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HEIDEGGER'S DASEIN AND ANGST: EXAMINING THE ANXIETY OF EXISTENCE IN INGMAR BERGMAN'S PERSONA¹

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Abstract

*According to a common belief, anxiety can be an experience of a certain degree of powerlessness because a person suffering from anxiety is hampered as a person who cannot possess a particular category of power. This lack of a desired power manifests as the source of emotion that results in anxiety. Because fear and anxiety are commonly used interchangeably in ordinary discourse, fear is often used erroneously instead of anxiety when, under further examination, anxiety would be the preferable usage. However, shedding light on the idea of anxiety (Angst), Heidegger (1889-1976) in *Being and Time* (1927) takes it upon himself to distinguish fear from anxiety: while the former (Fear) is experienced as an identifiable object -- as a threat qua threat -- to our life, the latter (Angst) is experienced where there is no identifiable object resulting in a relatively eventual traumatic experience, whereby the individual is "deprived of any avenue of escape from the threatening danger." Anxiety of existence on its own as a philosophical problem in Heidegger's examination is elaborated by the concepts of Being or Dasein (Existence). In this respect, describing 'the self of everyday Dasein' as the 'the-self-there,' Heidegger differentiates 'authentic being' from 'inauthentic being.' He highlights the problematic that we as human beings are thrown into the world of Being where individuals may fail to identify and differentiate themselves among inauthentic inscriptions of the masses within the confines of Existence. Examining the anxiety of Existence (Being of the world) around the idea of Dasein (Being in the world), Heidegger therefore discusses the anxiety under the rubric of thrownness. To this end, in this essay, with a Heideggerian perception of anxiety, I will discuss Ingmar Bergman's (1918-2007) classic work of art *Persona* (1966) by bringing forth the personality of a successful actress, found in Elizabeth Vogler (Liv Ullmann)'s story, where she seems to be suffering from an enigmatic mental collapse with symptoms such as muteness and a near catatonic lassitude.*

Keywords: Dasein, Angst, Anxiety, Heidegger, Bergman, Persona, Silence.

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HEIDEGGER'DE DASEIN VE ANGST: INGMAR BERGMAN'IN PERSONA'SINDA VAROLUŞ ANKSİYETESİ²

Öz

Yaygın görüşe göre anksiyete bir tür güçsüzlük halidir. Bu kaniya göre anksiyete yaşayan kişi endişe durumunun üstesinden gelmesine yardımcı olacak iradi gücü elinde bulunduramamaktadır. Söz konusu bu gücün eksikliği bir duygu durumu olarak anksiyeteyi doğurmaktadır. Günlük hayatta korku ve anksiyete sıklıkla birbirlerinin yerine kullanılır. Ancak doğru bir analiz ile bu kullanımın yanlış olduğu, korkunun anksiyetinin yerine kullanılamayacak farklı bir anlam barındırdığı görülmektedir. *Being and Time* (1927) adlı çalışmasında anksiyeteyi korku kavramından ayıran Heidegger (1889-1976) korkuyu bir tehdit nesnesi varken yaşanan travmatik duygu durumu, anksiyeteyi ise herhangi bir tehdit unsuru olmadan yaşanan duygu durumu olarak açıklar. Anksiyete durumunda tehdit nesnesinin olmayışı yaşanan duygu durumunun da bertaraf edilmesini zorlaştırır. Varoluş anksiyetesi Heidegger için başlı başına felsefi bir problem olarak *Being ve Dasein* kavramları etrafında tartışılır. Oluş halinde bir kendilik olarak *Dasein*'i 'the-self-there' olarak açıklayan Heidegger otantik oluşu otantik olmayan oluş'tan da ayırır. Dünyaya fırlatılmış varlıklar olduğumuzu ve bu nedenle varlık meselesinin önemli bir sorunu teşkil ettiğini söyleyen Heidegger, varlığın kendini yığınları oluşturan diğer otantik olmayan varlıklardan ayırmasının veya kendini otantik bir varlık olarak tanımasının da zorluğuna dikkat çeker. Varoluş anksiyetesini *Dasein* kavramı etrafında ele alan Heidegger anksiyeteyi esas olarak 'atılmışlık' düşüncesi etrafında tartışır. Bu çerçevede, bu çalışma Heideggerci anksiyete kavramı ekseninde Ingmar Bergman'ın (1918-2007) *Persona* isimli sinema eserini tartışmaktadır. Liv Ullman'ın başarılı oyunculuğuyla resmedilen Elizabeth Vogler karakteri *Persona*'daki anksiyete sorunsalını mental bir travmanın sepmtomları olarak katatonik bir sessizlik ve bezginlik olarak gösterir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Dasein, Angst, Anksiyete, Heidegger, Bergman, Persona, Sessizlik.*

