
Very bad	-,886	,090	,412 (96,621)***	,345	,492
Don't know	-,359	,126	,698 (8,184)**	,546	,893

Predictors	Model ^a				
	b	SE	Exp(b) ^b (Wald)	95% C.I.	
				Lower	Upper
Situation national economy (ref: very good)			(225,230)***		
Rather good	-,032	,076	,968 (,177)	,834	1,125
Rather bad	-,419	,077	,658 (29,624)***	,565	,765
Very bad	-,738	,086	,478 (74,341)***	,404	,565
Don't know	-,393	,144	,675 (7,479)*	,510	,895
Expectations country in general (ref: better)			(27,398)***		
Worse	-,277	,063	,758 (19,129)***	,669	,858
The same	-,068	,060	,934 (1,310)	,831	1,050
Don't know	-,094	,139	,911 (,452)	,693	1,196
Expectation country economy (ref: better)			(41,976)***		
Worse	-,334	,063	716 (28,029)***	,632	,810
The same	-,121	,062	,886 (3,823)*	,785	1,000
Don't know	,157	,141	1,170 (1,232)	,887	1,543
Media use					
High Media use index	,061	,036	1,063 (2,864)	,990	1,140
Low Media use index	-,096	,041	,908 (5,529)*	,838	,984
Internet use total (ref: everyday)			(25,743)***		
Often	,105	,062	1,111 (2,843)	,983	1,256
Never	,206	,062	1,228 (11,133)**	1,089	1,386
No	,650	,148	1,915 (19,344)*	1,434	2,558
Demographics					
Age Education 5 categories (ref: Up to 15)			(43,240)***		
16-19	,069	,054	1,072 (1,630)	,964	1,192
20+	,200	,059	1,221 (11,319)**	1,087	1,372
Still studying	,466	,114	1,593 (16,573)***	1,273	1,994
No fulltime educ.	,868	,208	2,383 (17,368)***	1,584	3,586
Refusal	,262	,222	1,299 (1,388)	,841	2,008
Don't Know	,068	,152	1,070 (,200)	,795	1,441
Age exact	-,001	,001	,999 (,165)	,997	1,002
Gender (ref: male)			(15,731)***		
Female	,120	,031	1,128 (15,088)***	1,061	1,198
Non-binary	,655	,740	1,926 (,784)	,451	8,217
Occupation (ref: responsible for ordinary shopping)			(52,045)***		
Student	-,184	,104	,832 (3,133)	,678	1,020
Unemployed	-,121	,087	,886 (1,944)	,748	1,050
Retired	-,068	,181	,934 (,140)	,655	1,333

Predictors	Model ^a				
	b	SE	Exp(b) ^b (Wald)	95% C.I.	
				Lower	Upper
Farmer	,305	,756	1,356 (,162)	,308	5,968
Fisherman	-,278	,135	,757 (4,265)*	,582	,986
Professional (lawyer.etc)	-,352	,119	,703 (8,771)**	,557	,888
Owner of a shop	-,396	,131	,673 (9,177)**	,521	,869
Business proprietors	,067	,118	1,069 (,318)	,848	1,347
Employed Professional	-,009	,147	,991(,004)	,744	1,321
General management	,049	,097	1,051 (,262)	,869	1,270
Middle management	,073	,091	1,075 (,640)	,900	1,284
Employed at desk	,010	,108	1,010 (,009)	,818	1,248
Employed traveling	-,076	,096	,927 (,619)	,767	1,120
Service job	-,130	,136	,878 (,915)	,673	1,146
Supervisor	-,171	,091	,843 (3,550)	,706	1,007
Skilled manual worker	-,223	,119	,800 (3,531)	,634	1,010
Unskilled manual worker	-	-	-		
Type of community (ref: Rural area			(,537)		
Small, Middle town	-,020	,036	,981 (,296)	,914	1,052
Large town	-,027	,038	,974 (,492)	,904	1,049
Social class (ref: working class)			(10,536)		
Lower middle	,079	,050	1,082 (2,549)	,982	1,193
Middle	,025	,041	1,025 (,356)	,945	1,111
Upper middle	,173	,070	1,189 (6,153)*	1,037	1,363
Higher	,246	,169	1,279 (2,125)	,919	1,780
Other	,201	,618	1,222 (,106)	,364	4,101
Non	,080	,250	1,083 (,102)	,663	1,768
Refusal	,264	,311	1,302 (,718)	,707	2,396
Don't know	-,045	,187	,956 (,058)	,663	1,378
Left – right scale (ref: 1 Left)			(100,424)***		
2	-,077	,110	,926 (,488)	,746	1,149
3	,004	,091	1,004 (,002)	,840	1,200
4	-,013	,089	,987 (,020)	,829	1,176
5	-,126	,082	,881 (2,380)	,751	1,035
6	-,123	,088	,884 (1,955)	,744	1,051
7	-,039	,089	,962 (,194)	,808	1,144
8	-,120	,095	,887 (1,616)	,737	1,067
9	-,073	,124	,930 (,345)	,729	1,186
10 Right	-,185	,109	,831 (2,895)	,671	1,029
Refusal	-,693	,105	500 (43,237)***	,407	,615
Don't know	-,415	,100	,660 (17,342)***	,543	,803

Predictors	Model ^a			
	b	SE	Exp(b) ^b (Wald)	95% C.I.
				Lower Upper
Constant	1,203	,177	3,330 (46,064)***	
Models summary				
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients	p < .001 (Chi-Square χ^2 4343,876)			
Hosmer and Lemeshow	p > .05 (Chi-Square χ^2 13,116)			
Nagelkerke R^2	,232			
-2 Loglikelihood	26978,992			
N	22.959			

*p < .05, **p < .005, ***p < .001

a. Dependent variable: Trust in the UN: 1 = Tend not to trust. 2 = Tend to trust.

b. Wald statistics are indicated in brackets.

First, contrary to many previous studies in the literature, religion as a personal value, respondents' age, strong political interest, type of community, high media use, and left – right scale (except for refusal and don't knows) are not statistically significant ($p > .05$).

For the main hypothesis of this research, when we look at the positive odds ratios of the personal values variable, it is clear that $H1$ holds true, suggesting that personal values are an important predictor of trust in the UN. Looking more closely, important personal values are all statistically significant ($p < .005$, $p < .001$) except religion ($p > .05$). Their positive coefficients (B) indicate an affirmative association with trust in the UN. For the personal value rule of law, the odds ratio, exp(b), is 1,219, implying that those who state rule of law as an important personal value are 1,219 times more likely to trust the UN compared to those who do not. The Wald statistic (20,695) in the parenthesis shows that this variable has a stronger effect on the outcome variable than the ones with a lower Wald statistic. Those who mention that they value democracy are approximately 142% more likely to trust the UN compared to those who do not. Respect for human life, 122%; tolerance, 126%; solidarity, 143%; human rights, 130%; respect for the planet, 145%; equality, 137%; peace, 128%; individual freedom, 120%; self-fulfillment, 124%; respect for cultures, 111% more like to express trust in the UN than those who do not hold those values. The Wald statistics are considerably high for personal values such as democracy (77,370), solidarity (68,304), human rights (53,138), respect for the planet (53,137), equality (47,763), and peace (44,796). These metrics demonstrate that the stated values have more predictive power on the outcome variable than the demographic variables in the model. However, the rest of the personal values such as; respect human life (28,386,) tolerance (24,037), individual freedom (20,144), self-fulfillment (14,842), and respect for cultures (4,294) also have high Wald statistics compared to many other variables in the model.

For the attachment to country variable, the negative coefficient ((B) -,261) indicates an inverse relationship between trust in the UN and not feeling attached to the own country. As can be seen through the exp(b) value (,771) for “not very attached” option, which was the only option statistically significant ($p < .001$) in the attachment to country variable, those who are not very attached to their own countries are less likely to trust the UN compared to those who are very attached. This variable has a lower Wald statistic (15,283) than

most of the personal value variables in the model. Attachment to the EU variable is much stronger than attachment to the country because all the items in this variable are statistically significant ($p < .001$) and the negative coefficients show that the less a person feels attached to the EU, the less likely they are to trust the UN compared to those who feel very attached to the EU. Wald statistics for the items of “Not very attached to the EU” (394,238) and “Not at all attached to the EU” (695,479) in this variable are the highest in the model, indicating the explanatory power of the variable over other variables in the model.

Moving on, the financial situation of a person is also statistically significant ($p < .001$) and compared to the reference group who say their financial situation is very good, those in the group of rather good exp(b) (,798), rather bad exp(b) (,537), very bad (,412), and don’t know exp(b) (,698) are increasingly more likely to distrust the UN, respectively. The high Wald statistics values for the items of this variable indicate the importance of personal finances in forming trust in the international institutions like the UN. Regarding sociotropic variables, compared to those who think that the state of the country's economy is very good, those who think that the country's economy is quite bad (expB; 658) and very bad (expB; 478) tend to trust the UN less. The Wald statistic for those who say the country's economy is very bad is noteworthy. For the variable of expectations about the future of the country's economy, the pessimistic anticipations appear to be conducive of distrust in the UN in comparison to the reference group. Analogously, expecting that things will be worse in the country in general (expB; ,758) is also likely to undermine trust in the UN.

Those with low political interest are 113% more likely to trust the UN than those who are interested in politics. However, the comparatively low Wald statistic (8,444) for this variable casts doubt on its robustness in the model. Similarly, the positive correlation between no internet use (expB; 1,228 / 1,915) and UN trust is also inviting careful evaluation. Low media use has a negative correlation with trust in the UN. Nevertheless, the odds ratio (expB; ,908) of this variable is not far from 1, meaning that the effect is dubious.

For demographic variables, higher education levels are positively correlated with greater trust in the UN. Those who are still studying (expB; 1,593) and those who continue their education until their 20s (expB, 1,221) are more likely to trust the UN. The result for the group with no full-time education can be ignored because the percentage of this group is so miniscule (0,7%) in this large dataset. Among genders, females are more trusting to the UN (expB; 1,128). For occupations, only three were statistically significant ($p < .05$, $p < .005$) and compared to the reference group who are responsible for ordinary shopping, fishermen (expB; ,757), professionals (expB; ,703) and owner of a shop (expB; ,673) are more likely to be in the group distrusting the UN. Those who define themselves as belonging to the upper middle class of the society are 1,189 times more likely to trust the UN than the reference group of the working class. Lastly, the ideological scale is not significant, but those who do not know (expB; ,660) and refuse (expB; ,500) to define themselves in terms of having leftwing values or rightwing values are more likely to distrust the UN.

Discussion

To explore the determinants of trust in the UN among European peoples, I operationalized a binary logistic regression analysis, and the results are quite robust. Except for religion, all the values tested in this research are important predictors of trust in the UN. However, based on their higher exp(B) values and Wald statistics, values such as; human rights, equality, solidarity, and respect for the planet are more robust predictors of trust in the UN than values like the rule of law, respect for human life, peace, self-fulfillment, individual freedom, democracy, tolerance, and respect for other cultures. These results confirm the *H1* of the study. Some of the above values, such as human rights, can be considered pillars of cosmopolitanism, so they are indirectly in line with the findings of Torgler (2008) and Diven and Constantelos (2011). However, the

present findings do not affirm what Torgler (2008) and Delhey and Welzel (2012) found in their research on the influence of religion on trust in international institutions. Unlike my research, democracy is not statistically significant in Arpino and Obydenkova (2019). However, consistent with the findings of the Glocalities survey (Karaca, nd), tolerance toward others and compassion for the planet are positively correlated with trust in the UN.

Contrary to the findings of Torgler (2008) and Diven and Constantelos (2011), in this research, I find a somewhat reverse relationship between political interest and UN trust. Although strong political interest is not statistically significant, low political interest is conducive to UN approval. This discrepancy with the previous literature may be the result of the changing effects of social media and the culture of polarized political awareness that we are witnessing today.

The low media use index has a negative relationship with trust in the UN; on the other hand, compared with those who use the internet every day, those who never use the internet and those who do not have access at all tend to express more trust in the UN. As Schlipphak (2014) points out, heuristics may be at work here. Based on the findings in this research, we can assume that when people are not informed via media about international institutions, they tend to form opinions by following clues from their trusted sources. In addition, as Aslan (2023) found, regions and cities where people live also serve as proxies for knowledge. Notably, on the left-right ideological scale, neither the reference group the leftists nor the rightists were statistically significant. In contrast, those who refuse to identify themselves on a binary classification and the “don’t know” group tend to distrust the UN. When we take into consideration the varied outcomes for this variable in Bjørnskov (2007), Diven and Constantelos (2011), and Arpino and Obydenkova (2019), it is safe to say that both sides of the ideological scale host people who trust the UN for possible different reasons.

Consistent with the findings of Brewer et al. (2004), Diven and Constantelos (2011), Schlipphak, (2014), Dellmuth and Tallberg (2015), the respondents in the survey who express that they are not very attached to their countries tend not to trust the UN, as opposed to the reference group who say that they are very attached to their countries. Likewise, those who mention they are very attached to the EU are more likely to be in the group showing more trust in the UN than those who state lower levels of attachment. Confirming the predictions of Lamprianou and Charalambous (2018) that a positive extrapolation relationship must exist between the approval of a lower-level institution and a higher-level institution.

As evident from the results, the probability of trust in the UN considerably decreases as a person defines his/her current financial situation with anything other than ‘very good’. Hence, those who feel they are not part of the well-to-do group of society express greater distrust in the UN. Exactly the same correlation applies to the other socioeconomic and sociotropic variables, such as; ‘situation of the national economy’, ‘expectations about the economy of the country’, ‘expectations about the country in general’, and ‘expressing to be among the upper middle class of the society’. These findings, with their high level of Wald statistics, show the prominence of economic variables over other variables in the model. Therefore, conclusions of Bjørnskov (2007), Torgler (2008), Algan et al. (2017), Arpino and Obydenkova (2019), Lipps and Schraff (2020) and Kıratlı (2020) are once more validated with the results of this study regarding the impact of material well-being on trust in international institutions, in this case the UN.

For gender, females trust the UN more than males. This may have resulted from UN campaigns designed to salvage women from their disadvantaged positions worldwide. However, the conflicting results for this variable in Torgler (2008) and Arpino and Obydenkova (2019) indicate the need for caution when interpreting its correlation with UN trust. The education variable affirms the findings of previous literature (Torgler,

2008; Diven & Constantelos, 2011; Arpino & Obydenkova, 2019). Consequently, the more a person climbs the educational ladder, the more likely they are to trust the UN. Many occupations in the variable are not statistically significant, and those that are significant (fisherman, professionals, owner of a shop) show a negative correlation with trust in the UN compared to the reference group sales representatives. The conflicting results from earlier research (Torgler, 2008; Arpino & Obydenkova, 2019) is a good sign of the lack of robustness of this variable. For the age variable, as no significant correlation has been detected, the results for the age variable in this research do not reaffirm the findings of some prior studies (Torgler, 2008) Arpino & Obydenkova, 2019; Kiratli, 2020). Nevertheless, just as my model, Bjørnskov (2007) doesn't find any evidence for the effects of age in his research. Likewise, because the type of community variable is not statistically significant, we cannot infer from this study whether living in rural communities affects trust in the UN. Thus, my results do not support those of Diven and Constantelos (2011) and McKay et Al. (2023).

In conclusion, based on the outcomes discussed above, we can safely posit that economic insecurity is the most robust determinant of distrust in the UN. Education, universal values, and satisfaction with the political system are the most important factors helping to garner trust in the UN. This research reveals that individuals who embrace values such as human rights, equality, solidarity, and respect for the planet have a higher level of trust in the United Nations. Therefore, the UN should demonstrate its sincere commitment to promoting these values worldwide and communicate this effectively to the global public. Moreover, the UN must work closely with both national governments and regional organizations to ensure that all world citizens properly understand and embrace these values. It should also intensify educational efforts aimed at promoting global economic equality and uniting people around common humanitarian principles. Transparent and consistent policies on this issue will, hopefully, increase trust in the UN.

As for the limitations of the study, the fact that participants might have differing views on the concept of trust, and that there is no separate question in the survey addressing this matter, can be considered a limitation of the study. Thus, future studies may address this issue by including an item on the definition of trust in the UN. Moreover, in this study, I did not include any variables to measure ethnicity (Bjørnskov, 2007), marital status (Torgler, 2008), corruption (Torgler, 2008; Arpino & Obydenkova, 2019), or some other variables like UN knowledge, media sources, the experience of being abroad, etc. Thus, in addition to the limitations of geographical representation, the number of variables can be stated as a limitation of this study. In future studies, the findings of this research can be tested for other geographies such as; Russia, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia.



