

Political Economy of the Islamist Party in a Muslim Democracy The Experience of PKS of Indonesia*

Raden Cecep Lukman YASIN

Deakin University
ryasin@deakin.edu.au

Abstract

This paper focuses on the effort of PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Justice and Prosperous Party) to win the heart of the people, and to build relatively solid party-mass relations. Considering that the newly emerging democratic Indonesia is characterized by rampant money politics as well as corrupt, pragmatic, or opportunistic behaviors among elites and broader electorates alike, the promotion of piety and morality to secure the loyalty of electorates is not sufficient. Under such conditions, PKS devised a community-building strategy to provide welfare service aiming at building close linkages with their recipients. This social service provision directed mostly to the marginalized not only boosts the party image as “caring” and “religious” among the pious Muslim electorates, but also reinforces the commitment of the struggle of the PKS as a *dakwah* party that struggles to build an Islamic society with justice and equity. It is argued that the party’s well-disciplined organizational structures and community building strategy to provide social welfare services that fill both material and spiritual needs of pragmatic electorates are the key to explaining the party’s ability to build a relatively solid mass support base.

Keywords: Dakwah, Islamist Party, Welfare Service

Introduction

The Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK), rebranded the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) was born out of a populist religious outreach (*da’wa/dakwah*) movement of the 1980s, inspired, in part, by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood movement. It was transformed into political party to contest the 1999 election in the aftermath of the May 1998 collapse of Soeharto’s New Order regime. In wave of optimism, diverse interests and ideologies, previously restricted under the authoritarian New Order regime, came to the surface, competing to gain ground in the public sphere.

PK/PKS became the principle vehicle of the *dakwah* movement first started by Muhammad Natsir, Indonesia’s fifth prime minister and leader of the Masyumi party which gained 21 percent of the popular vote in the 1955 election, the last free and fair election before the 1999 election. Under the leadership of Natsir, the pioneer of Islamism in Indonesia, the *dakwah* movement aspired to Islamize Indonesian society from below. PK/PKS describes itself as being unswervingly faithful to the *raison d’être* of its existence, namely the call for the establishment of Muslim *ummah* governed by Sharia in every aspect of its life. However, in order to participate in

* This paper was presented as an abstract in August, 24-26 2016 at International Congress on Political Economic and Social Studies, Istanbul/Turkey.

electoral system of politics, which necessitates the process of negotiating the ideals and interests, even a religiously inspired ‘dakwah party’ needs to strike a balance in steering its way through politics. Some degree of compromise between the party’s principles and general public demand cannot be avoided if the party is to win the mass support.

In politics, idealism should compromise with reality. PKS learn from its predecessor that pushed Islamist ideology and emphasized its exclusiveness as an Islamist party. PK’s failure to garner significant votes in the 1999 election is a signal for its successor that its political agenda and policy was not adequate for the expansion of the party’s constituency; it is only appealing to *Tarbiyah* activists and limited sympathizers. Image as a party of individuals with highly commitment to Islam might give a hope for the country fraught with multi-crises, especially moral decline. However, this religious image proves to be a disadvantage element for the party, since non-Islamist voters would not appeal to the Islamist agenda of the Islamist party.¹² Voters of nationalist orientation were suspicious of the party hidden agenda of changing NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia) into an Islamic state. Muslim traditionalist and modernist voters, associated with NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah respectively, will be reluctant to give their vote for a newly emerging Islamist party considered to be a threat to their religious, cultural and political credentials.¹³

After being involved in social and political realms, PKS cadres are becoming socially and politically matured. Slowly but surely, they are moving to the middle, indicated mainly by two distinct features. Firstly, the platform of the party is now less explicit about religious issues compared to that of its predecessor. The platform is translated into the selection of neutral themes of election campaign, such as social justice, the fight against corruption, and poverty alleviation, which are appealing to greater segment of the population.¹⁴ This strategy bore fruit; PKS managed to quintuple its share winning 7.3% of the vote and forty-five seats in the parliament. Secondly, the inclusion into the ministerial post and national as well as local parliament draw the party more into the middle. Deep involvement in electoral politics and democratic system requires the party to compromise its ideological

¹² The three national elections conducted since 1999 indicate the electorate’s inclination to reject candidates who campaigned on exclusive platform, see Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia and the Pitfalls of Low-Quality Democracy: A Case Study of Gubernatorial Elections in North Sulawesi,” in *Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, Marco Bunte and Andreas Ufen, London: Routledge, 2009, p. 141.

¹³ Noorhaidi Hasan, *The Making of Public Islam. Piety, Democracy, and Youth in Indonesian Politics*, Yogyakarta: SUKA-Press, 217.

¹⁴ Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, “Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia,” Lowy Institute Paper 05, Longueville Media for the Lowy Institute for International Policy Double Bay Australia, 2005, p. 71.

belief and preference.¹⁵ Cooperation and negotiation with parties of different ideologies become the normal value in politics, where the party often has to give up some ideals and satisfy with whatever seats or office it could win.

In realizing its goal, PKS is operating within the system of democracy. Democratization has enabled the party to behave rationally and pragmatically. In its first involvement in national democratic election of 1999, for instance, the party struggled to represent the political preference of the most conservative segment of Muslim community, hence the far right of the ideological spectrum. This ideological self-placement changes following the increasing stability of Indonesian democracy. The necessity to gain political opportunity or to survive the political threat leads the party to be open to the new experience. Consequently, the PKS leadership acknowledges that the struggle for implementation of Sharia needs to be presented in secular terms, such as striving for clean government and fighting corruption. With this in mind, PKS adopted a deliberate strategy of not making direct reference to Sharia. It described this approach as being intrinsic to its dakwah strategy and was intended to bring the party closer to its potential constituents and sympathizers.

Focus of the Study

Theoretical insight about the fate of Islamist parties in Muslim world is mainly a result from their opposition against undemocratic or authoritarian regime. In contrast, PKS offers an interesting theoretical significance, due to the fact that the party was established and based its support in a democratic political system. This article explores PKS' political rise and mobilization in the largest Muslim country Indonesia, following the country's democratic transition. Thus, the study of the party's trajectory will contribute to the debate about the political mobilization of religion-driven political parties in the context of democratic consolidation in the Muslim world.

Organizational expansion and electoral rise of the PKS are interesting to investigate due to the fact that all other religious parties, such as PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party), or PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party), and PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, National Trust Party), performed badly during the same period, even though they had better chances for political success. Compared to the newly emerging PKS, which is considered inexperienced and in a capital shortage to survive in the country's electoral democracy, all three established

¹⁵ Whether or not Islamist parties will moderate as a result of inclusion into the state organs and contribute to democratic consolidation is still debatable. See Asef Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007; Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, Gunes Murat Tezcur, *Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia: Golkar in Post-Soeharto Era*. London: Routledge, 2010; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party," in *Comparative Politics*, 2004.

faith-based parties bear high expectancy to survive and expand, due to their close connections with the prior regime, hence access to state resources, or with prominent mass-based religious movements, hence extensive social capital and infrastructure. In short, they have money, prominent personalities, and association with traditional and Western powers; capital that PKS can only hope for.¹⁶ It is thus intriguing to understand how and why PKS was relatively successful to expand the mass support base beyond prediction and expectation.

