

THE ROLE OF RUSSIA AND ENGLAND IN THE RISE OF GREEK NATIONALISM AND IN GREEK INDEPENDENCE

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There are names given to the various era's of history: stone age, metal age, space age, an so forth. These names are given according to the changes taking place on earth, trying to understand their reasons and characteristics. For that reason, Leonard W. Cowie and Robert Wolfson, two historians writing 19th century European history, entitled their books "Years of Nationalism, European History, 1815-1890." In fact this name is the most suitable to refer to the 19th century European history. Nationalism, from the end of the 18th century to the 19th century and to our day, even though its effect sometimes diminishes, is, especially in Europe and thereafter in all the world countries, the most important power affecting events. Many books have been written on the meaning of this concept. In this study, "Greek nationalism" is focused on and evaluated with regards to its very important and exemplary characteristics, its historical evolution among European nationalisms, and its consequences. As this is a very broad topic, this study focuses only on the influence of Russia and Britain in the creation and success of Greek nationalism.

Many sorts of typologies are constructed in order to understand the specificity and the conditions of the wide range of concepts of

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1. Leonard W. Cowie & Robert Wolfson, *Years of Nationalism, European History, 1815-1890*, London, 1985; also see Norman Rich, *The Age of Nationalism and Reform, 1850-1890*, W. W. Norton & Company, 1970.

"nationalism". One of them is "Eastern European nationalism."² The main characteristics of Eastern European nationalism, those distinguishing it from other types, are external influences, rebellious features, and the desires to establish independent states³. Another common characteristic of a large group is that, from the 15th to the 20th century the Ottoman State, for five centuries, occupied and ruled Eastern Europe. These nations knew a kind of nationalism favouring an independent state through a struggle against the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the status and conditions of non-Moslems should be reviewed.

1. Greeks in the Ottoman State

In the Ottoman State non-Moslem minorities were ruled in a "millet" system. Within the Moslem, Christian and Jewish millet, the Ottoman rule didn't care about the race and blood of its subjects. Religion was the distinctive feature. It divided the subjects into Moslems and non-Moslems. Under the Islam system, a tax called "cizye" was collected from the non-Moslems. All further regulations concerning their lifestyle were left to them to choose according to their own beliefs; there was no interference in the daily life. "European Turkey differed from the rest of the continent in one significant respect. Whereas Christian governments in the rest of Europe had permitted no Muslim communities, Christians had been officially tolerated."⁴

The religious leader of each group (the leader of the Jews, the High Priest, the Orthodox Patriarch etc.) was the representative with whom the Sultan communicated. They were the

2. Peter F. Sugar & Ivo J. Lederer (eds.), *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*. Washington, 1969.

3. Sugar, "External and Domestic Roots of Eastern European Nationalism" in *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, pp. 3-54.

4. H. Hearder, *Europe in the Nineteenth Century, 1830-1880*, Second ed., New York, 1988, p. 35; for the status of non-Moslems in the Ottoman Empire, see: *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, Benjamin Braude & Bernard Lewis (eds.), Vols. I-II, New York, London, 1982.

representatives of these groups both spiritually and socially. They were responsible to the Sultan for their society. They were free to regulate and rule themselves in internal affairs such as religious, social, judicial and commercial life⁵. Their trials were held in the courts of their own churches, according to their own laws. They could study in their own schools using their own educational systems. Marriage, divorce and inheritance procedures were regulated following their beliefs. There was no interference with their language. In modern day terms, they lived under a religious tolerance of "secularity" or "autonomy⁶." The Ottoman administration had started to grant these rights since it first faced non-Moslems, when it was very powerful. There were no pressure groups trying to force the Ottoman State to do so: it conferred them according to its own belief and management philosophy. The Ottoman administration by no means wanted to assimilate or destroy the Christian society or ever attempted such a kind of programme. The non-Moslems preserved their lifestyle and identity for hundreds of years. With the advantage of having no military obligations they were usually occupied with internal and external commerce, handicrafts etc. In most cases they were richer than the Moslems⁷.

The Greeks were the most advantageous minority in the Ottoman State. They were the most densely populated among the non-Moslems. Under the system of "millet", the leader of the Orthodox nation, the Phanariot Patriarch, was always elected from among the Greeks. Therefore the whole of the Orthodox population, Bulgarians, Serbians, Rumanians, Vlachs, Albanians and Arabians, were under Greek predominance. The Greeks considered the other Balkan nations as "barbarians" and felt different from them. The other nations regarded the Greeks as the

5. Richard Clogg, *Modern Greece*, London, 1981, p. 8.

6. Hearder, p. 36.

7. Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920* (EBNS), Washington, 1970, p.X.

lackeys of the Ottomans⁸. Educated and reach Bulgarians and Rumanians used Greek in their writings and some became completely Hellenized⁹.

The name of the Orthodox Church under Greek dominance, was "Phanariot Patriarch". There he had several occupations such as tax collection, judicial trials, social services, the regulation of heritages, commercial practices concerning the Greek and other Orthodox subjects, in addition to the religious ceremonies¹⁰. The autonomy given by the Ottomans to non-Moslems through the church, allowed the Greeks to fill all the hierarchical levels of the Phanariot Patriarch and as a consequence Greeks climbed to a more advantageous and higher social status than the other non-Moslem minorities. The Greeks were able to obtain all their wishes through the help of the Orthodox church organizations. For instance by the 1820s many Bulgarians were paying to the Greek Orthodox Church twice what they were required to pay to the Ottoman State¹¹. They even used the tolerance of the Ottomans to assimilate other Orthodox subjects. They tried to turn the other Orthodox subjects into Greeks. In a circular letter of the Orthodox Patriarch of 1800 it was ordered that in all churches only Greek books were allowed and all Bulgarian books were forbidden¹². In the other Orthodox Balkan countries the Greek pressure through the church was so heavy that in the 19th century the Balkan nationalistic movements not only opposed the Ottomans but also the Greek ecclesiastical and cultural dominance¹³. The first proponent of the Bulgarian

8. Sugar, p. 36; *The Movement for Greek Independence, 1770-1821*, Richard Clogg (ed.), London, 1976, p. XII.

9. Peter Mackridge, "The Greek Intelligentsia 1780-1830; A Balkan Perspective" in *Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence*, Richard Clogg (ed.), The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1981, pp. 69-70; Denis Deletant, "Romanian Society in the Danubean Principalities in the Early 19th Century" in the same book, pp. 230-231.

10. Clogg, *Modern Greece*, p. 8.

11. Richard Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878-1918, A History*, Boulder, Distributed By Columbia University Press, 1983, p. 10.

