Füze Teknolojisi Kontrol Rejimi: ABD Merkezli Hegemonik Bir Yapıdan Normatif Bir Yapıya Geçişin Önemi

Year 2020, Volume: 16 Issue: 36, 821 - 872, 28.12.2020

Eray Alım

https://doi.org/10.17752/guvenlikstrtj.847719

Abstract

Füze Teknolojisi Kontrol Rejimi (FTKR), füze ve kitle imha silahı tehdidini önlemede başat girişimlerden biridir. Bu oluşumun taşıyıcı gücü ise ABD’dir. Bu ülke, yaptırım baskısıyla Rusya, Hindistan ve Brezilya dâhil birçok farklı ülkenin FTKR kaidelerine uygun davranmasını sağlayabilmiştir. Bu hususa rağmen, belirli anlarda ABD’nin FTKR kaidelerini bizzat kendisinin ihlal etmesi, hegemonik güçlerin kuralları çiğnemenin yaratacağı itibar kaybına aldırmaksızın kendi çıkarlarını ön plana alabildiklerini göstermektedir. Kitle imha silahı ve füze tehdidinin daha etkili bir şekilde önlenmesi için ise FTKR’nin ABD merkezli bir “seçkinler kulübü” imajından kurtulması gerekmektedir. Bu oluşumun ABD merkezlilikten kurtulması, kendi kurumsal yapısı dâhilinde bir kontrol ve yaptırım mekanizmasına sahip olmasını gerekli kılmaktadır. Kurumsallaşmanın güçlendirilmesine eş zamanlı şekilde, FTKR kapsamında devletlerin füze tehdidine dair norm ve prensipleri içselleştirmeleri ve bu minvalde normatif bir dönüşüm geçirmeleri sağlanmalıdır. Bu çalışmada vurgulandığı üzere, FTKR’nin meşruiyeti ve etkinliği için ABD merkezli faydacı-hegemonik bir yapıdan normatif bir yapıya geçiş büyük önem arz etmektedir.

Keywords

Füze Teknolojisi Kontrol Rejimi, Uluslararası Rejimler, Füze Tehdidi, Kitle İmha Silahları, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri

The Missile Technology Control Regime: The Necessity of Transitioning from a US-Centered Hegemonic Framework to a Normative One

Abstract

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is one of the leading initiatives in the realm of tackling threats related to missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The US acts as a driving force within this organization. Through its sanction power, the US managed to compel countries such as Russia, India and Brazil into adhering to the principles of the MTCR. On the other hand, in certain occasions, the US violated the principles of the MTCR itself, which demonstrates that hegemonic powers may choose to privilege their own interests over regime rules despite the risk of suffering consequential reputational costs. It is in this respect essential for a more effective handling of the threat of weapons of mass destruction and missile proliferation that the MTCR shed the image of a US-centered “elite club”. Overcoming U.S-centeredness requires forming inspection and sanctions mechanisms within the institutional framework of the MTCR. Along with strengthening institutionalization, it also essential for the MTCR’s effectiveness that this organization enables the normative transformation of states, implying the facilitation of the internalization of norms and principles by states regarding missile threat. As stressed in this work, the MTCR’s legitimacy and effectiveness necessitate a transition from a US-centered utilitarian-hegemonic framework into a normative one.

Keywords

Missile Technology Control Regime, International Regimes, Missile Threat, Weapons of Mass Destruction, The United States of America

