BETWEEN PERPETUAL WAR AND PERPETUAL PEACE: LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER AS PERPETUAL (IN)SECURITY[*]

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ABSTRACT

The past forty years have seen a growing number of publications focusing on security due to its increasing role in (re)shaping internal and external political processes. However, despite its growing popularity as an academic object, far too little attention has been paid to the historico-philosophical roots of the concept from key liberal political thinkers. This paper therefore explores how security has been conceptualized in relation to concepts like war, property, and peace, in Hobbes, Locke and Kant respectively. The paper argues that security is the key element in the fabrication of the liberal social order. The demand for security is never innocent but always deeply connected to the demand for a specific form of social order. Security is neither neutral, nor natural; rather, it is highly political. It thus must be regarded as a proactive rather than reactive idea or practice. The philosophico-historical validity of these arguments can be shown by (re)reading (proto)liberal classical texts.

*Keywords***:** *Hobbes; Locke; Kant; Security; Liberal Social Order*

EBEDİ SAVAŞ VE EBEDİ BARIŞ ARASINDA: EBEDİ GÜVEN(SiZ)LIK OLARAK LİBERAL TOPLUMSAL DÜZEN[***]

ÖZ

Geçtiğimiz kırk yılda, güvenliğin iç/dış politik süreçleri (yeniden) şekillendirmede artan rolüne bağlı olarak güvenlik kavramına odaklanan yayınların sayısında artış görüldü. Gelgelelim, akademik bir nesne olarak artan popülerliğine rağmen kilit liberal düşünürlerde kavramın felsefi-tarihi köklerini göstermek için çok az çalışma yapılmıştır. Bu makale, Hobbes, Locke ve Kant'ta sırasıyla savaş, mülkiyet ve barış gibi kavramlarla ilişkili olarak güvenliğin kavramsallaştırılma biçimlerini araştırmaktadır. Çalışma güvenliğin liberal toplumsal düzenin üretiminde kilit unsur olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Güvenlik talebi asla masum değildir ve her zaman belirli bir toplumsal düzen talebi ile derinden bağlantılıdır. Güvenlik ne nötrtür ne de doğaldır; fakat bir hayli politiktir. Bu nedenle de reaktif bir fikir ya da pratikten çok proaktif olarak görülmelidir. Bu argümanların felsefi-tarihsel geçerliliği klasik (proto) liberal metinlerin (yeniden) okunmasıyla gösterilebilir.

*Anahtar Sözcükler***:** *Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Güvenlik, Liberal Toplumsal Düzen*

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Introduction

In the last few decades, researchers have shown an increased interest in the concept of security. The end of Cold War, the break-up of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and more recently 9/11 have ushered in a new era in terms of security studies. The contentious debate as to whether the security agenda should be narrowing or broadening of security agenda has ended up favoring the latter approach. Those supporting a narrower framework insisted that the main security referents were and should remain the state and its military. Proponents of a broader framework argued for a theoretical move to widen security reference object to individuals, communities, regions, or even the whole planet. They criticized their opponents for being too focused narrowly on state and military whereas, the latter claimed that an over-expansion of the focus of the concept would "destroy its intellectual coherence[1] or make it "potentially boundless." After this "battle" was won by proponents of broadening the agenda, security studies have been expanded to include issues like migration, AIDS, nature, gender, poverty and climate change.

While almost any issue can now constitute a research object for security studies most work in the security studies literature still lacks critical depth, confined within a liberal conceptual and assumptive framework. Even, the most critical work has failed to accentuate the link between liberalism and security. Most studies follow the assumption that liberalism merely concerns the individual. Similarly, the problem of security is identified as simply a problem of balance between security and freedom: while too much liberty might mean "anarchy", too much security might lead to authoritarianism and autocracy. Along these lines, security is traditionally understood as something to be protected. Consequently, most work on security has failed to consider the important historical role played by security in fabricating the liberal social order. Studies have typically concentrated instead on the reactive, responsive aspects of security. Hence, they have suffered from serious methodological and theoretical flaws. Notwithstanding several attempts to re-establish missing links between liberalism and security,[2] the complex historico-philosophical interactions between security and liberalism remain understudied, so a systematic understanding of how liberalism and security have shaped today's world is still lacking.

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[1] Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1991): 213.

