Araştırma Makalesi ● Research Article

Is the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction a Stipulative Distinction?

Anlambilim-Edimbilim Ayrımı Keyfi bir Ayrım mıdır?

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ÖZ

Dilbilim ve felsefede; dil çalışmasındaki iş bölümü, genellikle her biri tipik olarak söz konusu dilin -formel veya doğal- tamamlayıcı fakat farklı yönlerini temsil eden sözdizim, anlambilim ve edimbilim temel üçlüsü üzerinden şematize edilir. Bu yönler, görünürde, söz konusu dilin yapısını bu dildeki farklı dilsel roller ve bunların açıklayıcılık işlevleri üzerinden şematik olarak temsil ederek bize metodolojik bir kolaylık sağlarlar. Böylelikle, temel üçlü genellikle doğal ve formel dillerin şematik bir şekilde nasıl tahlil edileceğini veya edilmesi gerektiğini göstermek için öne sürülür. Temel üçlüyü kabul etmek dillerin tahlili için bazı metodolojik kolaylıklar sunsa dahi temel üçlünün geçerliliği anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımının nasıl temellendirileceği sorusuyla son yıllarda sıklıkla zorlanmıştır. Bundan dolayı, dayandığı varsayımlar düşünüldüğünde bu ayrımın temel üçlü ile ilişkisinde teorik olarak ne kadar desteklenebileceği cevaplamaya değer olmuştur. Eğer ki ayrım temellendirilemezse, bu ayrım keyfi bir şematik gösterimdeki keyfi bir ayrım olarak sunduğu metodolojik kolaylıktan başka bir önem taşımaz. Bu makalede; temel üçlünün altında yatan varsayımları, anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımının sağlam temellendirilmiş bir ayrım olmaktansa keyfi bir ayrım olduğu mealinde tartışacağım.

ABSTRACT

In linguistics and philosophy, the division of labor in the study of language is commonly schematized by the basic triad that consists of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics each of which typically stands for complementary yet distinct aspects of the language- formal or natural- in question. These aspects, at face value, provide us a methodological convenience by schematically representing the structure of a language with respect to diverse linguistic roles and their explanatory significance. Although endorsing the basic triad offers some methodological convenience for the analysis of languages, the viability of the basic triad has, in recent years, been frequently challenged with the question of how to ground the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Hence, it has become significant to answer the question of how far the semantics-pragmatics distinction in its connection with the basic triad is theoretically warranted considering the assumptions on which it rests. If the distinction cannot be grounded, it seems to have no substantial significance other than its methodological convenience as stipulative categories in a stipulative schema. In this paper, I discuss these underlying assumptions to the effect that the semantics-pragmatics distinction is a stipulative one rather than a well-grounded distinction.

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GENİŞLETİLMİŞ ÖZET

Temel üçlü, bir dilin açıklanması hedeflenen teorik bir önemine (explanandum) göre dili farklı açıklayıcı dilsel yönlere (explanantia) kapsayıcı olacak şekilde bölümlendiren şematik bir gösterimdir. Görünürde temel üçlü kapsamlı bir dil analizi için metodolojik kolaylık sunar. Nitekim; teorisyen bu taksonomik şema sayesinde ilgili dil çalışmasını farklı ama birbirini tamamlayan şeylere (fenomenler, mekanizmalar, süreçler, özellikler vb.) ayrıştırma imkânı bulurken pratik ve açıklayıcı bir analiz şemasını elinde bulundurur. Bu noktada; temel üçlü-Taksonomik Ayrım Varsayımı (TDA) adını verdiğim- dilin içlemsel ve/veya kaplamsal olarak ayrıştırılabilir, n-tane, açıklayıcı yöne (explanans) ilgili dile dair açıklanması gereken bir önem (explanandum) nazarında kesinlikli olarak bölünebilir olduğunu olurlayan bir varsayıma dayanmaktadır. Dil analizi için sadece metodolojik açıdan kolaylık sağlayan bir şema yeterli değildir, çünkü bu şema teorik olarak temellendirilmiş olmadıkça buna dayanan dil analizi de güvence altında sayılmaz. Aksi durumda, temel üçlü güvence altında bir dil analizi modeli olmaktansa keyfi bir model olarak kalacaktır. Bu açıdan temel üçlü beraberinde gelen varsayımlarla birlikte temellendirilmelidir. Böylece, temel üçlüyü temellendirme ödevi bu üçlünün merkez varsayımı olan TDA'yı temellendirmek ödevine indirgenebilir. TDA, ilgili dilin açıklayıcı yönleri arasındaki ayrımı (ör. anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımı) şematik olarak karakterize ettiği için TDA'yı temellendirme görevi anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımını temellendirme ödevi ile bütünleşir. Bu karşılıklı ilişkilerin ışığında, anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımının sağlam bir kuramını sunabilmemiz için TDA'nın iyi temellendirilmiş bir yorumunu sağlayabilmemiz gerekir. TDA'nın işaret ettiği şekilde; dilin taksonomik irdelenmesi, anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımı gibi açıklayıcı yön ayrımlarına dair yorumlama koşullarını saptayabileceğimiz birtakım oluşturucu birleşenleri (seçili bir dil L, bir teorik önem/explanandum L-ilgili önem, açıklayıcılar/explanantia n-tane ayrıştırılabilir tanım kümesi/küme-özel fonksiyon) içerir. Bu bağlamda, anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımı hangi dil, hangi explanandum ve hangi explanantia sorularına bağlı olarak çok farklı şekillerde tanımlanabilir. Başka bir deyişle, TDA'daki her bir oluşturucu bileşenin farklı bir yorumuna paralel olarak teorik tutarlılıklarına bakılmaksızın sınırsız sayıda anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımı yorumuna ulaşılabilir. İlk olarak, oluşturucu birleşen L dili yalnızca doğal dile veya formel dillerden birisine indirgenebileceği gibi her ikisini de kapsayacak bir dil nosyonu olarak kabul edilebilir. İlgili dilin tahayyül edilebilir her bir yorumu anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımının farklı bir yorumunu verecektir. Dahası, sunulan açıklayıcı dilsel yönlerin açıklaması gereken L-ilgili önem teoriden teoriye göre değişebilir ve böylece bu önemin ne olacağına dair her bir yorum farklı bir anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımı yorumuna olanak verir. Örneğin, Alaka Teorileri (the relevance theories) genellikle bu önemi dilsel iletişimin gerisinde yatan bilişsel süreçlerin betimlenmesi olarak görürken Grice bunu rasyonel ve kooperatif iletişimde iletilen anlamın açıklanması olarak ele alır. Dahası, ilgili dile ve hedeflenmiş açıklamaya göre benimsenmiş n-tane açıklayıcı yönün nasıl ayrıştırılabilir olduğu her bir anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımı teorisinde farklı yorumlanabilir. Genellikle, anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımına dair teoriler TDA'daki bu son oluşturucu birleşeni açıklayıcı dilsel yönlere dair tanım kümesi/küme-özel fonksiyonlarla dair beş ayrı karakteristiğe (tümleşiklik, belirlilik, özerklik, yükümlülük ve türevsellik) dayanarak farklı şekilde yorumlar. Tümleşik olma karakteristiğine göre, anlambilim ve edimbilim bir bütün olarak benimsenmiş dil için açıklayıcı bir modeli birlikte oluşturur. Bu bağlamda, bir teorisyen bu karakteristiği anlambilim ve edimbilime dair tanım kümelerini/küme-özgü fonksiyonları nasıl belirlediğine bağlı olarak bu karakteristiği reddedebilir, kabul edebilir veya yeniden yorumlayabilir. Örneğin, Carnap geleneğindeki pek çok filozof anlambilim ve edimbilim ikilisinin L-ilgili önemi tümleşik olarak açıkladığını kabul ederken indirgemeci teoriler ise dile dair ilgili önemi açıklamada bu yönlerin ikisinden -en az- birini gereksiz bularak tümleşiklik karakteristiğini bütünüyle reddeder. Benzer tartışmalar her bir karakteristik için örneklendirilebilir. Bu nedenle; temel üçlü içindeki anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımı, daha önce bahsedilen yorumlama koşullarının-yani TDA'daki oluşturucu bileşenlerin- ve bunlara eşlik eden kavramların -makul ya da değil- nasıl yorumlandığına bağlı olarak çok farklı şekilde çizilebilir. Yine de, anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımının olası yorumlarının çokluğu doğrudan bu ayrımın yüzeyselliğini gerektirmez. Her ne kadar bu kadar çok sayıdaki olası yorum ayrımın oldukça keyfi veya teori-göreli olduğunu işaret ediyor gibi görünse dahi bu yorumlar arasından birinin ya da birkaçının diğerlerinden daha makul ve savunulabilir olduğu tartışmaya sunulabilir. Burada kastedilen makul olma durumu iki anlamda anlaşılabilir: teorik tutarlılık ve ampirik uygunluk. Bu noktada, anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımını TDA'ya dayanarak formüle etmenin tek bir makul/savunulabilir ayrıma işaret etmemesi açısından bu ayrımın bir tür belirsizliği içerdiğini savunmaktayım. Birincisi, eğer ki anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımının teorik tutarlılığı ve ampirik uygunluğunu hangi dili ve dilsel önemi dikkate aldığımıza göre değerlendiriyorsak her bir ayrı ayrım yorumu için ayrı bir teorik tutarlılık ve ayrı ampirik uygunluk durumlarından bahsedebiliriz. Bir diğer deyişle, benimsenmiş dil ve dil önemine göre aynı derecede makul olan teorik tutarlılık ve ampirik uygunluğu teori-göreli olarak taşıyan pek çok anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımı yorumu bulunabilir. Bundan dolayı; anlambilim ve edimbilime dair bu taksonomik belirsizlik, bu ikilinin ayrımına dair her bir yorumun TDA'daki yorumlama koşullarını nasıl ele almış olduğuna bağlı olarak kendi teorik tutarlılık ve ampirik uygunluk esaslarını türetmesinden kaynaklamaktadır. TDA'nın oluşturucu öğelerinin yol açtığı belirsizliğe ek olarak, TDA'nın açıklayıcı dilsel yönleri monotonik ilişki içersinde sunduğu dil temsil şeması (ör. temel üçlü) anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımını makul şekilde sunabileceğimiz tek model değildir. Örneğin, Nemo'nun dört eksenli kesişim modeli anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımını monotonik olmayan bir şemada bölümler. Ayrımın doğasına dair bu belirsizlikler düşünüldüğünde, anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımını temellendirmek teori-göreli olarak makul olan keyfi bir öne-sürüm olmaktan öte geçmeyecek beyhude bir çaba haline gelir.

