The New Parameters of Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean: The European Union's Mediterranean Initiatives and Implications for Cyprus

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Abstract

This article aims to focus on the implications of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks for the European initiatives in the Mediterranean region. The main objective is to evaluate the transformation of Euro-Mediterranean relations and shifting regional dynamics in the light of changing international politics with regard to the new security environment triggered by September 11, 2001 as well as the subsequent Istanbul (November 2003), Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005) bombings that shook Europe. In addition it briefly dwells on possible repercussions of European domestic affairs on its Mediterranean policy as well as the compatibility of the existing European initiatives with the new ones. It also assesses the implications for Cyprus.

Keywords: Mediterranean Security, European Union, September 11, Mediterranean Initiatives

Özet

Bu makale, 11 Eylül 2001'deki terörist saldırıların, Avrupa'nın Akdeniz bölgesindeki girişimlerine olan etkisine odaklanmayı amaçlamaktadır. Makalenin temel amacı, 11 Eylül saldırılarının yanı sıra Avrupa'yı sarsan İstanbul (Kasım 2003), Madrid (Mart 2004) ve Londra (Temmuz 2005) bombalamalarının tetiklediği yeni güvenlik anlayışı bağlamında değişen uluslararası politika ışığında, Avrupa-Akdeniz ilişkilerinin dönüşümü ve bölgedeki değişen dinamikleri değerlendirmektedir. Buna ek olarak makale, bu dönüşüm ve değişimin Avrupa iç işleri ve Akdeniz politikası üzerindeki olası sonuçları olduğu kadar yeni Avrupa insiyatiflerinin eskisi ile ne ölçüde örtüştüğünü inceleyecektir. Aynı zamanda, bu çerçevede Kıbrıs sorununa yönelik çıkarımlarda da bulunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Akdeniz Güvenliği, Avrupa Birliği, 11 Eylül, Akdeniz Girişimleri

Introduction

In the Wider Europe framework, the EU defines security problems as "common challenges" and expresses its willingness to tackle them with the help of its Southern Mediterranean partners. In this respect, it appears that the Wider Europe framework does not put forward anything innovative or different than the principle goals of the Barcelona Process, especially with regard to European intentions and medium to long-term expectations in the Mediterranean. What was aimed at in the Barcelona Declaration back in 1995, in terms of security, migration, social and cultural cooperation, economic and financial aspects and various other topics, has permeated more or less in the same way in the Wider Europe framework, perhaps with a more emphatic tone.

Nevertheless, besides the similarities, there are also important points that distinguish the Wider Europe framework from its predecessor, the Barcelona Declaration. First of all, in the Wider Europe framework, the EU clearly indicates its willingness to take an active role in its southern neighborhood mainly for the purpose of conflict prevention and crisis management. Such a role is indicated as "political," as the official document of the European Commission puts it; but this time the role is defined in more specific terms and in a tone that keeps the door open for military intervention for crisis management purposes.[1] Although the phrase "military intervention" is never mentioned in the official European Commission communication, it is quite apparent that the EU goes one step beyond its usual mode of expression by addressing the conflicts in Palestine, the Western Sahara, and Transdniestria, adding that "the EU should take a more active role to facilitate settlement of the disputes over" these regions.[2]

Therefore, it will not be wrong to say that the Wider Europe framework addresses the main deficits of the previous European initiatives, mainly the EMP, and arranges the benefits of the European partnership in such a way that the Southern Mediterranean countries would enjoy economic and political advantages according to the progress they make as individual partners through a step-by-step approach. By virtue of its geographical proximity to the Southern Mediterranean, Cyprus holds the potential to play a decisive role within this framework.

However, it should also be noted that Wider Europe draws certain limits for the relations between the EU and the neighboring countries. Probably the most important subject that should be underlined in the

Wider Europe framework is that the option of EU membership or a similar role within the EU structure for non-European neighboring countries is clearly ruled out from the very beginning. Another point is that countries which previously had limited relations with the EU are at a disadvantageous position from the very beginning compared to the countries which undertake certain economic, political and social reforms to a certain extent, the latter eventually becoming eligible to a greater amount of financial assistance from the EU. It should here be noted that the Wider Europe framework was eager to deal with the EU's eastern and southern neighbors together, rather than addressing the members of the Barcelona Process alone. The framework is constructed mainly to attend to the concerns over the fact that the EU enlargement process will bring Russia into its immediate periphery. Given that the EU enlargement covers almost the entirety of Eastern Europe, this framework inevitably puts more emphasis on Eastern European members. Accordingly, it would be apt to focus on the ENP (European Neighborhood Policy), which can be pointed to as a milestone in Euro-Mediterranean relations that would, with its different set of goals and motivation, assign a reinforced importance to the geostrategic position of Cyprus.

