Terrorism, States' Responses, Liberties: Understanding the Idea of Balance between Human Rights and Security

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Abstract: This paper will focus on the relation between security and human rights at the states' level within the current period dominated mostly by terrorism-related issues. Terrorism will be taken as an emergency issue, which has changed national and international security agenda more frequently in the post-Cold War and increasingly during post 9/11 era. While examining the particular idea of a balance between security and rights-discourses in such emergency times, supporters of both sides will be given attention. So, the main argument can be explained in line with the idea that security is a need for all human beings in order to enjoy any other kinds of rights in a wider context, and terrorism is one of main obstacles to peoples' rights and liberties and to any kind of "deliberations" to find solutions. It will be argued correspondingly, for a fully sustainable secure environment, even during emergency times, like under a terrorist threat, keeping the balance between security and rights-discourses has turned to be one of the main prerequisites for all States, including for Western "supreme" powers.

Keywords: Security, States, human rights, 9/11, terrorism, emergency issue, democracy

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Terörizm, Devletlerin Tepkileri, Özgürlükler: İnsan Hakları ve Güvenlik Arasındaki Denge Fikrini Kavramak

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Öz: Bu makale, çoğunlukla terörle ilgili meselelerin egemen olduğu güncel dönemde, devletler düzeyinde güvenlik ve insan hakları kavramları arasındaki ilişkiye odaklanacaktır. Terörizm, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ve özellikle "11 Eylül" saldırılarını müteakip, ulusal ve uluslararası güvenlik ajandalarını daha fazla değiştirir hale gelen bir "acil durum" olarak ele alınacaktır. Bu gibi "acil durum"larda güvenlik ve haklar söylemleri arasındaki denge fikrini incelerken, her iki tarafın destekçilerine dikkat çekilecektir. Bu şekilde, ana görüş, geniş bir bağlamda diğer tüm haklardan yararlanabilmek için güvenliğin tüm insanlar için bir ihtiyaç olduğu ve terörizmin, insanların hak ve özgürlükleri ile sorunları çözme amaçlı "müzakereler" önündeki en büyük engellerden birini teşkil ettiği fikriyle açıklanabilir. Bu düşünceye bağlı olarak, tamamen sürdürülebilir güvenli bir ortamın tesisini teminen, terör tehdidi gibi acil durumlarda dahi, güvenlik ile hak ve özgürlükler söylemleri arasındaki dengeyi korumanın, Batı'nın "başat" güçleri dahil tüm Devletler için temel önkoşullardan biri haline geldiği ifade edilecektir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Güvenlik, Devletler, insan hakları, 11 Eylül, terörizm, acil durum, demokrasi

Introduction

Post-Cold War era has led to various disadvantages in addition to its positive sides. For some realist International Relations (IR) scholars, despite all of the critiques, one important advantage of the Cold War period was the bi-polar world structure through which hostilities between groups or states could be named and be defined with some concrete explanations. However, in the environment after 1991, especially when states have lost their ability to define their enemy and its particular aims and characteristics, the situation has started to be more complicated. As the ex-UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Ramcharan rightly exposes for this period, "the nature of a threat for states has changed", and "state-centered, geo-strategic political prism has been complemented by global, socio-ecological, developmental and cultural perspectives", while "a new category of challenges and conflicts that stem from an ideological and ethnic base" (Ramcharan, 2002, p. 43). In this way, as the terrorist attacks on United States on September 11th, 2001 (hereafter, mentioned as 9/11) have shown, states can also turn into the actors which might take unilateral actions for the sake of their people while undermining multilateral channels and international law principles. Hence, states' new security concerns legitimized through the security of their individual-citizens, have led to the new disputes as in the rights-abusive acts in line with the so-called 'war on terror' after 9/11.