12. Halil İnalcık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, Ankara, 1964, pp. 19-20.

13. Richard Clogg, *A Short History of Modern Greece (SHMG)*, Cambridge, 1979, p. 20.

national revival was Paisi Hilendarskii. His book was intended to warn his fellow Bulgarians against the danger of Hellenisation¹⁴. Bulgarians rebelled against the increasing dominance of the Greek Church all nineteenth century until they established their national church in 1870. Bulgaria therefore had a free church before its political liberation. Crampton stated that "the movement for political independence, however, was always, weaker than the Church movement¹⁵." The important point is that, whereas there is one centre in the Catholic world, there is no special centre in the Orthodox church. Even though the Ottomans initially had organized the Orthodox sects into a centre of unity, the Greeks tried to take advantage of this, prompting the other minorities to establish their own church centres.

Politically, apart from their advantageous situation in the church, there existed a tradition of "Phanariot Greek Lords" who were appointed to very important positions in the government by the Ottomans. These Phanariots were appointed to the states of Eastern Europe or the Balkans and to the special regions as Ottoman government officers. The governing of these areas was traditionally left to them¹⁶. Some of these Phanariots were at the same time members of rebellious anti Ottoman committees¹⁷. They continued to be the Mayors of their regions even after the independence of the Greek state¹⁸. Furthermore, these Phanariots were granted very important positions from the 17th century to 1821 in Ottoman Foreign Affairs, as translators and diplomats¹⁹. As will be outlined further in this study, some of these Greek Lords used their advantages against the Ottoman state.

14. Crampton, p. 5.

15. Crampton, p. 16.

16. Peter F. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe Under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804*, Seattle & London, 1977, pp. 120-134; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, Vol. IV, Part 1, Second ed., Ankara, 1982, p. 73.

17. Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, Vol. V, Ankara, 1988, p. 111; Clogg, SHMG, p. 51.

18. Karal, p. 116.

19. Clogg, SHMG, p. 9.

In the Ottoman Empire the non-Moslems were exempted from military obligations by a tax called "cizye". This happened to be a great advantage for them. During the first centuries of the Ottoman Empire, commerce was in the hands of the Armenians and the Jews. As the Greek Church prospered during the 18th century, the Greeks took over the commercial advantages from the others²⁰. As history progressed, the Greek merchants, with their traditional advantages under the Ottoman rule, acquired a special status which put them in a more active position than any other minority (e.g. Slavs or Bulgarians)²¹. The dominant position of the Greek Church, Greek culture and certain Greek families in the Ottoman employment meant that much early Balkan nationalism emerged as a reaction to Greek rather than to Ottoman domination, for example the resentment of Rumanians against the political authority of Phanariot Greeks or the later opposition of Bulgarians to Greek claims²²."

2. Russians Invasive Policy and Greeks, 1700-1770

When the Ottoman State reached the 18th century, a long era of decline began. Internal and external circumstances had changed. The land was not, as previously, well governed, but even if at that moment the Empire was one of the most powerful states in the world. However the first loss of land had occurred in 1699. These facts played a role in the rebellions taking place in the Balkans. An important factor is the invasive politics of the Russians on Ottoman lands and their ideas and actions to use the Orthodox subjects of the Ottomans to obtain their political goals.

Since 1472 Russia had seen itself as the proud and prestigious inheritant of Byzantium, referring to the marriage of Czar Ivan III with the daughter of the last Byzantine Emperor. The Russians

20. Clogg, *Modern Greece*, p. 10.

21. Sugar, "External and Domestic Roots...", p. 37.

22. Yapp, M.E., *The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792-1923*, Longman, London and New York, 1987, p. 60.

seriously considered occupying Istanbul²³. Naturally, family relations were used only to justify political motives. The true reason behind their concern about the Greeks and Greek independence was the opening of a gate to Istanbul in order to get an advantageous status vis-à-vis the Ottomans.

Russian involvement in the Balkan peninsula begins during the reign of Peter the Great at early eighteenth century. Tsar Peter called upon the Balkan Christians to rise in support of Russian army. However, their emphasis during the eighteenth century was on strategic concerns. During the Russian-Ottoman wars of 1736-39 and 1768-74 the Russian government established direct relations with three Balkan peoples: the Rumanians of Danubean Principalities, the Serbs and the Greeks.

During the eighteenth century an intimacy between the Greek Church and the Russians developed through mutual supports. In July 1700 for example, Czar Peter I through his ambassador asked commercial permission from the Ottomans for the Russians to pass through the Black Sea, which, in those days, was completely in the hands of the Ottoman State. This was the start of a Russian project of invasion towards the South. The Ottoman administration rejected the request, pointing out that the Black Sea was completely occupied by the Ottoman State. The ambassador considered the subject together with the Greek Patriarch Dossifei at Istanbul. Dossifei was better acquainted with the political views of the Ottomans. He advised the Russians not to insist on commercial privileges or permissions in the Black Sea because this would awaken the Ottomans and stimulate them to close the Kerch canal, which was the only strait connecting the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Ambassador Galicin consequently gave up his insistence. By helping to build up a burned church with permission of the Ottomans, the Russian ambassador returned the favour to the Patriarch. Czar Peter the same year, promoting the Patriarch, asked

23. Nevil Forbes & Arnold Toynbee. *The Balkan. A History of Bulgaria, Greece-Rumania, Turkey*, Oxford, 1915, p. 50.

the Ottoman State to review in favour of the Greeks some advantages and capitulations which had been transferred to the French²⁴.

When Czar Peter I sent the first Russian ambassadors to Istanbul he asked for a report on the cultural, economic and the other professions of the Ottoman Orthodox people. Furthermore in 1702 he asked the diplomats to try to find out how to make use of the Orthodox subjects in a war between Russia and the Turks. He wanted them to report on ways to get greater privileges in Jerusalem for the Orthodox church than for the others. The diplomats started to make surveys and to report them to their leader²⁵.

In the light of the reports from Istanbul the Russian Czar claimed his imperium over the Greeks as well as the Russians. In 1708 the Czar secretly sent pictures of himself decorated with the Holy Cross to Thessaloniki to be merchandized in order to enhance his popularity among the Orthodox subjects in the Balkans²⁶. This type of provocation was also observed in Serbia and Rumania. It had a considerable effect on the actions in the Montenegro rebellion²⁷. Russian army in 1711, entered into the war of Prut against the Ottomans. The official reason for beginning the war was to protect the Orthodox subjects in the Ottoman lands. He was defeated at the end of the battle. One of the statements in the peace-settlement was that Russians and Ottomans would not provoke each others subjects against their rulers²⁸.

Nevertheless Russia didn't give up these sorts of activities, but tried to perform them in a more secret and skillful way. Among

24. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, Vol. IV, Part 2, Second ed., Ankara, 1983, pp. 175-178.

