An Argument against Intentionalism as a Theory of Perception

Abstract

The problem of perception arises in hallucination and illusion: if the object we seem to confront is not there, what, if anything, is given in experience, and what constitutes its phenomenal character? Intentionalism is often presented as a fourth rival to sense-data theory, naïve realism, and adverbialism. This paper rejects that orthodoxy and defends the claim that intentionalism offers no distinctive solution to the problem of perception: every solution it can provide collapses into an option already available to non-intentional theories. The argument tracks a basic divide between views that posit an immediate object (or some entity constituting phenomenal character) and views that deny any such object. On the first horn, intentionalism structurally coincides with extant accounts that postulate non-ordinary objects or uninstantiated property-complexes; on the second, it collapses into a version of adverbialism. The paper thereby clarifies the dialectic, provides a systematic taxonomy, and undermines the “fourth option” claim.

Keywords

• problem of perception
• intentionalism
• hallucination
• illusion
• adverbialism
• naive realism

Algı Kuramı Olarak Yönelimselcilik Aleyhine Bir Argüman

Abstract

Algı problemi, özellikle halüsinasyon ve illüzyon örneklerinde, fenomenal karakterin ne tarafından oluşturulduğu sorusu olarak belirir: Karşımızda sandığımız nesne yoksa, deneyimde bize ne sunulur? Literatürde yönelimselcilik çoğu kez duyu-verisi kuramı, naif gerçekçilik ve zarfçılığa dördüncü bir alternatif olarak sunulur. Bu makale bu ortodoksiye itiraz etmekte ve şu temel iddiayı savunmaktadır: Yönelimselcilik algı problemine özgün bir çözüm sunmaz; sunabileceği tüm çözümler, yönelimsel olmayan kuramların zaten benimseyebileceği seçeneklere indirgenir. Argüman, (i) dolaysız bir objeyi (veya fenomenal karakteri oluşturan bir varlığı) kabul eden yaklaşımlarla (ii) dolaysız objeyi reddeden yaklaşımlar arasındaki ayrımı izler. İlk durumda yönelimselcilik, sıradan olmayan bir obje ya da gerçekleşmemiş özellik-kompleksi postüle eden mevcut kuramlarla yapısal olarak çakışır; ikinci durumda ise zarfçılığın bir versiyonuna çöker. Sonuç olarak yönelimselcilik, rakiplerine gerçek bir alternatif olamaz. Böylece makale, tartışmayı “yönelimsel içerik” etrafındaki belirsizliklerden arındırarak, algı kuramlarının algı problemine verdikleri yanıtları sistematik bir taksonomi içinde karşılaştırmakta, literatürdeki “dördüncü seçenek” iddiasını zayıflatmakta ve bunun metodolojik sonuçlarını da ortaya koymaktadır.

Keywords

• algı problemi
• yönelimselcilik
• halüsinasyon
• illüzyon
• zarfçılık
• naif gerçekçilik

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