Considering the realist rhetoric of international politics, because the security is one of the main constituents of sovereign states (in fact, also in the international law), there is no big dilemma in explaining states' behavior to protect their national security as the main interest in extreme circumstances like terrorism (Gray, 2002, pp. 226-234). So in the field of IR where the dominant role has played by the realist paradigm, the "ethical" side based on ideational principles such as "human rights" might not be given the attention they deserve (Freeman: 2007, p. 78). However, when the situation cannot be brought to an end from the perspective of security-provision, and when new sufferers arise as a result of new human rights-abuses following some security-led initiatives, then ignoring this "vicious circle" stemmed from dilemmas between security and rights discourses turn to be more and more difficult than before. Consequently, although, there is the belief that the "endless war" initiated by some Western states against the sources and collaborators of terrorism after 9/11 events must not be thought as the end of the human-rights era that is based on legality and "solidarity" of people (Dunne, 2002, p. 101), the declining attention to the issue of human rights at the national and international policy-levels has also reached one of its peaks following the contemporary developments (Kessing, 2007, pp. 148-149). For instance, the great tragedies which are still continuing in countries like Syria or Myanmar have showed us once again that although states might see themselves as the sole and natural provider of security in their fields against some terrorist and/or militant

and separatist groups, the failures in protecting innocent civilian populations and their rights turn to harm not only their regions but all humanity and the world.

Bearing in mind the context mentioned above, this paper will emphasize terrorism as an emergency issue, which has dominated national and international security agendas more frequently within the post-Cold War era, and will focus on the relation between security and human rights at the level of States within the current period dominated mostly by terrorism-related issues. While examining the particular idea of a balance between security and rights-discourses, both supporters of security claims and defenders of rights and liberties will be given attention. So, the main argument can be explained in line with the idea that security is a need for all human beings in order to enjoy any other kinds of rights in a wider context, and it must be claimed that terrorism is one of main obstacles to peoples' rights and liberties and to any kind of political "deliberation" for progress (Ignatieff, 2004, pp. 110-111). However, the necessity for a secure environment does not legitimate an excessive increase of power in States' authority against citizens or non-citizens. Therefore, the need to protect liberties against the increasing States' power in emergency times, like under a terrorist threat, will be a key issue to understand.

Terrorism and Declining Rights-Discourse?

For a long period of time, states have struggled to find a common way to define terrorism. Since the time of the French Revolution in 1789, there have been several definitions of this heinous action starting from its usage as a tool at the hands of the State to its equal meaning with the conflicts conducted by various ethnic or religious communities against the majority (Ignatieff, 2004, p. 83). In a simplified form, terror is currently defined as a kind of "political action that uses violence against civilians and civilian infrastructure in order to influence behavior, to inflict punishment or to exact revenge" (Booth and Dunne, 2002, p. 8). Hereafter, Tilly's main argument is also important to consider that rather than an approach based on a single evil group who is responsible for terrorism, he defends terror as a "strategy, not a creed"; thus "[t]errorists range across a wide spectrum of organizations, circumstances, and beliefs. Terrorism is not a single causally coherent phenomenon" (Tilly, 2004, pp. 7-12). Although, for a considerable period of history, states have seen, in fact, more "significant" players than some "non-state groups" regarding the usage of terror-like political actions (Booth and Dunne, 2002, p. 9), 9/11 might be seen as the beginning of intensification of cooperation between the states which have started to share a common attitude to define terrorism and its actors with "non-state sources" (Landman, 2006, pp. 142).

Regarding the national and international debates on terrorism, as Keohane repeats, one of the main questions has appeared traditionally as "[i]s violent repression of armed militant inside one's own country violation of human rights by

the government, or is it struggling against terrorism?" (Keohane, 2002, pp. 146-147). The question has been popular again, because within the post-9/11 process, several states which had been condemned before 2001 (like Russia or China) as a result of their response to their separatist minority-groups, have started to be supported by the Western states (mainly by the United States) in their struggle against the violence (Ignatieff, 2004, *pp.* 85-111). In this context, States such as USA and their foreign policies might be accused of eliminating principles and norms other than security-related matters. This elimination can be exemplified by some scholars like Falk who argues, "if the United States can decide when captured individuals are 'unlawful combatants', why can't others do the same, or worse?" (Falk, 2002, pp. 334). Accordingly, in some regions, like in Asia, where states have been seen as traditionally "less constrained" regarding the respect to individual human rights, the attitude of Western states, like in the US war on terror, has provided a wider realm to "challenge the universality of human rights norms, especially when [the] domestic stability is at stake" (Acharya, 2002, p. 202). Actually, some empirical findings and quantitative analysis on violation of rights and terrorism in various states show us that in regimes that can be called as democratic, the level of abuse of rights is in a lower level than in non-democratic regimes (Landmann, 2006). This explains partially that "old democracies," like United Kingdom and United States, have not hesitated to balance the concept of security with civil rights and liberties during post-9/11 period, while giving more attention to a need for a secure environment in order to preserve main values of their liberal democratic mechanism. Hence, as Linklater claims that "we have seen how different discourses since September 11 have been used to widen discussion to include the ideals of promoting human security and conforming with liberal principles of human decency in times of war", so that, the response from the Western states against terrorism can be interpreted in line with the idea that "humane values are not compromised in the war against illiberalism." (Linklater, 2002, pp. 310-311). From the angle of these "old" democracies, the main risk may arise in the so-called "new democracies" where legitimization of some "rights-abusive" methods turn to be routine via "modelling" the leading democratic states' practices against terrorism and crisis-situations at home (Landman, 2006, pp. 143).

