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Category Discussions from Ancient Philosophical and Logical Approaches to the Present: The History of Argumentation Studies and Three Different Types of Argumentation in Aristotelian Philosophy[**]

Mustafa YEŞİL[*]

Abstract

When we investigate the history of philosophy from Heraclitus to Aristotle, we see that almost each philosopher in this process has tried to explain (or define) what being, non-being, motion, truth, knowledge, value and so on are. Undoubtedly, the inquiries here are directly related to determine the categories of these mentioned things. As is known, categorization process is a structural activity that shapes all human cognitive processes in terms of classifying not only physical objects but also mental states and abstract ideas. This means that perception, thinking, learning, explaining and making sense of the objects and properties in the external world become possible only through categorization. We claim that the mentioned ancient philosophical discussions on categorization issue historically form the basis of argumentation studies. That Aristotle who's been influenced by previous philosophical discussions has systematically structured argumentation studies through his theory of categories makes this clear. That Aristotle and some Aristotelian philosophers consider arguments not only as demonstrative (apodeictic) arguments but also dialectical and rhetorical arguments show that argumentation studies have a wide range of application, namely it should not be limited to just demonstrative or rhetorical arguments.

Keywords: category, argument, demonstration, dialectic, rhetoric.

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I. Some ancient discussions leading to the argumentation studies

That Heraclitus considers the phenomenon of change as the fundamental reality of the universe affects argumentation studies as well as all sub-fields of philosophical investigation. As is known, this basic reality assumption can be understood from his famous three fragments. One fragment mentions that "On those who step into the same rivers, different and different waters flow." (B 12).[1] When this fragment is analysed, even if different waters flow on those stepping into the rivers staying the same, we can consider each river has an identity so we can talk about it as a subject. That what are changed are waters rather than rivers gives us communication and investigation opportunities on them.

The second fragment attributed to Heraclitus notes that "It is not possible to step into the same river twice." (B 91).[2] This means that continuity of change makes the rivers stepped into in different times different rivers from each other. No doubt that such an explanation makes impossible to speak on a river as a being. In such a case even what a river is cannot be defined because of constantly changing or flux.

The last fragment ascribed to Heraclitus says "We both step and do not step into the same rivers; we both are and are not." (B 49a).[3] There is no doubt that such an admission makes impossible to talk about not only river but only a person stepping into it since both of them constantly change. When we especially consider the second and third fragments here, we need to accept that making arguments about ontological or factual issues is redundant. For example, if everything totally changes so quickly, even in the case of a murder it will be impossible to say that x has killed y. Namely since the x killing y will not be the same x after the mentioned case, it cannot be judged and found to be guilty of a particular crime.[4]

Some ancient commentators claim these second and third fragments are not authentic.[5] But, we can see some kind of explanations like these in

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[2] Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, p. 50.

[3] Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, p. 49.

[4] Appleton, R. B., *The Elements of Greek Philosophy – From Thales to Aristotle*, Methuen, London, 1922, pp. 33-34.

[5] G. S. Kirk, *Heraklitus: The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1975, pp. 366-380; G. S. Kirk et. al, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005, pp. 195-197; Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, pp. 49-50.

Heraclitus' unity of opposition doctrine. This means that Heraclitus influences the argumentation studies not only with his fragments on river but also with his explanations on the unity of opposition. In fact, although the philosopher considers the running of universe as a constant change and transformation between hotness and coldness, he in his some explanations imply that such opposites are the one and same thing. We very well know that "The sea is the purest and foulest water: for fish drinkable and life-sustaining; for men undrinkable and deadly." (B 61)[6] does not make any contradiction. Because, that pureness and dirtiness here are valued by different beings makes possible the mentioned opposite qualities can be predicated on the same subject at the same time. However, even if we ignore that we have learned such an interpretation awareness from Aristotle, Heraclitus does not always make the relation between opposite qualities clear in this way.

> "Immortals are mortal, mortals immortal, living the others' death, dead in the others' life." (B 62).[7]
>
> "The same…: living and dead, and the waking and the sleeping, and young and old. For these transposed are those, and those transposed again are these." (B 88).[8]
>
> "The wise is one alone, unwilling and willing to be spoken of by the name of Zeus." (B 32).[9]
>
> "Into the same rivers we step and do not step, we are and we are not." (B 49a).[10]

Heraclitus in his explanations above not only considers the opposite qualities like mortal-immortal, living-dead, awake-asleep and young-old are the one and same thing but also simultaneously affirms the opposite components of a proposition like willing-unwilling, step-not step, are-are not. According to the philosopher's point of view, it is known that opposite qualities are ontologically depended on each other in order to come into existence. But, both claim the opposite qualities are the one and same thing and affirm the opposite components of a proposition together

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[6] Charles H. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 60-61.
[7] Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*, pp. 70-71.
[8] Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*, pp. 70-71.
[9] Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*, pp. 82-83.
[10] Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*, p. 289.

make logical contradictions. Namely, if opposite qualities like true-false, good-bad, beauty-ugly, honest-dishonest, profit-loss are considered as the one and same thing, scientific explanations, ethical criterions, artistic valuations, financial initiatives will become meaningless.[11]

Heraclitus' explanations above makes not only being and knowledge[12] but also naming and names controversial key issues.[13] Because, as the things constantly in flux cannot be stabilized by way of naming,[14] it is not possible for current names to reflect the existing things as they are. From this aspect, names are not reliable elements to get information. The fragment "The bow is called life but its work is death." (B48) makes the philosopher's approach to this issue clear enough. In short, names cannot even reflect the functions of the things named, let alone explain being itself.[15] To sum up all of these explanations with three arguments,

P(1): Things are constantly in flux.

P(2): What are constantly in flux don't have sameness (identity).

C: Therefore, things don't have sameness (identity).

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P(1): What are constantly in flux don't have sameness (identity).
P(2): Those which don't have sameness (identity) don't have definite names.
C: Therefore, what are constantly in flux don't have definite names.

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[11] In such a case, an engineer who says that "Copper is conductive and not conductive." will not be able to use the copper in the electrical circuit; a medical doctor who says "Vitamin C is good and not good for common cold." will not be able to prescribe a pill containing the mentioned vitamin to her patient.

[12] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* (Transl. W. D. Ross), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991, $1078^{b}5$-35.

[13] R. M. Van Den Berg, *Proclus' Commentary on The Cratylus*, Brill, Leiden, 2008, p. 15.

[14] E. Schiappa, *Defining Reality*, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, 2003, pp. 13-15.

[15] Robert Adamson, *A Short History of Logic*, William Blacwood and Sons, Edinburgh, undated, pp. 25-26; Raoul Mortley, *The Rise and Fall of Logos*, Hanstein, Bonn, 1986, pp. 55-57.

P(1): Those which don't have sameness (identity) don't have definite names.
P(2): Those which don't have definite names cannot be known.
C: Therefore, those which don't have sameness (identity) cannot be known.

