German Foreign Policy During the First Gulf Crisis: Overcoming a Taboo on Being a Military Power on World Stage

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Abstract

When Iraq attacked Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the international respond was immediate and enormous. In this international context, Germany could not stand irresponsible although its agenda was heavily preoccupied by the ongoing reunification negotiations. Additionally, another challenge for Germany in participating in such an international coalition was its post-World War II settlement which constrained Germany internally and externally from being a military power on world stage. Within this framework, this paper analyses German foreign policy during the First Gulf Crisis when 1990s made a fundamental reassessment about the scope and means of German foreign and security policy a necessity. This paper starts with a brief historical background of the international context and the Gulf War. Then, the paper focuses on the analysis of German foreign policy during the crisis in three periods. In doing so, this study mostly relies on secondary sources in its analysis by reviewing the relevant literature. In conclusion, the paper argues that, though it was comparatively limited, Germany’s participation in the international coalition responding the crisis is not a simple foreign policy choice but a strategic decision about reunified Germany’s role in the newly emerging international system, which will have greater implications as it substantially questioned a taboo on being an active international power including military means in world politics.

Keywords: Germany, Foreign Policy, Military Power, Gulf Crisis, Iraq.

Birinci Körfez Krizi’nde Alman Dış Politikası: Dünya Sahnesinde Askeri Güç Olma Tabusunun Aşılması

Öz

When news agencies from all around the world started to deliver the news on 2 August 1990 at 2:00 am according to local time that Iraq had attacked Kuwait, the world was, more or less, shocked although there had been some pre-concerns about a possible aggression. Although Iraqi hegemonic claims that Kuwaiti land was a natural part of the country was previously known, indications in early 1990 about Saddam Hussein’s intention were not seriously dealt with by the international community. However, this did not mean that it would have remained unanswered once the invasion actually happened. Although the reasons of such an irrational policy of Iraq were being discussed by many leaders, commentators and experts, one thing was certain from the beginning that this aggression would not stand as acknowledged by US President George H. W. Bush, who took the international leadership in responding to this aggression (Bush, 1990).

Immediate international reaction to the invasion of Kuwait demonstrated itself in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) within hours. Alarmed by Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the UNSC condemned the invasion and pawed the way for the international military intervention led by the USA (UNSC Res.660, 1990). The decision of the UNSC was indeed enormously different from what had been appearing since the establishment of the organization. The cooperation after the invasion among leading states in international politics was extraordinary. In this international context, not only big powers but also regional and middle powers felt responsible to participate in this international coalition in order to stop this aggression due to the emerging characteristics of the new international system, namely unipolar world in the early 1990s.

Only such a direct violation of international order and such an enthusiastic international response could draw Germans’ attention to international arena due to two main factors. First, the summer 1990 was enough exhausting for Germans since two Germany were about to finalize the negotiations for the reunification. Second, Germany, burdened by the genocidal legacy of Nazism and post-World War II constitutional arrangements, did not have any intention to be involved in a war, which was not even on their homeland. Within this framework, this paper aims to evaluate German position during the First Gulf Crisis between 1990 and 1991. In order to have a well understanding of German position in this war, this paper starts with a brief historical background of the international context of the early 1990s and the Gulf War. In this manner, the reasons of the invasion and the events after the invasion and responses of major powers will be discussed shortly in a historical context. In this part, it is important to understand what
kind of international politics and US leadership made Germany to participate in this war despite its internal restrictions and international doubts about Germany’s potential military power in world politics. Then, the paper focuses on the analysis of German foreign policy during the Gulf Crisis. In this part, German foreign policy is analyzed in three periods respectively; namely Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm, and Operation Provide Comfort. Indeed, regarding German foreign policy, the question was very consistent for the whole crisis: what was the role of newly reunified Germany as the international politics has started to change fundamentally? More specifically, should a reunified Germany become a military power internationally? However, in each and every specific period, German foreign policy was formulated and framed depending on different sets of internal and external variables.