Despite this "liberal supremacy" in the current literature however, it must not be forgotten neither that as seen in several recent developments, there can be some cultural or social elements of a constructive process which might be one reason to expect failures or radical solutions found by the Western state-elites in combating terrorism. For instance, such a constructive effect has been present during the post-9/11 period when the inclusion of some cultural elements to the discussion, like "clash of civilizations," "the West and the Rest," or the rise of "Islamo-fascism" (Hoffman, 2004, p. 938) have been repeatedly linked with terrorism. Certainly, that made the abuse of rights a naiver process for some innocent groups (like some

Muslim residents or visitors in Western societies) who are targeted in fact through such an Orientalist and theoretically constructive base (Kalın, 2018, pp. 115-118).

More Secure, Less Free in Emergency? Continuing Confusions on Security-based Claims in Western liberal-democratic literature

An'Naim mentions, "[t]errorism is a serious threat to human rights precisely because there is a powerful temptation to sacrifice principled commitment to the due process of law in the name of defending national security and public safety" (An-Na'im, 2002, p. 168). For details on this side of democratic gap, in fact, one of the problematic dimensions inside the triangle between security-terrorism-human rights stems from the responses to the terrorist movements. For An-Naim therefore, even in democratically-structured countries, the exacerbations can occur because of the harsh state-response to terrorist targets while defining them as violent, barbaric, and irrational groups. However, in many cases, to define the terrorist groups' aims with irrationalism has not brought the complete solutions to the problems; rather it has added new violations of rights of civilian populations in the name of combating against the evil. In this context, "[f]ailure to acknowledge and address the rationality of the terrorists is to deny their humanity, and thereby to forfeit any possibility of universality of human rights", thus "understanding the motivation of any terrorist is essential for a reasoned and sustainable response, and should not be seen as condoning crime or blaming the victim" (An-Na'im, 2002, p. 168).

As a response to sacrifices made in democracies in the name of a more secure realm, a libertarian or civil libertarian ideal is chosen generally by several scholars in Western Academia to criticize states' failures and extreme measures in the name of security. For instance, taking law as the main guarantee of rights of people, Posner and Vermeule explain the "civil libertarian thesis" as an approach to deny the curtailments of rights and liberties in an environment, which necessitates more security through state's increasing power. They see "constitutional rules" as the guarantee of individual rights and defend that even in emergency cases where authorities' power has gone "too far", civil liberties must be guaranteed (Posner and Vermeule, 2007, p. 16).

Also Elster emphasises on the importance of the concept of "panic" which is linked with an "emotional" process of "anger" or "fear" and with a need for "urgency" from the side of statesmen following the emergency-situations (Elster, 2005, p. 9); hence the expected decisions from the states' governments might not be in line with the consequences that can come from a rational process, and they "may work against their purpose" (Elster, 2005, p. 16).

Consequently, an important concern is mentioned as "democratic failure theory" which is based on possible emergence of the defects of a democratic system

(Posner and Vermeule, 2007). This emergence is expected to come into existence more easily when checks and balances decrease to a minimum level. Thus, under a threat of emergency, like terrorism, a major defect can be the majority's increased suppression upon the people who can be outside of this majority group in a cultural or ethnic sense, like the minority groups, immigrants or aliens in a country, or in a political sense, like the minority parties or dissent voices. Therefore, the issue can turn out to be a matter of "balanc[ing] the interests of a dissident individual or minority against the interests of the community as a whole" (Waldron, 2003, p. 201). Such an argument could not be denied totally, since in the logic of democracy the theories on "majority tyranny" and on the necessity of the limitation of political majority's power have been topics of the discussion for a long period. Considering these theories, even in the time peace and tranquility, majority, and its personification via the presence of executive governments, are seen as potential sources for limitations; so the concern on a more oppressive atmosphere in which the majority might be seen as the main benefactor through the usage of emergency-policies can be understandable.