European Neighborhood Policy (ENP): Before and After
In June 2004, as a definitive policy statement on the ENP, the EU Council firmly endorsed the European Neighbourhood Strategy Paper less than two weeks after its historic fifth enlargement. Originally designed for the eastern neighbours of the enlarged EU (Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova), the ENP also included the countries of the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and including Israel and Palestine). It should be underlined that the ENP was introduced only one year later than the proposal of the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the Wider Europe framework, almost as a supplement to them. The reason why such need arose can be found in the following two aspects: firstly, the EU enlargement which included the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, encompassed both Eastern and Southern European countries; secondly, the necessity of extending the ENP on matters related to Mediterranean such as the security threats and other regional concerns defined in the ESS a year before. For the EU, what was at hand on 1 May 2004 was not only the

greatest enlargement process, which added new members to the club, but also the acquisition of new neighbors in its periphery.

"As soon as the big enlargement from 15 to 25 member states was becoming virtually certain" and when the discussions within and without Europe over what strategy the EU should follow towards these new neighbors began, the EU started to develop a neighborhood policy.[3] As the European Commission puts it, the ENP is "designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors".[4] The enlargement process, indeed, has placed new challenges and security concerns on the table, just as Javier Solana mentioned in the Security Strategy in 2003, giving special emphasis to new and mostly unpredictable security challenges that Europe may have to confront both in Eastern Europe and in the Southern Mediterranean. The inherent problem of the enlargement policy suggests that the integration of acceding states brings the EU closer to neighboring geographies of turmoil, while it enhances European security.[5]

When compared to the European Mediterranean Policy (EMP), the ENP is a novelty in relations between the EU and its neighbors which aims to create a single framework for engaging in dialogue and cooperation with a set of widely different neighboring third countries. The actual necessity behind the formation of such a new policy can be summarized as "to stay clear of further enlargements and to manage the new external borders."[6] While the EU is planning to determine the limits of the enlargement as well as the policies towards its neighbors, one may wonder whether the new neighborhood policy would conflict with or totally undermine the already-existing Barcelona Process and its legacy in the Mediterranean. As an answer, one can observe that in the Mediterranean perspective, the ENP has more or less boosted relations between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean countries, which had very much lost momentum lately.

It is a widely acknowledged fact that Euro-Mediterranean relations have lost their previous dynamic and that there is much need for more flexibility towards the partner countries. The most important of all concerns over the Euro-Mediterranean partnership seems to be that it should be re-designed and re-utilized in accordance with recent regional and global developments. Adopting this perspective, the ENP has introduced two main benefits to Euro-Mediterranean relations. Firstly, it promises to enhance bilateral relations by diminishing the inhibiting

effects of the existing status quo between the EU and its Southern Mediterranean partners, allowing them to establish more direct relations. Thus, it reduces the possibility of restrained relations caused by the political fluctuations affecting the entire Southern Mediterranean. The second benefit is very much related to the first one, giving emphasis to the notion of "differentiation," which has been also signaled in the Wider Europe framework. Differentiation most simply lets the Mediterranean partners be responsible only for their own level of progress in their relations with the EU. To be more specific, it ensures that more advanced Mediterranean partners can derive more and easier benefit, according to their level of progress, from what the new neighborhood policy offers. Consequently it does not require a Mediterranean partner country to wait for other countries in the region to level up their relations with the EU in order to be eligible for the ENP incentives.

The ENP follows the same bilateral and regional tracks of the EMP as the main agendas of cooperation. The procedure of how the ENP shall work is actually copied from the EU accession negotiation process; relations with the members are held bilaterally and in accordance with their current political, economic, and other kinds of capabilities besides their compatibility to the European norms and expectations. The ENP Strategy Paper defines the method of this new policy as follows:

> The method proposed is, together with the partner countries, to define a set of priorities, whose fulfillment will bring them closer to the European Union. These priorities will be incorporated in jointly agreed Action Plans, covering a number of key areas for specific action: political dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU's internal market; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information society, environment and research and innovation; and social policy and people-to-people contacts.[7]

Evidently the main catalyst, though not the only one, that shaped the changing structure of the Mediterranean security and the European Union (EU) foreign policy in recent years towards the Mediterranean is the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Although it would be a mistake to blame this tragic event as the sole culprit for the lost

opportunities in the Mediterranean, today it is widely accepted that the 9/11 attacks had a great impact on Mediterranean politics in general and the future of the relations among the Mediterranean countries and the EU. Although "terrorism" is not new for European countries, 9/11 and also the Madrid and London bombings compelled the EU to divert, if not entirely abandon, its attention from the previous Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) issues—poverty, the North-South gap, socio-economic development—to issues of terrorism and radical Islam both within and outside the borders of the EU. As it was seen during the following years, this shift triggered dramatic developments in the traditional policy of the EMP towards the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 did not compel the EU to shape new Mediterranean polices immediately. Prior to that, it changed the perception of security threats of the EU countries together with the international community. In a sense, the post-9/11 era can be considered as the second important phase in security studies, the first being the end of both the Cold War and the bipolar international system in the 1990s.