The paper discusses Germany’s new role in international environment in the post-Cold War era through evaluating foreign policy of Germany between 1990 and 1991 as its first example. In this manner, German foreign policy during the First Gulf Crisis was a historic turning point because German military had been seen just as a part of common defense against Soviet bloc and due to the atrocities committed under Nazi regime it was very limited. However, 1990s brought new challenges and opportunities for Germany in several conflicts in international politics like the Gulf Crisis, Yugoslavia and Somalia (Baumann, 2011, p. 174). In this respect, this paper focuses only on the Gulf Crisis without making a comparative analysis of the evolution German Foreign Policy in other cases during the following years. Therefore, a fundamental reassessment about the scope and means of German foreign and security policy had become an obvious necessity during the Gulf crisis (Ronald, 1992, p. V) and a new discussion started on whether a limited role for Germany could be sustainable when “the world really wants to rediscover how well German soldiers can fight” as German President Richard von Weizsäcker questioned allusively (Die Zeit, in Lantis, 2002, p. 31).

**Iraqi Invasion and Immediate International Response**

Two-day operation of invasion started on 2 August, which resulted in several months of Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, was not an instant and unpredictable move of Saddam Hussein (Resende-Santos, 1992, p. 295). First, it was the final outcome of long-lasting historical disputes between Iraq and Kuwait since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Since Kuwait was a district in the Basra during the Ottoman period, Iraqi side claimed that it should have been a part of Iraq automatically. In responding this claim, Kuwaiti side had always argued that it had already been separated from Basra under British protection long before the dissolution of the Empire (Khadduri & Ghareeb, 1997, p. 6). Before the British mandate in Iraq was terminated on 3 October 1932, the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border had been agreed through exchange of official letters between the Prime Minister of Iraq and the ruler of the Kuwait in 1932 under the British control (Lauterpacht, Greenwood, Weller & Bethlehem, 1991, pp. 49-50). However, Iraq started to assert its territorial claims on Kuwait after the independence (Donaldson, 1996, pp. 143-144). Regional powers gained more leverage in the Gulf politics especially after the British withdrawal from its protectorates over the lower Gulf (Legrenzi & Gause, 2016, p. 305). When British protectorate in Kuwait formally ended on 19 June 1961, Iraqi Prime Minister Abdul Karim Qasim, claiming full sovereignty over the country, announced that Kuwait would be incorporated into his country (Resende-Santos, 1992, p. 296). Since the invasion was highly possible, British troops with the help of Arab world were able to stop a possible aggression. In October 1963, Iraq formally recognized Kuwait as an independent state after Qasim’s overthrown by the Baathist coup. In the following years, there was not an Iraqi military action against Kuwait due to its unstable internal politics.
Nevertheless, this did not necessarily mean that Iraq gave up its hegemonic claims on Kuwait. In the early 1970s, a new dispute emerged between Iraq and Kuwait on two islands, namely Bubiyan and Warbah Island, which are important from the perspective of Iraq’s free access to international trade. Following a failure to reach an agreement after several meetings, Iraq suddenly attacked on a border police station again on 20 March 1973 resulted the death of two Kuwaiti soldiers and one Iraqi (Khadduri & Ghareeb, 1997, pp. 6-75).

Second, apart from historical claims of Iraq over Kuwaiti territory, there were also some immediate factors, which led to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 (Legrenzi & Gause, 2016, pp. 310-311). Among them, Kuwait’s disloyalty to its promises considering the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was important factor. Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were intentionally and continuously producing oil more than their quotas in order to damage Iraqi economy. In late 1980s after a devastating war, Iraq actually could not be tolerable to this economic threat. Iraq officially accused these two states for carrying out an economic war by producing excessive oil which resulted in a sharp decrease of oil prices (Lauterpacht et al., 1991, p. 73). This economic burden was actually beyond the limits of Iraq especially after a very costly war. Additionally, Iraq was also accusing Kuwait that it was stealing Iraqi oil through a technique known as slant drilling (Hayes, 1990).