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Author Details **Mücahit Aslan (Dr.)**

¹ Doğuş University, Department of Foreign Languages, İstanbul, Türkiye

 0000-0001-9126-7592  maslan@dogus.edu.tr



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The Struma Incident: Refugees, Wartime Diplomacy, and Türkiye's Neutral Struggle



Emre Yürük¹ & Yasemin Kutlu Yürük²

¹ KTU, Department of International Relations, Trabzon, Türkiye

² Independence, Trabzon, Türkiye

Abstract

The Struma incident of 1941-1942 represents a tragic and complex episode during World War II, highlighting the intersection of geopolitical maneuvering, humanitarian crises, and wartime demands. This study examines Türkiye's role in the Struma crisis, where a vessel carrying 769 Jewish refugees from Romania sought passage through Turkish waters to reach Palestine. Despite Türkiye's neutral stance in the war and its humanitarian efforts, the incident underscores the limitations of international politics and strategic interests. The British government's refusal to issue visas for Palestine, coupled with pressure from both the Allied and Axis powers, placed Türkiye in a precarious position. Turkish decision-makers navigated this crisis with a focus on national security and neutrality while attempting to address the dire conditions aboard the Struma.

This paper also examines the crisis management processes employed by Turkish authorities, highlighting their efforts to balance humanitarian concerns with the strategic imperatives of wartime diplomacy. The complex decision-making environment requires careful consideration of international pressures and domestic stability. Furthermore, this analysis explores how the Struma incident influenced subsequent policies and practices in handling refugee crises, emphasizing the need for robust international cooperation and clear protocols in managing such humanitarian emergencies. Ultimately, the Struma tragedy serves as a poignant case study in the broader context of crisis management, international diplomacy, and refugee protection during times of global conflict.

Keywords

Türkiye • Jewish • Crisis Management • the Second World War • Struma



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✉ Corresponding author: Emre Yürük emre.yuruk@ktu.edu.tr



The Struma Incident: Refugees, Wartime Diplomacy, and Türkiye's Neutral Struggle

The Struma disaster is a poignant chapter in Jewish immigration history. With the ascent of Nazi power in Germany, Jewish migration to Palestine surged. A surge in Jewish migration to Palestine occurred. During World War II, many Jews sought refuge in Palestine from Nazi persecution. Concurrently, Jews in Romania sought escape from the Nazis and sought refuge in Palestine. However, their journey aboard the dilapidated Struma ship, which had been purchased for passage, became a difficult ordeal for the 769 passengers. Despite the ship's ailing engine, the ship reached the shores of Istanbul in December 1941. On board, three major issues plagued the passengers: the ship's malfunctioning engine hampered the journey to Palestine, health crises arose, and British authorities withheld necessary visas for entry into Palestine. Turkish authorities attempted to address these challenges, facilitating engine repairs and providing medical aid. Diplomatic efforts were fervently pursued to secure visas for the passengers (Directorate of State Archives Republican Archives, [hereafter BCA], 30.10/171.185.21). Nevertheless, the British government's stance, influenced by German pressure, posed a diplomatic dilemma for Türkiye.

One of the unaddressed foreign policy crises in Türkiye's history is the 1942 Struma Disaster. This tragedy garnered extensive media coverage for months and sparked numerous scholarly investigations. Studies by Çetin Yetkin (Yetkin, 2000), Douglas Frantz, and Catherine Collins (Frantz and Collins 2016) offer detailed analyses of the incident, delving into British and German policies, Arab reactions to Jewish refugees, the condition of the Struma ship, and the passengers' struggles. Additionally, research by Çağrı Erhan (Erhan, 2020) explores why Türkiye did not accept these individuals as refugees. However, there is an urgent need to assess the event through the lens of crisis management and analysis, especially considering the potential ramifications for Türkiye's neutrality during World War II. Turkish decision-makers faced a challenging dilemma, as a misstep could have drawn Türkiye into the conflict. This article aims to elucidate how the Struma incident evolved into a crisis and the decision-making process followed by the Turkish authorities to resolve it. This study aims to analyze (1) the Turkish authorities' perception of the problem, (2) the priorities of decision-makers, (3) their behavior during the decision-making process and (4) the crisis management techniques employed. The "Struma Crisis" unfolded suddenly, necessitating swift decisions from authorized personnel, deviating from routine practices, and carrying significant risks of future relations. Therefore, it is imperative to categorize this event as a crisis and evaluate it accordingly.

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework: Decision-Making and Crisis Management in Foreign Policy

Various scholars have offered different definitions of crisis, reflecting distinct perspectives and priorities. Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld characterized crisis as "a change in type and/or an increase in intensity of disruptive, that is, hostile verbal or physical, interactions between two or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities" (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2003, pp. 4–5). In contrast, Charles F. Hermann defined crisis as a "high threat," "short time," and "surprise" (Hermann, 1972, p. 187). Hermann's perspective emphasizes the elements of urgency and unpredictability inherent in crises. As Hermann (2001, p. 182) stated, different definitions of crisis not only indicate definitional differentiation but also express different levels of analysis and alternative theoretical and practical concerns (Hermann, 2001, p. 182).

Crisis management has indeed emerged as a crucial area of focus for states, particularly during the Cold War. The increased risk of nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union underscored the necessity of understanding and effectively managing crises. Academic studies on decision-making processes gained traction during this period, emphasizing their importance in averting conflicts and resolving crises. Crisis management entails a structured and systematic approach to address and mitigate situations characterized as “crises.” Crisis management is a systematic process that includes several key components. First, decisions must be made methodically, step by step, considering all available information and potential outcomes. Once the decision has been reached, the next step is to assemble a team capable of effectively implementing the outcome. The team should be well-coordinated and equipped with the necessary resources to execute the plan. Additionally, as the situation unfolds and the results of the implementation become apparent, agile and responsiveness is crucial. This may involve making new decisions promptly based on the evolving circumstances and ensuring that the crisis is managed effectively and efficiently (Vergiliel Tüz, 2014, p. 83).

In international policy analyses, crises are divided into two groups. 1) macro crises: international system crises and sub/regional system crises. 2) micro crises: crises at the actor level (foreign policy crises/ international crises) (Şener, 2021, pp. 370–71). Brecher posits that each international crisis can be examined through four interconnected phases: onset, marking the initial stage of the crisis; escalation, characterized by heightened disruption and an increased probability of military conflict; de-escalation, the inverse process of escalation involving a gradual reduction of tensions; and impact, which refers to the aftermath of crisis termination, analogous to the post-crisis phase in actor-level analysis (Brecher, 2008, p. 10).

Foreign policy crises are also classified and divided into types. In this context, the types of foreign policy crisis are examined in six categories. These categories are: i) According to the number of actors party to the crisis (Unilateral, bilateral, multilateral); ii) According to the way the crisis occurs (progressive, sudden, protracted, dormant); iii) According to the intention of the party creating the crisis (designed, legitimacy, indirect, accident); iv) According to the nature of the event that caused the crisis (Humanitarian, military-security, political, diplomatic, legal, economic); v) According to the impact of the event that created the crisis (National security, security dilemma, status uncertainty, reflection, adaptation); vi) Depending on the outcome of the crisis, those that cause a change in relationships and those that do not cause a change in relationships (Creating new problems, status quo ante, solving the problem, not solving the problem) (Şener, 2021, p. 372).

Crisis management is commonly understood as the concerted actions undertaken by relevant stakeholders to both mitigate the escalation of existing tensions toward armed conflict and safeguard fundamental values, priorities, security, and interests. Decision-makers manage crises, particularly during phases of escalating tensions, striving to avert military conflict. The efficacy of decision-makers in making sound judgments and implementing optimal choices under stress and time constraints exemplifies their proficiency in crisis management (Şener, 2021, pp. 378–79).

History of Jewish Migration: Struggle for “Eretz Yisrael”

While Jews originally inhabited the Palestine region, historical events, such as Babylonian and Roman rule, compelled them to disperse to other parts of the world. Roman persecution particularly catalyzed this dispersion, leading Jews to migrate across North Africa, Anatolia, and Europe, initiating what became known as the diaspora (Armaoğlu, 1991, p. 9). However, wherever they settled, Jews often faced discrimination and

were relegated to second-class citizenship. This lack of acceptance and opportunity prompted waves of migration, notably from Western European countries, including Belgium in 1261, England in 1290, France in 1394, Spain in 1492, and Portugal in 1496. In search of refuge and better prospects, many Jews sought shelter in Eastern Europe or the Ottoman Empire (Laqueur, 2008, p. 54).

During the Renaissance and Reformation eras, the condition of Jews in Europe remained largely unchanged. However, with the onset of the Enlightenment in Europe, particularly the French Revolution, in 1789, there was a notable improvement in their status. The principles of equality, fraternity, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provided Jews with more legal, religious, and economic opportunities than before. Despite this progress, European prejudice against Jews persisted to some extent. While secularism created a more favorable environment for Jews, the rise of nationalism in Europe posed new challenges. In subsequent years, anti-Semitism began to resurface in European countries such as France, England, Germany, Austria, and Poland. It became increasingly clear that an important issue concerning Jews had emerged in Europe that required resolution. Anti-Semites viewed Jews as a disruptive element to the ethnic and racial homogeneity of their respective countries. Europeans realized that assimilation or exile was not a viable solution to the Jewish question, leading to the consideration of resettling them elsewhere. Two options emerged for Jewish settlement: Uganda and Palestine. Since Uganda was not favored by the Jewish community, Palestine became its primary choice. The idea of settling Jews in Palestine was also accepted by European powers, particularly because Palestine was under the control of the Ottoman Empire, which was seen as “the sick man” of Europe at the time (Ahituv, 2006, pp. 301–401).

Theodore Herzl emerged as a prominent figure in this movement, advocating for establishing a Jewish state. In his seminal work, “The Jewish State” (*Der Judenstaat*), published in 1896, Herzl articulated his vision for a solution: the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine (Herzl, 1988). According to Herzl, the first step toward realizing this vision was the organization of all Jews worldwide. In his book, he proposed that Jews should form a cohesive nation and establish their own state. Herzl asserted that Jews possessed the necessary characteristics for nationhood and statehood, framing the Jewish issue not as a social or religious matter but as a national one (Herzl, 1988, p. 76).

Although Herzl’s ideas initially faced resistance, the first Zionist Congress convened in Basel, Switzerland in 1897, marking a significant milestone in the Zionist movement. The decisions made at this congress made the territories of Palestine a target for Jewish settlement. Under Herzl’s leadership, the Jewish community approached Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamit II, proposing Jewish settlement in Palestine in exchange for assistance with the Ottoman Empire’s debts. However, when the sultan rejected this offer, Herzl realized that the British might be able to help resolve their predicament (Armaoğlu, 1991, pp. 17–21).

The exchange of letters between British Prime Minister Arthur Balfour and Jewish Banker Walter Rotschild in 1917 marked a significant turning point in the establishment of a Jewish state. With the conclusion of World War I and the victory of the British and its allies, the Jewish population in the region began to increase. The British government, under the Balfour Declaration, expressed support for Jewish migration to the region (Shapira, 2012, p. 76). This support was crucial in facilitating Jewish immigration because the British controlled Palestine at that time. However, the increasing influx of Jewish immigrants led to tensions with the Arab population in the region. In 1936, Arab protests erupted against British policies and Jewish migration, prompting the British government to reassess its policy. Consequently, British authorities imposed restrictions on Jewish migration to Palestine. Despite these restrictions, Jewish immigrants continued to attempt to

reach Palestine through illegal means, underscoring the determination of the Jewish community to establish a homeland in the region (Wagner, 2014, pp. 698–726).

Jewish Immigration and Türkiye during the Second World War

The Jewish community faced increasingly difficult times when the Nazi Party, under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, gained control of Germany. Hitler's anti-Semitic policies presented new challenges, particularly for the British who governed Palestine at the time. Despite many Jews opting to relocate to other countries, some chose to settle in Palestine. The number of Jews immigrating illegally to Palestine had been significant during the postwar period, but it surged even further when conflict erupted a few months later. According to studies, 6,323 Jews arrived in Palestine between July and September 1939 (Armaoğlu 1991, p. 62). This influx of Jewish immigrants was met with disapproval from both the Arab population and the British government in Palestine. In response, the British authorities implemented strong measures to curb the exodus of Jewish immigrants to the region.

Indeed, Zionism was significant not only as a political objective for the Jewish people but also as a strategic endeavor aligning with the political and economic interests of England. Following World War I, the British sought to maintain control over key routes leading to their colonies, particularly the Suez Canal. Securing the Suez Canal and its surroundings was vital for England, especially given the challenges it faced in ensuring the security of this crucial waterway. Establishing a Jewish state in the region could serve the dual purpose of fulfilling Jewish aspirations for statehood while also bolstering British interests by enhancing stability and control over strategic territories, including the Suez Canal (Ediz, 2016, p. 146).

Indeed, tensions between British authorities and the Jewish community in Palestine escalated because of the issue of illegal immigration. The British restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine led to clashes between Jewish groups and British forces in the region (Armaoğlu, 1991, p. 62). Meanwhile, Jewish aspirations for an independent state in Palestine received significant support from US leaders such as Roosevelt and Truman. Both presidents expressed sympathy for the Zionist cause and advocated for establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Their support provided a boost to the Zionist movement and furthered the momentum toward the creation of a Jewish state (Arı, 2007, p. 214).

The escalating threat of Nazi persecution in Europe deeply concerned the Jewish Agency, which sought to ensure the security and well-being of Jewish people and was responsible for transporting refugees from Istanbul to Palestine (The Detroit Jewish Chronicle and the Legal Chronicle, 6 March 1942, p. 4). To find a safer environment, many Jewish individuals migrated to Palestine, and Türkiye emerged as a significant transit country due to its geopolitical position. Despite British restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine through limited immigration certificates, the desire to reach Palestine persisted among Jewish migrants. Türkiye served as a crucial transit point for Jewish individuals escaping Nazi persecution to Palestine. Recognizing the importance of organizing and facilitating this migration through Türkiye, Haim Barlas, the representative of the Jewish Agency, arrived in Türkiye to coordinate and oversee these efforts (Bali, 2003, p. 344–45).

Haim Barlas encountered numerous challenges in his efforts to facilitate Jewish migration through Türkiye, particularly due to Türkiye's policy of neutrality during World War II and restrictions on the establishment of organizations like his. Additionally, the geopolitical landscape shifted as Nazi rule expanded across Europe, leading to changes in migration routes and Turkish policies. Initially, Romania became a transit country for Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi persecution, as Italy closed its harbors to Jews. The Romanian

government allowed Jewish refugees, primarily from Germany and Austria, to pass through its territory unhindered, as they desired to maintain their independence from Nazi influence (Çelik, 2019, p. 40). On October 22, 1940, Portugal also prohibited Jewish individuals from passing through their country, further complicating migration routes (Shaw, 1993, p. 400). Furthermore, with the Nazi invasion of France, Yugoslavia, and Greece, the Mediterranean route for Jewish migration became untenable. Türkiye, seeking to maintain its neutrality and fearing Nazi invasion after the collapse of Greece, prohibited the passage of refugees through its Black Sea and Mediterranean borders. Despite these challenges, Barlas succeeded in changing Turkish policy with the assistance of his contacts in Türkiye. He sought to provide guarantees to Turkish authorities to alleviate concerns about violating Turkish neutrality (Shaw, 1993, p. 258).

Haim Barlas expressed his gratitude to President Refik Saydam and the Turkish government for their efforts in granting visas and permissions for Jewish individuals to travel to Palestine through Türkiye under the law dated 03.10.1940 (BCA, 30.10/99.641.7). This gesture of appreciation was conveyed through a letter, which likely indicated the significance of Türkiye's role in facilitating Jewish migration. It is noteworthy that Türkiye's decision to permit this activity occurred despite the country's strong opposition from Great Britain and the Vatican. This opposition stemmed from concerns about potential Arab reactions against their nationality and interests. Despite these challenges and pressures, Türkiye chose to allow Jewish migration through its territory, underscoring the country's commitment to humanitarian principles and its willingness to navigate complex international dynamics (Shaw, 1991, p. 257). For example, in mid-1941, a small boat carrying 20 Jewish passengers arrived off the coast of Istanbul. After its engine failed and the Romanian captain decided not to continue the journey, the boat was repaired and a new captain was assigned before being dispatched to the Mediterranean by Turkish authorities (BCA, 30.10/206.407.31).

In contrast to many European countries that either aligned with Germany or closed their borders to Jewish refugees, the Turkish government chose a different approach, guided by international protocols and humanitarian concerns. After careful deliberation, Turkish authorities granted permission to establish an office specifically for Jewish migrants and facilitate their transit passages (BCA, 30.18.1.2/91.57.4; BCA, 30.18.1.2/91.66.8; BCA, 30.18.1.2/92.85.19; BCA, 30.18.1.2/92.87.14). Among those passengers, there were also 450 Jewish children from Germany along with their 40 teachers (BCA, 30.18.1.2/92.85.7).