As to the first era, the EMP was clearly a European response to the newly emerged post-Cold War security challenges that aimed for regional stabilization through cooperation; basically democracy and market economy, instead of old-fashioned hard security exercises. However what the EMP intended to achieve in the Mediterranean could have only been achieved through a "soft" security understanding which is extremely time-consuming and very much relies on mutual consent to be successful. However 9/11 and its aftermath forced both the EU and also the United States (US) to reassess their foreign policy priorities to a certain extent, such as the policies related to the EMP and the "Security Community," which the EU aimed to establish in the long run. As a result, those priorities have been replaced by the policies aiming to tackle imminent threats, such as international terrorism. It was a major shift in that the strategies designed to address the actual causes of terrorism became less significant than coping with the terrorists and terrorism itself.

In light of these changes, this article aims to focus on the implications of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the European initiatives in the Mediterranean region. It attempts to evaluate the transformation of Euro-Mediterranean relations and shifting regional dynamics in the light of changing international politics with regard to the new security environment triggered by the September 11, 2001 as well as the following

Istanbul (November 2003), Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005) bombings that shook Europe. First, it discusses the first ever common strategic vision of the EU, the European Security Strategy (ESS) that emerged in 2003, and its relevance to the Mediterranean region. It subsequently discusses the Wider Europe Framework and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a novelty in Euro-Mediterranean relations. The ENP's contributions and shortcomings as a new approach are analyzed thoroughly and in comparison with the EMP. Lastly, the recent French initiative concerning the region, The Union for the Mediterranean, and its compatibility with the existing European initiatives are dealt with.

European Security Strategy (ESS)

The European Security Strategy (ESS) was first adopted as the basis of the EU's Strategic Concept at the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003, which enabled the EU to "adapt effectively to the changing security environment".[8] Later, it was approved by the European Council in December 2003 and entitled "A Secure Europe in a Better World." In this document five key threats were defined, which require more attention and insight than ever. According to the ESS these threats are terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. Michele Comelli argues that "not all of these security challenges coming from the EU's neighborhood area are specific to the region. However, the impact of these challenges on EU security, either real or perceived, can still be greater because of geographical proximity."[9] And, when geographical proximity is taken into account, the geostrategic position of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean is always considered decisive in preventing security threats.

According to Emel Oktay, the ESS was prepared to define a common and cohesive EU foreign policy in the aftermath of the Iraq War.[10] "The US decision to take military action in Iraq… without a specific UN mandate and with only some members of the EU on its side had created open rifts and a more general crisis of confidence within the EU and NATO."[11] The ESS can be viewed as a response to the post-9/11 security priorities of the US and a positive step in adjusting transatlantic divisions over Iraq.[12] It emphasizes the transatlantic relationship as "one of the core elements of the international system."[13] In addition, the ESS argues that

the transatlantic relationship is not only in the bilateral interest of the US and the EU but also something that strengthens the international community as a whole.

On the other hand significant differences exist between the ESS and its US counterpart as many claim, the US National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002. Firstly, the ESS underlines that the EU "should be ready to act before a crisis occurs and conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early."[14] Contrary to the "preemptive" strategy of the US, the EU did not use this as an argument in favor of military preemption, but rather as an argument that new threats are far from being purely military. Secondly, as Bjørn Møller observes, "rather than advocating military attack the document… emphasised the need for 'effective multilateralism' as a means to the end of 'a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions, and a rule-based international order.'"[15] On the other hand, the NSS of 2002 clearly did not rule out the option of "unilateral action" stating that:

> …while the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.[16]

The ESS and the Mediterranean

The Mediterranean region has a prominent place in the ESS for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the Arab states in North Africa are seen as the main importers of two major problems of Europe today—illegal immigrants and radical Islamism—that are often linked to terrorist activities in Europe. Secondly, North African countries are vital actors for Europe, with Gulf countries and Russia, which Europe relies on for its energy needs. The European security perceptions towards the Mediterranean have been defined in the ESS as follows:

> The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the

framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.[17]

As mentioned above, terrorism has been listed as one of the five key threats named in the ESS. European perception of terrorism had rather been focused on the North Africa and the volatile conditions in most of the region. The ESS illustrates the possible explanations of terrorism as soft-security problems, which are inter-connected and regional. It may be argued that the five threats mentioned in the ESS are in a sense the EU's diagnosis of the root-causes of terrorism. However it has also been acknowledged in the ESS that these regional problems have the capacity to develop into much more international concerns unless all European countries confront them. Moreover the spillover effects on Europe cannot be disregarded:

> The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernization, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society.[18]

Getting back to the energy issue, it is not surprising that the ESS draws attention to Europe's energy dependence as well. As is widely known, Europe is the world's largest oil and gas importer. It is assumed that European imports constitute about 50% of energy consumption today. It is predicted in the ESS that this amount will rise to 70% in 2030 and most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.[19] Therefore, it appears that the Mediterranean region has top priority for Europe not only for being constituted of countries that produce energy, but also for being the region where these energy lines are located.

The Wider Europe Framework and the European Neighborhood Policy
The European Security Strategy (ESS), as the first ever-common strategic vision of the EU, also provides an outline for the general strategy of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) at a global and regional level[20]. Although the ESS does not explicitly refer to the ENP as a means to build

security in the EU's neighborhood, it is clear that the ENP is the main instrument through which to pursue the objective of achieving security in the EU's immediate periphery.[21] Both the ESS and the ENP put emphasis on preventing "new dividing lines" between Europe and its neighbors especially in the Middle East and North Africa. In a sense, the strategic vision adopted in the ESS constitutes the essence of the ENP's "soft security" actions that had started with the drawing of the boundaries of Wider Europe Framework.