Theoretical debate about Islamist mobilization in the Muslim world revolves around the theory of “cultural framing” and “resource mobilization.” Both theories approach the question of popular allegiance to the Islamists. While the first emphasizes the party’s ability to frame an ideology in order to attract followers,¹⁷ the latter emphasizes the pragmatic attitude of Islamist parties in providing material reward to garner votes.¹⁸ Such studies suggest that party’s organizational structure and discipline, and social engagement are responsible for the mobilization of the party. This study focuses on the party’s “community building” strategy in delivering social welfare that fulfils both material and spiritual needs of pragmatic electorates. This strategy is considered to be the key to the party’s survival and expansion of its relatively solid mass support base. It is argued from the onset that PKS’s commitment to welfare provision targeted for the socially-deprived populations helps to reinforce its religious image and identity as dakwah party that results in establishing an informal long-term party-mass connection that help the party run effective electoral campaigns and boost the share of its popular votes.

Explaining PKS Mobilization

Initially, PKS membership consists of well-educated and ambitious Muslim youth, who were active in campus dakwah or *Tarbiyah* movement in 1980s. Heavily relied on dakwah channels dominated by individuals exposed to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and championed an Islamist vision with the goal of rallying popular support, especially the realization of an Islamic-based system based on Shariah, the party’s primary constituencies are of urban lower-middle-class residing especially in Jakarta and its surrounding satellite cities such as Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi. Starting from only 60,000 cadres in 1999, the membership has grown steadily and registered more than fifteen fold growth to more than one million cadres in 2014. On the press conference prior to the National Deliberation Meeting of

¹⁶ Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, “Personalities, Parties, and Voters,” in *Journal of Democracy* 21:2, April 2010, pp. 35-49. Douglas Webber, “A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” *Pacific Review* 13:3 (June, 2006)

¹⁷ Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, “Interests, Ideas, and Islamist Outreach in Egypt,” in Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 231-49.

¹⁸ Janine A. Clark, *Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004)

PKS in Bali on 1-3 February 2008, Tifatul Sembiring, the president of the party, maintained that PKS targets at 20% of the total vote in general election of 2009. To realize this ambitious dream, the party is forced to tread a new path of becoming an open party, allowing it of the influx of constituents from many different religious and social backgrounds. Through this new strategy PKS has made significant inroads beyond its traditional urban constituencies into areas such as Central and East Java and West Sumatra.

The PKS mobilization power can be illustrated by its electoral performances during 1999 to 2009. In the first democratic national legislative elections in 1999, the party's predecessor, PK, won only 1.4%, gaining only seven seats in the 500-member House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR). In the next election, PKS witness the increasing vote of 7.3%, from which the party secured 45 seats in the DPR, and also in 2009 election, with slightly increase into 7.8%, winning 57 seats of the 560-member House.¹⁹ It is important to note that PKS electoral success was at the expense of the sharp decline of all other Islamic faith-base parties, and against the dramatic rise of the relatively new Democratic Party (PD) led by the previous President Yudhoyono. While all other parties of religious or nationalist background have lost most of their popular support, PKS has managed to retain a steady support base and become the fourth largest party in the DPR and the most prominent religious party in the country.²⁰ The relatively solid mass support base, both among members as well as sympathizers, is responsible for the mobilization power of the party. Based on the national survey of CSIS in 2008, PKS enjoys the highest level of loyalty (above 75%) among party supporters, while other parties show comparatively modest rates ranging from 32% to 61 %.²¹ While many other parties suffer opportunistic behavior and severe factionalism among party members that weaken their organizational cohesion, PKS has a better cohesiveness in term of party member relationship.²²

To maintain the cadres' commitment towards the party, PKS develops several fundamental values to be followed strictly by its cadres. The first main value is the belief that the aim of their involvement in the party is to be a *jund al-da'wa* (soldier of dakwah) and their activities are solely for the

¹⁹ Rusla, "Perolehan Kursi Legislatif PKS Meningkatkan [PKS increases in legislative member seat]" www.antaraneews.com/berita/139144.

²⁰ Kikue Hamayotsu, "The Political Rise of the Prosperous Justice Party in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia," in *Asian Survey* 51:5, p. 975.

²¹ The loyalty rates of other major parties are as follows: Golkar 61%, PDI-P 55%, PKB 48, 5%, and PPP 32%, respectively. CSIS, Jakarta, *Perilaku Pemilih Indonesia 2008* [Indonesian voting behaviors 2008] (Jakarta: CSIS, 2008).

²² Michael Buehler and Paige Tan, "Party-Candidate Relationships in Indonesian Local Politics: A Case Study of the 2005 Regional Elections in Gowa, South Sulawesi Province," *Indonesia* 84 (October 2007), pp. 42-69; Vedi R. Hadiz, *Localizing Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010).

sake of God's pleasure (*ridha Allah*). By this very concept, individual interests became irrelevant; private ambition should be put aside for the sake of more important goal, namely God's pleasure. All activities undertaken by the party and the cadres are considered to be the media of dakwah to advance Islamic norms and values, and to gain God's pleasure. This shared value of being "*jund min junud al-da'wa*" (one of the soldiers of dakwah)²³ has eventually developed the sense of militancy among the cadres. PKS' cadres conceive themselves as members of a party with a strong commitment to the religiously-inspired shared values. The spirit to hold tight to such commitment helps to create internal solidity within the party. This solidity is considered responsible for the party immune to the exclusive motives and external interventions that could potentially destroy the very characteristics of the party.²⁴

Closely connected to the cadre's commitment as a "soldier of dakwah" is the spirit of *ta'ah* (obedience) towards *qiyadah* (the leaders).²⁵ PKS believes that with the existence of unshakeable obedience, any dakwah goals could be reached. The concept "*sami'na wa atha'na*," meaning "we hear and we obey", becomes an important feature that characterizes the very relation between the party leaders and the cadres.²⁶ For the cadres at a higher level, obedience to their leaders is more demanding as a part of total commitment that they should undertake for the party.²⁷ This structural obedience of the party's cadres helps the party to easily mobilize its cadres for the political, social, or cultural events. In the practical level, obedience and disciplined cadres have also made it possible for the party to make important adjustments as a response to the current political situation, without creating unnecessary internal commotion. The other main value is the spirit of *jamaah* (togetherness). To reach the party's ideals, as a dakwah party that believed in collective action, PKS endorses the importance of holding the spirit of *jamaah* as a means to preserve *ukhuwwah* (brotherhood). For PKS cadres, this value constitutes an important prerequisite for the success of the dakwah struggle to promote Islamic values and norms. The party's official documents states that the concept of *jamaah* is the prominent feature of the

²³ Hilmi Aminuddin, *Menegakkan Kepemimpinan Dakwah*, Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Bidang Arsip dan Sejarah, 2011, p. 116-117.

