@article{article_1613, title={TYPOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: A GAME THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE JUDICIARY IN EUROPEAN UNION’}, journal={Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi}, volume={15}, pages={137–158}, year={2007}, DOI={10.29228/mjes.181}, url={https://izlik.org/JA93KU86DD}, author={Mutlu, Erdem}, keywords={Avrupa Toplulugu Hukuku, Avrupa Toplulugu Adalet Divam, Oyun Kuramz, Tipoloji Analizi}, abstract={<p>This study aims to make a typological analysis on the European Court of Justice. Since the issue has an expansive property, it has been narrowed by keeping it within the limits of a game-theoretical approach. The game is a Bayesian Game and it has three players. The main understanding of the thesis is much concerned with legislature, executive and constitutional juridical bodies. The inter-action of players vice versa effects the structure of strategy profile for each player. The determination of strategy profiles is an outcome for the game. The conclusion is a typology for the European Court of Justice acting as a constitutional court. The main structure of the study built on theories by Thomas Bayes, John F. Nash, John Harsanyi, Joseph HH Weiler and Barry Weingast.  <br /> </p>}, number={2}