

POLICE INTEGRITY IN THE TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS: NARCOTICS AND PREVENTION OF SMUGGLING DIRECTORATE POLICE OFFICERS' PERCEPTIONS

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Abstract

Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate, which is one of the twelve police directorates in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) Police Organization, is the police unit that combating drugs in TRNC. This article explores Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate police officers' perceptions about police ethics in TRNC, by using the second version of international police integrity questionnaire developed by Klockars and colleagues. The questionnaire administered to police officers which employed in Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate in December 2013. Firstly, police officers evaluated eleven hypothetical scenarios. After reviewing each scenario, the respondents were asked to report; own and others' evaluations of its seriousness, knowledge of official rules, views about appropriate and expected discipline, and own and others' willingness to report the misconduct. The respondents evaluated scenarios described in the questionnaire to range in seriousness from the least serious to the most serious. Unlike the results of similar surveys, in three scenarios (failure to arrest friend with warrant, cover-up of police driving under the influence accident, and sergeant fails to halt beating of child abuser) respondents tended to have a higher view of the integrity of colleagues compared to their own position. According to the results most of the respondents supported and expected dismissal for the theft of knife from crime scene and auto-body shop 5% kickback scenarios; they only supported dismissal for unjustifiable use of deadly force scenario; and they only expected dismissal for false report on drug on dealer scenario. Although most of the respondents supported and expected some discipline for the rest scenarios described in the questionnaire. We also measured the contours of the code of silence and found that the code was much stronger for the behaviors evaluated as the least serious and the weakest for the behaviors evaluated as the most serious. Finally, we found that, most of the respondents believed that other officers in their directorate would be much more likely to protect all these behaviors -except unjustifiable use of deadly force, verbal abuse, cover-up of police driving under the influence accident, and sergeant fails to halt beating of child abuser - in the code of silence than they themselves would.

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Introduction

The island of Cyprus is located in the intersection of Europe-Asia and Africa. Politically and culturally it is European whereas it is geographically Middle Eastern. It is the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea. TRNC is located in the north of island and declared independency in 1983¹. TRNC has 35.04 % of the territory of the island with 3242 km² land area (İlseven et al., 2012: 6). According to the results of the census that was performed in December of 2011, de-facto population of TRNC is 294,396 inhabitants (SPO, 2012: 2)². The Gross National Product per capita is \$-13,721 in 2015 (SPO, 2017: 3). The official language is Turkish and the capital is Nicosia³, while currency used is the Turkish Lira. The main population of the TRNC is consist of the Turkish Cypriot natives and Anatolian-rooted Turkish immigrants⁴, and islam is the most dominant religion in the TRNC⁵. Due to its historic background and experiences, the power of central administration is deeply rooted in TRNC.

The police organization in TRNC is lead by the Prime Minister through the Commander of the Security Forces Commandership (Police Law, 1984: Article 3). The Police fulfill their functions under the Commander of Security Forces. The Commander of Security Forces is responsible for the overall work performance, administration, supervision, and inspection of the organization (Police Law, 1984: Article 3). The organization has central and district forces. District organization consists of 5 district police

¹ Turkish Cypriots established various political governing bodies under the names of; "General Committee" (from 21 December 1963 to 28 December 1967); "Temporary Cyprus Turkish Administration" (from 28 December 1967 to 21 December 1971); "Cyprus Turkish Administration" (from 21 December 1971 to 1 October 1974); "Autonomous Cyprus Turkish Administration" (from 1 October 1974 to 13 February 1975); and the Turkish Federate State of Cyprus (from 13 February 1975 to 15 November 1983) until 1983 (MONEYAS, 2010: 47). In this period, prior they accepted Basic Rules in 28 December 1967 as a miniature constitution, and after the Peace Operation they accepted the Turkish Federate State of Cyprus Constitution in 8 June 1975 (TFSC Constitution, 1975). Finally, Turkish Cypriots declared the establishment of the TRNC, and accepted the TRNC Constitution in 5 May 1985 (TRNC Constitution, 1985).

² 2015 estimate population of TRNC is 326,158 inhabitants (A new mid-year population estimate series has been prepared based on the 2006 and 2011 Population and Housing Unit Census) (SPO, 2017: 3).

³ The TRNC is divided into six districts namely Nicosia (Lefkoşa), Famagusta (Gazimağusa), Kyrenia (Girne), Morphou (Güzelyurt), Trikomo (İskele), and Lefka (Lefke).

⁴ Additional population of the island is consist of the laborers from Turkey and from other countries and students from different countries -at most from Turkey- who came over to pursue educational opportunities. In addition 311 Cypriot Greeks (Dayıoğlu, 2014: 37) and 156 Cypriot Maronites lives in TRNC (Dayıoğlu, 2014: 89).

⁵ Turkish Cypriot natives and Anatolian-rooted Turkish immigrants are Muslims, Cypriot Greeks are Orthodox Christians, and Cypriot Maronites are Maronite Christians.

directorates reporting to the 1st Assistant Chief of Police. Central organization has 12 directorates, out of which 3 report directly to Chief Commandant of Police and 9 report to 1st Assistant Chief of Police. Central organization has also the Supervisory Board and the Research and Development Unit reporting to the 2nd Assistant Chief of Police. Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate, which is one of the 3 police directorates that report directly to Chief Commandant of Police, is combating drugs in TRNC.

This research explores the contours of police integrity among the police officers in the Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate in TRNC. It begins with a short history of policing in Cyprus and TRNC Police. Then, it gives information about the foundation and development of the Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate and how it fights against drugs in TRNC. After that it explains the methodology of the measurement of police integrity. Finally, the study provides a measurement of the level of police integrity among the Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate police officers.

Short History of Policing in Cyprus and TRNC Police

The history of the police in Cyprus began in the Ottomans period (1571-1878)⁶. When the administration of the island was handed over from Ottoman Empire to the United Kingdom in 1878, there was already a security force on the island, which was called “Zaptiah Organization” consisting of mostly the Turks (Kayabaşı, 2016). This organization was reorganised in few years by the British and became known as the “Cyprus Military Police Force” (Kayabaşı, 2016). During the restructuring in 1st January 1935, the title of the Police was changed from the “Cyprus Military Police” to the “Cyprus Police Force” and the police uniforms, training, standarts, ranks, and equipment also changed (King, 1936: 4).