²⁴ Djony Edward, *Efek Bola Salju Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, Bandung: Harakutuna Publishing, 2006, p. 22-23.

²⁵ Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomen Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia*, (Bandung: Teraju, 2002), p. 117. The concept of cadres' obedience towards their leaders find its basis literally on the Al-Qur'an (4:59), stating that: "Obey the God, and obey the Messenger of God, and those of you who are in authority (*ulu al-amr*)..." The term *ulu al-amr* refers to legitimate leaders appointed by the people. To strengthen cadres' understanding of the importance of obeying the leaders, the party provides readings and training materials under the topic "*Qiyadah wal Jundiyah*" (the leader/commandant and the follower/soldier).

²⁶ Noorhaidi Hasan, *The Making of Public Islam. Piety, Democracy and Youth in Indonesian Politics*, Yogyakarta: SUKA Press, 2013, p. 232.

²⁷ Ali Said Damanik, 2002, p. 117.

party due to its role as a uniting element of the *ummah*, and the void of this value is the very cause of any failure, or at best the drawback, to the establishment of Islamic interests.²⁸ Therefore, for *dakwah* to be successful, it needs to be conducted collectively or *berjamaah*.²⁹

Weekly meeting of *halaqah* plays a great role in developing the cadres' collective commitment to the party's shared values that proves advantageous for the preservation of party cohesion. The first advantage is that the cadres perceive the party as a tool where they can develop and pursue their idealism. In other words, despite the shortcoming, the party becomes the cadres' political vehicle to carry out the spirit of *dakwah*. As a parameter of cadres' behavior and thinking, the party's shared values prevent any individuals from creating and developing alternative ideology that will create schism, fraction or camp within the party. It also protects the party from the presence of figures who might take over the process of understanding and interpreting the ideology or the leadership of the party in the name of improving the party's situation. This condition makes the creation of alternative camps or parties within PKS highly difficult. Another advantage is that the commitment to the unity of the party encourages the cadres to promote party harmony rather than personal ambition. It created the belief of the importance of being part of one group. This corps spirit becomes the reason for many of PKS' cadres to remain in the group, or at least restrain themselves from actions or activities that will give a bad name to the party or harm the cohesiveness of the party.

The relative success of the party in infusing the shared values means that the internal conflict will not be about the fundamental issues such as party ideology, but most likely about strategic or tactical issues. As the PKS spokesman, Mardani Ali Sera, once said that internal debate or conflict among PKS leaders is nothing but about "choosing the best vehicle after agreeing the place to go."³⁰ Therefore, conflict is considered as a natural consequence of the deliberative efforts to find the best possible way of implementing the party ideology. Under this circumstance, differences at the technical or strategic level do not jeopardize party's cohesion. The willingness of the cadres to maintain the unity of the party and their obedience to the decisions of the leaders has rendered the internal dispute manageable.

²⁸ Syamsul Balda, Abu Ridho, Untung Wahono, *Politik Dakwahh Partai Keadilan*, (Jakarta: DPP Partai Keadilan, 2000), p. 22.

²⁹ Tim Departemen Kaderisasi PKS, *Profil Kader Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, (Bandung: Syaamil Cipta Media, 2004), p. 107.

³⁰ Interview with Dr. Mardani Ali Sera, Vice Chairperson of MPP PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 6 October 2010. Cited in Firman Noor, *Institutionalising Islamic Political Parties in Indonesia: A Study of Internal Fragmentation and Cohesion in the Post-Soeharto Era (1998-2008)*, 2012, Unpublished thesis.

Dakwah and the Recent Election

General elections are reliable tool to measure and evaluate the dakwah performance of the party. To conduct a survey on the number of people accepting PKS dakwah would be prohibitively expensive. The result of recent election provides the party with a real number of people who accept the party dakwah. A ballot is a tool to figure out the progress or the stagnancy of dakwah. The fact that PKS share of vote is only 7 percent indicates that PKS dakwah is only acceptable to a very small number of people. It is also a wake-up call that the party still has so many things to do ahead of them. Therefore, according to Marfendi, PKS leading figure of West Sumatera, there is no reason for the PKS cadres to be satisfied or proud with their work. Even if the party's vote hits 10 percent, there are still 90 percent who refuse to join the party. With this in mind, Marfendi suggests that becoming members of parliament, or elected governor or regents, is only a bonus, because for PKS, the most important thing in the election is that the progress of dakwah is well-recorded through the election.

An optimistic look at the election result is made by Mahyeldi, PKS leading figure of West Sumatera who is also major of Padang, West Sumatera, stating that PKS dakwah has been appreciated by the people. The issue that should be addressed by PKS is not about public acceptance, but more about the method of recruitment. Mahyeldi maintains that:

“Our vote in the recent election is actually increasing, indicating a good public acceptance. It was quite something that our vote slightly increased by 200,000 in the time of political turbulence. Compared to Democrat Party and Golkar, which suffers dramatic lose of vote, PKS still survives the storm. In the next election, we should change our strategy of reaching out the people. We cannot depend on conventional strategy of social programs. In its formative period, PKS programs of social activities might contribute a lot to wide public acceptance. Decades have gone by, and it is a high time that we find other modes of social and political program and strategy that could raise public acceptance and vote as well.”

PKS share of vote in the recent election was indeed below the party expectancy. However, Jamal Lulail, PKS leading figure of Malang, perceives the result of recent election as a blessing for the party. The success in maintaining loyal voters and surpassing the electoral threshold is something the party is grateful of. In recent election of 2014 PKS garnered about 200,000 votes higher (8,480,204 or 6.79 percent) than that of the last election of 2009 (8,206,955 or 7.88 percent), but the parliamentary seat drops from 59 (10.59 percent) to 40 (7.1 percent). Jamal Lulail suggests that despite insignificant increase of vote, PKS is considered successful in keeping the vote stabile. According to him, the case of previous PKS president, Luthfi Hasan Ishaq (LHI), in corruption scandal does not seem to give adverse influence on PKS loyal voters who are considered mature enough to understand a political nuance behind the case.

It has become a common belief within PKS circle that the case of LHI and the political *fitnah* (tribulation) in its wake was created to halt the progress of PKS in politics, and PKS does not see the decrease of its number of seats in parliament as a failure, but more as a success in resisting the negative campaign by the media. Representing the standpoint of PKS cadres, Jamal Lulail has an intriguing opinion about the issue of corruption that has tarnished the image of PKS as a party with a noble work of dakwah:

“In 2012, PKS was predicted by many observers to be leading in the upcoming election of 2014, because PKS is widely known as a clean party, with very minimum corruption case, compared to other parties. For some, the prediction is considered a threat. Something should be done. The worst possible scenario should be drafted and put in motion. They know that catching a small fish would not inflict maximum damage to PKS, hence targeting the big fish. I can say in full confidence that the case of LHI is politicized.”