Even before the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004 and in London on July 7, 2005, the EU felt the necessity to surmount the impasse which the EMP and the decade-old Barcelona Process were experiencing.[22] In March 2003, European Commission proposed a new framework called Wider Europe; an important step for the Euro-Mediterranean relations as the ENP was outlined in a Commission Communication.[23] Although Wider Europe was considered to be a product of the European enlargement, with regard to Mediterranean, it is built on the fundamental principles of the Barcelona Process and the EMP.

The Wider Europe Framework came up with new perspectives on neighboring countries, political and economic relations, as well as some previously defined objectives which were stated in the ESS such as the desire to "develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighborhood—a ring of friends—with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful, and cooperative relations."[24] Moreover, this new EU approach has distinguished itself from a decade-old EMP by abandoning the "one-size-fits-all" policy; neighboring countries (namely the Southern Mediterranean countries within the scope of this study) would be evaluated separately by their willingness as well as their progress in political, economic and social aspects. In order to achieve the given relations with its neighbors the European Commission emphasized the 3P principles: proximity, prosperity, and poverty.

Proximity simply refers to the geographical location of the neighbors and is significant for the overall success of the comprehensive policies and mutual relations between them and the EU. To be more specific, proximity is a two-dimensional principle; a neighboring country which is closer to Europe in geographical sense possesses both greater opportunities to be pursued and greater security challenges to be confronted as well. The other two principles, prosperity and poverty, are

interrelated to one another in order to tackle "the root causes of the political instability, economic vulnerability, institutional deficiencies, conflict, poverty and social exclusion."[25] It is worth stressing that these goals are very much similar to those of the EMP's and demonstrate the parallel objectives that the EMP and the Wider Europe framework share.

In addition to these problems addressed, the Wider Europe framework puts emphasis on certain principles and ideas which at the same time constitute the core of the idea of a "European Union," democracy, pluralism, respect for human rights and civil liberties, the rule of law, and labor standards. These principles are seen as the prerequisites of a politically stable, socially and economically developed, prosperous, and peaceful Mediterranean.

The method proposed is, together with the partner countries, to define a set of priorities, whose fulfillment will bring them closer to the European Union. These priorities will be incorporated in jointly agreed Action Plans, covering a number of key areas for specific action: political dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU's internal market; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information society, environment and research and innovation; and social policy and people-to-people contacts.[26]

As mentioned above, the main difference between the ENP procedure and the EU membership accession is that the ENP (as was indicated in the Wider Europe framework as well) clearly rules out the possibility of EU membership from the very beginning. In addition, the ENP does not allow EU institutions to be completely shared by the Western Newly Independent States (WNIS) and Southern Mediterranean countries. As former president of the European Commission Romano Prodi puts it, the EU will "share everything but institutions" with the non-members. [27] However these set of procedures were designed in such a way that the benefits of the ENP will be granted to the neighbor countries only if they comply with the values and principles of the EU.

It is undeniable that the ENP is a novelty in Euro-Mediterranean relations; but it is equally hard to say that it is flawless. The ENP was unable to satisfy the needs of the Euro-Mediterranean community in almost every aspect. Although it has been noted that the ENP brought a promising approach to Euro-Mediterranean relations as a fresh solution to the deadlock in relations, it has been criticized especially for the

economic perspective it visualized and the expected gains from the bilateral approach to be conducted together with the partner countries.

In Barcelona in 1995, it was hoped that the asymmetric relationship between the EU and its Southern Mediterranean partners could be averted by the gradual development of the "Free Trade Area" (FTA), one of the goals to be achieved by 2010.[28] However, the developments have clearly not lived up to expectations so far. Although the bilateral approach of the ENP favors the partner countries in many aspects, the ideal of a FTA eventually favors the EU in terms of economic superiority over the partner countries, rendering the partners somewhat dependent on the European countries. This is actually the point on which the new neighborhood policy is criticized: abandoning the goal of promoting the FTA as it was stated in the Barcelona Declaration, and instead putting relations on a bilateral track leaving the encircling notion of a "Euro-Mediterranean region" aside—very similar to what the Wider Europe framework did.

Related to the economic aspect of the ENP, it would be accurate to claim that the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations with the countries that have relatively unstable or weak economies are left in the dark, as the ENP tends to favor relatively stable partner countries in this aspect. As officially declared by the European Commission, emphasis is on the importance of the regional dimension of the EMP and the intention to promote it financially. However both the Wider Europe framework and the ENP, probably unintentionally, degrade the regional dimension of the Barcelona Process and acknowledge that it "is only a complementary element which has a more limited function of "promoting *intra-regional* trade and *sub-regional* cooperation" in the Southern Mediterranean."[29] Even though the European Commission used to define its Mediterranean policy as multilateral, stating "multilateralism is now as common as, and sometimes even prevalent over, traditional bilateral approaches,"[30] the previous EU initiatives regarding the Mediterranean enjoyed very limited effects.