25. B. H. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire*, Oxford, 1949, pp. 27-28.

26. Uzunçarşılı, Vol. IV, Part I, pp. 70-71.

27. Ibid, pp. 71-72.

28. Ibid, pp. 78-85.

them was the work of Maurokordatos (1711-1769), an admirer of the French enlightenment, whose aim was to establish a constitutional regime. With him a nascent nationalism had come into existence. He made propaganda for Russia by publishing two biographies of Peter the Great (1736)²⁹. At the same time Cosmas the Aetolian had been traveling through Greece for 20 years as a Russian spy to make propaganda for the establishment of a Greek education system³⁰.

The Greek merchants, who had become very rich by the advantages they got from the Ottomans, started to educate their children abroad. The most popular place of all for the students was the Russia of Peter. During the reigns of Peter and Catherina II Russian propaganda was accomplished by Greek speakers. Eugenius Voulgaris (1716-1808), as a typical member of the Greek intelligentsia of this period, believed that Catherina II would save the Greeks³¹. He inherited this belief from the propaganda brochures which were being spread out since the reign of Peter. The philosopher Voulgaris was a member of the elite of the period. He introduced Western ideas to Greece. In 1761 a Russian feast was celebrated with much splendour under Patriarch Seroptim by the effort of Voulgaris and the Phanariot Greek Patriarch in Istanbul. The Ottoman rulers defined this event as a scandal. Voulgaris had very close relationships with Catherina II. He had personally written several Russian propaganda brochures³².

This propaganda and provocation by the Russians continued with ever more concentration. Until the 1768-1774

29. Stephan G. Xydis, "Modern Greek Nationalism" in *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, p. 221.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 221.

31. In fact the idea of liberation of the Greeks from the Ottomans finds its roots in 1468, when Cardinal Bessarion proposed to Emperor Frederick to start a crusade against the Turks. In 1553 another Greek invited Charles V and Francis I together the Greek people and to give them their liberty. *Ibid.*, p. 220.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 221-223.

Ottoman-Russian war, they provoked all Balkan Orthodox subjects against the Ottomans, including Rumanians, Albanians, Morea and Montenegro princes. As we observe, the inclusion into the peace-settlement of Prut in 1711 of a statement "forbidding provocation" didn't make any difference. Its only value was historical, precisely indicating the time of the Russian provocations and the sensitivity to them of the Ottomans, who were not blind to the beginning of these events. The statement therefore is valuable because it shows the worries of the Ottomans regarding the Russians, which they expressed by including such a forward and open statement as early as 1711.

In fact Russia never felt obliged to respect it. The agreement was only a compromise after a war it had lost. It was in contradiction to the Russian self-definition and to the evolution of the Russian Empire. Before the emergence of Pan Slavism in the 19th century, Panorthodoxism was the rule in Russia. The Russians considered themselves as having a mission. They thought that the destiny of Byzantium was the continuity of Orthodox religion with the Greeks, the protection and possession of Orthodoxy. They believed to be chosen for this task, which had been neglected because of the sins of Europe³³.

These ideas were a perfect basis for the Russian wish during the 18th and 19th centuries to invade the Ottoman Empire towards the South, the Mediterranean, and to occupy Istanbul. The method they chose was the promotion of rebellions, which, if they had not matured enough, on their own were provoked! After Peter I (1682-1725) another great Russian emperor who was not of Russian race was Catherina II (1762-1796). The intermediate period had consisted of the putting into practice of the above mentioned politics. As Catherina II came to power, Russia achieved a revigorated dynamism and new horizons.

33. Louis L. Snyder, *Varieties of Nationalism. A Comparative Study*, New York, 1976, p. 214.

3. The Beginning of Greek Nationalism and the Morea Rebellion (1770)

The Russians had upset the balance of powers in Eastern Europe, namely in Poland. Polish nationalists fled from Russia to Balta in the Ottoman Empire. The Russians persecuted the Polish nationalists into the depths of the Ottoman land and in Balta killed everybody, not discriminating between Polish and Ottoman subjects. After this event, the Ottoman-Russian war of 1768-1774 was inevitable. The Orthodox Ottomans finally began to respond to the Russian provocative propaganda which had been going on for a century³⁴. The time had come to activate the non-Moslem Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman State.

During this war, which was aimed at internally undermining the Ottoman State, the advice of Marshal Münih to Catherina II was used. In order to start a rebellion at Morean peninsula a Macedonian serving as an officer in the Russian army, the son of a priest, Mauro Mihal, was sent to Morea, carrying a Bible, pictures of Catherina and several crosses. He negotiated with the native "Monyats" and reached an agreement. Common propagandists were employed to stir up the villagers to rebel. From the environment of spies and provocateurs, a Russian known as Hacı Murad had come to Morea five years before the rebellion, in 1765. He knew Turkish, Arabic and Persian perfectly. Traveling all through the Balkans he had achieved success in his work. The Monyats got a guarantee of Russian protection if they chose to rebel. The Bishop of Malveziya had also received a declaration that the Russian Navy and army would come soon. Mauro Mihal had informed Catherina that when the Russian Navy would appear in the Mediterranean, the Morea Rebellion would start³⁵.

The Morea Rebellion of 1770 was prepared entirely by Russian spies and was a consequence of the Ottoman-Russian war under the

34. "Greek Nationalism" in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Vol. X, 1966.

35. Uzunçarşılı, Vol. IV, Part I, pp. 391-392.

rule of Catherina II. The Moreans were stimulated to rebel during the war between Russia and the Ottoman State. The conditions were right for a rebellion. Most of the land was in the hand of the Turks, who were the minority population. The Greek majority Monyats were an aggressive, politically developed in the spirit of rebellion, and active people³⁶. In fact they had always been irresponsible towards the Turks. They were of Albanian origin and assimilated by the Greeks. Nevertheless they claimed to be descendants of the ancient Spartans. Their profession was the plundering of commercial ships in the Eastern Mediterranean as pirates. They had plundered Turkish ships during the occupation of Crete. Being afraid of punishment, they had asked the Pope and the Toscana Mayor to move them to Europe but this had not been accepted. The Republic of Genoa had designated a place on the island of Corsica for these pirates. But they begged for mercy and the Ottoman State erased their previous debts and punishments and forgave them. Nevertheless the region was always a potential area of rebellion³⁷.

In 1768 the Russian Czaria Catherina II ordered the Russian Navy to enter the Mediterranean from their location in the Finnish bay of Kronstadt, during the Russian-Turkish war. The Navy used the route of the North Sea - Atlantic Ocean - Gibraltar to reach the Eastern Mediterranean. At that time they couldn't sail through the Black Sea since it was part of the Ottoman State. In the Navy served Greeks from the Azov Sea and the Morean peninsula³⁸.

The Russian Navy was enthusiastically welcomed in England. It consisted of 24 warships and many smaller ones. It had been constructed by the English. Even though the Russians had modern ships, they were not used to navigation. The captain of the Navy was Count Alexi Orloff, assisted by his brother. In reality the Navy was controlled by the English admirals Elphinston, Gregg and

36. "Greek Nationalism" in *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

37. Uzunçarşılı, Vol. IV, Part I, p. 392.

38. *Ibid*, p. 392.