After the Greek Cypriot police officers’ decisions to support a faction of National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston (Eoka⁷)) which was formed on 1st April 1955, which resulted in police failure to prevent crimes, a group of British police experts, the

⁶ For more information see KAYABAŞI, Osman (2016). The Building Of The Cyprus Military Police During The Period Of Transition From The Ottoman Empire To The British Administration (1878-1881), “The 1st International Mediterranean Karpasia Symposium” In History Cyprus, April 11-13, 2016, Mediterranean Karpasia University, Journal Of History Studies, Turkish National Police Academy, Nicosia, TRNC.

⁷ Eoka was a Greek Cypriot nationalist guerrilla organization that fought a campaign for the end of British rule and also Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, for the island’s self-determination, and for the eventual union with Greece.

“Cyprus Police Commission”, visited the island in 1956, to examine the organization and advised to implement the Anglo-Saxon law enforcement system (Armstrong, 1956: 1-48).

When the British government decided to evacuate the island, they revised the Police Law in 1958. In 1959, all laws enacted during United Kingdom colonial period was revised and published in 354 chapters and 6 volumes. Police Law was included in this publication, referred to as “Chapter 285, Police Law”. The British left in 1960 with two British military bases remaining on the island, and the administration was transferred to the Republic of Cyprus which was composed of two ethno-national communities (Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots).

Different from the United Kingdom colonial period, according to the Zurich and London Agreements which provided the legal base for the formation of the new republic, the new law enforcement was supposed to consist of two different organizations; police and gendarmerie. The staffs of the new organizations were supposed to be 70% Greek Cypriots and 30% Turkish Cypriots. When the creation of the new state was announced on 16th August 1960, Cyprus Police Force was also formed, urban areas being under the responsibility of the police and rural areas being under the responsibility of the gendarmerie. Commander of the police was Greek Cypriot and the commander of the gendarmerie was Turkish Cypriot.

On 21st December 1963, the reactivation of Eoka, resulted in disintegration between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities of the island which forced the Turkish police officers to retreat to Turkish populated areas and Greek police officers to retreat to Greek populated areas. This enabled them, aside from providing law enforcement, to act as a defensive force for their population. The Turkish Cypriots established various political governing bodies until 1983 and the police officers performed their duties both in districts and center under the military commanders.

When military junta in Greece seized the power in the island in 1974 by a military coup that it made by using Greek National Guardian Army and Eoka-b⁸, Turkey fearing the safety of both the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, initiated the “Peace Operation” and terminated the military administration. This operation was followed by a Ceasefire Agreement and

⁸ Eoka-b, was a Greek Cypriot paramilitary organization formed in 1971, and followed an ultra right-wing nationalistic ideology and had the ultimate goal of achieving the enosis (union) of Cyprus with Greece. Enosis refers to the movement of various Greek communities that live outside Greece, for incorporation of the regions they inhabit into the Greek state. Widely known is the case of the Greek Cypriots for union of Cyprus into Greece.

later Vienne Agreement which divided the island into two parts, Turkish Cypriots in the north and Greek Cypriots in the south of the island. The war-related experience exposed Turkish Cypriot police officers to considerable violence, while resulting in the relaxation of official rules and strengthening of the code of silence.

In 1976, police forces' connection to military commanders in the central administration and also in the districts ended and they were brought together under the umbrella of "Police Headquarters" that was formed under Commander of Security Forces. After the declaration of TRNC in 1983, Police Law, a residue from the United Kingdom colonial period was repealed and replaced by TRNC Police Organization (Establishment, Duty and Authority) Law (Law No 51/1984). The new republic's vision of a better security service was translated into recruitment of more officers and allocation of more financial resources to the police organization.

With the year 1991, cooperation with the Turkish National Police Academy was started, and resulted in some cadets being sent to Turkey for undergraduate police training and also some small scale improvements were made to the curriculum of basic police training course for police officers at TRNC Police School. With the opening of the borders between TRNC and the Greek Administration of South Cyprus in 2003, the interaction between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities was renewed. In 2005, many women employed as civilian staff in the TRNC Police Organization, were deployed to the borders, which also changed the mainly man staffed gender distribution in the organization.

In 2009, to start the cooperation between two communities with regard to the internal security problems, "the Office for Information Exchange for Crimes and Criminals" was formed in the buffer zone that is under the responsibility of United Nations. In 2011, the "Financial Crimes Unit" was formed to strengthen the fight against corruption and other related offences. Towards the end of 2012, the police initiated the institutional reconstruction in the way of modernization.

The Foundation and Development of the Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate and Fight Against Drugs in TRNC

After the conflict between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities in the end of 1963, Turkish Cypriots established various political governing bodies until 1983. In this period they started to built

legislative, executive, and judgment institutions. In this context, to fight against drugs more effectively, Turkish Cypriot Administration repealed Chapter 248 “Dangerous Drugs Law” (Law No: 20, 1956) a residue from United Kingdom colonial period, and replaced “The Rule of Amending and Regulating the Laws Relating to Narcotics” in 1972 (Law No: 4, 1972). Following year, “Narcotic Drugs Regulation” entered into force (Regulation No: 21, 1973). After the legal regulations, Turkish Cypriots Administration went on with the reconditioning the executive regulations.

The struggle of the Turkish Cypriots against drugs was carried out by the District Security Directorates until the end of 1974 (Refik, 1974: 11). The foundation of the Directorate of Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling dates back to 23 November 1974 when an Operation Unit was founded to help the District Security Directorates for narcotics and prevention of smuggling activities (Hıfzı, 1975: 23).

In the following years, as there was an increase in offences related to illegal drugs, this Unit was renamed as Operations and Narcotics Supervisory Unit in 1984 in order to facilitate a more effective fight against these kind of crimes (Birgen, 1985: 39). In 2005, the Unit was transformed into a Directorate and renamed as Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate (PGM, 2006: 45). During 2005-2009, the Directorate of Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling conducted all of its duties and activities at a central building in Nicosia. However, in the beginning 2009, Narcotics agencies in Famagusta and Kyrenia were established under the surveillance of the directorate in order to perform its duties more effectively in the districts.

With the aim of enhancing controls at TRNC entry/exit ports, detection dogs have been used since 2003 with the contribution of the Turkish National Police from Turkey despite not being included in the foundational framework of Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate. The training of dogs and their handlers has been carried by TRNC since 2008. A modern centre for Detection Dog Training was built in 2009 for the use of dogs and their handlers. Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate carries out its activities directly under the auspices of the Chief Commandant of Police. The Directorate gathers information on investigations approved by the General Directorate of Police and carries out investigations, conducts operations and when needed, assists other directorates and units on relevant matters about drugs and prevention of smuggling.