The unsure economic goals which the EU tries to reach through the ENP are not the only shortcomings of the new neighborhood policy. One of the European aspirations, a "ring of friends," is worth mentioning here, broadly referring to the peaceful, democratic, and well-governed states sharing the EU values in the European "near abroad." As one may notice, this notion somehow reflects the EU's foreign policy shift towards its

neighborhood, an outcome of the European internal dynamics aiming to keep a closer look on its "near abroad." Having these expectations, the ENP puts democracy and democratic institutions, respect for human rights, and the rule of law on the table as prerequisites of progress in relations throughout the Mediterranean region. In other words, the new neighborhood policy's benchmarks will probably be utilized by the European Commission to measure the reform activities of the partner countries.[31]

It is widely accepted that without achieving the prerequisites above, it is indeed difficult for Euro-Mediterranean relations to reach a step beyond the existing level, as well as for partner countries to enhance their relations with the EU. However, as Emerson and Noutcheva note, the Barcelona agreements present a "considerable switch in emphasis" away from the intention of cooperation, to the provision of instructions for harmonizing the norms and standards of the partner countries in accordance with those of Europe.[32] Moreover, it is equally irritating for the Mediterranean partners that unlike the Barcelona Declaration, the ENP is based on political conditionality; that is, if one party fails its obligations or undertakes different actions that are not defined in the association agreement, the other party may take appropriate measures based on pre-defined articles of the agreement. Although this conditionality seems to offer some sort of flexibility to both the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries, from a diplomatic perspective this can be interpreted as the EU having an upper hand in those asymmetric relations. This negotiating position of the EU is capable of suspending the advantages granted to the partner countries, if they do not achieve a desirable level of progress in adopting European norms and values.

To put it in a different way, the European countries have clear advantage in terms of economic and political power over their Southern Mediterranean partners, which allows the EU to manifest its demands from the partners and define the boundaries of benefits to be granted through the ENP. This has not been the case so far in the Barcelona Process. Related to the principle of conditionality issue, the EU's sensitivity over the implementation of norms such as freedom of speech, respect for human rights, and other social liberties has been widely questioned in the partner countries as a result of the EU's lack of will or attention in such aspects. European credibility has been hurt when the EU has not always taken the measures necessitated by the Association

Agreements. Which of the granted incentives would be suspended by the EU in case of the failure of the partner states to honor their commitments, remains rather problematic.

A Recent French Initiative Aimed at the Region: The Union for the Mediterranean

Initially proposed by the then president of the UMP (Union for a Popular Movement Party) Nicolas Sarkozy during the French electoral campaign in early 2007, the idea of Mediterranean Union (MU) sparked a hot debate within the EU, especially among the Southern Mediterranean members as well as the non-EU Mediterranean countries, including Turkey. Countries within the EU have been expressing "strong dissatisfaction with current relations with Southern Mediterranean partner countries and emphasizing the need to go beyond the EMP to enable Europe to tackle the real challenges that the Mediterranean and the EU have been facing after the strategic changes of the last decade."[33]

The initial structure of the Mediterranean Union envisaged that it would include only the riparian countries of the Mediterranean while leaving the non-Mediterranean EU members outside. In December 2007, the mini-summit held in Rome between the heads of state and governments of France, Italy and Spain adopted the "Appel de Rome" in which the initiative was turned into "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean" (UfM). This shift has in fact opened possibilities for non-Mediterranean EU countries eager to play a role in the area.[34] However, in March 2008 the French and German heads of state decided that it would better not to divide the EU members into Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean, particularly after the German objections stating that "if there are group-specific cooperations within the EU, those have to be open to all member states."[35]

It is noteworthy to mention that the French proposal has gone through some substantial modifications even though it has been only one and a hald years since President Sarkozy put it forward. The idea of a Mediterranean union gained a new dimension when the Spanish Foreign Minister outlined a proposal about transforming the EMP into a "Euro-Mediterranean Union" (EMU) a couple of months later. With this new proposal, Spain suggested assuring people greater freedom of movement in the area—something neither the EMP nor the EU is able or willing to do today. It is worth noting that the Spanish initiative does not dwell on

an institutional configuration to regulate the task of integrating the European and Southern Mediterranean areas with the objective of allowing people to circulate freely.[36]

It was argued that the EMU has the ability to embrace the EMP agenda and effectively advance it by taking advantage of its cooperation-based platform. As a long-term objective, the EMU has the intention to integrate the EU with the Southern Mediterranean as a priority on its agenda. In this sense, the EMU-approach can be seen as both ideologically and politically compatible with the existing EU initiatives, namely the EMP. The Southern Mediterranean leaders of the Maghreb region, following the lead of the Tunisian President, also insisted on "the importance of not detaching the new Union for the Mediterranean project from the EMP," arguing that the union can only be successful, if it complies with the existing Euro-Mediterranean instruments.[37]

According to Astrid Coeurderoy, "Sarkozy's priorities include the promotion of an open-minded and tolerant interpretation of Islam, both within France's Muslim communities and countries in the Muslim world themselves."[38] The plan theoretically envisions a consensus and cooperation among the members of this union based on four themes: environment and sustainable development; intercultural dialogue; economic growth and social development; and security of the Mediterranean region, the fight against terrorism in particular. The number of immigrants who seek better conditions on the northern shore does not seem that it will decrease in the coming years. It is for that illegal immigration is feared as one of the biggest sources of insecurity in Europe, as many European documents, including the UfM, underline. It has the potential of creating political frictions as well, such as the rise of extreme right-wing parties in Europe. The solution, according to many experts, is to create opportunities for employment on the Southern shores of the Mediterranean, which would mean investing and backing development in the region. It is equally questionable whether the UfM is able to put solutions on the table.