The fear from majority was not a null hypothesis because of the existence of some historical examples from various countries, and even from the countries that can be understood as the examples of the higher level of liberal democracy, like United States and United Kingdom during the post-9/11 period. "British Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001)" and "American Patriot Act (2001)" have been seen as some current developments in the Western liberal democracies to evaluate the significance attached to the concept of security inside the society, and to re-interpret the limits of the State in using pressure, interrogation, or removal of some individual rights for some groups of individuals (Elster, 1993).

Regarding the individuals inside a minority group, who due to their particular identities, beliefs, or living-styles, can be affected more intensely from the responses of governments during the emergency-periods, like in the shadow of the fear from future terrorist attacks, Waldron makes a considerable emphasis on the failure to see the initiative of security / rights balancing from the mere perspective of the majority of population. Hence, as he claims "few/most dimension of the balance" becomes equal importance together with "the liberty/security dimension," and in such a way, "simply adding something to the most side of the balance cannot "justify taking something away from the few" (Waldron, 2003, p. 203). For instance, the political usage of the term "terror" or "war on terror" might lead to essential problems. As Mullard and Cole reminds us, in the United States, members of the Republican party did not hesitate to declare before the 2004 presidential election that after the tragic events of 9/11, "the USA was still at 'war', and that the nation was safer under Republican control since by implication the Democratic Party was soft on terror and not be trusted with the nation's security" (Mullard and Cole, 2007, p. 3).

In connection with the arguments above, Ignatieff defends, "in emergencies, we have no alternative but to trust our leaders to act quickly, when our lives may be in danger", but while deciding the "larger question of how to balance liberty and security over the long term" the process should be opened to discussion of everyone (Ignatieff, 2004, p. 2). Actually, in the longer term we should emphasize the risk of using some communal feelings for a more secure environment. For instance, as the US case shows us during post 9/11-era, patriotism or love for the country have been used frequently in line with the aim to consolidate the legitimacy of state-acts for security-provision; however, this has been done regardless of the final consequences that might deteriorate the situation for a group of individuals, like the Muslim residents and/or visitors in that country.

At that point, from Falk's way of thinking, it can be said that "[n]ational patriotism is a powerful and risky vaccine that immunizes the body politic against self-criticism" (Falk, 2002, p. 334). The theoretical ingredient of Falk's approach is based on an opposition to the complete reliance of national balances and interests. Thus, the feeling that can be defined as patriotism turn out to be an element of a dangerous field in which the extreme cases, like the terrorist attacks against the security of the whole population, might be used as a policy that will not benefit, in fact, most of the individual members of the society. This is because [n]ational patriotism is premised on a world order that is decisively defined by autonomous sovereign states, each dependent for survival and prosperity on the successful exercise of its unconditional dependence on self-help. This dependence overrides any considerations of morality and law that may stand in the way of expedient action taken for the sake of survival and security (Falk, 2002, p. 335).

In fact, an expansion of state-power has been always a continuing reason of hesitation in various points of view. Taking the Western classical liberal understanding for example, it can be argued that "the existence of a threat from terrorist attack does not diminish the threat that liberals have traditionally apprehended from the state" (Waldron, 2003, p. 205). Related to this fear, as it is mentioned before, increased governmental authority may be explained via some theories like the "ratchet theory" through which "a succession of emergencies produces a unidirectional increase in some legal or political variable" (Posner and Vermeule, 2007, p. 131). This means that an emergency-law or application can be turned into the "routine" policy of state authority even if the situation is believed to be "normalized" (Posner and Vermeule, 2007, p. 134). On the other hand, in some situations, not governments, but some small circles of professionals or elites might be responsible in increasing and maintaining the tension under a threat of emergency. So, "creating new agencies to cope with an emergency, […] creates a cadre of officials with vested

interests in prolonging the new bureaucracy for as long as possible, even after the emergency has petered out" (Posner and Vermeule, 2007, p. 140). This group of elites and professionals might be from the military or from other pro-fessionally-organized interest groups that see themselves beyond the rule of the government and law. Therefore, to ensure the linkage between the judicial and executive mechanisms, rather than to show them as the potential rivals between each other, might be seen as the most appropriate measure in order to prevent the elite-driven processes of tensions, through which the emergen-cy-atmosphere, like the terror-case, is deteriorated, and violation of individual rights becomes a common practice.

