

Collective Conscious: A New Consideration Between Culture, Psyche, and Religion

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Özet: Bu makale; kültür, nefis (ruh: psyche), ve din olguları arasındaki ilişkiye ilişkin yeni bir muhasebe sunmaya çalışır. Geçmiş tecrübelerin hem bilinçli hem de bilinç dışı akıl için hayati önem taşımasından ötürü, kolektif bilince karşılık gelen nefis, yalnızca kültürün gizil içeriği olarak değil, dinin de kaynağı olarak tezahür eder. Bu bağlamda kültür de dinin somut görünümünden ibaret olmaktadır. Kısaca, bu makale, sosyal bilimsel din çalışmalarında seçkin akademisyenler Clifford Geertz ve Talcott Parsons'un bakış açılarına özellikle itibar ederek, kolektif bilincin en önemli unsur olduğu yargısına varır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: kültür, nefis, din, kolektif bilinç.

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Studying the relationship between culture, psyche, and religion is as important as understanding people rather than telling 'stories' about them. In other words, considering the fact that the phenomenon of perception, both for individuals and groups of people, is always backed up and thus colored by previous experiences, it gains crucial importance to focus on previous experience (or perception)-related phenomena in order to understand the real motives lying in the interaction between people, either at the level of individuals or groups of people. Culture, psyche, and religion are the most salient 'institutions' that can provide one with the type of insight by which one can claim to be keen and wise in understanding the triggering motives hidden behind the visible forms of interaction among people and, to some extent, to predict the future ones as well.

Without taking into account the previous experience, one cannot even talk about the phenomenon of perception, either practically or theoretically, since it is one of the 'must-be' elements of which people make use regarding the phenomenon of perception: "properties of the physical environment, electrical activity in the nervous system; and the prior experiences and knowledge of the perceiver."¹

At this point, the fact that previous experience is relative and specific (it forms a wide variety) needs to be taken into account in order to make perfectly clear that how perception differs is dependent on the fact that previous experience is relative and specific. Consequently, when one talks about previous experiences, which are relative and specific to everyone, the purely abstract realm of the phenomenon of perception comes up as necessary to talk about. In other words, when taking into account relative concepts such as 'big' or 'small,' we are sharply engaged in the realm of abstract thinking or reasoning. As a matter of fact, according to Plato, the ancient Greek philosopher, "senses can judge of themselves that they are confronted with a finger, they cannot judge

¹ E. Bruce Goldstein, *Sensation and Perception* (Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1996) 4.

whether they are confronted with, for example, something big or small. These latter properties are relative, and whether a finger is big or small, rough or smooth, depends upon what it is being contrasted with. In such cases reason is brought in to make a decision."² In short, since the 'reason' is taken into account in the process of perception as 'judge,' it can be said that that perception experienced by different people is at least somewhat relative.

On the other hand, considering the delicate difference between relativity, in which the perception is different even though the experience is not the same in essence, it may be rewarding to talk about the fact that the characteristics of perception are dependent on specific experiences. To point out the importance of specific experience, Aristotle, the great ancient philosopher, says that "everyone is fond of what has needed effort to produce it" and gives great examples regarding this case: "People who have made money themselves are fonder of it than people who inherited it. And while receiving a benefit seems to take no effort, giving one is hard work. This is also why mothers love their children than fathers do, since giving birth is more effort for them, and they know better that the children are theirs."³ As can be inferred from this excerpt, what makes people who make money themselves fonder of it than those who inherit it is their *specific experiences* earning it. Likewise, what makes mothers love their children more than fathers do, is mostly their being exposed to pain and trouble giving birth, which is a purely specific experience they have. As a result, it can be concluded that everybody's experience is specific and relative as well.

Just as one can talk about perception or previous experiences in the case of individuals, one can also talk about common perceptions or experiences in the case of groups of people or societies. Then the relativity and specificity are attributed to groups of people or societies as though they are one single individual. In other

² D. W. Hamlyn, *Sensation and Perception: A History of Philosophy of Perception* (London: Alden, 1996) 11-12.

³ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. by Terence Irwing (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985) 253.

words, when talking about common perceptions and conceptions, which can be best defined as 'collective conscious,' people are regarded as one single individual, as it is the case when referred to the concept of 'national character.' As Mark Twain remarked: "A nation is only an individual multiplied."⁴

Among the three concepts that are of our main interest in this paper, i.e. culture, psyche, and religion, psyche, which corresponds to common perceptions and conceptions or, associated with a practical and thus pragmatic connotation, to collective conscious, appears to be one that has the most extensive content, though not as 'concrete' as that of the other two. Before we go further into investigating how to detect collective conscious, therefore, it would be really illuminating to lay down some reasons why the collective conscious is the most important one of our interest. First of all, an analogy can be made in terms of the relationship between culture and collective conscious (psyche) as in the following: collective conscious is the 'latent content' of culture. In other words, culture is the manifestation of collective conscious and thus, in a form of a more clear analogy, can be likened to the visible side of it. Second of all, religion seems to be corresponding to culture as its 'alternative' or some kind of 'rival' and thus preserves a relatively independent entity compared to those of interdependent culture and collective conscious. However, in the final analysis, it will be seen that religion too is colored by collective conscious, since one can find a huge variety of versions of one single religion in today's world. Finally, since collective conscious is only an 'unbiased mechanism' working through the 'inputs' it gets, it cannot even be imagined that religion is prone, or has the ability, to replace it; they differ both in nature and function. In sum, religion in today's world, though associated with a desire to be fully 'independent' and dominant in people's lives, can only be described as an im-

⁴ Mark Twain, "The Turning-Point of My Life," *Essays and Sketches of Mark Twain*, ed. by. Stuart Miller (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1995) 17.

portant part of both collective conscious and culture as long as it penetrates into them.⁵

There are two ways to be able to detect collective conscious. The first one is to try to get a general picture of it by studying myths and folklore, etc. The second one is to infer from what is seen in real life as manifestations of the collective conscious. As a matter of fact, Sudhir Kakar, a psychoanalyst of India, points out that many social scientists attribute importance to national surveys of beliefs, attitudes and acts in order to reach generalizations while others do not see national statistics as essential⁶ since they are more interested in what they see in real life as the concrete manifestations of common perceptions and conceptions, i.e. collective conscious.

These two ways of looking at the collective conscious are equally important and can also be named as deductive and inductive ways of searching it. They both must be taken into account when trying to understand archetypes, premise, or common psychological themes already located in the collective conscious and even when trying to make changes in it as well.⁷

In addition, the resemblance and the strong link between collective conscious and culture is the primary reason why some scholars invariably conclude that “culture is always in flux, and is never fully understood”⁸ and why some offer different techniques of searching the culture. For example, some believe that “culture is

⁵ The use of the concept of ‘religious culture,’ especially when specified such as Islamic or Buddhist culture, is simply wrong and probably due to some kind of egocentrism. On the other hand, the fact that the use of Christian culture is not prevalent in general literature is maybe because it is not perceived as an extensive concept of definition upon which everybody is agreed. For example, Roman Catholics identify themselves as such rather than Christians. Associated with the same attitude, it would be useful to point out that the term American was first used in the place of the term Christian. However, seemingly, the concept of ‘religious culture,’ either right or wrong, is a culture-centered one.

⁶ Sudhir Kakar, *The Inner World* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996) 8.

⁷ It should be noted that cultural change imposed is out of our scope.

⁸ David Rosenthal, “The Genetic-Environmental Perspective in Psychopathology,” *Culture and Psychopathology*, Ed. by. Ihsan Al-Issa (Baltimore: University Park Press, 1982) 111.

(located) in the minds and hearts of men.”⁹ Some, on the other hand, believe that culture is located and must be detected on the hard surfaces of life, namely, with political, economic, and stratificatory realities.¹⁰ However, considering the division that we offered and espoused as clearly illustrated in the analogy of iceberg, the above-mentioned information can be expressed in such a shape as the following: some scholars are in favor of the idea that common perceptions and conceptions, which can be defined as ‘collective conscious,’ should be searched first since they are at the heart of the culture and thus actual determinants of it; whereas, some believe that one cannot talk about common perceptions and conceptions without considering their concrete manifestations in real life.