Subsequently, in the following months, a significant number of Jewish individuals residing in various European countries sought transit visas from the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry. These applications were submitted both individually and collectively, indicating the widespread need for safe passage through Türkiye as part of their journey to seek refuge elsewhere (Kodal, 2012, pp. 1911–15). Consequently, Barlas worked diligently to reassure Turkish authorities and navigate the complex geopolitical landscape to facilitate Jewish migration through Türkiye.

Struma Incident

As evidenced by the documents, the Turkish government predominantly approved transit visa requests from Jewish immigrants but also rejected some for various reasons. Additionally, Jewish individuals were permitted to stay in Türkiye for a certain period, reflecting Türkiye's efforts to provide assistance within its capabilities. However, despite Türkiye's best efforts to assist Jewish people, certain challenges remained beyond its control due to the international political environment (Shaw, 1991, p. 257).

One such example is the Struma incident, which illustrates the limitations faced by Türkiye in addressing the plight of Jewish refugees. The Struma incident involved a ship carrying Jewish refugees that sank into the

Black Sea in 1942, resulting in significant loss of life. Despite Türkiye's willingness to help, the complexities of international politics and the constraints imposed by external powers prevented Türkiye from preventing or resolving the tragedy. This incident serves as a poignant reminder of the challenges faced by both Jewish refugees and the countries that sought to aid them during this tumultuous period.

The joining of Romania with Nazi Germany in November 1940 marked a dark period for the Jewish population in Romania, with instances of torture and killings occurring across the country, including the massacre of 4,000 Jews in Jassy (Iași) (Sarı, 2021, p. 196). The escalation of racist laws in Romania during the early 1940s compelled many Jewish individuals to seek refuge in Palestine through Türkiye.

This situation created a new income opportunity for certain individuals, with advertisements widely appearing in newspapers, including announcements related to the Struma ship (Bali, 2003, pp. 346–47). Pandelis, a Greek businessman, sold tickets to Jewish people at high prices, misleading them by showing pictures of the transatlantic Queen Mary (Yetkin, 2000, p. 65). However, upon arrival at the ship, passengers discovered the grim reality: the Struma was an old vessel dating back to 1830 that was not suitable for human transportation and lacked essential rescue equipment and facilities. Originally used as a cargo ship on the Danube River, primarily for animal transportation, the Struma did not possess a license to carry passengers. Nevertheless, this issue was circumvented through the bribery of officials in Romania (Yetkin, 2000, pp. 47–49).

Despite the inhuman conditions and dangers posed by the vessel, Jewish refugees were left with limited options due to Nazi pressure and the closure of other routes to Palestine. The policy of the British government toward Jewish refugees also contributed to the dire situation, leaving people with no choice but to pay exorbitant prices for passage on unsafe ships (Frantz and Collins, 2016, p. 63). Additionally, Pandelis promised to secure passengers' visas by traveling to Türkiye via train before Struma arrived on the Turkish shores. Unlike other illegal ships, the Struma was perceived as legitimate, further adding to the desperation of Jewish refugees seeking safe passage to Palestine (Bali, 2003, p. 347).

On December 12, 1941, the Struma vessel departed from the port of Constanza in Romania with 769 Jewish passengers who had fled Romania to escape the advancing Germans. Their destination was Türkiye, with the goal of reaching Eretz Yisrael (the Promised Land) (The Detroit Jewish News, 1965). However, the journey was fraught with difficulties. Struma encountered security nets after passing the signal area at the entrance of the Bosphorus, and it was subsequently rescued by a military guide and towed to the Büyükdere control area on December 15, 1941. The ship was quarantined, and a yellow flag was raised (Bali, 2003, p. 349).

Meanwhile, the Turkish authorities initiated an investigation into the cause of the ship's malfunction. Given that faults were discovered not only in the engine but also in other parts of the ship, it was suspected that the malfunctions may have been deliberate. Considering this possibility, the Ministry of Transport sought guidance on how to repair the ship. Instructions were issued to the Istanbul District Port Authority Technical Administration to expedite the repair work to make the ship seaworthy as soon as possible. Concurrently, efforts were underway to secure entry for Jewish passengers into countries willing to accept them. This dual approach involved both repairing the ship for continued travel and negotiating with other nations for the safe resettlement of the passengers (BCA, 30.10/171.185.21).

As the malfunction on the Struma ferry persisted and the British continued to refuse entry to Jewish immigrants into Palestine, the on-board situation deteriorated, leading to nutritional and health issues. Concerns about immigrants' well-being were reported to the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, highlighting the dire circumstances and the potential for mass fatalities due to epidemics and cold weather.

An urgent action was recommended to bring the passengers ashore (BCA, 30.10/124.881.6). In response to the crisis, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee proposed to the Turkish authorities to accommodate the refugees in a camp and offered to cover all associated expenses. However, Turkish authorities were reluctant to set a precedent and consequently prevented most passengers from disembarking, allowing only nine individuals to leave the ship (Guttstadt, 2012, p. 202).

Meanwhile, the Jewish Agency attempted to persuade the Palestinian Government to issue sufficient certificates for Struma passengers. However, the Turkish government reiterated its stance that Türkiye was only a transit country and not a destination for refugees, further complicating efforts to find a solution for the stranded passengers (The Detroit Jewish Chronicle and the Legal Chronicle, 6 March 1942, p. 4). On February 23, 1942, it was decided that the only option left for the Struma ferry was to leave the Black Sea. The Istanbul Governorship was instructed to tow the ship to sea with a tugboat and to prevent its return to the Bosphorus. As a result, the Struma was launched into the Black Sea, propelled by an Alemdar engine provided by the Ministry of Transport (BCA, 30.10/171.185.21). Unfortunately, tragedy struck when the ship was at sea. It encountered a Russian submarine, resulting in its sinking (Kodal, 2012, p. 1920). For many years, the cause of Struma's sinking has remained unknown. Speculation were circulated, including the possibility of a ship striking a sea mine or being hit. Additionally, there were suggestions that the desperate passengers deliberately sabotaged the ship in an act of despair (The Detroit Jewish Chronicle and the Legal Chronicle, 20 March 1942, p. 12).

International Environment, Jewish Immigration and Türkiye's Stance

Türkiye's foreign policy during the interwar period was characterized using a cautious approach aimed at maintaining neutrality and balance despite growing tensions in Europe. Concerned about developments following World War I, Türkiye sought to avoid conflict entanglement and pursued alliances to counter emerging threats, particularly from Germany and Italy. To this end, Türkiye joined the League of Nations and played a leading role in the establishment of regional alliances such as the Balkan Pact and the Sadabat Pact. These initiatives aimed to strengthen Türkiye's position and foster stability in the region, while efforts were made to cultivate relations with major European powers like England and France (Balci, 2021, pp. 81–85).

However, Türkiye faced challenges that tested its foreign policy stance, particularly concerning the Arab-Jewish conflict and the rise of Nazi Germany. The Arabs, opposed to Jewish immigration to Palestine, supported Nazi Germany, which was led by the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haji Amin al-Husseini. Despite his efforts, internal divisions among the Arabs and their inability to forge political unity weakened al-Husseini's influence against Zionist leaders like Weizmann. In 1941, al-Husseini sought support from Hitler, aligning with Nazi Germany's ambitions in the Caucasus and the Middle East. In turn, Hitler planned to collaborate with the Arabs as part of his strategy to expand into the region. These geopolitical dynamics posed significant challenges to Türkiye's foreign policy, forcing it to navigate complex relationships and balance competing interests to safeguard its own security and interests (Armaoğlu, 2018, pp. 163–64). On the other hand, the defeat of the French against the Germans during World War II compelled the Turkish government to maintain a neutral stance and to preserve good relations with Germany. When Germany entered Bulgaria on March 1, 1941, the two countries became neighbors along the Thrace border. Despite Hitler's assurances of non-aggression in a letter to İnönü, he attempted to persuade Turkish authorities to join the war on Germany's side (Sarı, 2021, p. 199). The German threat was the first concern of Turkish policymakers.

The second concern was The British administration. Notably, represented by Sir Harold McMichael, the High Commissioner for Palestine and Jordan, took a stringent stance against Jewish immigration to Palestine during World War II, largely in response to Arab discontent. McMichael maintained close communication with London to prevent Jewish refugees from seeking refuge in Palestine, fearing that it would exacerbate tensions in the Middle East and garner sympathy for Germany, potentially inciting Arab revolts (Frantz and Collins, 2016, pp. 139–139).

To enforce these policies, the British sought to intercept ships carrying Jewish refugees in the Turkish Straits, aiming to deter unauthorized immigration (Kuzgun, 2021, p. 295). However, the British faced challenges not only from the Arab population but also from the Jewish community, particularly due to the large influx of unauthorized Jewish immigrants. According to Jewish sources, approximately 37,000 unauthorized Jewish immigrants arrived in Palestine in May 1939. The British administration's restrictions on illegal immigration sparked conflict with the Jewish community, leading to tensions and disagreements. These conflicts underscored the complex dynamics at play in the region during this period, with competing interests and pressures shaping British policies and relationships with both Arab and Jewish communities (Armaoğlu, 1991, p. 62).

Struma Crisis and Türkiye's Crisis Management Process

In this international political climate, Türkiye's primary foreign policy objective was to avoid involvement in the Second World War. However, the influx of Jewish immigrants from Europe and the use of Türkiye as a transit country presented significant challenges for the Turkish government. The crisis surrounding the Struma ship exemplifies one such challenge that placed Türkiye in a difficult position. The onset of the Struma crisis coincided with news of its departure from Constanta, marking the beginning of a period of crisis for Türkiye. This event underscored the complexities of Türkiye's foreign policy during the wartime era, as it navigated between its commitment to neutrality and its humanitarian obligations despite mounting pressure and challenges.

The Struma crisis was instigated by the actions of the German and British states, whose political conflict left Türkiye in a precarious position due to its geopolitical location. Throughout the war, Türkiye generally adhered to a neutral policy. Although this stance allowed Türkiye to avoid direct involvement in the conflict, it also presented challenges, particularly concerning the treatment of Jewish refugees. Although Türkiye did not participate in the war, it faced pressure to align its policies regarding Jewish refugees with the preferences of Germany and England. Consequently, Türkiye permitted the transit passage of Jewish refugees with valid permits for Palestine but refused entry to those lacking sufficient funds or visas for their intended destinations. This decision aimed to avoid provoking Germany and England, underscoring Türkiye's cautious approach to the crisis (Resmî Gazete, Number: 3960, 15 July 1938, pp. 10279–10283.)

The Struma crisis can be categorized as a political crisis, as Türkiye's protection of Jewish immigrants aboard the ship risked straining relations with Germany (Sarı, 2021, p. 199). The Turkish government, cognizant of its military limitations, carefully managed the crisis to minimize damage, navigating between British pressure and the German threat. Ultimately, Türkiye's handling of the situation reflected its pragmatic approach to foreign policy, prioritizing its national interests while seeking to mitigate potential repercussions from the conflicting interests of major powers.

The actions and proposals made by McMichael regarding the Struma ship highlighted the complexities faced by Turkish decision-makers during the crisis. When informed of the ship's impending arrival,

McMichael recognized Türkiye's obligations under the Montreux Treaty, which prohibited the blocking of legal or illegal refugee ships. As a solution, he suggested that Turkish authorities stop the ship for health screening upon arrival. If the ship proceeded despite these measures, McMichael proposed that the British navy attempt to tow it to the nearest Turkish port (Frantz and Collins, 2016, pp. 138–39). This suggestion reflected British officials' concerns about the potential consequences of allowing the ship to reach Palestine, namely, the encouragement of further migration from the Balkans (Shaw, 1993, p. 282).

The British stance on the issue presented a challenging scenario for Turkish decision-makers, complicating their response to the Struma incident. This unexpected crisis forced Turkish authorities to navigate between their obligations under international treaties, humanitarian concerns and the geopolitical implications of their decisions. In doing so, they grappled with the delicate balance of safeguarding Türkiye's interests while managing competing demands and pressures from various stakeholders involved in the crisis. In times of international crisis, individuals leading a country play a crucial role in decision-making processes and crisis management. These leaders are responsible for defending national interests, navigating challenges, and determining strategies and allocation of resources.

During the Struma crisis, Türkiye was governed by a single-party government led by the Republican People's Party. The key decision-makers included President İsmet İnönü, Prime Minister Refik Saydam, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Şükrü Saraçoğlu. İnönü, also known as the National Chief, possessed extensive state experience, having played a pivotal role in the Turkish War of Independence and maintaining Türkiye's neutrality during World War II. Although the leader overseeing crisis management remained the same, the unique circumstances of each crisis necessitated tailored responses. Effective crisis management relies on well-functioning mechanisms and a developed corporate culture to ensure accurate and timely information dissemination. In the case of the Struma crisis, Türkiye sought comprehensive information about the ship's situation.

Although the Council of Ministers served as the institutional decision-making body, decisions were typically made with the prime minister's approval after consulting relevant units rather than through consensus or majority vote. Various ministries, including the Ministry of Transport, were involved in the decision-making process, contributing to the production of detailed reports and informed decision-making. This collaborative approach enabled Türkiye to effectively manage the crisis and mitigate potential risks to national security.

In fact, the Struma incident can be characterized as a unilateral crisis. In this type of crisis, only one side perceives the situation as a "crisis" and takes responsive actions. For the passengers on the Struma, attempting to reach Palestine through the Turkish Straits to find safety under British control, the incident became a significant crisis for Turkish decision-makers. This was due to the lack of necessary permission from England and the complex conditions imposed by the ongoing war.

In this situation, Türkiye faced a unique challenge. The crisis did not directly involve other countries as parties; rather, Türkiye had to navigate the complexities. The country was forced to make decisions that balanced national security, national interests and priorities, and humanitarian responsibilities. The culmination of this crisis management was the difficult decision to send the Struma back to the Black Sea (Aksu, 2018, p. 73). This incident illustrates the challenges inherent in unilateral crises, where a nation's leaders must address a situation under significant external pressures and internal constraints. The Turkish government's decision-making process during the Struma crisis exemplifies the intricate balance required to navigate such delicate international situations.

The Struma crisis can indeed be categorized as both a unilateral and humanitarian crisis. Turkish decision makers found themselves in a difficult position, caught between the humanitarian needs of Jewish refugees and the political pressures of Nazi Germany and Britain. Despite the immense political pressure from Nazi Germany, Türkiye demonstrated a notable degree of resistance, particularly to humanitarian issues. Throughout World War II, Türkiye refused German demands to turn over Jewish refugees to internment in death camps, showcasing its commitment to humanitarian principles (Shaw, 1991, p. 256).

The dire conditions aboard the Struma underscored the humanitarian side of the crisis. On December 27, 1941, Romania sent a telegram to the Turkish government explaining that the ship could not return to Romania because it had left illegally. This communication further complicated Türkiye's position. Meanwhile, the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem reached out to the British authorities on January 19, 1942, seeking permission for Struma's Jewish passengers to enter Palestine. Unfortunately, no response was received. As the conditions on the Struma deteriorated, the health and well-being of its passengers became a pressing concern. Dr. H. Alataş, the deputy of health and social welfare, reported on February 4, 1942, that the refugees would need to be brought ashore to prevent mass casualties due to the increasingly unhealthy and dire conditions on the ship (BCA, 30.10/124.881.6). The Struma crisis exemplifies the complexity of managing a humanitarian crisis under severe political pressure. The Turkish government's actions highlighted the delicate balance required to navigate such situations in which humanitarian needs clash with geopolitical realities. Despite the tragic outcome, Türkiye's efforts to resist Nazi pressure and its attempts to manage the crisis within the constraints of the time are noteworthy.

The Turkish government indeed made significant efforts to address the humanitarian crisis surrounding the Struma ship, which arrived in Turkish territorial waters on December 15, 1941. These efforts aimed to find a resolution that balanced humanitarian concerns with the political and strategic interests of Türkiye. Upon the arrival of Struma, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs quickly initiated diplomatic efforts to find a solution. On December 20, 1941, the Ministry informed various foreign representatives in Ankara, particularly focusing on the British Embassy, about the dire situation of the Jewish immigrants aboard the Struma. Given that Britain held the mandate over Palestine and was in a state of conflict with the Jewish population there, Türkiye emphasized that if Britain would grant visas to the immigrants, Türkiye would facilitate their journey to Palestine. The British response, however, was not favourable. British Ambassador Knatchbull-Hugessen reported that Britain did not wish to allow these immigrants into Palestine. Despite continued negotiations, only 70 children were granted permission to enter Palestine, reflecting Britain's strict immigration policy and concerns about worsening tensions in the region (Kodal, 2012, p. 1919).

