TY  - JOUR
T1  - Varieties of Experiential Transparency
TT  - Deneyimsel Şeffaflığın Türleri
AU  - Demircioglu, Erhan
PY  - 2019
DA  - June
Y2  - 2019
JF  - MetaZihin: Yapay Zeka ve Zihin Felsefesi Dergisi
PB  - Murat ARICI
WT  - DergiPark
SN  - 2651-2963
SP  - 1
EP  - 31
VL  - 2
IS  - 1
LA  - en
AB  - Abstract: Considerations on the transparency of experiencein particular, and introspection in general, play a central role in thecontemporary philosophy of mind. However, despite various attempts to rectifymatters, it seems to me that appeals to transparency and introspection aresometimes mired in confusion: neither there is an explicit and generalrecognition of the fact that different transparency claims are often treated asone and the same, nor is there sufficiently robust clarity in whatintrospection itself can support. The central aim of this paper is to achievesome conceptual clarity by bringing to the surface for examination the richvariety of different experiential transparency claims that are left implicit inthe literature. The paper falls into three main sections. Section 2 discussesMoore’s views on introspection and the transparency of experience. Contracommon opinion, I argue inter aliathat Moore is concerned with showing that experience is not transparent (in a sense to be specified). Section 3 introduces“Harmanian transparency”, as it arises in the context of the debate betweenrepresentationism and phenomenism, and distinguishes it from “phenomenisttransparency.” Section 4 distinguishes two varieties of Harmanian transparency,i.e. “experiencing-act transparency” and “mental-paint transparency.”
KW  - transparency of experience
KW  - introspection
KW  - act-object model of experience
KW  - representationism
KW  - George Edward Moore
KW  - Gilbert Harman
N2  - Öz: Özelolarak “deneyimin şeffaflığı”, genel olarak ise “içgörü” üzerinedeğerlendirmeler çağdaş zihin felsefesinde merkezi bir role sahiptir. Bunakarşın, bana öyle geliyor ki, deneyimin şeffaflığı ve içgörü üzerine düşüncelertam bir netliğe kavuşmuş olmaktan uzaktır: farklı şeffaflık iddialarıarasındaki ayrımlar yeterince fark edilmemiş ve içgörünün kendi başına neyidestekleyip desteklemediği açıklıkla aydınlığa kavuşturulmamış durumdadır. Bumakalenin temel amacı, farklı şeffaflık iddiaları arasındaki zengin çeşitliliğiortaya serip tartışmaya kavramsal netlik kazandırmaktır. Makale üç temelbölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölüm, Moore’un içgörü ve deneyimin şeffaflığıüzerine görüşlerini tartışmaktadır. Genel kanının aksine, Moore’un deneyiminşeffaf olmadığını göstermeye çalıştığını iddia edeceğim. İkinci bölüm,Harman’ın şeffaflık tezinin fenomenist şeffaflık tezinden farklarına işaretetmektedir. Üçüncü bölüm ise, Harman’ın şeffaflık tezinin iki ayrı versiyonuolan “deneyimsel-eylem şeffaflığı” ve “zihinsel-tasvir şeffaflığı” arasındaayrım yapmaktadır.
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UR  - https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/metazihin/article/521297
L1  - https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/750753
ER  -