TY  - JOUR
T1  - William Alston'da İlâhî Bilginin Doğası ve Zaman
TT  - William Alston on the Nature of Divine Knowledge and Time
AU  - Tanış, Abdulkadir
PY  - 2019
DA  - December
DO  - 10.14395/hititilahiyat.551691
JF  - Hitit Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi
PB  - Hitit Üniversitesi
WT  - DergiPark
SN  - 2651-3978
SP  - 439
EP  - 464
VL  - 18
IS  - 36
LA  - tr
AB  - Çağdaş din felsefesinde ilahî bilginin doğası konusunda önemli görüşlerdenbiri William P. Alston tarafından ortaya atılmıştır. Sezgisel bilgi anlayışıolarak adlandırabileceğimiz bu bilgi anlayışının savunulmasının temelgerekçesi, onun Tanrı’nın mükemmelliğiyle daha uyumlu olmasıdır. Bu bilgianlayışı, Tanrı’nın varlık ve olgulara dair bilgisinin O’nun bu varlık veolguların doğrudan farkındalığından oluştuğunu iddia eder. Bu bilgi anlayışınıntemel vurgusu, arada Tanrı’nın kendi zihinsel temsilleri dahi hiçbir vasıtaolmaksızın O’nun her şeyi mutlak doğrudan bir farkındalıkla bildiğidir. Buyüzden, Tanrı’nın bilgisi, dolaylı olarak bilme anlamına geleceği için inançveya önerme şeklindeki öğeleri içermez. Alston’ın ilahî bilginin doğasıkonusundaki bu görüşlerinin, Tanrı-zaman ilişkisi konusunda da önemliimalarının olduğu iddia edilmiştir. Buna dayanarak bazı yorumcular sezgiselbilgi anlayışının Tanrı’nın zamansızlığını gerektirdiğini iddia ederken, bazıyorumcular da tam aksini iddia etmiştir. Bu çalışmada, sezgisel bilgianlayışının, Tanrı’nın zamansızlığı düşüncesiyle daha uyumlu görünmesine rağmen,onun ilahî bilginin doğasını açıklama konusunda yetersiz olduğu iddia edilecekve bu iddia için temel olarak iki gerekçe ileri sürülecektir. Sezgisel bilgianlayışı kabul edilirse, ilk olarak, bunun Tanrı’nın bilgisinin kapsamıkonusunda bir sınırlılık yarattığı; ikinci olarak, Tanrı ve yaratılmışvarlıklar arasındaki farklı varlık modunun nasıl korunacağı probleminin ortayaçıktığı gösterilmeye çalışılacaktır. Bu yüzden, Alston’ın savunduğu şekliylesezgisel bilgi anlayışının ilahî bilginin doğasını açıklama konusunda doyurucuolmadığı söylenecektir.
KW  - Din Felsefesi
KW  - Tanrı’nın Doğası
KW  - Tanrı’nın Sıfatları
KW  - William Alston
KW  - Sezgisel Bilgi Anlayışı
N2  - In the contemporary philosophy of religion,William P. Alston has proposed one of the most important views on the nature ofdivine knowledge. The basic reason for the view, which can be called asintuitive conception of knowledge, is that it is the perfect way to explain thenature of divine knowledge. According to the view, divine knowledge related to an entity or afact is simply the immediate awareness of that entity or fact. The basicemphasis of intuitive conception of knowledge is that God knows all things withabsolute immediate awareness, even without God’s own mental representations.Therefore, divine knowledge does not include any belief or proposition since itimplies indirectly knowing. It has been argued that these claims of Alstonabout the nature of divine knowledge have important implications for therelation between God and time. From this point of view, some thinkers haveclaimed that intuitive conception of knowledge requires God’s timelessness,while others have claimed the opposite. In this study, although intuitiveconception of knowledge seems more compatible with God’s timelessness, I will arguethat it is insufficient to explain the nature of divine knowledge. And I willgive two reasons for this claim. If intuitive conception of knowledge isaccepted, (i) it will limit theextent of divine knowledge and (ii)it cannot be preserved the different mode of being between God and temporalbeings. Thus, I will conclude that intuitive conception of knowledge asdescribed by Alston is not satisfactory in explaining the nature of God.SummaryOne of the most important views in thecontemporary philosophy of religion on the nature of divine knowledge has beenasserted by William Alston. The view, which can be called as intuitive conceptionof knowledge, has been put forward in order to oppose the traditional view thatdivine knowledge contains some beliefs, propositions and internalrepresentations, etc. According to intuitive conception of knowledge, God'sknowledge of a fact consists of direct awareness of the fact in question.Direct awareness refers to the fact that the known entity or fact is bodilypresent to God's