ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ / RESEARCH ARTICLE

The European Union's Crisis Management Operations in Support of the United Nations in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Question of Legitimacy

Avrupa Birliği'nin Birleşmiş Milletlere Destek Amacıyla Sahra-Altı Afrika'da Yürütmüş Olduğu Kriz Yönetimi Operasyonları: Meşruiyet Meselesi

Taylan Özgür KAYA[*] ID

Abstract

This article aims to analyse legitimacy of military crisis management operations carried out by the EU in support of the UN in sub-Saharan Africa by using Mark Suchman's typology of organizational legitimacy including pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. These three types of legitimacy are tested through analysing four cases in which EU has engaged in sub-Saharan Africa in support of the UN: Operation Artemis (2003), EUFOR RD CONGO (2006), EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2008-2009) and EUFOR RCA (2014-2015). In terms of pragmatic legitimacy, the EU enjoys high level of legitimacy, because these operations served both institutional interests of the EU and self-interests of some member states, particularly France. With regard to moral legitimacy, the EU suffers from a legitimacy deficit. Although declared motives for the launch of these operations was to help the UN in fulfilling its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, indeed, EU engagement in these crisis management operations was to a significant degree driven by the institutional interests of the EU and interests of some individual member states. Moreover, all operations were UN-mandated autonomous EU military operations rather than integrated EU troops in UN-led operations. Thus, real motivation for launching the operations and their modalities undermined moral legitimacy of these operations, because it casted doubts on whether these operations have served the global common good or not. Furthermore, EU's utilitarian, selective and self-interested use of its crisis management tool puts limit on the EU's future reliability and taken-for-grantedness as a UN partner in protecting and promoting international peace and security, and thus resulted in cognitive legitimacy deficit.

Keywords: European Union, United Nations, Crisis Management, sub-Saharan Africa, Legitimacy

* Assoc. Prof. Dr., Necmettin Erbakan University, Faculty of Political Science, Department of Political Science and International Relations. taylanozgurkaya@gmail.com

Öz

Bu makalenin amacı, AB'nin Birleşmiş Milletlere (BM) destek olmak amacıyla Sahra-altı Afrika bölgesinde yürütmüş olduğu askeri kriz yönetimi operasyonlarının meşruiyetini Mark Suchman'ın pragmatik, ahlaki ve bilişsel olmak üzere üçlü bir sınıflandırmaya tabi tuttuğu örgütsel meşruiyet tipolojisi çerçevesinde analiz etmektir. Bu üçlü meşruiyet tiplojisi, Birliğin Sahra-altı Afrika bölgesinde BM'ye destek olmak amacıyla yürütmüş olduğu dört askeri kriz yönetimi operasyonu çerçevesinde değerlendirilecektir: Artemis Operasyonu (2003), EUFOR RD CONGO (2006), EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2008-2009) ve EUFOR RCA (2014-2015). Bütün operasyonların hem Birliğin kurumsal çıkarlarına hem de Fransa gibi önde gelen üye devletlerin bölgesel çıkarlarına hizmet etmesi, Birliğe yüksek düzeyde bir pragmatik meşruiyet sağlamaktadır. Buna karşılık ahlaki ve bilişsel meşruiyet açılarında Birlik ciddi bir meşruiyet açığı ile karşı karşıyadır. Her ne kadar Birlik, bu operasyonların başlatılma sebebini BM'ye temel sorumluluğu olan uluslararası barış güvenliği koruma konusunda destek olma olarak açıklamış olsa da esas neden gerek Birliğin kurumsal çıkarları gerekse bazı üye devletlerin özel çıkarlarının korunmasıdır. Bunun yanında, bu operasyonlar, Birlik askerlerinin doğrudan BM komutası altındaki bir operasyona katılımından ziyade BM tarafından yetkilendirilmiş bağımsız AB operasyonlarıdır. Bu iki özellik yani operasyonların gerisindeki gerçek motivasyon ve operasyonların yürütülme tarzı bu operasyonların ahlaki meşruiyetini zayıflatmaktadır. Bunun temel nedeni ise bu iki özelliğin, bu operasyonların küresel ortak fayda olan uluslararası barış ve güvenliğin korunması amacıyla başlatılıp başlatılmadığı konusunda ciddi şüphelere neden olmasıdır. Ayrıca, Birliğin kriz yönetimi aracını faydacı, seçici ve özçıkarları için kullanması, uluslararası barış ve güvenliğin korunmasında BM'nin partneri olarak Birliğin gelecekteki güvenilirliğini azaltmakta ve bu şekilde de kriz yönetimi operasyonlarının bilişsel meşruiyetini zayıflatmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Birleşmiş Milletler, Kriz Yönetimi, Sahra-altı Afrika, Meşruiyet