Türkiye's position was further complicated by the legal constraints of the Montreux Straits Convention, which governed the passage of ships through the Turkish Straits. Türkiye communicated that it did not have the legal authority to unilaterally block or redirect the ship without violating international agreements. Despite these constraints, Türkiye expressed its willingness to help passengers continue their journey, provided they were given the necessary visas for Palestine (Çanak, 2015, p. 138). Throughout this crisis, the Turkish government sought to balance national interests with humanitarian responsibilities. The situation became a significant test for Turkish decision-makers, who had to navigate the complex interplay of international diplomacy, legal obligations and humanitarian needs. While Türkiye aimed to protect its national security and maintain its neutral stance during the war, it also made efforts to fulfill its humanitarian obligations within the constraints imposed by international law and the political realities of the time. The Struma incident highlights the complex and multifaceted nature of crisis management, particularly when

humanitarian concerns intersect with political and legal constraints. The Turkish government's actions demonstrate their commitment to seeking a humane resolution despite significant external pressures and limitations. Ultimately, Türkiye's attempts to resolve the Struma crisis reflect its efforts to act responsibly and compassionately, even in difficult international circumstances.

The Struma incident indeed placed Turkish decision-makers in an extremely challenging position, trying to balance political pressures from Britain, humanitarian concerns, and the legal and international constraints of the time. On February 10, 1942, Turkish authorities made a public press statement urging the British government to reconsider its stance on Jewish refugees aboard the Struma. This attempted to alleviate the political burden and shift responsibility to Britain. However, despite this call, British officials, including High Commissioner Sir Harold McMichael, remained steadfast in their refusal to allow immigrants to enter Palestine.

Further complicating the situation was a letter dated February 19, 1942, which introduced new diplomatic and legal hurdles. Despite the repairs, the ship was not permitted to continue to Palestine due to the British refusal to issue visas or alter their policy toward Jewish immigration. The captain of the ship was a Bulgarian citizen, and Bulgaria was allied with Germany, further complicating any decision involving the ship's movement. The Struma had been flagged under Panama, a country at war with the Axis, which added a layer of complexity to the ship's legal status (BCA, 30.10/171.185.21).

Given these complications, Turkish authorities decided to remove the ship from their territorial waters. On February 23, 1942, the Struma was towed back into the Black Sea (Kodal, 2012, p. 1920). Once in the Black Sea, the Struma, unable to continue its journey, faced an uncertain fate. Tragically, on February 24, 1942, the ship was torpedoed by a Soviet submarine, resulting in the loss of nearly all lives on board. This incident highlighted the tragic intersection of geopolitical maneuvering, wartime exigencies, and humanitarian crises.

Table 1

Analysis of the Struma Crisis

Date	15 December 1941–24 February 1942
Parties	Türkiye
Third Actors	British; Nazi Germany; the Jewish Agency
Decision Makers	İsmet İnönü (President), Refik Saydam (Prime Minister), Şükrü Saraçoğlu (Foreign Minister)
Types of crisis	Bilateral, Humanitarian, Unexpected
Triggering Event	Passing through Turkish waters
Climax of a crisis	Rejection of Jewish visas by British authorities
Türkiye's Demands and Goals	Fixing the ship's engine, issuing visas to passengers, not allowing passengers into the country, and being neutral
Türkiye's Crisis Management Strategy	Negotiation and Adherence to Contractual Obligations

The decision was driven by several factors such as diplomatic pressure, legal constraints, and humanitarian concerns. First, the British government's intransigence on its immigration policy left Türkiye with limited options. Second, the Montreux Straits Convention and other international legal obligations limited Türkiye's ability to unilaterally decide the fate of its ships. Third, despite recognizing the dire humanitarian situation, Türkiye was constrained by its broader geopolitical and diplomatic context.

Conclusion

The Struma incident is a profoundly tragic episode in the annals of World War II and the broader history of Jewish migration during the Holocaust. This encapsulates the dire consequences of geopolitical maneuvering, wartime exigencies and humanitarian crises that arise when nations prioritize strategic interests over human lives. This complex incident, involving multiple actors and intricate political dynamics, underscores the moral and ethical challenges faced by countries like Türkiye, which found themselves in precarious positions during the war.

Türkiye's position during World War II was characterized by careful neutrality. Under the leadership of President İsmet İnönü, Prime Minister Refik Saydam, and Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu, Türkiye aimed to stay out of the conflict while managing delicate relations with both the Allied and Axis powers. This strategic stance was critical for Türkiye, given its geopolitical significance and the pressures exerted by neighboring belligerent states. The arrival of the Struma in Turkish waters on December 15, 1941, was a significant diplomatic challenge. The vessel, carrying 769 Jewish refugees who had fled Romania, symbolized the desperation and suffering of Jews seeking escape from Nazi persecution.

The British government, represented by High Commissioner Sir Harold McMichael, resolute its policy of restricting Jewish immigration to Palestine, fearing that an influx of refugees would destabilize the region and inflame Arab opposition. Despite the harsh conditions aboard the Struma, British authorities refused to issue visas to its passengers, placing Türkiye in a difficult position. While sympathetic to the plight of the refugees, the Turkish government was also wary of antagonizing both Britain and Germany. This balancing act reflected Türkiye's broader foreign policy strategy during the war, in which maintaining neutrality and avoiding entanglement in the conflict were paramount.

Turkish decision-makers made several attempts to resolve the crisis humanely. They engaged in diplomatic efforts with the British and other nations to find a destination for the refugees, but these efforts were stymied by the intransigence of the British government and the complex international legal framework governing wartime maritime movements. The Montreux Straits Convention, which regulated passage through the Turkish Straits, further constrained Türkiye's actions. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, aware of the humanitarian disaster unfolding on the Struma, proposed that Britain issue visas for Palestine, offering to facilitate the refugees' journey. However, this proposal was rejected, and only few children were eventually permitted to disembark.

Faced with mounting pressure, deteriorating conditions aboard the ship, the refusal of both Romania and Britain to accept the refugees, and the refusal of the captain to move the ship, Türkiye decided to tow the Struma out of its territorial waters into the Black Sea on February 23, 1942. This decision, driven by pragmatic considerations, led to a catastrophic outcome. On February 24, 1942, the Struma was torpedoed by a Soviet submarine, resulting in the deaths of almost all of its crew. This tragic incident underscored the lethal consequences of a world at war, where humanitarian needs were often overshadowed by strategic imperatives and national interests.

The Struma incident illustrates the profound dilemmas faced by decision-makers in Turkey during World War II. Despite their efforts to balance humanitarian concerns with geopolitical realities, the constraints imposed by international politics severely limited their options. Türkiye's cautious approach, driven by a desire to maintain neutrality and safeguard national security, led to difficult and often heartbreaking decisions. While Türkiye facilitated the transit of many Jewish refugees and resisted Nazi demands to hand



over Jews within its borders, the Struma tragedy remains a stark reminder of the limits of humanitarian intervention in a time of widespread conflict and moral crisis.



Beyond its historical significance, the Struma incident provides a compelling case study for crisis management theories. By applying these frameworks to the situation, we gain a deeper understanding of the strategic decision-making processes and the complexities involved in balancing humanitarian goals with national interests during times of crisis. The application of crisis management theories underscores the unique challenges faced by neutral nations during wartime, especially when decisions can have profound humanitarian consequences. The lessons learned from this tragic episode highlight the importance of effective crisis management, not only in wartime but also in contemporary discussions on international refugee protection and humanitarian intervention.

In conclusion, the Struma incident reflects the harsh realities of World War II and the difficult choices faced by neutral nations like Türkiye. This underscores the necessity of balancing national interests with humanitarian responsibilities and the tragic outcomes that can result when the international community fails to act decisively despite human suffering. The lessons of Struma continue to resonate, reminding us of the imperative to prioritize human lives and dignity in our global policies and actions.



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Author Details **Emre Yürük (Asst. Prof. Dr.)**
¹ KTU, Department of International Relations, Trabzon, Türkiye
 0000-0002-6798-1048  emre.yuruk@ktu.edu.tr

Yasemin Kutlu Yürük (Dr.)
² Independence, Trabzon, Türkiye
 0000-0003-4038-2560  yaseminkutluyuruk@gmail.com

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Research Article

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Analyzing the JDP Era through Class Struggles



M. Şafak Sağlam¹  

¹ Haliç University, Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul, Türkiye

Abstract

Several significant social changes have occurred during the 21-year tenure of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government in Turkey. However, the scholarship on this period either utterly disregards the working class or depicts it as a passive demographic that is only affected by these changes. In other words, in the literature, the working class lacks agency. To fill this gap, this study examines the JDP government's role in relation to working class struggles. This analysis is based on labor protests between 2001 and 2019, obtained through newspaper reports of labor unrest. Based on this analysis, the JDP rule is divided into two periods: before and after 2010. In both periods, I illustrate that the working class was an agent of transformations, and it influenced transformations through bargaining processes and conflicts. In line with this analysis, this paper illustrates that the balance of power and class struggles between social classes constitutes an objective basis for understanding social and political transformations. Accordingly, based on new data, this study also contributes to the scholarly debate on authoritarianism, with an emphasis on the working-class agency.

Keywords

Justice and Development Party • Working class • Authoritarianism • Class struggles • Neoliberal transformation

Author Note

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✉ Corresponding author: M. Şafak Sağlam safaksaglam@halic.edu.tr



Analyzing the JDP Era through Class Struggles

In the history of the Republic and since the introduction of multiparty elections, no party has held power in Turkey as long as the JDP has. During the JDP administration since 2002, Turkey witnessed essential socio-political transformations. During this period, many issues regarding social reconciliation, including ethnic, religious, and cultural, were reopened for discussion. The neoliberal transformation that began in the 1980s peaked during the JDP government and penetrated almost every aspect of society (Çelik, 2015, p. 618). Since the period was socially turbulent, the academic literature on the JDP government is extensive and diverse. However, two distinct periods can particularly be outlined in this literature.

The first period covers the period from 2002, when the JDP came to power, until the Gezi Park Protests (GPP) in 2013. Many studies during this period discussed the party's actions positively in terms of democratization, reformism, and economic policies (Erol, 2019, p. 664; Glombitza, 2021, p. 168). In particular, left-liberal intellectuals claim that there have been notable steps toward democratization and a divergence from the regime that followed the 1980 coup (Insel, 2003; Keyman & E. Öniş, 2007, pp. 224-225). Also influenced by this perspective, identity studies based on dichotomies such as secular-religious, Kurdish-Turkish, and Alevi-Sunni have come to the fore. Some studies also highlight the success of the economic policy, which supports the positive outlook during this period (Sezal & Sezal, 2018, p. 218). In the years following the 2001 economic crisis, the longest uninterrupted growth performance was achieved, and inflation was reduced to single digits (Kus, 2016, p. 43). Simultaneously, growth spread to the grassroots and increased incomes in almost all layers of society (Bahçe & Köse, 2017, p. 584). Boratav calls the economy of the 2000-2007 period the "Tulip Period" in reference to the brief period of social and intellectual revival in the 18th-century Ottoman Empire. Boratav emphasized the favorable economic conjuncture of the following years by stating that "during Turkey's multi-party years, it is difficult to find a more favorable date than 2002 for an opposition party to take over power." (Boratav, 2018, p. 241). During this period, the world economy experienced an uptick, and "capital flows to the economies on the periphery of the capitalist world system increased by 33 percent (according to the Institute of International Finance) or 48 percent (IMF data) on average each year" (Boratav, 2018, p. 242).

Although the left-liberal literature contains criticisms of JDP's pre-2013 policies, it emphasizes the progress made in democratization. Another approach, which emerged after the GPP in 2013, examines the government's actions more critically. These studies generally concur that the JDP administration has taken an even more authoritarian form. However, views vary on the causes and definitions of authoritarianism. The two main approaches that stand out are competitive authoritarianism, which represents a liberal-oriented analysis, and as the second one authoritarian statism, which represents a Marxist-oriented perspective, a form of governance that arose in response to the crises of the 1970s and politically enabled the rise of neoliberalism (Karahanoğulları & Duygu, 2018).

According to the competitive authoritarianism approach, the JDP's authoritarianism was driven by its patronage relationships with the business elite and the urban poor. Thanks to these relationships, the party did not feel the need to secure legitimacy through democratic means. The government's anti-democratic practices were also tolerated by the electorate, which benefited from these patronage relationships. The deterioration of the national economy during the JDP limited the allocation of resources and narrowed the party's coalition with the business community and the electorate, which in turn accelerated authoritar-

ianism (Esen & Gumuscu, 2021, p. 13). As a result, a competitive authoritarian regime was established. In such authoritarian regimes, the acquisition of political power appears to take place through democratic mechanisms, yet the ruling party resorts to authoritarian practices very often not to lose its position, so the regime often does not even meet the minimum standards of democracy (Levitsky & Way, 2002, p. 52). The ruling party's practices include a lack of electoral justice, restrictions on rights such as freedom of the press, freedom of expression, association, and assembly, and the unequal distance of state institutions from political parties (Levitsky & Way, 2002, p. 53). Research on Turkey using the competitive authoritarianism approach also underlines concrete facts such as the media bias in favor of the ruling party, the inequality of resources for organizing political campaigns, the politicization of state institutions, and problems with election security (Çalışkan, 2018, p. 7; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016, p. 1587). According to this approach, all political parties seem to have the possibility of becoming a government, but the competition between parties is manipulated in favor of the ruling party.

Another approach considers authoritarianism and neoliberalism in relation (Özkiziltan, 2019, p. 218). However, it differentiates between various authoritarian governance strategies. In one analysis using this framework, economic policy and labor relations were regulated by a neoliberal conservative governance approach until 2013, after which the accumulation regime and state crisis led to increasing authoritarianism (Akçay, 2021, p. 81). Another study emphasized that the rule-based/technocratic policy-making and formal/procedural democratic approach, which lasted until 2010, gave way to governance through fait accompli and overt coercion (Bozkurt-Güngen, 2018, pp. 220-223). Others have argued that financial neoliberalism underwent a crisis in peripheral countries in the early 2000s. From a Gramscian perspective, this crisis was overcome through an expansion of the historical bloc to include previously uncovered layers of capital and lower classes. In addition, a temporary period of prosperity has emerged in many peripheral countries due to the global proliferation of foreign capital flows. The form of governance based on this historical bloc has been referred to as neoliberal populism. This consensus became unsustainable after the 2008 global economic crisis, and authoritarianism rose (Özden, Bekmen, & Akça, 2018, p. 247). Although these narratives have continuity regarding the neoliberal approach, ruptures have occurred in the style of governance. However, it can also be stated that there was a continuous policy of authoritarian management of the labor force during the JDP period (Erol, 2019, p. 664; Özden, Akça, & Bekmen, 2017, p. 192).

Among the analyses discussed, those that examine JDP governments in relation to neoliberalism primarily adopt a class struggle perspective. Nevertheless, even these studies do not include the working class as an active agent of transformation (Birelma, Işıklı, & Sert, 2024, pp. 65,68; Pınar, 2021, p. 35). Generally, the working class is described as a passive victim of changes. Although they mention critical stages of neoliberal transformation, such as privatization, changes in labor laws, marketization, and even class reactions against them, this is usually done descriptively (Çelik, 2015; Erol, 2019).

Yet, as I argue based on new data, the working class often acted as the very subject of these processes. By doing so, it showed agency in class power relations. This agency is laid bare at every stage of the conflict process, from determining what needs to be transformed to the extent to which such transformation can be realized. To make this case, I will offer a reframing of the period of JDP rule, centering the agency of the working class.

Data Collection from Newspapers

Within the scope of this study, the analysis of the working class was carried out using newspaper-based protest event data. In the literature, there are national and international studies on collecting class actions data using a quantitative method. The most comprehensive one among these was conducted by the World Labor Research Group. This study collected data on the protests that occurred on a global scale between 1870 and 2000 through the Times and New York Times newspapers (Silver, 2015, p. 257). A study in Turkey using a similar data collection method is Erdem Yörük's, which collected data using the Turkish newspaper Cumhuriyet on odd days between 1970 and 2010 (Yörük, 2012). His study emphasizes the transition from the formal to the informal proletariat and the rising Kurdish and Islamic movements. Among similar studies, the Labor Studies Group, which has been publishing reports since 2015, collected the most detailed data. A larger group manages LSG data collection and publishes reports annually (Emek Çalışmaları Topluluğu, 2021).