According to Jamal Lulail, normal and legal procedure does not apply in case of LHI. He compares LHI case with that of Anas Urbaningrum of Democrat Party. It takes almost a year after the latter conviction of corruption suspect that he was finally apprehended. In Anas case, KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, Corruption Eradication Committee) needs long process of collecting evidence and witnesses before arresting the suspect. Jamal Lulail explains that unlike Anas, LHI is not convicted suspect, nor proven evidence of corruption. PKS leaders are convinced that the LHI case is not merely a legal but a political maneuver. It is a common conviction among PKS leader that the real target is not to imprison LHI, but to dismantle PKS. Jamal Lulail explains what he believes as the KPK scenario in arresting LHI:

“They tried to find evidence that PKS as a party is receiving fund from illicit source, i.e. the money LHI got from alleged corruption. To their dismay, such evidence never exists. So they lower the target: no longer dismantlement of PKS, but preventing it from achieving electoral threshold, hence its disappearance from political arena.”

In his *taujih* (directive speech) in Silagnas (Silaturahmi Anggota Legislatif Nasional PKS) on 20 September 2014, Anis Matta, previous PKS president of 2013-2015, announced that PKS should be grateful with the result of the recent election, because despite a political tsunami, PKS still survives. Right after Hidayat Nur Wahid and Fahri Hamzah were elected the vices of MPR and DPR respectively, Anis mentioned that it was a great success for PKS, the success that might raise the rivals' eyebrows. The fact that both figures are the most mature, influential, and experienced among MPR and DPR deputies would make PKS bargaining in the parliament even higher. Furthermore, in the KMP (Koalisi Merah Putih, Merah Putih Coalition), PKS is acting as a backbone and eager to cooperate with other parties. For

all this achievement, in his *taujih*, Anis urged that all the cadres keep a low profile and seek to gather more friends.

Establishing communication with different groups and parties as well as building coalition is one of the strategies of dakwah. Despite the small vote share of 7 percent, PKS still have to meet people's expectation and give voice to people's interests. Knowing that the party does not have enough voice in the parliament to be heard and followed, the natural way to advance the party's goals is to establish coalition with other parties. PKS might constitute only 10 percent of all the coalition power, but the party can multiply its power by working together with parties of the same vision. PKS cannot work alone; it needs a coalition to exchange ideas.

The coalition in KMP is made to be a permanent one, and PKS will be consistent with its decision and work hard to maintain the cohesiveness of the coalition. So far, as Marfendi suggests, PKS has shown its loyalty to the coalition, especially during the political campaign for Prabowo presidency where PKS cadres were mobilized to support the presidential election through their active participation in every step of vote counting from the village level all the way to the national counting by KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, General Election Commission). PKS Headquarters also released their own quick count. All these efforts were acknowledged by the chief of KMP, Prabowo, as Mahyeldi has this to say:

“Prabowo has acknowledged the party's significant role and contribution within the coalition. In many occasions, Prabowo himself expressed publicly his appreciation for the hard work and loyalty of PKS cadres. That is actually our attitude and character, as a result of *tarbiyah*. When we are given a trust, we will keep it to the last breath. Minang philosophical expression says: *Kato pertamo ditapati, kato kaduo bacari-cari* (first words are binding, the second words are lying). So, PKS holds to its first words and will never budge. Decision to join the coalition was taken after a long process of deliberation, because it is meant to last for a long-term period of time.”

According to Marfendi, one of the reasons of PKS support for Prabowo in the recent presidential election is that the party saw in him the readiness to work together for the best interest of the nation. Prabowo is considered by PKS as having a deep concern of protecting national natural resource from the exploitation of foreign countries, and ready to use it for the greater benefit of all the people. The protectionist rhetoric of Prabowo was congruent with the goal of PKS dakwah of realizing prosperity of the people by protecting and managing the country's natural resource. Regarding this goal, Marfendi states that:

“We are now in a big coalition. Our target is to build the country, maintain our dignity, and free ourselves from the control of foreign nations. Indonesia is a big country with highly rich natural resources, but these are seized by

foreign countries. We have a huge gold deposit in the mountain, but it is under the control of Freeport. So we should work together to build our country.”

PKS decided to form a coalition with KMP partly because PKS platform has a close affinity with Prabowo’s vision about self-reliance and sufficiency. According to Marfendi, Indonesia is becoming a big market for the foreign producers, due to her huge number of population. He substantiates his claim with the fact that Indonesia starts importing sugar and rice now, and this situation needs to be ended. It is in this particular issue that PKS sees the affinity between the popular program of Prabowo and the aim of PKS dakwah of social empowerment. Both Prabowo and PKS seem to come to terms with the issue of economic platform. Marfendi explains that numerous dialogs between Prabowo and the party elite were responsible to the smooth join force between an Islamist party and ultra nationalist party of Gerindra (Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Greater Indonesia Movement Party). Referring to the initial process of coalition with Gerindra, Marfendi states that:

“Prabowo had once been apprehensive about PKS due to the image of the latter being an extreme group. However, once engaged in dialogue with us, he admitted that he found in PKS what he strove for all this time, and in numerous occasions he asked PKS to help mentoring the cadres of his party. If Prabowo wins the presidential election, we will have a big chance to begin realizing our dream of welfare and prosperous society.”

Being in the coalition is not without disadvantage to the PKS image. There exists a perception that the party is of no difference from other parties in KMP, which is perceived as a coalition of corrupt parties or parties fraught with problems. That the coalition is merely based on interest, not on ideology, so it is destined to be unsuccessful is another critical comment of the public. By joining the coalition, PKS is also accused of having abandoned its ideological belief, preference, and goals. Addressing to this issue, Marfendi maintains:

“We cannot counter this perception by delving ourselves into debate and argument. We would rather counter it by our real work for the society. Our cadres who become regents or mayors in many municipalities are actually ambassadors of PKS. Due to their closeness to the community, regents or majors have strategic role and position to deliver da’wa in a widest sense of the word. If they succeed in delivering justice and prosperity, they will become representations of PKS value. Someday, if people want to know about PKS, we can simply ask them to see our cadres.”

The coalition of KMP is formed as a balancing power and a ‘watchdog’ for the government’s performance. In the recently established administration of Jokowi, PKS decided to be with the coalition of KMP and become a loyal opposition. According to Jamal Lulail, this position is taken due to the lack of confidence in working with the ruling party, whose ideology is relatively

antagonistic toward PKS ideals. It is feared that the inclusion of PKS in the Jokowi cabinet would be counterproductive. Joining the cabinet is also unhealthy for the party political investment. Jamal Lulail gives his opinion about the reason for PKS to be outside the cabinet:

“Since PKS cadres are known to be outspoken in defending the principled value, it is easier for PKS to be outside the Jokowi cabinet. We are free to express our criticism against government policy that we deem inconsistent with public interest. Being outside a government is not a novel experience for PKS. We have a long history of being an opponent during the new order era. So being inside or outside the government is not a big issue, the important thing is that we keep working for a good cause.”