consciousness directly. The most important reason underlyingAlston's use of intuitive conception of knowledge is that it is the perfect wayto explain the nature of divine knowledge. According to him, God’s knowing afact or an entity through a proposition, belief, or mental representation wouldnot mean perfection for him since his knowledge would have been mediated byanother means in such a case. Therefore, intuitive conception of knowledge,which means absolute immediate awareness, is the model of knowledge that bestsuits God's perfection. The concept of intuitive knowledge advocated byAlston can be seriously challenged in two respects. First of all, the claimthat the intuitive knowledge model is based, that the known fact or entity is bodilypresent to the consciousness of the knowing subject will create significantproblems in terms of the classical assumptions of theism. The most fundamentalchallenge is how to preserve the different mode of being presupposed betweenGod and temporal beings when intuitive conception of knowledge is accepted.Accordingly, theism has a sharp ontological distinction between God and temporalbeings, assuming that they have very different modes of being in theirrelations to time. But the assumption that the temporal being is bodily presentto God’s consciousness implies that the temporal being is present to God’sconsciousness with its temporal characteristics. In this way, the fact that thetemporal being is bodily present to God indicates either (i) that God is temporal with this being or (ii) that the temporal being is in fact timeless. Indeed,philosophers like William Hasker try to justify God's temporality based on intuitiveconception of knowledge. Although Alston defends the idea that “a fact’s beingpresent to God directly or bodily does not mean that God shares the same modeof being with this fact”, he is unable to show how it is possible. Moreover,the idea that the known fact or entity is bodily present to God's consciousnessimplies that the fact or entity in question is immanent to God. Especially, theexample of “self-awareness of one's own consciousness states” given to explain intuitiveconception of knowledge is remarkable. Because this example is generallypresented as a situation in which the knowing-known distinction is eliminated.Given these considerations, how will the fundamental theistic idea that temporalbeings and God have ontologically different mode of being, be protected? We canunderline that the intuitive model of knowledge tries to eliminate the means suchas beliefs or propositions in divine knowledge and to bring the knowing subjectand the known object closer in order to explain the nature of divine knowledgein a perfect way. However, it is so controversial how far the intuitive modelof knowledge can preserve the different mode of being between God and temporalbeings which theism presupposes. Second, if we accept an intuitive conception ofknowledge, it seems inevitable to limit the extent of divine knowledge. Forexample, consider counterfactual situations. Can God have knowledge ofcounterfactual situations? God should not have such knowledge in terms of intuitiveconception of knowledge. For intuitive conception of knowledge assumes that theknown fact is present to the consciousness of the person who knows directly.But counterfactuals do not exist actually. Thus, if God's knowledge consists onlyof intuitive knowledge, then He will not know any counterfactual because thereis no being to be present to Him. For divine knowledge should consist of somepropositions or mental representations to know situations such as “Actual worldinstead being as it is, it could have been such and such” or “if x had chosen b instead of a, it wouldhave been such and such”. Therefore, if the whole of divine knowledge isinterpreted as intuitive, it seems a necessity to limit his knowledge to theactual situation. In other words, if the whole of divine knowledge is intuitivedirect knowledge, and this knowledge requires that the known fact is bodilypresent to God, then divine knowledge will only cover the knowledge of thefacts which have already existed.
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UR  - https://doi.org/10.14395/hititilahiyat.551691
L1  - https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/848150
ER  -