Immediate factors combined with historical and long standing hegemonic claims led Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. In hours, Iraqi troops reached Kuwait City and started to consolidate its power and established a puppet government, then annexed Kuwait (Donaldson, 1996, p. 151). The rapid victory also caused a refugee crisis when around one million fled to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. It also created a diplomatic crisis when Iraq hold around 10,000 western citizens including 400 Germans in Kuwait as human shields in order to pressure their governments to accept this de facto situation (Lantis, 2002, p. 19).

Whatever the reasons and justifications coming from Iraqi side, both the invasion itself and attitude of Iraq after the invasion presented a direct challenge to international order and peace and principles. Therefore, international community led by the US did not delay its answer to this challenge. Within the decision making circles of US Administration, it was believed that any delay or any concession could have been regarded as a reward for aggression, which could set the stage for further acts of banditry (Donaldson, 1996, p. 142). Within hours of the invasion, the UNSC met to discuss the immediate crisis and obligations of the international community to restore the order. The UNSC adopted Resolution 660 by 14 votes in favor since Yemen did not participate in voting. The Resolution clearly condemned Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanded immediate and unconditional withdrawal from territory of Kuwait (UNSC Res.660, 1990).

Since Saddam Hussein was determined to resist international pressure, the UNSC passed another resolution on 6 August, which imposed severe sanctions in economic terms under Chapter VII in order to strengthen the pressure on Iraq, enforces all states to stop all kinds of transaction from Iraqi government and stop any international funding of Iraq. The Council also requested all Member States to stop their imports all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait or any sale or supply military equipment (UNSC Res.661, 1990).

In this international context, US President Bush took the leadership to organize a tangible response to Iraqi aggression. In the first instance, the aim was to resolve the crisis without use of military means because especially European states insisted on diplomatic means. However, the US did not want to give time Iraq for a possible permanent occupation, which was also a concern for Europeans. Although the international politics started to evolve fundamentally since the late 1980s as the Berlin Wall fell; the Cold War
rhetoric was very much obvious and the containment was a clear aim in US foreign policy in responding Iraqi aggression (Donaldson, 1996, p. 141). He ordered US forces to enter Saudi Arabia and Gulf Region as a response to Saudi King Fahd’s request on 6 August 1990 since Saudi Arabia was also considered in danger of any further Iraqi aggression. Certainly, President Bush and US Administration were not alone in these efforts because European powers supported US policy. In this manner, European Community called for the immediate withdrawal of Iraq and full Iraqi compliance with UNSC Resolutions (Lantis, 2002, p. 20).

To conclude, it became apparent very soon that Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would not be tolerated by major world powers including US, Europeans and even the USSR and China. Indeed, it was not surprising when world’s dependency to oil as main energy source is considered. A chaotic situation in the Gulf was not considered in the interest of any industrial nation because oil has always constituted one of the main sources for the production. Moreover, it is important to note that oil in the Middle East is not very crucial only because it is main source of energy but also it is the cheapest one to extract.

German Position During the First Gulf Crisis

Although the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was unanimously declared as unacceptable by all major powers, NATO member led by the US were particularly critical. After all unsuccessful international measures to take Iraq out of Kuwait without deploying military force, the US warned Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait by 15 January 1991 or face war (Friedman, 1990). By 16 January 1991, the US-led coalition forces under the UNSC Resolution 678 started an operation which led to Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait on 25 February (UNSC Res.678, 1990). During this crisis, traditional German position was fundamentally challenged as it evolved from having no Middle East policy to a broadly defined limited engagement as discussed below (Perthes, 2004, p. 1).

Operation Desert Shield: Internal Debates on the Role of Germany on the World Stage

Operation Desert Field refers to the period until mid-January 1991 from the start of the invasion when operations leading to the buildup of troops and defense of neighboring countries were carried out. Indeed, when Saddam Hussein noticed that a serious international operation was on the way, Iraq tried to reach an agreement on the conditions of withdrawal gradually. Nevertheless, the international coalition had determined that Iraq had to withdrew unconditionally and started to prepare a campaign.