Introduction

In linguistics and philosophy; *syntax*, *semantics*, and *pragmatics* are typically held to schematize some complementary but distinct aspects (i.e. explanans/explanantia) in a language with respect to some related significance (i.e. explanandum) such as meaning, language comprehension, communication, and linguistic cognition. The basic triadic model could be traced back to Charles Morris' (1938) and Rudolf Carnap's (1937, 1942) formulations, and it can be standardly articulated as follows:

(a) syntax: the study of formal relations of one lexical code with another; (b) semantics: the study of formal relations between lexical codes and what they encode; (c) pragmatics: the relations of lexical codes to their users and interpreters (Huang, 2014; Levinson, 1983).

Each aspect seemingly contributes its own explanatory significance to the exhaustive analysis of the relevant explanandum. Therefore, each aspect seemingly corresponds to particular domains (i.e. extensional contribution) and/or domain-specific functions (i.e. intensional contribution) by which an aspect can be distinguishable from another. By a domain of an aspect in the basic triad, I simply mean the extensional feature of an aspect in the sense that a domain of an aspect, if any, includes its very own extensional members or topics such as some particular phenomena, properties, processes, relations. Relevantly, a domain-specific function, as I discuss, amounts to the intensional feature of an aspect by which the domain of an aspect is distinctively defined in a given language. To illustrate, the definition of syntax in the above standard representation, i.e. the study of code-to-code relations and codificational rules, corresponds to a domain-specific function whereas phenomena such as the hearsay particle in Turkish (-miş/mış) constitutes the domain of syntax.

Undoubtfully, such a schematic representation of language, which exhaustively compartmentalizes it into distinct domains and/or domain-specific functions, offers a *prima facie* methodological convenience for a comprehensive analysis of language. After all, it taxonomically guides a theorist to divide the given language study into distinct yet complementary *stuff* (phenomena, mechanisms, processes, properties, or whatever) so that the theorist holds a practical and explanatory model in the task of language analysis.[1] Although the basic triad seems to be an effective tool of analysis, it is worth questioning whether the proposed aspects are theoretically warranted in the face of the notions and assumptions on which it rests. In other words, the basic triad, if it successfully explains the given language with respect to the distinct aspects, must rely on profoundly grounded aspects to the effect that each aspect would stand for a canonized category for the analysis of the language in question. Otherwise, the basic triad would turn out to be a *stipulative schema* which has no substantial import independently of its practical convenience in the taxonomy of language study.[2] Thus, it is indispensable for a theorist to seek out substantivizing the given aspects on profound grounds.

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[1] Notice that I have no intention commit myself into any technical use of the term as in *stuff ontology*. Drawing on Stojanovic (2014), I adopt the term *stuff* for not committing myself into any precise definition concerning with syntax, semantics, or pragmatics.

[2] Stipulative definition/schema, as opposed to substantial ones, assigns a contextually arbitrary or a theory-relative meaning/role/features onto a term or a schema for the sake of given discussion, argumentative progress, and such with respect to some query. Thereby, the basic triad, if it is a stipulative schema at all, is an arbitrarily constructed framework for modeling language structure regardless of thinking such a model exists on logical/factual/empirical basis.

Hence, the basic triad, in its standard representation, implicates one central assumption, which I call *the Taxonomical Distinction Assumption*, that simply displays the definitive divisibility of language based on some intensionally and/or extensionally distinguishable explanantia with respect to some explanandum pertaining to the language in question. *The Taxonomical Distinction Assumption* (hereafter *TDA*) simply goes as follows:

TDA: In a language *L*, there are distinguishable *n-tuple of* aspects (i.e. explanantia) of *L-related significance* (i.e. explanandum) if and only if there are respectively distinguishable *n-tuple* domains and/or domain-specific functions that are substantial - to some degree or another- in accounting for *L-related significance*.