Talcott Parsons, in his article entitled “The Superego and the Theory of Social Systems,” though his primary motive to write this article is “to bring the theory of personality” as introduced by psychoanalysis “and the theory of the social system within essentially the same general conceptual scheme,”¹¹ provides us with great insights concerning the concept of collective conscious. In trying to bring these two theories of two different disciplines together, Parsons points out that the interaction between personalities, as a primary basis without which the internalization of moral values cannot come to be, is a natural process rather than a mechanistic one.

According to Parsons, psychoanalysis has a great deal of connection with sociology primarily because of the concept of superego; yet to examine this connection results in necessity to make some changes in it. For example, in psychoanalytic conception, the very young child is so vulnerable to the moral norms or standards “imposed” by the superego that he or she experiences a great deal of conflict at an early age. Apparently, this conception proposes

⁹ Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description,” *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973) 11.

¹⁰ Ibid 30.

¹¹ Talcott Parsons, “The Superego and the Theory of Social Systems,” *Social Structure and Personality* (London: Free Press, 1970) 33.

that the internalization of moral norms is a mechanistic process that one cannot talk about the implication of free will or natural interaction involved, which depicts the major problem associated with psychoanalysis. That is, in psychoanalysis, there is not a natural way of the internalization of moral values and self-determination involved, just like the fact that there is no sexual determination considered to be involved.¹² Moreover, to give an idea how prevalent this conception was, it might be mentioned that as one of the assumptions about suspected causes of disorders, 'conflict with mother,' was previously used in DSMs prior to DSM-III.¹³

This is not the case, however, according to Parsons, since there are three forms of interaction all of which must be taken into account to make the interaction happen: 1- cognitive perception (what is the object?) 2- cathexis (what does the object mean?) 3- "the integration of cognitive and cathectic meaning."¹⁴ Furthermore, the interaction is not explicit when there is an inanimate object involved, but "where the object is another person, the two, as ego and alter, constitute an integrative system."¹⁵ As a result, based on the above-mentioned forms of interaction upon which the internalization of moral values 'imposed' by the superego depends, it can be truthfully said that the very young child is capable of understanding of the social status of his mother. In other words, a child can be in love with 'his' mother only when he learns who his mother is.

The reality of the interaction between personalities leading to the internalization of moral values in individuals appears to be the key point of Parsons' argument. That is, according to Parsons, when one talks about the interaction between different personalities, he/she has to take into account the social values associated with collective conscious and its concrete manifestation, namely, culture. Consequently, since collective conscious or culture forms

¹² Thomas Szasz, *Sex by Prescription* (New York: Anchor, 1970) 20.

¹³ See David Holmes, *Abnormal Psychology* (New York: Longman, 1997) 57.

¹⁴ Parsons (the father) 20.

¹⁵ *Ibid* 22.

the only basis on which people depend in their interaction and communication, it can be concluded that the interaction of personalities is mainly shaped and directed by collective conscious and culture and thus is a product of them.

Likewise, Anne Parsons, the daughter of Talcott Parsons, espouses the reality of interaction primarily colored by collective conscious as a keen standpoint for her argument that “whether the Oedipus complex is universal or not...is no longer very meaningful in that particular form”¹⁶ as though inspired by her father’s above-referred article. According to Anne Parsons, the more consistent focus should be on “what is the possible range within which culture [i.e., collective conscious and its manifestation] can utilize and elaborate the instinctually given human potentialities, and what are the psychologically given limits of this range?”¹⁷ Anne Parsons, as can be inferred from the excerpt above, by asking a really challenging question, summons our attention to how different basic human instincts that are universal can be manifested through collective conscious and what limits are associated with that process? In other words, Anne Parsons, coming up with a conclusion her father did not mention explicitly, points out the significance of studying collective conscious. In her account, also, collective conscious seems to have almost as much power as the basic human instincts have.

In addition, just like her father, Anne Parsons strongly criticizes Freud, since psychoanalysis does not attribute importance to the fact that how people cognized things is strictly dependent on the internalization process colored by collective conscious, together with culture in a broader sense. On the other hand, psychoanalysis sees the same process as rather a mechanistic one, which is the primary reason why Anne Parsons criticizes psychoanalysis as being ‘behaviorist.’¹⁸

¹⁶ Anne Parsons, “Is the Oedipus Complex Universal?,” *Belief, Magic, and Anomie* (New York: Free Press, 1969) 43.

¹⁷ Ibid 43. (Brackets are mine.)

¹⁸ Ibid 43.