It is true that both the UfM and the EMU aim at upgrading the Euro-Mediterranean relations institutionally and improving the ENP experience. But they are also quite different in that they are based on different strategic visions. According to Roberto Aliboni and his co-writers, "the EMU is based on a long-term objective of integration across the Mediterranean."[39] The UfM, on the other hand, reflects the political

stand of President Sarkozy and, in this sense, is primarily based on a broad sense of confrontation with the Muslim world, beginning with Turkey. It would be wrong to say that the UfM puts Mediterranean cooperation and heritage aside completely. However, it should also be noted that the UfM agenda has its own priorities and handles some problems in a different perspective than they are usually handled. Immigration is one of them, as it is defined as a crisis that the EU has to tackle in the UfM. In other words, the UfM is designed to control rather than allow freedom of movement. Therefore, it differs from the EMU, which actually offers the latter.

If we evaluate the UfM as the leading and most debated proposal so far, we should underline the fact that reactions from the EU member states, especially from the EU and non-EU Mediterranean members alike, have been generally skeptical so far. The reality is that this initiative is seen very much as an alternative to Turkey's membership in the EU and a way of controlling illegal immigration from Northern Africa. After all, President Sarkozy has voiced his concerns many times about Turkey and illegal immigration commenting that "it is better to see Europe's relations with Turkey through this Mediterranean Union" and argued that "if Europe wants to have an identity it must have borders and, therefore, limits."[40] In this sense, a challenging task awaits Sarkozy as the newly founded union comprises 27 EU members plus most of the North African countries, the Balkans, Israel and the Arab world, meaning approximately 756 million people from Western Europe to Jordan.[41]

The official inauguration of the UfM was during the Paris Summit held on July 13, 2008. The summit brought together 43 European and Mediterranean States as well as both international and regional organizations like the UN, the League of Arab States, and the African Union. In addition, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Monaco and Montenegro have been included to the initiative, as these countries have accepted the acquis of the Barcelona Process. As stated in the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, the UfM is "building on the Barcelona Declaration and its objectives of achieving peace, stability and security, as well as the acquis of the Barcelona Process"[42]—particularly appeasing the concerns that the UfM will be a duplication of the Euro-Mediterranean efforts.

It can be argued that the Paris Summit is a milestone for the future of the UfM as well as the Middle East peace process. While the participant

countries underlined their support for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's comments on Israeli-Palestinian conflict are remarkable as he pointed that Israel and the Palestinians had never been as close to a peace deal as they were now and he would like direct talks with Syria as well. After four months of hot debate, the problem of where the UfM headquarters would be located was finally solved during the Marseilles ministerial conference held on November 3-4, 2008. Members agreed to base the headquarters in Barcelona, Spain. In addition, the official name ever since "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean" has been shortened to "Union for the Mediterranean." Since it has already been accepted that UfM is actually a "level-up" continuation of the Barcelona Process, a special emphasis would no longer be required.

As stated during the Paris Summit, the Marseilles conference very much dealt with the institutional structure of the UfM. As a novelty compared to the Barcelona Process, a new institutional framework has been introduced during the Paris Summit, which envisages a co-presidency, mainly to strengthen the joint ownership. According to this new structure, one Mediterranean and one EU country would serve as co-presidents of the UfM. It has been agreed that French and Egyptian presidents would be the first co-presidents. In Marseilles, the governing organs of the UfM were unveiled as well, specifying who is responsible from which task. In addition, the 2009 work programme as well as a "fields of cooperation" list has been agreed upon.

The Cyprus Question from the EU's Mediterranean Perspective
Against this background, it seems clear that the EU appears eager to invest time, effort, and money in its reinforced Mediterranean initiative. The EMP and UfP come to the fore as tools in differing capacities to enhance the European designs of security as well as to create an awareness of and commitment to the European norms and values in its "near abroad." Within this framework, Cyprus's privileged geostrategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean serves as a very appropriate connecting point between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean. As the EU's Commissioner for Environment, Stavros Dimas stated in June 2005, the adhesion of Cyprus together with two other Mediterranean countries, Malta and Slovenia, strengthened the EU's hand "[i]n a bid to create a true 'ring of friends' around its new external frontiers."[43] Therefore, the

recent Mediterranean emphasis of the EU would assign a decisive role to the island once more substantial plans begin to unfold properly. The Greek Cypriot administration, on various occasions, has expressed its willingness to more actively engage in the "military and civilian capabilities" of the EU and even promised "a more constructive role" in the further development of the European security.[44]