Although Heraclitus was influenced by his predecessors, he was a more prominent philosopher in terms of influencing later thinkers. As a matter of fact this effect can clearly be seen especially in Parmenides' philosophy. Parmenides rightly implies the following question while shaping his point of view: If, as Heraclitus claims, everything in the universe is in flux or constant change, how is it possible to say that what something really is? Because, to claim that everything in the universe continuously, rapidly and totally changes will bring alone the elimination of both being itself and knowledge on it. Namely, if being has not an identity, it is not possible for it to be known. In fact, Parmenides in this context not only criticizes Heraclitus but also argues that the idea of becoming is completely absurd and inconsistent.

As is seen, Heraclitus tends to deny being and stability while founding the idea of becoming; as for Parmenides, he inclines to refuse becoming and change while forming the idea of being. Some ancient commentators consider this contrast between these two philosophers as one of the first systematic debates in the history of philosophy. No doubt that the mentioned discussion deeply affected both the perspective of subsequent philosophers in terms of form and content and the historical development process of argumentation studies.

> "Come now, I will tell you about those ways of enquiry which are alone conceivable. The one, that a thing, and it is not for not being, is the journey of persuasion, for persuasion attends on reality; the other, that a thing is not, and that it must needs not be, this I tell you is a path wholly without report, for you can neither know what is not nor tell of it…" (Fr. 3)[16]

> "It is necessary to assert and conceive that this is Being. For it is for being, but Nothing is not. These things I command you to heed. From this way of enquiry I keep you first of all, but secondly from that on which mortals with no understanding

[16] A. H. Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides*, Parmenides Publishing, Las Vegas, 2009, p. 56.

> stray two-headed, for perplexity in their own breasts directs their mind astray and they are borne on deaf and blind alike in bewilderment, people without judgement, by whom this has been accepted as both being and not being the same and not the same, and for all of whom their journey turns backwards again." (Fr. 5)[17]

Parmenides by way of his explanations above reveals three different ways of enquiry on being. The first of these is on being; the second is on non-being, and the last is on the acceptance of being and non-being as the same thing. Parmenides considers the first way of enquiry in question as the unique way needs to be followed. To him, what human needs to consider as a guide during this research process is reason (logos) rather than sense organs which reflect the variety and multiplicity of external things. Because, taking sensory organs[18] as guides causes human to face the phenomenon of change which is at the basis of all illusions, let alone explain being itself or reality.

The second way of enquiry that Parmenides has brought into question is on non-being. He firstly denies the existence of non-being or empty space and then insists that what is not cannot be investigated and talked about it. Because, if the existence of non-being is accepted, it will be necessary to explain how and when being comes into existence from non-being. For Parmenides, since being is as an ingenerated, imperishable, entire, unique, and unmoved thing, trying to explain such questions containing the assumption of change is a redundant attempt. On the other hand, even if some people try to explain how and when being comes into existence from non-being, their explanations will necessarily depend on names given by mortals with no understanding.[19]

The third way of enquiry that Parmenides has brought into question is on the acceptance of both being and not-being as the same thing. In fact, this approach is nothing but using the two ways of enquiry above together. The philosopher considers this method of research as a path of mortals and two-headeds who do not know anything. Because these

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[17] Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides*, p. 58.

[18] "Let not habit do violence to you on the empirical way of exercising an unseeing eye and a noisy ear and tongue, but decide by discourse the controversial test enjoined by me." (Fr. 7). Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides*, pp. 62, 182, 288.

[19] Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides*, p. 35.

people who adopt this path suppose there is a cycle between being and non-being, the bewilderments in their minds prevent them even to make a judgement. For Parmenides, it is necessary to make a judgement to be able to overcome the mentioned bewilderment. That is, it is a great contradiction to accept both being and non-being together.

As is seen, Parmenides shapes his point of view in a different way from his predecessors. Namely, he with concentrating on what is rational rather than what is sensational makes a methodological difference between the two areas in question. In this context he not only claims what are in constant change or flux are unreal and illusive but also states that what is real will not change. When we analyse the issue in terms of ancient discussions leading argumentation studies, we firstly need to say that Parmenides associates the third way of enquiry above to Heraclitus. Because, as we mentioned before, Heraclitus claims that what are considered as opposites are the same thing. No doubt that what Parmenides wants to say here is that if the doctrine of unity of opposites Heraclitus claims is accepted, making a judgement will be impossible, let it alone making an argument.

If we analyse the second way of enquiry above, we can see here that an alleged connection between being and non-being depends on the assumption of constant change in the universe. For Parmenides, if the existence of change is accepted, being will necessarily be accompanied by non-being. In such a case where everything in the universe constantly changes, it will not be possible to make a judgement reflecting the cases of what are in constant flux. That is, to Parmenides, not only the doctrine of unity of opposites but also the doctrine of flux adopted by Heraclitus makes judgements impossible.

Since Parmenides is concerned with the deceptive appearances of sensible world, he searches for both the being unchanged and truth from a metaphysical perspective. He in this context claims that what is not can neither be thought and known nor uttered. Namely, the intelligible being unchanged rather than deceptive appearances of sensible world is the only legitimate content of what is thought, known, and uttered.[20] At his point, what is or what is true is considered as identical with what is thought, known, and uttered. Contrary to this, what is false is seen as

[20] Paul Seligman, *Being and Not-Being – An Introduction to Plato's Sophist*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1974, pp. 5-6.

identical with what is not. No doubt, if we endorse this assertion claimed by Parmenides, whatever people say will be true and what is more, there will be no contradiction between what they say. To sum up this approach with an argument The Sophist would claim later,

P(1): To utter what is false is to utter what is not.

P(2): It is impossible to utter what is not.

C: Therefore, it is impossible to utter what is false.[21]

To the first way of enquiry which is the only path Parmenides follows, we notice here there is an ontological gap that cannot be filled between metaphysical being and sensible world. Because, that he considers what is thought, known, and uttered as related to metaphysical being will make the judgements on sensible world impossible. In fact, we can realize the mentioned gap from what Parmenides says on naming and names.

Parmenides sometimes claims that naming and names are the issues related to the sensible world which is totally illusive. For instance, coming into existence, passing away, motion and change of quality are impossible since at one point or another they involve what is not. In this context, they are illusive beliefs of mortal,[22] any mention of them will be empty names, names that name nothing, senseless babbles.[23] Namely, since the judgements relating to the sensible world will imply what is not, they are nothing but deceptive orders of words.[24] At this point, since such names are not related to the realm of intelligible being and so do not have solid foundation, they are useless; even they can be seen as detrimental structures because of preventing people to learn what real being is.[25] As a result, not only sensible but also metaphysical knowledge is impossible. We can make two different arguments to sum up Parmenides' explanations so far:

P(1): The illusory things cannot be thought, known, and uttered.

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[21] Seligman, *Being and Not-Being – An Introduction to Plato's Sophist*, p. 9.
[22] Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides*, pp. 76-78, 269.
[23] Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides*, p. 76; Seligman, *Being and Not-Being – An Introduction to Plato's Sophist*, p. 5.
[24] Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides*, p. 260; Seligman, *Being and Not-Being – An Introduction to Plato's Sophist*, p. 26.
[25] Mortley, *The Rise and Fall of Logos*, pp. 55-57, 95-101.

P(2): What are sensed are illusory.

C: What are sensed cannot be thought, known, and uttered.

