

BALKAN CHALLENGES: A TURKISH PERSPECTIVE¹

Ali Hikmet ALP*

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The single most important event of the last decade of the XX. Century has been the collapse of the communist system.

The consequent strategic environment (the disappearance of a hostile superpower and opening towards the East) has been greatly enhanced the security of both Turkey and Germany, the front-line countries of the previous period. Their interest with developments and stability in the Balkans (SouthEast Europe)ⁱ, which occupy a pivotal position at the center of Eurasia, is only natural.

However, the management of its consequences of this spectacular event is still an unfinished job. Conflicts and instabilities are not over. Both countries can easily be affected by new, different kind of risks and instabilities. The last decade has showed that their impact is directly felt as refugee flows, blockage of transport and communications, arms and drug trafficking, reduced trade, etc. Regional stability is therefore a shared objective, unequivocally expressed through their cooperation in international organisations active in the region, such as NATO, UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, where both countries are members.

However, sharing the same objective does not necessarily mean a sameness of interests, which may, and in fact, are perceived differently by Turkey and Germany. The quality of this stability, means engaged and the roles of the international or local actors too (“what is done and by whom”) are important and they cannot be perceived by the two countries in the same way. I believe this point (which is also relevant for their policies towards Russia, Caucasus and Central Asia) will be more evident when we try to identify specific Turkish interests, several of them linked with Turkey’s peculiar geography and its peculiar historical connections with the region.

The relative weight of the two states, individually or within these organisations too are different. Germany is economically the most powerful, and politically a very influential member of the European Union, which endorsed heavy responsibilities in the region. Visibility of its contributions individually or through the Union and its increasing economic presence helped

¹ Türk – Alman İlişkileri ve Avrupa Birliği Uluslararası Konferansında 26 Eylül’de gerçekleştirilen Panel 1’de sunulan bildiridir.

* Emekli Büyükelçi, AGİT Eski Daimi Temsilcisi, Dış Politika Enstitüsü Yönetim Kurulu Üyesi

Germany to change its image of the Second World War, as an occupying power in the Balkans.

IMPORTANCE OF THE SEE FOR TURKEY

Balkans is Turkey's immediate neighbourhood, geographically interposed between Europe and its own landmass. For political, economic, security and several other reasons to keep open this gateway to Europe is a matter of vital national interest. This can be best ensured through peace, democratic stability and economic development in the region.

Consequently, Turkey is rightly sensitive towards the probability of the emergence of a hostile "hegemon" or of an adversarial major power competition, which may result in the division of the region once again, as it had happened prior to, and during the Cold-War period.

Historically, Balkan nations have never been excellent partners for cooperation. It would therefore be realistic to assume that, peace, development and stability in the Balkans can be best assured through its integration, in the larger sense of the word, with a friendly Europe. The SEE, once integrated with Europe, cannot have, by definition, policies trying to alienate or exclude Turkey (with the exception of usual, or manageable rivalries as in the case of Turkish-Greek relations), itself a candidate country with customs union and a NATO member. But a differentiation which would foreclose its EU membership (Luxembourg conclusions), or would keep it outside of the security arrangements in the region (CESDP in its present form) are clearly against its national interests.

However, despite this vital importance of the region, Turkish policy-makers have to bear in mind that Turkey is not simply a "regional" country. In prioritizing their policies and actions, they have to take into account the other components of the Country's vast strategic environment, such as the Caucasus, Central Asia, Iran and the Middle East. Turkey in this environment continues to provide for Europe a no less important protective shield, usually taken as granted by the Western Europe, but better understood by the USA. Some Turkish and foreign scholars argue that, this peculiar strategic environment is one of the reasons (not openly declared) of the reluctance of some EU members towards the Turkish membershipⁱⁱ.

Confidence building and continuity: Republican Turkey gave up all territorial claims on the ex-Ottoman possessions not included in the International Treaties.

Preservation of the territorial status quo as a policy principle followed since the First World War by all Turkish Governments is in perfect harmony with the overall objective of stability and a source of confidence for the regional powers. Indeed, the Turkish foreign policy displays in this respect an

uninterrupted continuity. In the Republican Period, even in the unofficial statements of the nationalist parties, claims for territorial expansion are absent.