The literature also contains critiques concerning the reliability of the use of newspaper data in the study of collective action (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, & Soule, 2004; Franzosi, 1987; Ortiz, Myers, Walls, & Diaz, 2006). Selection and description biases are the main forms of criticism. Selection bias is about the specific actions that are covered by newspapers. Description bias is how these actions are reported (Earl et al., 2004, pp. 68-73). The recommended approach to reduce the influence of these two biases is to increase the number of sources consulted (Earl et al., 2004, p. 74). However, this study was limited to a single source due to the length of the period covered. In this regard, Cumhuriyet was chosen because it is known for its sensitivity to labor news and has a relatively formal (the number of pages and the space allocated to labor news) and ideological consistency. This consistency allows for comparisons to be made between years regarding the number of protests. Index bias emphasizes actions that may be unnoticed because action data are collected through the newspaper's indexes (Earl et al., 2004, p. 68). Indexes were not utilized in this study. In addition to the quantitative data obtained from the newspaper, the news content was also subjected to analysis. The study was also conducted using secondary sources from the period.

The data presented in this study were obtained by the even-numbered days of the year covering the years 2001-2019. The data does not cover all social protests but are limited to those organized for work-related reasons by wage workers. The two main variables are protests and cases. Protest is defined as actions undertaken by wage earners in opposition to their employers or the government to secure or defend their labor rights. Case is defined as actions related to the same issue. In addition, the social class/groups of the employees who organized the protests and the reasons for the protests were used as variables.

Periodizing JDP Governments

Literature has shown that the JDP government can be divided into different periods regarding policies. In parallel, the quantitative changes in labor protests over the years prove the existence of various periods. [Figure 1](#), which indicates the number of protests, shows various patterns of increase and decrease in the number of protests over the years. The first pattern is the annual linear increase in protests from 2001 to 2005. The period between 2006 and 2010 also shows a similar trend. A continuous upward trend is also observed in [Figure 2](#), which indicates the number of cases. Based on the data in [Table 1](#), considering the reasons that triggered the protests and the workers' demands during these two periods, the interval between 2001 and 2010 can also be taken as a single period. These patterns align with JDP analyses that divide the period approximately as before and after 2010. However, while the pre-2010 JDP administration was perceived positively by left-liberal intellectuals, the agenda of these years in terms of workers' protests

was set by privatizations, marketization of public services, and demands for personal rights, particularly decreasing real wages. A bird's-eye view analysis proves that neoliberal transformation accelerated between 2001 and 2010, resulting in increased working-class reactions.

For the period after 2010, the number of protests and cases does not show such a clear pattern at first glance. Nevertheless, except for 2013 and 2017, worker activism has a general downward trend. The main reason for the high number in 2013 was the GPP, the most extensive mass democratic action in the republic's history. Various studies date the JDP's authoritarian turn to 2013 (Akçay, 2021, p. 81; Sezal & Sezal, 2018, pp. 221-226; Uysal, 2019, p. 16). As shown in [Figure 1](#), worker activism has remained high until this date.

Figure 1

Number of protests by year

Source: (Sağlam, 2023)





Figure 2

Number of cases by year

Source: (Sağlam, 2023)



The reason behind the high number of protests in 2017 was demonstrations against dismissal by decree law. These actions were generally carried out by politically engaged individuals with a political orientation. Therefore, they cannot be defined as mass protests. Furthermore, as a data source, Cumhuriyet newspaper's sensitivity towards these protests explains the high number of protests in the graph.

Table 1

Primary Causes of Protests by Period

Years / Causes of Protests	Privatization	Marketization	Employee Rights	Union Rights	Wage	Democracy	Occupational Safety	Unemployment
2001-2005	21%	10%	20%	12%	15%	11%	1%	4%
2006-2010	13%	7%	12%	11%	21%	19%	4%	5%
2001-2010	17%	8%	16%	11%	18%	16%	3%	5%
2011-2019	3%	0%	13%	14%	16%	34%	7%	7%

Source: (Sağlam, 2023)

Another factor distinguishing the period after 2010 is the change in the causes of protests. Before 2010, the opposition to the ascendancy of neoliberalism stood at the forefront. However, after 2010, the highest value came to be democratic freedoms. When we detail the reasons for protesting anti-democratic practices, the punishment of workers for their political views and attitudes is the primary one. Another leading reason is journalists' demands for the freedom of the press. In addition, the Kurdish issue, anti-secular practices, and corruption are other notable themes. Based on the workers' protests, the JDP government could be framed in two periods: before and after 2010.

Pre-2010 JDP Governments

Before delving into class actions, it is necessary to briefly discuss the state of the economy and social classes at the beginning of this period and the government policies that led to these actions. First, there is a case to be made that during the JDP era, the labor movement was relatively weak (Çelik, 2015, p. 618). Nevertheless, it should not be easily claimed that the working class was politically insignificant in Turkey at the onset of the 21st century. Curbed by the oppressive atmosphere following the coup d'état in September 12, 1980, working-class contention regained impetus via the Spring Actions in 1989 and 1990, the general work stoppage in 1991, and the Zonguldak miners' strike and march (Çelik, 1996, 2014). The mobilizations of the working class continued throughout the 90s (Akkaya, 1999; Koç, 2021; Üzümlü, 2011). Also during this period, public sector workers struggled first to have their unions recognized and then to win the right to collective bargaining, including the right to strike. All major trade unions demonstrated their eagerness to work collectively for a class-oriented mobilization by establishing the Labour Platform in 1999 (Üzümlü, 2011, p. 191).

The class struggle can be analyzed with its opposing sides. In contrast to the picture of the rising working class and the consolidation of their organizations, a fragmented landscape emerges for the power bloc. The working class confronted against a weak coalition government composed of the Democratic Left, Nationalist Movement, and Motherland Party. While none of these parties could surpass the national election threshold during the 2002 elections, the JDP managed to be the sole ruling party. However, it can be said that even the new party in power had a coalition within itself with different political views, including "moderate Islamists,

moderate nationalists, secular but socially conservative center-right voters, and a sizable number of liberal intellectuals" (Özbudun, 2006, p. 555). Furthermore, despite being the successor of the traditional lines of Turkish politics known as "Millî Görüş," or the main strand of Islamist politics led by Necmettin Erbakan, it was, after all, a new party and one that was not entirely accepted within the existing Status Quo.

From an economic perspective, the pre-JDP period was characterized by years of economic crisis, and the years encompassing the economic crisis (1998-2002) had an average growth rate of 1.0%, which is the lowest yearly rate in Turkey's history, save the years of the Second World War. The economy recovered after the JDP came to power, and the average growth rate for 2003-2007 rose to 7.3 percent. (Boratav, 2018, p. 254). Growth was also felt by lower-income groups. By 2007, the share of the working class in the total net financial wealth exceeded the 20% threshold. Indebtedness and social assistance programs also influenced the formation of this situation (Boratav, 2018, p. 254).

In this context, class struggles occur within the framework of neoliberal transformation. The period until 2010 can be interpreted as the construction of neoliberalism. The major aspects of this construction are the privatization of State Economic Enterprises, the marketization of public services, especially education and health, and the transformations in labor laws.

Privatizations

Privatization practices in Turkey were carried out at a slow pace until the 2001 crisis. After the crisis, privatization practices accelerated gradually (Erol, 2019, p. 665; Zaifer, 2018, p. 1). Based on numerical data, privatization revenues from 1986 to 2002 amounted to \$8.053 billion. In contrast, between 2003 and 2012, during the tenure of JDP governments, a total revenue of \$35.255 billion was generated from privatization (Toker & Angin, 2013, p. 76). As shown in Table 1, 17 percent of the working-class protests were against privatization.

The initial privatization efforts of the 2000s occurred within the banking sector, which suffered significant impacts from the economic crisis. In 2003, the number of existing banks decreased to 50 from 79 in 2001. The ratio of employees working in state-owned banks decreased by 42 percent from 1999 to 2004 and by 25 percent for the entire sector (Gençler, 2010). In this environment, Emlakbank and Türkbank were liquidated. Halkbank was put on the privatization agenda, but it was not realized in the end. Secondly, the abolition of the regional directorates of public institutions such as Rural Services and Highways, TCDD, 112, Retirement Fund, etc., came to the agenda. These changes represented more than just administrative modifications since they constituted implicit privatization. This paved the way for contractors and subcontractors to take over services previously operated by the public sector (TMMOB, 2005, p. 12). Thirdly, the privatization of state economic enterprises (SEEs), where protests reached the highest level, was carried out. While many SEEs were privatized during this period, the three cases in which protests were most intense were PETKİM, TÜPRAŞ, and TEKEL. The TEKEL protests represent the peak of reactions in all anti-privatization demonstrations.

If we consider privatization protests in a general sense, it becomes clear that they influence each other and exhibit shared repertoires of actions during the demonstrations. Typically, these protests commence within the confines of the enterprise ("Emlak Bankası çalışanları: Tasfiye istemiyoruz," 2001) and subsequently expand to encompass the vicinity of the enterprise, the local district/city where it is located ("Emlakbank çalışanları ayakta," 2001), and then, in a national context, move toward the capital city ("Bankayı hortumcular kapatamaz," ; "Emlakbank'ta tepkiler büyüyor," 2001). The repertoire of actions during these demonstrations includes elements such as press releases ("Emlakbank çalışanları ayakta," ; "Geleceğimiz

karartılıyor," 2001), placing advertisements in the media ("Köy Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü Hakkında İftiralar ve Gerçekler," 2004), work slowdowns, marches within the vicinity of the enterprise ("İşçiler yürüdü," 2002), intercity marches from the city where the enterprise is situated to the capital ("KESK üyeleri Ankara'ya yürüyor," 2004), and large-scale rallies ("Söz bitti sıra eylemde," 2004).

During the privatization process of these three SEEs, this repertoire expanded. For example, strikes were practiced more frequently in PETKİM and TÜPRAŞ protests ("Tüpraş'ta eylemler sürüyor," ; "Tüpraş çalışanları yine eylemde," 2004). TEKEL protests represent the peak of the reactions among all anti-privatization demonstrations. A unique feature of the TEKEL protests was their creation of a permanent protest space ("Çadirkent'in muhtarı da oldu," 2010). Shortly after the start of their protests, the workers set up tents around the headquarters of the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türk-İş). They maintained their demonstrations at a fixed location for 78 days. Another unique feature of the TEKEL protests was the decision to call a general strike with the participation of almost all labor confederations (Bulut, 2010, pp. 344-345). Although the general strike did not achieve practical success, it showed the potential of establishing the unity of the whole working class through the TEKEL protests (Dönmez, 2020, pp. 524-525; Yalman & Topal, 2017, pp. 9,11).

In addition to these cases, privatization protests have also occurred in different enterprises. A general assessment of these protests is that they failed to halt the privatization process. In this regard, the failures in individual instances have impacted the objectives of subsequent protests. For example, in many protests, including the TEKEL protests, the goal of the workers was not to halt privatization but to secure public sector jobs for those working in the institutions to be privatized (Doğan, 2018, p. 267). Even though the working class obtained some concessions, it ultimately became weakened regarding labor organizations. The fact that unions in Turkey were organized mostly in the public sector also played a pivotal role in this context.

The Marketization of Education and Healthcare

Privatizations have restricted workers' opportunities for secure job contracts within the public sector. The marketization of public services, especially education and health, has similarly resulted for white-collar workers. Not all professions were equally affected by the process, but the overall process contributed to the precarization of white-collar workers. For instance, when considering educational services, the case in which teachers work in private schools for a minimum wage became possible solely due to marketization.

Educators opposed this neoliberal transformation process through their actions. The other main reasons for the protests in the education sector were secularism and ethnic issues. During this period, the largest numbers of protests reported in newspapers occurred in 2005, 2007, and 2012. In 2005, the reason for most of the protests was the closure case against the union Eğitim-Sen. The lawsuit was filed due to the statement on education in the mother tongue in the "Aims of the Union" section of the union's statute ("Kapatılmaya ikinci kez ret," 2005). In this respect, it appears to be related to the Kurdish issue. However, it is also interpreted as an illiberal attitude toward the freedom of union organization. Another notable action that year was the Great Educators' March, organized by the same union. Here, educators protested in different provinces, and then a representative group of teachers marched to the capital. The cross-country march ended with a large rally in Ankara. The union members emphasized their demand for free and high-quality education. Needless to say, demand was in stark contrast to the ongoing neoliberal transformation.

In 2007, educators organized again, including work stoppages. The prominent discourses in these protests were anti-neoliberalism, anti-reactionism ("Eğitimciler meydanlarda," 2007), and various demands such as

wage increases ("Eğitimcilerden sevk eylemi," 2007), and nepotism in the delegations ("Eğitimciler meydanlarda hak aradı," 2007). Additionally, several nationwide protests were organized against the terrorist acts that took place in the same year. The upper echelons of universities and academicians participated in these protests ("Türkiye tek yürek oldu," 2007). In 2012, protests took place against the regulation regarding educational content and duration at different levels, popularly known as the 4+4+4 law. The protests highlighted concerns about the quality of education and secularism ("Bütün çocuklar risk altında," 2012).

Neoliberal transformation also occurred in the health sector, affecting the recipients of health services and workers. Table 2 quantitatively evaluates this, indicating a rise in doctor and nurse employment within the private sector. The number of beds in public hospitals increased by 136% between 2002 and 2018, whereas in private hospitals, the increase was 405% (T.C. Sağlık Bakanlığı, *Sağlık İstatistikleri Yıllığı 2018*, 2018). The growth in auxiliary staff and hospital capacities demonstrates that the nature of the private sector's role in the health sector has changed. The role of private healthcare providers has evolved from a minor and specialized service to a more comprehensive service comparable to that of the public sector.

Table 2

Number of Physicians and Nurses Employed in Public And Private Institutions by Year

Years	Doctors		Nurses	
	Public	Private	Public	Private
1999*	64892	11329	60595	4020
2018	123699	29429	126891	34345
Change Rate	191%	260%	209%	854%

Note: *Total of SSK and university hospitals affiliated with the Ministry of Health.

Source: (T.C. Sağlık Bakanlığı 2000-2018 *Sağlık İstatistikleri Yıllığı 2018*)

Publicly known as The Full-Time Employment Law, Law No. 5947, enacted in 2010, notably impacted the private healthcare sector. Before implementation, physicians were permitted to operate their private practices and public institutional positions. However, the law stipulates that doctors must resign from their public positions or close their private clinics. In the education sector, the phenomenon of non-appointed teachers has accelerated marketization by creating a pool of cheap labor power. Similarly, in the healthcare sector, the Full-Time Employment Law restricted doctors' petty bourgeois-style working arrangements and contributed to the commodification of healthcare.

During this period, we counted the largest number of protests from the health sector in newspapers in 2004, 2010, and 2011. On March 11-12, 2004, health workers performed a work stoppage supported by various marches and protests. They carried out these actions under the slogan "'G(ö)revdeyiz' - We are on duty," emphasizing that it was healthcare workers duty to defend the people's right to health. Simultaneously, they demanded improvements in their working conditions ("İnsanca yaşam için g(ö)rev," 2004). Continuing similar actions throughout the year, doctors started marches from 6 provinces to Ankara in June and completed their march with a large rally in Ankara. This event, named the "White March for Hope," echoed similar themes in opposition to the commodification of healthcare. The Turkish Medical Association led the protests. ("Hekimler alanlara çıktı," 2004). Furthermore, in December of the same year, led by The Health and Social Services Workers Trade Union (SES), workers protested the transfer of Social Security Institution (SSK) hospitals to the public, expressing concerns about privatization and marketization. Across several provinces, they stopped working for a brief period and rallied ("Sağlık emekçileri: SSK halkındır satılamaz," 2004). Afterward, these protests grew much larger under the leadership of the Labor Platform.


In 2010, the protests were primarily focused on the Full-Time Employment Law. Doctors emphasized the aspect of the law that harnessed the labor of health workers and proletarianize. While the protests continued the following year, a work stoppage took place at the medical faculties of Istanbul University in November 2011. It is emphasized during the action that the Full-Time Law causes the loss of qualified staff; therefore, no expert personnel are left to perform the surgeries. Protesters also criticized Performance System ("Kölelik yasasına hayır," 2010).

Post-2010 JDP Governments

Post-2010 Turkish politics is commonly interpreted through the concept of authoritarianism. While the number of actions and cases increased annually in the previous period, the fact that they tended to decrease in this period seems compatible with the authoritarianism narrative. Beyond this, another critical factor is the change in the reasons for contentions. During this period, approximately one-third of the protests encompassed democratic demands. In summary, the nature of the protests after 2010 palpably differed from before.