It is possible to tackle *TDA* at two levels of interpretation, i.e. object-level and meta-level, which implicate further assumptions at the respective levels. At the object-level interpretation of *TDA*, the focal point of analysis merely concerns with how to viably delimit or characterize the given aspects which are conceptually derivative on the exhaustively interconnected components- namely, a language *L*, an explanandum *L-related significance*, explanantia *n-tuple aspects in L*- under the structure of *TDA*. Yet, the meta-level interpretation of *TDA* merely focuses on the structure of *TDA* itself under which the components in *TDA* are interconnected.

Any task of grounding the basic triad, thereby, requires a theorist of providing (i) well-grounded characterization of the posited aspects with respect to the given components in *TDA* and (ii) principled reasons for adopting the given aspects under the very structure of *TDA* instead of under some other structure (triadic or non-triadic, monotonic or non-monotonic) for the divisibility of language. Nevertheless, grounding the basic triad is excessively arduous and demanding task with respect to the object-level and meta-level interpretations entailing to *TDA*. Because, the components in *TDA* by which syntax, semantics, and pragmatics are defined and structured might be construed and interconnected in numerous manners. Consequently, the boundaries amongst syntax, semantics, and pragmatics could be postulated in numerously distinct manners. Hence, many philosophers and linguists, as will be visited later, have proposed differing characterizations of the aspects based on their disputes over the contentious question of how to coherently conceptualize each component in TDA along with some accompanying notions. Although such characterizations might be enumerated unrestrictedly, there are some underlying convictions to which each interpretation of the basic triad and its aspects must address in order to provide a profound ground for endorsing such a taxonomical division of language.

Particularly, the question of how to draw the boundaries between semantics and pragmatics has, in the last decades, come to the fore as one of the most predominantly discussed questions in philosophy of language and linguistics.[3] Given what has been pointed out earlier, these discussions have accordingly focused on two levels of inquiry : (i) a quest for a well-grounded characterization (and thereby a principled distinction) of semantics and pragmatics; (ii) a quest for a meta-linguistic structure under which they are entertained. The first horn of the inquiry led many theorists such as Bach, Borg, Carston, Cappelen and Lepore, and Recanati to seek out theoretically coherent and empirically plausible marks of semantics and pragmatics which satisfy some adopted explanatory significance in virtue of some relevant language phenomena (e.g. deictic expressions), the adopted notions (e.g. meaning, truth, proposition),

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[3] Ariel, 2010; Bach, 1999b,2004a, 2004b,2005,2007,2012; Bach & Bezuidenhout, 2002; Bianchi, 2004; Borg, 2004; Cappelen & Lepore, 2005, 2007, 2008; Carston, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2008a, 2008b; Dever, 2013; Gauker, 2012; Gillon, 2008; Jaszczolt, 2012; 2019; Katsos, 2008; King & Stanley, 2005; Nemo, 1999; Peregrin, 1999; Recanati, 2002a, 2002b; Salmon, 2005; Stalnaker, 1970; Stanley, 2005, 2007; Stojanovic, 2008, 2014; Szabo, 2006; Travis, 2008; Sperber & Wilson, 2002.

criteria (e.g. context-sensitivity), theoretical commitments (e.g. the correspondence theory of truth, structured propositions) and such. On the other hand, the second horn of the inquiry led some other theorists such as Nemo, Jaszczolt, and Stojanovic to question the meta-linguistic grounds of positing the semantics-pragmatics distinction as it appears in the basic triad within the structure of *TDA*.

In this paper, I will critically outline the semantics-pragmatics distinction with respect to these two levels of inquiry while showing why and how the task of grounding the semantics-pragmatics distinction seems to be over arduous and overdemanding. In the light of this, I will consequently discuss why the basic triad itself, along with the aspect distinctions derived from it, seems to be a stipulative schema rather than a well-grounded model for the structure of language or linguistic cognition. In what follows, I will initially address the question of how to draw the semantics-pragmatics distinction considering distinct ways of charting out these aspects as they are presented in the literature. In doing so, I will carve out the presumptive provisions and underlying notions that shape the varying interpretations of the distinction. Then, I will take issue with the entire enterprise of grounding the semantics-pragmatics distinction to the effect that I will present a deflationary account of it.

Charting out the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction

For current purposes, it can be reiterated that the basic triad which amounts to a seemingly definitive taxonomy of language study with respect to the constitutive components (a language *L*, an explanandum *L-related significance* and explanantia distinguishable *n-tuple of domains/domain-specific functions*) might be construed in numerously distinct ways based on what language/explanandum/explanantia one adopts in his postulation of the basic triad. In other words, it is conceivable to provide unrestrictedly many interpretations for each component irrespective of their theoretical coherency.

First, the accounts of the semantics-pragmatics distinction might go into divergent ways based on the adopted notion or kind of language. As it is employed in the standard Carnapian paradigm of the basic triad, the relevant notion of language signifies some universalized conception of formally regimented natural language with respect to what information/propositional content they encode at the public language level.[4] Such a conceptualization of the component *L* reflects the general agenda purported in ideal language philosophy tradition. According to the proponents of ideal language philosophy such as Carnap, a natural language system can be formally modeled after a formal system of logic to the effect that the analysis of natural languages becomes on par with the analysis of formal systems of logic in terms of their intensional and extensional functions.

Still, modeling a natural language after a formal system of logic must profoundly lay out the similarities and dissimilarities amongst these distinct kinds of language. In other words, there must be grounds to account for similar/dissimilar components in a system modeled after another one. To illustrate, there might be some features of natural languages that are difficult to subsume under a formal system of logic. As Montague (1970, 1974) notices; natural languages, as opposed to formal languages, are abundant with deictic expressions (e.g. 'you', 'here', 'this') whose denotations cannot be identified without any context of use. In this vein, Lewis (1980) and Stalnaker (1981), for instance, devise more refined model-theoretic accounts

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[4] Philosophers generally endorse the idea that a language *L* in a given account of the basic triad represents a universal notion of language so that every natural language partakes of the same schematic structure and the same categorical functions. Thereby, particular elements in a particular natural language (e.g. the rules for use of possessive pronouns in English) are model-theoretically subsumed under universal categories.

(e.g. possible world semantics, index-theoretical semantics) as a model on which natural languages can be constructed. As a result, some other systems of logic are brought out to meet with natural languages. However, such approaches rely on the analogy between formal languages and natural languages that we in return can map natural language semantics/pragmatics onto a suitable system of formal semantics/pragmatics.