Dugdale. Having been checked in England, the fleet headed to the Mediterranean. The Ottoman Statesmen didn't count on the Russian Navy and mistakenly thought that the Russians couldn't have an naval force or come from the North Sea to the Mediterranean in a period of less than a year³⁹.

Nevertheless in March 1770 the Russian Navy reached the Morea peninsula. According to the plan of Orloff a rebellion would be started from Morea to Thessaloniki by an invasion of the Aegean islands, closing the strait of the Dardanelles for the Ottoman Navy⁴⁰. However, an unexpected event changed his plans. While two groups of ships were sailing to the Aegean waters, one group was caught in a storm and looked for shelter in a near-by bay. The Monyats, thinking that the rebellion had started, began to fight too early. Alexi Orloff had to change his plans and join the fighting⁴¹. According to other sources the leading ships and their Admiral Spiridov reached Morea in February 1770 and after negotiations with the Monyats had to send 500 Russian soldiers to the peninsula. The Monyats had said they would not begin the rebellion before Russian soldiers were seen on the peninsula. By landing 500 soldiers on the peninsula, Orloff had begun the rebellion⁴².

In March 1770 the rebellion started in Morea. Since it had been planned for many years, it spread out very quickly. A regional officer of Kalamata, called Beraki, dressed a group of Greeks in Russian uniforms and included them in the wars. The combined forces of Greeks and Russians invaded important cities of Morea such as Koron, modon, Navarin, Patras, Anaboly, Tripolice, Kalamata and Miristra. With the Ottoman general Muhsinzade Mehmet Pasha combatting on land and the Admiral Mandalzade

39. Ibid, pp. 392-393; İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, Vol. IV, İstanbul, 1972, pp. 47-48.

40. Uzunçarşılı, Vol. IV, Part I, p. 394.

41. Ibid, p. 394.

42. Danişmend, p. 48.

Hüsameddin Pasha on sea several combats were fought. Even though Moslem and Turkish subjects surrendered to the Russians, they were all massacred. This massacre caused a shock in Europe. The rebels, being persecuted by the Turk, reached the castle of Alexi Orloff in Navarin, begging the Russians to let them into the castle and to save them from the Turks. The rebels said that the Russians had promoted independence and rebellion for them but that they didn't even save their lives. Even so the Russian general Alexi Orloff didn't open the door of the castle and left them to the mercy of the Ottoman army. Meanwhile, the Russian Navy got away from the peninsula. This rebellion lasted for two months and ended with the Ottomans regaining full control⁴³.

The Russian Navy tried to stir up Athens, Agriboz and other cities for rebellion, but when they saw the fate of Morea, these subjects didn't want to enter war. The Russians had found far less men than expected in Morea. However, they informed Czarina Catherina that there were 100.000 fully armed soldiers waiting for them and ready to fight. Catherina believed this. The Russians didn't have sufficient forces to invade the whole peninsula by themselves. They had thought that they could give the starting shot for a big fire, but they only succeeded to invade a few ports and the supports fell short. Furthermore, they didn't get along with the Moreans. They called the Monyats "cowards"; the Greeks in turn called the Russians "traitors" because the Navy didn't help them to escape when they had lost the war⁴⁴.

After the Morea rebellion there was a confrontation between the Turkish and the Russian Navy on 6 July 1770, at day-time, near by the Koyun islands. The struggle ended to the advantage of the Ottomans. At night, the Ottoman fleet looked for shelter in Çeşme bay. The ships were carelessly situated next to each other in the small bay. The English Admiral Elphinston sent two ships,

43. Uzunçarşılı, Vol. VI, Part I, p. 398.

44. Ibid, p. 398.

commanded by Admiral Dugdale, to the Ottoman Navy. The Ottoman Admirals thought that the ships came for diplomatic negotiations and they let them come too close. The Russian ships opened the firing and all but two Ottoman ships perished in the fire.

The Russian victory of Çeşme was enthusiastically celebrated in Europe. It added to the prestige of the Russians. Even though the actual conqueror was Admiral Elphinston, it was the Russian Prince Alexi Orloff who was praised. Later he was given the name Tschesmeskij, i.e. "from Çeşme". To his glory, a triumphal arch was erected at the palace of Carskoyeselo.

The special points to be kept in mind in these events are the provocation of the Russian Navy in order to make the Morea rebels start a revolt and their attempts to do the same in other cities of the peninsula. The entire procedure of the 1868-1874 Çeşme naval war is to be included in the Russian-Ottoman war of that period in the Mediterranean. After that, Admiral Elphinston advised to threaten the Ottomans with a bombardment of Istanbul, passing through the Dardanelles strait and forcing them into peace. Alexi Orloff didn't dare to do this; he wanted to close the Dardanelles and to threaten the Ottomans by commercial means. He planned to establish a base at the gate of the strait. To this end, the Russian Navy had invaded Limni Island; for two months it tried in vain to conquer the castle; it finally retreated. As the Russian Navy couldn't accomplish much in the Aegean, it looked for shelter at Paros Island for a while. English sailors abandoned the Russians at that location.

In 1772 the Russian Navy tried to occupy some islands in the Aegean. Announcing their invasion of the Ottoman coasts, they tried to provoke several revolts, in Syria and Egypt, by sending a few ships to Alexandria and to Haifa. In 1773 they tried in the same manner to invade the south-west coast and the islands of Ottoman Anatolia. They were defeated. Only the Isporad islands were conquered. In this region, a Morean gang leader, Pasaros, was appointed as a Mayor. This situation lasted until the Agreement of

Kuchuk Kainardji in 1774. Immediately after the agreement, the Russian Navy returned to its home-base in the Baltic Sea⁴⁵.

The same Russian strategy of using local inhabitants of Ottoman land, and of provocation revolts at Morea, Pire, Athens, Agriboz, Syria and Egypt and of supporting the rebels, of invading Limni port, as well as an extension of this approach was manifested in Crimea in 1771⁴⁶. These events are studied as far as they affect our research topic.

When the war for Poland started, this country was already partitioned among three great states. The Ottomans were not in an advantageous position against the Russians. With the Kuchuk Kainardji Agreement the six years of war were brought to an end. With this agreement, Crimea was seized from the Ottomans; Russia paved the way to interfere with Serbian & Bulgarian affairs, as well as acquire the right to open consulates anywhere she liked. From the research point of view this formal agreement was an acceptance of the Russian power as the protector of Orthodoxy in the Ottoman Empire and interference in these matters could be expected. This Russian right to interfere, hung over the Ottomans as a "sword of Damocles" for many years. It gave Russia the right to follow its own policy in the Balkans. With the consulates in the Balkans, direct contacts with Orthodox subjects were accomplished.