Since dakwah is a collective duty of all PKS cadres, the absence of PKS cadres in the Jokowi’s cabinet does not necessarily mean that PKS ceases in doing dakwah in politics. If one gate is closed, others are open. Commenting on the absence of PKS cadres in the state cabinet, Surahman Hidayat, the chair of PKS Sharia Council, has this to say:

“Being inside or outside Jokowi cabinet is a blessing for us. When we are assigned the posts in the cabinet, we consider it as a means to enhance our performance and capacity in delivering our mission of dakwah for the benefit of the nation, but when we are not, then it is an opportunity for us to learn and train ourselves on how to become a good critic and control for the government. So, in both situations, we can still perform our duty of dakwah.”

However, there is also a concern among PKS leaders about the decision of becoming an opposition. Since dakwah needs power and authority, the absence of PKS cadres in Jokowi’s cabinet would entail a difficulty for dakwah. While still hoping that Prabowo is elected president, Marfendi states the benefit and disadvantage of being outside the cabinet:

“If Prabowo won the president election, our dakwah would run much easier, and knowing that he lost the election, then we should multiple our energy and perseverance for dakwah, especially, when we are now choosing to be outside of Jokowi cabinet. To be inside the cabinet is not always easy; it puts us on a dilemma. In the last part of SBY’s administration, for instance, we were given 3 ministerial posts in his cabinet. Being critical to the government’s policy which we often found unfavorable for the people, was interpreted as disloyal to the government in which we were parts of its coalition. After ten year within the coalition with government, our share of vote seems to be in stagnancy. It is around 7 percent. There is no significant increase. Now, being outside Jokowi administration makes us easy to be critical to the government. However, it also comes with serious consequence. Remember that LHI was apprehended and sentenced to 18 year of imprisonment, and revoked of his political rights. It happened while we are

inside the government coalition. You can imagine what would befall on us now. So, we should all the time be ready for the worst.”

Explaining PKS Politics of Service

The discussion above reveals factors that explain the party’s exceptionally strong member attachments. It also confirms the existing studies on PKS’s mobilization power that heavily rely on ideological beliefs and/or the political behavior of party elites. The passage above also explains the PKS’s religious identity and activism that account for the promotion of piety and collective identity. This activism of dakwah facilitates a collective allegiance among party cadres. However, the mere ideological underpinning can only partially explain the mobilization pattern; it cannot properly explain its popularity after the party’s downplaying of the Islamist agenda, such as formal enforcement of Shariah, especially after 1999. The casual attitude of the party toward the implementation of Sharia is merely an immediate effect of democracy on religious political parties. By participating in the electoral democratic governance, religious political parties are compelled to moderate their platform and goals. In order to be successful in gaining votes and enter governing coalition, the religious parties need to go beyond their exclusive issues normally invoked by Islamist parties, such as the formalization of Sharia in the state constitution and its enforcement upon the Muslim subjects. By focusing on non-religious issues such as clean governance, anti-corruption and social justice, PKS has translated Islamic ideology into a language of universal values. This approach proves to serve as a political strategy to win larger constituency. One strategy of building mass-party relation and gaining median voters is through pragmatic programs of community building. Therefore, the party’s strategy of economic politics within the urban middle class and rural constituencies warrants some discussion.

1. Building Party-Mass Linkage through Welfare Services

As agents of dakwah, the PKS cadres are encouraged to observe Sharia norms by showing their religious observance and social activism, while in the state level the parliamentarians are obliged to give good example, such as denouncing and avoiding the practice of corruption and bribery. The party engagement in social activities and popular programs might have a strategic value for the image of the party, and it might also become a social or political investment for the party. When the party works hard for the people, it is natural if they would be supportive to the party. However, because the real politics does not follow this logic, PKS continues giving social service as a part of implementing Sharia norms; whether or not the people would vote for them at the ballot is not the party concern.

The politics of service (*khidmat*) is closely related to the issue of sincerity. Perceiving parliamentary dakwah and engagement in politics as a part of religious duty to promote Islamic norms, PKS emphasizes the sincerity in

action as a necessary ingredient of dakwah. While the work of dakwah is noble and sacred, the political arena is murky and requires compromise in all senses of the word.³¹ How the party handles the temptation of the murky world of politics is something intriguing to look at. For PKS cadres, engaging dakwah in politics will put sincerity to the test; whether or not they work for the greater good of society or for their own accomplishment. The sincerity is also central in keeping the wheel of dakwah moving forward.³² As a dakwah party, PKS should never cease giving service to the people, and the party is well aware that the cadres in all levels of the party structure have worked hard to deliver the service, but despite years of service in the community, PKS often finds that people in the community do not lend their support for PKS cadres to win their position in government offices. The commensalism between PKS and general subjects of dakwah would become a potential discontent on the part of PKS cadres. The recent PKS slogan “keep giving service” (*Tetap Melayani*) following the result of 2014 election seems to keep the cadres’ moral high.

This politics of *khidmat* can be considered as the advancement of the resource mobilization approach which further emphasizes the organizational structures and strategies devised by PKS as an alternative strategy to attract greater masses. By providing welfare services to the lower class of the community, this strategy is devised to build a sustained mass-party relationship. The politics of *khidmat* serves material and spiritual needs of underprivileged Muslim constituencies, which in turn not only helps the party to expand its support base, but also boosts the party image and commitment within the recipients at large. Among the cadres, the welfare service for underprivileged communities is framed as a “religious duty,” reminding them that the party is committed to the Sharia norms of helping out the needy people. In other words, the party commitment to welfare services keeps alive its religious image, and helps the party recruit new members into the movement, against the fact that the party elites are becoming more politically pragmatic.³³

There are at least two conditions that substantiate the value of politics of welfare services in attracting general people in the context of Indonesia’s electoral political system of democracy. First, the weak legal enforcement has led to the rampant money politics during intensive electoral competition. Opportunistic behavior and political apathy among the general electorates help the practice of money politics widespread and escalated

³¹ Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, p. 133-134.