References

• BROOKS, Stephen G. ve William C. Wohlforth. World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008.
• BOWEN, Wyn Q., The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation, 2000, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
• CIRINCIONE, Joseph vd., Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C, 2005.
• FISHER, Richard D., China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach. Praeger Security International, Connecticut, 2008.
• HASENCLEVER, Andreas vd., Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004.
• IKENBERRY, G. John. Liberal Leviathan. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011.
• KATZENSTEIN, Peter J (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996.
• KEOHANE, Robert, After Hegemony: World Political Economy Cooperation and Discord, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984.
• MASWOOD, S. Javed, The South in International Economic Regimes: Whose Globalization?, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2006.
• MISTRY, Dinshaw, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 2003.
• PIFER, Steven, The Eagle and the Trident: U.S-Ukraine Relations in Turbulent Times, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C, 2017.
• ROEHRIG, Terence, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War, Columbia University Press, New York, 2017.
• WIRTZ, James J. (ed.), Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology, and History (Volume II: Nuclear Weapons), Santa Barbara: ABC Clio, 2005.
• ADLER, Emanuel ve Michael Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities”, Emanuel Adler ve Michael Barnett (ed.), Security Communities, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, 29-65.
• BAUER, Sibylle, “The Export Control Regimes”, SIPRI Yearbook 2016: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 758-767.
• BERGER, Thomas U, “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan”, Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996, 317-356.
• CHANKIN-GOULD, Sarah ve Ivan Oelrich, “Double-Edged Shield”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2005, Cilt: 61, No: 3, 36-41.
• CHONG, Allen, “Revisiting the Missile Technology Control Regime: Fostering a New Norm for Ballistic Missiles”, Canadian Foreign Policy, 1999, Cilt: 7, No: 2, 107-126.
• DOYLE, Suzanne, “A Foregone Conclusion? The United States, Britain and the Trident D5 Agreement”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 2017, Cilt: 40, No: 6, 867-894.
• DUNCOMBE, Constance ve Tim Dunne, “After Liberal World Order”, International Affairs, 2018, Cilt: 94, No: 1, 25-42.
• EGELİ, Sıtkı. “Turkey Embarks Upon Ballistic Missiles: Why and How?”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Cilt: 14, No. 56, 2017, 3-22.
• FINNEMORE, Martha ve Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, International Organization, 1998, Cilt: 52, No: 4, 887-917.
• GHEORGHE, Eliza, “Proliferation and the Logic of the Nuclear Market”, International Security, 2019, Cilt: 43, No. 4, 88–127.
• HANSEN, Nelson E. “North Korean-Iranian Cooperation in Ballistic Missile Development”, Jungmin Kang (ed.), Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea, Dordrecht: Springer, 2013, 115-127.
• IKEGAMI, Masako. “Seeking a Path Toward Missile Nonproliferation”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2016, Cilt: 72, No: 6, 365-367.
• KARAMAT, Jehangir, “Missile Acquisition by Pakistan: Military Strategic Imperatives”, South Asian Survey, 2004, Cilt: 11, No: 2, 169-176.
• KATZENSTEIN, Peter J., “Coping with Terrorism: Norms and Internal Security in Germany and Japan”, Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993, 265-295.
• KEOHANE, Robert ve Joseph S. Nye, “Review: Power and Interdependence Revisited”, International Organization, 1987, Cilt: 41, No: 4, 725-753.
• KOBLENTZ, Gregory D, “Emerging Technologies and the Future of CBRN Terrorism”, The Washington Quarterly, 2020, Cilt: 43, No: 2, 177-196.
• KRASNER, Stephen D., “Transforming International Regimes: What the Third World Wants and Why”, International Studies Quarterly, 1981, Cilt: 25, No: 1, 119-148.
• KRASNER, Stephen D., “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables”, Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1983, 1-21.
• MEARSHEIMER, John J., “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security, 1994, Cilt: 19, No: 3, 5-49.
• MEARSHEIMER, John J., “A Realist Reply”, International Security, 1995, Cilt: 20, No: 1, 82-93.
• MEARSHEIMER, John J., “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order’, International Security, 2019, Cilt: 43, No: 4, 7-50.
• MISTRY, Dinshaw ve Mark Smith, “Negotiating Multilateral Instruments Against Missile Proliferation”, International Negotiation, 2005, Ciltt: 10, 425–451.
