Yeni Kurumsal İktisat

Year 2012, Issue: 45, 43 - 73, 05.09.2012

Tamer Çetin

Abstract

 Yeni kurumsal iktisat, son dönemlerde iktisat literatürüne hem teorik hem de ampirik olarak çok farklı perspektiflerden katkı sağlayan ve bu anlamda, görece sıkışık durumdaki Ortodoks algıya bir açılım imkanı tanıyan disiplinler arası bir iktisadi yaklaşım olarak literatürde kendine ayrıcalıklı bir yer bulmayı başarmıştır. Yaklaşım, kurumlar, kurallar ve organizasyonlar üzerine işlem maliyetleri, sınırlı rasyonalite, mülkiyet hakları, eksik sözleşmeler ve fırsatçılık gibi yeni bir terminolojiyle farklı bir metodolojik perspektif sunmayı başarmış ve böylece, iktisadi faaliyetin kurumsal temellerini pozitif araştırmanın merkezine taşıyarak, günümüzde en canlı ve dinamik iktisat disiplini haline gelmiştir. Bugün itibarıyla, yeni kurumsal iktisat, hakim iktisadi bilgeliği reddetmeden, ama gerçek dışı Neoklasik varsayımları sert bir biçimde eleştirip, yerine gerçekçi teoriler üreterek, yerleşik iktisadi gündemin tam merkezinde bulunmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Yeni Kurumsal İktisat, İşlem Maliyetleri, Mülkiyet Hakları

Keywords

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