INTRODUCTION

According to Heidegger, man like other entities exists in a world that he is thrown into by his/her birth. However, while being thrown into such a world, he becomes an entity trying to understand his existence through cognitive abilities that make him unique and different from all other entities. A person speculating about his/her existence in the world therefore differs from any other existing entity because no other entity can go beyond its spatial or ontic existence in the world. For instance, while a table exists in the world it can never have a world as humans do. However, although humans seem to be existent in the world in a way similar to any other entity, they still differentiate from the rest of entities with a potential to have a world while becoming a being in it. Therefore, such an entity comes to have

² Bu çalışmanın kısa bir versiyonu "Ca'Foscari Üniversitesi, Venedik, İtalya'da (20-23 Haziran 2017), "International Journal of Arts and Sciences (IJAS) Konferansında sunuldu.

a world s/he can speculate about while living concurrently in such a world along with other entities.

Being in a world or Being of a world therefore makes a great difference for Heidegger. It means that a person as a Dasein –there-being-- through Heideggerian terms weds his 'presence in the world' to 'his speculation of his presence in such a world' thereby making the existence itself get rid of a static position of beingness but form a fluid and changeable position in that world. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger, therefore, elaborates on the idea of that entity problem and explains how being human – which he refers to as Dasein -- has some understanding of what it is to be.²

For Heidegger, among all other entities it is only the human being that goes beyond his/her beingness and becomes an entity existing at the same time of being aware of his existence. In other words, "Heidegger raises the question of the meaning of Being and claims that the possibility of raising this question presupposes the existence of an entity that raises it" (Mansbach, 1998). This might remind one of Descartes's concept of existence formulated around the terms of *res extensa* and *res cogitans*, thereby establishing an understanding of ontology through a dualistic view of existence. Positioning the human being as the ontological center, Descartes's philosophy seems to form the roots of modern philosophy around subjectivism. Differing from Descartes's dualistic view positing the human being as the ontological center, Heidegger, however, argues that what makes a subject possible is as much important as what establishes the existence of the subject. As Mansbach remarks "thus subjectivism not only leaves the nature of man unquestioned, but blocks all further ontological inquiry and brings philosophy to a dead end" (1998).

While the subject for Descartes is distinct from the external world with its ontological central role, it is for Heidegger neither prior to nor distinct from the external world. Subject and Object altogether are present as defined by Heidegger with the concept of Dasein that is constitutive of our Being-in-the-world. However, Heidegger's perception of Being as a Being-in-the-world differs from Descartes' *cogito* separating Being from the world through his separation of subject and object.³ As Inwood remarks: "In selecting Dasein as the starting-point for his

² "Heidegger develops his idea of Dasein in critical engagement with Husserl's phenomenology, with Scheler's philosophical anthropology, [with the ontological theology of St Augustine and the metaphysics of Aristotle]. His notions of Existenz and Angst, stem from Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Luther and St Augustine. Heidegger is also influenced by Descartes, Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche. It is also recognized that Heidegger's influence on others is immense: on theologians, psychoanalysts, literary critics, philosophers, and social scientists. Influential authors such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens have used Heidegger as an important source of inspiration" (Wollan, 2003, pp.31-39).

³ "Heidegger attempted to unify the duality of modern philosophy by reuniting subject and object (world) together in the single entity Dasein. Subject and a cogito. Dasein and its world can never be separated. Dasein is the Being-in-the-world. Therefore, Being-in-the-

enquiry, Heidegger does not focus on one type of entity to the exclusion of others; Dasein brings the whole world along with it” (Inwood, 2000, p.23).

For Heidegger, human being as Dasein is not related to anything that is static, constant, invariant or not anything that has been actualized this or that way in the course of history, but the principle of human beings as Dasein is about a potential (möglichsein) to become something that s/he has not become yet. In other words, it could be deduced that, a human being as a Dasein is in process of being, thereby suggesting that s/he is in the process of becoming himself or herself that has not been actualized yet, though having a potential to become. Hence, Dasein is the condition of the possibility of the world. It is therefore the sum of its possibilities and potentials but never a thing that can be categorized and talked about in the way that we discuss about other entities that are not Dasein.