The need for Balance: Security as a Right against Terrorism

As it is underlined through the internationally recognized and as by the United Nations' several resolutions, treatises or declarations, security is a necessity and priority for all individuals for the enjoyment of various other rights. Hence, as Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights underlined "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person". For the foreign policy realms of States, also in the Article 28 of the same Declaration, the concept of "security" is highlighted indirectly that "everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully reali-zed" (https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/). Accordingly, in addition to UN's endeavors' worldwide, with the works and activities of some other international and regional organizations like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), European Union and others alike during 20th century and today, security and human rights turn to be the two sides of a medal-lion through which the stronger realist rhetoric in IR goes hand in hand with the ideational dimension based on rights-discourses.

Therefore, in order to understand the relation between rights and security, the discussion can be seen from another dimension too that if in an environment whe-re the violations of human rights at various levels have been turned into common practices, there might be found many reasons for insecurity related to the lack of respect for rights (Schaumburg-Müller, 2007, pp. 90-91). In view of that, the idea that "people living in fear are not free" is a commonly-accepted rule among vari-ous scholars, so that it has been widely claimed that "security appear[s] to trump liberty" in "emergencies," like in terrorism (Ignatieff, 2004, p. 5).

On the balance between security and rights, Waldron tries to make a clarifica-tion in emphasizing the difficulty in approaching the rights-rhetoric from the pers-pective of interests based on security and from a consequentialist way of thinking as a result of these security-interests. Thus, although it is mentioned that there is a certain complexity in making individuals' rights a part of a collective process

of division and re-interpretation according to some consequentialism, there is a truth in Waldron's sayings that security must be also thought as a kind of rights, and that "[f]ear is only half a reason for modifying civil liberties [according to this security-right]: the other and indispensable half is a well-informed belief that the modification will actually make a difference to the prospect that we fear" (Waldron, 2003, p. 198).

When we say "balance" of human or individual rights with the aspect of security and the threat-perception, such as under terrorism, then we must do some clarification on the question, which rights do we take first as a matter of discussion? Accordingly, as the events after 9/11, and the historical records linked with the domestic and international responses against terrorism show us that the aspect of civil liberties is one of the considerable dimension we must take into consideration. By civil liberties in a democratically-structured system, we usually define our freedoms that can be in line with the civil and political aspect of the general conception of human rights. Thus, various rights that have a negative nature as a result of the necessity of the absence of intervention (particularly from the state-level) can be given as civil liberties. Right to speech, travel, conscience, religion or fair trial are some of those (Waldron, 2003, p. 195). Considering individual civil liberties, the discussion regarding the need for security can be linked also to the uneasy relationship between individual claims for human rights and communal necessities that might be explained with a collective or group-based idea of rights (Schaumburg-Müller, 2007). As a consequence, it can be argued that the need for a wider structure for a secure environment for the whole community has been used frequently in the process of justification.

Accordingly, at the national level, new security concerns related to the urgent issues, like terrorism, have brought the "limitations" upon human rights and their interpretation in various ways like "through legislative changes which encroach upon human rights protection, through the more restrictive interpretation of existing rules, and through actual discretionary power" (Kessing, 2007, pp. 159, 169). As a consequence, the result is not changed, and as Elster claims, "civil liberty curtailments" turn out to be the reason of why we are talking about "reductions" by "legislative acts," and "executive decisions that limit the rights and freedoms of individuals" in the need for security (Elster, 2005, p. 5).

In this context, Posner and Vermeule give the approach of balancing security and liberty under emergency of terrorism with the help of "the deferential view" through which the legal bodies' responsibilities might be re-interpreted, and different from a libertarian approach, government's decisions can guide to find the appropriate solutions. Such an approach might be linked with the idea of "tradeoff thesis" according to which "governments should, and do, balance civil liberties and security at all times" due to their equal value and importance to individuals (Posner and Vermeule, 2007, p. 5). In such a way, a deferential view turns out to be an approach, which says "judicial review of governmental action, in the name

of Constitution, should be relaxed or suspended during an emergency. […] The real cause of deference to government in times of emergency is institutional: both Congress [and Parliament] and the Judiciary defer to the executive during emergencies because of the executive's institutional advantages in speed, secrecy, and decisiveness" (Posner and Vermeule, 2007, pp. 15-16).

