Armies of War Without Uniforms: Mercenaries and Private Military Companies in Russia’s Interventions in Syria and Ukraine

Year 2023, Volume: 24 Issue: 2, 292 - 301, 19.04.2023

Çağla Mavruk Ali Gök

https://doi.org/10.37880/cumuiibf.1230878

Abstract

In the struggle for influence and power between states, states tend to use mercenaries and PMCs due to reasons such as the economic cost of the regular army, the negative reactions to be received from many actors in an official intervention in the target state, the sanctions of international law and the indignation caused by a possible loss of official soldiers, especially in the society. The history of mercenaries dates back to ancient times. However, they were used extensively in conflicts in many regions after the Cold War. The changing perception of security is the main reason for the resurgence of mercenary activities. Factors at the center of the changing perception of security are the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a privatized military industry. Considering the interventions where mercenaries were deployed, Russia’s interventions in Ukraine in 2014 and then in 2022 and in Syria in 2015 come into prominence. The overarching purpose of this research is to explain how these actors affect the character of the war by explaining the reasons for their use, duties and effects on the battlefield. The study concludes that Russia used mercenaries in Ukraine for secrecy and reasonable deniability and aimed to prevent the reaction of the world public opinion. On the other hand, Russia used mercenaries in Syria to prevent the reaction of the Russian public by hiding casualties and reflecting the operation as a successful operation without any casualties.

Keywords

Mercenaries, Private Military Companies, Ukraine, Syria

Savaşın Üniformasız Orduları: Rusya’nın Suriye ve Ukrayna Müdahalelerinde Paralı Askerler ve Özel Askeri Şirketler

Abstract

Devletler arası etki ve güç mücadelesi meselesinde devletlerin paralı asker ve özel askeri şirketleri kullanma eğilimlerine etki eden bir çok faktör bulunmaktadır. Bu faktörler, düzenli ordunun ekonomik maliyeti, hedef devlete resmi bir müdahalede birçok aktörden alınacak olumsuz reaksiyonlar, uluslararası hukukun yaptırımları ve olası bir resmi asker kaybının özellikle toplumda yarattığı infial şeklinde sıralanabilir. Paralı askerlerin tarihsel açıdan çok eski bir geçmişi bulunmasına karşın, Soğuk Savaş sonrası birçok bölgede tekrar yoğun bir şekilde aktif çatışmalarda kullanılmışlardır. Değişen güvenlik algısı, paralı askerlik faaliyetlerinin yeniden canlanmasının ana nedenidir. Değişen güvenlik algısının merkezindeki faktörler ise Soğuk Savaş’ın sona ermesi ve özelleştirilmiş bir askeri sanayinin ortaya çıkması şeklinde ifade edilebilir. Söz konusu kullanım örnekleri değerlendirildiğinde Rusya’nın 2014 ve 2022 Ukrayna ve Arap Baharı süreci sonrası Suriye müdahaleleri ön plana çıkmaktadır. Çalışmanın temel amacı Rusya’nın Suriye ve Ukrayna müdahalelerinde paralı askerlerin kavramsal açıdan sınıflandırmasını yapabilmek ve bu aktörlerin muharebe sahasında neden kullanıldıklarını, görev ve etkilerini ifade ederek savaşın karakterine nasıl etki edebildiklerini ortaya koyabilmektir. Çalışma, Rusya’nın paralı askerleri Ukrayna’da gizlilik ve makul inkâr için kullandığı ve dünya kamuoyunun tepkisini önlemeyi amaçladığı sonucuna varmaktadır. Öte yandan çalışma Rusya’nın Suriye’de paralı askerleri, kayıpları gizleyerek Rus halkının tepkisini önlemek ve operasyonu herhangi bir zayiat vermeden başarılı bir operasyon olarak yansıtmak için kullandığını iddia etmektedir.

Keywords

Paralı Askerler, Özel Askeri Şirketler, Ukrayna, Suriye, Mercenaries, Private Military Companies, Ukraine, Syria

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