Historical legacy, cultural and ethnic ties, not linked in any way to territorial ambitions, too is important aspects. The Ottoman State developed more in Europe than Anatolia, for several reasons. It brought Islam to Europe and continued a presence of five centuries, without a systematic policy of islamisation. Due to nationalistic or religiously motivated (and by today's standards) even racist policies of the new independent states in the ex-Ottoman territories, Turkish and Muslim populations in the Balkans considerably decreased. But the demographic connection has not been interrupted. With the migration to Turkey of the millions of Muslims of non-Turkish originⁱⁱⁱ it has, in a sense, been strengthened, This explains why the slaughtering of the hundreds of thousands of Muslims in Bosnia was considered in Turkey more than a grave humanitarian situation. The arms embargo against the Bosniaks, for example (which unfairly deprived them from the means of self-defence) was considered by a large section of the public opinion as a cruel, deliberate discrimination. We should also add the considerable influence, which the citizens of Balkan origin can wield as pressure groups.

Turkish minorities in the Balkans is another important aspect. As the 1984 campaign against the Turkish minority in Bulgaria has shown, the way these minorities are treated can cause serious tensions^{iv}. A situation which has now radically changed, thanks to the democratisation and the EU membership ambitions of Bulgaria.

With regard to economic factors, Balkans as a transit route is of vital importance. As other Balkan countries Turkey too lost considerable revenues because of the closure of the main artery through Yugoslavia and because of the sanctions. This role of the Balkans will further increase with developed infrastructure (so called European corridors) and political stability. Besides that and despite the small size of the markets and the transition difficulties of these countries, trade and the Turkish investments too are on the increase^v. Turkey traditionally is among the major trading partners of Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria. Turkish industrialisation effort increased economic complementarity, and despite the loss of industrial production in the countries and transportation difficulties, economic relations, trade and investments are on the increase. Through regional organisations, trilateral and bilateral arrangements Turkey promoted and concluded trade liberalisation agreements with regional partners.

HOW TURKEY CONTRIBUTES TO REGIONAL STABILITY

With the exception of Greece and to some extent with Bulgaria, Turkey did not have bilateral problems with other SEE countries. A quick improvement of bilateral relations with the former Eastern Bloc countries has therefore been possible, including the resolution of almost all controversial issues with Bulgaria. Political support in international forums and in particular

for NATO membership, as well as active participation in regional cooperation schemes too should be considered as important contributions (in particular for Bosnia, Albania and Macedonia).

Although to determine the amount of the Turkish assistance from private sources and NGO's is almost impossible, the public sector assistance is evaluated over 500 mil. \$USA between 1991-97, in the form of credits, debt forgiveness and donations. Participation in peacekeeping operations (Bosnia, Alba Operation in Albania, Kosova and now Macedonia, a leading role in the promotion of the "Multilateral Force") as well as donation of military materiel, police equipment and military training, refugee reception are among the significant Turkish contributions.

With regard to the present situation the following remark seems appropriate: Turkey provided considerable assistance in the early periods of the transition and during the Balkan Wars. Since then, conditions have dramatically (and mostly positively) changed. Except the continuation of the political assistance and assistance to weakest sectors (bilaterally or thorough the Stability Pact), Turkey does not anymore need to assume important additional burden, which can be diverted to other areas such as the Caucasus and the Middle East. The present European effort for the development of the SEE is, for all practical purposes, a part of the enlargement policy, therefore not a Turkish responsibility.

PROSPECTS OF TURKISH-GERMAN COOPERATION IN THE BALKANS AND IN THE SP IN PARTICULAR

Most of the efforts for Balkan stabilisation are multilateral. Both countries participate in NATO efforts. Although there are differences regarding the size and modalities of the assistance, as I said, political objectives are the same.

Obviously, being a member of the EU, Germany has much more possibilities to influence policy making and participation. Its economic-financial capabilities, which Turkey does not have, are a plus. Despite its interests, Turkey cannot have a crucial influence in shaping the Western policies towards the Balkans, or in their implementation, although it may have enormous negative influence if it chooses to do so.