[2] See Welsh School, Paris School, and Foucauldian theoretical lines in security studies and Neocleous *The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of Police Power* (London: Pluto Press, 2000); *Critique of Security* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008); *Anti-Security* (Ottawa: Red Quill Books, 2011).

To rectify this, security must be regarded as a proactive rather than reactive idea or practice. The point is not that the social order is first constituted and then security is achieved. Rather, security itself plays a constitutive role in forming of any social order. One can also see this by carefully examining the (proto) liberal social order. The primary aim of this paper is to critically examine the relationship between security and the liberal social order. The central question is to what extent can we think of liberalism and security together? The methodological approach taken is based on a critical (re)reading of classical and/or proto (liberal) texts of key thinkers namely Hobbes, Locke and Kant. It is hoped that this study will contribute to a deeper and critical understanding of security. One general argument is that security is neither neutral, nor natural; rather, it is highly political and there has always been purposeful political power behind it.

This paper is divided into three parts. The first deals with Hobbes's concept of "perpetual war." The second analyzes Locke's concept of property and his theoretical move to make it the core element of security and the liberal social order. The final part discusses the extent that Kant's "perpetual peace" and "liberal peace theses" reflect socio-historical and socio-political reality.

Leviathan vs Behemoth: Hobbes' Never-ending War

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As one of the founders of classical liberal political philosophy and modern political thinking, Thomas Hobbes's (1588-1679) importance lies in his political project to resolve the 17th century's constant disorders and socio-political conflicts in a mercantile age of capitalism and state making, particularly in England. These included the English Civil War (1642-1651), the Glorious Revolution (1688) and in Europe, the Anglo-Spanish war (1585-1604) and the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). As a supporter of absolute hereditary monarchy , Hobbes aimed to construct a peaceful, legitimate, and desirable social order in which central, paternal, secular, and sovereign authority plays a crucial role. Following Foucault [3], I argue that Hobbes describes in *Leviathan* (1651) a social order in which war, in two different forms, is decisive in the fabrication of the social order.

Hobbes claims that all human beings are equal in the sense that they have broadly similar physical and intellectual capacities even if some may be slightly stronger or wiser than the others.[4] This "natural" equality causes conflict

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[3] *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976*, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003).
[4] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan (R. Tuck, Ed.)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

when they desire same things, turning them into enemies that fight until one is killed. Yet, far from ending the conflict; this death merely leads to violence against somebody else. Hobbes suggests that, in the nature of men, there are three principal causes of the quarrel; Competition, diffidence and glory. The first one is strictly related to the pursuit of gain; the second results from the desire for safety and the last one is a quest for reputation. Eventually, the human nature led man to fight each other. In the absence of coercive, sovereign, and deterrent power; the situation immediately turns into a *Bellum omnium contra omnes;* the war of all against all:

> Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without
> a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that
> condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of
> every man against every man.[5]

For Hobbes, the "state of war" -"a war of all against all"- is the natural consequence, given human nature, of the absence of a coercive power in the "state of nature." This ultimate state of insecurity arises because everybody has the liberty to do anything, absent a coercive power to prevent them. In the Hobbesian sense, liberty means "the absence of externall Impediments: which Impediments, may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgement, and reason shall dictate him."[6] Here, he perfectly describes negative liberty as it is called in the liberal tradition, which leads him to believe in the necessity of a coercive, sovereign power. In its absence, individuals constantly fear that other people will harm them simply because they are at liberty to do so. Consequently, everybody immediately becomes everybody else's enemy. Hobbes describes the state of perpetual war and its "catastrophic" consequences as follows:

> Whatsoever, therefore, is consequent to a time of Warre, where every
> man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time,
> wherein men live without other *security*, than what their own strength
> and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition,
> there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain:
> and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the
> commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building;
> no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much
> force; no knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no
> Arts; no letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare
> and danger of violent death; And the *life of man, solitary, poore, nasty,*
> *brutish, and short.*(italics added). .

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[5] Hobbes, p. 88.
[6] Hobbes, p. 91.

There are several conclusions to be drawn from these remarks: First, without a sovereign, human nature places individuals in an insecure condition that immediately descends into widespread violence. Second, the resulting state of perpetual war due to the absence of security prevents economic relations, commodities, buildings, knowledge and so on. Third, Hobbes clearly describes a world without civil society: an uncivilized, non-social, non-political, primitive community of people. Fourth, without a "Leviathan", civil society cannot exist. That is, civil society owes its very existence to the state. Fifth, the emergence of state and civil society is one and the same thing and historically it does correspond the same moment.