4. The "Greek Policies" of Russia After 1774

Russia was able to to pursue its politics in a more conveniently way after it had forced the Ottoman State to accept its interferences with Orthodox subjects through the international agreement of 1774. Russias policy of interference was again reinforced at the convention of Aynalı Kavak in 1779⁴⁷. In 1771 Russia had tried to stir up Crimea for independence against the Ottomans. It became independent in 1774 by the Kuchuk Kainardji Agreement. In 1783,

45. Ibid, pp. 401-404.

46. Ibid, p. 406.

47. Ibid, pp. 452-453.

Russia invaded Crimea and annexed it. Provoking all the Orthodox subjects to rebellion against the Ottomans, they promised to give them all their support in case of revolt. Among these peoples were Rumanians, Gregorians, Montenegros and Greeks. In 1786 the Russians stirred up the Moreans again for a similar rebellion. Morea had learned the lessons of the past and didn't respond to the provocations. However, Suli, Epirus and Southern Albania were eager to revolt. The regional Mayor of the Ottomans, Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, was able to oppress it. Russian provocations continued⁴⁸.

Czarina Catherina II regarded herself as very powerful as a consequence of her accomplishments against the Ottomans. In 1787 she formed an alliance with the Austrian Emperor Joseph II against the Ottoman State. If the Ottomans were likely to wage war against either of the two, the other was supposed to interfere. If the war was won, they decided to share the Ottoman territories. Following this "Greek Project", the lands belonging to Rumania, Moldavia, Bessarabia, South Podolia and Bukovina were covered under the name "Dacia", an Orthodox kingdom, subjected to Russian dominance. The Crimean coast was to be invaded directly by the Russians. The main Aegean islands were also to be given to Russia. Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina were for Austria. Dalmatia was to be taken over from Venice and given also to the Austrians. Venice in return got Cyprus, Crete and Morea. In order to satisfy the other European countries, they also got a share in the system: Algeria to Spain, Libya and Tunesia to England, Syria, Palestine, the Lebanon and Egypt went to France, the Northern Caucasus and Gregoria to the Russians. If Istanbul would be occupied by the Russians, the Byzantine Empire was to be reconstructed with Catherina II's grandson the Grand Duke Constantin as the Byzantine Emperor. For this purpose, the Prince was taught Greek. Byzantium, under Russian protection, was to dominate Istanbul, Bulgaria, Dobruca, Thrace, Greece, Macedonia, Albania and

48. "Greek Nationalism" in *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

Montenegro. Anatolia, Iraq, Jordan and Arabia were to be left to the Ottomans⁴⁹.

There were interesting points in the project and Russia would get the largest share. The region of the Monyats, who had fought with the Russians for the independence of Morea against the Ottomans, was to be given to Venice. While the Rumanians were granted a crowned kingdom, the Morea people didn't get any independence at all. If Byzantium was to be reconstructed it was to be Russian, not Greek. Even though the name was "Greek Project", everything in it was subject to Russian assimilation. It was clear that all the provocations and stimulations had not been for the benefit of the benefit of the Greeks but of the Russians.

Catherina II came to the Crimea in 1787. She was welcomed at Kherson Port at the beginning of the river Dinyeper. There, together with the Austrian Emperor Joseph II, Catherina passed under an arch on which was written "Way to Byzantium", in Greek and in Russian. During this ceremony the Austrian and Russian ambassadors in Istanbul, discussed the details of the division of the Ottoman land⁵⁰. England and Prussia finally rejected the project, which would have brought Russia into the most powerful position. It failed because a rebellion took place at the same time in the Belgian area of the Austrian Empire. Another reason was the fact that the Russians were unable to gather the necessary money from Europe.

In 1790 Panos Kiri, Khrizos Lazotsi and Nikolaos Pangalos, all three Greeks, asked for help from Catherina II in "protecting the occupied Byzantine Empire, their Holy Religion and Patriarch from the barbarian Moslems". They wanted the grandson of the Czarina as their King Constantin. They said that they had armed themselves to fight for their life and fortune against the enemy of Christianity

49. Barbara Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914*, Cambridge, 1993, p. 5; Clogg, SHMG, pp. 30-31.

50. Danişmend, p. 65.

and that their people were ready to fall to Catherina's feet⁵¹. This relationship between Russians and Greeks can be minimized or exaggerated; it was never directly or indirectly broken from 1700 until Greek independence.

5. Changes in the Eastern Politics of England at the End of the 18th Century

At the beginning of the second half of the 18th century, the Ottomans had a favorable relationship with France. England was closer to Russia by reason of the French-English friction. The invasive politics of Russia on Ottoman land had not yet come to the point of irritating England. In India there was French danger but no Russian interests. As there was no Russian Navy in the Black Sea, the Russians were also incapable of causing commercial trouble. England had cooperated militarily with the Russians, even their expenses were covered in English ports and they were supported by English admirals during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768-74.

In the 1780s the very quick Russian invasion into Eastern and Southern Europe caught English attention. Especially the 1787 Greek Project made clear the Russian targets and the goals Russia had set to itself for many years. The Ottoman State was to be shared between two empires and Russia would become stronger. The balance of power was changing in favour of Russia, not of England. The English Prime Minister of the period, W. Pitt, had proposed for the first time to form an alliance with the Ottomans in order to protect English interests in the region. Roughly speaking, public opinion was not much in favour of this idea from the beginning. The public preferred a Russian occupation of Istanbul to the barbarian Turks⁵². Nevertheless W. Pitt succeeded to persuade public opinion, during the 1782-92 Ottoman-Russian War, by stressing the consequences of a Russian presence in the

51. W. Esq. Eton, *A Survey of the Turkish Empire*, London, 1772, Second ed., pp. 365-368.

52. Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya (1789-1919)*, Ankara, 1970, p. 40.

Mediterranean. He insisted on keeping the Russians away from this region. England now changed its politics of allowing the Russians to attempt whatever they wanted and to gather the fruits. England accepted to protect the unity of the Ottoman land against Russian invasive politics. This English view lasted until the First World War. Naturally it was possible within this framework to make partial changes in policy according to different events and circumstances.

6. The Reasons for the Greek Revolt

6.1. Societies

6.1.1. Cultural Societies

Starting from the 1800s new developments were observed in Greek nationalism. Until that time, the Morea revolts were the main characteristic of the movement. Furthermore, there was a rebellious, brigandage and bandit atmosphere at the base of Greek nationalism. However at the time of the first construction of a cultural basis for national identity, an awareness developed of different traditions of Greek nationalism and identity. These evolved into a cultural base. Afterwards, political and rebellious nationalistic movements were organized on this cultural basis. Naturally, external support and contacts continued during this period too.