The Metodology of the Measurement of Police Integrity

Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković designed a survey instrument -police integrity questionnaire- that measures the extent of police integrity, in 1995 (Kutnjak Ivković and Klockars, 1996; Klockars et al., 1997). Their questionnaire includes descriptions of 11 hypothetical scenarios, the majority of which address various forms of police corruption, from the acceptance of gratuities and gifts to opportunistic thefts and shakedowns. Each scenario is followed by the same series of 7 questions that asked officers to report; own and others' evaluations of its seriousness, knowledge of official rules, views about appropriate and expected discipline, and own and others' willingness to report the misconduct.

Over the span of the last 20 years the first version of the police integrity questionnaire has been applied in 23 countries, spanning continents, cultures, legal systems, and economic states (Kutnjak Ivković, 2015: 17). One of the study used the first questionnaire is the book "Contours of Police Integrity" (Klockars et al., 2004a) features chapters from 14 countries.

Klockars and colleagues argued that their original survey needed to be augmented if inquiry into police misconduct were to be extended beyond corruption motivated by personal gain (Klockars et al., 2000: 9-10). Carl B. Klockars, Sanja Kutnjak Ivković, and Maria R. Haberfeld (Klockars, 1999) developed the second version of the police integrity questionnaire in 1998, which includes scenarios that cover a variety of forms of police misconduct, from police corruption and use of excessive force to a failure to execute an arrest warrant and a falsification of the official record and planting of evidence. One of the study used the second questionnaire is the book "Measuring Police Integrity Across The World: Studies From Established Democracies And Countries In Transition" (Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 2015a) features chapters from 10 countries. Our research reports the results of the TRNC survey of police officers using the second version of the international police integrity questionnaire developed by Klockars and colleagues.

Questionnaire

The questionnaire includes 11 hypothetical scenarios, 5 of which describe examples of police corruption, 4 describe examples of the use of excessive force, 1 describes a failure to execute an arrest warrant, and 1 describes a falsification of the official record and planting of evidence.

Our study of police integrity in TRNC, was conducted in December 2013. The respondents were provided with a letter asking them to assume that the officer described in the scenarios had been a police officer for 5 years, had a satisfactory working record, and had not been disciplined in the past. The questionnaires were completed anonymously, and the questions regarding demographic information were kept to the absolute minimum.

Upon reading description of each hypothetical scenario, the respondents answered seven questions designed to measure the officers' personal views, as well as their assessments of their colleagues views, regarding the case. In particular, the respondents were asked to provide assessment of scenario seriousness, the anticipated and appropriate disciplinary action, and willingness to report police misconduct. Each question is followed by the possible answers ranging from a five- to a six – point Likert-scale. Most of the scales were kept in the original form, but the disciplinary scales had to be adjusted for the TRNC conditions. According to the TRNC Police Law (1984) for a misconduct, the following disciplinary penalties can be applied: 1= “None”, 2= “Warning”, 3= “Written Reprimand”, 4= “Short-term retention of promotion (up to 6 months)”, 5=“Long-term retention of promotion (up to 18 months)”, and 6= “Dismissal or demotion in rank”.

At the end of the questionnaire, the respondents were asked a few demographic questions. To increase the respondents' willingness to participate in the study and to exclude the possibility that respondents could be identified, demographic questions has been kept to a bare minimum, inquiring about the length of the respondents' police experience and current agency experience, rank, whether they were employed in a supervisory position. The question regarding the demographic information about rank was modified in accordance with the ranking system of the TRNC police.

Finally, the last two questions were asked the respondents to assess whether other police officers in their directorate would have provided truthful answers and whether they had done so themselves. We used the response to the latter question as a screen, for eliminating the filling questionnaires from further analyses which the respondents who had stated openly that their answers were not truthful.

The Sample

The study aiming at measuring occupational corruption perceptions and improving ethics perception was carried out in TRNC in the beginning of

December of 2013. Personnel working in the eight directorates affiliated to Police Headquarters central institution comprise population of the main study⁹. The directorates are: Administration Police, Criminal Investigation, Intelligence, Traffic, Immigration, Administrative and Personnel Affairs, Communication & IT., Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling; whereas Fire-fighters; Sea, Air and Ports; Police School; and Special Forces directorates are not included in the main study. This study includes only the results of the Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate police officers' perceptions.

Personnel working in the Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate comprise population of this study. Sample is designed to include all personnel of this directorate; except the chief of directorate. In the end, 32 of 37 officers or 86.5% of the population of police officers, employed in this directorate, filled out the surveys.

Respondents' Demographic Characteristics

Our respondents were quite experienced police officers; only 18.8% had less than 6 years of total experience, and the majority of the respondents (81.2%) had more than 6 years of experience (Table 1). In the other hand, the majority of the respondents (75.1%) had less than 11 years of experience in the Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate (Table 1). The majority (84.4%) of police officers in our sample are in the lower-rank group (police constable- police sergeant). In addition, 56.3% of the respondents were non-supervisor.

The last two questions in the questionnaire asks respondents whether they and their fellow police officers responded honestly while filling out the questionnaire. The overwhelming majority (71.9%) thought that their fellow officers would provide truthful answers. In the other hand, all of the participants reported that they personally had answered honestly, so we did not exclude any response from the further analyses.

⁹ For the main study see: KAYABAŞI, Osman (2017). The Contours of Police Integrity in The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, II. International Symposium on Multidisciplinary Studies (ISMS), 18-21 May 2017, Rome, Italy.

Table 1: Respondents' Demographic Characteristics

	Number of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents (%)
Supervisory Role		
non-supervisor	18	56.3%
supervisor	14	43.8%
Length of service (total)		
3-5	6	18.8%
6-10	9	28.1%
11-15	6	18.8%
16-20	9	28.1%
over 20 years	2	6.3%
Length of service (current agency)		
Less than 1 year	3	9.4%
1-2	2	6.3%
3-5	7	21.9%
6-10	12	37.5%
11-15	5	15.6%
16-20	3	9.4%
Rank		
Police constable	19	59.4%
Police Sergeant	8	25.0%
Sub. Inspector	3	9.4%
Inspector	2	6.3%

Results

1. Perceptions of Misconduct Seriousness

After reviewing each scenario, the respondents were asked to evaluate how serious they perceive the behaviors described in the scenarios, as well as to estimate how serious most police officers in their agency would evaluate them¹⁰. They were offered answers on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from “not at all serious” (1) to “very serious” (5). The results shown in Table 2, indicate that the respondents viewed each of these violations of their agency’s rules as serious. Specifically, the mean assessment of seriousness for each of the 11 scenarios was greater than the midpoint (3) of

¹⁰ The two questions were worded: “How serious do YOU consider this behavior to be?” and “How serious do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY consider this behavior to be?”.

the scale; in 10 scenarios (except scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI (3.28)), the mean was well above four (Table 2).