• OZGA, Deborah A, “A Chronology of the Missile Technology Control Regime”, The Nonproliferation Review, 1994, Cilt: 1, No: 2, 66-93.
• RUGGIE, John Gerard, “International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends”, International Organization, 1975, Cilt: 29, No: 3, 557-583.
• SPEKTOR, Matias, “The Long View: How Argentina and Brazil Stepped Back from a Nuclear Race”, 2015, Americas Quarterly, No: 57.
• SPEKTOR, Matias, “The Evolution of Brazil’s Nuclear Intentions”, 2016, The Nonproliferation Review, Cilt: 23, No: 5-6, 635-652.
• PETERSEN, Charles C., “Moscow, Washington and the Missile Technology Control Regime”, Contemporary Security Policy, 1995, Cilt: 16, No: 2, 1995, 44-71.
• “Rumblings Precede 25th Missile-Control Meeting”, Strategic Comments, 2011, Cilt: 17, No: 3, 1-3.
• TARZI, Shah M., “International Regimes and International Relations Theory: Search for Synthesis”, International Studies, 2003, Cilt: 40, No: 1, 23-39.
• “The MTCR: Staying Relevant 25 Years On”, Strategic Comments, 2012, Cilt: 18, No: 2, 1-3.
• U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE. “Proposed Rules”, Federal Register, 19 November 2018, Cilt: 83, N: 223, 58201-58202.
• VAN WYK, Jo-Ansie, “The International politics of Nuclear Weapons: A Constructivist Analysis”, Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, 2007, Cilt: 35, No: 1, 1-28.
• WALTZ, Kenneth N., “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability”, Foreign Affairs, 2012, Cilt: 91, No: 4, s.2-5.
• BROCKMANN, Kolja ve Robert Kelley, “The Challenge of Emerging Technologies to Nonproliferation Efforts”, SIPRI, April 2018.
• EWERS, Elisa Catalano, vd., “Drone Proliferation Policy Choices for the Trump Administration”, Center for a New American Security, June 2017.
• SAYLER, Kelly M., Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, 17 March 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R45811.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 18.04.2020).
• SPEIER, Richard H., K. Scott McMahon ve George Nacouzi, “Penaid Nonproliferation Hindering the Spread of Countermeasures Against Ballistic Missile Defense”, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2014.
• SPEIER, Richard. H., “George Nacouzi, Carrie A. Lee ve Richard M. Moore, Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons”, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017.
• TOLLEFSON, Scott D., “Brazil, the United States, and the Missile Technology Control Regime”, Naval Postgraduate School, California, March 1990.
• “22 U.S.C. 2797b - Transfers of missile equipment or technology by foreign persons”, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2009-title22/USCODE-2009-title22-chap39-subchapVII-sec2797b/summary (Erişim Tarihi: 24.07.2020).
• “1925 Geneva Protocol”, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/1925-geneva-protocol/#:~:text=The%201925%20Geneva%20Protocol%20prohibits,force%20on%208%20February%201928 (Erişim Tarihi: 28.09.2020).
• ALLISON, George, “Britain’s 1,000 Mile Punch – A Guide to the Tomahawk Cruise Missile”, 7 August 2018, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/britains-1000-mile-punch-a-guide-to-the-tomahawk-cruise-missile/ (Erişim Tarihi: 29.09.2020).
• ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, “The Missile Technology Control Regime at a Glance”, July 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mtcr (Erişim Tarihi: 15. 02.2020).
• ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, “Chemical Weapons: Frequently Asked Questions”, June 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Chemical-Weapons-Frequently-Asked-Questions (Erişim Tarihi: 20. 07.2020).
• Best Practices for Effective Export Control Enforcement”, https://www.wassenaar.org/ app/uploads/2019/consolidated/Best-Practices-for-Effective-Export-Control-Enforcement.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 21. 07.2020).
• HERMAN, Arthur, “The Treaty Behind China’s Drone Edge”, 8 July 2019, The Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-treaty-behind-chinas-drone-edge-11562626340 (Erişim Tarihi: 12. 02. 2020).
• GEORGE, Nirmala, “India Joins Elite Club of Countries Controlling Exports in Missile Technology”, 27 June 2016, The Star, https://www.thestar.com/business/ 2016/06/27/india-joins-elite-club-of-countries-controlling-exports-in-missile-technology.html (Erişim Tarihi: 11. 02.2020).
• HOROWITZ, Michael C., “Drones Aren’t Missiles, So Don’t Regulate Them Like They Are”, 26 June 2017, https://thebulletin.org/2017/06/drones-arent-missiles-so-dont-regulate-them-like-they-are/ (Erişim Tarihi: 10. 01. 2020).
• LDWO, “Report by the MTCR Chair: MTCR Chair addressed HCOC Plenary”, 22 June 2016, https://mtcr.info/report-by-the-mtcr-chair-mtcr-chair-addressed-hcoc-plenary/ (Erişim Tarihi: 16. 01. 2020).