In the early nineties Turkey has been an important promoter of the Western intervention in the Balkans. With the active involvement of NATO, and all other relevant organisations, this objective has been achieved.

In view of the increased involvement of the EU in Balkan security and stability, Turkey is justifiably very sensitive about the possible consequences of the shape which a Common European Defence and Security Policy will finally take, in view of the risk of its exclusion from participation and decision making processes.

It is doubtful, that Europe, no more under direct security threat and pressure from the East fully appreciates these concerns.

Rather excessive European self-confidence neglects that Turkey can introduce different approaches and a balance in dealing with the complex political and ethno-cultural issues of the region. A case in point is the Bosnian disaster, where the European powers were late in understanding (and incapable of intervening without Americans) the extremely negative impact in the Muslim World of not providing adequate protection and support to Bosnian Muslims.

With regard to possible Turkish-German cooperation in the Balkans, it should be added that Germany is not a country very much open to bilateral cooperation, for its own specific reasons and possibly also because of the present state of the bilateral relations. All countries, in exchange for their assistance, want in return to get an undiluted local and international visibility, with the expectation of influence and better protection of their interests. For Germany, which has been more successful than others in economic penetration, the EU umbrella, rather than cooperation with third countries seems to be preferable.

THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MATTERS: NEW OUTLOOK IN EUROPE TOWARDS THE BALKANS

The history of the XIX and a considerable part of the XX Century is full of developments and interventions of which Europe cannot be proud. While the Balkans gained the reputation of the “powder keg of Europe”, the role and responsibility of the European power politics is often forgotten. Western historians rarely mention for example the expulsion of the Turkish-Muslim populations from the Balkans, in conditions no better than today’s ethnic cleansings.

Maybe the single most important change today is the change in the European outlook towards the region. Instead of national expansionist policies and interference, which exploited intra-regional divergences, the trend now is for coordinated, even common policies to enhance stability and development. Transformation in outlook is true also for the peoples of the SEE, and governments are able to respond to popular choice, practically unhindered by the kind of divisive influences, which Russia exercised in the past.

HOT POINTS: SECURITY CHALLENGES, LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THE RECENT BALKAN CONFLICTS, WEAKNESSES OF THE BALKAN STATES

Decrease in the likelihood of an aggression from outside the region to Balkan countries is slim, although not improbable. As the moderate policies of Albania have once again proved during the present Macedonian crisis, governments no more blindly endorse nationalist agendas. Probability of war between most of the Balkan countries has therefore been much reduced and will diminish even more with the consolidation of democracy and stability in individual countries, and with enhanced European leverage to influence national policies. Still, threats from within, such as ethnic tensions, minorities and exacerbation of the contradictions due to poor performance in economy and state building, corruption, inadequate border controls, etc. will continue, with the risk of serious inter-state tensions, even conflicts. We have to remind here that the Western part of the region (Bosnia, Serb minorities and return issues in Croatia, refugee issues in general) has still serious political divergences and several unresolved minority and resettlement problems.

PRESENT OR PROBABLE TENSION AREAS

Developments in the FRY deserve special attention and conditional Western assistance. Disappearance of the Milosevich regime and progress towards democracy are very positive developments. However, the election of a new President and Parliament through a democratic process are not enough and question marks about the future political developments in the FRY will continue.

While FRY is gradually being included in the Western cooperation and assistance programs, there is a long way to go in terms of internal political stability, openness to international cooperation, judicial and administrative reforms and economic restructuring. Resolution of the status question of Kosova and relations with Montenegro, approaches towards the State of Bosnia and (as one of its constituent elements) towards the Republica Srpska, Serb minorities abroad and other minorities in Serbia, as well as the question of war criminals will continue as delicate issues affecting its relations also with neighbours.

