CHALLENGES OF CHANGE: HOW CAN THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTE TO A “CULTURE OF PROTECTION” IN PEACE OPERATIONS?

Abstract

"The humanitarian impact of the armed conflict for the 4.6 million inhabitants of Ituri has been catastrophic. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, between 500,000 and 600,000 internally displaced persons - many of who remain in hiding and cannot be accounted for - in addition to nearly 100,000 refugees from Uganda and the Sudan, are dispersed throughout the area. Since the first major onslaught of violence in June 1999, the death toll has been estimated at more than 60,000, and countless others have been left maimed or severely mutilated." United Nations, Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 27 May 2003.

References

1. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in
2. Armed conflict (S/2001/331), 30 March 2001, par. 5.
3. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict
4. (S/1999/957), 8 September 1999. Barbara Crossette, Annan Sets Up Panel to Study U.N.'s Peacekeeping Predicament, New York Times, 8 March 2000. United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305, S/2000/809, 21 August
5. (hereafter referred to as the Brahimi Report). Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect
6. IDRC, Ottawa, December 2001, p.32, par. 4.18 (hereafter refered to as The Responsibility to Protect).
7. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable
8. Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, A/52/871-S/1998/318, par.20.

9. John MacKinlay, Beyond the Logjam: A Doctrine for Complex Emergencies, in Max Manwaring and John
10. Fishel (eds.) Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder: Challenges and Lessons of Peace Operations
11. London, Frank Cass, 1998, pp. 118-119. 8 Ibid, p. 298.
12. The Responsibility to Protect, op cit. Ibid, p.37, par. 4.41.
13. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, The Danger of Ignoring Congo, Los Angeles Times, 11 June 2003.
14. UN Security Council Resolution 1484, S/RES/1484 (2003), 30 May 2003, par. 1, 4.
15. Congolese Patriotic Union (Union des Patriotes Congolais).
16. Alpha Sow, Achievements of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force and future scenarios, paper
17. presented at an ISS workshop on MONUC and peace implementation in the DRC, Pretoria, 17-19 September 2003.
18. On 28 July 2003, the Security Council adopted resolution 1493 which, inter alia, extended the mandate of
19. MONUC until 30 July 2004, increased the military strength to 10,800 and (acting under Chapter VII) authorized
20. MONUC to use all necessary means to fulfil its mandate in Ituri and North and South Kivu. It may be argued
21. that MONUC already had a Chapter VII mandate (see reference to Resolution 1291 (2000) below). Although
22. the previous Rules of Engagement did not need a major change with the new mandate, their interpretation and
23. application on the ground needed to be adjusted very quickly. IRIN, DRC: Interview with Brig-Gen Jern Isberg, acting Ituri Brigade commander, Bunia, 3 September 2003. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect
24. IDRC, Ottawa, December 2001, p.37, para 4.19. Colonel Lawrence Smith, MONUC Sector 5 Commander, speaking at an ISS workshop on MONUC and peace implementation in the DRC, Pretoria, 17-19 September 2003..
25. There is a substantial difference, however, between the two cases: In the case of East Timor, a final status is
26. envisaged (full independence). In the case of Kosovo, no such final status had yet been agreed upon, and in
27. principle, the suspension of Yugoslav sovereignty over the province as specified in Resolution 1244 (1999) was a temporal measure.
28. The idea, as introduced by the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in August
29. was to protect threatened communities in their place of residence in order to prevent armed attacks, forced
30. population movements, harassment, arbitrary arrests and killings. See United Nations, Report of the Secretary
31. General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, A/54/549, 15 November 1999, pp. 17-18.
32. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1289, S/RES/1289 (2000), 7 February 2000, par.10. 23
33. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1291, S/RES/1291 (2000) 25 February 2000, par. 8. The fact
34. that this mandate was never implemented was vividly demonstrated to the world via the brutal massacres of
35. civilians in and around the town of Bunia during May 2003. The 400-strong Uruguayan contingent of UN
36. soldiers could do nothing but protect their compound. The militiamen showed complete contempt for the UN
37. soldiers, and what remained of the civilian population also had little regard for the peacekeepers. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1296, S/RES/1296 (2000), 19 April 2000, par. 13.
38. S/2001/331, 30 March 2001, op cit, pp. 2 - 8.
39. Tobias Vogel, The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance
40. jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a018.htm> posted on 3 September 1996, p. 4. A/54/549, 15 November 1999, op cit.
41. Barbara Crossette, U.N. Details Its Failure to Stop '95 Bosnia Massacre, New York Times, 16 November 1999. 29 Ibid. Brahimi Report, par. 50.
42. United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations peace operations, A/55/502, 20 October 2000, par. 7. (e).
43. Karl Deutch, Politics and Government: How people decide their fate, 3rd Edition, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1980, p.13. 33 Ibid, p. 15.
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46. Today, August-September 1995, pp. 171-174. Mats Berdal, Armies in International Peacekeeping, Paper presented at a conference on Taking the South
47. African Army into the Future, ISS/S.A. Army, Pretoria, 15 November 1993.
48. On the phenomenon of spoilers in peace processes, see Stephen Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1, Fall 1997. Again, the DRC provides an excellent example of the nexus between prolonged conflict, human insecurity, and the illegal exploitatioin of natural resources.
49. Robert Bunker, Failed State Operational Environment Concepts, Military Review, Vol. 77, No. 5, 1997, p. 90. Alpha Sow, op cit.
50. (UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs) Integrated Regional Information Network.
51. IRIN, DRC: Interview with Brig-Gen Jern Isberg, op cit. IRIN, DRC: Protection, water and food are priorities in Bunia, Goma, 13 May 2003. “Poor child”. Alpha Sow, op cit.
52. United Nations General Assembly, Protection of children affected by armed conflict: Report of the Special
53. Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, A/54/30, New York, 1 October 1999, par. 29-30.
54. Walter Jones and Steven Rosen, The Logic of International Relations, 4th Edition, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1982, p. 455
55. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Remarks to the Fourth Committee, 15 October 2003.