Independent regulatory authorities are expected to act as apolitical agents to prevent market failures in the sector they regulate. However, according to political signal theory, regulatory authorities cannot escape the interventions and control of the political power. In addition, according to capture theory, regulation is designed and operated for the benefit of dominant capital groups in the sector. This article applies both theories to the case of Türkiye’s radio and TV sector. Based on our analysis we claim that the Turkish Radio and Television Supreme Council is a unique case of a supposedly independent authority being captured by both the political power and dominant capitalist groups in the sector, which are intertwined with this power, by limiting its administrative and financial autonomy. Our findings show that the close relations between capital groups and important political figures, which have been clear since the the sector was first liberalized, have helped these groups gain a privileged position in Türkiye’s media sector. As a result, the main instrument that changed the media ownership structure was the interventions of the political power in line with the propositions of the "political signaling" theory.