The crisis of Gulf in summer of 1990 was “a very serious and complicated strategic dilemma at the worst possible time” (Lantis, 2002, p. 20). It was not a right time because Germany’s agenda was pre-occupied with domestic developments for reunification (Finlan, 2003, p.72). German politicians were clear from the beginning that the invasion was a violation of international peace but they were not sure whether Germany would participate in the coalition or not. They were also not sure what this contribution could be because since the end of the Second World War, for the first time Germany was expected to participate in a military conflict outside of Europe. Actually, beside other debates, German Constitution did not allow military involvement in outside nations (Matthews, 1993, p. 61). Therefore, it was almost impossible to demand a military contribution from Germany in 1990.

Other than military contribution, however, considering the very expensive cost of coalition operation, US officials demanded significant economic contributions from wealthy allies, including Germany. However, Germany was also aware of the fact that the reunification would cost extensively, therefore economic contribution to the international
coalition was also subject to internal discussions. Therefore, the first German dilemma during the Gulf Crisis was "whether it was defensible for an economically powerful state to refrain from helping to maintain the order of a system from which it derives a great deal of economic wealth" (Matthews, 1993, p. 62).

German political leaders, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg met for the emergency meeting on 2 August 1990 to decide the German position. In that meeting, cabinet leaders agreed that Germany would contribute financially due to its alliance with the US but not militarily because of constitutional limitations. Regarding internal debates about Germany’s contribution to the international coalition, constitutionality debate played an important role in domestic politics of Germany from the beginning during the Gulf Crisis. In German politics, Grundgesetz, German Constitution, has an essential importance to shape both domestic and external affairs of the government and it is not easy to amend any article of the constitution. Related parts Article 24/2 and Article 87 read as the following:

Article 24/2: For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may join a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to such limitations upon its rights of sovereignty as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world.

Article 87a/1: The Federation establishes Armed Forces for defence purposes" (Basic Law).

Indeed, these two articles can be interpreted in a conflicting manner because while Article 24 somehow permits government to join collective security bodies, Article 87 openly states that German armed forces can be built up for defense purposes only. In total, those who were against Germany’s military involvement in international politics argued that the Gulf case was not an exception and the constitution did not allow government to send troops to the Gulf. Indeed, according to Lantis, most of German leaders interpreted above articles that German involvement could only be possible in regional collective security defense, which was very consistent with Germany’s commitment to NATO area operations, which had its roots from the post-World War II establishment and continued during the Cold War (Lantis, 2002, p. 23). However, in a new world order with the fall of Berlin Wall, questions emerged about the capacity of Germany’s involvement in military crisis through UN missions in out-of-area operation. Indeed, this debate was very important because it has a direct affect on the Germany’s place in international order after the Cold War. Some leaders in Germany were not content with the traditional understanding of constitutional ‘political reality’ (Ronald, 1992, p. 4) and imagined that a reunited Germany could become a military power on the world stage. These discussions created many diversions both between the political parties and inside the political parties. For instance, while Chancellor and Defense Minister believed that a new understanding of German Foreign Policy in a new environment is necessary; Foreign Minister Genscher was in favor of a narrow interpretation of the constitution which did not allow deployment of German troops out-of-area operations (Lantis, 2002, p. 23).

The Gulf Crisis did not trigger such debates only among political elites. German public was also heavily preoccupied with the ongoing crisis. One survey reveals that while a 65% majority of Germans supported a multilateral effort to make Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, 70% denied German participation in any military operation mainly because of internal development about reunification (Der Spiegel, in Lantis, 2002, p. 26). In other words, majority of Germans though that number one priority of their government should have been domestic politics in such a historic transition period and thousands marched in the streets to oppose Germany’s participation into the coalition (Cooper, 2002, p. 43). There was also another factor that any kind of military engagement of Germany other than defense was considered as a taboo due to memoirs of the catastrophic war in 1940s. It is
for this reason that post-World War II establishment in Germany was designed in a way that Germans should have never expected to build an army other than self-defense which created a kind of culture of reticence in years (Ronald, 1994, p 62).