1. Introduction

Since the EU and the UN have complementary political interests, shared norms and values, and operational interdependence, they have been regarded as natural partners (Peters, 2011, p. 644). They share a wide range of norms and values and an ideal of the establishment of a rule-based and peaceful international order based on effective multilateralism. They cooperate in a wide range of areas including the protection and promotion of global peace and security, and the provision of development and humanitarian assistance (Peters, 2011, p. 645). In terms of protection and promotion of global peace and security, the strengthening of EU-UN cooperation in the field of crisis management is mutually beneficial. On the one hand, the crisis management capability developed by the EU within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) can be utilized by the UN in carrying out its responsibility to protect and promote global peace and security. On the other hand, the UN is a body which has the authority to provide legitimacy for the EU's conflict and crisis management activities and for its effort to become an important global security actor (Peters, 2011, p. 645). The mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and the UN has been clearly seen in sub-Saharan African cases discussed in this article, the UN missions provided a strategic framework for EU crisis management operations in return for EU's provision of vital military support to UN missions at challenging security environments (Gowan, 2009, p. 119). In addition, as it will be seen in our case studies, through connecting the CSDP with the UN, the EU was able to present its defence identity as part of a global collective security strategy (Gowan, 2009, p. 119). Moreover, the EU is seen as a perfect partner for the UN, which

has been looking for reliable and like-minded partners having the necessary capabilities, including rapid reaction capacity and well-developed communications, intelligence and logistics facilities in order to share its increasing logistical and financial burden of global peacekeeping (Hadden, 2009, p. 54). On the EU side, through complementing their significant contribution to the UN regular budget with an effective partnership with the UN in the area of crisis management, EU member states expect to boost the Union's international visibility (Hadden, 2009, p. 54).

These factors led the two organizations to cooperate in the area of crisis management and their cooperation in this field was formalized by two documents which were signed and jointly declared by both organizations: "2003 Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management" and "2007 Joint Statement on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management". In both documents, the two organizations confirmed their mutual commitment to an international order based on effective multilateralism; they reaffirmed their determination to work together in the area of crisis management. Both organizations acknowledged that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rests with the UN Security Council, in accordance with the UN Charter. While the UN acknowledged the EU's considerable contribution of human and material resources in crisis management, the EU re-emphasized its commitment to contribute to the objectives of the UN in crisis management.

Against this backdrop, this article aims to analyse legitimacy of military crisis management operations carried out by the EU in support of the UN by using Mark Suchman's typology of organizational legitimacy including pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. These three types of legitimacy are tested through examining four cases in which EU has engaged in support of the UN in sub-Saharan Africa: EU's two military crisis management operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Operation Artemis (2003), EUFOR RD CONGO (2006), EU military crisis management operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) – EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2008-2009) and EU military crisis management operation in CAR – EUFOR RCA (2014-2015). In the first part, Suchman's typology of organizational legitimacy will be discussed. In the second part, the legitimacy of EU's crisis management operations in support of the UN will be analyzed by using Suchman's typology of organizational legitimacy.

2. Operationalizing Legitimacy

Max Weber was widely recognized as the social theorist, who introduced the concept of legitimacy into sociological theory and organization studies (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, p. 50). Weberian conceptualization of legitimacy is related with political authority and signifies the degree to which a political order is recognized by its subjects as having a valid claim to rule. The distinctive feature of Weberian understanding of legitimate rule is the mode of obedience; for Weber, if subjects obey commands of the rulers as a maxim of action, its authority is deemed legitimate in the eyes of subjects. For Weber, there are three sources or types of political legitimacy: rational-legal in which obedience is based on the legally established impersonal order, traditional in which

obedience is based on the person of the chief occupying the traditionally sanctioned position of authority, and charismatic in which obedience is based on putative exceptional qualities of a leader (Smith, 1970, pp. 18-19). Weber also emphasized the significance of social practice being directed by rules and suggested that legitimacy can arise from conformity with both general social norms and formal laws (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, p. 50). Following in footsteps of Weber, Talcott Parsons defined legitimacy as conformity of an organization to social laws, norms and values (Deephouse, et. al., 2016, p. 5). Weberian and Parsonian conceptualization of legitimacy has been adopted by many organization theorists; legitimacy of an organization is evaluated through examining whether its acts are in conformity with established social laws, norms and values or not (Deephouse et. al., 2016, p. 5).

Mark Suchman further developed this conceptualization of legitimacy and put forward a comprehensive definition of legitimacy. He defined legitimacy as "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). He offered three-fold classification of legitimacy, including pragmatic legitimacy, moral legitimacy, and cognitive legitimacy.

Pragmatic legitimacy takes its source from the self-interested calculations of an organization's most immediate audiences. Here audiences or sources of legitimation are main constituencies, who scrutinize organizations and assess their legitimacy (Suchman, 1995, p. 578). In other words, if immediate audiences of an organization consider actions of an organization serve their interests, these actions are deemed legitimate. Within the context of this article, in the EU case, immediate audiences or sources of legitimation are member states especially in the area of security and defence policy due to its intergovernmental nature. Concerning the military crisis management operations, if some or all member states considered that a crisis management operation serves their interests, this operation is deemed legitimate.

Second type of legitimacy, moral legitimacy is based on judgements about whether the activity of an organization is the right thing to do or whether the activity promotes societal welfare as defined by the audience's socially constructed value system rather than a self-interested calculation of an evaluator (Suchman, 1995, p. 579). In this study, moral legitimacy of EU operations can be evaluated through testing whether these operations have served the global common good through helping the UN in maintaining international peace and security.

The last type of legitimacy, cognitive legitimacy is based on cognition instead of interest or evaluation. Cognitive legitimacy is based on comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness (Suchman, 1995, p. 582). According to comprehensibility, legitimacy arises from the availability of cultural models which offer a reasonable explanation for the existence and actions of an organization. If such models exist, actions of an organization are considered as predictable, meaningful and inviting (Suchman, 1995, p. 582). For Suchman (1995, p. 583), depending on the extent of its attainability, taken-for-grantedness is the most subtle and the most powerful source

of legitimacy and an organization attains such kind of legitimacy, if its existence and activities are deemed as inevitable, unrivalled and incontestable by construction. While comprehensibility is based on predictability and plausibility, taken-for-grantedness is based on inevitability and permanence (Suchman, 1995, p. 584). In this article, the cognitive legitimacy of the EU as a crisis manager is tested through evaluating comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness of the EU as a UN partner in protecting and promoting international peace and security.

