TY  - JOUR
T1  - Is The Median Voter Hypothesis Valid in Developed Countries?
TT  - Gelişmiş Ülkelerde Ortanca Seçmen Hipotezi Geçerli mi?
AU  - Karadeniz, Yasin
PY  - 2025
DA  - February
Y2  - 2024
DO  - 10.25295/fsecon.1451286
JF  - Fiscaoeconomia
JO  - FSECON
PB  - Ahmet Arif EREN
WT  - DergiPark
SN  - 2564-7504
SP  - 296
EP  - 304
VL  - 9
IS  - 1
LA  - en
AB  - According to the median-voter hypothesis, the size of the public sector in terms of the redistribution of income is determined by the majority rule. This hypothesis suggests that an increase in average income relative to median income increases the size of government, because voters that have the median income are the decision-making voters. The meaning of the size of the public sector here is social expenditures, tax rates, and public debts. This paper aims to analyze the validity of the median-voter hypothesis on the basis of 24 developed countries for the period 2004-2018. Results of the analysis conducted via the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Two-Stage System Generalized Method of Moments influentially support the claims of the median voter hypothesis about social expenditures, tax rates, and public debts. Results are also valid in terms of their different versions that include control variables of the constructed master patterns.
KW  - Median Voter Hypothesis
KW  - Public Debts
KW  - Social Expenditures
KW  - Marginal Tax Rate
KW  - Dynamic Panel Data Analysis
N2  - Ortanca seçmen hipotezine göre gelirin yeniden dağıtımı açısından kamu kesimi büyüklüğü, çoğunluk kuralı tarafından belirlenir. Bu hipotez, ortalama gelirin ortanca gelire göre artışının kamu büyüklüğünü artırdığını ileri sürer. Çünkü ortanca gelire sahip olan seçmen karar verici seçmendir. Burada kamu büyüklüğünden kasıt ise, sosyal harcamalar, vergi oranları ve kamu borçlarıdır. Bu çalışma da ortanca seçmen hipotezinin geçerliliğini, 24 gelişmiş ülke üzerinden 2004-2018 dönemi için araştırmayı amaçlar. Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond İki Aşamalı Sistem Genelleştirilmiş Momentler Methodu ile yapılan analiz sonuçları; ortanca seçmen hipotezinin sosyal harcama, vergi oranları ve kamu borçlanması ile ilgili iddialarını güçlü bir şekilde desteklemektedir. Sonuçlar, kurulan ana modellerin kontrol değişkenlerini içeren farklı versiyonları açısından da geçerlidir.
CR  - Agranov, M. & Palfrey, T. R. (2015). Equilibrium tax rates and income redistribution: A laboratory study. Journal of Public Economics, 130, 45-58. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.08.008
CR  - Alesina, A. & Rodrik, D. (1994). Distributive politics and economic growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2), 465-490. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118470
CR  - Barnes, L. (2012). Does median voter income matter? The effects of inequality and turnout on government spending. Political Studies, 61(1), 82-100. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.0095
CR  - Barro, R. J. (1974). Are government bonds net wealth?. Journal of Political Economy, 82(6), 1095-1117. https://doi.org/10.1086/260266
CR  - Black, D. (1948). On the rationale of group decision-making. Journal of Political Economy, 56(1), 23-34. https://doi.org/10.1086/256633
CR  - Borge, L.-E. & Rattsø, J. (2004). Income distribution and tax structure: Empirical test of the Meltzer-Richard Hypothesis. European Economic Review, 48(4), 805-826. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2003.09.003
CR  - Bowen, H. R. (1943). The interpretation of voting in the allocation of economic resources. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 58(1), 27. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885754
CR  - Buchanan, J. M. (1958). Public principles of public debt, a defense and restatement. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin.
CR  - Colagrossi, M., Karagiannis, S. & R. Raab (2019). The median voter takes it all: Preferences for redistribution and income inequality in the EU-28. Publications Office of the European Union. Luxembourg, ISBN 978-92-76-01908-4.
CR  - Gouveia, M. & Masia, N.A. (1998). Does the median voter model explain the size of government?: Evidence from the states. Public Choice, 97, 159-177. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1004973610506
CR  - IMF (2022). Public finance in modern history. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/datasets/FPP (14.12.2022).
CR  - Larcinese, V. (2007). Voting over redistribution and the size of the welfare state: The role of turnout. Political Studies, 55(3), 568-585. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.0065
CR  - Lindert, P. H. (1996). What limits social spending?. Explorations in Economic History, 33(1), 1-34. https://doi.org/10.1006/exeh.1996.0001
CR  - Meltzer, A. H. & Richard, S. F. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 914-927. https://doi.org/10.1086/261013
CR  - Milanovic, B. (2000). The median-voter hypothesis, income inequality, and income redistribution: An empirical test with the required data. European Journal of Political Economy, 16(3), 367-410. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(00)00014-8
CR  - Modigliani, F. (1961). Long-Run implications of alternative fiscal policies and the burden of the national debt. The Economic Journal, 71(284), 730-755. https://doi.org/10.2307/2228247
CR  - OECD. (2022). General statistics; Public sector, taxation and market regulation. https://stats.oecd.org/ (14.12.2022).
CR  - Our World in Data. (2022a). Mean vs. median income or consumption. https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/mean-versus-median-monthly-per-capita-expenditure-or-income (14.12.2022)
CR  - Our World in Data. (2022b). Distribution of participatory democracy. https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/distribution-participatory-democracy-vdem?time= 2004&country=EST~CZE (14.12.2022)
CR  - Persson, T. & G. Tabellini. (1994). Is inequality harmful for growth?. American Economic Review, 84(3), 600-621. https://doi.org/10.3386/w3599
CR  - Soto, M. (2009). System GMM estimation with a small sample. Barcelona Economics. Working Paper Series, 365.
CR  - Yerdelen Tatoğlu, F. (2020). İleri panel veri analizi (Stata uygulamalı). İstanbul: Beta
CR  - Wong, M. Y. H. (2017). Median voter and power resources Revisited: A composite model of inequality. European Political Science Review, 9(4), 607-628. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175577391600014X
CR  - World Bank. (2022). World development indicators. https://databank.worldbank.org/ source/world-development-indicators (14.12.2022).
UR  - https://doi.org/10.25295/fsecon.1451286
L1  - https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/3788143
ER  -