Although the degree to which the officers considered the scenarios serious, though high on average, varied greatly across the scenarios. Evaluations on seriousness ranged from scenario 3 (describing the theft of a knife from the crime scene) as the most serious and scenario 8 (describing cover-up of police DUI) as the least serious (Table 2). The respondents' evaluations of seriousness of 11 scenarios could be classified into three categories: the least serious, intermediate seriousness, and the most serious scenarios.

Based on respondents' responses four behaviors (scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident; scenario 6: officer strikes a prisoner who hurt partner; scenario 11: Stg. fails to halt beating; and scenario 7: verbal abuse "arrest an asshole day") were identified as the least serious forms of police misconduct covered by the questionnaire.

Even though the given scenarios describe the severe forms of police misconduct, scenario 8 (cover-up of police DUI), which is a form of police corruption, one involving internal corruption from Barker and Roebuck's classification (1973). Prior research on police integrity (Klockars et al., 2004b: 14) shows that internal corruption has been classified as one of the least serious forms of police corruption. In their analysis of the application of the second questionnaire, Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld (2015b: 342) document that the respondents in 8 out of 10 countries evaluated the cover-up of police DUI accident among the three least serious scenarios.

On the other hand, it is surprising that the two scenarios that involve officer misuse of force (scenario 6: officer strikes prisoner; and scenario 11: Stg. fails to halt beating child abuser) were evaluated as the least serious scenarios in the questionnaire. These two scenarios which are examples of the empty hand control and located in the middle of the force continuum; evaluated as less serious than the verbal coercion (scenario 7: verbal abuse of motorist) which can be viewed as belonging to the start of the force continuum.

Out of the four scenarios that can be classified as scenarios of intermediate seriousness (the values of means are between 4.25 and 4.50), one describes gifts from merchants (scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants), while the other is scenario 2 (fail to arrest friend with warrant) depict violation of professional conduct by police officers. In this group, both of unjustifiable use of deadly force (scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force), and falsification of the official report (scenario 10: false report on drug on

dealer) scenarios are the two scenarios which are at the border of most serious scenarios with the values of means 4.5. Keeping in mind that deadly force is at the top of the use of force continuum, it is by no means surprising to see that the respondents evaluated the use of deadly force as the most serious scenario describing the use of force scenarios and, at the same time it is surprising that the abuse of deadly force was evaluated as the intermediate seriousness level.

On the other end of the scale, with mean values ranging from higher than 4.5 to 5 (Table 2), respondents placed three scenarios which they considered to be the most serious types of misconduct. These scenarios include the theft of a knife from a crime scene (scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene), the acceptance of a kickback (scenario 9: auto body shop %5 kickback), and a biased allocation of services (scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands). Out of those three most serious scenarios, theft from a crime scene (scenario 3), which encompasses not only the abuse of power for personal gain, but also the abuse of trust by citizens put in a vulnerable position by a crime, was evaluated as the most serious in this group. In their analysis of the application of the second questionnaire in 10 countries, Kutnjak Ivković and Habersfeld (2015b: 340) document that the respondents in virtually every country (Armenia, Australia, Croatia, Estonia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, and USA) other than Russia evaluated the theft of knife from crime scene as the most serious out of all 11 scenarios. This uniformity should not be surprising, opportunistic theft is among the most serious forms of corruption in Roebuck and Barker's typology of corruption (1974). Furthermore, in their analysis of the application of the first questionnaire in 14 countries, Klockars et al. (2004b: 14) document that an earlier version of this scenario, describing a theft of watch from the crime scene, that the respondents from almost every country evaluated it as the most serious or second serious scenario.

Similarly the acceptance of a kickback (scenario 9) was another scenario which well deserves to be on the serious side of the scale. Also scenario 9 illustrating traditional form of corruption in which a police officer abuses his official position to obtain an illegal kickback (Roebuck and Barker, 1974).

It is surprising to see that scenario 5 (supervisor offers holiday for errands) is in the same group. This could be probably explained that they might have identified themselves with the officers who would have replaced the corrupt officer in our scenarios. In other words, our respondents are potentially

reacting harshly not to the supervisor conduct, but to the direct consequences of the corrupt transaction, which they envision facing themselves or potentially might have already faced in real life.

The fact that a case of internal corruption (scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands) is considered more serious scenario than both scenario 4 (unjustifiable use of deadly force) and scenario 10 (planting drugs on a drug dealer and falsifying the official record) is surprising. Particularly in light of the fact that scenario 4 describing the abuse of the most severe form of force –unjustifiable use of deadly force- and scenario 10 describing another severe form of corruption -planting drugs on a drug dealer and falsifying the official record- in the second group. This could be probably explained by the fact that our respondents are working in the Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate that fight against drug dealers and justification given for the activity – a dose of “street justice”- probably contributing toward making it less serious in the eyes of police officers than it should be.

A comparison of the respondents’ own estimates of seriousness and how serious they estimated that other police officers in their directorate would evaluate the same scenarios revealed several findings.

First, for each scenario (except from scenario 2, 8 and 11), the respondents evaluated these scenarios as more serious than they thought the other police officers would; the means for evaluations of own seriousness were generally (except from scenario 2, 8 and 11) higher than the means for others’ estimates of seriousness. Second, there were not statistically significant differences between the means measuring own estimates of seriousness and the means measuring others’ estimates of seriousness. On the other hand, all of the mean differences were small (above the 0.50)¹¹. Third, the relative order of the scenarios, measured through the ranking of the scenarios, suggests that police officers followed approximately the same internal order of seriousness. In fact, the Spearman’s correlation between the rankings of own estimates of seriousness and others’ estimates of seriousness is very high (Spearman’s correlation coefficient = 0.902, $p < 0.001$).

¹¹ Klockars and colleagues, “employed a rule of thumb which was to regard mean differences of less than 0.5 as not meaningful even though a simple t-test establishes the difference as significant” (Klockars et al., 2006: 26).

2. Assessment of Rule Violations

As part of the evaluation of each scenario, the officers from the Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate were asked whether the hypothetical cases violates the official rules¹². They could select an answer a five-point Likert scale, ranging from “definitely not” (1) to “definitely yes” (5).