Leviathan is not a creature *per se*; rather it is made of "real" human beings. Its gigantic body is symbolically composed of thousands and thousands of people while its enormous head refers to the sovereign. It is an "Artifical man" whose soul is sovereignty. Yet, Hobbes still wants to show that the subjects and the sovereign are conflated in the body of Leviathan. How can this conflation occur? Is it coincidental? Is it a rational choice of the people? Or is there something else there? Hobbes's formulation to create a sovereign power is to suggest a "covenant", "concord" or the widely known "social contract" whereby people who gather together from fear of "perpetual war" individually state: "*I Authorise and give up my right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his actions in like manner.*"[7] [emphasis in the original] This "multitude", as Hobbes calls it, of people is united in one "Person" and it is the Commonwealth, Leviathan, *Civitas*, or a "Mortal God" (in contrast to the "Immortal" one). By authorizing this sovereign, every individual both creates himself and Leviathan, thereby instigating a "peaceful" relationship with others through the sovereign's authority. Being subjects of the sovereign unites them for the same reasons: peace and defense of Commonwealth. By conflating the sovereign and subjects in the one body politic, Hobbes excludes any possibility of an independent corporate or political organ that could mediate between sovereign and subjects. That is, he eliminates the option of a parliament in favor of an absolute monarch. There is a direct and vertical relationship between sovereign and subject.

The greatest sin against Leviathan is to reject its authority because this constitutes a direct attack on its very existence. It also signifies disobedience, rebellion and ultimately a declaration of war. From the point of view of the sovereign, it requires the harshest punishments because it challenges to its power. Thus, rebellion unmasks the continued war under the social order layer;

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[7] Hobbes, p. 120.

it is the renewal of the war between the sovereign and the "enemy" within. The rebels are no longer considered as "Subjects, but as Enemies. For Rebellion, is but warre renewed."[8]

According to Hobbes, the only legitimate reason for rebellion is self-protection. As long as the sovereign protects its subjects against the internal and/or external threats, it can demand their obedience. When it stops protecting them, the "covenant" is dissolved and rebellion becomes legitimate. As Carl Schmitt [9] notes for Leviathan specifically- but which is valid for all states: "*The protego ergo obligo* is the *cogito ergo sum* of the state." Hence, protection is the most important preconditions for the legitimacy of states. Accordingly, "if protection ceases, the state too, and every obligation to obey ceases."[10] and then everybody returns to the state of nature. Thus, there is a mutual relationship between obedience and protection. Indeed, this formulation can even be reversed. As Charles Tilly [11]argues, modern states, can be considered as "protection rackets" offering protection against mostly "illusive" threats to condition obedience while the states, themselves may be a direct threat to subjects:

> The sovereignty is the soule of the Common-wealth; which once departed from the Body, the members doe no more receive their motion from it. The end of obedience is protection; which wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own or in others sword, Nature applyeth his obedience to it, his endeavour to maintaine it.[12].

To conclude this section, I argue that Hobbes's major concern in Leviathan is to find a formulation for a secure social order constructed under the sovereignty of Leviathan, an analogy of a mythological-theological monster. My main argument is twofold: First, as Foucault[13] puts it, war is deferred to ahistorical, hypothetical, and unknown, state of war to legitimate the ongoing war. Second; the war is incorporated into body politic through a "regime of internal security."[14] Hence, the war that is claimed to be over is still going on.

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[8] Hobbes, *Leviathan (R. Tuck, Ed.)*, 219.

[9] *The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), p. 52.

[10] Carl Schmitt, *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol*, trans. George Schwab and Erna Hilfstein (London: Greenwood Press, 1996), p. 72.

[11] Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 169–91.

[12] Hobbes, *Leviathan (R. Tuck, Ed.)*, p. 153.

[13] *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976*, p. 90.

[14] Jörg Spieker, "Foucault and Hobbes on Politics, Security, and War," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 36, no. 3 (2011): pp. 187–199.

Furthermore, it adopts a continuous character against the enemy within, against the subjects, because of their permanent threat of rebellion. This point is crucial to understand Hobbes, his solution to end war, (permanent war or civil war) is to absorb and institutionalize it under the coercive power of the sovereign. He therefore, converts its form to maintain the social order so that the motor of the social order is permanent war, controlled and absorbed by various mechanisms. I claim that this is a pacification process that can be called security. Reformulating Clausewitz's famous dictum, I would suggest that *security is the continuation of war by other means*. Leviathan represents the philosophical-political and legal totality of these means.