Having these internal debates and political turbulences in Germany, what was the German response to the Operation Desert Shield, the first stage of the Gulf Crisis? Germany did respond its most significant ally's request due to allied solidarity as Chancellor strongly insisted (Ronald, 1992, p. 11). US Secretary of State James Baker made an official tour in September 1990 to ensure economic backing for the operation from mainly Gulf countries and its European allies. During this 11-day journey to nine countries, Baker met Chancellor Kohl and they agreed on a two billion US dollar in addition to material support for another coalition ally Turkey and the transportation of Egyptian soldiers that would be deployed for the defense against further Iraqi aggression to the Gulf (Baker & DeFrank, 1995). Indeed, during the early days of the Gulf Crisis, this checkbook diplomacy satisfied both domestic and international environment because on the one hand public and political leaders gave their consent for financial contribution without sending German soldiers to the Gulf; on the other hand coalition leaders understood Germany's domestic concerns and constraints in era of reunification as long as it was loyal to allied solidarity with a considerable financial backing. In addition to sharing the economic burden, Germany also took an active role in supporting US initiatives through mobilizing European institutions (Munro, 2006, p. 219).

Operation Desert Storm: The Strategic Dilemma for Germany

Having believed that any further delay might have make a credible military response impossible (Lauterpacht et al., 1991, p. 244), the UNSC assembled by foreign ministers of member states rather than their permanent representations on 29 November 1990. After long discussions, the UNSC adopted the Resolution 678 which legitimized a direct military operation if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait until 15 January 1991 (UNSC Res.678, 1990). The coalition launched its massive air campaign on 16 January, which started Operation Desert Storm.

The deepening and the widening of the crisis led new debates in Germany and pressured Germany to make more contributions to coalition which was authorized by the UNSC. During this phase of the crisis, what was crucial for German political leaders was to balance external demands in the name of being ally and growing opposition to the war within the electorate (Kimball, 2010). Indeed, Chancellor Kohl and Defense Minister Stoltenberg were in favor of further German activism from the beginning. According to these two leaders, the new world politics have given greater responsibilities to Germany as it was reunited and fully sovereign. Kohl, for instance, stated that a greater responsibility for global peace was a demand not only by Europeans but also by the world at large (Haftendorn, 1996, p. 113).

Although Foreign Minister Genscher did not support further German activism, he was well aware of the situation; meaning that in such an international environment in which a well-supported international coalition forces emerged, leaving Germany outside of this coalition may have long standing affects in the new international conjuncture. In addition, unlike the Desert Shield Operation, this time inclusion of Turkey in area of danger by the NATO changed the way of domestic debates and concerns. Since Germany is not only member of NATO but also one of the most beneficiaries of its security umbrella during the Cold War years, it had concrete obligations to Turkey in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO, 1949). In other words, when one of NATO members was considered under threat, the nature of the constitutional debate evolved into a new
situation that the Gulf Crisis could be interpreted within the context of collective defense of Europe and the extension of Germany's participation might be possible.

Regarding public opinion, although the objectivity was still subject to discussions, as many say, the military operation against Iraq was the first lively broadcasted war in this scale (Kellner, 1996, p. 168). When news started to be delivered to the world about the atrocities committed by Iraq, it easily changed the public opinion about the use of German armed forces in within the coalition (Cooper, 2002, pp. 53-55). As Lantis summarized based on surveys that 71% of German citizens approved international military operation and 57% backed German financial contribution to the coalition by late January. Additionally, in February, majority of Germans gave consent to the use of military force and the deployment of armed forces to Turkey to contribute to NATO's defense (Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik in Lantis, 2002, p. 35).