One of the most significant reasons for the change in the content of the protests was the alterations in labor and public sector unionism. In the biggest union confederation, Türk-İş, the influence of the JDP started to increase from 2007 onwards (Erol & Şahin, 2023, p. 137). This influence became particularly evident during the protests against the Social Security and General Health Insurance law in 2008. Türk-İş participated in the joint movement at the beginning, just like in the previous Labor Platform protests ("Emekçilerden 2 saatlik uyarı," 2008). However, as the protests continued to grow, Türk-İş adopted a more passive stance ("Emekçilere Polis Jopu," 2008). The most concrete criticism of this stance came from the leader of the main opposition party, who stated, "Türk-İş" is said to be the backyard of the JDP. Well, it's not the backyard, it's the front yard" ("Türk-İş AKP'nin ön bahçesi," 2008). Members of the confederation also reacted to its transformation, prompting the formation of 'Sendikal Güç Birliği' by ten unions within the confederation ("Yeni sendikal güç birliğine doğru," 2011). This coalition aimed to take control of the confederation's leadership in the next congress but was unsuccessful. The transformation of Türk-İş also marked the de facto end of the Labor Platform.

Another significant transformation occurs in the struggle of civil servants. The trade unions covering civil servants represent three different lines. KESK, which is more militant, has experienced a decline in membership, while Memur-Sen, closely affiliated with the ruling party, has dramatically increased its membership. In 2009, Memur-Sen surpassed Kamu-Sen in terms of membership and became authorized to negotiate wage increases. Following this development, protests by public employees decreased gradually after 2010. The decline in organized labor movements resulted in a reduction in the massify of protests. Especially after 2016, with the declaration of emergency law, most protests were carried out by small groups or politically conscious pioneers.

Figure 3*Membership ratios of public service unions**Source: Derived from Trade Union Statistics of Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Labour and Social Security*

A further factor contributing to the reduction in the number of protests is the intensification of restrictions and the introduction of more punitive measures against protests. Not incidentally, while the number of prohibitions on protests was an average of 10 per year between 2007-2010, it began to increase following the GPP and reached its peak after the declaration of a state of emergency in 2016, with an average of 48 per year between 2011-2019 (Arslanalp & Erkmen, 2020, p. 110). A similar trend is evident in the findings of the V-DEM Institute report. In the report, the freedom of peaceful assembly is evaluated on a five-point scale, with an average of 2.5 for the years between 2001 and 2010 and a mean of 1.12 for the years between 2011 and 2019. For reference, a score of 1 corresponds to "State authorities rarely allow peaceful assemblies, but generally avoid using lethal force to prevent them." (Coppedge et al., 2024).

Finally, the 4857 Labour Law, implemented in 2003 to enable flexible employment conditions, has significantly affected labor relations and worker activism. With this law, subcontracted labor relations became widespread in the public sector. Although not yet prevalent, sub-contracting has been implemented across various professions, from theatre actors to imams and preachers ("AKP önünde imam eylemi," ; "İş güvencesi istiyoruz" 2011). The municipal and health sectors stand out as two fields where subcontracting is most widespread. While protests against subcontracted labor arrangements have emerged in many different sectors, the struggles of healthcare workers have been particularly prominent ("Sağlık çalışanından '15 acil talep,'" 2011).

In conclusion, the weakening of trade unions, the loss of trust among workers in unions, the increasing authoritarian practices of the government, and the growing costs of participating in protests in the precarious employment environment have all contributed to both a shift in the reasons for protests and a decrease in their frequency.

Gezi Park Protests

Gezi Park Protests are particularly prominent among the protests during this period. These protests, which occurred in 2013, were not only the defining moments of this decade but also the most extensive social movement in the history of Turkey. It is also possible to consider the protests as the culmination of

the class movements that gained momentum in the 2000s. Various studies have also considered 2013 as the milestone date of the authoritarian turn of the JDP government (Akçay, 2021, p. 88; Uysal, 2019, p. 16).

The GPP emerged in response to a proposal to regulate Taksim Square and its surroundings. The focus of the reactions was the plan for a shopping center in the park adjacent to the square. As this project became official in early 2012, various social groups began to react. In February 2012, the Taksim Solidarity platform was established under the leadership of TMMOB, DİSK, and KESK, along with various other trade unions, professional chambers, and NGOs ("AKP'nin Taksim Projesi'ne karşı Taksim Dayanışması kuruldu," 2012). This organization tried to raise awareness and prevented the plan through protests ("Taksim için insan zinciri," 2012). However, they had scant success initially. In late May 2013, with the beginning of construction activities in Gezi Park, the protests started again and quickly turned massive. By the end of the first month of the GPP, the protests had spread to 79 out of 81 cities, with around 2.5 million participants (İnsan Hakları Derneği 2013). It took several months for the protests to subside.

The GPP not only stands out as the largest protest during the period in question but also a catalyst for other protests. Almost every protest in 2013 and 2014 sought affiliation to Gezi Park, often adapting GPP's slogans and demands to their actions. Additionally, it causes an increase in environmentalist protests. In short, the GPP created hegemonic power over the protests in subsequent years. The high number of protests in 2013 and 2014 should be understood in the context of GPP and the dynamism it unleashed. However, this impact was not enduring and gradually fizzled out in the medium term.

Did the protests have a class dimension? There is no easy answer. According to the foreign press, participants in the protests were predominantly of the secular or young middle class (David & Toktamış, 2015, p. 34). Various academic studies have also described the participants as middle-class, triggered by democratic sensitivities. In contrast, some studies have critiqued middle-class thesis. One emphasizes the fault lines that could exacerbate class conflict triggered by the policies implemented by the JDP to facilitate capital accumulation (Ercan & Oğuz, 2015). The second focuses on the political and ideological dimensions of these politics. Both highlight the labor-capital contradiction in the protests through an analysis of participant profiles and demands of protests (Can Gürcan & Peker, 2015). Another quantitative study on the participant profile states that the protesters were predominantly from the working class. They are followed by white-collar and nonmanual workers who work in jobs that do not require high qualifications—followed by the petty bourgeoisie as third and professionals in fourth place. These data make it difficult to argue that Gezi was a middle-class movement (Yörük & Yüksel, 2015, pp. 137-138).

Nevertheless, compared to their representation within the overall population, it becomes evident that White Collar workers had a significantly higher participation rate in the Gezi protests than the working class. Moreover, this gap further widened in favor of white-collar workers if we consider only Gezi Park and its surroundings as the protest area. As a result of this data, it can be stated that white-collar workers are more attentive and support them intensively within their strata (Yörük & Yüksel, 2015, p. 156). Therefore, white-collar workers stand out in adopting and pioneering the Gezi Park protests compared to other social groups.

Protests Against Anti-Democratic Practices

The rise of authoritarianism has had consequences in many areas, including restrictions on freedom of thought, meetings and demonstrations, the rise of nationalism, and interference in lifestyles. As a result, the demands of the protests have changed accordingly (Dönmez, 2020, p. 526). One of the most prominent protests in this respect is against the dismissals by decree-law. Many individuals and groups, such as Acad-

emics for Peace, participated in these protests. However, these protests lacked widespread mobilizations and were limited to a few pioneering individuals. One of the notable instances was the protests led by Nuriye Gülmen and Semih Özakça, visibly associated with the protests. According to data compiled from the newspaper, 93 of the 168 democratic protests organized in 2017 were related to them. In addition to Gülmen and Özakça, many employees in similar situations also staged protests. The protests against the dismissals lasted quite a long. For example, Gülmen's protest lasted 433 days. These non-mass protests were often violently broken up by security forces.

Press freedom is another major cause of democratic protests. Numerous mass protests occurred between the prosecution of several well-known journalists and investigations against various media outlets. In 2012, known as the 4+4+4 Education System was a prominent issue that triggered democratic protests. The Kurdish issue and government corruption were the other two topics on which democratic protests were rising.

Other Protest Movements

During this period, significant protests occurred within the aviation and metal industries. A common characteristic was the high level of unionization compared to other sectors (T.C. Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı 2016). In the aviation sector, more than half of the employees were unionized. At this point, the JDP's bill of legislation, which aimed to weaken the collective power of unionized workers, sparked the conflict. According to a provision in the bill, companies would be permitted to carry out 40% of their activities in the event of a strike. Furthermore, the employer could determine the personnel needed to carry out the activities. The sector's largest union considered this provision as undermining the practice of strikes and eliminating the influence of unions ("Hava-İş Sendikası'ndan Kamuoyunu Bilgilendirme Duyurusu," 2012). When airline workers began to mobilize against this proposal, the employer responded with a lockout. The struggle lasted months and included legal proceedings, a 219-day strike, and 571 days of unemployment for the dismissed employees. Eventually, the bill was enacted, but the employees dismissed during the protests were reinstated.

In 2015, the metal sector experienced one of the biggest waves of strikes in its history. The cause of these protests was low wages. Workers started the actions spontaneously since their union was insensitive to their situation. During negotiations with the employers, their demands consisted of improvements in wages, the ability to elect their representatives, and job security for those participating in the protests (Taştan, 2015). Renault workers were the first to launch the strike, and each subsequent day, a new factory joined the strikes. By the fifth day of the strikes, production was halted in several factories employing a total of 12600 workers ("Metalde genel direniş: Reno, Tofaş, Coşkunöz, Mako'dan sonra Ototirim," Muzaffer Özkurt 2015). During these strikes, the focus of the protests was not directed only on the employers but also the union. Subsequently, mass resignations occurred in its membership (Özveri, 2016, p. 715). This strike wave, also called "Metal Storm," led to substantial improvements for the workers (Taştekin, 2019).

Finally, the number of occupational safety protests increased during this period. In particular, accidents resulting in fatalities in shipyards frequently led to protests ("Tersane işçileri tabutla yürüdü," 2015; "Tuzla'da iş cinayetlerine protesto," 2013). The relatives of victims of work accidents have established various organizations to draw attention to occupational safety. These organizations held regular demonstrations called "Conscience and Justice Watch" ("Devlet adaleti sağlasın," 2019).

Let me circle back to the steps taken toward marketization in the education sector in the pre-2010 period. The result of this marketization manifested itself as mass unemployment among teachers after 2010. The

"Non-Appointed Teachers Platform," established in 2009, effectively drew public attention to this issue through their subsequent activism (Kiraz & Kurul, 2018, p. 286).

Results

This study aims to demonstrate that during the JDP rule, the working class actively participated in determining the extent and nature of neoliberal transformation, contrary to its often repeated image as a passive collective victim. This is evident also through numerous class actions that hegemonized themselves, thus shaping public opinion and many actions not covered in this study. Dividing the JDP regime into two periods primarily based on authoritarianism and ignoring these actions would result in an incomplete analysis.

The causes of workers' protests demonstrate that the JDP government tried to establish neoliberal labor relations in its first period, which could be extended until 2010 or 2013. In this period, the working class has been putting a tough fight against neoliberal transformation from the beginning, and although its actions have not entirely halted it, they have limited it to a certain extent. In the post-2013 period, the decline of class organizations and the precarious working environment led to a decrease in the number of protests, and the protests became unorganized, more singular, and limited to politically-engaged militants. The government became authoritarian during this period, and the deterioration of the working class situation became more and more concrete due to neoliberal flexible employment policies. Even though it has become more challenging and perilous for workers to demand their rights under an authoritarian regime, their current situation, characterized by precarious working conditions resulting from neoliberal transformation, causes workers to be exposed to loss of rights much more frequently, which forces them to take action more than before. Therefore, it is necessary to wait for class reactions to emerge. It should be noted that the JDP consciously prefers authoritarianism as a management strategy to suppress possible contentions. Although the authoritarianization of power affects the pattern of workers' actions, the source of this authoritarianization lies in the increased potential for action caused by the workers' deteriorating conditions.



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Author Details

M. Şafak Sağlam (Dr.)

¹ Haliç University, Political Science and International Relations, İstanbul, Türkiye

 0000-0001-7660-9187  safaksaglam@halic.edu.tr

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Research Article

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Social Alienation with International Students in New York City: A Phenomenological Research



Konur Alp Demir ¹ , Fatih Yaman ²  & Burak Koçak ¹ 

¹ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Political Science and Public Administration, Rize, Türkiye

² Manisa Celal Bayar University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Political Science and Public Administration, Manisa, Türkiye

Abstract

The city is a vibrant geographical area where social life is revived. Urbanization refers to the organized development of a city resulting from the interaction of various factors. This research uses a phenomenological research design to explore the experiences of students coming to the United States from abroad and sheds light on their encounters with social alienation. Through in-depth interviews with 20 students, this research investigates the meaning of social alienation from the perspective of students, as well as the challenges they face and their suggestions for addressing this critical issue. The data analysis was conducted using MAXQDA-22, a qualitative and mixed method analysis software. The findings reveal the multifaceted nature of social alienation experienced by students, which is characterized by feelings of isolation, exclusion, and detachment from their social environment. Several factors, including social dynamics, system adjustment, language barriers, and cultural differences, lead to the participants' sense of alienation. The study also highlights the coping mechanisms and strategies employed by students to navigate social alienation, such as seeking supportive friendships and engaging in extracurricular activities. The participants' suggestions emphasized the significance of fostering a more inclusive and understanding environment within educational institutions and society at large.

Keywords

Social Alienation • International Students • Phenomenological Research • Coping Strategies

Jel Codes

H79, H83, R23



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✉ Corresponding author: Konur Alp Demir konuralp.demir@erdogan.edu.tr



Social Alienation with International Students in New York City: A Phenomenological Research

Social change is a concept that describes the differentiation of each component within a society, which functions as a cohesive unit, over a specific time. It is very difficult to develop a rule that every element or institution in society will change absolutely over time. Because social change can gradually reflect its own character to society, spreading over time, or it can show itself in the form of a quick and sudden stimulus. It is undeniable that there are some effective factors in the emergence of social change (Tolan, 2005: 281). In this research, the phenomenon of social alienation is examined through the lens of migration, which is one of the relevant factors.

As a result of the dynamic movements of economic, political, and cultural factors, which are the compulsory triggers of social transformation, the migration that occurs with the movement of communities from one point to another causes changes both in the factors that trigger it and on the points of departure and destination. Continuing within this context, migration has mobilized the labor market, leading to fluctuations in the supply and demand for labor in various sectors and resulting in observable changes in social characteristics (Kaygalak, 2009: 9).

The city is a meaningful spatial meeting point where the world we live in is made sense of, walking on its pavements, communicating with the environment, realizing the day we live in, and preparing for the next day (Lefebvre, 2015: 41). At this intersection, the city expects individuals who exhibit responsible attitudes to advance to the urbanization stage, or at the very least, move closer to it. Before this stage, the most important task for the individual to do is to match the value judgments of the city with his or her own values. The individual can have the power to create change to the extent that she or he can achieve this matching (Keleş, 1998: 80).

In this research, a conceptual discussion will be held in the triangle of the global city, urbanization, and local customs, based on the foresight that the ideals of the localization of cities that try to resist globalization and their stance against social alienation require a universal perspective. For this purpose, first, a conceptual discussion will be held, and a common ground will be tried to be created by evaluating the concept of social alienation and the problem of urbanization on the same axis. Next, the stance of localization in relation to globalization will be examined, and the argument will be made that these two concepts are not opposites but rather two interconnected endpoints. The transformation of modern cities, whose importance has increased with globalization, into a global city form, will be examined using a conceptual framework. In this context, the role of local customs in global cities is evaluated. The study concludes by emphasizing the experiences of individuals who have not successfully integrated into urban life and have arrived in the cities through external flows such as migration.

This study explores the phenomenon of social alienation among international students in the United States, a complex issue that is deeply rooted in individual experiences and perceptions. Given the subjective nature of this phenomenon, a phenomenological approach is particularly suitable because it allows for a rich, detailed understanding of how social alienation manifests in this specific context. The decision to focus on a sample of 20 students was made to enable an in-depth exploration of their lived experiences. While the sample size may appear limited, it is appropriate for phenomenological research, where the goal is not to generalize findings but to capture the essence of the experience. This focused approach ensures

that the intricacies of social alienation, as experienced by these students, are thoroughly understood and articulated, providing valuable insights that may inform more generalized studies in the future.

In this context, through in-depth interviews with 20 students, this study investigates the meaning of social alienation from the perspective of students, as well as the challenges they face and their suggestions for addressing this critical issue. The data analysis was conducted using MAXQDA, a comprehensive qualitative and mixed method analysis software. The findings reveal the multifaceted nature of social alienation experienced by students, which is characterized by feelings of isolation, exclusion, and detachment from their social environment. Several factors, including social dynamics, system adjustment, language barriers, and cultural differences, lead to the participants' sense of alienation. The study also highlights the coping mechanisms and strategies employed by students to navigate social alienation, such as seeking supportive friendships and engaging in extracurricular activities. Moreover, the participants' suggestions emphasized the significance of fostering a more inclusive and understanding environment within educational institutions and society at large. In conclusion, this phenomenological study provides valuable insights into the experiences of students facing social alienation in the United States. The research highlights the need for educational institutions and policymakers to proactively address this issue and promote a more inclusive and supportive environment for students. By fostering a sense of belonging and social connection, this research aims to contribute to students' well-being and academic success, fostering a more harmonious and empathetic society.