Finally, in her account, the concept of collective conscious is often referred to since it is a sound standpoint for her arguments and is also expressed in some consistent ways of definition with the account we laid down before. For example, in the following excerpt one can find three different concepts such as culture, collective representation and unconscious all used differently one from another in one single sentence: "What we are saying is rather that conscious representation of objects by definition depends on collective representation, though their affective charge or valence may be rooted in unconscious or instinct-based constellations which are prior to culture."¹⁹ Furthermore, as we have already mentioned, the author is so committed to the reality of collective conscious that she finds the question 'Is the Oedipus Complex Universal?', which is also the title of her article, irrelevant, being in favor of the idea that it is obviously not universal, and gets our attention focused directly on the significance of collective conscious.

The power of collective conscious has been realized by many as such that it may even be concluded that great people are those who are sharply aware of the collective conscious of their societies. For example, Gandhi, the most renowned figure of Indian independence, right before India became independent, created a great slogan that made so much sense to Indian people that it functioned as something to speed up the process of independence, if nothing else: 'India, sit down!' This slogan, which was created to start a general strike throughout India as a protest against English administration, had a significant and triggering impact on the Indian collective conscious which is associated with inner ecstasy and mystical features. In other words, it would not have made as much sense to, say, English people as it did to Indian people, among whom one can find "an Indian [who] can sit for hours doing nothing, without an inner voice condemning him as a 'do nothing.'"²⁰ In short, Gandhi, in harmony with the Indian collective conscious,

¹⁹ See Ibid 59-60.

²⁰ Kakar 136.

created a tremendously effective slogan which also resulted, at least to an important extent, in a general strike throughout India.

Furthermore, right before World War I started, in Britain and the USA, there was an analogy used by the press in which the German were likened to Barbarians and Huns, which was so effective that even Hitler, the tyrant of Germany in most of the period of the time between two world wars, referred to it as a good example of psychologically right war propaganda a couple of years later after World War I ended: "The war propaganda of the British and the Americans was psychologically right. By introducing the German as a barbarian and a Hun to its own people, it thus prepared the individual soldier for the terrors of war and helped guard him against disappointment."²¹ In sum, the war propaganda developed by Britain and the USA had a well-known correspondence not only in the collective conscious of the people of these two countries, but also that of the almost every western country. Thus, in short, it had a triggering impact on the collective conscious of the people who would fight against Germany and its allies and manifested itself as a decisive opposition against Germany before World War I started.

In the case of the Turkish independence war, the main motive can be best explained as triggering impact that occurred when a Greek army landed at Izmir, one of the major cities of Turkey. Despite the fact that Turkey had experienced some 'invasions' by English, French, and Italian armies by that time, there was not an armed and especially organized respond against the occupiers. "The cession of remote provinces inhabited by alien peoples could be borne, even the occupation of the capital [Istanbul] could be suffered, for the occupiers were the victorious great powers of the invincible West, and their soldiers would sooner or later return whence they came. But the thrust of a neighboring and former subject people into the heart of Anatolia was a danger –and a humiliation– beyond endurance."²² In other words, Greek invasion of

²¹ Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. by E. R. & C. N. H. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1939) 234.

²² Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965) 236.

some of the Turkish land, both motivated by and aimed at the Byzantine 'Great Idea,' had a sharply triggering impact on the Turkish collective conscious at the time, which was familiar with opposition against the Byzantine Idea for centuries.²³

Similarly, in the case of Jews, their behavior in Palestine definitely was not the same as their behavior in Europe when faced with the persecution of the Nazis. This incredible change can be explained by the fact that their "struggle" in Palestine was sharply backed up by their collective conscious, which functioned almost as an 'empty box' when they were exposed to the persecution of the Nazis in Europe. Eric Hoffer explicitly points out why this incredible change occurred and thus touches the undisputed power of collective conscious: "The Jew in Europe faced his enemies alone, an isolated individual, a speck of life floating in an eternity of nothingness. In Palestine he felt himself not a human atom, but a member of an eternal race, with an immemorable past behind it and a breathtaking future ahead."²⁴

To cover one more interesting example regarding the power of collective conscious, one should cite the Turkish novelist named Orhan Pamuk, as he has one of the protagonists in his novel titled *The Black Book* talk about a 'principle' in worry of influencing more people: "A columnist who wants to get a large number of readers to accept an idea must have the skill to restore and refloat the sediment of decaying concepts and rusty memories that lie asleep in the readers' memory banks like the corpses of lost galleons that lie at the bottom of the Black Sea."²⁵ The novelist here is as if talking about the collective conscious, only without naming it.

