Big Tech Marketlerdeki Öldürücü Devralmalarda Yetersiz Denetim: AB Birleşme & Devralma Tüzüğünün Yeniden Değerlendirilmesi

Year 2024, Volume: 44 Issue: 1, 253 - 280, 21.08.2024

Ahmet Selim Kızılay

Abstract

Rekabet hukuku belirli pazarlarda faaliyet gösteren teşebbüsleri kontrol etmeye yönelik geniş bir kurallar bütününden oluşur. Bu çalışma rekabet denetiminden kaçırılan ve aynı zamanda “öldürücü devralmalar” olarak bilinen, büyük işletmelerin yenilikçi girişimleri (start-up) sadece pazar dışı bırakmayı ve bilhassa gelecekteki bir rekabeti ön almayı amaçlayan devralma hareketlerini kontrol altına almak adına AB Birleşme-Devralma Tüzüğü kurallarının yeniden düşünülmesinin gerekli olup olmadığını tartışmaktadır. Rekabet denetimi radarının altında kalan ve belirli mal ve hizmet sektörlerinde oluşturulan bu “öldürücü” nitelikteki devralmalar ile bunların önlenmesine karşı mevcut düzenlemeler yetersiz kalmaktadır. Çalışma aynı zamanda yenilikçi pazar ortamı yapısına ve nihayet tüketicilerin refahı üzerinde muhtemel zararlı etkilere yol açabilecek bu öldürücü stratejilere karşı yerel rekabet otoritelerince birleşme-devralma izinlerinin değerlendirilmesinde kullanılabilecek yeni yöntemlere işaret edecektir. Dijital pazarlardaki yeni nesil ürünler karşısında geleneksel kurallar etkin çözümlerin gerisinde kalabilir. Teorik arka plan, AB üye devletler düzeyinde alınan önlemler ve son dönemde rekabet hukuku araçlarının güçlendirilmesi yönündeki AB düzeyindeki çağrılara yer verildikten sonra halihazırdaki mevzuatın teknoloji devleri, örneğin GAFAM beşlisi, üzerinde yakından bir takibin ne denli eksik kaldığı gösterilecek ve adil bir rekabet ortamı için önerilerde bulunulacaktır.

Keywords

Öldürücü devralmalar, teknoloji devleri, birleşme & devralmalar, Avrupa Birliği Birleşme-Devralmalar Tüzüğü (EUMR)

Lack of Effective Control on Killer Acquisitions in the Big Tech Market under EU Framework: Rethinking of EUMR Rules?

Abstract

Antitrust enforcement comprises a wide body of rules to control undertakings operating in specific markets. This study examines whether any rethinking of the EU Merger Regulation rules is required to capture transactions escaping antitrust scrutiny, also referred to as “killer acquisitions” where large incumbents buy out innovative start-ups with the principal incentive to pre-empt competition restraint in the future. Existing measures aim to exercise a sort of control for acquisitions that fly under the antitrust radar and fall short of addressing and preventing “killer” intentions occurring in specific product and service markets. It will further call for reform on the approach that competition authorities take while reviewing merger filings to adjust the tools for a better fit to scrutinize such killing strategies which would potentially result in harmful effects to the innovative market structure and eventually to consumer welfare. With the new generation of products in the digital markets, the traditional rules of competition law might fall short of effective solutions. Once given the theoretical background and the measures adopted at the Member State level and recent calls for strengthening competition law tools at the EU level, we aim to demonstrate the inadequacy of the existing rules to address the need for closer scrutiny over the tech giants, i.e., the GAFAM five, and we suggest adapted tools to ensure fair competition.

Keywords

Killer acquisitions, big tech, mergers & acquisitions, European Union Merger Regulation (EUMR)

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