The Greek Classics were being published in other countries and other popular books aiming at the awakening of nationalistic feelings were secretly smuggled into the land. These activities were covered by cultural nationalism. The publication of Adamantios Koraes was a typical example of the publishing of Greek books in Paris and the distribution in the Ottoman Empire⁵³. The poets Rhigas Pheraios and Kosmas were authors who worked on the national consciousness and on the departure away from the Ottomans. The important point was that the Greek national

53. Clogg, *Modern Greece*, p. 11.

movement started not in Greece itself but among the Greek communities in Vienna, Odessa, St. Petersburg, Marseille and Paris. The early journals, the literary revival, the first conspiratorial groups were all started in these foreign centres, as part of a general European movement, which spread from there to Greece⁵⁴.

The first institutionalization of the Greek nationalistic movement also started outside Greece. The poet Rhigas established the first society "Hetairia" against the Ottomans in 1796 in Vienna. This society, as with other societies with the same goal, had a close direct relation with Corfu, Athens, Beograd, Istanbul, Bucharest and Vienna freemason clubs. Rhigas, as were other members of the Hetairia, was a freemason himself. The society couldn't achieve its goals because the Austrian police arrested Rhigas and handed him over to the Ottomans⁵⁵. The leader of a similar second movement was the poet Koraes. The name of his society was Athena. It was supported by the France of Napoleon. The ideal of this movement was, that Napoleon should occupied European Ottoman land, including Istanbul, which would then be established as a kingdom ruled by a member of Napoleon's family. This was proposed by a member of the French Foreign Office, Kodrikas, who was of Greek origin⁵⁶.

In 1813 the Hôtel Grec (Ellinoglossos Ksenodhokhion) society was founded in Paris under the leadership of a former French Ambassador who had worked in Istanbul. The secretary of the society, Angelopoulos, was a consul of the Ottoman State. One of the founders of the Philike Hetairia, Athanasios Tsakalof, was also a member of the society. The Hôtel Grec gave rise to two other societies, Philike Hetairia and Finiks. The latter was founded in 1787 by Alexander Maurokordatos, an Ottoman officer in

54. J. R. Talmon, *Romanticism and Revolt. Europe 1815-1848*, London, 1967, p. 112.

55. M. Murat Hatiboğlu, *Yunanistan'daki Gelişmelerin Işığında Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinin 101 Yılı (1821-1922)*, Ankara, 1988, pp. 5-6.

56. Von Irmgard Wilharm, *Die Anfänge des Griechischen Nationalstaates, 1833-1843*, R. Oldenbourg München, 1973, p. 50, from Hatiboğlu, pp. 6-7.

Wallachia who had fled to Russia. Finiks sought alliance with Russia, whereas the other movements favoured France⁵⁷.

The Metropolitan of Arta Ignatius in 1810 in Bucharest had founded Filologiki Hetairia. In 1812 in Athens Hetairia Filomouson was established (inspired by the Greek mythology "the muses" they called themselves "Society of the Goddesses of Art"). This was a more active movement. Foreigners, especially English, and others, living around Athens, were members. The fame of the society spread quickly⁵⁸.

Count Ioannis Kapodistrias, a Foreign Affairs advisor of Czar Alexander I of Russia, wanted to raise the Greek question during the Vienna Congress of 1814-1815. He didn't succeed but he tied the Congress delegates to his society. Among them were the Russian Czar Alexander and the Princes of Bavaria and Württemberg. Kapodistrias collected a large sum for charity reasons. Thanks to these gains in prestige, he became the head of Hetairia Filomouson. He outlined his views as follows: "When will a Trazivulos* come for us? I would like very much to gather the Christian leaders to do something together for the Greeks⁵⁹."

All these Russian or French societies enabled the awakening and functioning of Greek consciousness. This formed the basis for national rebellious societies.

6.1.2. *Rebellious Societies*

In Greece and even more in the Balkans, the most effective of these societies was Philike Hetairia. This society was founded in 1814 for the ripening and the realization of the Greek movement. Having been established in Odessa, the organization worked with

57. Ibid, p. 51.

58. Hatiboğlu, p. 7.

* Thrazivulos was the man who reconstructed the unity of Athens after the Peloponnesian wars in the 4th century.

59. Ibid, pp. 7-8.

Masonic rules: activities were held secretly. The aim was a general Balkanic uprising supported by the Russian government: Russian assistance was central in the plans of the society⁶⁰. According to the reports of observers in 1810, there was no rebellious atmosphere without external support⁶¹. In fact, even after independence, Greece never had the capacity to perform any activity without external support.

The first leader of Philike Hetairia was one of its original founders, Nikolaos Skufas, a merchant. The other two founders were also merchants. After the society had moved its centre to the Patriarch of Istanbul in 1818, the leaders of the society were the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Capodistrias⁶² and the Greek general of the Russian Czar, "the son of a former cospodar of Wallachia", Ypsilantes. The most important secret leader of the society was the Russian Czar Alexander I⁶³. In the seal of the society there were three signs: an A for the Russian Czar Alexander, a K for the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greek origin Kapodistrias, the leader of the Philike Hetairia and Σ for Ieri Simmakhia, i.e. Holy Alliance⁶⁴.

According to R. Clogg, the number of members didn't exceed 1000 until 1821⁶⁵. The Jelavichs and Seton-Watson have other figures. Seton-Watson notes that the society, in Istanbul had only about 17.000 members until 1817⁶⁶. The Jelavichs claim that "in time the society had hundreds of branches and a large membership" as it spread in the Balkans⁶⁷. Both observations could be acceptable:

60. Jelavich, EBNS, pp. 39-40.

61. Clogg, SHMG, p. 42.

62. About Capodistrias and his relationship with the Greek revolution, see: C. M. Woodhouse. *Capodistria*, Oxford University Press, 1973, London, 1973. For his memoir: "Aporçu de ma carrière publique, depuis 1789 jusqu'à 1822" in *Sbornik imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*, Vol. III, 1869, pp. 163-292.

63. Jelavich, EBNS, p. 40.

64. Hatiboğlu, p. 10.

65. Clogg, SHMG, p. 48.

66. R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans*, New York, 1966, p. 50.

67. Jelavich, EBNS, p. 40.

the society may have had 1000 inscribed members and still hundreds of branches and further thousands of potential members in the Balkans.

A statistical report of Clogg shows that of the 1000 members, 54% were merchants, 13% professionals (teachers, students, lawyers, doctors), 12% provincial notables, mostly from the Peloponnesus, 10% clergymen (of whom few came from the higher ranks of hierarchy), 9% soldiers and only 2% peasants and artists⁶⁸. The merchant members provided financial support for the society. In order to catch public attention, the religious aspect was emphasized. The Patriarch Gregorios, the Bishops and Phanariot Lords was inscribed on the member list. "Apostles", priests preaching to the public, made the people believe in the ideology of the society⁶⁹. These Apostles, without discriminating between races, preached to all Orthodox regions, to Bulgaria, Serbia, the islands and Rumania, in an attempt to spread membership of their society. They focused their attention especially on the elites of these regions. Their activities captured not only rebellious groups, but even the Greeks who previously were afraid of losing the commercial advantages they enjoyed in the Ottoman State⁷⁰.