Considering this characterization of the component *L* in *TDA*, it is doubtful if such an analogy between natural languages and formal languages satisfactorily holds in terms of their matching counterparts. Peregrin (1999) hereby suggests that there is no contention about demarcating syntax, semantics, and pragmatics in formal languages. There are three distinct aspects in a formal language: "syntax proper (delimiting well-formedness, i.e., the class of the expressions of the language), proof theory or 'logical syntax' (delimiting provability, i.e., the class of the theorems of the language) and model theory or semantics (delimiting validity, i.e., the class of tautologies or analytic truths of the system)" (Peregrin, 1999, pp. 428-9). Interestingly, pragmatics seems to have no counterpart in this formal schema if it is conceived to concern with the context of use. This is so, it might be illegitimate to model natural languages after formal languages which do not have any analogous domain for pragmatics. Thus, a theorist can endorse that the component language *L* in *TDA* exclusively stands for natural languages since no formal language has any aspect such as pragmatics.

Additionally, linguistic comprehension concerning with the notion of language *L* might be construed at two levels, i.e. publicly accessible and inaccessible levels. Hereby, appealing to such distinct levels of linguistic comprehension results in distinct interpretations of the basic triad along with the semantics-pragmatics interface. Regarding these levels, Carston (2008b), for instance, holds that there are personal (publicly accessible) and sub-personal (publicly inaccessible) levels of linguistic comprehension. According to her, linguistic comprehension at the personal level includes conscious and publicly explicit processes whereas the sub-personal level of linguistic comprehension is composed of pre-reflective, automatic, and publicly implicit processes. Just as in Carnap's semantics-pragmatics distinction and in Grice's distinction between *what is said* and *what is implicated,* philosophers often take the public language level into account while schematizing the language study.[5]

It is also possible for a theorist to apply the schematic representation to the notion of language at the sub-personal level. Here, the relevance-theoretic account of the basic triad-which was first introduced by Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson (1986)-interpret semantics and pragmatics through associating each aspect with fundamentally different types of cognitive processes which precedingly underlie the public-level appearances of language. According to the relevance theorists, semantics entertains *coding/decoding processes* by which linguistic codes are paired with their conventional meanings while pragmatics concerns with inferential processes whereby "one can integrate this [conventional] meaning with other information available from the context to arrive at the interpretation of an utterance" (Szabo, 2006, p. 371). As Carston (2008b) points out, the decoding process (semantic process) "is performed by an autonomous linguistic system" that automatically and modularly implements some computational rules resulting in "an output representation, which is the semantic representation, or logical form, of the sentence or phrase employed in the utterance" (pp.57-8). On the other hand, the inferential process (pragmatic process) occurs when the outputs of the

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[5] Grice's distinction between saying and implicating follows from the communicational phenomenon that there can be some informative gap between what is said by an utterance and what is communicated by it as in the case of ironies, metaphors and such. Here, Grice holds that what is said by an utterance is "closely related to the conventional meaning of the words (the sentence) ... uttered" (1989, p.25). He further holds that what is implicated by an utterance corresponds to what addressees can infer from what a speaker says by this utterance in the relevant context or co-text of use by virtue of some rational communicative principles.

decoding process are integrated with contextual information to recognize what the speaker intends to convey. Here, it is worth noticing that the relevance theorists do not restrict the inferential processes to the public/conscious levels of linguistic representations so that they differ from Grice's account of implicatures or any such utterance interpretations.[6] They believe that the inferential processes in utterance interpretation can equally operate at the sub-conscious cognitive levels of linguistic representations.

Regarding the constitutive components in *TDA*, the adopted notion of *L-related significance*, in addition to the assigned notion of language *L*, might vary from one account to another. First, the notion of *L-related significance* by which the taxonomical division of labor in a language is mediated also diversifies depending on what notion or kind of language is in play. After all, *L-related significance* amounts to some adopted explanandum relevant to some adopted language, and thereby what is to be explained about a language depends on what this language stands for. If one, for instance, applies the basic triad onto formal languages with respect to the notion of meaning as the adopted explanandum then she must provide the analysis of meaning in accordance with what formal language she picks out. To illustrate, the formal system of standard deductive logic (e.g. first-order propositional logic) and the formal systems of non-standard logic (e.g. quantifier modal logic) do not share nor stipulate the same *L-related significance* such as truth-assignments or truth-evaluability if this *L-related significance* is taken as meaning. In other words, the different systems of distinct kinds of languages might produce different interpretations of the same *L-related significance*. Furthermore, some accounts of the schematic division of language might simply attempt to account for conceptually distinct explanandum so that they also propose the distinct accounts of the semantics-pragmatics distinction. Linguistics, for instance, typically takes this significance as the systematicity in the study of natural languages so that the aspects are to stand for methodologically substantial fields in the study of language. In contrast with a much more comprehensive interpretation of L-related significance in linguistics, philosophers often mediate the basic triad through relatively narrow notions of significance. Carnap, for instance, takes *L-related significance* as a well-grounded understanding of lexically encoded meaning in natural languages with respect to the general conditions of formal provability/validity. Still, Gricean and Neo-Gricean theorists, for instance, set a much more comprehensive explanatory agenda to fulfill by means of the schematic representation of language. They typically seek out the plausibility of language understanding in communication and thus a formally restricted notion of *L-related significance* such as lexically encoded meaning in natural languages becomes too narrow to satisfy.

These interpretative variations manifest themselves not only through these constitutive components such as *language L* and *L-related significance* but also through the more particular notions falling under them. As introduced earlier, the basic triad typically endorses : (i) syntax concerns with the formal category encompassing the code-to-code relations and the codification rules in a language; (ii) semantics deals with the formal relations between codes and what content are encoded/denoted by them; (iii) pragmatics works out the interlocutors' relations with these codes in their uses. Thus, how to construe the boundaries among the aspects particularly depend on the following notions : (i) codes (formal/ natural, linguistic/non-linguistic, type-like/token-like, implicit/explicit and etc.), (ii) content (e.g. stable/unstable,

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[6] Implicatures, according to Grice, are communicative implications that are different from inference and entailment relations which solely rest on logically or truth-conditionally relevant meanings in each well-formed expression. Broadly speaking, an implicature is an inference from what is said by an utterance in accordance with interlocutor's communicative co-operation. Unlike the relevance theoretical accounts, Grice's account of implicatures constrains such inferential processes onto publicly accessible dimension of language through that interlocutors can co-operatively work through.

literal/non-literal, representational/non-representational, propositional/non-propositional, assertoric/non-assertoric, and etc.), (iii) relation (e.g. logical entailment, non-logical implication, relevance, decoding, inferential, and etc.), (v) use (e.g. competence/performance, contextual/non-contextual, conventional/conversational, sentence meaning/ speaker's meaning, and etc.). Hence, the aspects of the basic triad can be distinctively interfaced so that each portrayal possibly entertains a distinct interpretation of the constitutive components and their accompanying notions. The interpretations of the interfaces amongst the aspects might also be drastically enumerated so that the theories of the semantics-pragmatics distinction, at the object-level, diverge from each other in virtue of how to construe these constitutive components along with the relevant notions. After all, different conceptualizations of the same notion ultimately determine how an account of the semantics-pragmatics distinction presents the domains and/or domain-specific functions of these aspects with respect to the given *L-related significance* in the adopted language.