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P(1): What is ingenerated, unique, unmoved, etc. cannot be explained by names.

P(2): (Metaphysical) Being is ingenerated, unique, unmoved, etc.

C: (Metaphysical) Being cannot be explained by names.

That Parmenides both claims what is not cannot be thought, known, uttered and assumes an ontological gap between metaphysical being and sensible world causes some sophistic reactions against him. For instance, while Parmenides claims that only the intelligible being can be known, Protagoras rejects this transcendental reality assumption and claims that opinions of mortals determine what is and how it is.[26] Namely, what seems to me is for me and what seems to you is for you. From this approach, since what I consider as true will be true for me and what you consider as true will be true for you, namely, whatever we say there will be no contradiction between us. No doubt, it is very surprising to move quickly from the impossibility of uttering what is false to the point in which all of what are said can be considered as true. But, whether the first or the second point are considered, from these both cases, even if making some arguments seems theoretically possible, it will not be practically and logically possible to give them truth values. As a result, both the first and the second approaches in question totally deny that what is false may exist. In fact, this is nothing but announcing the impossibility of logical argument and scientific knowledge.[27] That is,

P(1): What is relative to each person's perspective cannot be considered as knowledge.

P(2): Truth is relative to each person's perspective.

C: Truth cannot be considered as knowledge.

Gorgias implies that Parmenides' assumptions on non-being and being ultimately contain contradictory situations. For instance, if, as Parmenides claimed, being was eternal and unlimited, it would have to

[26] Seligman, *Being and Not-Being – An Introduction to Plato's Sophist*, p. 8.
[27] Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides*, p. 25.

be in a position. But being in a position is to be enclosed in something. Since the eternal and unlimited being Parmenides claimed cannot be enclosed in something, it will have no position and place to be in. Therefore, it is not possible for what is eternal and unlimited to exist. No doubt Gorgias in this context denies both the existence of non-being and the existence of what Parmenides considers as being.[28] On the other hand, if thought is considered as the criterion of being or non-being, then that Parmenides considers what is and what can be thought as the same thing will reveal some contradictory situations. For the human mind can conceive of non-beings like flying humans or chariots running over the sea.[29] That is, where the case of thought is taken a criterion of being and non-being, both being and non-being will exist at the same time.[30] In other words, if both what is is something that is and what is not is something that is, then all contradictory things will have existence at the same time.[31] To put it briefly, since being and what can be thought are not the same things, even if being is, it is not possible to rely on thought in terms of explaining what being is. The last point Gorgias draws attention to as a reaction to Parmenides is on communication. For him, even if what are seen, heard, etc. are considered as external beings, speech (logos) itself is a completely different thing from those mentioned things. On that sense, what are communicated to friends, neighbours, etc. are not what are seen and heard themselves, but only speeches which are totally different from the external things.[32] As a consequence, for Gorgias, nothing exists; even if it is, it cannot be thought; even if it can be thought, it cannot be explained or communicated to others. At this point, as Cratylus says, only one option will remain to be followed. It is nothing but restricting communication instruments to the movement of fingers.[33]

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[28] Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians* (Transl. Richard Bett), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 15-19; Francis MacDonald Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides*, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1958, pp. 147-150.

[29] Michael D. Bakaoukas, "Nonexistence – A Comparative-Historical Analysis of the Problem of Nonbeing", *E-Logos*, 4/2014, p. 2.

[30] Christopher W. Tindale, *Reason's Dark Champions*, The University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 2010, p. 106.

[31] Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides*, p. 298.

[32] Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*, pp. 15-19.

[33] Seligman, *Being and Not-Being – An Introduction to Plato's Sophist*, p. 26; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, $1010^{a}1$-$1010^{a}14$.

Plato is seriously influenced by Heraclitus' and Parmenides' explanations on being and change while not only shaping his structure of thought but also implying that the continuation of philosophical adventure will be possible by clarifying how these explanations open the door to sophism. Because, if everything in the universe constantly and totally changes, it will not be possible to talk about a being or category of being. On the other hand, if there is no such fact as change in the universe and, moreover, non-being cannot be talked about, in this case, it will not be possible to speak on what are false, images, likeness, imitations and arts.[34]

As is seen especially in his *Sophist* dialogue, Plato tries to explain not only the discussion of being and change[35] but also the possibility of non-being can be talked. In this context, he accepts five great kinds or forms that metaphysically are and attempts to make the mentioned discussions clear through them. For him, being independently from all other kinds is and above all of them. This means that it is also above the fact of change. On the other hand, the four kinds except for being really are the things that are not, but they are in terms of sharing in being. Namely, these kinds embraced by being, whether taken one by one or all together, in some respects are and in some respects are not.[36]

For Plato, the other great kinds that metaphysically are except for being are four. They are change, rest, sameness, and difference.[37] He claims that both change and rest are at the same time. That is, change is and a different thing from rest; rest is and a different thing from change. Since both change and rest share in being, it is possible the propositions "*Change is.*" and "*Rest is.*" to be considered as true. But, because these two things sharing in being are opposite of each other, namely they are unmixed with each other, it is not possible the propositions "*Change is rest.*" and "*Rest is change.*" to be considered as true. Similarly, both sameness and difference are at the same time. Since both sameness and difference share in being, not only the proposition "*Sameness is.*" but also the proposition "*Difference is.*" will be true. But, because they are unmixed

[34] Plato, *Sophist* (In, *Theaetetus and Sophist*, Ed. and Transl. Christopher Rowe), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, 241^{a}-242^{b}.
[35] Plato, *Sophist*, 252^{a}.
[36] Plato, *Sophist*, 256^{d}.
[37] Plato, *Sophist*, 254^{d}.

with each other, both the proposition "*Sameness is difference.*" and "*Difference is sameness.*" will be false.[38]



Five great kinds in Plato's *Sophist*

It is important to note here that what Plato considers as great kinds are not names. Rather, they are the things that metaphysically are.[39] As is seen from the figure above, although he considers five great kinds in his *Sophist* dialogue, he also says that they are more in number.[40] For Plato, truth or falsity of what are said is evaluated according to the ways these forms are combined with each other.

Plato claims that there are three different ways of combination between kinds. The first way is to be claimed that there will be no combination between them. For him, if this first way is followed, communication and philosophy will totally be eliminated.[41] That is, for instance, if there is no combination between kinds, it will be impossible both change and rest to combine with being, and so, this assumption will nip the construction of proposition like "*Change is.*" and "*Rest is.*" in the bud.