Locke's Liberalism: Property, Waste, and Accumulation

As a theorist of the rising capitalism and liberalism, Locke, in his seminal work *Two Treaties of Government* (1690), deals with the class interests of a "progressive" landed aristocracy engaged in capitalist agriculture and colonial trade[15]. Writing against absolute monarchy and in favor of the liberties of property, Locke is widely known as the father of classical liberalism. His writings had a great impact on Voltaire, Rousseau and many Scottish Enlightenment thinkers. His ideas were also popularized and broadly referenced by American revolutionaries. In *Two Treaties of Government,* he redefined property as the basis of the state, security and social order. After, almost four centuries, property still holds that position.

The crucial concept in Lockean social order is property. It is the precondition of civil society and the state. Locke starts with religious references to formulate property. Taking anthropocentric approach, he claims that God gave the world to Adam, so man has every right on earth. All the plants and animals are placed at the common service of human kind. However, apart from this communal ownership of natural products, "every man has a *property* in his own *person*."[16] Thus, man can have property as a result of "the labour of his body, and the work of his hands."[17] Gathering, for instance, is a constitutive and binding act whereby man can appropriate something. The defining concept here is labor because it creates private property out of communal ownership. Similarly, Locke argues, if individuals cultivate a plot of land then it becomes their property. Yet, what is the measure of property? Locke's answer is a limiting principle: "need."

[15] Wood and Wood, *A Trumpet Of Sedition: Political Theory and The Rise of Capitalism* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), pp. 115–16.
[16] Locke, p. 18.
[17] Locke, p. 18.

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Nobody can have more than they need. However, such a claim was incompatible with the principles of the mercantilist era that Locke was writing in.

Locke has a simple, albeit brilliant solution: the invention of money and/or the use of precious metals. If it is impossible for someone to preserve their property, e.g. fruits, from spoiling, then they can exchange it for money - which cannot spoil-, and whose value arises from the people's tacit, common agreement. Thus, the invention of money enables the accumulation of wealth by exchanging "surplus" produce in the market. Locke argues that because unused or misused property is "waste," and it is a sin. Locke's idea of waste is closely connected to the ethos of "improvement," capitalist accumulation, and colonialism. With both politico-economic and religious connotations, waste lies at the core of colonialist discourse in that uncultivated and unproductive lands, being nothing but "waste," should be somehow incorporated into market relations. In this regard, Locke's statement that "in the beginning, all the world was America" is impressive. Just as the "vacant places" of America had already been colonized, likewise all uncultivated lands could justifiably be colonized by "industrious" men to avoid waste. At this point, Locke's position about property has clearly changed as his main concern is now accumulation rather than "need."

In Locke's version of natural law, property is obviously prior to civil society, which makes it a "natural right." However, the condition of the property is "very unsafe, very unsecure" in the state of nature as its preservation cannot be guaranteed. "This makes a man willing to quit a condition, which however free is full of fears and continual dangers."[18] Individuals therefore willingly enter into civil society "for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates." This provides the *raison d'être* of the foundation of civil society:

> The great and *chief end,* therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, *is the preservation of their property.* To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting. [emphasis in the original][19]

Even the legislative, the supreme power of civil society, is subject to the "*first and fundamental natural law*, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the *preservation of the society*."[emphasis in the original][20] Locke's principal concern is the limits of legislative power because there is always a danger that an arbitrary, absolute monarch can abuse it. Locke, therefore argues that this should be "limited to the public good of the society," and that the legislative cannot take anyone's property or levy taxes on them without their consent. To do so contradicts the "fundamental law of property" and the purpose of

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[18] Locke, p. 75.
[19] Locke, p. 75.
[20] Locke, p. 81.

government. If legislative power becomes one person's property, the "original compact" dissolves, the relationship of obedience is removed, and the legitimacy of power is disappears. For Locke, by violating civil-positive law and its moral-natural foundations, arbitrary power puts itself into a "state of war" against the people. In this situation, everyone has a right to "*reinstate* their *legislative in the exercise* of their power.*" [emphasis in the original][21]