3. Operation Artemis

The EU military operation in the DRC, code-named Operation Artemis, which was launched with the decision of the Council of the EU on 12 June 2003, was the first peacekeeping mission conducted outside the geographical boundaries of Europe by a European institution. It was also the first CSDP operation in Africa. It was launched upon the request by the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in order to provide a temporary stabilisation force in the Ituri Region in implementation of the mandate provided by the UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003) of 30 May 2003.

The mandate of the mission was to contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in the Ituri capital, Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia, and if the situation necessitates it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, UN personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town until UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) could be reinforced (UNSC, 2003). Thus, Artemis was a 'bridging operation' which had a limited ambition, duration, geographic reach and functioned as an interim force for stabilizing the situation in Bunia until the arrival of reinforced MONUC.

The operation was an autonomous EU-led crisis management operation with recourse to a Framework Nation and France was designated as the framework nation. France provided the command and control capabilities necessary for the planning, launch and management of the Operation Artemis, the Operational Headquarters for the mission and the majority of personnel (1,700 out of 2,000) including the Operation Commander and Force Commander. Indeed, the operation was an UN-authorized independent EU-led operation conducted by France with the collaboration of other countries under the EU flag.

Although the main motivation for the launch of the operation appeared to help the UN in fulfilling its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, indeed, the institutional interests of the EU and interests of some individual member states, particularly France were more decisive regarding the launch of the Operation Artemis. First of all, concerning institutional interests of the Union, French leadership believed that Artemis provided a great opportunity to test newly-emerged security and defence policy of the EU (Koepf, 2012, p. 340). It was also believed to provide an opportunity to demonstrate the EU's ability to act independently from NATO (Olsen, 2009, p. 251). Another significant reason related with the institutional interests of

the EU was that two pioneers of the CSDP, France and the United Kingdom (UK), considered this operation as a heaven-sent opportunity to overcome the deep divisions among the EU member states caused by the Iraq War in the spring of 2003, and thus, reenergize European cooperation on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the CSDP, which was shattered due to internal divisions over the Iraq War (Olsen, 2009, p. 257; Congo mission tests Europe's military policy, 2003; Homan, 2006, p. 153; Ulriksen, Gourlay & Mace, 2004, p. 512; Rodt, 2011, p. 105). It can be said that it was an attempt by the Member States to prove that they could still cooperate and that the CFSP/CSDP was still alive (Olsen, 2009, p. 251).

Concerning individual interests of the Member States, France had a vested interest in launching the operation. First of all, since France was the lead nation and it contributed the largest number of troops, the operation enabled France to be recognized politically as an effective military actor (Olsen, 2009, p. 251; Gegout, 2005, p. 437). The Artemis was also a good opportunity for France for demonstrating its own defence capabilities: through the Artemis, France was present in the DRC before other international actors. The operation helped to boost French prestige on the international scene (Gegout, 2005, p. 437). Secondly, through sending an EU mission instead of a uniquely French intervention, France limited the risk of casualties for its troops. In contrast to his close relations with the UK, Rwandan President Paul Kagame had frosty relations with France. French leadership believed that the presence of British troops in the field would provide some kind of defensive shield for French troops against any possible Rwandan intervention in Bunia against the French and British troops (Gegout, 2005, p. 438). Thus, the operation enabled France to reduce its own transaction costs through sharing them among other member states, and gain the legitimacy afforded by the EU itself (Ginsberg & Penksa, 2012, p. 43). Thirdly, the operation provided a good opportunity for France to repair its tainted image due to its failure to stop genocide in Rwanda (Gegout, 2005, p. 436). Fourthly, the operation enabled France, which has been strong supporter of the establishment of a European-only defence capability independent from the USA for many years, to reinforce the EU's independence vis-à-vis the USA in the defence field. The operation provided an opportunity for demonstrating that the EU was capable of acting with one voice – after the Iraq crisis – and without the USA (Gegout, 2005, p. 437). Fifthly, another reason for France to push for the launch of the operation and take on a leading role was the protection of its vital economic interests in the DRC, which were at stake due to instability and chaos in the country. The DRC has been one of the biggest trade partners of France: being France's biggest trade surplus in Central Africa and having the fourth biggest market share of French products in Francophone Africa. Moreover, the DRC was the sixth biggest market for French products among sub-Saharan African countries and France was the DRC's second biggest supplier, after China. France has also been the biggest foreign direct investor in the DRC; approximately 200 French companies have been active in the country (FMEFA, 2017). Most prominent among them, French oil company Total has a significant presence as the country's leading exploration and production operator and biggest petroleum product retailer (Total, 2019). It has carried out important off-shore drilling projects in the DRC, such as the Moho Nord deep offshore project. (FMEFA, 2017).