The second way is to be assumed that all kinds can combine with each other. But, if such a combination is considered, this will make oppositions like change and rest, sameness and difference, good and evil,

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[38] Plato, *Sophist*, 255^{a-b}.
[39] Seligman, *Being and Not-Being – An Introduction to Plato's Sophist*, p. 7.
[40] Plato, *Sophist*, 256^{cd}.
[41] Plato, *Sophist*, 259^{e}-260^{c}.

etc. possible to combine with each other.[42] That is, this approach is nothing but tolerating the propositions like "*Change is rest.*", "*Sameness is difference.*", and "*Good is evil.*". For the history of philosophy, it is known that Heraclitus and Protagoras tend to adopt this approach in question. But, as Aristotle says, to assume that everything can combine with everything in all respects is nothing but claiming that nothing actually exists.[43]

The third way of combinations between kinds is to be assumed that some kinds can combine with some kinds in some respects. Plato claims that all actions underlying philosophical process like communication, thinking, inference become possible through this way.[44] At this point, as both musicians combine sounds and grammarians combine letters, it is important for dialecticians -namely, philosophers- to know the ways of combination between kinds, and combine them by their nature. That Plato considers this way of combination as philosophy is an indication of the importance he attaches to this process.[45]

Plato explains not only being and change but also the possibility of talking about what is not through five great kinds. For him, difference as one of the great five kinds in question is not an absolute being kind, but it is in terms of sharing in being. At this point, when talked about what is not, what is talked is not about absolute non-being, but it is about what is "different" than being. That is, if it is considered that difference is one of the great kinds, when talked about what is not, what is talked actually refers to what is different than being. For instance, when we utter the words "not beautiful" in relation to something, on each occasion that something is different from the nature of the beautiful.[46]

For Plato, speech must necessarily say something *of* something; it's impossible for it to say something of nothing. For example, when we see that Theaetetus sits, our current sentence "*Theaetetus sits.*" will be the true one says the thing that is, as he is, about Theaetetus. But, for the same case,

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[42] Plato, *Sophist*, 252^{d-e}.

[43] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 989^{a}31-989^{b}21, 1007^{b}19-1008^{a}7.

[44] Plato, *Phaidros*, (In, *Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus*; Transl. Harold North Fowler), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2005, 266 / pp. 534-537.

[45] Plato, *Sophist*, 253^{d-e}; Seligman, *Being and Not-Being – An Introduction to Plato's Sophist*, p. 52.

[46] Plato, *Sophist*, 257^{d-e}, 258^{b-c}.

if we use the sentence "*Theaetetus flies.*", that sentence will be false because of saying a different thing that is from those that are about Theaetetus.[47]

As is understood from the ancient discussions up to now, each thinker seems to adopt a different perspective. From this fact, we can claim that if only one of them is taken into consideration, some issues like the unreliability of names, the impossibility of talking about what is not, the infallibility of speaker, the question of whether reality has a physical or metaphysical nature, etc. will reveal some difficulties for making arguments. On the other hand, it is undisputable fact that when these ancient discussions are totally considered, they will make a huge contribution to the argumentation studies we have today.

II. Aristotle's theory of categories in terms of forming the basis of argumentation studies

Unlike Plato, Aristotle does not accept being to be considered as a single kind or form, and claims that neither the one nor being can be the genus of all being. For him, since the concept being is an indefinite expression used in many various senses, it refers to different categories of being.[48] In this context, he talks about some various kinds of being, and uses different conceptual frameworks to refer to each of them.[49]

In general terms, what Aristotle enumerates as various kinds of being are being in terms of being true, being in terms of being potential or actual, being in terms of being accidental, and being in terms of being the figures of categories. In this paper, we will briefly mention both being in terms of being true and being in terms of being the figures of categories. When recalling the discussions on being, non-being, and truth so far, what Aristotle will say in this context are important in terms of being able to make a general evaluation of them.

To Aristotle, truth and falsity do not reside in things. That is, they cannot be found in the things outside the mind. What is more, the things outside the mind are not images of what are thought, rather, much of what is thoughts is shaped after experiments on those things. In this context, both what is true and what is false are nothing but a combination of

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[47] Plato, *Sophist*, 262^{e}, 263$^{a\text{-}d}$.

[48] Franz Brentano, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle* (Transl. Rolf George), University of California Press, Berkeley, 1975, pp. 53, 60.

[49] Brentano, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, p. 3.

thoughts. In other words, while what is considered to be true represents the existence of a connection between what is and what is thought, what is regarded to be false points to the non-existence of a connection between them.[50]

For Aristotle, it is not possible to determine truth or falsity only from the combination of thoughts in the mind. For instance, human is not mortal because we think that he is mortal; conversely, we think and say that human is mortal because he is mortal in reality. At this point, what makes our expression true is the combination between what really is outside the mind and the concepts referring to this reality, not the combination between the concepts of human and mortal alone.[51] Everything that is is not true, but all of what are true refer to the things that are. Briefly stated, what Aristotle tries to explain here is that not only the concept being but also the concept true are used to refer to the things that are.

To being in terms of being the figures of categories, Aristotle in this context enumerates ten categories which are different from each other. They are respectively substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, having, doing, and affection. All these things in the list of categories refer to the things that are outside the mind. That is, as the concept being is used to refer to the things that are, these concepts in the mentioned list is be used to refer to the different figures of being.

We need to say here that the status of the things enumerated in the list of categories is a controversial topic for both ancient commentators and contemporary philosophers. Namely, some of them consider these in question to be only linguistic or conceptual categories, some of them see them as ontological categories. In fact, to see the things in the list of categories to be only linguistic, conceptual or ontological categories is an alien commentary for Aristotle's philosophy. Because, to see the mentioned things as only linguistic, conceptual or ontological structures will cause to be considered all his philosophy to be only linguistic, conceptual or physical explanations. But, as we can understand from both Aristotle's own texts and Al-Fârâbî's comments on them, what he actually

[50] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, $1027^{b}17$-$1028^{a}8$; Brentano, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, pp. 15-19.
[51] Brentano, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, p. 19.

wants to do is a logical combination between linguistic, conceptual, and ontological categories.

For Aristotle, the things in the list of categories stand for different figures of being. On that sense, substance, quantity, quality, relation, and all the rest are different from each other in terms of being. But, the main difference needs to be considered here between them is that the existence of all the things other than substance depends on substance in terms of being. At this point, for Aristotle, to discuss the topic of being is to discuss what substance (ousia) is.

When we regard his theory of categories, Aristotle uses the concept substance in two different ways. While the first usage points to *the first substances*, the other indicates to *the second substances*. What he considers as first substances are the concrete and particular things that are externally. In this sense, the individual person or horse we can point out by saying "this" or "that" is a first substance. As is understood from his similar explanations, all the external things that are concrete and particular in terms of being sensible like *this* land, *that* tree, *those* bones, etc. are first substances. They neither can be predicated of anything nor be said to be in anything. That is, they are the external things themselves that are different from linguistic and conceptual categories used as instruments of communication and thought.

What Aristotle considers as first substances are the ontological basis from which all scientific researches are carried out. To what he calls as secondary substances, they are the concepts classified as kinds or genus. For Aristotle, this does not mean that the mentioned concepts metaphysically or mentally exist independently from first substances. Because, as the existence of secondary substances depends on first substances, the knowledge of first substances depends on secondary substances. That is, as far as understood from both Aristotle's and Al-Fârâbî's texts, while the existence of concepts or meanings that the discipline of logic deals with depends on the things that are outside the mind, the knowledge of these things that are outside the mind can be learned using these object-oriented concepts.