The portion of affirmative answers, shown in Table 2, demonstrates that most of the police officers from the Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate correctly evaluated the described behaviors as violations of official rules. The respondents’ evaluations of scenarios suggest that the most of the scenarios were considered rule-violating behaviors with means clustered in the center (3.50 to 4.69 point scale) (Table 2). More than three fourths of the respondents (76.15% on average across the 11 scenarios) selected either “4” or “5” on the questionnaire and, thus, affirmed that the behavior described in the scenarios violated the agency’s rules.

However, the percentages of police officers who did so varied across scenarios, from the scenarios in which a slim majority (56.3%) evaluated the behavior as rule violating (scenario 7: verbal abuse “arrest an asshole day”) to the scenarios in which the overwhelming majority (90.6%) did the same in three scenarios (scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene; scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands; and scenario 10: false report on drug on dealer) (Table 2).

Similar to the rankings of own and other police officer’s seriousness, the ranking of violation of official rules can be also categorized into three groups: the least, intermediate, and the most violation of official rules.

Based on respondents’ responses, four behaviors (scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident; scenario 7: verbal abuse “arrest an asshole day”; scenario 6: officer strikes prisoner who hurt partner; and scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating) were viewed as the least serious violation of official rules, similarly in the same group (the least serious scenarios) of respondents own seriousness.

Out of the four scenarios that can be classified as scenarios of intermediate level (the values of means are between 4.16 and 4.50) one describes with

¹² The question was worded: “Would this behavior be regarded as a violation of official policy in your agency?”.

minor forms of police corruption, such as the acceptance of gratuities (scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants), another one describes misconduct by a supervisor (scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands) while the others (scenario 2: fail to arrest friend with warrant, and scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force) describes depict violation of professional conduct by police officers. These scenarios were identified as intermediate level of violating official rules.

Scenarios ranked highest for the most serious violation of official rules were scenario 9 (auto-body shop 5% kickback), scenario 10 (false report on drug on dealer), and scenario 3 (theft of knife from crime scene).

Why would some of the respondents have problems recognizing some of these scenarios as violations of official rules? It is possible that a substantial minority of the police officers do not know the official rules. On the other hand, it is possible that the officers from the Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate may meet on the grounds of seeing some force continuum as a right for their agency to solve the criminal activity about drug trafficking. However, in three of four use of force continuum scenarios (scenario 6: officer strikes prisoner who hurt partner (34.4%); scenario 7: verbal abuse “arrest an asshole day” (28.1%); and scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating (28.1%)) almost one third of the police officers seem to be unsure of whether the behaviors constitute violations of official rules (Table 2).

Finally, the respondents’ evaluations of whether the behavior constitutes a violation of official rules is strongly related to how serious they perceive the behavior; the more serious they evaluate the behavior, the more likely they are to evaluate it as rule-violating. The ranking of scenarios based on their evaluations of seriousness and the ranking of scenarios based on their evaluations of rule-violating nature of the behavior are very similar (Spearman’s correlation coefficient = 0.943; $p < 0.001$).

Table 2. Police Officers Perceptions Of Seriousness And Violations Of Rules

Scenario number and description	Own seriousness		Others' seriousness		Mean difference (own -others)	Paired t-test	P	Violation of rules				
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank				Yes (%)	No (%)	Not sure (%)	Mean	Rank
	Scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants	4.25	5.0	4.00				4.0	0.25	1.679	.103	75
Scenario 2: failure to arrest friend with warrant	4.41	6.0	4.50	9.0	-0.09	-0.828	.414	78.1	9.4	12.5	4.34	6.5
Scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene	4.75	11.0	4.65	11.0	0.10	1.791	.083	90.6	3.1	6.3	4.69	11
Scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force	4.50	7.5	4.38	6.0	0.12	1.277	.211	81.3	12.5	6.3	4.34	6.5
Scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands	4.59	9.0	4.41	7.0	0.18	1.982	.056	90.6	9.4	0	4.50	8
Scenario 6: officer strikes prisoner who hurt partner	4.03	2.0	3.91	2.0	0.12	1.277	.211	59.4	6.3	34.4	3.94	3
Scenario 7: verbal abuse- "Arrest An Asshole Day"	4.12	4.0	3.97	3.0	0.15	1.646	.110	56.3	15.6	28.1	3.84	2
Scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident	3.28	1.0	3.31	1.0	-0.03	-0.297	.768	59.4	25.0	15.6	3.50	1
Scenario 9: auto-body shop 5% kickback	4.69	10.0	4.56	10.0	0.13	1.277	.211	87.5	3.1	9.4	4.56	9.5
Scenario 10: false report on drug on dealer	4.50	7.5	4.47	8.0	0.03	0.373	.712	90.6	6.3	3.1	4.56	9.5
Scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating of child abuser	4.06	3.0	4.13	5.0	-0.07	-0.701	.488	68.8	3.1	28.1	4.03	4

Stig Sergeant, DUI driving under the influence

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Answers "4" and "5" were grouped together as "yes", answers "1" and "2" as "no", and answer "3" as "not sure"

Table 3. Views About Appropriate Discipline (Should) And Expected Discipline (Would)

Scenario number and description	Should	Mode	Rank should	Rank would	Mean	None	Some Discipline	Dismissal	Chi-square test	P	Phi
Scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants	Should	Warning	1-7		2.66	15.6%	75.0%	9.4%	38.976***	.000	1.104
	Would	Warning		1-7	2.78	15.6%	78.1%	6.3%			
Scenario 2: failure to arrest friend with warrant	Should	Warning	1-7		3.72	37.5%	59.4%	21.9%	21.164***	.000	0.813
	Would	Warning		1-7	3.69	31.3%	53.1%	15.6%			
Scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene	Should	Dismissal	9-11		5.25	12.5%	31.2%	56.3%	8.780**	.003	0.524
	Would	Dismissal		9-11	5.25	3.1%	53.1%	43.8%			
Scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force	Should	Dismissal	9-11		4.69	3.1%	59.4%	37.5%	39.326***	.000	1.109
	Would	Long-Term Retention		8	4.56	6.3%	62.4%	31.3%			
Scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands	Should	Warning	1-7		3.56	6.3%	84.3%	9.4%	52.543***	.000	1.281
	Would	Warning		1-7	3.31	9.4%	81.2%	9.4%			
Scenario 6: officer strikes prisoner who hurt partner	Should	Warning	1-7		2.81	12.5%	78.1%	9.4%	35.429***	.000	1.052
	Would	Warning		1-7	2.78	6.3%	87.4%	6.3%			
Scenario 7: verbal abuse- "Arrest An Asshole Day"	Should	Warning	1-7		2.59	21.9%	68.7%	9.4%	25.129***	.000	0.886
	Would	Warning		1-7	2.40	21.9%	71.8%	6.3%			
Scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident	Should	Warning	1-7		2.66	25.0%	31.3%	6.3%	42.396***	.000	1.151
	Would	Warning		1-7	2.75	25.0%	34.4%	9.4%			
Scenario 9: auto-body shop 5% kickback	Should	Dismissal	9-11		4.28	25.0%	65.6%	40.6%	27.109***	.000	0.955
	Would	Dismissal		9-11	4.45	22.6%	64.5%	41.9%			
Scenario 10: false report on drug on dealer	Should	Short-Term Retention	8		4.13	18.8%	40.7%	21.9%	26.880***	.000	0.917
	Would	Dismissal		9-11	4.22	3.1%	28.1%	25.0%			
Scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating of child abuser	Should	Warning	1-7		3.52	9.7%	25.8%	16.1%	40.067***	.000	1.137
	Would	Warning		1-7	3.55	6.5%	29.1%	22.6%			

