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DOĞRULUĞU EPİSTEMOLOJİNİN SINIRLARI DIŞINDA YENİDEN DÜŞÜNMEK: RORTY VE HEIDEGGER

Year 2006, Issue: 1, 95 - 102, 01.06.2006

Abstract

Bu bildiride, doğruluk kavramını modern epistemolojinin sınırları dışında düşünmüş olan iki filozofun, Amerikalı neo-pragmatist Richard Rorty ve Alman Martin Heidegger’in doğruluk anlayışlarını karşılaştırarak ele alıyorum. Öncelikle Rorty’nin “pragmatik doğruluk” anlayışını açıklığa kavuşturduktan sonra, bu anlayışın, Rorty’nin ortaya attığı kendi özgürlük gerekçesinin altını nasıl oyduğunu gösteriyorum. Daha sonra, Rorty’nin kendi kendisini reddeden argümanındaki bu temel sorunun, onun tutarsız Platonculuk tanımına dayandırdığı Platonculuk eleştirisinden kaynaklandığını ortaya koyarak, Heidegger’in Rorty’e göre daha tutarlı olan Platonculuk tanımı ve eleştirisi üzerine inşa ettiği “ontolojik doğruluk” anlayışını, Rorty’nin doğruluk anlayışına göre daha başarılı bir doğruluk anlayışı olarak öneriyorum

References

  • Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Çeviri: John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Harper and Row. New York: 1984.
  • Heidegger, Martin. Gesammtausgabe Vol.65: Beitraege zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Klostermann. Frankfurt: 1989, 1936-8 el yazmaları.
  • Heidegger, Martin. Nihilism. Nietzsche II. Çeviri: Frank A.Capuzzi. Harper and Row. New York: 1982.
  • Rorty, Richard, Consequences of Pragmatism. University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis: 1982.
  • Rorty, Richard, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press. Princeton, NJ: 1979
  • Rorty, Richard,“Solidarity or Objectivity?” Post-analytic Philosophy, ed. John Rajchman ve Cornel West. Columbia University Press. New York: 1985.

Rethink the Truth Beyond the Borders of Epistemology: Rorty and Heidegger

Year 2006, Issue: 1, 95 - 102, 01.06.2006

Abstract

In this presentation, I examine and compare the two different conceptions of truth of two philosophers; the neo-pragmatist American philosopher Richard Rorty and the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, who have thought the concept of truth beyond the limits of epistemology. Firstly, after I clarify Rorty’s conception of “pragmatic truth,” I show how Rorty’s conception undermines its own main motivation for freedom. Secondly, I show that the basic problem with Rorty’s self-refuting argument stems from his criticism of Platonism, which he bases on his own inconsistent definition of Platonism, and at the end, I offer Heidegger’s ontological conception of truth, which he bases on his more consistent definition and criticism of Platonism, as a more successful conception of truth.

References

  • Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Çeviri: John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Harper and Row. New York: 1984.
  • Heidegger, Martin. Gesammtausgabe Vol.65: Beitraege zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Klostermann. Frankfurt: 1989, 1936-8 el yazmaları.
  • Heidegger, Martin. Nihilism. Nietzsche II. Çeviri: Frank A.Capuzzi. Harper and Row. New York: 1982.
  • Rorty, Richard, Consequences of Pragmatism. University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis: 1982.
  • Rorty, Richard, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press. Princeton, NJ: 1979
  • Rorty, Richard,“Solidarity or Objectivity?” Post-analytic Philosophy, ed. John Rajchman ve Cornel West. Columbia University Press. New York: 1985.
There are 6 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Turkish
Subjects Philosophy
Journal Section Research Article
Authors

Özgür Aktok This is me

Publication Date June 1, 2006
Submission Date January 1, 2006
Acceptance Date April 1, 2006
Published in Issue Year 2006 Issue: 1

Cite

Chicago Aktok, Özgür. “DOĞRULUĞU EPİSTEMOLOJİNİN SINIRLARI DIŞINDA YENİDEN DÜŞÜNMEK: RORTY VE HEIDEGGER”. FLSF Felsefe Ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, no. 1 (June 2006): 95-102.

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