Where Does Turkey Stand in the Quest for Civilian Nuclear Energy in the Middle East?

Year 2017, Volume: 22 Issue: 2, 85 - 106, 01.08.2017

Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney

Abstract

Some Middle Eastern states have proposed massive projects for building nuclear power plants NPP as part of their energy security plans to cut down reliance on electricity production from gas or hydro resources. The gold standard of attaining nuclear energy was introduced to the region by the UAE’s experience and then Turkey came up with the BOO model of acquisition for its first NPP. The attraction of the BOO model is not only the financial relief that it brings for the aspirant country, but also the non-proliferation characteristics it carries. Turkey’s second attempt at a BOT model nuclear plant is also in line with its aim of developing civilian nuclear energy, along with international nonproliferation frameworks. This paper examines why and how Turkey launched its civilian nuclear project as part of its energy supply security trajectory and where it currently stands in the Middle East from the perspective of nuclear non-proliferation

Keywords

Akkuyu, ATMEA1, Russian Federation, Turkey, Japan, BOO, BOT.

References

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• 2 Ibid.
• 3 Ibid.
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• 6 “Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Turkey: 2016”, Ibid.
• 7 Ibid.
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• 9 Turkey is dependent on gas pipeline imports from the Russian Federation 55.1 %, from Iran 16.2 % and from Azerbaijan 12.8 % but also LNG imports from Algeria 8.1 % and Nigeria 2.9 %,; Ibid, p.11.
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• 12 Ibid.
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• 15 Later on, in June 2010 nuclear cooperation agreement with South Korea and then in April 2012 two similar agreements with China signed.
• 16 After Özal’s election, the Turkish parliment passed Law No: 3096. According to this law, private enterprises were allowed to enter the industry by building new generation, transmission and distribution facilities under the build-operate-transfer (BOT) model. See: “Akkuyu Nuclear Plant: What Exactly is Going On?”, at https://turkeywonk. wordpress.com/2014/04/16/the-akkuyu-nuclear-plant-what-exactly-is-going-on/ (last visited 4 February 2017).
• 17 Ibid.
• 18 According to this Law the vendor would be required to negotiate a bilateral arrangement to sell a certain amount of the energy that is planned to be produced at the site for up to fifteen years, directly to TETAŞ-which would then be expected to distribute it to the country. This law was a variation on the 1984, 1986 and 1999 BOT/BOO related legislation.
• 19 Stefamnia Jourdan Cara, “Nuclear Construction 1st Nuclear Power...”, op.cit.
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• 21 Ibid.
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• 24 The Turkey-Russia Intergovernmental Agreement that provides the legal framework for the nuclear power Project includes no direct compensation provisions. But it does incorporate provisions for the international arbitration of disputes. Besides, Turkey and Russia also have a bilateral agreement for the protection of mutual investments that could be used to initiate compensation claims.See, Sinan Ulgen, “Is this the End of MoscowAnkara Nuclear Cooperation?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, at http://thebulletin.org/ end-moscow-ankara-nuclear-cooperation9059 (last visited 13 January 2017).
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• 26 Ibid.
• 27 Ibid.
• 28 Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Energy Resources and Natural Resources, “The BuildOwn-Operate (BOO) Approach: Advantages and Challenges”, at https://www.iaea. org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2014/2014-02-04-02-07-TM-INIG/Presentations/35_S7_Turkey_Camas.pdf (last visited 23 January 2017).
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• 32 Ibid.
• 33 Dina Esfandiary and Gawdat Bahgat are among the eminent experts who supported the 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement and have explained the reasons of why it will not lead to nuclear cascade. See, Dina Esfandiary, “Why Nuclear Dominoes Won’t Fall in the Middle East?”, at http://thebulletin.org/why-nuclear-dominoes-wont-fall-middleeast8236 (last visited 3 February 2017); Gawdat Bahgat, “Iran’s Nuclear Dael: Implications of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”, at https://www.files.ethz.ch/ isn/192743/ISN_192562_en.pdf (last visited 11 January 2017).
• 34 Emily Landau is among the eminent experts who have frequently touched on the likely security risks related with the 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement. See, Emily Landau, “What 29 Top US Scientiests don’t Know?”, The Times of Israel, 10 August 2015.
• 35 Dina Esfandiary, “Dominoes Won’t Fall in the Middle East?”.
• 36 Ibid.
• 37 Ibid.
• 38 Ibid.
• 39 Ebinger, Massy, Banks and Avasarala, “Energy Security Initiative”.
• 40 Ibid.
• 41 Ibid.
• 42 Alison Macfairlane, “Where, How, and Why Will Nuclear Happen?”, in Adam N. Stulberg and Matrew Fuhrmann (eds.), The Nuclear Renaissance and International Security, Standford University Press, California, 2013, p. 54.
• 43 Ebinger, Massy, Banks and Avasarala, ‘‘Energy Security Initiative”