Stg Sergeant, DUI driving under the influence

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

3. Perceptions of Appropriate and Expected Discipline

In addition to emphasizing the communication of official rules, the organizational theory of police integrity predicts that the disciplinary actions taken by an agency play a key role in shaping that department's overall integrity levels (Kutnjak Ivković et al. 2015: 317). Accordingly, the respondents were asked to select the discipline appropriate for the behaviors described in the scenarios as well as to select the discipline they thought their agency would mete out in such cases¹. Based on the norms of the TRNC Police Law (1984), the answers offered in the questionnaire included: "none" (no discipline), "warning", "written reprimand", "short-term retention of promotion", "long-term retention of promotion", and "dismissal or demotion in rank".

We first explored the respondents' views of the appropriate discipline for the misbehaviors described in the questionnaire. We used four different approaches: modes, ranks, means, and percentages². Similar to the case of evaluation of seriousness opinions on the appropriate discipline also vary across scenarios.

Among the different appropriate disciplines described in the questionnaire, "warning" appeared to be the most frequently regarded as an appropriate discipline that should follow in case an officer is engaged in inappropriate behaviors (this was the fact in seven cases: scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants; scenario 2: failing to arrest friend with warrant; scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands; scenario 6: officer strikes prisoner who hurt partner; scenario 7: verbal abuse "Arrest An Asshole Day"; scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident; and scenario 11: supervisor fails to halt beating).

Short-term retention in promotion as the appropriate sanction was selected only in one scenario. Respondents thought that scenario 10 (false report on drug dealer) was the case when retaining an officer from promotion up to six month should be the proper form of disciplinary sanction. According to respondents' modal responses, the three scenarios in which the dismissal should be considered the appropriate discipline were scenario 3 (theft of

¹ The two questions were worded: "If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any, discipline do you think SHOULD follow?" and "If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any, discipline do you think WHOULD follow?".

² The answers were reclassified the following way: "none" remained "none", "dismissal or demotion in rank" was shortened as "dismissal", and all the other disciplinary options ("warning", "written reprimand", "short-term retention of promotion", "long-term retention of promotion") were reclassified as "some discipline other than dismissal".

knife from crime scene), scenario 4 (unjustifiable use of deadly force), and scenario 9 (auto-body shop 5 % kickback).

By comparing the respondents' views on the appropriate discipline and their expectation of the agency's actual response, the police integrity survey offers a gauge of whether the officers perceive the agency's discipline as fair (Kutnjak Ivković et al. 2015: 319). The officers' modal judgments on what they viewed as appropriate and what they expected the agency to choose to implement for a discipline did not differ for nine of the scenarios (Table 3). It means that the officers perceive the agency's discipline as fair in these nine scenarios.

Our respondents thought that a police officer who use force continuum (scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force) should attract more harsher discipline, and must meting out a "dismissal or demotion in rank". At the same time, they expected that the agency would discipline somewhat lenient, and receive a "long-term retention" instead. On the other hand, respondents thought that a police officer who are planting drugs on a drug dealer and falsifying the official record (scenario 10 : false report on drug on dealer) should receive only a "short-term retention". But, at the same time, they expected that the agency would discipline somewhat more harshly, meting out a "dismissal or demotion in rank" instead. According to modals, respondents perceive the agency's discipline as lenient in scenario 4 (unjustifiable use of deadly force), and as harsh in scenario 10 (false report on drug on dealer).

The correlation between the two rankings of modal values suggests a very strong correlation (Spearman's correlation coefficient = 0.950; $p < 0.001$). The police integrity survey allows for a test of whether the officers' evaluation of the seriousness of the misconduct influenced their advocacy and expectation of more severe discipline. In this study, the officers' assessments of both appropriate and expected discipline were closely related to their evaluations of scenario seriousness. Support for a positive relation was demonstrated by the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between modal appropriate discipline and the mean seriousness of the misconduct (Spearman's correlation coefficient = 0.737; $p < 0.05$) and between modal expected discipline and the mean seriousness of the misconduct (Spearman's correlation coefficient = 0.737; $p < 0.05$).

To further compare the respondents' views on appropriate versus expected agency discipline, we compared the respondents' mean responses (Table 3). According to the means, in the five scenarios (scenario 2: failure to arrest friend with warrant, scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force,

scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands, scenario 6: officer strikes prisoner who hurt partner, scenario 7: verbal abuse “arrest an asshole day”), the officers expected agency discipline on average would be milder than they perceived as appropriate. On the other hand, in the five scenarios (scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants, scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident, scenario 9: auto-body shop 5% kickback, scenario 10: false report on drug dealer, scenario 11: Stg. fails to halt beating of child abuser), the officers expected agency discipline on average would be harsher than they perceived as appropriate. In one scenario (scenario 3: theft of knife from crime), the mean values of appropriate and expected discipline are the same (5.25). The mean responses were differing from the past police integrity surveys of USA police agencies (see Klockars et al., 2006; Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2013, Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2015) which found that most officers perceived the appropriate discipline to be slightly lighter than the discipline they expected their police agency would mete out.

Nonetheless, none of those cases have a difference between mean responses that meets the rule of thumb on meaningful differences between mean survey responses of 0.5 (Klockars et al., 2006: 26), with the respondents expecting that the discipline the agency would mete out would be neither less nor more severe than it should have been (Table 3).