As is seen in the explanations above, it is easy to realize that there is a strict relation between objects and concepts in terms of being ontological and epistemological issues. But, even if this is a relation structured strictly, it is not possible for it to represent singly the system of knowledge that

logic deals with. That is, after discussing the status of ontological and conceptual categories, we need to focus on how linguistic categories are explained in this system of knowledge. As in known, Aristotle in his book of *De Interpretatione* says that "Spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, …".[52] It is true that there is not any discussion relating to the authenticity of this quote. No doubt, it is possible for this quote and rest of it to be considered as "the most influential text in the history of semantics.".[53] But, from the mentioned passage, to claim that Aristotle emphasizes on mental meanings singly and therefore, in his philosophy, mental and subjective states determine language brings many problems in its wake. Moreover, it is quite obvious that such an interpretation will devastate Aristotle's both realism and philosophy completely.

As far as we can also understand from Al-Fârâbî's comments on Aristotle's mentioned book, Aristotle does not certainly claim that mental meanings are the most basic instruments in the mentioned system of knowledge and therefore, mental and subjective states determine language or linguistic categories. Conversely, he identifies a relation between linguistic and conceptual categories too. As will be recalled, we mention that the relation between objects and concepts has been object-oriented and structured strictly. To this new or second relation, it has been an option-oriented structure. That is, this means that people are free to choose and use the language they want in terms of referring to the meanings that logic deals with. For language is not a natural structure. If it was so, there would be only one language in the world. On that sense, what is natural is not language, but the faculty of thinking and language acquisition.

To the question what are the meanings that logic deals with, firstly, Al-Fârâbî claims that grammarians and logicians analyze meaning in different ways. That is, grammarians analyze meaning from the perspective of only one language. And what is more, what they consider as meanings are the things that their community use habitually. Namely, if a meaning can be successfully used in terms of communication, the word said in this context is considered as meaningful. What is important here for a grammarian is just to investigate whether the mentioned word

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[52] Aristotle, *De Interpretatione* (In, *Categories* and *De Interpretatione*, Transl. J. L. Ackrill), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002, $16^{a}3$-9.

[53] Deborah K. W. Modrak, *Aristotle's Theory of Language and Meaning*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 1.

has a meaningful usage. In other words, grammarians don't examine the meanings of words in terms of being arranged mentally or rationally. This underdetermination allows people both to refer a meaning using different words and to intend many different meanings using just a word. But, as can be seen clearly in Al-Fârâbî's books, all these explanations on grammarians don't mean that he has underestimated grammar and language.

For Al-Fârâbî, logicians examine meanings in terms of being arranged mentally or rationally. But, this arrangement process must be consistent with the two relations we have mentioned above. Even that they have only one of these two relations will devastate their logical status. In this context, logic not only uses meanings in terms of being logical instruments but also examines grammatical meanings in terms of explaining their logical or non-logical status. We aware of that some examples need to be given to clarify these explanations. We will try to do this in the next section while describing the different types of arguments. We also aware of that we owe the interpretation composition above to Al-Fârâbî. We need to do this, because his comment in this process help us both to understand Aristotle's philosophy wholly and to see what Aristotle did not discuss in detail in this context.

III. Three different types of argumentation in Aristotelian Philosophy

As is known, the word logos in Greek is not used in Aristotle's books as a definite concept referring to the logic as a discipline. He used this word to refer to different things like speech (logos), proposition, and definition. Al-Fârâbî uses the word logos (nutk in Arabic) to refer to both faculty of language and thought and inner and outer speech. For him, the faculty in question is an innate potential enabling human to acquire thought and language. On the other hand, while inner speech stands for thought, outer speech corresponds to speech acts.

To the logic as a discipline, for Al-Fârâbî logic is a discipline dealing with meanings in terms of having both an object-oriented relation and an option-oriented outer speech relation. From this point of view, he certainly denies grammar to be considered as logic. No doubt, this clearly means that he has structured argumentation studies from the mentioned logical perspective rather than grammatical or linguistic explanations.

As far as we can also understand from Al-Fârâbî's explanation, Aristotle considers theory of categories as a basis for argumentation studies. At this point, firstly, we need to clarify what we mean with argument or argumentation. We hope that the following quotation will also help us to explain what argument is. "A syllogism (syllogismos) is an argument (logos) in which, certain things being posited, something other than what was laid down results by necessity because these things are so."[54] For Aristotle's theory of categories, we as humans must categorize not only substances and their features but also concepts and linguistic terms related to them to be able to acquire knowledge. From this point of view, when we investigate the quote above, we can easily say that the concept argument (logos) is more comprehensive than the concept syllogism. On the other hand, although the concept argument above is being accepted and used as if a general structure, we can certainly claim that both Aristotle and Al-Fârâbî uses different kinds of arguments too.

No doubt, it can be claimed that there are some historical reasons of the definition of argument above to be generally accepted and used. One of the main reasons here is that this kind of arguments are considered formally valid and well-structured arguments. But we claim that they are not only formally valid and well-structured arguments but also object-oriented arguments. We will try to clarify this claim a little later. As a result, as is understood from both Aristotle's and Al-Fârâbî's books, it is possible to classify arguments as demonstrative arguments, dialectical arguments, and rhetorical arguments. Moreover, it can be claimed that not to take any notice of this classification prevent people to see the comprehensive perspective of philosophy.

A. Demonstrative Arguments

Firstly, we want to draw a figure on the theory of categories to be able to tell easily both what demonstrative argument is and how it works. As in the classic descriptions, we will point out both few individual humans as substances or beings and the concepts human and living as secondary substances.

[54] Aristotle, *Topics* (Transl. W. A. Pickard), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991, $100^{a}18$-$101^{b}4$.



When we comment the figure above from Aristotle's theory of categories, what we need to say firstly is that it is an individual or object-oriented structure, not a metaphysic-oriented one like in Plato's thought. Here, as the concept human can predicated of each individual who falls under itself, in terms of being genus or kind, the concepts in higher levels can be predicated of the concepts which fall under themselves. This categorization enables us to say the sentences like "Socrates is a human.", "Plato is a human.", "Human is a living.", "Human is a rational living.". From both Aristotle's and Al-Fârâbî's explanations, when we investigate this figure in terms of explaining the demonstrative arguments, we see two different conceptual combinations. While first of them is on the intension-extension relation between concepts, second is on the definition of concepts. That is, what Aristotle and Al-Fârâbî mean with necessary or essential predication is functionalized by this kind of combination structures.

To explain the mentioned first combination structure, no doubt, many contemporary thinkers regard the following sentences like "Human is (a) living.", "Heart is organ.", "Cancer is disease.", "Water is liquid.", "Cardiologist is doctor.", "Art is discipline.", "Physics is science.", "Democracy is form of government.", "Computer is machine.", etc. are analytical sentences. For them, since this kind of sentences are combinations of mental concepts (namely, subject and predicate) entirely, they are true by virtue of meaning. Namely, their truth depends upon both the meanings of their constituent terms and how they are combined. This is nothing but claiming that analytical sentences are redundant statements to acquire knowledge. Since we will also make similar explanations on the subject of definition below, we will mention briefly a few things. As far as we can understand from both Aristotle's and Al-Fârâbî's explanations on the theory of categories, this kind of sentences cannot be evaluated as true

only by virtue of meaning. Because, firstly, both philosophers don't attach importance such a definition of truth. On the other hand, even if it is claimed that how we understand the world will change according to the different categorization schemes, it is clear that we cannot arbitrarily categorize many things. If the sentences above were only conceptual combinations, we would not have experienced empirical or factual chaos when they were changed. But, for instance, to consider heart as a plant, cancer as an entertainment, cardiologist as a teacher, democracy as a toy, etc. will both devastate epistemology entirely and turn daily life into chaos.