Locke underlines that conquest, irrespective of the title of the conqueror, is not a justified way of constructing a Commonwealth since it is incompatible with the principle of consent. Thus, as an unjust war, conquest can never establish a real relationship of sovereignty between the unjust conqueror and the conquered people. The position of an unjust conqueror is similar to that of a robber breaking into a house since both violate the principle of consent and, exercise force over the victim. At this point, it is worth noting that even the "conqueror in a lawful war" has only limited power over the conquered people. That is, conquest does not grant absolute power "over the lives or fortunes of those, who engaged not in the war, nor over the possessions even of those, who were actually engaged it."[22] Even in a "just" conquest, possessions are untouchable. Locke was well aware that his suggestion was a "strange doctrine" that is quite contrary to the historical practices. To consolidate his argument, Locke gives an example: "I may kill a thief that sets on me in the highway, yet I may not (which seems less) take away his money and let him go; this would be robbery on my side."[23] What Locke endeavors to do here is to rebuild "property" as an almost sacred, untouchable category that is far more valuable than the lives of people.

Locke's last concern is the conditions for the "dissolution of the government." He differentiates between "dissolution of government" and "dissolution of the society." Wherever society is dissolved, the government cannot survive. Dissolution usually results from the invasion of the commonwealth by foreign forces. Yet, the main problem that Locke faces is dissolution from "within" the country. The first and most important stage is the degeneration of the legislative whereby "the members of commonwealth are united, and combined together into one coherent living body. [It] is the soul that gives form, life and unity to the commonwealth."[24] To deal with an arbitrary absolute power, Locke gives priority to the legislative as the supreme power of the government. Once the legislative has been broken or dissolves, contrary to

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[21] Locke, p. 95.
[22] Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, p. 112.
[23] Locke, p. 113.
[24] Locke, p. 131.

the "social contract," the legitimate authority of the sovereign, whether one person or a body is abolished. The subjects now have every right to establish a "new legislative." Similarly, if the executive power cannot enforce the law, it also means the effective dissolution of the legislative power. Another way of dissolving the government is that the legislative itself acts against its *raison d'être.* As Locke[25] emphasizes:

> The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their property; and the end why they choose and authorize a legislative, is that there may be laws made, and rules set as guards and fences to the properties of all the members of the society, to limit the power, and moderate the dominion of every part and member of the society.

Thus, it is unjust for the legislative to act against the meta-objective of the state and social order, which is the preservation of property, both lives and possessions. As Locke clearly emphasizes, if the legislative destroys the properties of the subjects then social contract is dissolved and the relationship of obedience abolished:

> Whenever the *legislators endeavour to take away and destroy the property of the people*, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge, which God hath provided for all men, against the force and violence. [emphasis in the original]*[26]*

Locke notes that people (the propertied class) have a right to resist or rebel against an unjust arbitrary authority as far as property is concerned. He therefore claims that the truly rebellious ones are those who act against the social contract. By doing so, they put themselves in a Hobbesian state of war. It should be noted that Locke here makes an important historical and theoretical-philosophical contribution to liberal ideology. The authority of the sovereign is conditioned by the right to property, so the sovereign remains so if it protects and respects the right of property. Otherwise, sovereignty dissolves, and the people rebel until a new government can be founded that respects private property. Locke's social order is thus based on the "sacred" right of property; the *raison d'être* of the state is preserving property. Locke made property the heart of the liberal social order, so any attack on this is a declaration of war against the social order. Sovereignty is also limited by the right to property. Any attack against property is thus a reason for a "just" war.

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[25] Locke, p. 135.
[26] Locke, p. 135.

Kant's Perpetual Peace, or Commerce, Cosmopolitanism, and Colonialism?

Compared to his contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics, Kant`s political philosophy is less well-known, except perhaps his famous essay on "Perpetual Peace" (1795**).** Drawing on Abbé de Saint Pierre's (1658-1743) *Projet pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe* (1713). [Project for Making Peace Perpetual in Europe], Kant elaborates a paradigmatic liberal formulation of everlasting peace. His essential argument is that there is a direct correlation between the development of commercial relations and peace. More commercial relations established between republics means a more peaceful world. His peace project can be epitomized by the axiom that the "spirit of commerce…. cannot coexist with war." Kant's peace equation is thus "spirit of commerce" plus "body of a federal union". After the collapse of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), in a neoliberal "globalized world" and under the guidance of United States of America (USA), the United Nations, and countless multinational governmental and non-governmental organizations, his peace project has been "actual" more than ever. According to liberal claims, at least history is about to justify Kant's peace project. Against these claims, however I am going to argue that "perpetual peace" is merely a teleologically and deterministically formed moral and legal justification for a particular global and domestic order based on trade relations, including colonial ones.