Table 4: Police Officers Perceptions of Willingness to Report

Scenario Number & Description	Own Willingness to Report		Others' Willingness to Report		Mean Difference (Own - Others)	t-test	p	Own Willingness to Report		
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank				Yes (%)	No (%)	Not sure (%)
	Scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants	3.63	5.5	3.06				1.5	0.57	1.982
Scenario 2: failure to arrest friend with warrant	4.31	8	4.03	8	0.28	2.329*	.027	81.3	6.3	12.5
Scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene	4.69	11	4.56	11	0.13	1.161	.255	90.7	6.3	3.1
Scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force	3.63	5.5	3.78	6	-0.15	-1.408	.169	53.1	18.8	28.1
Scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands	4.09	7	3.97	7	0.12	1.072	.292	75	9.4	15.6
Scenario 6: officer strikes prisoner who hurt partner	3.31	3	3.25	3	0.06	0.626	.536	46.9	34.4	18.8
Scenario 7: verbal abuse- "Arrest An Asshole Day"	3.19	2	3.28	4	-0.09	-0.770	.447	40.6	34.4	25
Scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident	2.97	1	3.06	1.5	-0.09	-0.722	.476	40.6	43.8	15.6
Scenario 9: auto-body shop 5% kickback	4.53	10	4.41	10	0.12	2.104*	.044	81.3	0	18.8
Scenario 10: false report on drug on dealer	4.34	9	4.22	9	0.12	1.679	.103	78.2	9.4	12.5
Scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating of child abuser	3.53	4	3.69	5	-0.16	-1.222	.231	50	18.8	31.3

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Stg Sergeant, DUI driving under the influence

1. Willingness to Report Misconduct

The police integrity questionnaire offers a means to assess the extent and nature of the police code of silence (Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2015: 320). The blue wall of the silence refers to the existence of an unwritten rule that police officers do not report on the misconduct of their colleagues (Kutnjak Ivković, 2005:79-80). The last two questions after each scenario asked the respondents to express how willing they would be to report misconduct and to estimate how willing other officers in their agency would be to do so¹. The answers ranged on a five-point Likert scale from “definitely not” (1) to “definitely yes” (5).

The answers conveying their (un)willingness to report misconduct, help us assess the extent and nature of the code of silence. However, our results illustrate the point that the code of silence does not protect all behaviors equally. The analysis of the mean values suggests that scenarios could be divided into three categories.

First, there are three scenarios (scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident; scenario 7: verbal abuse “Arrest An Asshole Day”; and scenario 6: officer strikes prisoner who hurt partner) in which the mean values are near the mid-point of the scale (2.97-3.31), suggesting that the behaviors described in these scenarios would be well protected by the code of silence. In addition, a separate analysis of the code of silence (measured as the percentage of the respondents who said that they would not report) shows that about one-third of the respondents for each of these scenarios said that they would not report a police officer who engaged in misconduct described in these scenarios (Table 4).

Second, there are three scenarios (scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating; scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants; and scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force) in the middle group with the means between 3.5 and 4 and with about one-five of the respondents saying that they would not report (Table 4).

Third, there are five scenarios (scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands; scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene; scenario 9: auto-body shop 5% kickback; scenario 10: false report on drug on dealer; and scenario 2: fail to arrest friend with warrant) for which the means are all from above

¹ The two questions were worded: “Do you think you would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?” and “Do you think most police officers in your agency would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?”.

4 to close to 5, that are on the reporting side of the scale. At the same time, the percentage of the police officers who stated that they would not report is the smallest for these scenarios (between 9.4 and 0 percent).

The respondents' adherence to the code of silence is strongly negatively related to their perceptions of scenario seriousness (Spearman's correlation coefficient = 0.906, $p < 0.001$), likelihood of recognizing it as rule-violating behavior (Spearman's correlation coefficient = 0.977, $p < 0.001$), and the severity of appropriate discipline (Spearman's correlation coefficient = 0.673, $p < 0.05$). The more serious the officers evaluated the behavior, the less likely they were to say that they would protect it. This findings is consistent with past studies on USA police integrity (Klockars at al., 2006; Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2013; Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2015), suggesting that willingness to report misconduct is negatively related to the officers' perceptions that the behavior was serious.

We also compared the respondents' own willingness to report with their estimates of others' willingness to report (Table 4). The mean values suggest that, in seven scenarios, the respondents seem to be somewhat more willing to say that they would report than they estimated that others would. On the other hand, in four scenarios (scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force; scenario 7: verbal abuse "Arrest An Asshole Day"; scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident; and scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating) - one of them is internal corruption and the rest is levels of force continuum-, the respondents say that they would not report than they estimated that others would. Although the differences between the means for their own willingness to report and the means for others' willingness to report are statistically significant in only 2 out of 11 scenarios (scenario 2: failure to arrest friend with warrant, and scenario 9: auto-body shop 5% kickback). Nonetheless, following the rule-of-thumb (Klockars et al., 2006: 26) the differences are meaningful in only one scenario (scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants). Finally, a comparison of the rankings shows that their own willingness to report and their estimates of others' willingness to report are very strongly related (Spearman's correlation coefficient = 0.902, $p < 0.001$).

Conclusion

Our study is the part of the first study of police integrity in Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The results indicate that police integrity is a com-

plex phenomenon and Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate's police officers in TRNC Police Organization do not treat all police misconduct equally. We found that the respondents' evaluations about police misconduct seriousness were closely related with their knowledge about official rule violations and they were also closely related to the severity of discipline and they were negatively related to their willingness to report misconduct.

The respondents evaluated scenarios described in the questionnaire to range in seriousness from the least serious to the most serious. According to the means; "scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene" and "scenario 9: auto-body shop 5% kickback" are in the category of behaviors of most serious scenarios for themselves, their colleagues and their directorates. Moreover; "scenario 10: false report on drug on dealer" is in the category of behaviors of the most serious scenarios for their directorates, but, both for themselves and their colleagues it is in the category of behaviors of the intermediate seriousness. Narcotics and Prevention of Smuggling Directorate's police officers in TRNC Police Organization considered that; "scenario 2: failure to arrest friend with warrant" is in the category of behaviors of the most serious scenarios in terms of colleagues, and they also considered that it is in the category of behaviors of the intermediate seriousness in terms of themselves and their directorates.

According to the means; "scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident", "scenario 6: officer strikes prisoner who hurt partner", and "scenario 7: verbal abuse- 'Arrest An Asshole Day'" are in the category of behaviors of the least serious scenarios for themselves, their colleagues and their directorates. Unlike the results of the similar surveys, in three scenarios (scenario 2: failure to arrest friend with warrant, scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident, and scenario 11: sergeant fails to halt beating of child abuser) respondents tended to have a higher view of the integrity of colleagues compared to their own position.