Some discussions on the context-sensitivity criterion for pragmatics clearly exemplifies such an interpretative variation at hand.[7] According to the context-sensitivity criterion, pragmatics concerns with the contextual effects on how interlocutors use and interpret an utterance of an expression in a given context (e.g. 'I'm not her brother') while semantics involves with how interlocutors use and interpret an utterance of an expression irrespective of a given context and its effects (e.g. 'Some brothers do not have sisters'). Depending on how the notion of context is conceptualized, the context-sensitivity criterion, and thereby the semantics-pragmatics distinction, can be postulated in varying ways. According to one standard depiction, the context is the physical/extra-linguistic setting in which an utterance occurs that can be saliently and mutually recognized by the interlocutors in this act of utterance and/or the interpretation of it (Allott, 2010; Caplan, 2003; Salmon, 2002). Philosophers often label this notion of context as *the physical context* in which the context of an utterance consists of all physical features (interlocutors' identity, time, place, intonations, gestures and etc.) which become relevant to the interpretation of this very utterance (Caplan, 2003; Lewis, 1980). Nonetheless, this conception of context does not exhaust all the other plausible alternatives. By contrast, Bach considers that the notion of context cannot be entirely extra-linguistic setting in the face of phenomenon such as co-text (e.g. *speech act adverbials* such as 'However' and 'moreover') that make what some text or utterance conveys relevant to what another text or utterance conveys. Hereby, Bach posits two types of context, i.e. *narrow context* and *broad context*. The former includes any linguistically signaled contribution from the context that becomes relevant to "specify the speaker, the place, the time and perhaps the world" while the latter "includes that and all the rest" (Stojanovic, 2008, p.318).

Even though there could be a consensus on the constitutive components (*language L, L-related significance, n-tuple of domains/domain-specific functions*) in *TDA*, the adopted domains and/or domain-specific functions which delimit each aspect distinctively could be constructed based on the distinct interpretations of more particular notions affiliated with these aspects. To wrap up, the task of grounding distinct linguistic aspects inherits some interpretative provisions (i.e. the constitutive components such as *language L* and *L-related significance* and the relevant notions) by which theorists can provide varying, even irreconcilably competing, analyses of the same aspects, namely semantics and pragmatics. So far, it has been underlined that there are general categories and notions that any theory, which commits itself to the divisibility of language study into distinct aspects, endorses and construes in one way or another. Nevertheless, any commitment to such a division of labor further follows

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[7] See Bach 2004a, 2005,2012; Travis, 2008; Recanati, 2002, 2004a, 2005; Stanley & Szabo, 2000a; Berg, 2002; Borg, 2004, Cappelen & Lepore, 2008; King & Stanley, 2005.

some general characteristics of the domains/domain-specific functions which delimit each aspect distinctively. These characteristics can be stipulated as follows:

(1) Integrity: The proposed aspects, as a whole, are held to constitute an integrity to form an explanatory model for the adopted language. Thus, each aspect in the language study has no redundancy in accounting for the given linguistic explanandum.

(2) Definitiveness: The proposed aspects are definitively distinguishable in the sense that there is no anomalous/borderline stuff which brings out ambiguity as to what aspect is to be held in the face of given linguistic stuff. Thus, any linguistic analysis in a given language has the marks of these aspects definitively.

(3) Autonomy: Each proposed aspect bears some degree of autonomy in the sense that the proposed aspects have their own domains and/or domain-specific functions by which we can definitively distinguish one aspect from another. Thus, each aspect bears its own distinguishing mark.

(4) Amenability: The proposed aspects interface with one another in an amenable manner (e.g. symmetrical or asymmetrical) to the effect that all/most/some pragmatic phenomena, for instance, homogenously rely on syntactic or semantic components while all/most/some semantic phenomena monotonically rely on syntactic or pragmatic components and so on. In its typical Carnapian representation, the basic triad constructs the interfaces between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics asymmetrically. According to it, the domain of discourse concerning with each aspect impinges on each other in a one-directional way of amenability to the effect that all/most/some pragmatic phenomena rest on semantic components, all/most/some semantic phenomena rest on syntactic components and so on.

(5) Derivativeness: The proposed aspects are not *sui generis* categories and yet they are derivative some preceding notions and assumptions concerning with the previously mentioned interpretative provisions. Postulating taxonomically distinct categories such as semantics and pragmatics already rests on the higher-order assumption that the language in question -either a particular system of constructed language or every natural language- can be classified substantively. Yet, such a postulation is also derivative at the object level of analysis. The proposed aspects are also derived from a general theory of language which needs to include prior analyses on the notions such as linguistic signs, meaning, linguistic relations and so on. Thus, grounding the proposed aspects inherently requires one of providing well-grounded accounts of the notions such as sentence, proposition, implication and so on.

The above characteristics constitute a further basis of digression on how to chart semantics and pragmatics within an aspect distinction schema such as the basic triad. In other words, many theorists digress on how to construe the above convictions concerning with the characteristics of the adopted characteristics. An interpretation of the integrity characteristic, for instance, typically occurs in nearly all formulations of the semantics-pragmatics distinction. Nevertheless, there are at least four theoretical positions on the semantics-pragmatics distinction in virtue of the above characteristics including the integrity characteristic: *complementarism, reductionism, and expansionism* (Huang, 2014; Nemo, 1999).

The complementarist views typically preserve the semantics-pragmatics distinction in one way or another whereas the reductionist views melt one aspect into another. Hereby, the complementarism holds that semantics and pragmatics are thought to be complementary and/or they hold a degree of autonomy with respect to their domains/domain-specific functions. As in the Carnapian representation of the basic triad, any view which commits itself to the divisibility of language into distinct aspects also commits itself to one or another sort of complementarism. Furthermore, the complementarist view takes each aspect to be indispensable (at least with varying degrees) for theorizing linguistic understanding. Thereby, complementarism holds that both semantics and pragmatics are integral explanantia in accounting for the relevant explanandum in a theory of language.

Moreover, reductionism simply takes issue with any putative integrity held between semantics and pragmatics. Accordingly, it contends that one of these aspects has no genuine explanatory role in accounting for the given explanandum. Since the reductionist view posits the redundancy of either one of these aspects, the distinction between semantics and pragmatics in the basic triad can be nullified by incorporating one aspect into another. Drawing on the later Wittgenstein's theory of meaning, many philosophers such as Travis (2008) interpret the integrity characteristic in favor of pragmatics since endorsing meaning as use seems to implicate the redundancy of semantics which is portrayed to concern what the linguistic codes encode irrespective of their communicative uses. Besides, there is another reductionist stance that pragmatics could be entirely incorporated into semantics to the effect that there are only syntactic and semantic aspects of language study. Many formal semanticists such as Montague (1970) and Lewis (1980) describe this sort of reductionism exclusively for formal languages. They mainly believe that pragmatic stuff only arises from indexical expressions and thus languages devoid of indexical expressions, for them, do not include pragmatics as an aspect (King & Stanley, 2005). Although reductionism argues for reducing the number of explanantia, it is also possible to argue for introducing an additional explanans. Hereby, expansionism offers to widen the basic triad by stipulating a further aspect or aspects. Stojanovic (2014), for instance, widens the basic triadic model by introducing a non-redundant aspect, i.e. 'pre-pragmatics', which stands in between semantics and pragmatics. In doing so, she attempts to ground the seemingly borderline cases which obfuscate the boundaries amongst semantics and pragmatics. In this regard, expansionism offers additional aspects to constitute an integrity to satisfy with the explanandum in question.