Nevertheless, the EMP and UfP lay considerable emphasis on the confidence-building capacity of the EU, as they seek to improve the perceptions of Europe across the Southern Mediterranean and a divided member-state, such as Cyprus, would harm rather than underpin, the EU's renovated attempt at building confidence in its neighborhood and beyond. Without the substantial solution of the Cyprus problem, the EU would never be perceived in the way it desires to be seen in the area of its Mediterranean policies. The Cyprus problem could perpetuate what Heinz Kramer highlighted in 1997 as "the disruption of the strategic pattern in the Aegean and the Mediterranean region with serious consequences for Europe's future security."[45] In this respect, the current political situation on the island bears the potential to cast shadow over the EU's Mediterranean policies and disproves the Union's confidence-building rhetoric in the eyes of the non-European members of the UfP.

Carl Bildt, the former Prime Minister of Sweden, holds that Cyprus is not the conductor but still a part of the "enormous task" of "creating or influencing the creation of stable structures from Bihaj to Basra." The EU's failure to facilitate peace and reconciliation in Cyprus deserves considerably more attention from the member-states and EU institutions, as it signifies "monumental shortcomings" in Europe's security, defense, neighborhood and Mediterranean policies. The sought repoliticization of neither the ESS nor the EMP could be achieved as long as the Cyprus question endures.[46]

Conclusion

Reflected in the recent initiatives, the policy shift in Euro-Mediterranean relations can be explained by the internal dynamics of the EU and by the insecure atmosphere created in the Mediterranean after the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent war in Iraq. However, it would be very optimistic to expect from the new initiatives such as the ENP and the UfM extensive contributions to the solutions of partner countries' standard problems such as poverty, social development, and regional security. The ENP is

designed to address the regional problems of the Mediterranean secondarily. In addition, it is fair to claim that the ENP primarily serves European rather than the Mediterranean security.

Despite various commitments that have been made in the Barcelona Declaration as well as in the ENP, especially with regard to democracy, human rights, socio-economic development, and finally European norms and values, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership as a whole process "is in reality characterized by a lack of common values."[47] The Euro-Mediterranean partners generally had the tendency to prioritize the second basket of the EMP, which is the partnership on economic and financial cooperation. On the contrary, the Europeans always gave emphasis to the first basket, which covers political and security aspects. Consequently the partnership in social, cultural, and human affairs (third basket) has been neglected for a long time by both sides.

According to Anette Jünemann, "the EU's desire to address issues that have proved difficult to deal with in the context of the first (political and security) basket of the Barcelona Process; the growing importance of the EU's Justice and Home Affairs agenda" (probably as a consequence of 9/11), "European responses to the Middle East conflict—and last but not least—the need to respond to September 11," have led to the rediscovery of the third basket.[48] In fact, since April-May 2001, the field of Justice and Home Affairs has become one of the main areas of the EMP activity.

Since 9/11, the relevance of Mediterranean policies to European security has been increased even more.[49] Considering the timeline of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the launch of the ENP falls in the aftermath of 9/11, a period in which the prioritization of terrorism as a main threat to European security as a whole, rather than an issue of peace and stability, reached its peak in the European discourse on terrorism. As Ulla Holm puts it, "The fight against terrorism and the terror attack in Madrid 2004 have accentuated the importance of the Mediterranean and the Middle East for European security."[50]

The question of why the ENP did actually follow a contrary approach in certain aspects compared with its predecessor, the Barcelona Process, can be understood better by taking these catalysts into account. The notion of terrorism has been considered a threat prior to 9/11 as well; however it is probably the first time that we have seen terrorism on the top of the European agenda, dominating its external as well as internal

relations. Europe now perceives terrorism as an exceptionally serious threat, especially after the Madrid and London bombings, and eventually decided that it is very much directed against its norms, identity, and other values that the idea of European Union has built on.

The policy shift that the ENP initiated in the Euro-Mediterranean relations is very much related to the issue of shaping the southern shores of the Mediterranean through a "one-way formulation" (rather than a "partnership" which the Barcelona Process favors) of relations between Europe and Mediterranean partners. To put it in a different way, the ENP downgrades the notion of partnership to serve European security, moving away from a more neo-realist approach. It certainly does not mean that the Barcelona Process put European interests in the second place, after the chronic problems of the region; however the ENP is eager to associate the wellbeing of the Euro-Mediterranean relations with the level of political and economic liberalism adopted by the Southern Mediterranean partners, mainly because of the European perception of security being equal to adoption of democracy and other common values. As the EMP had long before lost its pace, the Wider Europe framework and later the ENP changed their tone with regard to the situation in Southern Mediterranean and in the Middle East, openly prioritizing the European interests even while offering the partners a share in the European market.