As the condition of the possibility of the world, Dasein also represents an entity that has been thrown into the world suggesting that we as Dasein are forced to be ‘who we are’ with the company of the other entities of the same physical world. We, in this sense, are not free from ‘our past causing our fall’ that is also related to our *thrownness* into this world. While living with other Daseins, we as Dasein become a ‘they-self’, making us one of the inauthentic members of those they-selves thrown into this fallen situation in a world of both authenticity and inauthenticity. However, the possibility of achieving an authenticity, despite the fact that that authenticity is imbedded with inauthenticity, is what matters from the Heideggerian perspective.

On the other hand, it is noteworthy that despite its inauthentic aspects, such a fallen situation in the world also provides a Dasein with a comfort facilitating Dasein feeling secure among one’s Other: inauthentic beings that altogether compose the idea of the Heideggerian ‘They-self’. In other words, in the ‘they-self’, the Dasein seems to be comfortable as it ensures one’s feeling at home with the majority with a tranquil familiarity. This might be taken as a condition of ‘everydayness’. However, in order to get rid of the confining aspects of everydayness, an anxiety needing to be practiced will make it possible for Dasein to achieve authenticity.

In other words, only if anxiety overwhelms us, can we get a chance to achieve our authentic self. However, a person as a ‘being-in-the-world’ experiences anxiety only when s/he realises one’s ‘they-selfness’, thereby confronting a person of inauthenticity with his/her self. Conscience (Gewissen) therefore plays a pivotal role for Heidegger because it is what summons the authentic self. With the help of

world precedes the Cogito. The truth of Cogito is replaced in the disclosedness of Being which is basically primordial truth. Unlike Descartes and others, he breaks the chain of the tradition in terms of an understanding of world. His understanding of Being is Being-in-the-world, but the world of the Being of Dasein is not the physical world. It is the world of Dasein. If we follow Heidegger’s train of thought, we cannot indulge in the kind of skepticism that Descartes presents, since it is predicated on a false distinction between us and the world” (*Heidegger’s Critique of Descartes*).

Conscience functioning as a reminder for the self that s/he is not what s/he really believes the self to be, Dasein is therefore summoned by conscience to seek the authenticity lost in the everydayness of his/her they-selfness. In such a situation, Dasein, with a feeling of anxiety and guilt, is prompted to desire for an authenticity lost in the realm of everydayness. However, it is also significant to note that preoccupied with the everydayness of they-self, we forget that our lives, in Heidegger's words, as "Being-toward-the-end" are finite. Therefore, anxiety for Heidegger comes to be about nothingness including the anxieties of death and thrownness, as Magrini remarks:

Heidegger views the issue of existential nothingness as a pressing philosophical concern, which is to be confronted and interrogated. The monumental significance of nullity within Being and Time is evident when we come to understand that without the ultimate anxious encounter with the nothing of existence Dasein can neither legitimately approach the possibility of its Selfhood nor authentically enact its freedom. 'Anxiety is about death and guilt, awakening Dasein to the inherent instability and indefiniteness of its finite existence. However, anxiety is not a fear of a particular entity in the world. Rather, anxiety is a generalized, highly disturbing dread arising from Dasein, which induces a crisis of meaning. Anxiety provokes a shattering breakdown in the everyday, familiar ways in which Dasein conducts its life and most dramatically illustrates the principle of breakdown and revelation within Heidegger's philosophy. (2006, pp.78-79)

Padgett argues that "Dasein is guilty of neglecting its authentic Self, and this 'Being-guilty' (Schuldigsein) is what calls to Dasein: it is a call, as Heidegger remarks, both "from me and yet from beyond me" (Padgett, 2007, p.2). Cramped in the confines of they-self, devoid of its authenticity in everydayness of they-self and hence feeling guilty, Dasein's achievement of authenticity can be actualized only after its realization of its own anxiety emerged as an outcome of its failure "to hear its own Self in listening to the they-self" (Heidegger, 1998, p.315). Heidegger elaborates this as follows:

The they has always kept Dasein from taking hold of [the] possibilities of Being. The "they" even hides that manner in which it has tacitly relieved Dasein of the burden of explicitly choosing these possibilities. It remains indefinite who has 'really' done the choosing. So Dasein [makes] no choices, gets carried along by the nobody, and thus ensnares itself in inauthenticity. This process can be reversed only if Dasein specifically brings itself back to itself from its lostness in the "they". But this bringing-back must have that kind of Being by the neglect of which Dasein has lost itself in inauthenticity. When Dasein thus brings itself back from the they, the they-self is modified in an existentiell manner so that it becomes authentic Being-one's-Self. (1998, pp.312-313)

Through anxiety and a feeling of guilt, Dasein is summoned by conscience to find authenticity that has been lost in the course of everydayness of 'they-self'. As the call heard from the conscience is a call both from and beyond the Self, it comes to be a call different from other voices belonging to any other self-practice in the banality of everydayness. However, it is significant to note that the call of conscience practiced in a feeling of anxiety with respect to Dasein's confrontation of a potential authenticity comes to stand for a call heard only in silence. Heidegger explains this as follows:

The call dispenses with any kind of utterance. It does not put itself into words at all; yet it remains nothing less than obscure and indefinite. Conscience discourses solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent. In this way it not only loses none of its perceptibility, but forces the Dasein which has been appealed to and summoned, into the reticence of itself. The fact that what is called in the call has not been formulated in words, does not give this phenomenon the indefiniteness of a mysterious voice, but merely indicates that our understanding of what is 'called' is not to be tied up with an expectation of anything like a communication. (1998, p.318)

Silence as a means of communication originating from an anxiety of Dasein's accordingly comes to call to Dasein by means of the appeal of conscience. As Heidegger puts it: "The call comes from me and yet from beyond me" (320). In other words, Dasein cannot hear the call unless it moves beyond its they-self, which includes an inauthentic self of itself. However, it's also noteworthy to state that Dasein is already to be beyond its they-self to be able to call itself to that place away from the 'they' (Padgett, 2007, p.5).

INGMAR BERGMAN'S *PERSONA* AS A DASEIN

This is where I argue that Ingmar Bergman's *Persona* can be analysed through the Heideggerian perception of Dasein.

Although there are a great number of film critics and scholars⁴ who find Bergman's *Persona* enigmatic and difficult to categorize, through Heidegger's philosophy of existence in relation to the idea of *thrownness* into the world, *Persona* can still be considered as a work representing the angst of one who in Heidegger's terms is a-being-in-the-world, while at the same time having a particular world of his/her own; thereby going beyond the borders of a self actualization in the everydayness of a they-self.

⁴ "Persona has enjoyed copious critical attention. From the initial, perplexed newspaper reviews to the numerous articles and even in a full-length monograph, commentators have tried to make sense of the film's mix of avant-garde techniques and straightforward dramaturgy. [1] From confused protests, to depictions of the 'transcendent image,' [2] to pleas for a Swedish nativist reading, [3] to formal analyses of devices bared, [4] to critiques of an assumed Hegelian model of identity and recognition, [5] interpretations of this rather cryptic film abound" (Stern, 2010, s. 204).

According to this account, Bergman's most radical and most wellknown work, *Persona* primarily tells a story of two women protagonists. One is a successful actress, evidently in her mid-thirties, named Elizabeth Vogler (Liv Ullmann), a patient now suffering from an enigmatic mental collapse whose chief symptoms are muteness and a near-catatonic lassitude. The other is a pretty young nurse of twenty-five named, Alma (Bibi Andersson), who is charged with caring for Elizabeth - - first at a mental hospital, then at a beach cottage loaned to them by a woman psychiatrist who is Elizabeth's doctor and Alma's supervisor. Overall, it is in the foreground that these women's characters and personalities merge into one another, making it difficult for the spectators to understand what is true and what is not in terms of their relations both with one another and also with their own worlds.

Elisabeth Vogler suffers from a breakdown causing her to go into a permanent silence suddenly during a performance of *Electra*. Refusing to speak, she is taken to a hospital where she remains silent, and has no emotional relation to others. On the other hand, Alma, the nurse, who is in charge of taking care of Elisabeth, is informed by the doctor that Elisabeth might have chosen not to speak of her own will, as she seems to be healthy both physically and mentally. The doctor remarks: "She's healthy, both mentally and physically. It's not even some kind of hysterical reaction." Besides, with respect to Elisabeth's choice of silence, the doctor's following explanation plays a further significance as it foregrounds the drive pushing Elisabeth to gain authenticity in a realm of 'personas'.