PROBLEMS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

In the Western Balkans, besides the delicate FRY situation there are still vulnerable or unstable states or entities, as well as serious risks of the emergence of internal conflicts liable to involve the neighbours (Bosnia, Albania, Macedonia and their neighbours). Although several lessons have been drawn from the war in Bosnia, credible models regarding the establishment of the

internal balance and inter ethnic cooperation are not in sight, as shown by the dilemmas of Kosova situation and recently in Macedonia.

Despite the strong trends for integration, it would be imprudent to say that the risks of re-emergence of aggressive nationalism and of traditional tensions have been completely eliminated. In some areas, entities, ethnic communities, even peoples are not happy with the way borders are defined. Still fresh memories of the recent conflicts and feed the inability to overcome the traditional distrust towards each other. Even if the past “historical bases” for expansion (greater states), demands for territorial changes, (often linked to ethnic composition and minorities) are no more in the agendas of the governments, the Bosnian and Macedonian situations show that confidence in multi-ethnic Balkan states is far of being established. Europe will continue its presence and assistance so that majorities, minorities and constituent peoples work out new ways for living together within the same state and to cooperate.

OTHER PROBLEM AREAS FOR THE REGIONAL STATES WITH POSSIBLE IMPACT ON REGIONAL STABILITY

The post-Cold War democratic regimes are expected to bring not only freedom, but also economic development and prosperity. If the pro-West democratic governments are not good performers (with adequate assistance) the internal, and consequently overall Balkan stability cannot be ensured. Non-democratic, authoritarian political forces may re-emerge^{vi}, at least slowing down the progress.

The importance of the fast reconstruction and economic development versus slow institutional progress and low assistance absorption capabilities of the recipient countries is not a new dilemma for the West in general and for the International financial institutions.

External assistance, although indispensable, is not sufficient for the success of the ongoing transformation. International Community believes that progress in the elimination of the shortcomings in the following areas^{vii} identified by the World Bank is imperative:

Transition, State and institution building: Difficulties of transition to market oriented economy in a period of regional instability and conflicts. Institutional weaknesses, social costs of the slow economic recovery, dubious effectiveness of the reforms, unfair distribution of the national income, elite and class issues.

Questions of “good governance”. (Inefficiency of the judicial system, excessive bureaucracy, corruption, organized crime, law and order, ineffective judiciary system).

Accommodation of ethnic diversity and treatment of the minorities. (In particular in the negative case of the absence of a reasonably steady economic and social development and adequate constitutional changes).

The need for a new social contract between different ethnic groups for consensual participation in a common state is obvious. However, even the viability and effectiveness of the arrangements imposed and tutored from outside, and relative economic development (fed by outside help) do not seem to be panacea. Time and perseverance to ensure “sustainability” are necessary.

With regard to human rights, in most cases “the problem is not so much in the restriction of rights recognized by the State, but the inability of the State to provide for and to ensure the conditions for the protection and the full exercise of the rights”^{viii}.

Another serious shortcoming is the mutual “image problem”, influenced by historical connections (Slavism, pan-orthodoxy, ethnic and religious polarisation) and myths which tend to emphasize the “epic” episodes of their history, written by ideologists rather than true scholars. For decades, if not for centuries, their peoples have been subjected to negative propaganda, not only towards Turkey, the imperial power and the standard bearer of the Islam, but also towards each other. Division of the last four decade too has taken their toll^{ix}. A lot has to be done in this respect in the whole SEE.

ROLES AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE BALKANS, PROSPECTIVE NATO AND EU MEMBERSHIPS, RESPECTIVE ROLES IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND POST-CONFLICT STABILISATION

As it is accepted by a majority of policy analysts the European Governments reactions vis-a-vis Bosnian conflict was weak, divided and disorganised, with tragic consequences.

It would not be wrong to say that what moved the West for a more active involvement was not the political will to use the elaborate conflict prevention tools and institutions which already existed, but the reaction of the public opinions and the role and influence of the media. Europe decided to intervene only after the change of heart on the American side. Subsequent cost for Europe (and in particular for Germany which had to receive almost 400.000 refugees) has been much costlier than that of a timely intervention. None of the International Organisations has been able to pass the test successfully.

In subsequent interventions NATO played the essential role. No wonder that the Balkan countries consider NATO as a guarantee for their security even without being a member, as an Organisation which is able to deliver and as a connection with the USA.