In fact, in democratically-structured countries, the understanding based on the reliance on executive power can be linked with the idea of trust on majority rule of governments. Democratic principles such as accountability, responsibility, and openness turn out to be the crucial elements of this trust (Ignatieff, 2004, p. 10). So, for some writers the belief in true nature of liberal democracy might be added to the answer in understanding the balance between security and liberty; and while "[d]emocratic constitutions do allow some suspension of rights in states of emergency" (Ignatieff, 2004, p. 2), they are seen also as substantial guarantees for individuals against any kind of violation.

As an element of the balance between security and liberty, Nickel reminds us the importance of "due-process rights" which "protect people against being imprisoned for alleged crimes without being given the opportunity for a fair and public trial" (Nickel, 2007, p. 106). Thus, it is argued that for a long period of time, maybe since the emergence of Magna Carta in the 13th century, these rights have functioned to provide the "security of life and liberty," while preventing authorities' "cruelty" and "unfair treatment" (Nickel, 2007, pp. 108-110). In order to find a common way to approach due-process rights and emergency-situations, like terrorism, Nickel's endeavor deserves attentions. He defines different levels of emergencies in which appropriate attitude of government will play a key role in protecting the status of due-process rights. Thus, while a country can be within the "normal times," when it is "not facing severe and dramatic problems," it can enter also into the periods of "troubled times," "severe emergencies," or "supreme emergencies" (Nickel, 2007, pp. 114-116). After having the capability to define the situation within the country exactly, for Nickel, it might be argued that for instance, "if a terrorist emergency is severe enough (thousands of domestic terrorists at work with large weekly attacks), it may be justifiable to enact a system of detention without trial of suspected terrorists arrested in the national territory" (Nickel, 2007, p. 122). In accordance with the internationally legally binding-documents, while accepting security as one of the basic rights to enjoy all other rights, such classifications might be developed through good practices.

Conclusion

As seen from the discussion, within the post-9/11 period, the course of events have proved once again that governments and authorities might behave according to some particular objectives based on security of their people. The security-argument of States are highly linked with the rights-provision and also with the logic

of human rights that aims to provide a secure environment at various levels for everyone as underlined also vie some internationally-binding agreements. On the other hand, we must also accept that one of the main problematic dimensions in an emergency situation, like under a terrorist attack, emerges in the shadow of the feeling of insecurity, where citizens feel more and more limited in their realms and turn into "passive" actors, and while the "question of the security of the state" turn to be above anything else (Mullard and Cole, 2007, p. 4).

Therefore, this problematic process of approaching terrorism might be assessed according to the "treatment" that a government or a legal system has in such an emergency. It must be remembered that terrorism's main aim is, in fact, to destroy community's ideals and "to diminish the humanity of its victims and to reduce them to its own level of barbarity" (An-Na'im, 2002, p. 168). In this sense, the "quasi-militaristic rather than police approach" might turn to have "corrosive" results for "the entire political and legal culture" (Gearty, 2007, p. 47). Thus, while recognizing the need of sustainable security for the enjoyment of all liberties, States might be expected also to be more vigilant in using their power and in choosing the ways to re-interpret the rights and freedoms of individuals.

However, in contrast to the shared opinions found in the Western Academia during the post-Cold War era, we must be similarly careful about some overestimations that only some Western liberal states have the sole answer to these common problems in the field of security-rights dilemma. Hence, as Kalın rightly defends, the "otherization"-project of Islam and some Muslim groups by Western supreme powers following 9/11 terror events has already exacerbated the situation (Kalın, 2018, pp.115-116). For some, such a "civilizer" or "peace-maker" role of the West might be thought still as a guarantee of security of all. Nevertheless, to reply devilish actions like terrorism with another damaging methods like classifying, labelling and undermining some groups of people and their ideas, as observed from the Western "civilized" response to some "inferior-Islamic-Eastern" people, is clearly not the appropriate answer to protect the balance of the scales between security and rights.

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