As both political leaders and public opinion were transformed during the crisis towards to be more tolerant for further involvement, Germany's involvement was framed on certain principles. Among them, the foremost priority was the joint cooperation with the US and to key allies, second was the supporting the use of force without direct participation, third was the special effort for the security of Israel, the last but not the least all these efforts should not endanger the reunification process and cooperation with the USSR (Lantis, 2002, p. 36). These principals again demonstrate that German government tried to reach a kind of balance a deeply uncomfortable situation between internal and external demands. First of all, Germany rightfully wanted to continue its close relations with the US. Moreover, its willingness to be part of international coalition as a major power can be understood because it stated that it would contribute more to the coalition in terms of both financially and militarily. As far as domestic constraints are concerned, German leaders had no tolerance to delay or stop reunification process. Lastly, these principals once again reminded how genocidal legacy of Third Reich was binding that Germany committed itself to the security of Israel.

During the Operation Desert Storm, Germany increased its support to the coalition. First, Germany increased its help in terms of being strategic base for coalition forces and it cancelled almost all restrictions to use NATO airbases for installation and logistical purposes. Furthermore, in February, it deployed its troops for support operations and naval forces to the eastern Mediterranean to cover NATO operations (Matthews, 1993, p. 210). In addition to military contributions, Germany continued financial aids increasingly. Bonn contributed more than six billion US dollar in cash and several material deliveries which in total constituted one-tenth of the financial costs of Operation Desert Storm (Ronald, 1992, p. 12; Haftendorn, 1996, p. 113). Germany also announced an increase in humanitarian relief aid for regional states that were affected by the war and economic sanctions, including Jordan, Egypt, Turkey and Israel (Lantis, 2002, p. 27; Hess, 2009, p. 201).

To conclude, during the second phase of the crisis, which began on 16 January 1991 with a massive air assaults against Iraq, German contributions to international coalition led by the US had important role despite of some critiques that Germany could and should have done more. After a series of heavy air attacks for more than 40 days which destroyed many important military bases and resources of Iraq, the ground war continued in the last days of February 1991. On 28 February, ceasefire was declared and Iraq officially agreed to abide by UNSC resolutions concerning Iraq–Kuwait crisis. With this cease-fire, the crisis entered a new phase which presented different challenges and opportunities for Germany again.
Operation Provide Comfort: A Real Opportunity for Germany

Since the coalition massive air assault completely damaged Iraqi infrastructure, it was like that there was no government in Iraq when war ended. Iraqi government was nearly a failed state which created a power vacuum. In this chaotic environment, some Kurdish groups in the north and Shia groups in the south, who were discontent with the regime for long years, wanted to benefit from the absence of authority in order to have regional autonomy. Within this framework, expecting that Iraqi army which was destroyed by the coalition could not take the control, these groups started to rebel against Baghdad in the early March (Donaldson, 1996, p. 185). However, Saddam Hussein managed the crisis with his remaining forces within a month and Iraq declared its victory over rebellion. The way Saddam dealt with the crisis especially in the northern part of Iraq was a real humanitarian catastrophe and hundreds of thousands of Kurdish people fled into the Turkey-Iraq border (Resende-Santos, 1992, p. 347; Khadduri & Ghareeb, 1997, pp. 189-211). Turkey opened its border to Iraqi refugees and asked international relief in order to handle the situation. On 5 April 1991, the UNSC passed Resolution 688 which condemned Iraqi government for its repression of people, called for an immediate international relief and appeals all states to contribute humanitarian efforts (UNSC Res.688, 1991). Within this context, the US government announced to lead Operation Provide Comfort, a defense and a relief mission designed to deal with humanitarian problem in northern Iraq. This new international mission brought new dimensions and dilemmas to German decision makers in the year 1991 when US President contacted with Kohl to request German participation in the humanitarian relief operations in northern Iraq, Turkey and Iran.