³² This strategy of providing service and performance, rather than ideology, resembles the way AKP won popular support in Turkey. See M. Hakan Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

³³ Sunny Tanuwidjaja, “Political Islam and Islamic Parties in Indonesia: Critically Assessing the Evidence of Islam’s Political Decline,” in *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 32:1 (April 2010), pp. 29-49.

especially during the heat of election days.³⁴ Besides, voters are becoming more pragmatic and resistant towards party ideology; they favor more to the party that could bring them welfare and material assistance.³⁵ Second, the government ineffectiveness in delivering welfare service needed by the majority of the people, such as basic healthcare and good education, has left an open gap to be filled by social service providers. Especially since the late 1990s, welfare service provision conducted by religious welfare movement has forged the link between the party and the masses.³⁶

Lacking the financial capital to engage in more competitive and expensive electoral politics, PKS capitalize its capability and capacity of social welfare provider to recruit and mobilize supporters. This provision is integrated into an essential component of dakwah program of building a caring and just society.³⁷ Staffed with skilled and dedicated youth working within disciplined and adaptable organization, this social service and program become a key success of keeping the loyalty of their recipients to the dakwah movement. To expand its welfare service, the party establishes strategic coalitions with various Islamic non-governmental organizations, which make it capable to cut across class boundaries to forge a party-mass linkage.

The special party's office responsible to manage and mobilize the cadres to run the operation of welfare provision nationally at the grassroots is called Kesra (People's Welfare). In the district level across the country, Kesra establishes service stations called Pras (Pos Rakyat Adil Sejahtera, People's Justice and Prosperous Service Station), which provides services in health care and family consultation for the underprivileged. One of the services provided by Pras is free health care, which is especially popular among poorer communities neglected by the government. In districts with scarcity of doctors and health care experts, for instance, PKS deploys qualified personnel to provide free medical checkups and medication. Circumcision operations for Muslim boys or immunization for children are often held in coordination with local schools. In many remote areas, Pras dispatches

³⁴ For example, Jamie Davidson, "Dilemmas of Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia," *Pacific Review* 22:3 (July 2009), pp. 293-210; Paige Johnson Tan, "The Anti-Party Reaction in Indonesia: Causes and Implications," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24:3 (December 2002), pp. 88-114.

³⁵ "Voters Value Actions over Ideology," *Jakarta Post*, July 11, 2008; Thomas B. Pepinsky, William R. Liddle, and Saiful Mujani, "Testing Political Islam's Economic Advantage: Evidence from Indonesia," in *American Journal of Political Science* 56:3, pp. 584-600.

³⁶ Hilman Latief, "Health Provision for the Poor: Islamic Aid and the Rise of Charitable Clinics in Indonesia," *South East Asia Research* 18:3 (September 2010), pp. 503-533; Minako Sakai, "Community Development through Islamic Microfinance: Serving the Financial Needs of the Poor in a Viable Way," in *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*, eds. Greg Fealy and Sally White (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), pp. 267-285.

³⁷ Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Terwujudnya Masyarakat Madani Yang Adil, Sejahtera, dan Bermartabat [PKS development policy platform: Towards the realization of fair, prosperous, and dignified civil society] (Jakarta: PKS, 2007).

doctors from among the party's cadres with vehicles equipped with basic medical equipment. In the run-up to the 2009 legislative election, it is reported that the central board of PKS provided its local branches with 467 health care service vehicles to facilitate the cadres for electoral campaign.³⁸

Social welfare provision is also provided by the women's wing of the party called PWK (Pos Wanita Keadilan, Women's Justice Station) whose task focuses on services targeted at housewives, mothers, and children. Depending on the local need and the availability of resources, the services provided include, but not limited to, donation of books and school materials, mobile libraries for children, parenting course, classes on home health care and baby nutrition. Various trainings, such as growing herbs, sewing, making cakes, catering, handcrafting from recycled products are also provided to empower housewives with simple skill that enable them to earn moderate income for their household. Such social empowerment activism by female cadres of the party helps to build connection with people in the grassroots. More than a decade after its establishment in 2002, PWK have reached more than 45.000 household nation-wide, and with more than 200 PWK, women cadres of the party manage to build close communication with families and communities untouched by the government development projects.

2. Strategic Coalition With Islamic NGOs

Since political parties are not allowed to run charity foundations, PKS has to circumvent such institutional constraints by forging strategic coalitions with numerous Islamic civil society organizations. Functioning as PKS service brokers to deliver a range of social services across the archipelago, these NGOs are of crucial channels for the party to gain access to state-funding sources and projects as well as CSRs of private companies, domestic and abroad. From the political perspective, strategic coalition with religious NGOs is a means to penetrate society, especially the grassroots communities, and to minimize common suspicion and resistance among Muslim communities towards political parties.³⁹ Some well-known social organizations and foundations associated with PKS cadres include JSIT Indonesia (Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu Indonesia, the Indonesian Network of Integrated Islamic Schools), Rumah Zakat (Islamic Charity House) and PKPU (Pos Keadilan Peduli Ummat, National Humanitarian Foundation). The last two institutions, which have grown rapidly since the democratic transition, offer prominent examples of strategy of penetrating

³⁸ "Wow! PKS bagi-bagi 467 mobil" [Wow, PKS distributes 467 cars], www.m.inilah.com/news/detail.

³⁹ Paige Johnson Tan, "The Anti-Party Reaction in Indonesia: Causes and Implications," in *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24:3, pp. 484-508.

marginalized Muslim communities. Also, the expansion of these institutions indicates the PKS increasing penetration, both in urban and rural areas.⁴⁰

Established in 1993 by Fahmy Alaydrous, one of PKS founders, JSIT Indonesia is religious education movement that introduces a modern type of Islamic school emphasizing a comprehensive approach that incorporates both secular and religious curricula.⁴¹ Starting from only five Islamic primary schools in the area of Jabodetabek (Jakarta, and its surrounding areas of Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi),⁴² the school network has now housed 1,926 schools, comprising of 879 kindergartens/preschools, 723 elementary schools, and 324 high schools nationwide. The chair of JSIT, Sukro Muhab, reveals that JSIT was inspired by the party concern about secular system of national education that separate secular and religious subjects, and the JSIT expansion cannot be separated from the increasing demand of Muslim families to find schools that provided balanced system of education for their beloved children. Apart from conducting training for teachers and educational staff members, JSIT also establishes cooperation with internationally recognized institutions, such as International Center for Educational Excellence of Malaysia, Association for Academic Quality of Pakistan, Al-Irsyad and Al-Juneid Islamic School of Singapore, Smart Bestari of Thailand, and Khoirat Foundation of Turkey.⁴³

A charity-based welfare foundation named Rumah Zakat (Zakat House) is also linked to PKS. Founded in 1998 by a PKS prominent figure, Abu Syauqi, Rumah Zakat (RZ) has developed into one of the largest zakat institutions in the country, running 28 branches in Bandung alone, and delivering various innovative nationwide welfare programs for the poor. The program is categorized into six main fields, which is education, economic empowerment, health care, green environment, and charity. In the field of education, RZ helps students from underprivileged families with scholarship. For economic development, RZ provides micro financial support, together with one-year assistance and product development, to help small and micro enterprises stand on their feet. Health service is given for the needy which includes free maternity clinic, mobile clinic service and cataract surgery. Building water well and distributing clean water becomes a popular program of RZ that contributes to preserve the environment and maintain healthy life style. The last but not least, RZ also runs a special charity program during the month of Ramadan to put a smile on the face of the needy. This special program provides complete and nutritious menu for breaking the fast which is distributed to the targeted areas and communities.