Don't you think I understand? The hopeless dream of being. Not seeming, but being. In every waking moment aware, alert. The tug of war... what you are with others and who you really are. A feeling of vertigo and a constant hunger to be finally exposed. To be seen through, cut down... even obliterated. Every tone of voice a lie. Every gesture false. Every smile a grimace. Commit suicide? That's unthinkable. You don't do things like that. But you can refuse to move and be silent. Then, at least, you're not lying. You can shut yourself in, shut out the world. Then you don't have to play any roles, show any faces, make false gestures. You'd think so... ...but reality is diabolical. Your hiding-place isn't watertight. Life trickles in everywhere. You're forced to react. Nobody asks if it's real or not, if you're honest or a liar. That's only important at the theater, perhaps not even there.
(*Persona*, 1966)

This drive will fail eventually, as it is "the hopeless dream of being." As a Dasein, Elisabeth's existence will be confined within the borders of a physical world, no matter how much she tries to go beyond it.

On the doctor's suggestion when Alma and Elisabeth go to stay at a seaside house, their relationship evolves into a sort of multi-layered relationship made up of mostly Alma's monologues. As it is only Alma who speaks in their semantic realm, her words come to function as the only bridge between the characters and the spectators as well. By means of Alma's narratives, the spectator seems to be invited in a sense to consider the role of Elisabeth's silence in her relation with the

world as a Dasein. Alma's following explanation with respect to her sense of anxiety shared with Elisabeth in this context depicts the common conflict of mankind through these two characters' intertwined personalities, as skilfully represented through Bergman's camera angle: "The anxiety we carry with us ... all our broken dreams, the inexplicable cruelty ... the fear of death, the painful insight into our earthly condition ... have worn out our hope of a divine salvation The cries of our faith and doubt against the darkness and the silence are terrible proof of our loneliness and fear. Do you think it's like that? I don't believe that" (*Persona*, 1966).

With Bergman's extraordinary use of the camera capturing and representing these women through cinematographic means of close-ups, sometimes in shades merged into one another, it is suggested that the idea of Dasein is thematized not only through some verbal predicates but also through a spectator's probing gaze. Bergman's cinematography creates the spectator's gaze. As remarked before, according to Heidegger, we are practicing a kind of they-self in a world we are thrown into where we accordingly experience a banality of everydayness consisting of inauthentic others. In such a world of thrownness, achieving authenticity for Heidegger seems to be related to one's Dasein's merits, including the angst emerging out of his/her ontological speculation of the self-existence that is interpreted from the within of one's ontic existence - - going beyond it toward an ontological awareness of its existence. It is our ontological being that matters for Heidegger rather than ontic entities because ontic existence refers to a sort of entity that surrounds us, such as a table, a pen, etc., thereby functioning as an object that might be analyzed and categorized also as an object of science. However, for Heidegger ontology is what opposes such a kind of dualistic perception that separates subject from object. It is internalized all in one and cannot be categorized. Dasein for him, therefore, cannot be categorized as an object of science but understood only ontologically.⁵

Dasein/Persona's Ontological Quest

According to Carl Jung, "When we analyse the persona we strip off the mask, and discover that what seemed to be individual is at bottom collective" (Jung, 1966, p.246). Persona is what we allow the others to see in relation to our identities. With a reference to the Mask the ancient Greek players wore, persona stands for masks we choose to display to others. It, in a sense, might be a kind of mask we wear to hide what we do not want to reveal. This is how the inauthentic

⁵ In terms of the difference between ontic and ontologic for Heidegger, Roderick Munday remarks as follows: "Entities present-at-hand within the world are understood ontically and their characteristics can be arranged into categories. Dasein on the other hand is understood ontologically and its characteristics are arranged into existentials. The difference between existentials and category is both in the way they are used (existentials applies only to Dasein, category applies to entities within the world) but in the different paradigmatic assumptions (the differences between an ontical and ontological understanding) that underpin them" (Munday, 2009).

beingness is performed according to Heidegger by every single individual after being thrown into the world. With birth, we are thrown into this world and live in the banality of everydayness. However, in such a thrownness, we paradoxically can keep our benefits safe in a world governed by the rules of the same everydayness.