On the one hand, cover-up of police DUI accident (scenario 8), striking a prisoner (scenario 6), and verbal abuse of citizens (scenario 7) have been evaluated as the least serious forms of police misconduct featured in the questionnaire, requiring the most lenient discipline, and the most likely to be covered by the code of silence (first group). On the other hand, theft from a crime scene (scenario 3), and kickback (scenario 9) have been evaluated as the most serious forms of police misconduct in the questionnaire, requiring harsher disciplinary sanctions, and lacking strong support by the code of silence (second group). These findings are

consistent with the main police integrity survey of TRNC (Kayabaşı, 2017). Besides these findings, in the main police integrity survey of TRNC (Kayabaşı, 2017) not stopping the use of excessive force by a supervisor (scenario 11) have been evaluated in the first group, and the falsification of the official report (scenario 10) have been evaluated in the second group.

The four scenarios used in the questionnaire (scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force; scenario 6: officer strikes prisoner; scenario 7: verbal abuse of motorist; scenario 11: sergeant fails to halt beating of child abuser) could be modeled along the use of force continuum traditionally used to model force in police training (NIJ, 2009). The verbal coercion (scenario 7) can be viewed as belonging to the starting point of the force continuum while the use of deadly force (scenario 4) would occupy the end of the force continuum, and the other two scenarios (scenario 6 and scenario 11) are examples of the empty hand control which located in the middle of the force continuum (Kayabaşı, 2017).

In our study, it is surprising that these two scenarios (scenario 6 and scenario 11) which are located in the middle of the continuum, were evaluated in the same group (as the least serious scenarios) with the verbal coercion but less serious than it. As deadly force is at the top of the use of force continuum, it is by no means surprising to see that the respondents evaluated the use of deadly force as the most serious scenario describing the abuse of force scenarios and, at the same time it is surprising that the abuse of deadly force was evaluated as the intermediate seriousness level. On the one hand, these findings are consistent with the main police integrity survey of TRNC (Kayabaşı, 2017). On the other hand, they are not consistent with past police integrity surveys of USA police agencies (see Klockars et al., 2006; Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2013; Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2015).

The questionnaire also contains five scenarios describing police corruption, spanning a range of seriousness (scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants; scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene; scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands; scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident; and scenario 9: auto body shop 5% kickback). The policing literature typically views the acceptance of gratuities as the stepping stone toward more serious corruption, in itself tolerated by the police culture, seen as easily justifiable, and rarely severely disciplined by police agencies (Roebuck and Barker, 1974). On the other end of the spectrum, Roebuck and Barker (1974) characterized opportunistic theft as one of the most

serious types of corrupt activities, typically triggering a negative reaction from the police agency.

Our respondents evaluated the cover-up of police DUI accident as the least serious form of corruption; the acceptance of free meals and gratuities as intermediate seriousness; the kickback and the theft from a crime scene were evaluate as the most serious for themselves, their colleagues and their directorates; while the supervisor offers holiday for errands (scenario 5) was evaluate as the most serious for themselves, but both their colleagues and their directorates it was evaluate as the intermediate seriousness. These findings (except scenario 5 own seriousness) are consistent with the main police integrity survey of TRNC (Kayabaşı, 2017), and past police integrity surveys of USA police agencies (see Klockars et al., 2006; Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2013; Kutnjak Ivković et al., 2015).

Most of the police officers from TRNC correctly evaluated the described behaviors as violations of official rules. However, percentages of police officers who did so varied across scenarios, from the scenario in which from slightly more than a half of the respondents (56.3 %) evaluated the behavior as rule violating (Scenario 7: verbal abuse “Arrest An Asshole Day”) to the scenario in which the overwhelming majority (90.6%) did the same in three scenario (scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene, scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands, and scenario 10: false report on drug on dealer). It is possible that a substantial minority of the police officers do not know the official rules. On the other hand, it is possible that the officers, may meet on the grounds of seeing some “street justices” as a right for their directorate to solve the criminal activities as a part of their work. However, in the three of four use of force continuum scenarios (scenario 6: officer strikes prisoner who hurt partner (34.4%); scenario 7: verbal abuse “arrest an asshole day” (28.1%); and scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating (28.1%)) nearly one third of the police officers seem to be unsure of whether the behaviors constitute violations of official rules.

According to the modes they reported that; “scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene”, “scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force”, and “scenario 9: auto-body shop 5% kickback” are in the category of behaviors that required the most harsh disciplinary sanctions. In addition they reported that; “scenario 7: verbal abuse- ‘Arrest An Asshole Day’”, “scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident”, “scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants”, and “scenario 6: officer strikes prisoner who hurt partner” are in the category of behaviors that required the most lenient disciplinary sanctions.

Furthermore, they supported and expected dismissal for the theft of knife from crime scene and auto-body shop 5% kickback scenarios; they only supported (not expected) dismissal for unjustifiable use of deadly force scenario; and they only expected (not supported) dismissal for false report on drug on dealer scenario. Although most of the respondents supported and expected some discipline for the rest scenarios described in the questionnaire. By comparing the respondents' views on the appropriate discipline and their expectation of the agency's actual response, the officers' modal judgments on what they viewed as appropriate and what they expected the agency to choose to implement for a discipline did not differ for nine of the scenarios, that it means the officers perceive the agency's discipline as fair for these nine scenarios. On the other hand, our respondents perceive the directorate's discipline as lenient for scenario 4 (unjustifiable use of deadly force), and as harsh for scenario 10 (false report on drug on dealer).

We also measured the contours of the code of silence and found that the code was much stronger for the behaviours evaluated as the least serious and the weakest for the behaviours evaluated as the most serious. These results provide further evidence in support, Klockars and colleagues' (2006: 6), Kutnjak Ivković and colleagues' (2015: 323) and Kayabaşı' (2017) empirical findings of the negative relation between perceptions of police misconduct seriousness and the code of silence. Finally, we found that, most of the respondents responses that other officers in their directorate would be much more likely to protect all these behaviors -except unjustifiable use of deadly force, cover-up of police driving under the influence accident, and sergeant fails to halt beating of child abuser scenarios- in the code of silence than they themselves would.

Finally, we can clearly said that TRNC Police Organization need to set up "police ethics rules set" without further delay and by means of TRNC Police School need to prepare "police ethics training program" both in the basic training and in-service training levels for enhancing police ethics and police integrity in TRNC.

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