Since it was launched and implemented with a mandate provided by the UN Security Council Resolution, its international legitimacy was beyond doubt. However, with regard to Suchman's typology of legitimacy, there are problems. First of all, in terms of pragmatic legitimacy, which is based on audience's self-interest, the EU enjoys high level of legitimacy, because the operation served both the institutional interests of the EU and interests of some individual member states, particularly France. Concerning moral legitimacy, the EU suffers from a legitimacy deficit. Although the main motivation of the operation was declared to help the UN through contributing to the improvement of security and humanitarian situation in the Ituri capital, Bunia, indeed, EU engagement in crisis management operation was to a significant degree driven by the institutional interests of the EU and interests of some individual member states. Moreover, the operation was a UN-mandated independent EU military operation rather than integrated EU troops in UN-led operations. Thus, true or foremost motivation of EU Member States for launching the operation and its modality undermined moral legitimacy of the operation, because it casted doubts on whether it has served the global common good through helping the UN in maintaining international peace and security.

4. Operation EUFOR RD CONGO

During the presidential and parliamentary election campaign in the spring of 2006 in the DRC, maintenance of order in Kinshasa was recognized by the UN as a key element for the success of the electoral process (Olsen, 2009, p. 253). On 25 April 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1671 (2006), which authorised the temporary deployment of a EU force (EUFOR RD Congo) to support MONUC during the period encompassing the elections in the DRC. Upon UN Security Council's authorization, the EU Foreign Affairs Council decided to launch the Operation EUFOR RD Congo by adopting a Joint Action on the EU military operation in support of the MONUC during the election process on 27 April 2006. The mandate of the mission was to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Congolese Government, contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa, ensure the security and free movement of EUFOR RD Congo personnel and the protection of its installations and execute limited operations to extract individuals in danger (UNSC, 2006). The military operation was launched on 12 June 2006 by Council Decision 2006/412/CFSP and ended on 30 November 2006. The EUFOR RD Congo was conducted within the framework of the CSDP and was assigned to support MONUC to stabilize the situation during the election process, protect civilians and protect the airport in Kinshasa. The military deployment, with the operational headquarters provided by Germany, included an advance element of almost 1,000 soldiers in and around Kinshasa. The EU also had available almost 1,200 troops on-call 'over the horizon' in neighbouring Gabon from where they could be rapidly deployed if necessary (Olsen, 2009, p. 253). When compared to Artemis, it was a stand-by operation (EU-led operation in support of an existing UN mission – MONUC) with a very narrow mandate which aimed to provide additional security to support the electoral process in the capital of Kinshasa (Tull, 2012, p. 138).

Although the political motivation for the launch of the operation seemed to help the UN, indeed, just like the Operation Artemis, the institutional interests of the EU and interests of some individual member states, particularly France were more decisive regarding the launch of the EUFOR RD Congo. First of all, concerning institutional interests of the Union, it was seen by some member states, in particular France and Germany as a significant opportunity to recover from the debacle over the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005 through demonstrating that they could still cooperate in the area of security and defence policy. (Olsen, 2009, pp. 253, 257) That is why the operation was identified by senior experts on EU's security and defence policy as a cosmetic operation which was a cover to hide main rationale of the operation, bolstering the credibility of the CSDP after the fiascos of the Constitutional Referendum (Haine & Giegrich, 2006; Howorth, 2007, p. 239). Thus, the main rationale for launching the Operation was to establish the EU as an international actor and prove that it could still function and make foreign policy despite domestic crisis (Olsen, 2009, p. 254). While assessing the success of the Operation, Bastian Giegerich (2008, p. 32) argued that the main achievement of the operation was symbolic: it demonstrated the EU capacity for action in general and particularly, in support of the UN which helped to build confidence and add to the body of shared CSDP experience among EU member states. However, the long-term impact of the operation on peace and stability in the DRC was unclear (Giegerich, 2008, p. 32).

With regard to individual interests of the Member States, maintaining security and stability in the DRC has been of particular interest to France. First of all, as it was mentioned in the previous part, France has vital economic interests in the DRC. Secondly, France, as an ex-colonial power in the region, has been actively engaged in the DRC and in the wider region for years. However, since France had a tainted image in the region due to its failure to stop genocide in Rwanda, it would be less risky and costly to carry out a military operation under the EU flag and EU command than a uniquely French one (Olsen, 2009, p. 254). Moreover, it was also a good opportunity for France to repair its tainted image. Thus, France instrumentalized the EU to take care of its concerns about the DRC's stability; in other words, it tried to multilateralize its own national interests.

In terms of pragmatic legitimacy, similar to the Artemis, the EU enjoys high level of legitimacy, because it served both the institutional interests of the EU and interests of some individual member states, in particular France. With regard to moral legitimacy, the EU suffers from a legitimacy deficit, because the declared motivation of the operation does not fully coincide with true motivation. Even though it was declared that the operation was launched to help the UN through contributing to the protection of civilians from physical violence, the protection of Kinshasa airport, ensuring the security and free movement of EUFOR RD Congo personnel and the protection of its installations and execute limited operations to extract individuals in danger, indeed, it was significantly driven by the institutional interests of the EU and particular interests of some member states. Furthermore, it was a UN-mandated autonomous EU military operations instead of integrated EU troops in UN-led operations. Hence, inconsistency between declared and true motivation for launching the operation and its modality undermined its moral

legitimacy, because it was doubtful whether it has served the global common good through helping the UN in maintaining international peace and security.

5. Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA

The EU military operation in the Republic of Chad and CAR (Eastern Chad and the North-eastern CAR), which was launched on 28 January 2008 by Council Decision 2008/101/CFSP and conducted under the CSDP, with the agreement of the governments of Chad and CAR, had been carried out between 28 January 2008 and 15 March 2009, under the mandate provided by UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (25 September 2007). The mandate of the mission was to contribute to protecting refugees from the Darfur region and internally displaced people, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to contribute to the protection of UN personnel in the region. The operation, in other words, aimed to contribute to a 'safe and secure environment' in the region (Dijkstra, 2010, p. 395). It was the largest autonomous military operation of the EU so far, with 3,700 troops and its area of operation was in a remote part of Africa (Dijkstra, 2010, p. 405). Just like the Operation Artemis, it was a bridging operation which had a limited ambition, duration, geographic reach and functioned as an interim force for supporting and protecting refugees from Darfur and internally displaced people from the region and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel until the UN Mission in CAR and Chad (MINURCAT) has taken over the authority of the operation. It was the most multinational military operation deployed in Africa so far, with 14 EU Member States present in the field, 19 in theatre, and 22 at the Operation Headquarters at Mont Valérien (France) (CEU, 2009). During its mandate, in order to secure the area, EUFOR conducted numerous patrols, large-scale operations in areas where it did not have permanent camps and carried out air missions (CEU, 2009). When the operation ended, about % 60 of EUFOR, some 2,200 troops, moved to MINURCAT and it continued to provide logistical support to MINURCAT for the beginning of its operation (Dijkstra, 2010, p. 403).

Although the foremost motivation for the launch of the operation appeared to help the UN, indeed, just like other two missions in the DRC, EU engagement in Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA was to a significant degree driven by the institutional interests of the EU and interests of some individual member states, particularly France. First of all, concerning institutional interests of the Union, French leadership believed that EUFOR Tchad/RCA would enable to demonstrate that the EU was an independent international conflict manager, at least in Africa (Olsen, 2009, p. 256). In addition to France, most of European governments regarded this operation as an opportunity for the EU to demonstrate its effectiveness as a security actor in the conflict-prone Darfur region following the failure of the UN mission to Darfur (UNMID) (Berg, 2009, p. 62). Moreover, this operation was also well suited to the French policy of promoting the CSDP through emphasizing its military character rather than purely civilian one (Seibert, 2010, p. 10). The operation provided an invaluable opportunity to enhance the operational experience of the

CSDP, boost EU's credibility as a military actor and increase EU's involvement in Africa (Rodt, 2011, p. 113).

Concerning individual interests of the Member States, France had a special interest in launching the operation. As the ex-colonial power, France had a particular interest in maintaining the stability in Chad. France, which had signed defence and military cooperation agreements with Chadian government after its independence and had established a permanent military presence (Operation EPERVIER) in 1986, had a vested interest in Chad's stability (Dijkstra, 2010, p. 397). These agreements included confidential clauses envisaging the protection of pro-French authoritarian leaders from any domestic armed insurrection in return for protection of French interests in the region (Bono, 2011, p. 29). As a part of these agreements, France had deployed at least 3,000 troops in Chad to support the pro-French government and contribute to stabilizing the country since the mid-1980s (Olsen, 2009, p. 255). The true motive of the French leadership for pushing for EUFOR Tchad/RCA was to help pro-French despotic regimes of Idriss Déby in Chad and François Bozizé in the CAR to stabilize their countries and thus secure the survival of their regimes (Bono, 2011, p. 38; Tull, 2012, p. 138). Thus, France aimed to multilateralize and Europeanise its military commitments in Chad and the CAR through launching a EU military operation rather than a purely French one (Bono, 2011, p. 39). That's why France took the lead in launching the operation and given the problems in supplying sufficient soldiers to the mission, France committed to 'plug the gaps' and promised to fulfil logistical requirements, including helicopters and transport aircraft. France provided about 2,000 soldiers stationed in the country as a part of operation EPERVIER and a general as force commander (Olsen, 2009, p. 255).

In terms of pragmatic legitimacy, like the previous two operations, since the operation was launched to promote both the institutional interests of the EU and interests of some individual member states, particularly France, the EU enjoys high level of legitimacy. Regarding moral legitimacy, the EU suffers from a legitimacy deficit. Although it was declared that the operation was launched to help the UN through contributing to protection of refugees from the Darfur region and internally displaced people, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, and contributing to the protection of UN personnel in the region, indeed, EU engagement in this crisis management operation was to a significant degree driven by the institutional interests of the EU and interests of some individual member states. Moreover, this operation was a UN-mandated independent EU military operation instead of integrated EU troops in UN-led operation. Thus, true or foremost motivation of EU Member States for launching the operation and its modality undermined its moral legitimacy, because it raised doubts whether it has served the global common good through helping the UN in maintaining international peace and security.

6. Operation EUFOR RCA

The EU military operation in the CAR, which was launched on 1 April 2014 by Council Decision 2014/183/CFSP and conducted under the CSDP had been carried out between 30 April 2014