However, it would be unfair not to emphasize the vital role of the EU Union in post-conflict reconstruction, which is no less important than the prevention of the conflict. NATO can prevent a conflict, can stop a war, but cannot cope with the multiple tasks of reconstruction, which has political, economic and social aspects. As it has been once again seen in the Macedonian

example, an well-organized cooperation of both, the EU and NATO is necessary, instead of premature ambitions to go alone for motivations alien to the issues of the region. It is obvious that Europe, in order to perform this role (despite its poor record), it has to generate the political will for engagement, adequate means and resources (manpower, logistics, command and control and intelligence capability, as well as institutional arrangements suitable for fast and effective political and military decision-making)^x.

For various reasons, but mostly due to differences of vision among its members, CESDP project seem to be hesitant between an intellectual construction of a union model complete in all respects (institutional aspects) and the development of strong conflict prevention capability, where EU can play the valuable, even indispensable role in its so-called “security neighbourhood” (with a proposed force of 60.000). We cannot of course discuss here all the implications of the CSDP project and the EU efforts to develop an autonomous intervention capability. Suffice it to express doubts that, on the feasibility of taking the crucial decisions in a timely fashion and managing efficiently the military forces (even with an automatic availability of the NATO assets) without a major effort to solve political and institutional aspects. When it comes to regional issues and to the highest form of political decision making (which the use of military forces require), EU is not a homogenous group. Undue emphasis seem to have been placed on the NATO-EU military relationship, at the expense of the above mentioned points. NATO capabilities in practice mean US intelligence and lift capabilities, which may not be as vital as emphasized, since EU will not have the clout, political coherence and the means to intervene beyond its neighbourhood for the foreseeable future, except participation in UN coalitions. While the Europeans are critical of Americans for not wanting the development of a European defence autonomy, they themselves display an inability to take the initiative in more modest projects, when need and opportunity arise, as the case is for example now in Macedonia (even if Bosnia and Kosova examples are overlooked).

Some highly placed politicians and officials went as far as accusing Turkey of trying to prevent EU to acquire a “defence and security identity” because of its proposal for “case by case” NATO decision (Washington Summit compromise which EU wants to revisit), instead of automatic availability, as if that “big brother” contribution is a “sine qua non” component. One can hardly imagine a Turkey so powerful as to prevent the most prosperous and powerful countries of Europe to acquire something, including a security identity or autonomous defence capability. Isn't it fair to say that such views do not take into consideration that, at final account, any “availability”, is a NATO political-military involvement where all NATO members have a right for a say, even for participation. That position taken by France in particular, remains far behind the WEU arrangements with non-member states, overlooks the unnecessary, even harmful consequences of the exclusion of Turkey (an ally of difficult times) from a positive involvement in the security of a region vitally important for its own security.

The worst imaginable scenario is of course the monopolisation of an issue by a group of countries and then a failure in the implementation, as the case was during the Bosnian war.

While EU can have more acceptability than NATO for intervention, in particular for peacekeeping in some other areas like the Caucasus, neither coherent policies, nor the necessary political will, collective decision-making capability and resources to acquire the means are on the horizon. The absence of the EU as an entity in the coalition efforts to combat against the terrorist safe-heavens in Afghanistan (in contrast to individual involvement of its members) is conspicuous.

IRRESISTIBLE ATTRACTION OF THE EU MEMBERSHIP AND ITS EFFECTS ON INTRA-REGIONAL COOPERATION

The ‘Euro-Atlantic integration (meaning EU membership and, in particular for the Eastern Balkan countries, NATO membership) became national policy objectives for all Balkan countries. This trend not only enhances acceptability for positive political influence, but also provides a valuable incentive for conflict prevention and encourages further long-term EU involvement. Countries are consequently more willing to accept advice, suggestion and integration program coming from EU, although their implementation is a different matter. It has at the same time some undesirable (but probably unavoidable) side effects:

-It is liable to lead to long-term dependency and the creation of more protectorates in unstable areas.