Endnotes

[1] The communication document of the European Commission puts it as follows: "Greater EU involvement in crisis management in response to specific regional threats would be a tangible demonstration of the EU's willingness to assume a greater share of the burden of conflict resolution in the neighboring countries." (European Commission, *Wider Europe-Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbors* (Brussels: European Commission 2003), 12.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva, "From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy." *IEMed-Cidob Med. 2005 Mediterranean Yearbook* (2005): 92-97, 92.
http://www.iemed.org/anuari/2005/anarticles/anemersonnoutcheva.pdf

⁴ European Commission. *European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper* (Brussels: European Commission, 2004), 3. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf

⁵ Javier Solana, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy* (European Institute for Security Studies: Brussels: 2003), 8. http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf

⁶ Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, "A 'Ring of Friends'? The Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy for the Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Politics* 9:2 (2004): 240–7.

⁷ European Commission, *ENP Strategy Paper*, 3.

⁸ Gerrard Quille, "Making Multilateralism Matter: The EU Security Strategy," *European Security Review* 18 (2003):1-2 (p.1). http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/esr_19.pdf

⁹ Michele Comelli. "Building Security in Its neighborhood Through the European Neighborhood Policy?" Paper presented at EUSA Biennial Conference, Montreal, IAI, 2007, 2. http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2007/papers/comelli-m-02b.pdf

¹⁰ Emel Oktay, *Today's Neighbours, Tomorrow's Partners: Managing the Neighbourhood in Post-Enlargement Europe* (The Hague, Clingendael Institute, 2007).

¹¹ Alyson J. K. Bailes. *The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary History* (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2005), p.9. http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP10.pdf

¹² Quille, 2.

¹³ Solana, 9.

¹⁴ Ibid., 7.

¹⁵ Bjørn Møller, "The EU as a Security Actor: Security by Being and Security by Doing" (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2005), 36.

¹⁶ "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002," http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html.

¹⁷ Solana, 8.

¹⁸ Ibid., 3.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Oktay.

²¹ Comelli.

[22] It should be noted that such necessity actually arose right after September 11, before there were any serious terrorist attacks that threatened or directly targeted European countries.

[23] European Commission, *Wider Europe—Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbors* (Brussels: European Commission, 2003), 3.

[24] Ibid., 3.

[25] Ibid., 6

[26] European Commission, *ENP Strategy Paper*, 3.

[27] Romano Prodi: "Enlargement is a Necessity," *Business Week*, November 18, 2002.
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_46/b3808713.htm.

[28] Johansson-Nogués, 240-7.

[29] Rafaella Del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher, "From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy Towards the Southern Mediterranean?" *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10 (2005): 17-38.

[30] See the "Conclusion" of *The Barcelona Process, five years on: 1995-2000* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000).

[31] Johansson-Nogués, 240-7.

[32] Emerson and Noutcheva, 93.

[33] Roberto Aliboni, Ahmed Driss, Tobias Schumacher, and Alfred Tovias, *Putting the Mediterranean Union in Perspective* (Lisbon: EuroMeSCo, 2008), 9.
http://www.euromesco.net/images/paper68eng.pdf

[34] Ibid.

[35] "Sarkozy's Mediterranean Union Plans Irk Merkel," *EurActiv*, December 13, 2007. http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/sarkozy-mediterraneanunion-plans-irk-merkel/article-169080

[36] Aliboni *et al*., 9.

[37] Ibid., 20.

[38] Astrid Coeurderoy, "Turning the Page," *The Journal of International Security Affairs* 14 (2008): 29-33. http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2008/14/coeurderoy.php

[39] Aliboni *et al*., 10.

[40] Quoted ub Coeurderoy.

[41] BBC News. "Mediterranean Union is Launched," *BBC News*, July 13, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7504214.stm

[42] *Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, Paris, 13 July 2008*.
http://www.eu2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/07/0713_declaration_de_paris/Joint_declaration_of_the_Paris_summit_for_the_Mediterranean-EN.pdf

[43] Stavros Dimas, "Address to the European Parliament at the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Convention," www.portofentry.com/site/root/resources/industry_news/3079.html. 20 June 2005.

[44] Costas Melakopides and Giorgos Kentas, *CFSP Watch*, *2005—Cyprus*.http://www.fornet.info/CFSPannualreports2005/CFSP%20Watch%202005%20Cyprus.pdf

[45] Heinz Kramer, "The Cyprus Problem and European Security," *Survival* 39:3 (1997), 16-32, 19.

[46] European Policy Center, "Whatever Happened to the European Security Strategy."
http://www.epc.eu/en/er.asp?AI=506&LV=293&PG=ER/EN/detail&TYP=ER&see=y&t=2.

[47] Anette Jünemann, "Security-building in the Mediterranean after September 11,"in *Euro-Mediterranean Relations after September 11: Regional and Domestic Dynamics*, ed. Anette Jünemann (London: Frank Cass, 2004): 1-20, 6.

[48] Ibid., 9.

[49] Federica Bicchi, "The European Origins of Euro-Mediterranean Practices," *Institute of European Studies (University of California, Berkeley)*, Paper 040612 (2004).
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=ies.

[50] Ulla Holm, *The EU's Security Policy Towards The Mediterranean: An (Im)Possible Combination of Export of European Political Values and Anti-Terror Measures?*(Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2004), 7.