and 15 March 2015, under the mandate provided by UN Security Council Resolution 2134 (28 January 2014). The mandate of the mission was to contribute to the creation of a safe and secure environment in the Bangui, the capital of the CAR, particularly at the M'Poko airport, district 3 and 5, to create security conditions required for provision of humanitarian aid to those in need, to prepare the transfer of authority for UN or AU operation, to support the activities of the other international operations in the area, particularly French Operation Sangaris and the African Union (AU)-led International Support Mission to the CAR (MISCA: *Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique Sous Conduite Africaine*) (Mandrup, 2017, p. 181). Just like the Operation Artemis and the Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA, it was a bridging operation which had a limited ambition, duration, geographic reach and functioned as an interim force for contributing to the creation of a safe and secure environment in two districts of Bangui and the airport, and setting the stage for the provision of humanitarian aid to affected population until the redesigned and upgraded UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) has taken over the authority of the operation. It was also a stand-by operation, which was conducted parallel and in support of the French Operation Sangaris and the AU-led MISCA, aimed to relieve their operational burden in the protection of civilians, restoration of security and public order, stabilization of the country and the creation of safe environment for humanitarian assistance. When compared to EU's previous military engagements in sub-Saharan Africa, the EUFOR RCA Operation was the smallest one in terms of deployed troops, only 750 combat troops were deployed; 18 EU Member States and 2 third countries, Georgia and Montenegro, contributed personnel to the Operation. Like Operation Artemis, France was designated as the framework nation and provided the bulk of the force with 400 troops. Similar with the previous EU operations in sub-Saharan Africa, it was an UN-authorized independent EU-led operation conducted by France with the collaboration of other countries under the EU flag.

Like the previous military operations in sub-Saharan Africa, the ostensible goal of the EUFOR RCA was to help the UN in maintaining international peace and security, but indeed the true reason behind EU's engagement was to promote the institutional interests of the EU and interests of some individual member states, particularly France. With regard to institutional interests of the EU, the operation provided another great opportunity to prove EU's adequacy as a globally acting, independent and effective security actor, which has the capability and willingness to manage crisis in tough geographies like sub-Saharan Africa. Another reason which was put forward by Thierry Tardy (2014) was that this operation provided a heaven-sent opportunity for EU member states to put into practice their strong commitment to enhance the effectiveness, visibility and impact of the CSDP, which was emphasized in European Council Conclusion of 19-20 December 2013, titled as "Defence Matters". Thus, Tardy (2014) argued that this operation was seen as a great opportunity to demonstrate that security and defence issues were still significant for EU member states.

Similar to the previous three operations, France, as the ex-colonial power, had a special interest in maintaining the stability in the CAR and thus launching the operation. First and foremost, France has vital economic interests in the CAR, which were at stake due to instability and chaos

in the country. France has been leading foreign direct investor in the country; French companies including Orange, Air France, Bolloré, Castel, Somdiaa and Total have significant presence in the CAR (FMEFA, 2019).

Following the fall of Bozizé Regime as a result of Seleka assault on the Bangui, the country fell into instability and chaos in 2013 due to the conflict between mostly Muslim Seleka fighters and mostly Christian anti-Balaka fighters. When it was realized that the situation has been deteriorating quickly and the clash between these conflicting groups began to turn into a humanitarian crisis due to attacks against civilian populations, with the authorization of the UN Security Council, France launched the Operation Sangaris in support of the AU-led MISCA for protecting civilian population from the uncontrolled and escalating sectarian and interethnic violence and a possible genocide in December 2013. When French leadership realized that the situation in the CAR had become too difficult for them to handle on its own following the death of its two soldiers, they tried to convince its EU partners to launch a CSDP operation to relieve its financial and operational burden in the restoration and maintenance of security and stability in the CAR (Nováky, 2016, p. 99). Another possible reason behind French willingness to launch an operation was that this crisis provided another good opportunity for France to repair its tainted image due to its failure to stop genocide in Rwanda. It was believed that through a prompt military intervention, France could prevent the emergence of Rwandan-like genocide and thus repair its tainted image. Although France intended to repair its tainted image, the Operation Sangaris further deteriorated French image in the CAR. Since their deployment, French troops concentrated on the disbandment and disarmament of Seleka fighters while ignoring anti-Balaka militias (Kane, 2014, p. 315; Borowski, 2014). This made Muslim population vulnerable to attacks by Christian anti-Balaka fighters and they seized this opportunity and increased their attacks on Muslim population. Muslim population began to consider that French troops were supporting anti-Balaka fighters and French intervention was biased against them. Muslim people began to see French troops as part of the problem and identify them as the white anti-Balaka and likened their situation with Rwanda (Smith, 2014). This situation resulted in the feeling of enmity against French troops among Muslim population and decreased legitimacy of the Operation Sangaris. This left France with little choice but to push for the launch of the EU operation. This operation constituted another case of multilateralization and Europeanization of French interests in sub-Saharan Africa.

With regard to legitimacy of the operation, like all three previous operations, since the EUFOR RCA served both the institutional interests of the EU and interests of some individual member states, in particular France, the EU enjoys high level of pragmatic legitimacy. Concerning moral legitimacy, the EU suffers from a legitimacy deficit. Although the main motivation of the operation was declared to help the UN through contributing to the creation of a safe and secure environment in some districts of the capital city, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, to prepare the transfer of authority for a UN operation, to support the activities of French Operation Sangaris and the AU-led MISCA, EU engagement in this crisis management operation was in essence driven by the institutional interests of the EU and particular interests of some member

states. Furthermore, like all other operations, it was a UN-mandated independent EU military operation rather than integrated EU troops in UN-led operations. Hence, true or foremost motivation of EU Member States for launching the operation and its modality undermined moral legitimacy of it, because it is doubtful whether it has served the global common good through helping the UN in maintaining international peace and security.