-Too much reliance on and high expectations from assistance and membership advantages with the EU creates also disappointments and unnecessary competition.

Several criticisms are directed at EU policies, as shortcomings, sometimes unfairly:

-Dealing with the countries individually, instead of a region-wide approach for integration (Preferences dictated by enlargement policy and not necessarily by region-wide issues).

-Insufficient attention to integration among regional countries themselves, with the result of an undue emphasis on vertical integration than on the horizontal one.

-Lack of a region-scale macro economic discipline and planning.

-Inefficiency and slowness of the decision making process (Brussels bureaucracy).

It would however be fair to say that since a couple of years EU is developing new policies and approaches, changing its initial outlook, such as

association and cooperation agreements, Stability Pact, etc., which will remedy to situations addressed in such criticisms. There is no other alternative anyhow.

REGIONAL COOPERATION, PARADOXES OF THE PRESENT DAY BALKANS: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

Internal dynamics of most Balkan countries develop in a positive direction. Democracy, human rights and market economy are taking roots. Although attention is often focused on conflicts and the negative aspects, difficult, uneven, but steady progress achieved in almost all areas and countries should not be overlooked. The Eastern Balkans, Bulgaria and Romania, steady improvement in Albania are good examples, proving the point that Balkans is not only a region of conflicts and tensions. Despite the shortcomings, International involvement and effort brought improvements almost in all cases.

One shortcoming is the insufficient Regional cooperation: Intra- regional cooperation is necessary because several of the problems are common and in many cases they are among themselves. As it is often said, integration with Europe cannot be possible without regional integration, at least without substantial regional cooperation.

Among the regional cooperation schemes (The South Eastern Europe Cooperation Process, South East Europe Cooperation Initiative, The Stability Pact for the South East Europe, as well as the EU's Western Balkan Initiative and several "trilateral" or bilateral cooperation initiatives).

The SEE Cooperation Process deserves special attention as an "indigenous" initiative, a forum for political consultations at highest level. It comprises all SEE countries^{xi}, practically a historical "first". It's Charter identifies a large spectrum of cooperative ideas and a code of conduct. It is a remarkable achievement that SEE countries have been able (despite unnecessary competition) to establish the rudiments of a Multinational peacekeeping force, which so far remained symbolic.

There are several impediments on the way of the development of efficient regional organisations:

-Balkan nations do not have an established tradition of coming together for problem solving. The dominant trend is to look towards major European powers.

-Some of them (with the understandable exception of Turkey and Greece), think (rather exaggeratedly) that enhanced regional cooperation can produce a wrong impression of choice, at the expense of "EU first" policy.

-There are no economically powerful members, which would lead or pull the others, at a time when economic considerations have priority.

European Union can and should do more to encourage regional cooperation, supporting some of the regional projects from its programs and showing more interest for regional cooperation schemes with real participation, rather than a simple presence. It should also help to convince the regional countries that regional schemes cannot be considered as harmful to their objectives for Euro-Atlantic integration^{xiii}.

STABILITY PACT FOR SEE (GERMAN INITIATIVE)

As a comprehensive approach similar to OSCE, is certainly the most articulate regional cooperation scheme under nominal OSCE auspices, but essentially an EU management responsibility. Several criticisms such as insufficient funding (6 billion Euros for 5 years), loose management, interference and duplication with other EU schemes, slow decision-making and poor monitoring are being made. The Pact in practice is a parallel version of the pre-integration policy implementation of the Union. Despite the openly expressed complaints of the regional countries for what they consider as insufficient funding, there is no doubt about its usefulness. Some organisational and procedural changes will eventually be made by the successor of Mr. Hombach, probably considered as too outspoken for EU standards.

SECI, a less ambitious project (an American initiative) aimed at concrete intra- regional cooperation projects in crucial areas. Its activities are gradually overtaken by the Stability Pact.

CONCLUSIONS

Conflicts in the Balkans have been contained and now practically ended. However, reconstruction and state building necessitates long-term effort by countries themselves and by the European Union in particular. The West, in particular Europe will be engaged for a long time. There is no doubt regarding the resurgence of conflicts if peacekeeping forces are withdrawn. In particular after the 11 of September terrorist attack, America will probably accelerate the new Administration's tendency to downgrade its Balkan involvement. Although International presence in Bosnia and Kosova is established under the UN umbrella, EU will continue to bear the main burden, for quite a long time.