Urban, Urbanization, and Urban Administration in the Age of Mass Migration

In the century we live in, as a result of the dynamic movements of the communities who left their geographies for different reasons and migrated to new living spaces, multicultural and ethnic-origin social structures began to emerge. This emergence constitutes the starting point of social differentiation (Massey et al., 1993: 431).

Immigrants who attempt to integrate into different cultures and political structures by migrating have to struggle with very different oppositions in their mental and physical worlds. At the core of this struggle are the differences between the life left by immigrants in the past and the new conditions in which he/she finds himself/herself (Çelik, 2012: 298). The phenomenon of migration is not only a spatial displacement event but also a multidimensional process of social experiences that includes mental and cultural transformation (Özer, 2004: 11).

There are two important problems that need to be overcome in front of the community, which migrated and created a new living space for itself. The first is “economic problems” and the second is “social problems”. To the extent that the immigrant community can overcome these two problems, it can find a place for itself in the new space (Kartal, 1983: 92). However, it is important to remember that experiencing “adaptation” problems because of migration reflects a natural process (Özer, 2004: 12).

When evaluating migration within a simple conceptual framework, it is important to recognize that while migration primarily involves spatial change, it also serves as a trigger for societies' cultural transformation. Because migration is a phenomenon that constitutes the motor power of social change, its contribution to the identity problem and the emergence of identity incompatibility with other points of view are among the results that can be considered natural. As a result of migration, a social identity is constructed that is stuck between the life left in the past and the life that has just begun (Çetin, 2012: 26). The key concept underlying this identity is the city. If it is necessary to define meaning in the Middle Ages through a reference to the

past, it can be mentioned that it is possible to define the urban phenomenon as an area with economic, vital, cultural, and legal value. This area is the “gathering and meeting centers” of the community members. These centers constitute geographical areas where religious ceremonies, commercial activities, and vital needs are met (Pirenne, 2012: 47).

A city is not a geographical area compressed into certain patterns, and its starting and ending points are determined by precise rules. Therefore, it would be a misunderstanding to evaluate a city in terms of the geographical area it occupies. The city is only the geographical location of a living mechanism that gathers different elements within it. For this reason, when defining urban identity, it is necessary to consider not only permanent citizens but also temporary urbanites (Bauman, 2011: 113).

The city is directly affected by population changes as areas where the values arising from the qualitative change of a society are experienced. For example, to meet the requirements of the war economy in the harsh living conditions of the Second World War in England, an average of 6 million people left their rural lives and started to live in urban areas (Keleş, 2008: 25-35). The picture that emerges as a result of this life transformation is urbanization. Urbanization means an increase in both the number of cities and the population living in a city. Therefore, urbanization is the technical expression of a transformation experienced during the transition from rural to urban areas. As a result, there are changes in the organizational system and the internal working order. Cities are constantly moving because of internal and external migration movements. These active states of the cities reveal a social structure that has opposing views and has failed to integrate (Keleş, 2012: 309-312). The integration of this social structure is one of the responsibilities of city administrations. City administrations are not just administrative units that fulfill daily and local public needs; on the contrary, they are integrative structures that assimilate the spirit of civility (Demir & Yavaş, 2015: 132-135).

As the number of cities in a region increases, social life approaches a turning point. This orientation naturally leads to an increase in the population density in urban areas and population concentration in areas with high levels of development (Keleş, 1998: 80).

Social Alienation

Human beings are inherently sociable creatures. In line with the purposes of creation and because of his instinctive actions, a person who cannot live alone has to continue his life by being articulated with a group or community. The great human association that arises from such a necessity is called society. In fact, society is a kind of unity formed by individuals coming together. One of the main purposes of society is to perform actions that individuals cannot perform alone, in unity, and through cooperation. For this reason, it is important for each individual in society to interact with another individual to adapt to the natural flow of life. If evaluated from this perspective, society is actually a “body of relations”. The element on the opposite side of this unity is alienation (Demir, 2018: 249).

Alienation occurs when individuals detach themselves from the advancements that originate from societal changes, the solitude that stems from being displaced, and the cultural shifts that ensue as a consequence. This outcome is indeed a manifestation of turmoil. The transformation in social interactions and the challenges faced by individuals in adjusting lead to a decline in value systems and difficulties throughout individuals’ transition to a society. At this juncture, the notion of estrangement becomes palpable. In other words, alienation refers to the temporary state of disconnection that an individual experiences while transitioning from one stage to another (Tolan, 2005: 281).

When an individual cannot discover an appropriate environment for their existence in society, they initially experience a sense of impotence. Subsequently, they focus on the lack of meaning in their surroundings and the events that occur. This level of focus leads to a disordered way of living. When a person is cut off from the outside world due to a lack of rules, they start to doubt themselves and feel disconnected from their own identity as a result of this self-reflection. Currently, the individual is struggling with their future goals and facing the lack of meaning in non-existence while also embracing the possibilities of existence. As a result, the person feels obligated to take on a different persona, distancing themselves from their own sense of self (Seeman, 1959: 786; Tolan, 2005: 302-303).

For an individual who is socially alienated, their experiences in their surroundings lose significance, and this lack of meaning in the world causes the individual to transition from tangible realities to intangible fantasies. The individual experiences a sense of existential nihilism when unable to focus on the subjects she should have faith in during the decision-making process and when uncertain about the principles she should embrace (Seeman, 1959: 786).

Alienation results in people being isolated from their environment. Therefore, the individual encounters problems in terms of being present in the social structure. In reality, people evaluate themselves in an environment separate from the society in which they live, and their communication with the social environment is cut off (Parker, 1978: 240).

The Problems of Urbanizing Social Foreigners

It is not an easy task to settle for foreigners who have to continue their lives in an unknown area as a result of mass migration in the outskirts of the city, or to assign a separate function outside society. These people who are trying to become indigenous or candidates for indigenization with the characterization of foreigners display an unusual character. Expecting indigenous candidates to come out of their shells by adopting local customs means ignoring ethnic and cultural differences (Bauman, 2011: 113).

Thinking that the “disobedient” foreigners they have encountered in the cities are trying to move to the next stage with the instinct of internalizing their new lives by getting away from the life they left in the past due to the problems of “focusing” in the cities, is nothing but an imaginary projection of a reality full of illusions (Bauman, 2011: 113).

Wirth (1938: 5) defined urbanism as a “way of life.” The unique nature of communal existence becomes obvious as urban areas grow in size. Urban life assumes the responsibility of altering human existence and providing guidance at crucial junctures (Wirth, 1938: 5). To successfully accomplish this objective, individuals must adjust to their social life. An individual who desires to thrive in a densely populated culture might attain individualization by recognizing their distinctiveness to the masses. Discovering a position in many options, understanding and expressing distinctions, and accepting these distinctions are crucial for establishing one’s uniqueness. When someone fails to acknowledge their distinctiveness by conforming to societal norms, they risk becoming lost in the collective. To avoid this undesirable consequence, it is crucial to establish one’s position in society and actively oppose feelings of isolation. For individuals who are socially alienated, their experiences in their surroundings lose their significance, and this lack of meaning in the world causes them to shift from tangible realities to intangible aspirations. The individual experiences a sense of existential nihilism when unable to focus on the subjects she should have faith in during the decision-making process and when she is uncertain about the values she should believe in (Erinç, 1997: 59).

An individual striving to become an urban dweller adjusts to the new surroundings based on the specific characteristics of their environment, rather than conforming to pre-established norms (Karpat, 2003: 67). Living in an urban environment involves dealing with the challenge of social isolation. If a person who is aware of their individuality observes the modification, alteration, and difficulties faced by every object or aspect of social life that displays signs of vitality in their surroundings and comprehends this, then they have reached an advanced level of urbanity. Being an urbanite entails being cognizant of the surrounding urban environment and actively shaping one's own life based on this awareness. Therefore, urbanity can be viewed as a mode of perception. Being an urbanite means having the ability to create a unique and individualistic lifestyle and navigate life based on the principles of this lifestyle, which is open to change (Erinç, 1997: 60-62).

On the transfer of Slattery (2012: 286), according to Wirth, urban life can lead people toward a troubled spirit world by capturing them inside. At this point, the space for human beings is meaningless. The end of not being able to make sense of the place you live in is to be alone in the crowds. This loneliness causes a person to be irritable and hopeless and reduces the time to spare for another person in the name of friendship to a limited level (Slattery, 2012: 286).

When an individual experiences a feeling of detachment or estrangement toward anything, various causes, such as unjust and disrespectful treatment, involuntary displacement, and baseless delusions arising from certain experiences, might influence their emotional state. The alienated individual experiences a sense of powerlessness and isolation from the surrounding environment. At a high level of emotional intensity, individuals may reach a state where they are unable to engage in communication with their surroundings (Slattery, 2012: 129-130). To comprehend the impact of globalization on national identities in urban areas, it is necessary to introduce foreign cultures and languages into the distinct and uniform linguistic-cultural settings of cities hosting global events. Urban populations, influenced by globalization trends, are subject to further examination because of their cultural and linguistic variability (Aristova, 2016: 157).

By this way, alienation increases with the transition of individuals from a small and intimate community to an urbanized, industrialized, bureaucratized, and knitted environment with complex social relations, where official relations are intense. To be more specific, it is a natural process to expect alienation to increase while urbanizing. In another expression, it can be mentioned that there is a direct relationship between urbanization and alienation (Parker, 1978: 239).

The Stance of Indigenization in the Opposition to Globalization and the Administration of Global Cities

Although it is difficult to see the essence attributed to the locality in the whole because of globalization, this essence of locality has a value that cannot be easily lost. This essence undertakes a task that directs the process of variability in spatial and social mobility. This quality is interpreted as locality. Locality or localization is a phenomenon that makes it an art to observe small but important brush strokes in a big picture. Approaching the local essence while moving away from the center constitutes the abstract conceptualization of localization. Although this conceptualization and the basic logic of globalization seem to reveal two contradictory situations, in reality, the dynamism of localization and its ability to mobilize the base feed the development process in the global sense (Özden, 2008: 153). Because localization has a quality that is fed by social, cultural, ethnic, religious, demographic, and political elements (Fosler, 1996: x).

Cities have become a geography where social movements come to life despite globalization. If evaluated in this context, the transformation of local living spaces into global cities is a foreshadowing of an expected end. Because of new transformations, the urban order has moved away from an elitist local geography ideal and has become a universal living space (Bauman, 2010: 28-29).

The understanding of global city administration can be explained by the nature of globalization, which divides among countries. The content of this statement includes "economic", "political" and "cultural" elements (Tortop et al., 2017: 384). Because, in an order where the roots of the nation-state logic have begun to be shaken or such a perception is tried to be created, the qualitative questioning of national and international relations awaiting explanation comes to the fore. The ideas that care to be represented at the local level and the values that are tried to be preserved emphasize the necessity of spreading the administration to the base (Tortop vd., 2017: 389). Therefore, the understanding of the global city, which attempts to make sense of it under this title, is built on universal values and grassroots administration.

The global city has an identity that constructs the cultural values of the people of the city to be in harmony with other cultures by universalizing them under economic globalization. The connection between this situation and economic globalization is hidden in the borderless nature of the economy (Lemanski, 2007: 448; Sassen, 2005: 28).

Since the global city kneaded in this identity is a political and economic process, it has become a conscious target for both local urban elites and public officials on a plane where local interests gain importance. If evaluated in this context, it can be stated that global cities move away from being the object of superficial scientific studies and continue their existence as a value that serves the political and economic goals of local, national and global elites in the social worlds of business world, state and civil life (Timberlake, Wei, Ma, & Hao, 2014: 164).

The global city creates a suiChart basis for formulating a new human geography. To achieve this, the unity of global politics and the economy must interact with cultural elements (Acuto, 2013: 5).

The Stance of Local Customs in Global Cities

Social strangers can enter social intimacy to the extent that they can internalize the values that belong to someone else or another group by universalizing their differences and local cultural values of their own during the social integration stage (Günay, 2008: 343). In a world where important steps have been taken toward globalization as a result of people's inability to act within this scope, staying at a fixed point on the limited plane of local customs constitutes one of the biggest obstacles to social progress. Local units, which started to lose their meaning despite globalization, left their own fields of existence and started to become more dependent on the global one. This dependency is a guiding meaning-making situation that emerges on the axis of the interpretation of the transformation of social relations. At this point, the locals have become a prisoner of the world beyond their control. Thus, each element that attempts to localize or makes progress at this stage is faced with another globalized element. At this stage, the local has to choose between declaring its dependence on the global and living with its identity within its own borders (Bauman, 2010: 9).

The point that should be emphasized within the framework of this interpretation is that three different sociological perspectives exist regarding the consequences of globalization from a cultural perspective. If these perspectives are interpreted in the context of the global city, the cultural differences of societies,

convergence, or the convergence of societies and the creation of a hybrid society are emphasized (Lane, 2019: 1).

The cultural values of cities have become unable to maintain their stagnant structure because of global transformations. The dynamic and transformative nature of globalization forces local cultures to evolve. This evolution finds an area of movement in a wide framework, from lifestyle to eating habits, to social values to mentality. The most obscure actor in this field of action is the “local habits” that face the danger of disappearing. The city is in a crisis of identity with its globalization. The social and cultural fabric of the city is attempting to identify with another identity thousands of kilometers away in a universal void, going beyond its local character. This phenomenon causes the fabric of local cultures, habits, and values to deteriorate (Yayinoğlu & Susar, 2008: 20-22).

After providing fundamental and conceptual information about the subject under consideration and explaining the nature of the topic, transitioning to the explanation of the research methodology is important to convey the foundations on which the structure of this field research is built.

Methodology of the Research

Social alienation is a profound and pervasive phenomenon that can significantly impact individuals' well-being and sense of belonging within society. This research uses a phenomenological research design to explore the experiences of students coming to the United States from abroad and sheds light on their encounters with social alienation. Through in-depth interviews with 20 students, this research investigates the meaning of social alienation from the perspective of students, as well as the challenges they face and their suggestions for addressing this critical issue.

Participants	Nationality	Occupation	Institution	Gender	Age Range
P1	Turkish	Student	The New School	Female	22-24
P2	Turkish	Student	Fordham University	Female	25-27
P3	Mexican	Student	Columbia University	Female	28-30
P4	Indian	Student	Columbia University	Male	30+
P5	Indian	Student	Columbia University	Female	25-27
P6	Indian	Student	City University of New York	Male	25-27
P7	Taiwanese	Software Engineer	New York University	Male	25-27
P8	Tibetan	Student	Columbia University	Female	30+
P9	Turkish	Student	The New School	Male	28-30
P10	Japan	Student	Columbia University	Female	22-24
P11	Bosnian	Student	The New School	Female	30+
P12	Turkish	Student	City University of New York	Male	28-30
P13	Turkish	Bakery	City University of New York	Female	30+
P14	Canadian	Student	New York Film Academy	Female	30+
P15	Hong Konger	Student	Columbia University	Female	22-24
P16	Turkish	Student	Monroe College	Female	25-27
P17	Turkish	Student	Columbia University	Male	28-30
P18	Turkish	Student	Columbia University	Male	25-27
P19	Indian	Student	City University of New York	Female	22-24

Participants	Nationality	Occupation	Institution	Gender	Age Range
P20	Turkish	Student	Columbia University	Male	22-24

The table above presents the demographic information of the participants. The interviews were conducted face-to-face between February and April 2023. Participants were selected using maximum variation sampling, a purposeful sampling strategy in qualitative research. This approach ensured the inclusion of participants from various nationalities, thereby creating a diverse study group. As a result, the study explored a broad spectrum of experiences related to social alienation.

The data analysis was conducted using MAXQDA-22, a qualitative and mixed method analysis software. To ensure the reliability and validity of the data analysis, this study utilized MAXQDA's comprehensive features for the systematic coding and categorization of data, which help maintain objectivity and consistency throughout the analysis process. By employing this software, the research minimizes the risk of subjective bias when interpreting qualitative data because it allows for clear tracking of coding decisions and themes. Furthermore, the software's robust tools for data visualization and cross-referencing enhance the validity of the findings by enabling thorough and transparent analysis. This methodological rigor ensures that the conclusions drawn are both credible and reliable, reflecting the true nature of the participants' experiences with social alienation.

