Year 2018, Volume 0, Issue 2, Pages 17 - 34 2018-10-04

Doğruluk Koşulu Bilginin Sarsılabilirlik Kuramları için Gereksiz midir?
Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge?

Uğur Aytaç [1]

36 150

Sarsılabilirlik kuramları makul bir bilgi tanımına ulaşabilmek için hatalı gerekçelendirmelere dayalı doğru inançları eleme stratejisini güder. Farklı felsefeciler kendilerine özgü sarsılabilirlik anlayışları geliştirmiştir. Sarsılmaz gerekçelendirmeler hiçbir zaman yanlış inançların dayanağı olmadığından Zagzebski (1994) katı sarsılabilirlik şartının inancın doğruluğu ile gerekçelendirilmesi arasındaki bağımsızlığı ortadan kaldırdığını ifade eder. Bunu takiben, Zagzebski ve yine benzer görüşleri savunan bazı felsefeciler (ör. Merricks, 1995) sarsılmaz gerekçelendirmenin zorunlu olarak doğruluğu beraberinde getirdiği sonucuna varır. Bu makalede, sarsılmaz gerekçelendirmelerin her zaman doğru inanca ulaşmaması durumuna örnek göstererek, doğruluk koşulunun lüzumsuz olmadığını iddia ediyorum. İddiama göre metafizik sorulara (örneğin: Tanrı var mıdır?) ilişkin inançlar sarsılmaz gerekçelendirmelere sahip olabilirler. Buna rağmen söz konusu gerekçelendirmeler destekledikleri inançlara doğruluk atfedemez.

Defeasibility theories aim to reach a plausible definition of knowledge by finding strategies to exclude true beliefs based on faulty justifications. Different philosophers have advanced with their own understandings of undefeated justification. Zagzebski (1994) indicates that the strong defeasibility condition violates independence between truth and justification because undefeated justification never leads to false beliefs. Following this, Zagzebski and some other philosophers who pursue a similar line of reasoning (e.g., Merricks, 1995) conclude that undefeated justification entails truth. In this paper, I argue that the truth condition is not superfluous by presenting an example of undefeated justification that does not entail truth. My claim is that beliefs about metaphysical questions (e.g., Does God exist?) can have undefeated justifications. Nonetheless, such undefeated justifications are not capable of assigning truth to the beliefs that they support.

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Primary Language en
Subjects Social
Journal Section Makaleler
Authors

Orcid: 0000-0002-4773-5472
Author: Uğur Aytaç
Institution: Amsterdam Üniversitesi, Amsterdam Sosyal Bilimler Araştırma Enstitüsü, Siyaset Bilimi
Country: The Netherlands


Bibtex @research article { kilikya467101, journal = {Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi}, issn = {}, eissn = {2148-9327}, address = {Mersin University}, year = {2018}, volume = {0}, pages = {17 - 34}, doi = {}, title = {Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge?}, key = {cite}, author = {Aytaç, Uğur} }
APA Aytaç, U . (2018). Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge?. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi, 0 (2), 17-34. Retrieved from http://dergipark.org.tr/kilikya/issue/39550/467101
MLA Aytaç, U . "Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge?". Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi 0 (2018): 17-34 <http://dergipark.org.tr/kilikya/issue/39550/467101>
Chicago Aytaç, U . "Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge?". Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi 0 (2018): 17-34
RIS TY - JOUR T1 - Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge? AU - Uğur Aytaç Y1 - 2018 PY - 2018 N1 - DO - T2 - Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi JF - Journal JO - JOR SP - 17 EP - 34 VL - 0 IS - 2 SN - -2148-9327 M3 - UR - Y2 - 2018 ER -
EndNote %0 Cilicia Journal of Philosophy Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge? %A Uğur Aytaç %T Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge? %D 2018 %J Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi %P -2148-9327 %V 0 %N 2 %R %U
ISNAD Aytaç, Uğur . "Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge?". Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi 0 / 2 (October 2018): 17-34.