⁴⁰ Kikue Hamyotsu, "The Political Rise of the Prosperous Justice Party in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia," in *Asian Survey* 51:5, p. 983.

⁴¹ See www.jsit-indonesia.com

⁴² These schools are SDIT Nurul Fikri of Depok, SDIT Al Hikmah of South Jakarta, SDIT Iqro of Bekasi, SDIT Ummul Quro of Bogor, and SDIT al-Khayrat of East Jakarta.

⁴³ See www.jsit-indonesia.com

The Zakat House has built a reputation as a leading Islamic philanthropy movement whose program is well known among both urban middle-class Muslims and the corporate sector, whose yearly donation amounts to 110 billion rupiah, making RZ one of the biggest zakat collection management organizations in the country. In 2014, RZ achieved Top of Mind Zakat Management 2014 Award in Indonesian Middle-Class Brand Forum III held by SWA Magazine and Center for Middle-Class Consumer Studies for various assistances given to outermost areas in Indonesia. The adoption of modern technology and management has enable RZ to coordinate large-scale operations of humanitarian aids such as natural disaster relief programs and war victims. In 2013, for instance, RZ participate in aiding the victims of Mount Sinabung eruption and Haiyan thypoon in the Philippines and civil war in Rohingya.⁴⁴ By helping and encouraging marginalized population to live in healthy, dignified, and financially independent life, RZ has contributed to community-building and empowerment of the poor.

Explaining the Political Economy of Mass-Party Relations

The community service which leads to community networks developed by PKS functions as a means of connecting the PKS cadres and their service beneficiaries in the grassroots to the party elite. Both cadres and sympathizers have built a collective identity that go beyond narrow class boundaries. Recruited mainly from educated middle class, the cadres provide leadership and services to their constituents and become the representatives of the party within the grassroots, while the service beneficiaries primarily coming from underprivileged lower-class communities provided a basis for the party electorates. In the long run they are also expected to join into the rank of the party cadres and serve the dakwah movement program.⁴⁵ The party frames this welfare service as an integral component of dakwah upon which the cadres should show commitment, and the service beneficiaries are expected to give their vote in return for the service they have received from the party cadres. The welfare programs conducted by the party cadres compensate the limitation on party's financial capacity and on state bureaucracies' access. With this welfare program, the party are able to penetrate directly into the 'mind and heart' of the electorates. By providing them with material and spiritual needs, the party has forged relatively solid party-mass relations at the grassroots.

The party elite are fully aware that utilization of services provision for political and religious mobilization of the party does not entirely remove or limit the opportunistic behaviors among service recipients.⁴⁶ To minimize the occurrence of commitment problem among pragmatic electorates, especially relating to the program involving financial fund, the party invents

⁴⁴ See www.rumahzakat.org

⁴⁵ PKS, Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan, pp. 37-50.

⁴⁶ Frederic C. Schaffer, ed., *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007).

a mechanism of “communal responsibility.” This mechanism is designed to keep the service recipients attached to the party. The attachment to the party is possible by the obligation of the service recipients to form a group of 10 to 15 members to take joint responsibility for managing their loans. For the success of the group, PKS cadres give supervision and hold regular group meeting to discuss various business and financial problems. With this cooperative scheme, the service recipients are enmeshed in the community-based network, and hoped to become prospective supporters of the party.⁴⁷

Socioeconomic treatment of the party towards underprivileged communities provides the PKS elites an instrument to introduce, encourage and finally incorporate the service beneficiaries into the rank of party cadres. The process of this gradual and stealth recruitment and cadrization explains the pattern of the party mobilization. Through the regular meeting between the cadres and the people, in their homes or public places, such as village hall or mosques, the service recipients’ familiarity with the party programs and leadership is gradually increasing. The party acts as an anchor for members of the community who were previously isolated and vulnerable. Through service provision, the community familiarize themselves with the party activism.⁴⁸ The bond between these social segments of communities and the PKS cadres can be converted into social and political capital, ready to be utilized effectively during the campaign.

The welfare services have become a part of the party strategy to expand its electoral base. The policy of gradual incorporation and mobilization of the people affiliated with the party’s socioeconomic network is also adopted in other social, religious, and educational institution linked to PKS. All the students, teachers and parents affiliated with school network of JSIT, for instance, will be fully coordinated and mobilized to support the party’s political programs. The efficacy of this socioeconomic treatment for the vertical mobility of the cadres can be observed by the mere fact that almost all female cadres securing legislative offices both at the national and sub-national levels originates from an activist committed with these community services.

The commitment and efforts of PKS cadres to welfare provision for the underprivileged have contributed to “clean and caring” (Bersih dan Peduli) images that account for the electoral rise of the party.⁴⁹ Due to the party’s strategic emphasis on welfare services, and its commitment to the struggle of dakwah in building an Islamic society, the party finds the cadres supportive to the party program, even when they find that the leadership of the party has relaxed their Islamist ideals and engaged in pragmatic political maneuver.

⁴⁷ Kikue Hamayotsu, “The Political Rise of the Prosperous Justice Party in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia,” *Asian Survey*, 51:5, p. 986.

⁴⁸ “Istimewa, Gerak Kader PKS” [Excellent, PKS cadre’s performance], *Kompas*, June 10, 2005.

⁴⁹ Bubalo and Fealy, “Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia” p. 69.

While reminding the cadres that PKS is still committed to dakwah, the party platform also reminds them that the cadres' dedication to service and people's welfare is a part of "religious duty."

Conclusion

The abovementioned discussion shows that the PKS cadres' commitment to shared values provides a positive impact on the cohesion of the party. It prevents the party from fragmentation or fictionalization from within. The shared values such as collectivism, obedience, and gradualism, are transmitted to the cadres through the *halaqah*. The unique identity as "a soldier of da'wa", whose main duty is to struggle for God's pleasure, creates commitment to preserve the ideals of the party, and the cadres regarded such ideals as their priority. For the cadres, the party not merely "a disposable tool" for material and personal gain, but a vehicle to advance the da'wa cause. Since da'wa should be collectively conducted, the commitment to obey the leaders is of paramount importance to maintain the spirit of togetherness. Thanks to the cadres' commitment to the shared values of the party, PKS was relatively able to avoid serious or prolonged conflicts and in general was capable to maintain its cohesion.

