Vekâlet Teorisinde Fırsatçılık Kavramı ve Oyun Teorisi Arasındaki İlişki

Year 2021, Volume: 4 Issue: 2, 439 - 454, 02.09.2021

Buket Arslan , Elif Çetin

https://doi.org/10.33712/mana.962926

Cited By: 1

Abstract

Vekâlet Teorisi ve Oyun Teorisinde ifade edildiği şekilde, finansal etkileşim içerisinde bulunan taraflar arasındaki asimetrik bilgi; avantajlı tarafın, bu avantajı kullanarak çıkar mücadelesi vermesine ve bunun sonucunda fırsatçı eğilimlerde bulunmasına sebep olmaktadır. Vekâlet teorisinin temel varsayımlarından olan ve sınırlı rasyonellik ilkesi çerçevesinde içsel bir değişken olarak görülen fırsatçılık kavramı, bireysel çıkarların sözleşmenin karşı tarafı aleyhinde gözetilerek ve genellikle sözleşmede bulunan boşlukları kullanarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu durum asil-vekil arasında bir güven ve belirsizlik sorununa yol açmakta; bunun yanı sıra görevi kötüye kullanma, dolandırıcılık gibi hileli davranışlar neticesinde piyasa mekanizmasını etkileyebilmektedir. Bu çalışmada fırsatçılık kavramı, temel mikro iktisadi analiz yöntemlerinden vekâlet teorisi ve oyun teorisi perspektifinde incelenmiş; yapılan ilişkilendirmeler doğrultusunda öneriler sunulmuştur. Yapılan çalışma ile vekâlet fırsatçılığının oyun teorisi çerçevesinde açıklanabildiği görülmüştür. Literatürde henüz bu iki teoriyi birlikte inceleyen bir ölçek bulunmamaktadır. Ancak çeşitli sektörlerde ortaya çıkan vekâlet fırsatçılığı sorunlarının oyun teorisi ile çözümlenebileceği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Analiz araçları ve modelleme alt yapısı ile oyun teorisinin farklı senaryoların olası sonuçlarını karşılaştırarak optimal stratejileri belirleme fırsatı tanıması, vekalet fırsatçılığı perspektifinden yönetici ve stratejistleri önemli derecede öngörü sağlayabilecektir.

Keywords

Asimetrik Bilgi, Fırsatçılık, Vekâlet Teorisi, Oyun Teorisi

The Relationship Between The Concept of Opportunism in Agency Theory And Game Theory

Abstract

As expressed in Agency Theory and Game Theory, the asymmetric information between the parties in financial interaction causes the advantageous party to enter into a struggle for interest by using this advantage and as a result, show opportunistic tendencies. The concept of opportunism, which is one of the basic assumptions of the agency theory and seen as an internal variable within the framework of the limited rationality principle, emerges by putting individual interests forward against the counterparty of the contract and generally using the gaps in the contract. This situation causes a problem of trust and uncertainty between the principal and the agent, as well as adversely affecting the market mechanism as a result of fraudulent behaviors such as professional misconduct and fraud. In this study, the concept of opportunism is examined from the perspective of agency theory and game theory, which are among the basic microeconomic analysis methods; and suggestions are made in line with the established associations. With the study, it has been seen that agency opportunism can be explained within the framework of game theory. There is no scale in the literature that examines these two theories together yet. However, it has been concluded that the problems of proxy opportunism that arise in various sectors can be solved with game theory. Due to analysis tools and modeling infrastructure of game theory provides the opportunity to determine the optimal strategies by comparing the possible outcomes of different scenarios, it will be be able to provide significant insight to managers and strategists from the perspective of agency opportunism.

Keywords

Asymmetric Information, Opportunism, Agency Theory, Game Theory

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