Again, the characteristic of definitiveness is open to distinct interpretations depending on what defining roles/distinguishing marks are embraced regarding the given language and explanandum. If a theorist endorses semantics and pragmatics as somewhat significant explanantia explaining the explanandum in question, then she needs to be in a position to draw a sharp and pertinent distinction between semantics and pragmatics so that she can consistently point out what is, and what is not, marked as semantic/pragmatic stuff. Nevertheless, how to distinguish semantics and pragmatics in a principled way varies based on how to coherently stipulate these aspect-related roles and marks in the face of some linguistic phenomena from the adopted language along with its accompanying explanandum. Hereby, the characteristic of definitiveness leads us to answer the question of how to delimit semantics and pragmatics in the first place. At this point, there are three ways to delimit each aspect for the sake of making a sharp distinction between the aspects: (i) delimiting by postulating dichotomies; (ii) delimiting by language phenomena; (iii) delimiting by postulating criteria/criterion. For now, it can be held that the definitiveness characteristic, just as the other characteristics, can be plausibly construed in distinct manners.

Regarding the first way, it is worth recapturing that the diversifying distinctions between semantics and pragmatics, at least for the complementarist views, implicate different

systems of semantics, each of which comes along with their own system of pragmatics. Similarly, Levinson (1983) introduces more than ten possible definitions for the distinction by underlining what seems to be problematic for each definition considering the given criteria and borderline cases from natural languages. Not deciding on one of these definitions, he concludes that it is difficult to provide a definitive and intensional definition for pragmatics along with semantics. Considering this very particular problematic, Mira Ariel (2010) makes the point that "the definition problem became the delimitation problem" when the theorists in the literature could not come up with an "intensional definition by reference to a set of [distinctive] properties" (p. 94). Thus, it might be plausible to entertain the characteristic of definitiveness for the semantics-pragmatics interfaces through postulating some expository dichotomies instead. In this fashion, Huang (2014) and Nemo (1999) list the dichotomic ways by which the semantics-pragmatics distinction is to be delimited. These dichotomies often go as follows:

sign/world relation vs. sign/users relation; meaning vs. use; code vs. use; conventional vs. non-conventional meaning; competence vs. performance; truth-conditionality vs. non-truth conditionality; compositionality vs. non-compositionality; type vs. token; context insensitivity vs. context sensitivity; saying vs. implicating; explicit vs. implicit; decoding processes vs. inferential processes

These enlisted dichotomies are provisional although the list looks definitive enough to exhaust much of the proposed ways to delimit the distinction. If it is recalled that the constitutive components in TDA and the related notions function as interpretative provisions on how to construe the semantics-pragmatics distinction, it is obvious that the enlisted dichotomies are also subjected to the interpretative variations relying on the question of what language, explanatory significance and related notions are adopted.

The definitiveness characteristic might also appear by means of delimiting semantics and pragmatics in accordance with certain natural language phenomena. That is to say, some philosophers contend that pointing out the extensions of each aspect in a given language suffices to show how pragmatics definitively distinguishes from semantics and vice versa. Levinson (1983) marks such definitions as extensional one and he further formulates the following definition of pragmatics by crediting it to Stalnaker: "Pragmatics is the study of deixis, implicature, presupposition, speech acts, and aspects of discourse structure" (p. 27). Such extensional definitions only delimit the extensional boundaries of the relevant aspect such as pragmatics. Nevertheless, it seems to restrict the extensional boundaries with a limited number of phenomena that are taken to be canonized. Hence, one can argue for adding other phenomena as pragmatic once she adopts them as canonized phenomena for pragmatics with respect to the notion of language which she adopts in the first place. Thus, it is always possible to find new sets of canonized topics in the adopted language depending on what pragmatics covers in this adopted language. It is mainly because any topic in a given language becomes canonized for delimiting pragmatics only if the adopted system of pragmatics in this language already satisfies the proposed topics. Therefore, how these canonized topics are labeled as pragmatic in the extension of the given language already requires an intensional definition of pragmatics. Hence, the extensional definition, in turn, gets into a vicious circle in the sense that the delimiting what phenomena fall under pragmatic analysis already presupposes a criterion to distinguish the domain of semantics from the domain of pragmatics. Consequently, the list does not have to exhaust all possible linguistic phenomena which straddle our adopted definitions of semantics and pragmatics. If our definitions have no intensional character, then they do not signify a sharp distinction. Consequently, we can face some linguistic cases which we can neither count as semantic nor count as pragmatic. Similarly, Levinson (1983) remarks:

> For in common with all extensional definitions, it provides no criteria for the inclusion or exclusion of further phenomena that may come to our attention; at best one can say that what warrants pragmatic treatment for some new topic is simply linguists' consensus based on intuitive 'family resemblance' to more familiar topics. (p.27)

In this vein, one can propose the characteristic of definitiveness concerning with the domains of semantics and pragmatics by pointing out some extensional stuff as definitively semantic/pragmatic in a given language. Thus, such a depiction of definitiveness which is extensional in nature seems to be a ready-to-hand remedy to chart out whether some linguistic stuff is pragmatic/semantic or not. Nevertheless, it indispensably implicates the fact that there still must be an intensional definition of these aspects in order to speak of the reason why such and such phenomena are or are to be pointed out as semantic/pragmatic in the first place. Thus, this second way of constructing the definitiveness characteristic eventually gears us to discuss how to construct these aspects intensionally.

Considering the definitive construction of semantics and pragmatics by intensional characterization of them, the third way contends that one can definitively delimit semantics and pragmatics by figuring out what specific functions/roles make these aspects distinct explanans. In the literature, many theorists often appeal to three types of criterion to represent functionally or intensionally specific marks of each aspect, namely *conventional meaning vs. non-conventional meaning; context-insensitivity vs. context-sensitivity; truth-conditionality vs. non-truth-conditionality.*[8] For the sake of brevity, these criteria can be summarized through narrowing them down to the notion of meaning as follows : (i) the conventionality criterion holds that the mark of semantics is lexically encoded meaning while pragmatics concerns with conversationally/non-lexically conveyed meaning; (ii) the context-sensitivity criterion contends that the mark of semantics is context-invariant/standing meaning while the mark of pragmatics amounts to context-variant meaning ; (iii) the truth-conditionality criterion sets out the mark of semantics to be truth-conditional meaning while taking pragmatics as the domain of non-truth-conditional meaning. Again, it is worth noting that these criteria might be adopted in drastically divergent ways depending on how a theorist construe them in accordance with the *language L, L-related significance*, and the relevant notions in *TDA*. First, if one needs to assess the question of how semantics and pragmatics can be delimited definitively in virtue of their intensional character then she must check whether the given intensional characterization of these aspects bears not only theoretical coherence in the face of adopted notions but also empirical plausibility in the face of language in question. Thereby, empirical plausibility is a derivative matter on what language is adopted in the first place while theoretical coherence ultimately relies on how a theorist construes the relevant notions. If a theorist appeals to the conventionality criterion to natural languages, then she must be in a position to explain why such and such phenomena in natural languages accord with the given criterion. To illustrate, the proponents of this criterion holds that lexically encoded meaning of an expression corresponds to built-in content/representation as in the cases of proper names, number determiners and quantifier domain modifiers, and logical connectives. Nonetheless, attaching this sort of stability to lexically encoded meaning in natural languages further brings out the burden of explaining some expressions such as deictic expressions which correspond to unstable representations on distinct occasions of use although they seem to have some stable function about how to pick out these representations in the relevant context.[9]

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[8] See Bach, 1999b, 2004a, 2004b; Bach & Bezuidenhout, 2002; Bianchi, 2004; Carston, 1999, 2007, 2008a; Gillon, 2008; Huang, 2014; Jaszczolt, 2012. Although the terms such as 'literal meaning' and 'context-sensitivity' can differ from one theory to another, they still share some degree of convention here.

