Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 2667-405X Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University 10.26745/ahbvuibfd.1735277 Microeconomics (Other) Mikro İktisat (Diğer) Sınırlı Belirsizlik Koşullarında Ücretsiz Fazla Mesai Sırasında Kaytarma Shirking During Unpaid Overtime Under Limited Uncertainty https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1924-5230 Koçsoy Alperen ANKARA HACI BAYRAM VELİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ 04 20 2026 28 1 155 174 07 05 2025 03 06 2026 Copyright © 1999, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University Journal of the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences 1999 Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University Journal of the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences

Bu çalışmada, davranışsal iktisat alanında süresi net olarak belirlenmemiş ücretsiz fazla mesailerde çalışanların kaytarma davranışını ele alıyoruz. Standart istihdam koşullarında kaytarma üzerine kapsamlı araştırmalar yapılmış olsa da çalışanların ücretsiz mesai süresini kısaltıp uzatabildikleri durumlarda nasıl davrandıkları hakkında çok az şey bilinmektedir. Bu çalışma, sonuçlar hakkında sınırlı belirsizlik koşulları altında ücretsiz fazla mesai sürelerini kontrol eden çalışanları incelemektedir. Avrupa futbolundan 9.018 yüksek riskli karardan oluşan kapsamlı bir veri seti kullanarak, çalışanların ücretsiz fazla mesai ile karşı karşıya kaldıklarında sistematik olarak kaytarma davranışı gösterdiklerine dair kanıt sunuyoruz. Analizimiz, sonucun belirsizliği azaldıkça çalışanların sistematik olarak olması gerekenden daha kısa ücretsiz mesai yaptıklarını ortaya koymaktadır. Bulgular, sınırlı belirsizlik ve ücretsiz fazla mesainin çalışan davranışını etkilemek için nasıl etkileşime girdiğine dair yeni bulgular sağlamakta ve çalışanların fazla mesai süresini kontrol ettiği ortamlarda işyeri verimliliği için çıkarımlar sunmaktadır.

Understanding shirking behaviour during unpaid overtime periods of uncertain duration remains a fundamental challenge in behavioural economics. While extensive research has examined shirking under standard employment conditions, little is known about how decision-makers respond when they can influence the likelihood of continued unpaid work. This study examines decision-makers who control the duration of unpaid overtime periods under conditions of limited uncertainty about outcomes. Using a comprehensive dataset of 9,018 high-stakes decisions from European football, we find systematic evidence of strategic shirking behaviour when decision-makers face indefinite unpaid overtime. Our analysis reveals that as outcome uncertainty decreases, decision-makers systematically reduce the duration of unpaid overtime periods. The findings provide novel insights into how limited uncertainty and unpaid overtime interact to drive strategic behaviour, with implications for workplace productivity and incentive design in environments where workers control overtime duration.

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