To subject of definition in terms of explaining its role in demonstrative arguments, firstly we need to say that many contemporary thinkers consider Aristotle's theory of definition as a non-functional approach. Namely, since they deny the existence of essence (or form) in natural substances, they claim that this theory cannot be rationally accepted and used. It is a reality that Aristotle gives just a few examples of definition and these examples contain some difficulties by their nature. In one of them, he aims to give a general framework by which the thinking faculty human has is considered as what makes a human human, namely what differentiates human from other living things. No doubt, it is not very easy to know and explain what makes a substance that substance, what makes a tree that tree, or what differentiates a maple from other trees, etc. even today.

When we interpret Aristotle's explanations on essences of natural substances considering some discoveries of modern sciences, we can claim the following sentences can be treated in a similar way as examples of definition: "Water is a compound of one oxygen and two hydrogen (H_2O).", "Salt is a compound of sodium and chloride (NaCI).", etc. No doubt, what make these compounds water or salt are their natural structures. That is, what make them what they are aren't mental meanings or linguistic usages. On the other hand, both Aristotle and Al-Fârâbî claim that artificial substances like wall and clothe have essences (forms) and these essences exist in the mind of artist as a form or aim.[55] In fact, Al-Fârâbî implies that "four causes" in Aristotelian thought can be used in terms of making definitions. For instance, although stone, brick, mud, wood, etc. are components of wall, what makes a wall wall is the aim or

[55] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, $1032^{a}27$-$1032^{b}29$.

form in the mind of artist. That is, he makes the wall with the aims of its preventing risks coming from outside and carrying the ceiling.[56]

That Aristotle does not limit definitions to natural substances and implies definitions can be made by way four causes show us the existence of many definition opportunities. "Heart is an organ which pumps blood to body.", "Eye is an organ which receives visual data.", "Democracy is a form of government in which citizens have right to vote in terms of electing administrators.". As is seen, although it is not possible to define everything, some natural or artificial things can be defined. But, what we need to draw attention to here is that democracy does not exist as a natural substance. When we investigate its status from the theory of categories, we can realize that its existence depends on people's voting actions in terms of electing administrators. In fact, this means that there are many different forms of government like oligarchy, monarchy. But, what differentiates democracy from other forms of governments is that citizens have right to vote in terms of electing administrators. Namely, just as what democracy is cannot be explained if form of government doesn't exist, what differentiates democracy from other forms of government cannot be explained if the right given citizens to vote for administrations is not considered. This is what Aristotle and Al-Fârâbî regard as necessary or essential predication.

As far as we can understand from both Aristotle's and Al-Fârâbî's explanations, ontological statutes of numbers can be commented in a similar way. Namely, numbers don't exist as natural substances in the external world. They exist in terms of being the enumeration of substances. But, even if numbers are not natural substances, some kinds of necessary or essential predications can be used for them. For instance, both of the sentences "Nine is a number.", "Number is a quantity." are necessarily or essentially predicated. Namely, just as we cannot talk about nine if we don't accept number, we cannot mention on both nine and number if we don't also accept quantity. Moreover, quantities are not limited to numbers.

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[56] Al-Fârâbî, *Kitâb al-Burhân* (Ed. Mâcid Fahrî, al-Mantıq 'ınd al-Fârâbî, Dâr al-Mashriq, Beirut, 1987, p. 48; Al-Fârâbî, *el-Fusûlü'l-Hamse* (Tahk. ve Takd. Refîk el-'Acem, *el-Mantık 'ınde'l-Fârâbî I*) Dâru'l-Meşrik, Beyrût, 1985, pp. 72-73; Al-Fârâbî, *Felsefetü Aristûtâlîs* (Tahk. ve Takd. Muhsin Mehdî) Dâr Mecelletü Şi'r, Beyrût, 1961, p. 89; Al-Fârâbî, *Kitâbu Îsâğûcî ey el-Medhal*, (Tahk. Ve Takd. Refîk el 'Acem, *el-Mantık 'ınde'l-Fârâbî I*) Dâru'l-Meşrik, Beyrût, 1985, pp. 79-80.

As is seen, in Aristotelian thought necessary or essential predications are explained in two ways. While in the first way they are applied by way of intension-extension relations between concepts, in the second way they are used as definitions of concepts.[57] For both Aristotle and Al-Fârâbî, demonstrative arguments depend on these kinds of necessary propositions. Because, as they invariably preserve their truth, their truth value doesn't depend on the linguistic usages of different communities. In this context, we need to give some examples consisting of the mentioned necessary premises to be able clarify what the structure of demonstrative argument is.

P(1): Cancer is a disease involving abnormal cell growth which invades or spreads to other parts of the body.

P(2): All diseases involving abnormal cell growth which invades or spreads to other parts of the body are dysfunction of organism.

(C): Cancer is dysfunction of organism.

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P(1): Four is a number.

P(2): All numbers are quantities.

C: Four is a quantity.

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P(1): Democracy is a form of government.

P(2): All forms of government are human made structures.

(C): Democracy is a human made structure.

For Al-Fârâbî, demonstrative arguments have certain truth, namely, they invariably preserve their true value. No doubt, this means to claim that they are not only formally valid but also necessarily/essentially true arguments. As their premises are necessarily true proposition, their conclusions are deductively inferred necessary propositions. As far as we

[57] Al-Fârâbî gives the following example to explain the usage of definition in demonstrative argument. P (1) "All C are B.", P (2) "All B are A.", (C): "All C are A.". Al-Fârâbî, *Kitâb al-Burhân*, p. 36; Ibn Bâcca, *Ta'âlîku ibn Bâcca 'alâ kitâb al-burhân*, ed. Mâcid Fahrî, *al-Mantıq 'ınd al-Fârâbî*, Dâr al-Mashriq, Beirut, 1987, pp. 141-143.

can understand from Al-Fârâbî's explanations on Aristotle's theory of categories, these kinds of categorical structures and their combinations between each other are fundamental structures on which human structures his thought and knowledge. Both they and their combinations between each other are basis, because, what cancer is cannot be explained or known if disease doesn't exist; what four and so forth are cannot be explained if number is not considered; what democracy and so on are cannot be explained if form of government is not regarded. Moreover, even if each concept cannot certainly be defined, it is clear that the premises and conclusions in demonstrative arguments above are not emotion and context dependent structures.

B. Dialectical Arguments

For Aristotle and Al-Fârâbî, while premises of demonstrative arguments are necessarily or essentially predicated proposition, premises of dialectical arguments are possibly predicated proposition.[58] At this point, if we need to explain the difference between how essential and possible predications work, essential predications are proposition structures that explain what x is or what kind of thing x is. As for possible predications, they are proposition structures that explain the possible situations of x. we want to use here the concept democracy to clarify the statutes of both essential and possible predications. As we have mentioned before, when asked what democracy is, we can easily say that it is a form of government. Then, when asked what kind or form of government democracy is, we can say that what makes a form of government democracy is to be given citizens the right to vote in terms of electing administrators. These two properties of democracy not only are ontologically found in each democratic process but also are used as objective determinations of the democracy meaning that logic deals with.

