REASONS FOR FAILURE OF AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Year 2022, Volume: 32 Issue: 2, 217 - 244, 29.12.2022

Fikret Bayır

https://doi.org/10.54078/savsad.1081896

Abstract

This study aims to investigate the reasons for the inadequacy of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), formed by the multinational military force under the command of NATO. For this purpose, the security situation in Afghanistan in the last twenty years has been examined in three periods. The first period is International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations from 2001 to 2010. During this period, ISAF took on the task of both ensuring national security and establishing the ANSF. The second period is the “transition” period between 2011 and 2014, in which security responsibility is transferred. The last period is when ANSF assumed the responsibility of the country's security. In order to understand the security and establishment/operation processes of the ANSF in all three periods, interviews were conducted with 28 officers (currently retired) assigned to the region by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). According to the results, ISAF could not stop the increasing attacks of the Taliban in the first period and could not seize the military initiative. The ANSF, which was formed in this period, entered the transition period before it could gain full operational competence due to a lack of training and equipment. Hearing that the United States of America (USA) started negotiations with the Taliban during the transition period was met with suspicion in the ANSF and negatively affected the operations. In the third period when the ANSF assumed security responsibility, the Taliban attacks continued to increase, and as a result, international forces withdrew from the country in September 2021, leaving Afghanistan to the Taliban. Other factors affecting the failure of the ANSF are the inability to set law and order in the country, the inability to prevent corruption, the lack of unity and solidarity among ethnic groups, and the lack of "national consciousness"

Keywords

Afghanistan, NATO, Security, Taliban

Afganistan Ulusal Güvenlik Kuvvetlerinin Başarısızlık Nedenleri

Abstract

Bu çalışmanın amacı, NATO komutasındaki çok uluslu askeri gücün oluşturduğu Afgan Ulusal Güvenlik Kuvvetlerinin (AUGK), ülke güvenliğini sağlamada yetersiz kalmasının nedenlerini araştırmaktır. Bu amaçla, Afganistan’ın son yirmi yıllık süreçteki güvenlik durumu, üç dönem halinde incelenmiştir. İlk dönem, 2001-2010 yılları arasındaki ISAF(Uluslararası Güvenlik Destek Kuvveti) operasyonlarını içermektedir. Bu dönemde ISAF hem ülke güvenliğini sağlama, hem de AUGK’ni oluşturma görevini almıştır. İkinci dönem 2011-2014 yılları arasında, sorumluluğun devir-teslim edildiği “geçiş” dönemidir. Son dönem ise AUGK’nin ülke güvenlik sorumluluğunu üstlendiği dönemdir. Her üç dönemdeki güvenlik ve AUGK’nin kuruluş/operasyon süreçlerini anlamak için, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerince bölgede görevlendirilmiş 28 subay (halen emekli) ile mülakat yapılmıştır. Elde edilen sonuçlara göre, ilk dönemde ISAF, Taliban’ın gittikçe artan saldırılarını durduramamış ve inisiyatifi ele geçirememiştir. Bu dönemde oluşturulan AUGK, eğitim ve donatım noksanlıkları nedeniyle tam olarak harekât yetkinliği kazanamadan, geçiş dönemine girilmiştir. Geçiş döneminde ABD’nin Taliban ile görüşmelere başladığının duyulması, AUGK’de şüpheyle karşılanmış ve operasyonları olumsuz etkilemiştir. AUGK’nin sorumluluğu üstlendiği üçüncü dönemde de Taliban saldırıları artarak devam etmiş ve sonuç olarak uluslararası güçler, Eylül 2021’de ülkeyi Taliban’a terk ederek çekilmiştir. AUGK’nin başarısızlığına etki eden diğer faktörler olarak; ülkede kamu otoritesi, kanun ve nizamın hâkim kılınamaması, yolsuzlukların önlenememesi, etnik yapılar arasında birlik ve beraberlik sağlanamaması ile “ulus bilinci” oluşmamış olması gibi konular belirtilmiştir.

Keywords

Afganistan, Güvenlik, NATO, Taliban

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