²³ On the other hand, it can also be said that Byzantine Great Idea was the most consistent or powerful motivation to stick with for the Greek. Consequently, the war known as the Turkish independence war for its various implications such as struggle against the idea of 'illegitimate' and thus dependent Turkey, which was mostly between the Turkish and the Greek, was in fact a war of two different collective consciousnesses. In addition, to do further research regarding this case, I personally would feel motivated to investigate how consistent the basic motives espoused by both sides were with the collective conscious representations of these two different peoples.

²⁴ Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York: Harper & Row, 1951) 64 (section 45).

²⁵ Orhan Pamuk, *The Black Book*, trans. by. Güneli Gün (London: Faber and Faber, 2002) 237.

Not only is collective conscious the main contributor of what has been known as 'national character' since it is the underlying reason in collective behavior, motivation, response etc., it is also prone to be manifested, either positive or negative ways, in psychopathology associated with specific groups of people. For example, in the case of eating disorders, it might be argued that in societies in which thinness, especially in women, is not "culturally" promoted, the number of eating disorders would be really small compared to societies in which thinness is culturally promoted and defined as ideal. Likewise, it might be mentioned that in some regions of the continent of Africa fatness in women is considered as beauty, obviously unlike in Europe and America. In special houses, girls are kept for several months and fed almost extremely. At the end of this process, they get really fat and are considered to be ready for marriage. Consequently, it would not be just a hypothesis to assume that the number of the cases of eating disorders in Africa is comparatively smaller than in Europe and America. Likewise, having talked about how important it is for women to get fat in Africa, John S. Mbiti, a professor of African religions and philosophy, writes the following, as though pointing out the strong link between collective conscious and psychopathology: "Women are considered most beautiful when they are fat. Fat women of Europe and America would have no difficulty in winning crowds of admirers in Africa."²⁶

So far, I have indicated that collective conscious is crucially important to understand human behavior as it is important to know previous perceptions (experiences) in order to be able to somewhat predict the future ones. Secondly, regarding the concept of culture, it can be contented that there is a strong relationship between culture and collective conscious such that culture is only the manifestation of intense, powerful, and salient features of collective conscious. On the other hand, this relationship is also pretty much like the one between two major components of the same whole as implied in the analogy of iceberg, in which what we

know as culture can actually be named as the visible side of 'culture' whereas collective conscious can be named as the invisible, abstract side of it, which is prior and dominant to the visible one. However, either way, it has been noted, collective conscious functions as rather a mechanic tool. Therefore, religion, which has certain beliefs and rituals that are not as open to change as collective conscious and culture, aims and struggles to replace culture or, to put it a bit different, tries to be the most dominant element (and maybe the only one in some cases) which interacts with collective conscious simply because of its demanding nature.

It may be argued that religion is not able to replace culture since it is not and cannot be the only one that holds the power to shape the collective conscious in today's multicultural, 'global' world. One might think that organized religion cannot exist in today's amorphous, postmodern cultures because the power to shape the psyche is extremely diminished in such cultures. To put it different, after all these considerations, one might easily end up thinking that without the power to shape the psyche, organized religion does not have much of a chance. Nevertheless, considering the fact that religion often refers to eternity-related concepts, it might also be noted that it still has the power even to be able to replace culture. Religion is powerful and therefore cannot be ignored regarding its ability to replace, perhaps "invade" culture. Indeed, a joke made by the comedian Bob Hope might be worth mentioning here since it puts emphasis on the eternity-related aspect of religion as a phenomenon. The attribution is something like the following: "I do benefits for all religions –I'd hate to blow the hereafter on a technicality."²⁷ Simply said, it seems that Bob Hope grasped the most effective aspect of religion.