The activities were planned by Russians and even executed by professional spies. In Petersburg, two Greek sailors, Perkhevos and Argiropulos were appointed by Kapodistrias and sent to Istanbul with a reference letter. They carried orders from the main centre in Istanbul to perform provocations in the Balkans⁷¹. The Russian consulates and the diplomatic personnel naturally were members of the society. They tried to found further cells in Greece⁷². Kapodistrias believed that a Turkish-Russian war was forthcoming. He planned to use the tactics which had been used during the 1812

68. Clogg, SHMG, p. 49.

69. Wilharm, pp. 52-53.

70. "Greek Independence" in *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

71. Hatiboğlu, pp. 11-12.

72. Jelavich, EBNS, p. 40.

Bucharest Agreement, to the benefit of the Russians. In the same way the Greeks would be able to use the vague statements of a Russian-Turkish peace agreement to reach their independence⁷³. In order to demonstrate the Philike Hetairia's external financial and administrative links, one could mention that it kept its coffer in Munich, its head was in Petersburg and its centre in Istanbul⁷⁴.

Philike Hetairia also had direct connections with the Egyptian Mayor Mehmet Ali Pasha, who was known as an enemy of the Ottoman Sultan. He was offered Russian support the event of a revolt. In fact the Hetairia didn't want relations to become too close; it kept them in reserve⁷⁵.

6.2. Other Reasons

During the Renaissance and humanistic movements in Europe the Ancient Greek culture was studied. As a consequence, the first relations started on an ideological basis. Previously, the Europeans were not attracted by or interested in the Greeks, who in turn didn't have any knowledge of the Europeans⁷⁶. As a result, Europeans expected Greeks to be a mythological brave, courageous, beautiful, idealistic people.

The Greek families, who were economically prosperous thanks to the religious, administrative and commercial advantages of the Ottoman Empire, sent their children to the European educational centres. These students discovered their identity in these centres, where they studied the European image of Greece. During the 18th and 19th centuries, American revolutionary ideas, as well as the national liberation movements became examples for them. As mentioned previously under the heading "Societies", the perception of national identity was followed by national movements. During this stage they studied previous external interferences of Russia and

73. Clogg, SHMG, p. 48.

74. Danişmend, pp. 103-104.

75. Clogg, SHMG, p. 48.

76. Talmon, p. 10.

other states to their benefits. Within a very short time, England and France obtained a new and different role in the Near East. They sometimes supported the Ottoman State, Mehmet Ali Pasha, or the Greek revolts, by different means. France took over the Ionian Islands from Venice in 1797. The Russians took them away from France in 1799; in 1800, they went to the Ottomans, in 1807 to France and in 1815 to England. The Islands changed hands several times in a short period⁷⁷.

The Greeks certainly had suffered under by the tactics and plans which had been used upon them by the different states. However, these experiences improved their political knowledge. As they were used by other states, they learned to make use of the advantages⁷⁸. Although Vienna and Russia were the places where the Philike Hetairia plans matured, the Aegean islands became the base of the revolts; the English supported them by providing escaperoutes and supplies⁷⁹. The Greeks also proposed to Napoleon during his conquest of Italy in 1798 to start a revolt together⁸⁰. This proposal could be the result of hesitation by the Russians became involved militarily with the Greeks after the experiences of 1770 Morea revolt. Alternatively, the Greek proposal to Napoleon maybe seen as an attempt to bind France and Russia in support for Greek independence.

Another reason was the decline of the Ottoman domination on the Balkans. When the Ottoman power started to decline, the whole administrative, judicial and executive system showed a lack of performance. The local executives abused their legal powers of tax collection for their own benefits⁸¹. Other reasons which could be mentioned under the heading of internal and external effects on the Greeks are the Serbian revolution as an example of a rebellion; the

77. Karal, p. 109.

78. "Greek Independence" in *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

79. Ibid.

80. Danişmend, p. 105.

81. Ibid.

opposition between the Mayor of Egypt Mehmet Ali Pasha and the Ottoman State, resulting in the weakening of Ottoman forces and authority and the local turmoil which upset commerce on the islands and disturbed the financial status of the Greek merchants.

7. Greek Rebellion

7.1. The Tepedelenli Ali Pasha Rebellion (1820)

The opposition between the Ottoman central administration and Tepedelenli Ali Pasha had activated the revolutionary atmosphere which had matured both internally and externally. Ali Pasha was the local ruler of Yanya, the area between Albania and Greece, since 1788. He was a successful commander who gained power and wealth through consecutive wars. The loyalty of the family was rewarded by the Ottomans, who gave large areas of land to the sons of Ali Pasha, who had fought courageously for the State. Even though he pretended to be loyal to the Sultan, Ali Pasha secretly prepared to establish his own state. In his palace at Yanya, Ali Pasha lived in a luxury comparable to the Sultan's, but the Ottoman sovereign, Mahmud II didn't interfere with it. Ali Pasha was an old man and he was expected to die soon.

Ali Pasha ruled his region strictly. The rebellious activists were afraid of him. When Ali Pasha had learned about the preparation of the revolt, he informed the Capital, Istanbul. However, Halet Efendi, who was in charge of the seal of sovereignty at that moment as an advisor of the Sultan, favoured the Greeks. He persuaded Sultan Mahmud II that the Greeks would not start a rebellion. At the same time, when the English Ambassador also warned the Sultan for a revolt, Halet Efendi sent the Greek State translator Nikola Maruzi, who was in fact a member of the rebellious society Philike Hetaira, to investigate the rumours. As could be expected, Maruzi in his report about the Morea revolts only described the loyalty of the Greeks to the Ottomans and said there were no preparations for a revolt. Furthermore he stimulated

the opposition between Halet Efendi and Ali Pasha, accusing Pasha of being a very cruel governor⁸².

Sultan Mahmud II was already annoyed with the personal politics of Ali Pasha and stirred up by Halet Efendi, he asked for Ali Pasha to be punished. This changed the course of the events and the rebellion became that of Ali Pasha (1820). In order to gain time, Ali Pasha asked the Sultan to forgive him and in the meantime sought help in France and England. He also provoked the Orthodox subjects, whom he had oppressed previously, to rebellion. Istanbul sent forces, commanded by Hursit Pasha, to oppress the revolt of Ali Pasha in Yanya. The struggle between the forces of both camps bloody. The revolt was suppressed only after two years (1822).

7.2. Greek Revolts

This period was the most advantageous for the Greeks to revolt. They were saved from Ali Pasha who had oppressed them formerly, and they didn't have to fear the state because the forces sent to their region were directed against Ali Pasha. Therefore this period offered a perfect opportunity to reach their goals. The Ottoman State was now in a very weak state, suitable for revolt.