[9] David Kaplan's (1989) analysis of standing meaning, which consists of his distinction between *character* and *content*, provides a similar strategy. Here, the *character* of a deictic expression serves to be a stable function, in a

Furthermore, the criteria do not exhaustively work through the notion of meaning in the adopted language although they are exemplified in this way for the sake of argumentative clarity. The accounts which formulate some intensional marks for the definitive picture of semantics and pragmatics can diverge not only on how to theorize the particular notion of meaning but also on what other notion they apply the criteria irrespective of such a particular interpretation of meaning. In other words, the meaning-oriented interpretations of the criteria do not exhaust all the other ways employing these criteria. The relevance-theoretic accounts, for instance, associate semantics and pragmatics with distinct cognitive processes instead of affiliating them with distinct contents. For instance, Carston posits that the semantics-pragmatics distinction corresponds to a distinction between decoding and inference processes so that the former "is performed by an autonomous linguistic system" that automatically and modularly implements some computational rules result in "an output representation, which is the semantic representation, or logical form, of the sentence or phrase employed in the utterance" (2008a, pp.321-2). However, the inference process integrates the outputs of the decoding process with contextual information recognize what the speaker intends to convey. Therefore, the criteria can also be grounded in cognitive processes rather than contents.

The discussion this far has been focused on how theorists typically characterize the integrity and definitiveness of the boundaries among semantics and pragmatics. As discussed, these characteristics can be fairly interpreted in distinct ways in accordance with how the interpretative provisions in *TDA* are conceptualized. Given this conclusion, the characteristic of amenability and the characteristic of autonomy are also susceptible to interpretative variations amongst theories. For the sake of the characteristic of amenability, many theorists such as Carnap, for instance, think that there is a transitive but asymmetrical relation between the aspects in the sense that syntax provides "input to semantics, which in turn provides input to pragmatics" (Huang, 2014, p.2). Holding that semantics exclusively concerns with truth-conditional content, Gazdar (1979), in this fashion, presents a clear-cut interpretation of the amenability and autonomy convictions by his illustrious formula: "Pragmatics = Meaning - Truth-Conditions" (p.2). Furthermore, the view which is commonly coined as *pragmatic wastebasket* notion also embodies an interpretation of the amenability characteristic since it simply defines pragmatics as the study of "all those aspects of meaning not captured in a semantic theory" (Levinson, 1983, p.12). The wastebasket notion treats pragmatics to be merely subsidiary or amenable to semantics so that pragmatics as an explanans has no intensional contribution to the explanandum in question and thereby it merely becomes an extensional aspect consisting of non-semantic elements in the given language. So, the wastebasket notion of pragmatics also exemplifies how the characteristics such as autonomy and amenability can vary from one interpretation to another.

Philosophers such as Recanati, Searle and Travis, on the other hand, beg the difference by portraying the autonomy and amenability characteristics in favor of pragmatics. Hereby, they defend the notion of pragmatic intrusion which can be contrasted with the notion of the pragmatic wastebasket. According to the former notion, all/most/some pragmatic stuff (phenomena, mechanisms, principles, properties, and content) which are allegedly non-semantic intrude into sentences to bring out semantic stuff. In this respect, semantics as an explanans becomes amenable to pragmatics in all/most/some cases while semantics entertains a lesser degree of autonomy. Better yet, reductionism, for instance, rejects any degree of autonomy for either one of these aspects due to the conviction that one of these aspects

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sense conventional, which characteristically mediates the relation between a content of deictic expression and its occasion of use. For instance, the character of an indexical 'I' amounts to the first-person speaker of a given utterance and it is a stable function attached to the expression types which include it. On the other hand, the *content* of this indexical varies as the speaker changes.

collapses into another. Similarly, expansionism provides a different construal of the autonomy characteristic based on the idea that autonomous domains which seemingly belong to semantics and pragmatics fall within the autonomous domain of an additional explanans such as pre-pragmatics.

Leaving aside the rest of the characteristics, the derivativeness characteristic further brings out a rift amongst the accounts of the semantics-pragmatics distinction. For one thing, a theorist can ground or entertain distinct notions and theories which precede any postulation about the divisibility of language into distinct aspects. To illustrate, Grice's intention-based semantics for natural languages, for example, does not share the same notion of meaning with Carnap's formal semantics. For another thing, even if theorists can reconcile over the preceding notions and theories from which the aspects such as semantics and pragmatics derive then there is still enough space to digress on how to frame the definitive divisibility of language based on intensionally and/or extensionally distinguishable, n-tuple of, explanans with respect to some explanandum pertaining to the language in question. Recalling the very structure of *TDA*, any semantics-pragmatics distinction which occurs within the framework of *TDA* rests on a taxonomy of somehow monotonic domains just as the definitiveness, amenability, autonomy characteristics suggest. In other words, the clearly distinguishable ranges (outputs) of one domain-specific function of an aspect are to be-in one way or another- the clearly distinguishable inputs of the other domain-specific function of an aspect. Accordingly, the input-output relation monotonically holds between the aspects to the effect that they-with varying degrees of contribution-constitute an integrity to ground for the given explanandum. However, theorists are not obliged to accept this monotonic schema itself nor they have to appeal to the input-output relation between semantics and pragmatics if they want to postulate the divisibility of language the aspects such as semantics and pragmatics. For instance, Levinson (2000), hereby, underlines:

> There is every reason then to try and reconstrue the interaction between semantics and pragmatics as the intimate interlocking of distinct processes, rather than, as traditionally, in terms of the output of the one being the input of the other.(p. 242)

Hence, one can adopt an alternative model under which pragmatics and semantics are not interfaced by the input-output relation. To illustrate, one can provide an intersectional framework under which domains and domain-specific functions of the relevant aspects intersect with each other so that every linguistic phenomenon becomes a matter of one aspect to some degree while it becomes a matter of another aspect to another degree. In this respect, François Nemo (1999) provides such a framework where linguistic phenomena are distributed on a Cartesian plane in terms of their varying degrees of being semantic and pragmatic. Again, this distribution works depends on the defining functions of the relevant axis, namely semantics and pragmatics. In this respect, Nemo (1999) describes two domain-specific functions (to be exact, axis-specific functions in this case) for each aspect in the sense that semantics concerns with lexically encoded content and/or truth/representation whereas pragmatics concerns with communicated content and/or linguistic acts (pp.345-50). Hence, these axis-specific functions establish four axes of a Cartesian plane where every linguistic phenomenon in a given language falls within the intersections of these axes. Thus, no framework seems to be indispensable for deriving the semantics-pragmatics interfaces from the definitive divisibility of language into distinct domains of aspects.

