Nörofenomenoloji: Zor Problem için Metodolojik Bir Çözüm Yolu (Francisco J. Varela)

Abstract

Bu makale, Chalmers’ın temel iddialarından biriyle başlar: Birinci elden deneyim indirgenemez bir fenomenler alanıdır. Bu uçurumu kapatabilecek teorik bir çözüm ya da doğada fazladan bir bileşen olmadığını öne sürüyorum. Bunun yerine, bilinç fenomenleri, keşif ve analizi için titiz bir yöntem ve açık bir pragmatiğe ihtiyaç duyar. Fenomenolojinin araştırma tarzından ilham alan ve “nörofenomenoloji” adını verdiğim yaklaşımım, deneyimde açığa çıkan fenomenler ile bilişsel bilimler tarafından ortaya konan korelasyonel fenomenler alanı arasındaki karşılıklı kısıtlamalar aracılığıyla açıklamalar geliştirmeyi hedefler. Bu yöntemin daha geniş bir araştırma topluluğunda geliştirilmesi ve ilerletilmesi gerekir.

Keywords

• nörofenomenoloji
• fenomenoloji
• bilinç
• deneyim
• zor problem

Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem (Francisco J. Varela)

Abstract

This paper starts with one of Chalmers basic points: first-hand experience is an irreducible field of phenomena. I claim there is no theoretical fix or extra ingredient in nature that can possibly bridge this gap. Instead, the field of conscious phenomena requires a rigorous method and an explicit pragmatics for its exploration and analysis. My proposed approach, inspired by the style of inquiry of phenomenology, I have called neurophenomenology. It seeks articulations by mutual constraints between phenomena present in experience and the correlative field of phenomena established by the cognitive sciences. It needs to expand into a widening research community in which the method is cultivated further.

Keywords

• neurophenomenology
• phenomenology
• consciousness
• experience
• hard problem

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