In such a world, the idea of being-in-the-world is our common role we share with every other individual, thereby helping us forget that we are finite and inauthentic entities preoccupied with the banality of everydayness along with other 'they-selves'. As we are all thrown into a world where we have almost no choice apart from experiencing what the others experience, we get therefore "carried along by the nobody," and thus we in Heidegger's view ensnare ourselves in inauthenticity (Heidegger, 1998, p.312). It is the nullity with its potential infinity that might provide the entity with possible perceptions of its existence.

For Heidegger, we as Dasein are, therefore, guilty of neglecting our authentic Selves, and this is what calls Dasein from within itself and yet from beyond itself. In such a context, when it is about Bergman's *Persona*, feeling helpless and guilty, Elisabeth seems to oppose all worldly sounds with a nullity effect emerging out of her own guilt and despair, all of which come to be actualized only through her silence. However, the doctor's interpretation of Elisabeth's silence makes great sense where it is underlined that being-in-the-world -- in other words, being thrown into the world -- is already a hopeless dream of being: "Don't you think I understand? The hopeless dream of being. Not seeming, but being." In such a world, we are always entrapped with personas made up of inauthentic consciousness of our selves.

On this account, Elisabeth Vogler who suddenly stops speaking seems to be going through this Heideggerian feeling of guilt calling her from the inauthentic state of everydayness. Having experienced many of the worldly pleasures such as achieving fame, physical beauty, career and family, Elisabeth with her silence seems to have been called for a Heideggerian authenticity felt through an anxiety about her persona in the world. This is even implied by Alma when she speculates about what might have caused her silence after realising that she tore her son's photograph sent to her by her husband

It was an evening at a party, wasn't it? It was late and rather noisy. In the early hours, someone said to you "Elisabet(h), you have everything as a woman and as an artist, but you lack motherliness." You laughed because you thought it was ridiculous ... but you couldn't stop thinking about what he had said. You grew more worried ... so you let your husband make you pregnant. You wanted to be a mother. When you knew it was definite, you became afraid, afraid of responsibility, afraid of being tied down, afraid to leave the theatre ... afraid of pain, afraid of dying, afraid of your swelling body. But all the time you acted, played the part of the happy expectant mother. And everybody said, "She has never been this beautiful." You tried several times to get rid of the fetus. But you failed. When you knew it was inevitable, you started to hate the child and wished it would be

stillborn. You wished that the baby would be dead. You wanted a dead child. It was a long and difficult delivery. You suffered for days. The baby was delivered with forceps. You looked with disgust at your screaming child and whispered, Can't you die soon? Can't you die? But he survived. The boy screamed day and night ... and you hated him. You were afraid. You felt guilty. In the end, relatives and a nanny took care of the boy, and you could leave your sickbed and return to the theater. But the suffering wasn't over. The boy was seized by a massive and unfathomable love for his mother. You resisted desperately because you felt that you could not return it. You try and try ... but the meetings with him are cruel and awkward. You can't do it. You're cold and indifferent. And he looks at you. He loves you, and he's soft, and you want to hit him for not leaving you alone. You think he's repulsive, with his thick lips and ugly body and his moist and pleading eyes. You think he's repulsive, and you're afraid. (Persona, 1966)

As a being in the world, Elisabeth's angst, reminding her of her finitude in this world, wants to own her choice among the choices practiced by inauthentic others. Her silence in this context provides her with the choice of owning her world by surpassing her role as a persona in the world. Like any other individual in the world, Elisabeth experiences several roles ascribed to her by the common teachings of the society making up the world of banalities. These roles -- in Bergman's view, these personas -- include parenting, having a family, a professional job, etc.; and they come to be practiced inauthentically by every single person, invoking eventually an entity out of that person that is unaware of his/her authenticity lost in the majority of they-self.