As the study suggests, mere ideological factors cannot sufficiently explain the party-mass relations and patterns of Islamist mobilization. While, religious study groups (*halaqah*) serves as an important channel for recruitment and indoctrination among party cadres, the party cannot rely on the promotion of piety or morality to secure the loyalty of electorates. Welfare services strategy is used to explain the rise of PKS electoral gains. As a dakwah party, PKS obliges its cadres to involve in welfare provision, propagated as "religious duty." This distinctive community-building strategy is designed to attract the service recipients into the reach of the party, and also to bind the cadres and sympathizers with the party elites. Equally important, the policy of welfare service is a means to overcome the limited capitals for survival and success in political arena of the newly emerging democratic system of post-authoritarian Indonesia, which is characterized by highly competitive and money-driven electoral politics. The deficit in resource and institutional constraint push the party to forge strategic coalition with numerous NGOs serving as the welfare service delivery. By direct involvement in community development and social service, the cadres have forge relatively solid party-mass relations at the grassroots, and have provided the party with community networks mainly in the urban areas and recently also in rural areas. Moreover, the party's commitment to social welfare for the poor not only reinforces "clean and caring" images among the pious Muslim community, but also reminds party cadres that the party remains committed to dakwah.

References

- Aminuddin Hilmi (2011), *Menegakkan Kepemimpinan Dakwah*, Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Bidang Arsip dan Sejarah.
- Arifin, Lukman Hakim and Mukhlison S. Widodo (2007), "Mendapat Tawaran dari Sales Ideologi, interview with Din Syamsuddin, Muhammadiyah Chairman, in *Gatra*, No. 8, 4 January.
- Balda, Syamsul, Abu Ridho, Untung Wahono (2000), *Politik Dakwahh Partai Keadilan*, (Jakarta: DPP Partai Keadilan).
- Bubalo, Anthony, and Greg Fealy (2005), "Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism, and Indonesia," Lowy Institute Paper 25, Lowy Institute for International Policy.
- Buehler, Michael, and Paige Tan (2007), "Party-Candidate Relationships in Indonesian Local Politics: A Case Study of the 2005 Regional Elections in Gowa, South Sulawesi Province," in *Indonesia* 84 (October).
- Clark, Janine A. (2004), *Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press).
- CSIS, Jakarta (2008), *Perilaku Pemilih Indonesia 2008* [Indonesian voting behaviors 2008] (Jakarta: CSIS).
- Damanik, Ali Said (2001) *Fenomen Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia* (Bandung: Teraju).
- Davidson, Jamie (2009), "Dilemmas of Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia," in *Pacific Review* 22:3 (July).
- E. Fuller, Graham (2003), *The Future of Political Islam* (New York: Palgrave McMillan).
- Edward, Djony (2006), *Efek Bola Salju Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Bandung: Harakutuna Publishing).
- Frederic C. Schaffer, ed. (2007), *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers).
- Hadiz, Vedi R. (2010), *Localizing Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press).
- Hamayotsu, Kikue (2011) "The Political Rise of the Prosperous Justice Party in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia," in *Asian Survey* 51:5.

- Hasan, Noorhaidi (2013), *The Making of Public Islam. Piety, Democracy, and Youth in Indonesian Politics* (Yogyakarta: SUKA-Press).
- Jung, Eunsook (2009), *Taking Care of the Faithful: Islamic Organizations and Partisan Engagement in Indonesia*, Ph.D. thesis.
- Kholis, Arif Nur (2009), *PP Muhammadiyah Terbitkan Sembilan Poin Instruksi Hadapi Pemilu 2009*, www.immuui.wordpress.com/2008/07/29.
- Kikue Hamayotsu (2010), "The Political Rise of the Prosperous Justice Party in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia," in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 51, Number 5.
- Latief, Hilman (2010) "Health Provision for the Poor: Islamic Aid and the Rise of Charitable Clinics in Indonesia," in *South East Asia Research* 18:3 (September).
- Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, *Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Terwujudnya Masyarakat Madani Yang Adil, Sejahtera dan Bermartabat* (2007) [PKS development policy platform: Towards the realization of a fair, prosperous, and dignified civil society] (Jakarta: PKS).
- Mietzner, Marcus (2009), "Indonesia and the Pitfalls of Low-Quality Democracy: A Case Study of Gubernatorial Elections in North Sulawesi," in *Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, Marco Bunte and Andreas Ufen (London: Routledge).
- Mujani, Saiful and R. William Liddle (2010), "Personalities, Parties, and Voters," in *Journal of Democracy* 21:2.
- Noor, Firman (2012), *Institutionalising Islamic Political Parties in Indonesia: A Study of Internal Fragmentation and Cohesion in the Post-Soeharto Era (1998-2008)*. Unpublished PhD thesis.
- Noorhaidi Hasan (2013), *The Making of Public Islam. Piety, Democracy, and Youth in Indonesian Politics* (Yogyakarta: SUKA-Press).
- Pepinsky, Thomas B., William R. Liddle, and Saiful Mujani (2009), "Testing Political Islam's Economic Advantage: The Evidence from Indonesia," in *American Journal of Political Science* 56:3.
- Robert W., Hefner (2008), "Islamic Schools, Social Movements, and Democracy in Indonesia," in *Making Modern Muslims: The Politics of Islamic Education in Southeast Asia*, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press)
- Sakai, Minako (2008), "Community Development through Islamic Microfinance: Serving the Financial Needs of the Poor in a Viable Way," in *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in*

- Indonesia*, eds. Greg Fealy and Sally White (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies).
- Schwedler, Jillian (2006), *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen* (New York: Cambridge University Press).
- Tan, Paige Johnson (2002), "The Anti-Party Reaction in Indonesia: Causes and Implications," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24:3 (December).
- Tanuwidjaja, Sunny (2010), "Political Islam and Islamic Parties in Indonesia: Critically Assessing the Evidence of Islam's Political Decline," in *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 32:1 (April).
- Tezcur, Gunes Murat (2010), *Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia: Golkar in Post-Soeharto Era* (London: Routledge).
- Tim Departemen Kaderisasi PKS (2004), *Profil Kader Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Bandung: Syaamil Cipta Media).
- Tomsa, Dirk (2008), *Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia: Golkar in the Post-Suharto Era* (London: Routledge)
- Webber, Douglas (2006) "A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia," in *Pacific Review* 13:3 (June).
- Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky (2004), "Interests, Ideas, and Islamist Outreach in Egypt," in Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism*.
- Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky (2004), "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party," in *Comparative Politics*, Vol 36.
- Wiktorowicz, Quintan, ed. (2004), *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press).
- Yavuz, M. Hakan (2009), *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- "Affirming Moderation of PKS," Jakarta Post, June 28, 2010
- "Istimewa, Gerak Kader PKS" [Excellent, PKS cadre's performance], Kompas, June 10, 2005.
- "PKS Fokus ke Massa Pinggiran" [PKS shifted its focus to rural masses], Kompas, May 31, 2008.
- "PKS Inklusif, Syariat Islam Jalan Terus?" [As PKS becomes inclusive, will Syariah continue?], Kompas, June 20, 2010.
- "Voters Value Actions over Ideology," Jakarta Post, July 11, 2008
- "Wow! PKS bagi-bagi 467 mobil [Wow, PKS distributed 467 cars]," www.m.inilah.com/news/detail/47783.