7. Conclusion

All four operations reveal that while the Union enjoys a high level of legitimacy with regard to pragmatic legitimacy, it suffers from a legitimacy deficit when it comes to moral and cognitive legitimacy. Since all operations served both institutional interests of the EU and self-interests of some member states, in particular France, pragmatic legitimacy of the operations has increased. With regard to Union's institutional interests, these operations provided significant opportunity for the EU to prove itself as a globally acting, independent and effective security and defence policy actor even after severe internal crisis, such as Iraq Crisis in 2003 and Constitutional Treaty Referendum fiasco in 2005. With regard to interests of member states, the operations provided France with a significant opportunity to pursue its interests in the *Françafrique*[1] under a UN mandate and within EU framework. All operations enabled France to reengage in areas of its former colonies. France instrumentalized the UN authorization and the EU's institutional framework to help stabilize its former colonial lands with which it has still maintained close political, economic and even military ties. In other words, these operations enabled France to multilateralize and Europeanize its own national interests. Many experts on EU's security and defence policy underline French instrumentalization of these operations. While some put forward that EU framework together with UN authorization provided France some kind of protective shield against charges of neo-colonialism (Wouters, De Jong & De Man, 2010, pp. 20-21), some others assert that they enabled France to present itself as friendly and safe intervener through hiding its notorious past in the region behind the positive image of the EU (Bailes, 2008, p. 120). In addition, another prominent expert identified French instrumentalization as a 'dirty laundering', which allowed France to hide its pursuit of narrow national interest behind an EU cover (Mennon, 2009, p. 240). Moreover, these operations also provided an opportunity for France to prove itself as an effective military actor and to restore its image damaged by its biased intervention in Rwanda.

With regard to moral legitimacy, the EU suffers from a legitimacy deficit. Although the main motivation of these operations was declared to help the UN in fulfilling its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, indeed, EU engagement in these crisis management operations was to a significant degree driven by the institutional interests of the EU and interests of some individual member states. Moreover, all operations were independent EU military operations mandated by the UN instead of integrated EU troops in UN-led operations.

---

1   This concept refers to France's special sphere of influence or backyard in Africa (Whiteman, 1997, p. 92; Bovcon, 2013, p. 6).

EU Member States preferred to launch independent military operations (a bridging or a stand-by operation) rather than directly participating in the UN-led peace operations. This preference revealed the fact that EU's institutional interests, including promoting the EU's profile and prestige as a globally acting foreign and security policy actor and mitigating negative effects of some internal crisis, have been pursued under the guise of helping the UN in maintaining international peace and security. Thus, true or foremost motivation of EU Member States for launching the operations and the modality of these operations undermined their moral legitimacy, because it casted doubts on whether these operations have served the global common good through helping the UN in maintaining international peace and security.

Moreover, EU's utilitarian, selective and self-interested use of its crisis management tool puts limit on the EU's future reliability and taken-for-grantedness as a UN partner in protecting and promoting international peace and security, and thus resulted in cognitive legitimacy deficit. The EU's failure to launch a bridging operation in the eastern DRC in 2008-2009 despite UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's request from the EU to launch a bridging operation just like Artemis until MONUC facing a severe military and humanitarian crisis at that time would be reinforced is a significant example of the EU's utilitarian, selective and self-interested use of its crisis management tool. Owing to the reluctance of some EU Member States, particularly the UK, Germany and France, the EU failed to send a bridging force to the eastern DRC for helping the UN stabilize the situation (Gowan, 2011). This example brings into question the EU's future reliability and taken-for-grantedness as a UN partner in protecting and promoting international peace and security particularly in cases where EU's institutional interests or member states' individual interests are not at stake. This has an undermining effect on cognitive legitimacy of EU's crisis management tool.

References

Bailes, A. J. K. (2008). The EU and a 'Better World': What Role for the European Security and Defence Policy. *International Affairs*, *84*(1), 115-130. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00692.x.

Berg, P. (2009). EUFOR Tchad/RCA: The EU Serving French Interests. In M. Asseburg & R. Kempin (Eds.), *The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence* (pp. 57–69). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.

Bono, G. (2011). The EU's Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic: An Operation to Save Lives?. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, *5*(1), 23-42. doi: 10.1080/17502.977.2011.541781.

Bovcon, M. (2013). Françafrique and Regime Theory. *European Journal of International Relations*, *19*(1), 5-26. doi: 10.1177/135.406.6111413309.

Congo mission tests Europe's military policy. (2003, June 17). Retrieved January 10, 2018, from Taipei Times website, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2003/06/17/200.305.5617.

Council of the European Union (CEU). (2009). EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) Factsheet. Retrieved October 07, 2017, from http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-tchad-rca/pdf/01032009_factsheet_eufor-tchad-rca_en.pdf.

Deephouse, D. L. & Suchman, M. C. (2008). Legitimacy in Organizational Institutionalism. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin & R. Suddaby (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism* (pp. 49–76). London: SAGE Publications.

Deephouse, D. L., Bundy, J., Tost, L. P. & Suchman, M. C. (2016). *Organizational Legitimacy: Six Key Questions*. University of Alberta School of Business Research Paper No. 2016-901. Retrieved September 20, 2019, from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2849636.

Borowski, M. (2014, January 9). French Troops Fail to Stop the Violence in CAR. *Deutsche Welle Top Stories*. Retrieved July 3, 2020, from https://www.dw.com/en/french-troops-fail-to-stop-the-violence-in-car/a-17351664.

Dijkstra, H. (2010). The Military Operation of the EU in Chad and the Central African Republic: Good Policy, Bad Politics. *International Peacekeeping*, *17*(3), 395–407. doi: 10.1080/13533.312.2010.500150.

French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs (FMEFA) (France Diplomacy). (2017). Congo. Last updated October 2017. Retrieved July 2, 2020, from https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/congo/.