In this context, as a persona Elisabeth in life plays the roles of a successful actress, wife and mother. However, having trouble with her very own persona, she in silence goes beyond the borders of a world where she is solely a being, and achieves a world of her own that is fluent and unsteady. Having practiced several Personas inauthentically, Elisabeth comes to have and to possess her very own Personas, and every one of them represents her position as a theyself. However, her silence as a revelation of the angst she feels internally also depicts her as a Dasein who feels guilty of neglecting an authentic self lost in the Personas of everydayness. This 'being-guilty' (Schuldsein) comes to be the drive for Heidegger as it is what he names Dasein. This is a troublesome process that makes one feel, in a sense, the vanity and banality of simply only being a 'being in the world' and likewise makes one forget that s/he is finite. Elisabeth feeling guilty and anxious therefore seems to own her choice in silence. In this silent realm she comes to actualize her beingness no longer as a 'being-in-the-world' but as a 'being of a world' that is not apriori, definite or stable. As James Magrini elaborates, the Heideggerian view of anxiety "exposes Dasein to the fundamental nature of its Being-in-the-world by bringing it before the great void of existence,

and is therefore crucial to Dasein's authentic existential understanding of such phenomena as 'death,' 'nothingness,' and 'thrownness'" (2006, p.78).

Elisabeth's angst – anxiety -- leading possibly to achieving her authenticity might be deduced from certain scenes representing her strife with the banality and vanity of her inauthentic roles – personas - preoccupying her in a world of affectedness, thereby causing her to forget her state of finitude. In the hospital, the scene where she seems to be petrified with the news and iconic image from Vietnam showing the stark self-immolation of a Buddhist monk, and the photograph of a Warsaw child as a victim of the Holocaust seem to have been employed by Bergman to highlight the atrocities perpetrated by humanbeings that consist of inauthentic masses. Elisabeth, both mentally and physically healthy, nonetheless seems to be highly engaged in such mishaps practiced by human beings stuck in the banality of everydayness that keeps them away from achieving a Self-hood. They are also rather stuck in the vanity of a they-self that comes to be seen as a self but is not an authentic self, rather a singularity tied up by the banality of a they-self

However, it is noteworthy to argue that Elisabeth's choice of silence itself can also be conceived as of a Persona, suggesting that there is no way out and therefore reminding us of the doctor's interpretation of her situation where the doctor had interpreted it as 'the hopeless dream of being'. In other words, her silence might be considered as another mask she puts on similar to other masks she put on till then. Therefore, Elisabeth's silence, though it seems to be a way to get away from the they-self, still cannot be a solution for the Dasein. Abraham Mansbach remarks that for Heidegger

Dasein is not the ground of its existence, but the ground of the not. For Dasein individuates itself by choosing among its possibilities. Yet with every choice, it annuls all other possibilities, since it can select only one. Its power and capacity to be is mainly a power not to be. It is the ground of a nullity (Nichtigkeit). The not is a possibility rooted in Dasein's existential constitution which, far from being a negation of things, makes them possible: it allows them to show themselves as they are in themselves. (1998)

While Elisabeth's silence might be considered as a revelation of anxiety, she feels deep inside, thereby representing the Heideggerian call that is essential for Dasein. Her silence still cannot be regarded as the final possibility providing her with authenticity. It is only one of the possibilities she can conduct to go beyond her ontic existence. However, going beyond it does not ensure that Dasein will gain authenticity. From Heidegger's perception of Ontology, her escaping an ontic existence gains her an ontological perception of herself, a further importance of achieving a final entity that indeed was not possible for Heidegger. In other words, Dasein in fact makes no choices, as argued by Mansbach; it is only the possibility of achieving itself before its other selves that have not been actualized, but potentially can come true anytime as long as the call is heard by Dasein.

Therefore, achieving an ultimate phase of authenticity is not feasible as Dasein is not the ground of its existence.

Elisabeth's silence, despite its seeming passivity, will be active by virtue of its nature of being against the stabilized codes of societal teachings that are practiced widely in inauthenticity. It will therefore tend to move forwards to evolve. When the doctor talks to Elisabeth about her hypothesis concerning the reasons why she might have stopped speaking, her silence is considered as another role she plays similar to other roles she has played before: "Elisabeth, I understand why you're silent, why you don't move. Your lifelessness has become a fantastic part. I understand and I admire you. I think you should play this part until it's done ... until it's no longer interesting. Then you can leave it, as you leave all your roles" (*Persona*, 1966). Her silence, that might justly be regarded as another role, is at the same time an active process imbued with Heideggerian anxiety that calls to Dasein to understand its existence, even if it costs pain and gives no hope for a definite and finite understanding of its own existence.