It is widely accepted that no religion gives rise to fanaticism or bigotry in essence. However, it is also accepted that religion is eventually subject to fanaticism in the sense that every 'belief' sys-

²⁷ See: <http://www.basicquotations.com/index.php?aid=21> (It should be noted that this quote can be easily found on various websites when you look it up on the searching engines writing down *Bob Hope* and its first few words like *I do benefits for all..*)

tem, trend or, shortly, “ism” that gathers people and addresses to them is subject to fanaticism and bigotry as the dark sides they are extrinsically associated with. Moreover, when religion is the issue, its dark side associated with fanaticism and bigotry gains vital importance to be careful about, since it is a system that makes promises with eternity-related and, sometimes, extremely abstract concepts.²⁸ The following comparison probably first made by Thomas Szasz, a psychiatrist who believes that there is no mental illness in the same sense as bodily illness, is illuminating regarding both the bright and dark sides of religion: “If you talk to God, you are praying; if God talks to you, you have schizophrenia.”²⁹ In short, as an example of the bright side of religion, a person who prays presents a nice and even adorable scene. However, when God “starts” talking to this person or any man especially of the kind who has some authority over others, then there is a serious problem, of course depending on what the “talk” is about.

Therefore, it would be a really wise perspective to perceive religion, and to get it perceived, with a framework in which it is described with concepts unfamiliar to fanaticism such as democracy and even secularism,³⁰ instead of just leaving it as an independent or partly in power entity outside the collective conscious-culture cycle. Perceiving religion in familiarity with these concepts may be confusing in terms of the question ‘what is religion compared to culture?’, or ‘what is culture compared to religion?’, and resulting in worry regarding its ‘untouchable’ content. These types of question also indicate that religion, when perceived and expressed with the concept of, for instance, secular, is integrated into the collective conscious-culture cycle rather than replacing them. In a natural

²⁸ See Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973) 122-123.

²⁹ Thomas Szasz, *The Second Sin* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1973) 101.

³⁰ Secularism in essence, I espouse and believe, was not a numb reaction against religion as it seems to have had today. On the contrary, it was a noble attempt to get the individual rescued from no-question-realm restrictions and ‘tyrannical’ demand of so-called religion. Consequently, being secular does not mean being all indifferent about ‘afterworld.’ On the other hand, secularism provides people with free will regarding the demands of religion and it is the free will-oriented atmosphere that makes religious people come out and enjoy the joy of religion. In this regard, secularism is not hostile to religion and is even completely compatible with it.

manifestation of the collective conscious, religion cannot be tyrannical. After all, in a 'democratic religion' fanaticism can only live no longer than a short period of time.³¹

In conclusion, studying the relationship between culture, psyche, and religion has an extraordinarily illuminating contribution to our understanding of human behavior, both at the level of individual and groups of people. Culture is only the manifestation of psyche, which can best be defined as collective conscious as it corresponds to common perceptions and conceptions. In other words, previous experience in the case of individual appears to be collective experience in the case of groups of people. Collective conscious, though it functions in a mechanistic way unlike religion, has an enormous power to shape the collective behavior since it is at the heart of common perceptions –collective conscious to collective behavior is previous experience to the current one. Therefore, a collective action or reaction is most likely to occur when it is in harmony with, or backed up by, the collective conscious.

Religion, on the other hand, as a closed system which has been struggling to dominate since when it was "replaced" by culture, is only allowed to be manifested in the cultural realm through the collective conscious. To avoid the dark side of religion, it must be summoned to the just and delicate realm of evaluation of the collective conscious, which is not hostile to religion itself considering the fact that the first human being, Adam, was also the first messenger of God. After all, thinking of the specific theologies, religion really needs to be in harmony with the collective conscious of all, the one which has been filled up since the first human being.

³¹ The crucial point would be whether one is in favor of the idea that any individual of a specific religion can interpret the basic texts of that religion, just like any individual can interpret a law code. Of course, there is difference between ordinary people and those who studied law but it is not anybody's 'monopoly' anyway to interpret the law.

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Abstract: This essay endeavors to come up with a new consideration regarding the relationship between culture, psyche, and religion. Since previous experiences are crucial to both conscious and unconscious human mind, psyche, which corresponds to collective conscious, not only appears to be the latent content of culture, it also appears to be the source of religion as well. In short, especially leaning upon the perspectives of Clifford Geertz and Talcott Parsons, both eminent scholars in social scientific studies of religion, the essay comes to the conclusion that collective conscious is the most important of all.

Key Words: culture, psyche, religion, collective conscious