As a starting point, Kant lists the preconditions for maintaining perpetual peace between independent states. First, there should be no secret war preparations in terms of accumulating materiel. Second, no independent state, irrespective of size, may be acquired in any way against its will. Third, since the existence of armies ontologically and mutually threatens other states, every state should gradually abolish their armies. Fourth, national debts cannot be contracted regarding the external affairs of the state. Fifth, no state should forcibly interfere in the constitution or government of another state. Sixth, no state at war with another should eternalize its ongoing hostilities, such as through assassinations, poisonings or instigating treason. According to Kant, these "dishonourable stratagems" turn war into "a war of extermination."[27]

As an anti-monarchist, Kant believes that, as a transcendental philosophical concept reason is only realizable under a *republican constitution* based on three principles: *freedom*, *dependence,* and *equality.* Freedom is for all members of society (meaning men); everyone (as subjects) depends on a single common form of legislation (as subjects); everyone (as citizens) has legal equality. For Kant, the *republican constitution* is the only form compatible with

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[27] Immanuel Kant, *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. H. S. Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbett, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93–97.

the idea of the "original contract." Only it can lead to perpetual peace. Thus, every state should have a republican constitution.

The *first* definitive article of perpetual peace is a republican constitution based on the people's consent. Since every important decision must be based on the consent of people according to a republican constitution, the decision to wage war should also have the people's support. However, because "enlightened" people are rational and aware of their interests, it is difficult to get their support to declare war. In contrast, in a state where the people are subjects, it is the "simplest thing in the world" for the ruler to decide to wage war. Since "the head of state" is unlikely to have to sacrifice anything personally during-or after- the war, he can easily decide to wage war, even if it is unwise. Diplomats will be on hand to justify the war for the sake of property.[28]

The *second* definitive article of perpetual peace is a federation of free states. Kant argues that, just like the transition from the state of nature to civil society, each nation, for its own security, has a right to demand relationships with other nations under binding constitutions that secure each one's rights. Therefore, nations, just as individuals did in "the state of nature", can seek a supreme coercive organization to secure their existence. The international domain is thus assumed to be a "state of nature" in a Hobbesian "state of war." This is the classical interpretation of the realist approach in international relations, originating from Machiavelli and Hobbes. Yet, despite the rhetoric of peace in Kant, one can easily classify him alongside Machiavelli and Hobbes within the realist approach to international relations. In the absence of a common coercive legal organization, *realpolitik* prevails in international relations. Kant therefore suggests establishing a *federation of peoples* although this is not equivalent to an "international state."[29]

The *third* definitive article of perpetual peace is cosmopolitan rights. Kant argues that people have a natural right to hospitality: "the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else's territory."[30] That is, if a stranger acts peacefully, then it is his right to be treated in the same way. Like Hobbes and Locke, Kant also claims that all nations, just as for individuals according to Hobbes and Locke, are equal in the sense that they possess the same rights. After comparing the "civilized," "commercial" states of Europe with other non-civilized non-commercial states, Kant concludes that European countries are much more hostile since they have conquered "America, negro countries, Spice islands and the Cape etc." Nevertheless, Kant does not criticize them because they conquer and/or exploit these territories; on the

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[28] Kant, pp. 99–102.
[29] Kant, pp. 102–5.
[30] Kant, p. 105.

contrary, he criticizes them because of their use of brutal methods while exploiting native people. Kant claims that "inhospitable" methods, such as violence and extremely severe slavery, cause the "collapse" of companies or loss of "real profit." He argues that "the peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere."[31] Now, he foresees a "global community" constructed through the development of colonialism, trade relations, and accumulation of capital. He suggests a legal framework based on the concept of rights for this international commercial web to maintain a "global order." His main tools are law and developing international commercial relations. He claims that once a global community emerges, "cosmopolitan rights" are achievable. Only with the aid of this right, is it possible to construct a "perpetual peace." Thus, Kant obviously puts "commercial relations" at the center of his peace project. Then, a supreme organization based on a moral-universal and legal law is required to secure these commercial relations. Ultimately, cosmopolitan rights are merely the right to engage in commerce on a cosmopolitan level.

