Doğa ile Deneyim Arasında Niteler ve Fenomenal Bilinç Sorunu

Abstract

Bu makale, niteler (qualia) ve fenomenal bilinç sorununu çağdaş doğalcı (natüralist) yaklaşımlar bağlamında ele almakta ve bu sorunun formülasyonunun bizzat doğa anlayışının sınırları tarafından belirlendiğini savunmaktadır. Modern bilimin kartezyen kuruluşuna dayanan doğa anlayışı, doğa ve deneyim arasındaki ayrımı merkeze alarak doğayı zihinden bağımsız bir gerçeklik olarak düşünür. Bu doğrultuda şekillenen fiziksellik kavramı, zihinsel olmayan olarak tanımlanmakta ve yaşam kavramı, öznellikten ayrılarak mekanik düzeyde açıklanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda doğa anlayışına dayanan her açıklama, fenomenal düzeyi dışlamaktadır. Dolayısıyla, fiziksel süreçlerden yola çıkarak, deneyimin öznelliğine bağlı olan niteler gibi fenomenal unsurların açıklanması bütünüyle problematik hale gelmektedir. Makalenin amacı, modern mekanik doğa anlayışına yön veren doğa-deneyim ayrımının fenomenal bilinç sorununu çıkmaza sürüklediğini ve bu nedenle bilinci açıklamak için elverişli bir kavramsal temel olmadığını ortaya koyarak; doğa ve deneyim arasındaki ilişkiyi yeniden düşünen bir yaklaşımın gerekli olduğunu savunmaktır. Bu doğrultuda, fizikselliğin deneyimden ayrı düşünülmesinin yol açtığı açmazlar saptanmakta ve yaşayan bedenin bir özne, bilinçli ve anlam üreten bir organizma olarak yeniden kavramsallaştırılması gerektiği vurgulanmaktadır.

Keywords

• niteler
• fenomenal bilinç sorunu
• açıklama boşluğu
• zor sorun
• fizikalizm
• mekanik doğa anlayışı

The Problem of Qualia Between Nature and Experience

Abstract

This article examines the problem of qualia and phenomenal consciousness within the framework of contemporary naturalist approaches. It argues that the very formulation of this problem is shaped by the conceptual limits of our prevailing understanding of nature. Rooted in the Cartesian foundations of modern science, this conception of nature places a fundamental divide between nature and experience. Accordingly, the concept of physicality is defined independently of experience, and the concept of life is explained at a mechanical level, stripped of subjectivity. On this basis, any explanatory framework grounded in such an understanding of nature tends to exclude the phenomenal dimension. As a result, attempts to account for phenomenal properties like qualia, those tied to the subjectivity of experience, purely in terms of physical processes become deeply problematic. The aim of this article is to show that the modern mechanical conception of nature, shaped by a dualistic division between nature and experience, leads to a conceptual impasse in explaining consciousness. It argues that this conception fails to provide a suitable conceptual ground for such an explanation, and that a rethinking of the relationship between nature and experience is necessary. In this context, the paper exposes the explanatory difficulties arising from the separation of physicality from experience and emphasizes the need to reconceptualize the living body as a subject; a conscious and sense-making organism.

Keywords

• qualia
• phenomenal consciousness
• explanatory gap
• hard problem
• physicalism
• the mechanical theory of nature

References

1. Arıcı, M. (2018). “The Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness.” MetaZihin, 1(1): 1-19. Alındığı URL: http://dergipark.gov.tr/metazihin/issue/38128/439971
2. Aristoteles. (2004[MÖ 4. yüzyıl]). Fizik. Çev. Saffet Babür. İstanbul: Say Yayınları.
3. Bitbol, M. (2005). Physique et philosophie de l’esprit. Paris: Champs Flammarion.
4. Block, N. (2011). “Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(12): 567-575.
5. Boden, M. A. (2006). Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science (Cilt: 1-2). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
6. Butterfield, H. (1958). The Origins of Modern Science 1300-1800. New York: The Free Press.
7. Churchland, P. S. (2002). Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
8. Chalmers, D. J. (1995). “Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3): 200-219.

9. Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10. Daston, L. (1992). “Objectivity and the Escape From Perspective.” Social Studies of Science, 22(4): 597-618. https://doi.org/10.1177/030631292022004002
11. Democritus. (1999). “Fragments.” C. C. W. Taylor (Der. ve Çev.), The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus içinde (s. 9). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
12. Dennett, D. C. (1992). Consciousness Explained. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.
13. Descartes, R. (1904a[1641]). "Meditationes de prima philosophia." C. Adam ve P. Tannery (Der.), Œuvres de Descartes (Cilt: 7) içinde (s. 1-90). Paris: Léopold Cerf.
14. Descartes, R. (1904b[1647]). "Méditations métaphysiques." C. Adam ve P. Tannery (Der.), Œuvres de Descartes (Cilt: 9-1) içinde (s. 1-247). Paris: Léopold Cerf.
15. Descartes, R. (1904c[1647]). "Principes de la philosophie." C. Adam ve P. Tannery (Der.), Œuvres de Descartes (Cilt: 9-2) içinde (s. 1-352). Paris: Léopold Cerf.
16. Descartes, R. (1909a[1664]). "La Description du corps humain." C. Adam ve P. Tannery (Der.), Œuvres de Descartes (Cilt: 11) içinde (s. 217-290). Paris: Léopold Cerf.
17. Descartes, R. (1909b[1664]). "Le Monde, ou le Traité de la lumière." C. Adam ve P. Tannery (Der.), Œuvres de Descartes (Cilt: 11) içinde (s. 3-118). Paris: Léopold Cerf.
18. Descartes, R. (1909c[1649]). "Les Passions de l'âme." C. Adam ve P. Tannery (Der.), Œuvres de Descartes (Cilt: 11) içinde (s. 291-497). Paris: Léopold Cerf.
19. Devitt, M. (1983). “Realism and the Renegade Putnam: A critical study of Meaning and the Moral Sciences.” Noûs, 17(2): 291-301.
20. Dunaway, B. (2017). “Realism and Objectivity.” McPherson, T. C. ve Plunkett, D. (Der.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics içinde (s. 135-150). New York: Routledge.
21. Eddington, A. S. (1928). The Nature of the Physical World. New York: The Macmillan Company.
22. Fjelland, R. (2002). “Facing the Problem of Uncertainty.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 15: 155-169.
23. Galilei, G. (2008[1623]). "Il Saggiatore." M. A. Finocchiaro (Der. ve Çev.), The Essential Galileo içinde (s. 179-189). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
24. Goff, P. (2017). Consciousness and Fundamental Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
25. Güven, Ö. (2024). Çağdaş Zihin Felsefesi Tartışmaları. İstanbul: VakıfBank Kültür Yayınları.
26. Güzeldere, G. (1997). “The Many Faces of Consciousness: A Field Guide.” Block, N., Flanagan, O. ve Güzeldere, G. (Der.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates içinde (s. 1-67). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
27. Hempel, C. G. (1969). “Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets.” Morgenbesser, S., Suppes, P. ve White, M. (Der.), Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel içinde (s. 179-199). New York: St. Martin’s Press.
28. Jackson, F. (1982). “Epiphenomenal Qualia.” The Philosophical Quarterly, 32(127): 127-136.
29. James, W. (1904). “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1(18), 477-491.
30. James, W. (1950[1890]). The Principles of Psychology (Cilt 1-2). New York: Dover Publications.
31. Kauffman, A. ve Roli, A. (2023). “Beyond the Newtonian Paradigm: A Statistical Mechanics of Emergence.” Corning, P. A., Kauffman, A., Noble, D., Shapiro, J. A., Vane Wright, R. I. ve Pross, A. (Der.), Evolution “On Purpose”: Teleonomy in Living Systems içinde (s. 141-160). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
32. Kim, J. (1992). “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52(1): 1-26.
33. Kim, J. (1996). Philosophy of Mind. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
34. Kim, J. (2009). “Mental Causation.” McLaughlin, B., Beckermann, A. ve Walter, S. (Der.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind içinde (s. 33-65). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
35. Kirk, R. ve Squires, R. (1974). “Zombies vs. Materialists.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 48: 135-163.
36. Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
37. Leibniz, G. W. (1898[1714]). “The Monadology.” R. Latta (Der. ve Çev.), The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings içinde (s. 215-271). London: Oxford University Press.
38. Levine, J. (1983). “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64(4): 354-361.
39. Levine, J. (2001). Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
40. Lewis, D. (1986). “Postscript to ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’.” Philosophical Papers Volume II içinde (s. 130-132). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
41. Locke, J. (1999 [1690]). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. P. H. Nidditch (Der.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
42. Maturana, H. R. ve Varela, F. J. (1980[1973]). Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living. Dordrecht: Springer.
43. Nagel, T. (1974). “What is it Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review, 83(4): 435-450.
44. Nagel, T. (1986). The View From Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press.
45. Papineau, D. (2009). “The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism.” McLaughlin, B., Beckermann, A. ve Walter, S. (Der.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind içinde (s. 53-65). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
46. Place, U. T. (1956). “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” British Journal of Psychology, 47(1): 44-50.
47. Popa, T. (2017). “Mechanisms: Ancient Sources.” Glennan, S. ve Illari, P. (Der.), The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy içinde (s. 13-25). New York: Routledge.
48. Putnam, H. (1967). “Psychological Predicates.” Capitan, W. H. ve Merrill, D. D. (Der.), Art, Mind, and Religion içinde (s. 37-48). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
49. Riskin, J. (2016). The Restless Clock: A History of the Centuries-Long Argument Over What Makes Living Things Tick. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
50. Rosenberg, G. (2004). A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
51. Sayan, E. (2012). “Analitik Zihin Felsefesinin Temel Problemlerine Bir Bakış.” Kaygı: Uludağ Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Felsefe Dergisi, 18: 37-54.
52. Smart, J. J. C. (1959). “Sensations and Brain Processes.” The Philosophical Review, 68(2): 141-156.
53. Stoljar, D. (2010). Physicalism. New York: Routledge.
54. Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
55. Tyndall, J. (1872). Fragments of Science. London: Longmans, Green & Co.
56. Varela, F. J., Thompson, E. ve Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
57. Varela, F. (1996). “Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem.” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3(4): 330-349.
58. Watson, J. B. (1913). “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It.” Psychological Review, 20(2): 158-177.
59. Westfall, R. S. (1978). The Construction of Modern Science: Mechanisms and Mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.