French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs (FMEFA) (France Diplomacy). (2019). Central African Republic. Last updated 1 April 2019. Retrieved July 2, 2020, from https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/central-african-republic/.

Gegout, C. (2005). Causes and Consequences of the EU's Military Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Realist Explanation. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, *10*(3), 427–443.

Giegerich, B. (2008). Chapter One: EU Crisis Management: Ambitions and Achievements. *The Adelphi Papers*, *48*(397), 15-34.

Ginsberg, R. H. & Penksa, S. E. (2012). *The European Union in Global Security: The Politics of Impact*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gowan, R. (2009). ESDP and the United Nations. In G. Grevi, D. Helly & D. Keohane (Eds.), *European Security and Defence Policy: the first ten years (1999-2009)* (pp. 117-126). Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.

Gowan, R. (2011). From Rapid Reaction to Delayed Inaction? Congo, the UN and the EU. *International Peacekeeping*, *18*(5), 593-611. doi: 10.1080/13533.312.2011.598324.

Hadden, T. (2009). *A Responsibility to Assist: EU Policy and Practice in Crisis-management Operations under European Security and Defence Policy*. Portland: Hart Publishing.

Haine, J. & Giegerich, B. (2006, June 12). In Congo, a Cosmetic EU Operation. *International Herald Tribune*. Retrieved January 15, 2018, from https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/12/opinion/12iht-edhaine.1954062.html.

Homan, K. (2006). Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In European Commission External Relations Directorate-General (Eds.), *Faster and More United? The Debate About Europe's Crisis Response Capacity* (pp. 151-154). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

Howorth, J. (2007). *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kane, M. (2014). Interreligious violence in the Central African Republic. *African Security Review*, *23*(3), 312-317. doi: 10.1080/10246.029.2014.931625.

Koepf, T. (2012). The Problems of French-led Peace Operations in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa. *International Peacekeeping*, *19*(3), 333–347. doi: 10.1080/13533.312.2012.696383.

Mandrup, T. (2017). *Study Report of DR Congo, South Sudan, Libya and Central African Republic*. Deliverable of the Horizon 2020 Project: Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU Conflict

Prevention. Retrieved April 10, 2020, from https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/documents/downloadPublic?documentIds=080166e5b19002b1&appId=PPGMS.

Mennon, A. (2009). Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten. *International Affairs*, *85*(2), 227-246. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00791.x.

Nováky, N. I. M. (2016). From EUFOR to EUMAM: The European Union in the Central African Republic'. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, *21*(1), 95-114.

Olsen, G. R. (2009). The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe?. *International Peacekeeping*, *16*(2), 245-260. doi: 10.1080/135.333.10802685828.

Peters, I. (2011). Strategic Culture and Multilateralism: The Interplay of the EU and the UN in Conflict and Crisis Management. *Contemporary Security Policy*, *32*(3), 644-666. doi: 10.1080/13523.260.2011.623065.

Rodt, A. P. (2011). The EU: A Successful Military Conflict Manager?. *Democracy and Security*, *7*(2), 99-122. doi: 10.1080/17419.166.2011.572790.

Seibert, B. H. (2010). Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA and the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy. Strategic Studies Institute Monograph. Retrieved September 17, 2017, from https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1026.pdf.

Smith, D. (2014, March 10). Christian Militias Take Bloody Revenge on Muslims in Central African Republic. Retrieved July 4, 2020, from The Guardian website, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/10/central-african-republic-christian-militias-revenge.

Smith, R. V. (1970). The Concept of Legitimacy. *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory*, *35*, 17-29.

Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches. *Academy of Management Review*, *20*(3), 571-610.

Tardy, T. (2014). EUFOR RCA Bangui: 'Defence Matters'. European Union Security Studies Alert No: 7. Retrieved March 24, 2020, from https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert_7_CSDP_and_CAR_.pdf.

Total. (2019, October 1). Total in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville). Retrieved July 2, 2020, from https://www.total.com/republic-congo.

Tull, D. M. (2012). UN Peacekeeping Missions During the Past Two Decades: How Effective Have They Been?. In J. Krause & N. Ronzitti (Eds.), *The EU, the UN and Collective Security: Making Multilateralism Effective* (pp. 117-149). Oxford: Routledge.

Ulriksen, S., Gourlay, C. & Mace, C. (2004). Operation Artemis: the Shape of Things to Come?'. *International Peacekeeping*, *11*(3), 508–525. doi: 10.1080/135.333.1042000249073.

United Nations Security Council (UNSC). (2003, May 30). UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4764th Meeting. Retrieved September 30, 2017, from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/UNresolution1484.pdf.

United Nations Security Council (UNSC). (2006, April 25). UN Security Council Resolution 1671 (2006). Adopted by the Security Council at its 5421st Meeting. Retrieved September 30, 2017, from http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8698.doc.htm.

Whiteman, K. (1997). The Man Who Ran Françafrique. *The National Interest*, (49), 92-99.

Wouters, J., De Jong, S. & De Man, P. (2010). *The EU's Commitment to Effective Multilateralism in the Field of Security: Theory and Practice*. Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies Working Paper No. 45. Retrieved January 30, 2018, from https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jan_Wouters4/publication/228624020_The_EU%27s_Commitment_to_Effective_Multilateralism_in_the_Field_of_Security_Theory_and_Practice/links/543cc4640cf20af5cfbf724d/The-EUs-Commitment-to-Effective-Multilateralism-in-the-Field-of-Security-Theory-and-Practice.pdf.