Thrown into this world, all individuals with a potential of going through numerous possible personas arrive at becoming their very possibilities. As Heidegger remarks, we are our possibilities that in nature prompt possibilities for future. However, no individual is secluded from the past. Then every individual as Dasein comes to live through his/her past, in Heidegger's words, "the other end" that is birth, now, and the future of possibilities. In this respect, he seems to go beyond both Kant and Descartes with respect to their understanding of existence, and delves into the pre-Socratic thoughts of Heraclitus and Parmenides. When it is remembered that Heraclitus criticized his predecessors and contemporaries for their failure to see a unity of experience, Heidegger's criticism of Cartesian dualism might be more understood now. Similar to Heraclitus's idea of flux, an ongoing process of Dasein's perception of itself with the help of angst and its nullity is likewise governed by change, which in this respect include numerous variables and inconsistencies.

On this ground, Elisabeth's and Alma's intermingled representation through the cinematography such of shades, close ups, etc. is employed by Bergman in a way that allows the plot to be analyzed through the Heideggerian concept of Dasein with respect to a characters's intermingled identities. Alma's following words in this context lay bare the flux of nature and the Heideggerian perception of Dasein that comes to depict an existence rooted in its own possibilities. Alma's question about the possibility of being one and the same person at the same time reveals the anxiety that Heidegger has been preoccupied with when he was thinking about his idea of Dasein. Alma asks Elisabeth: "Is it possible to be one and the same person at the same time? I mean, two people?"

On the other hand, after Alma reads Elisabeth's letter including Elisabeth's ideas about her, Alma's hatred for Elisabeth is also detailed both through Alma's words and behaviours. As a representation of inconsistent feelings, Alma's hatred of Elisabeth is also important, as it suggests that although they seem to be entwined, they still cannot be reconciled with one another, which accordingly

means that there is nothing to be stabilized as long as it is about the Dasein's anxiety of existence. Alma's words therefore represent a message that originates both from and beyond herself, suggesting that her identity entwined with Elisabeth's is a revelation of Dasein's anxiety in relation to other existential possibilities, while at the same time revealing a secret common to all humanbeings concerning their fallen situation. Alma says: "You're unapproachable. The doctor said you're healthy, but I wonder about your madness. You're acting healthy so well that everyone believes you. Everyone but me, because I know how rotten you are" (*Persona*, 1966).

CONCLUSION

The idea of rot prevails in inauthentic qualities of everydayness. Elisabeth's rot symbolizes Heideggerian angst arising from where a drive for authenticity emerges. However, the rot as represented by Elisabeth's silence is considered as a specific rot by Alma, who in this context comes to stand for the mouthpiece of the they-self pervasively manifesting the sense of everydayness. Elisabeth's silence should therefore be considered as a way of dissidence not welcomed in a realm of banality that is governed by the rules of they-selfness. When regarded overall, one can conclude that others' interpretations of us play an eminent role in determining who we are, likening every single entity to one another. In this realm of everydayness, Dasein seems to be safe as it is secured by the codes of banality that accordingly is the source originating the merits of they-self. However, Dasein desiring and preferring to own a world, to being an ordinary they-self, signifies that we are on the run from ourselves only when we, as Dasein, feel the inauthentic roles of our being in the world. Yet it is critical to note that although it seems to be hard to get away from the they-self, Elisabeth's silence as a representative of the angst she undergoes reminds us that she is on the run from herself because of an authenticity. Although her silence seems to be only one of those numerous personas she has undertaken throughout her life, her state of self-consciousness of her they-selfness is what Bergman draws our attention to by means of her silence in the film. It is this self-awareness residing in her angst that makes her meet her inauthentic self and accordingly makes her desire for authenticity in this world of banalities. In the end, Alma implies to Elisabeth that she is content with her role -- as a being-in-the world -- contrary to Elisabeth's silence suggesting her striving both for authenticity and rejection of the they-selfness: "I'm not like you. I don't feel the same as you. I'm Sister Alma. I'm only here to help you. I'm not Elisabet(h) Vogler. You're Elisabet(h) Vogler" (*Persona*, 1966). Alma's final words shed light on how their entwined representations dissolve in the end since Alma opposes a self-conscious position in her world where a safer zone is provided only through the means of they-selfness, ensuring a more stable environment containing inauthentic ones sharing a lot in common with one another. Elisabeth's rejection displayed in her silence establishes her *Persona* as Dasein inclined to reject any social ascription pre-defined for her. In this context, language on its own

as the primary agent forming and then maintaining all logo-centric human institutions seems to be the first and most significant human tool to be rejected by Elisabeth.

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