To possible predications on democracy, they explain neither what democracy is nor what kind of thing democracy is. In fact, these kinds of explanations are the statements that are possible both to be predicated and not to be predicated on the concept democracy. Namely, even if different sentences like "Democracy is the most important value in the world." or

[58] Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* (Transl. A. J. Jenkinson), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991, 46^a4-46^a27, 65^a26-65^b37; Aristotle, *Topics*, 100^a25-101^a4; Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* (Transl. Jonathan Barnes), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991, 72^a6-72^a14.

"Democracy is the tyranny of majority." are used, these sentences and so on can be regarded as true propositions by different people. But, the sentences "Democracy is a form of government." and "Democracy is not a form of government." cannot be considered as two separate true propositions, even if they are said by different people. No doubt, it is possible to relate these explanations to the concepts cancer, number, water, salt and so on we have mentioned earlier.

Al-Fârâbî also considers the premises of dialectical arguments as popular and generally accepted premises. Although these premises and the arguments made by them don't give certain truth or necessary consequence, their strength or weakness depends on witnesses of the people who have different interests. These popular and generally accepted premises may be believed or accepted by all people, by most people, by some wise people, by some people residing in a country or community, etc. When we investigate what Al-Fârâbî says on popular and generally accepted premises, we see that he focuses on two different usages of these propositions and the arguments made by them. In the first usage, he treats the expressions of praising and criticizing which are ethical valuations. He uses the sentence "Taking care of parents is good." as an example in this context. We can make an argument including the mentioned sentence and then clarify how these kinds of arguments work.

P(1): Taking care of parent is good.

P(2): What are good are the things that must be done.

C: Taking care of parent is the thing that must be done.

When we analyse this argument, we immediately realize that the first premise is a contingent proposition. Because, although it seems to say something everyone can accept, there will be many people who ignore and deny what is said by this premise.[59] For instance, anyone who was abandoned by his parent when he is a baby may not attribute truth to this promise. This means that some people regard this premise as false, while others consider it to be true. It is also possible to interpret the other premise and consequence in the same way. But, what we want to draw attention to briefly here is that conclusion reveals an opinion which its

[59] Aristotle, *Topics*, $104^{a}9$-$104^{a}37$; Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* (Transl. W. A. Pickard), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991, $165^{a}38$-$165^{b}12$.

counter-example can be claimed rather than certain or necessary truth. The following argument can be commented as a similar example.

P(1): Democracy is the best form of government.

P(2): The best form of government should be adopted.

C: Democracy should be adopted.

To second usage of this context, Al-Fârâbî brings the inductive aspects of premises and conclusions in question into the forefront. For him, while sometimes it is not possible for human to observe all of what he wants to observe, sometimes what are observed cannot be fully determined. Namely, not only limitedness of human power and abilities but also difficulties and deficiencies of natural observation, etc. are obstacles to achieving certain and necessary truth. For Al-Fârâbî, despite these difficulties, human should go on to research truth in proportion to his power and abilities. That we make an example of argument from these explanations will help to clarify the way these premises and conclusions work.

P(1): All fruits that contain vitamin C are good for those who suffering from influenza.

P(2): Orange is a fruit that contains vitamin C.

C: Orange is good for those who suffering from influenza.

When we analyse this argument, it is known that the conclusion is a scientific and common judgement. That is the reason why medical doctors suggest eating orange or give pills containing vitamin C to their patients who suffering from influenza. But, this doesn't mean that no medical doctors will refuse this conclusion in the future. Even today some of them may claim that this judgement is wrong. We want to make another argument in this context.

P(1): Experts are qualified and educated people in their specific areas.

P(2): All qualified and educated people in their specific areas can be trusted in terms of information and consultation.

C: Experts can be trusted in terms of information and consultation.

When we interpret this argument from Al-Fârâbî's explanations on dialectical arguments, we can claim that even if majority of people rely on experts' opinions, all what experts say cannot be considered as true. Because, not only the limitedness of human abilities but also the contingency or underdetermination of induction method prevent these kinds of judgement to be evaluated as true.

Even if some commentators imply that Aristotle didn't respect the inductive method, as far as we can understand from both Aristotle and Al-Fârâbî's explanations, dialectical arguments work by inductive propositions and arguments. In this context, that Al-Fârâbî classifies arguments in terms of truth evaluation is an original approach. For him, while demonstrative arguments that build on deductive processes give "certain truth", dialectical arguments that build on inductive processes give "approximate truth" (to certainty). Although human aims to achieve certain truth in his all researches, he must settle for approximate truth because of the mentioned difficulties above. However, although Al-Fârâbî grades the demonstrative and dialectical arguments in different ways in terms of truth evaluation, he considers both them as scientific research and proof methods.

Another point Al-Fârâbî points out on dialectical argumentations is that this method is used as a discussion tool. As is known, the word dialectic comes from the word dialektos in Greek which means "discussion". He translates this word as "cedel" which means "discussion" in Arabic. At this point, he draws attention to two different usages of dialectic method including bad and good. The bad usage of this method is that people try to defeat each other rather than looking for truth. Moreover, he severely criticizes theologians because of they constantly argue redundant and speculative issues to defeat each other and calls them as debaters. In short, they are people who try to satisfy their feelings basing on popular and generally accepted proposition in a community rather than experimental data. For Al-Fârâbî, the good usage of dialectical method is that people try to achieve truth arguing each other. Here, people bring scientific concerns into the forefront rather than satisfying individual emotions and attach importance to experimental data instead of popular premises. For Al-Fârâbî, this usage of dialectical method contributes both to understanding of demonstrative arguments and to the

regulation of social life. For it is not possible to explain everything in human life by demonstrative arguments.[60]

C. Rhetorical Arguments

Al-Fârâbî also mentions rhetorical arguments as a third type of arguments. As we have mentioned before, for him, while demonstrative arguments are related to the certain truth, dialectical arguments are related to the approximate truth.[61] As to the rhetorical arguments, this includes a more different kind of truth than those two mentioned above. To be able to explain this kind of truth, we firstly need to draw attention to a significant difference between rhetoric and poetry. For Al-Fârâbî, the fundamental function of poetry is to get people fantasize or imagine, and then get them act according to what are fantasized or imagined. That is, a poet doesn't need truth or verification to influence people. To the main function of rhetoric, it is to persuade people following a process of verification. Namely, rhetorician applies to verification or truth to be able to evoke the emotions of people and direct them where he wants to. For Al-Fârâbî, the main purpose of rhetorician here is to persuade the interlocutors rather than to seek truth.