Compared to previous phases, participation in an international coalition within the context of humanitarian relief was more legitimate for both political leaders and the public in Germany. Since Operation Provide Comfort did not compose a direct armed conflict, German government responded immediately in terms of technical personnel and equipment (Lantis, 2002, pp. 46-47). In financial terms also, in time, Germany provided around twelve billion US dollar to the coalition efforts which corresponds about one sixth of the total cost of the operations in total (Resende-Santos, 1992, p. 316; Perthes, 2004, p. 14) despite the critiques that it was indeed less than Germany could actually have done (Sked, 1991, pp. 53 and 56-57). Even the opponents of the deployment of German troops outside the NATO area in previous cases including Foreign Minister Genscher supported Germany’s active role. Though it was mainly a participation by peaceful means, it is important to note how this participation had implications on public perception about the role of Germany in international politics. In a comparative survey year by year, for instance, an increasing majority of German people were declaring their will to assume a more active international role from 1990 to 1992 (Ronald, 1994, p 61).

Conclusion: A New Role for Germany in International Politics

This paper aimed to evaluate German position during the First Gulf Crisis between 1990 and 1991. The Gulf Crisis posed direct challenges to the international community including Germany which was preoccupied by the reunification process in 1990. The US led coalition was very determinant to respond Iraq and liberate Kuwait without delay. Participation for Germany into this coalition was not just a simple foreign policy choice but a strategic decision about reunified Germany’s role in the newly emerging international system. In order to analyze Germany’s strategic choice which would have great implications especially in terms of European politics in the following years, this paper started with a brief historical background of the international context of the early
1990s and Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Second, the paper focused on the analysis of German foreign policy during the Gulf Crisis in separate phases while referring external and internal opportunities and restraints shaping decision making procedures. Lastly, the paper came with some conclusions about Germany’s new role in international environment in the post-Cold War era through evaluating foreign policy of Germany between 1990 and 1991 as its first example.

German foreign policy during the First Gulf Crisis was a historic turning point in many respects. First and foremost, Germany demonstrated that it would be loyal to its international responsibilities emerging from its membership to the NATO and the UN. As one the most beneficiaries of the NATO alliance in the Cold War settlement, Germany fulfilled its alliance responsibility even in a period when Germany was in a comprehensive transition period due to reunification in addition to its constitutional obstacles. Second, although Germany had the burden of heavy cost of reunification process and reconstruction of its eastern half, it proved its financial power as being an important paymaster in the Gulf War. Third, this crisis became a precursor to a more active Germany in international politics, especially in European affairs, after the Cold War. In cooperation with France, it played an important role to activate European countries to respond the crisis and took the leadership in the decision making processes of the EC. Fourth and more specifically, it was also understood that a more active international role for Germany did not exclude military dimension when deem it necessary. The ongoing discussions in the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis made it clear that Germany would need a strong armed force in the foreseeable future to participate, at least, in the UN missions as a necessary component of German active role in international politics. A broader interpretation of the constitution for the deployment of armed forces abroad was indeed revolutionary because of long-standing policies and international pressures to limit Germany's power in military terms. After all, the whole post-World War II establishment in Germany was built in a way that Germans should never thought to engage military activity other than self-defense.

To conclude, Germany played an important role in the Gulf Crisis despite its domestic constraints. However, this role will have greater implications as it substantially questioned a taboo of both German politicians and the public on being an active international power including military means in world politics. By participating in this crisis, Germany, as an emerging global actor, showed that it was ready to take leading role in international politics with its entire means; financially, politically and even militarily. In this direction, since the early 1990s, Germany has been involving in many operations under the umbrella of both the NATO and the UN as in the examples of Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq. In brief, the participation of Germany into the coalition forces during the First Gulf Crisis became a clear precursor to how Germans define their strategic interests and how Germany's new role is framed in the post-Cold War era.

REFERENCES


Özet


Makalenin ikinci ve ana kısımda ise Körfez Krizi sırasında Almanya Dış Politikası’nın ayrıntılı analizine odaklanmaktadır. Bu kısımda Alman dış politikası sırasında