While the phenomenological research design focuses on the subjective and contextualized experiences of a specific group of international students, it is acknowledged that this approach has inherent limitations in terms of generalizability. However, the depth of understanding gained from this method is crucial for exploring the complex phenomenon of social alienation. The study's reliance on in-depth interviews with a relatively small study group size (20 participants) means that the findings are context-specific and reflect the experiences and perceptions of these individuals. The qualitative study aims to provide a rich, detailed understanding rather than generalizable results. However, the focus on a specific group of students at a particular time and location may limit the applicability of the findings to other contexts or populations. Future research could build on these findings by incorporating complementary quantitative methods or expanding the participant pool to include a broader range of contexts and experiences, thereby enhancing the generalizability and robustness of the conclusions.

On the other hand, the empirical findings of this study are based on self-reported interviews data, which may be influenced by participants' recall biases or social desirability effects. The diversity of participants' backgrounds in terms of nationality, socioeconomic status, and academic discipline may affect the consistency of their experiences and perceptions of social alienation. Additionally, the subjective nature of phenomenological analysis may lead to interpretative variations. Future studies should consider incorporating quantitative measures or triangulating with other data sources to validate and expand upon these findings.

Ethical considerations were given significant importance in this study. Participants were informed about the study objectives, and their informed consent was obtained before the interviews. Confidentiality was ensured, and personal identifiers were removed from the data to protect participants' privacy. Additionally, participants were given the option to withdraw from the study at any time without consequence.


Findings of the Research

This section presents the analysis of the interview data. Based on the arguments of the participants, three themes emerged: pre-relocation views, post-relocation views, and the phenomenon of social alienation. Pre-relocation views are discussed in two categories: factors influencing the relocation decision and pre-relocation challenges. Post-relocation views are addressed in three categories: post-relocation challenges, post-relocation support and assistance, and coping strategies for culture shock. Views on social alienation are categorized into four categories: defining social alienation, the impact of social alienation, strategies to overcome social alienation, and recommendations regarding social alienation.

Chart 1. below presents the categories of ‘factors influencing the relocation decision’ and ‘pre-relocation challenges’ under the theme of pre-relocation views. The views of the factors influencing relocation decisions are grouped under four headings. Accordingly, *educational aspirations* (11) are the most frequently mentioned arguments. It is followed by *better opportunities* (7), *political or economic issues* (6), and *the experience of different cultures and independence* (3). In contrast, the views in the pre-relocation challenges category are grouped under six headings. Accordingly, *economic and political problems* (6) and *the visa process* (6) are the most frequently mentioned arguments. They are followed by *financial issues* (5), *accommodation issues* (5), *administrative details* (3), and *separated from loved ones* (3) arguments.

Chart 1

Intensity Distribution Chart Showing Participants’ Opinions on ‘Factors Influencing the Relocation Decision’ and ‘Pre-relocation Challenges’



Some of the views of the participants who put forward the “educational aspirations” argument, which is most frequently mentioned in the category of *factors influencing relocation decisions*, are as follows:

“I always dreamed to have an education in NY.” (Participant 2).

“I left my country to pursue my undergraduate studies. I was excited by the possibility of living and studying in the United States and was able to do so because my family’s financial situation took a very fortunate turn the year before I came to college.” (Participant 6).

“Studying abroad has always been my dream and when I got the chance to come to USA to study, I was happy to seize the opportunity.” (Participant 8)

Some of the views of the participants who put forward the “economic and political problems” and “visa process” arguments, which are most frequently mentioned in the category of *pre-relocation challenges*, are as follows:

“There are economic problems in that country and this is tiring.” (Participant 13)


“I think my country’s economy was not going well that moment. Furthermore, this situation affected my life and my decisions.” (Participant 16)

“Application process and visa issues are, to a large extent, exhausting.” (Participant 9)

Chart 2. below presents the categories of ‘post-relocation challenges’, post-relocation support and assistance’, and ‘coping strategies for culture shock’ under the theme of post-relocation views. The respective views in the post-relocation challenges category are grouped under seven headings. Accordingly, *cultural difference* (7) is the most frequently mentioned argument. It is followed by *system adjustment* (5), *building bridges/communities* (4), *language barrier* (4), *discrimination* (2), *overwhelming assignments* (1) and *health solutions* (1) arguments. On the other hand, the views in the post-relocation support and assistance category are grouped under three headings. Accordingly, *social support* (9) is the most frequently mentioned argument. This was followed by *personal/family support network* (7) and *therapeutic support* (1) arguments. Lastly, the views in the coping strategies for the category of cultural shock are grouped under two headings. Accordingly, *navigating cultural differences* (8) is the most frequently mentioned argument. It is followed by *connecting people* (2) argument.

Chart 2

Intensity Distribution Chart Showing Participants’ Opinions on ‘Post-relocation Challenges’, Post-relocation Support and Assistance’, and ‘Coping Strategies for Culture Shock’



Some of the views of the participants who put forward the “cultural difference” argument, which is most frequently mentioned in the category of *post-relocation challenges*, are as follows:

“One challenge I had was adapting to the US attitudes of individualism and small talk.” Participant (7)

“Definitely cultural differences.” For example, in my country welcoming is pretty common.” (Participant 16)

Some of the views of the participants who put forward the “social support” argument, which is most frequently mentioned in the category of *pre-relocation support and assistance*, are as follows:

“I was part of a scholarship body (Rhodes) that was entirely built up of international students, and there were plenty of social events that Rhodes would invite us to. There were also workshops and discussions on mental health. They also generally support students who need or want mental health care.” (Participant 5)

“I have a very good friend living here who has helped me a lot, like showing me around and helping me get along with my new life and so on. I think that was one big reason why I was quite ready to embrace my new life so much.” (Participant 8)

“I was extremely fortunate and blessed to be surrounded by some of the nicest people I have ever met in my life. We all found ourselves in the same space, mentally and emotionally. We were all away from home, overwhelmed, and alone. We became a family for each other.” (Participant 14)

Some of the views of the participants who put forward the “navigating cultural differences” argument, which is most frequently mentioned in the category of *coping strategies for culture shock*, are as follows:

“New York is a huge city. With a lot of movement, life happens too fast and in different languages. Getting used to moving on the subway, knowing directions, how to prepare for winter, the way people communicate (rude but helpful, it feels like they are scolding you but actually they want the best for you), everything was new.” (Participant 3)

“I did experience a lot of culture shocks. I never truly overcame them all, but as the years went by, I did adapt to my surroundings quite a bit.” (Participant 6)

Chart 3. below presents the category of ‘defining social alienation’ under the theme of the phenomenon of social alienation. The views in this category are grouped under three headings. Accordingly, *cultural exclusion and otherness* (8) is the most frequently mentioned argument. It is followed *disconnectedness from the social environment* (7) and isolation (6).

Chart 3

Intensity Distribution Chart of Participants’ Opinions on ‘Defining Social Alienation’

Code System	ALL PARTICIPANTS	SUM
▼ SOCIAL ALIENATION IN THE GLOBAL WORLD		0
▼ The Phenomenon of Social Alienation		0
▼ Defining Social Alienation		0
As being alone and isolated	6	6
As disconnectedness from social environment	7	7
As cultural exclusion and otherness	8	8
Σ SUM	21	21

Some of the views of the participants who put forward the “as cultural exclusion and otherness” argument, which is most frequently mentioned in the category of *defining social alienation*, are as follows:

“Although I like to be attracted to me because I am a foreigner, sometimes questions about my country and culture make me feel culturally alienated. I think such questions and statements can exclude people from a culture.” (Participant 1)

“I believe is when you feel your identity does not match with the ones surrounding you, there is no sense of belonging or of community, so you feel isolated.” (Participant 3)

“The feeling of being left out, on my own or even worse feeling alone in the public/with people around because there is a lack of connect intentionally or otherwise.” (Participant 4)

Chart 4. below presents the category of ‘the impact of social alienation’ under the theme of social alienation. The views in this category are grouped under three headings. Accordingly, *personal isolation* (6) is the most common argument. It is followed by *silent disconnection and depression* (4) and *identity crisis and perceived differences* (2) arguments.

Chart 4

Intensity Distribution Chart of Participants’ Opinions on ‘the Impact of Social Alienation’


Code System	ALL PARTICIPANTS	SUM
▼ SOCIAL ALIENATION IN THE GLOBAL WORLD		0
▼ The Phenomenon of Social Alienation		0
▼ The Impact of Social Alienation		0
Personal isolation	6	6
Silent disconnection and depression	4	4
Identity crisis and perceived differences	2	2
Σ SUM	12	12

Some of the views of the participants who put forward the “personal isolation” argument, which is most frequently mentioned in the category of *the impact of social alienation*, are as follows:

“I experienced it because I was one of the few non-natives in my surrounds. I was also one of the only people of color. I found it difficult to combat, but I made good friends to try. It never truly ended until I moved to New York City, a place that is more populated and less diverse than the previous places I lived in.” (Participant 6)

“I felt lonely because I did not belong to the groups that people in my neighborhood had formed. I wish I could become one of them sooner and feel more at home.” (Participant 8)

Chart 5. below presents the category of ‘strategies to overcome social alienation’ under the theme of social alienation. The views in this category are grouped under four headings. Accordingly, *creating a social environment* (13) is the most common argument. It is followed by *positivity and mediation* (3), *acceptance and cultural appreciation* (3), and *family and friendship support* (2).

Chart 5*Intensity Distribution Chart of Participants' Opinions on 'Strategies to Overcome Social Alienation'*

Some of the views of the participants who put forward the “creating a social environment” argument, which is most frequently mentioned in the category of *strategies to overcome social alienation*, are as follows:


“I’m going to social events and frequenting bars, cafes, parks; I call my family more often; I’m a writer and reader and have found people through book talks and literary events too.” (Participant 5)

Participating in sports clubs and other activities that share common interests. (Participant 7)

“I love being around people, and I love socializing. If there’s ever a time, I would hypothetically feel socially alienated, I would go out and sign up for events etc.. to get to know new people.” (Participant 14)

“I ensure I connect with people and try my best to learn about different cultures as much as possible. I ask questions to learn, but I never judge.” (Participant 18)

Chart 6. below presents the category of ‘recommendations regarding social alienation’ under the theme of social alienation. The views in this category are grouped under six headings. Accordingly, *preparing for cross-cultural adjustment* (6) is the most common argument. It is followed by *getting appropriate information from experienced people* (5), *step out of your comfort zone and be confident* (3), *be culturally flexible and open-minded* (3), *build community connections* (3) and *acquire a good level of English* (2) arguments.

Chart 6*Intensity Distribution Chart of Participants' Opinions on 'Recommendations Regarding Social Alienation'*

Some of the views of the participants who put forward the “make preparation for cross-cultural adjustment” argument, which is most frequently mentioned in the category of *recommendations regarding social alienation*, are as follows:

“Every person is different, despite coming from the same country. I would advise them to research the city and surroundings where they will move to ensure it will suit their personality and meet their social needs.” (Participant 6)

“Acquire a good level of English, develop personal interests and learn about the local culture.” (Participant 7)

“They should start learning about the dynamics of that country. There are vlogs, TV series, and podcasts, so they can take a look to determine what it is like to live in that particular country.” (Participant 18)

The Result

Cities are not merely geographical areas; they are living environments where the culture of life is shaped. The communities within these environments strive to exist across a variety of spectrums, from the local to the global level. In this context, a city has the power to influence the overall character of its residents, impacting everything from daily life to broader cultural aspects.

The multicultural nature of a city, shaped by immigration, is a natural process that elevates the city to the status of a global city. This global dimension can be assessed from two perspectives. First, a global city enhances its social structure by bringing together people from diverse cultures, facilitating the establishment of an intercultural communication network. Additionally, a global city becomes a focal point for capital accumulation factors, such as trade, which is a positive aspect. Conversely, local customs in a global city may lose value or be forgotten despite globalization. Maintaining these customs within a diverse community is challenging because local traditions must co-exist with new cultural influences. This dynamic can lead to issues related to urbanization and highlight the negative aspects of a global city.

It is accurate to say that one of the basic principles of urbanization is the capacity to adjust to the overall dynamics of the metropolis. By blending local practices with universal principles, an individual can transition from being a social outsider to being an urban citizen. Nevertheless, we should not perceive this circumstance as the individual completely forsaking his local traditions, but rather as him adapting to a new environment while still maintaining a connection to his past. The capacity to simultaneously employ both local and universal criteria significantly impact an individual's endeavor to coexist within groups. It is crucial to acknowledge that individuals who identify as urbanites may eventually assimilate into the city by adopting stereotypical ideals. The term "city guest" might be used to describe the antithesis of this scenario. If an individual is unable to reconcile and incorporate both local and universal ideals, he or she can only exist as a visitor to the city. When someone rejects the values of the city and fails to connect with its residents, they are isolated in a remote part of the city, waiting for their departure to the next place. The subsequent task, as a test of one's abilities, should involve acquainting the visitor with the customs of the locality and promoting their assimilation into both the urban area and its inhabitants. Through this process, individuals may shift from social isolation to being a member of the urban community, adopt local traditions, and acquire the capacity to apply universally accepted principles for personal development.

When placed in an unfamiliar setting, each individual is inherently a social outsider. The urban environment influences the personality of these socially marginalized individuals, creating a distinct atmosphere in which they can act according to their own principles within a broader framework. At this stage, the individual will either integrate with the city's population or undergo a unique form of urbanization.

Cultural conflicts, language barriers, and the fear of exclusion also impact people from their countries of origin. These individuals often stress the importance of social support and having friends who can offer such support. Those who have left their native country seek to connect with others facing similar challenges, believing that shared problems can foster mutual support. For many, the primary concern is social exclusion and marginalization, which can heighten feelings of loneliness and depression and trigger identity crises.

The feeling of not belonging to a new environment often intensifies the desire to return home, as individuals fear social alienation and isolation. In such cases, the intensity of social alienation and sense of disconnection frequently make individuals more willing to return to their home countries.

To address these issues, various precautions and efforts can be taken. For example, individuals who build a positive social network in their new host country are generally happier and more resilient despite challenges. Those who remain motivated and seek support from their surroundings can navigate this transition with less difficulty. Support from friends and family is crucial in this regard. Engaging in activities such as exploring public spaces, joining a gym, keeping a diary, maintaining regular contact with family, and embracing new cultures can significantly mitigate the effects of social alienation. By stepping out of their comfort zones, engaging with their new environment, and connecting with new people, individuals can better manage and reduce the negative impacts of social alienation.

Field research on social alienation has revealed that the desire for education and better living conditions can lead to indecision about addressing political and cultural challenges. However, the results also show that economic concerns become more pronounced upon entering a new social environment. These concerns form the basis of an individual's anxiety when considering moving to a new social setting or living outside his/her home country.

In addition to these concerns, many people worry about difficulties in obtaining entry permits for their desired destinations. Similarly, questions about where to live, securing financial support, navigating administrative issues, and coping with the emotional strain of being separated from family and loved ones are also crucial. However, the primary motivation for individuals seeking to relocate abroad is the pursuit of higher education. It is observed that a family's financial situation can further intensify the desire to study abroad.

Despite the strong desire to live and work abroad, concerns about political, economic, and social acceptance in the host country often lead to apprehension. Individuals who wish to leave their home country due to economic and political issues fear encountering similar problems in their new country. As a result, those who cannot find political, economic, or social satisfaction in their homeland are increasingly motivated to emigrate.

This study explores the relationship between literature and research through the lens of social alienation due to spatial changes, highlighting the challenges in maintaining cultural continuity during transitions to new locations. An examination of the issues of disappearance and discord within the multicultural framework of metropolitan regions reveals that the social estrangement experienced by individuals trying to assimilate is fundamentally a clash of cultural values.

Based on this context, we conclude that the evolving dynamics of cities can lead individuals to feel disconnected from the stable nature of rural areas. To address this issue, we propose that cities should effectively integrate both old and new elements to prevent the loss of cultural identity, mitigate detachment from new cultures, and avoid the adoption of exclusive behavioral norms. This approach requires the implementation of action plans to ensure that intercultural dialog meetings—recommended for city governments

—are held regularly to address segregation and foster the development of personal identity within the urban crowd.



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Author Details

Konur Alp Demir (Assoc. Prof. Dr.)

¹ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Political Science and Public Administration, Rize, Türkiye

 0000-0003-1199-930X  konuralp.demir@erdogan.edu.tr

Fatih Yaman (Res. Asst. Phd.)

² Manisa Celal Bayar University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Political Science and Public Administration, Manisa, Türkiye

 0000-0002-1019-0472  fatih.yaman@cbu.edu.tr

Burak Koçak (Asst. Prof. Dr.)

¹ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Political Science and Public Administration, Rize, Türkiye

 0000-0003-0430-4397  burak.kocak@erdogan.edu.tr

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