Al-Fârâbî calls the truth or verification that rhetoric deals with as "the furthest truth from certainty". Given the fact that demonstrative arguments related to "the certain truth" and dialectical arguments related to "the approximate truth", it is clear that Al-Fârâbî assigns rhetorical arguments to a lower category in terms of truth. At this point, we need to identify some aspects that distinguish rhetorical arguments from others as much as we can. At first, as far as I can understand from what are said in both Aristotle's and Al-Fârâbî's papers, that demonstrative arguments give certain truth regardless of a speaker's moral character (ethos) and how he appeals to emotion (pathos) differentiates them from others. Namely, these two factors are the basic means of persuasion in rhetorical arguments. In fact, the aim of science is not to persuade, but to verify and to pursue truth in proportion to its power.

Secondly, while demonstrative arguments are built on the necessary premises which their counter-examples cannot be claimed, dialectical arguments are developed on the possible premises, namely opinions

[60] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, $84^{a}30$-$84^{b}2$; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, $996^{b}26$-$997^{a}14$.
[61] Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, $68^{b}8$-$68^{b}14$.

which their counter-examples can be asserted.[62] As to the rhetorical arguments, even if their premises are popular and generally accepted propositions, the main purpose of people using these arguments are to persuade their interlocutors rather than to pursue truth. That is, while dialectical arguments mainly include the inductive and experimental premises pursuing truth (which approximates to certainty) in proportion to their strongness or weakness, rhetoric arguments principally contain analogical and context sensitive premises only to persuade. From this aspect, the propositions of persuasive arguments are below the opinions given in dialectical arguments in terms of their degree of truth. No doubt, some persuasive utterances or arguments are more satisfying and effective than others. But, despite all the differences in their degrees of persuasiveness, none of them doesn't give the truth dialectical arguments yield namely, the approximate truth to certainty.[63]

Thirdly, an important point that distinguishes rhetorical arguments from others is that it concerns both particular (singular) and universal topics. Briefly stated, both premises and conclusions of demonstrative arguments are universal propositions. Dialectical arguments work in the same way too. That is, although traditional Aristotelian philosophy initiates an investigation from particular objects or events, it doesn't attribute knowledge value to singular propositions. For this approach, since particular objects and events are constantly changing and unlimited, what it considers as knowledge is the generalizations or rules obtained from particular objects and events.[64] No doubt, this doesn't mean that traditional philosophy denies the existence and reality of particular objects and events. As to rhetoric arguments, they include not only universal propositions but also the sentences related to particular objects and events in terms of persuading. Because these kinds of sentences are more context-sensitive explanations, they are important means of contextual persuasion processes.[65] On the other hand, even if all premises

[62] Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, $24^{a}16$-$24^{b}16$.

[63] Deborah L. Black, "The Logical Dimensions of Rhetoric and Poetics: Aspects of Non-Demonstrative Reasoning in Medieval Arabic Philosophy" (PhD Thesis), University Of Toronto, Toronto, 1987, pp. 174-175.

[64] Black, "The Logical Dimensions of Rhetoric and Poetics: Aspects of Non-Demonstrative Reasoning in Medieval Arabic Philosophy", pp. 192, 204, 228.

[65] Black, "The Logical Dimensions of Rhetoric and Poetics: Aspects of Non-Demonstrative Reasoning in Medieval Arabic Philosophy", pp. 198-199.

and conclusions of rhetorical arguments are universal propositions, the main purpose here is not to verify, but to persuade.

As is known, enthymemes are basic tools for persuasion process in rhetorical arguments. Although they are not included in the common or popular definition of argument,[66] both Aristotle and Al-Fârâbî regard them as arguments.[67] For Al-Fârâbî, enthymeme is a statement composed of two joint premises, and the people use it intentionally omit one of these two joint premises. Since the people using enthymemes hide certain premises and doesn't declare them, it is called an enthymeme. At this point, the people hiding certain premises need to know that interlocutors already have in their minds the common point of views on the hidden premises. Namely, the enthymeme becomes persuasive when it implies the common point of view. On the other hand, if certain premises are not hidden in an argument, that argument will not be persuasive.[68] That is, if we declare all the premises, make the necessary one universal, and fulfil in each one of them the conditions of the syllogisms, in this case we will move from the degree of persuasion to the degree of certainty or verification.[69]

Both Aristotle and Al-Fârâbî explain the types of enthymemes in detail. We will write a few examples here taking into account their explanations. For example, when someone says the sentence "This man comes and goes under cover of night, so he is a suspicious person.", he omits the first premise of the following argument.

P(1): All who come and go under cover of night are suspicious people. (Hidden premise)

P(2): This man comes and goes under cover of night.

C: This man is a suspicious person.

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[66] "A syllogism (syllogismos) is an argument (logos) in which, certain things being posited, something other than what was laid down results by necessity because these things are so.". Aristotle, *Topics*, $100^{a}18$-$101^{b}4$.

[67] Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, $70^{a}3$-$70^{a}23$; Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, $71^{a}1$-$71^{a}11$; Aristotle, *Rhetoric* (Transl. W. Rhys Roberts), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991, $1356^{a}37$-$1356^{b}26$, $1359^{a}6$-$1359^{a}10$, $1395^{b}20$-$1396^{a}3$.

[68] Al-Fârâbî, *Book of Rhetoric* (Transl. Lahcen E. Ezzaher), *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Autumn 2008), p. 373.

[69] Al-Fârâbî, *Book of Rhetoric*, p. 380.

Similarly, when someone says the sentence "This man has fever, since he breathes rapidly.", he neglects the first premise of the following argument.

P(1): All who breath rapidly has fever. (Hidden premise)

P(2): This man breaths rapidly.

C: This man has fever.

When we consider both Aristotle's and Al-Fârâbî's explanations, we can develop many current examples of enthymemes. For instance, when someone says the sentence "This man is a democrat, so he is honest.", he actually tries to persuade or say his interlocutor of the honesty of all democrats. If we write the mentioned sentence as an argument, we can easily understand the first premise has been hidden in the sentence above.

P(1): All democrats are honest. (Hidden premise)

P(2): This man is a democrat.

C: This man is honest.

In the same way, let us suppose we ask a person a question, so he says us "I'm an expert, and you can trust me.". In this case, even if the mentioned person has hidden a premise, he tries to evoke a common sense in our mind through what he has hidden and persuade us. The following argument is exactly what he has wanted to say.

P(1): All experts can be relied. (Hidden premise)

P(2): I'm an expert

C: I'm reliable.

No doubt, it is possible to increase the number of these samples. But here we have tried to explain that Aristotelian philosophy treats not only demonstrative arguments but also dialectical and rhetorical arguments.

V. Conclusion

All of the explanations so far clearly show that ancient philosophers consider to explain what being, non-being, motion, truth, knowledge, value and so on are as the fundamental philosophical problems to be solved. In this context, each explanation

related to these problems is an attempt to determine a category, like the category of being, motion, and knowledge, etc. Unlike previous thinkers, Plato considers these determination samples as ideas existed independently of human experience. As to Aristotle, he regards categories as structures that are formed through human experiences in terms of enabling communication and knowledge. He also forms the argumentation studies through these categorical structures namely, his theory of categories. But, for Aristotle and Aristotelian philosophy what needs to be emphasized here is that argumentation studies includes not only demanstrative arguments that are context independent deductive reasonings but also dialectical and rhetorical arguments that are context dependent inductive and analogical reasonings.

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