If this suggestion is historicized, it can be seen an invitation to the colonial powers to reconstruct colonial trade relations in a morally and legally justifiable way. This has a double object. First, it aims to end colonial wars between colonial powers. Second, it suggests that colonialism should be based more on the "spirit of commerce" and less "violence" and "slavery." The problem is that, despite Kant's enlightenment optimism, violence and slavery are inherent to colonialism.

To construct perpetual peace is not just a duty of humanity but also its destiny. Kant's approach is teleological to the extent that he sees perpetual peace is guaranteed by "nature herself." He argues that the "mechanical process of nature" will eventually lead humanity to perpetual peace, even though some people are unwilling to accept that. When he says that natural laws, such as Newtonian physics, lead nations into commercial and international relations, it means that he also naturalizes colonial and commercial relations deterministically.

While nature separates nations through language and religion, war and commercial relations unite them. Kant enumerates two ways of unification, which he claims are diametrically opposed. The first is "force" or "cunning," which includes warlike feelings and actions. The second is pacifistic, which avoids violence and war because it is based on "mutual self-interest." This is crucial to understand Kant's perpetual peace project. As he argues, "For the spirit

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[31] Kant, p. 108.

of commerce sooner or later takes hold of every people, and it cannot exist side by side with war. And of all the powers (or means) at the disposal of the power of the state, financial power can probably be relied on most."[32] This is guaranteed by nature, which creates an "actual mechanism of human inclinations." Kant's vision here is both international and national. Only a state with a republican constitution -that secure individual rights, including the right to commerce- can construct its social order; only after this is, it ready to participate in constructing "global order." Ultimately, therefore, "global order" requires republican constitutions based on individual rights.

Kant's prominence comes from the fact that his approach of "perpetual peace" is the source of liberal arguments that emphasize the peaceful nature of the capitalist mode of production and exchange relations. In short, Kant argues that international peace can be achieved by expanding capitalist commercial relations. However, the question of how this expansion takes place is unanswered; the nature of the relationship between republican, constitutionalist, colonialist and capitalist countries, and non-capitalist colonies is left uncertain. It seems that Kant's teleology complies with colonialism. If it is a condition for "perpetual peace" that all countries need to be republican and capitalist, then can how colonized countries obtain these qualities? If the answer is not by progress and education, then it inevitably implies a political process.

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Conclusion

This study set out to gain a better understanding of the relationship between security and (proto)liberal arguments about social order. It identified that, from Hobbes on, the social order has been considered to be a consequence of a war between sovereigns and subjects. The foundation of Leviathan did not end the war but legally institutionalized it, thereby making it "perpetual." This war continuing underneath the institutionalized and legalized social order, can thus be named security. I suggest that we can understand the Hobbesian concept of security *as the continuation of war by other means.*

Locke then reconstructed the concept of property as a vital security referent object of the liberal social order. The state itself was founded to secure property rights and even the sovereign must respect the "divine" right of property. If a sovereign commits an offence against property, those affected have every right to resist this unlawful act. A violence of property rights may therefore provoke a "just war" against the usurper.

Kant established a correlation between the development of commercial capitalism and peace. Even though it was empirically falsified by two world wars

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[32] Kant, p. 114.

and countless armed and unarmed conflicts between capitalist nation-states, it still constitutes the core argument of " the liberal peace thesis." Yet, as this study shows Kant's argument suffers from a teleological, deterministic and optimist stance. Capitalism, especially in the form of colonialism, has not been propagated naturally nor peacefully. Power relations have always played a critical role in fabricating a certain social order-liberal in this case. Kant's naïve optimism and teleology mask socio-political power relations that made the liberal social order possible.

Taken together, these arguments suggest that the relationship between liberalism and security must be analyzed more critically. Otherwise, there is a risk of taking security for granted in the liberal social order. The liberal social order is not naturally, mechanically, or teleologically fabricated. Rather, it is a product of complex socio-political processes. Furthermore, its historical success arose from its ability to pacifiy (potential) rebels. Thus, the war against "enemy within" has been crucial. At the expense of oversimplification, one might argue that the ongoing Hobbesian war against internal antagonists to the liberal social order, at the center of which stands the Lockean concept of property has taken the name of security to make itself an indispensable precondition for Kantian perpetual peace.

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