TY  - JOUR
TT  - Descartes’ Theory Of Ideas And The Existence Of The Physical World
AU  - Yalçın, ŞAHABEDDİN
PY  - 2002
DA  - December
JF  - Muğla Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi
JO  - İLKE
PB  - Muğla Sıtkı Koçman Üniversitesi
WT  - DergiPark
SN  - 1302-7824
SP  - 1
EP  - 9
IS  - 9
N2  - In this paper I argue that the problem of the existence of the physical world that Descartes faces in his epistemology is not just a methodological problem raised by the so-called ‘Evil Demon Hypothesis’, as some have argued, but rather it is a real epistemological problem which appears to be a consequence of Descartes’ theory of ideas. Descartes’ conception of ideas as representative objects in the mind, by not allowing a direct access to, that is, preventing a clear and distinct perception of, the existence of the physical objects, makes the existence of the physical world problematic in the context of the Cartesian philosophy. In the paper, I first examine Descartes’ theory of ideas, and then try to show how the problem of the existence of the physical world arises as a result of this theory. In doing this I briefly consider Descartes’ ‘proof’ of the existence of the physical world, which does not seem to be consistent with Descartes’ fundamental epistemological assumptions, especially his principle of clear and distinct perception.
UR  - https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/musbed/issue//250440
L1  - https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/217168
ER  -