The use offorce is resorted by States as a form of dispute settlement generally as a lastresort. But Article 2(3) of the United Nations (UN) Charter states that allmembers shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means. Article2(4) bans the unilateral use or threat of force by States. In the customaryinternational law, Article 2(4) is interpreted as a prohibition against the useof force focusing on restricting the use of military instruments. Thisinstrument-based interpretation of the use of force causes the responsibilityof States which deploys cyber instruments to cause physical damage in thetarget States’ critical infrastructures, remain outside the scope of Article2(4).  There aredoctrinal difficulties in examining current international law on use of forceand self-defense in cyberspace, while the legal frameworks for defining theparameters of operations in cyberspace are not clear. As being unforseen untilthis age of information and cyber technology, the prohibition of the use offorce interpreted from Article 2(4) should be evolved to cover coercive uses ofcyber instruments being used to have destructive effects in the enemy’sphysical infrastructures such as telecommunications, transportation, powersystems, finance and emergency services. Categorizingthe cyber attacks as having physical effects to critical infrastructure and nothaving any physical effects can be the first step to solve the problem ofevolving the article to cover cyber attacks within the concept of use of force.Then the efforts may be concentrated on the cyber attacks having physicaleffects on the enemy’s infrastructures to be considered as a use of force. Themain problem is that there would be an unwillingness of the powerful Stateswhich are likely to use the opportunities of cyberspace in Inter-State coercionto evolve the interpretation of the article, while the technology-dependent orpowerless States would have a volition to evolve the Article.