Democratisation and reforms are being encouraged by the national policy objectives which accord highest priority to Euro-Atlantic integration, somehow shifting the attention from effective political and economic cooperation among regional countries.

Regarding the regional security, threats originate from within, rather than from outside. NATO is considered as the main guarantor of the regional security, while the security projects of the EU, such as CESDP, creates

concerns in some non-members, in particular in Turkey, because of their exclusive character.

As a regional country, Turkey considers that its multiple interests and connections can be protected best by peace, stability and progress in the Balkans. Integration with Europe of this region is therefore in Turkey's interest, provided that Turkey itself is offered participation and involvement.

Notlar:

ⁱ Most regional countries do not like to be associated with the traditional word "Balkan", probably in order to emphasise their European vocation, and to disassociate themselves with the not-so-good reputation of the region. The "Central European Initiative", which seems to have lost of its initial lustre, comprises all countries traditionally considered as 'Balkan', except Turkey and Greece. Turkey, a Eurasian power at the same time, does not seem to be concerned with such categorisations.

ⁱⁱ For a rare frank assessment of this opinion see also *European Integration and Defence: Ultimate Challenge?*, by Jolyon Howorth, Chaillot Papers, No 43. The German Government's ambiguity regarding the applicability of the Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty in the eventuality of an aggression against Turkey during the Gulf War is another example.

ⁱⁱⁱ This phenomenon should not be mixed with the extensive opportunities for participation and mobility offered to Muslims of non-turkic origin. The Ottoman State did not define the rights and the privileges of the communities and individuals by race or ethnic origin, but by their religion. 'Ethnicity', as it is understood today is a concept imported from the West.

^{iv} Almost in all Balkan countries there are Turkish minorities, most important being in Bulgaria (estimated around a million and in Greece around 150.000).

^v In 1999 Turkish exports were around 1.300 mil. \$US and imports a little under one billion, Romania and Bulgaria are first and second trade partners. Turkish investments in Romania are about 900 mil. \$USA. According to Turkish press, the present economic crisis in Turkey has accelerated Turkish investments in particular in Bulgaria. One has also to take into account that the aggregate economies and population of these countries are smaller than that of Turkey.

^{vi} However, several examples show that economic development alone cannot prevent the surge of nationalism.

^{vii} The World Bank Report of 1999, *The Road to Stability and Prosperity in South Eastern Europe, A Regional Strategy Paper*. Another interesting study on the matter is the collective work by three Balkan scholars: *The Southern Balkans: perspectives from the region*, edited by D. Triantaphyllou, Chaillot Paper N0.46

^{viii} Quoted from the excellent study by Institute for Regional and International Studies, Sofia: "Security and reconstruction of Southeastern Europe: A policy Outlook from the Region".

^{ix} As an illustration we can mention that the “name problem” between Greece and Macedonia is still pending, Bulgaria reluctantly (and indirectly) recognized at official level a “Macedonian Nation”, Kosova Albanian’s claim for self-determination, Albanian rights movement in Macedonia (often perceived as a cover for “Greater Albania” ambitions, regardless of the fact that Albanians were also the most discriminated minority in the FRY).

^x For an analysis of the development of the CESDP, capabilities and shortcomings see: European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?, Jolyon Howorth, Chaillot Paper No.43

^{xi} Croatia participates as an observer.

^{xii} The interest of the EU with the SEE Cooperation Process has so far been confined to the participation of Solana, Patten and the SP Coordinator, Mr. Hombach, The Union has been generous to Greece in terms of resources to conduct a certain Balkan policy, as its proxy.

Copyright of Akdeniz University Faculty of Economics & Administrative Sciences Faculty Journal / Akdeniz Universitesi Iktisadi ve Idari Bilimler Fakultesi Dergisi is the property of Akdeniz University Faculty of Economics & Administrative Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.