In sum, I have discussed how and why the semantics-pragmatics distinction within the basic triad can receive so many distinct interpretations based on how one can -plausibly or not-construe the previously mentioned interpretative provisions and their accompanying notions. This is so, we could typically end up with a vast number of formulations of the very same taxonomical aspects. Hence, the task of grounding the semantics-pragmatics distinction

becomes an arduous matter as far as there are equally coherent interpretations of the semantics-pragmatics distinction within *TDA*. In this fashion, Recanati (2002a) admits:

> …it is futile to insist on providing an answer to the twin questions: What is the principled basis for the semantics/pragmatics distinction? Where does the boundary lie? Answers to these questions can still be given, but they have to rely on stipulation. (p.461)

Thus, any definition of semantics and pragmatics seems to be stipulative rather than substantial due to the fact that drawing the distinction is already the by-product of our theoretical notions surrounding the interpretative provisions in *TDA*.

Conclusion

The object-level interpretations of the semantics-pragmatics distinction, not always but typically, follow from the presumptive schema *TDA* which construes a framework charting out what a theorist presumes when she accepts distinguishable aspects (i.e. *explanans/explanantia*) of some linguistic significance (i.e. explanandum) in a given language. *TDA,* within its framework, brings forward the provisional points of interpretation (i.e. *a language L, explanatory significance L-related significance*) and the distinguishing characteristics of aspects (i.e. *domains and/or domain-specific functio*ns) by which the object-level interpretations of the semantics-pragmatics distinction differentiate. Moreover, *TDA* implicates that we can construe the semantics-pragmatics interface in a vast number of distinct ways. For one thing, the provisional points of interpretation in *TDA* can be characterized in several distinct ways. For another thing, some preceding notions/theories on which these interpretative provisions fundamentally rest can be construed in a number of distinct ways.

Although there are too many formulations to postulate, one can still expect to find out a profound formulation more viable than any other. Yet, this expectation cannot be fulfilled since all the possible distinct object-level interpretations also entail to indeterminacy in deciding on what interpretation is more viable than any other. In other words, *TDA* involves with some degrees of theoretical and taxonomical indeterminacy in the sense that there can be no single viable way to formulate the semantics-pragmatics distinction by means of *TDA*. For one thing, there can be equally plausible interpretations in terms of theoretical coherence and empirical plausibility in a given notion of language if we assess this theoretical coherency and empirical plausibility regarding what language and explanandum are taken into consideration by the given account of the semantics-pragmatics distinction. In other words, there could be a vast number of interpretations which account-relatively bear the same degree of theoretical coherence and empirical plausibility. Thus, this taxonomical indeterminacy occurs in the sense that these interpretations bear their own merits of theoretical coherence and empirical plausibility depending on their particular construal of the provisional points of interpretation in *TDA*. Therefore, any proposed semantics-pragmatics distinction within *TDA* becomes admissible as long as it coheres with the particular portrayal of the interpretative provisions and accompanying notions in TDA.

Again, such a particular portrayal becomes viable not only by its theoretical coherency with respect to the accompanying theories/notions but also by its explanatory efficacy in the face of linguistic phenomena relevant to the adopted language in that portrayal. Thus, there is a further indeterminacy concern that a particular construal of *TDA* can always be altered or re-adjusted to meet with some empirical/linguistic anomaly which appears relative to the given construal of the interpretative provisions in *TDA*. In other words, some particular construal of the distinction within the general framework of TDA can be preserved against some relevant linguistic anomaly in indefinitely many ways inasmuch as the relevant assumptions which underlie the given construal of the distinction are adjusted to meet with the anomaly in

question. Consequently, the general framework of *TDA* entails to the parsimony of viable accounts in terms of theoretical coherence and empirical plausibility.

Additionally, *TDA*, within its general framework, does not exhaust all the other possible models which permit theorists to viably hold the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Instead of endorsing the given interpretative provisions as they are structured in the framework of TDA, one can still hold the semantics-pragmatics distinction within an alternative framework (e.g. Nemo's intersectionalist model) by which the semantics-pragmatics boundaries are viably explained away. Thus, there are various object-level and higher-order disagreements on how to posit the semantics-pragmatics distinction; moreover, each disagreeing theory can be equally viable in terms of its theoretical coherence and empirical plausibility that pertain to the adopted language, notions, concomitant theories, and the framework. Accordingly, we face a trivial formulation which deflates the theoretical import of the semantics-pragmatics distinction[10]:

> For any theory *T* which posits semantics and pragmatics within a taxonomical framework *F*, semantics/pragmatics in *T* concerns with whatever is *semantic/pragmatic* in *T*.

Hence, the viability of any semantics-pragmatics distinction *D* within a framework *F* is completely derivative on the viability of the relevant theory *T* and the relevant framework *F*. This is so, 'semantics' and 'pragmatics' turn out to be the stipulative categories under which more fundamental theories and analyses on *T* and *F* are schematically abridged. If such a distinction *D* within *F* is held as the well-grounded formulation then the underlying theories and analyses behind *D* within *F* must already be fundamentally grounded in terms of explaining some theoretical significance (i.e. linguistic cognition, language understanding, communication, meaning, productivity, compositionality and so on) which the formula *D* within *F* entertains in the first place. Even in that case, the task of grounding the formula *D* within *F* secondarily -and contingently- lean on the task of grounding the underlying theories. Here, it is also possible for one to posit an alternative formula *D** within *F* or *F** which equally coheres with the same theories in question. Thus, if the formula such as *D* within *F* is adopted as the grounded distinction between semantics and pragmatics then *D* within *F* must hold the canonized aspects which the robust results of some grounded theories which underlie *D* within *F* necessarily entail. Otherwise, schematizing the uncanonized distinct aspects within an uncanonized framework becomes a matter of methodological convenience, and thus drawing the semantics-pragmatics distinction in a principled way turns out to be a trivial dispute.

To conclude, the task of grounding the semantics-pragmatics distinction within a schematic model has neither major nor primary significance due to the fact that drawing such a distinction ultimately hinge on more fundamental questions and theories about the notions such as meaning, truth, context, communication, linguistic cognition and so on. To be able to canonize the given aspects in the basic triad and to substantivize the interfaces amongst them, we must initially hold canonized accounts and theories which are already supposed to ground the viability of such a division of labor in a theory of language. Instead of focusing on how to draw the semantics-pragmatics distinction, we should focus on the primary questions underlying behind such a stipulative distinction. Hence, I hold the terms *semantic* and *pragmatic* as merely methodologically convenient abridgments which might overshadow the essential discussions that these terms are laden with in the first place. Therefore, the task of

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[10] Notice that this deflationary stance on the semantics-pragmatics distinction can also be read as an account-relative stipulation schema by which a theorist fits the interpretation of the given aspect distinction into his account of the taxonomy of language study.

grounding the semantics-pragmatics distinction, at the surface level, turns out to be a trivial effort which do not go beyond providing an account-relatively viable stipulation.

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