• MISSILE DEFENSE PROJECT, “DF-11 (Dong Feng-11 / M-11 / CSS-7)”, Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 29 January 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/dong-feng-11/ (Erişim Tarihi: 16.02.2020).
• MISSILE DEFENSE PROJECT, “Trident D-5”, Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 June 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/trident/ (Erişim Tarihi: 29.09.2020).
• MISSILE DEFENSE PROJECT, “Missiles of the World”, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ (Erişim Tarihi: 23.07.2020).
• MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME, https://mtcr.info/ (Erişim Tarihi: 05. 01. 2020).
• MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME, “Guidlines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers”, https://mtcr.info/guidelines-for-sensitive-missile-relevant-transfers/ (Erişim Tarihi: 22. 07. 2020).
• MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME, “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQS)”, https://mtcr.info/frequently-asked-questions-faqs/ (Erişim Tarihi: 23.07.2020).
• OGILVIE-WHITE, Tanya, “Post-INF Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific: Political Viability and Implementation Challenges”, IISS, 30 June 2020, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2020/06/post-inf-arms-control-asia-pacific (Erişim Tarihi: 23.07.2020).
• PAYNE, Keith, “The Missile Technology Control Regime—European Involvement and Compliance Issues 2”, 15 July 1998, Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers, https://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/pt2_payne.htm (Erişim Tarihi: 10.02.2020).
• PINKSTON, Daniel, “The New South Korean Missile Guidelines and Future Prospects for Regional Stability”, International Crisis Group, 25 October 2012, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/korean-peninsula/new-south-korean-missile-guidelines-and-future-prospects-regional-stability (Erişim Tarihi: 20.07.2020).
• “Political Declaration: Conference “2019. Capturing Technology. Rethinking Arms Control”“, 15 March 2019, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2199926/798daa 3007fd8fc2dddd04db13633353/190315-erkl-konf-rethinking-arms-control-data.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 23.07.2020).
• PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, “Defense Planning Guidance, 1994-1999”, 29 February 1992. https://www.archives.gov/files/ declassification/iscap/pdf/2008-003-doc18.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 29.03.2017).
• REUTERS, “U.S., South Korea Agree to Revise Missile Treaty in Face of North Korean Threats”, 2 September 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles/u-s-south-korea-agree-to-revise-missile-treaty-in-face-of-north-korean-threats-idUSKCN1BD034 (Erişim Tarihi: 22.02.20).
• ROBLIN, Sebastien, “Saudi Arabia Already Has a Ballistic Missile Arsenal Courtesy of China—With a Little Help from the CIA”, The National Interest, 22 September 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/saudi-arabia-already-has-ballistic-missile-arsenal-courtesy-china%E2%80%94-little-help-cia-31772 (Erişim Tarihi: 22. 07.2020).
• SIDHU, Waheguru Pal Singh (WPS). Masako Ikegami ve Sıtkı Egeli, “Too late for missile nonproliferation?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 22 August 2016, https://thebulletin.org/ roundtable/too-late-for-missile-nonproliferation/ (Erişim Tarihi: 21. 07.2020).
• SPECTOR, Leonard S., “The Missile Technology Control Regime and Shifting Proliferation Challenges”, April 2018, Arms Control Today, https://www.armscontrol.org/ act/2018-04/features/missile-technology-control-regime-shifting-proliferation-challenges (Erişim Tarihi: 26.07.2020).
• TASS, “20 Questions with Vladimir Putin. Putin on the Army and the Arms Race”, 2020, https://putin.tass.ru/en/ob-armii/ (Erişim tarihi: 29.03.2020).
• TAYLOR, Jeffrey, ”Public Statement from the Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime, Auckland”, 11 October 2019, https://mtcr.info/public-statement-from-the-plenary-meeting-of-the-missile-technology-control-regime-auckland-11-october-2019/ (Erişim Tarihi: 08.01.2020).
• “Text of the HCOC”, https://www.hcoc.at/?tab=what_is_hcoc&page=text_of _the_hcoc (Erişim Tarihi: 22. 07. 2020).
• “THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGMIE (MTCR)”, 08 January 2018, The Nuclear Threat Initiative, https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/missile-technology-control-regime-mtcr/ (Erişim Tarihi: 08. 03. 2020).
• UNITED STATES SENATE, “U.S.-Indian Nuclear Energy Cooperation: Security and Nonproliferation Implications a Compilation of Statements by Witnesses Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 7 November 2005, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/CPRT-109SPRT24420/pdf/CPRT-109SPRT24420.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 11.02.2020).