." />
Research Article
BibTex RIS Cite

Extendend Mind as a Different Way to Realize Cognition

Year 2022, Issue: 2, 23 - 35, 27.10.2022

Cansu İrem Meriç

Abstract

The main claim of the famous paper “The Extended Mind”, written by Clark and Chalmers (CC), is that the mind could literally extend into the external world. Among the many opponents of this claim, Robert Rupert has raised two main objections against it. The first, depending on the acceptance or denial of the possible 4th feature the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) is either insignificant or implausible and the second, external cognitive states are so immensely different from internal ones that they should be counted as distinct. In this paper, I will not only answer Rupert’s criticisms through system-respond and differences in R-properties, but I will, in the end, also respond to the criticisms on extended mind, which are based on the observation that it is not as groundbreaking as it first appeared to be, and claim that even if that is the case, it doesn’t posit a problem to its significance.

Keywords

Extended Mind Multiple Realization Functionalism Embodied Cognition Mind

References

  • Adams, F.& Aizawa, K. (2001). The Bounds of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology. 14. doi: 10.1080/09515080120033571.
  • Clark, A. & Chalmers, D. (1998). The Extended Mind. Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
  • Love, N. (2004). Cognition and the Language Myth. Language Sciences 26, 525-544. doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2004.09.003
  • Meriç, C.İ. (2021). Plant Mind Through Amalgamated Functionalism [unpublished master’s thesis]. Bilkent University
  • Miyazano, K. (2017). Does functionalism entail extended mind?. Synthese 194, 3523-3541 doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0971-2
  • Rowlands, Mark, Joe Lau, and Max Deutsch, "Externalism About the Mind", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/content-externalism/>.
  • Rowlands, J. M. (2010). The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. MIT Press.
  • Rupert, R. (2004). Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition. The Journal of Philosophy, 101(8), 389-428. Retrieved May 21, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/3655517 Shapiro, L. A. (2004). The Mind Incarnate. MIT Press.
  • Steffensen, Sune Vork. (2009). Language, languaging, and the Extended Mind Hypothesis. Pragmatics & Cognition. 17. 677-697. 10.1075/pc.17.3.10ste.
  • Tribble, E. (2005). Distributing Cognition in the Globe. Shakespeare Quarterly, vol. 56, no. 2, [Folger Shakespeare Library, The Shakespeare Association of America, Inc., Johns Hopkins University Press, George Washington University], 135–55, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3844304.

Bilişi Gerçekleştirmenin Farklı Bir Yolu Olarak Genişletilmiş Zihin

Year 2022, Issue: 2, 23 - 35, 27.10.2022

Cansu İrem Meriç

Abstract

Clark ve Chalmers (CC) tarafından yazılan meşhur “Genişletilmiş Zihin” makalesinin ana iddiası, zihnin, kelimenin tam anlamıyla dış dünyaya yayılabileceğidir. Bu iddianın birçok muhalifi arasında, Robert Rupert buna karşı iki ana itirazda bulunmuştur. İlki, aşağıda tartışılacak olan olası 4. özelliğin kabulüne veya reddine bağlı olarak, genişletilmiş biliş (HEC) hipotezinin ya önemsiz ya da mantıksız oluşu ve ikincisi, dış bilişsel durumların içsel olanlardan çok farklı olmasına bağlı olarak onlardan ayrı sayılmasının gerekliliğidir. Bu yazıda, sadece Rupert'in itirazlarına sistem-cevabı ve R-özelliklerinin farklılıkları ile cevaplamakla kalmayacak, aynı zamanda, son olarak, genişletilmiş zihin iddiasının ilk başta düşünüldüğü kadar çığır açıcı olmadığı gözlemlerine dayanan eleştirilere değinecek ve durum böyle olsa bile, bunun tezin önemine dair bir sorun teşkil etmediğini iddia edeceğim.

Keywords

Extended Mind Multiple Realization Functionalism Embodied Cognition Mind

References

  • Adams, F.& Aizawa, K. (2001). The Bounds of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology. 14. doi: 10.1080/09515080120033571.
  • Clark, A. & Chalmers, D. (1998). The Extended Mind. Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
  • Love, N. (2004). Cognition and the Language Myth. Language Sciences 26, 525-544. doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2004.09.003
  • Meriç, C.İ. (2021). Plant Mind Through Amalgamated Functionalism [unpublished master’s thesis]. Bilkent University
  • Miyazano, K. (2017). Does functionalism entail extended mind?. Synthese 194, 3523-3541 doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0971-2
  • Rowlands, Mark, Joe Lau, and Max Deutsch, "Externalism About the Mind", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/content-externalism/>.
  • Rowlands, J. M. (2010). The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. MIT Press.
  • Rupert, R. (2004). Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition. The Journal of Philosophy, 101(8), 389-428. Retrieved May 21, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/3655517 Shapiro, L. A. (2004). The Mind Incarnate. MIT Press.
  • Steffensen, Sune Vork. (2009). Language, languaging, and the Extended Mind Hypothesis. Pragmatics & Cognition. 17. 677-697. 10.1075/pc.17.3.10ste.
  • Tribble, E. (2005). Distributing Cognition in the Globe. Shakespeare Quarterly, vol. 56, no. 2, [Folger Shakespeare Library, The Shakespeare Association of America, Inc., Johns Hopkins University Press, George Washington University], 135–55, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3844304.
There are 10 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language English
Journal Section Makaleler
Authors

Cansu İrem Meriç 0000-0003-3874-370X

Publication Date October 27, 2022
Published in Issue Year 2022 Issue: 2

Cite

APA Meriç, C. İ. (2022). Extendend Mind as a Different Way to Realize Cognition. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi(2), 23-35.
AMA Meriç Cİ. Extendend Mind as a Different Way to Realize Cognition. KFD. October 2022;(2):23-35.
Chicago Meriç, Cansu İrem. “Extendend Mind As a Different Way to Realize Cognition”. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi, no. 2 (October 2022): 23-35.
EndNote Meriç Cİ (October 1, 2022) Extendend Mind as a Different Way to Realize Cognition. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi 2 23–35.
IEEE C. İ. Meriç, “Extendend Mind as a Different Way to Realize Cognition”, KFD, no. 2, pp. 23–35, October 2022.
ISNAD Meriç, Cansu İrem. “Extendend Mind As a Different Way to Realize Cognition”. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi 2 (October 2022), 23-35.
JAMA Meriç Cİ. Extendend Mind as a Different Way to Realize Cognition. KFD. 2022;:23–35.
MLA Meriç, Cansu İrem. “Extendend Mind As a Different Way to Realize Cognition”. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi, no. 2, 2022, pp. 23-35.
Vancouver Meriç Cİ. Extendend Mind as a Different Way to Realize Cognition. KFD. 2022(2):23-35.