The commander of Czar Alexander and leader of Philike Hetairia, Alexander Ypsilantes, as the head of all the rebellious forces, had chosen the Danubian Principalities (Wallachia and Moldavia) as the right place to start the revolt. The Hetairia leaders believed that Russia would interfere once the revolt starts. The aim was to provoke all the Orthodox subjects, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Serbians, to participate in a general Balkan revolt. They were expecting a violent Ottoman reaction, therefore, Russian army would be forced to march⁸³. Lately, a special status had been given to this region in agreements between the Russians and the

82. Karal, p. 111.

83. Jelavich, *Entanglemens*, p. 52.

Ottomans. The Ottomans had to seek Russian approval for the appointment of governors and for interventions. If the Ottomans wanted to suppress a revolt, the Russians had a reason for legal intervention in the Balkans. In fact the governor of the hospodar of Moldavia, Michael Soutsas, was also a member of Philike Hetairia⁸⁴. In March, 1821, Alexander Ypsilantes, his brother Nikolaos and Count Kuzenos with a force of 3000 people crossed the river Prut and entered the city of Yas. Later on, in Arpil, they entered Eflak and reached Bucharest with 5000 people. Alexander Ypsilantes announced the support of the Czar in the places he conquered: "Act, oh friends, and you will see a Mighty Empire defend our rights⁸⁵." He also wrote to the Czar for his support.

In this period, we should remember the Vienna resolutions of 1821. The great powers of Europe, being tired with the revolutionary events taking place after the French Revolution, decided not to support any minority revolts and to combine their powers to stop any revolutionary moment. They feared that rebellions might be an example to their own minority groups. This strategy was especially promoted by the Austrian Prime Minister Metternich. During the Congress of Laibach (March, 1821), Metternich seriously reminded Czar Alexander of the Vienna decisions and asked him not to support the Greek revolts. Therefore the Czar couldn't help Ypsilantes. Furthermore, the native regional forces were not enthusiastic about the fight. The Rumanians did not favour the Ottomans but they preferred Ottoman occupation to Greek rule and - as they supposed later Russian occupation. As a result they refused to help Ypsilantes and his forces⁸⁶. This region was autonomous to some extent, run by Greek governors appointed by the Ottomans. There were no common expectations between the public and the Greek Mayors. Rumanians, simply, did not support Ypsilantes' revolt against the Ottoman rule⁸⁷.

84. Clogg, SHMG, p. 51.

85. Clogg, *Movement*, pp. 201-203.

86. Clogg, SHMG, p. 51.

87. Jelavich, *Entanglements*, p. 54.

This rebellion in the Danubian Provinces (Rumania) was very easily suppressed by the Turks as the Czar could not fulfill his obligations of support and as no regional contributions were available. Ypsilantes' forces fell apart and he fled to Austria. He was under arrest in Fort Mugant until his death in 1828. The Czar later announced his disapproval of the actions of his general Ypsilantes⁸⁸.

The corruption of the Danubian revolt was a disillusion for a generalized Orthodox rebellion with Russian support. After its suppression by the Ottomans another one, concentrating on Greek subjects living in Morean peninsula of the Peloponnesus only, began. Since the Morea Mayor Hursit Pasha had left to suppress Ali Pasha in Albania, the Peloponnesus was suitable for revolt. The people of Morea, as we saw when we studied the events of 1770, were always ready for revolt.

The Patriarch of Patros, Germanos, in April 1821 had started the rebellion by calling upon all Greeks to fight against the Turks at Kalavrita. This revolt spread out very quickly: the islands and the inland countryside became rebellious regions immediately. The brother of the former rebellious Russian commander Alexander Ypsilantes, Demetrios Ypsilantes, became the leader of the Morea region revolt, where the Philike Hetairia was active. They sought a consitutional liberal government. In the countryside, gangs fought at random. Finally the native Greeks rejected Ypsilantes and Maurokordatos replaced him⁸⁹.

In this area the Turkish population formed a minority and had sought for shelter in fortresses. The fighting consisted mainly in attacks by Greek forces on these bases. During the clashes there was a lot of bloodshed. The most remarkable incident was the massacre of 8,000 civilian Turks in Tripolis in an attempt to lay hands on the treasury of Morea. There was a wide public reaction

88. Jelavich, *Entanglements*, pp. 53-56.

89. Danişmend, p. 106.

all over the world⁹⁰. Nevertheless, public opinion was of no use any more! As we will see, the world public opinion had already been arranged in favour of the revolts. Although both sides had lost many people during the guerilla clashes, the newspapers only reported the attacks of the Ottomans⁹¹. In order to order to gather support and interventions on behalf of Greece, there was a concentrated use of propaganda means in the west. Especially the massacre of 3,000 Greeks at Chios in 1822 was very often referred to⁹². As the revold developed on land, the commercial ships of the Greeks were converted into warships to carry the rebellion to the islands. They were able to resist the Turkish Navy.

7.3. The Reaction of the Ottoman Administration to the Rebellion

The Danubian and Morea uprisings caused great excitement to the Ottoman government. The sovereign was disappointed about the disloyalty of his subjects to whom he had given so many advantages over other minorities. His rage and anger increased with the news of the massacre of civilian Turks. When he learned about the form of the uprising and when the plans of Philike Hetairia were uncovered, Sultan Mahmud II ordered the killing of all Greeks. However, being couctioned by his statesmen it was decided that only the rebellious subject were to be punished⁹³.

The Patriarch of the Greeks in Istanbul, Gregorios, was an active member of Philike Hetairia. He was scared when he saw that no Russian support was available. He declared the oath of Philike Hetairia to be false and ordered a curse on the people who fought against the state. This had some effect in Istanbul but there was no change in Morea⁹⁴.

90. Jelavich, EBNS, p. 44; Clogg, SHMG, p. 53.

91. Jelavich, EBNS, p. 44.

92. Ibid.

93. Karal, p. 113.

94. Ibid, p. 113.

During the investigations of the rebellion, the Patriarch and many metropolitans were found guilty. The Patriarch Gregorios and some priests were members of Philike Hetairia and the Patriarch was its focal point. During these investigations it was discovered that reports on the corruption of the Ottoman State, had been sent to Russia from this religious center in Istanbul. The Patriarch personally had written letters to the Czar, giving advice on the strategy to be followed for the destruction of the Ottoman state. These letters contained interesting information on the relations of the Istanbul Phanariot Patriarch, the Russian Palace, the Greek uprising and the destruction of the Ottoman State. This letter was later included in the memories of General Ignat'yef, who was a Russian Ambassador in Istanbul:

"I went to the Patriarchite the day Mahmut Nedim Pasha resigned. Patriarch Yermanos, during our conversation, read me a copy of the letter sent to Czar Alexander by his predecessor Gregorius, who was hanged during Sultan Mahmut upon accusations of aiding the Greek rebellion. This letter which could bring the end of Yermanos as well, if seized by the Turks, contained many noteworthy recommendations which could end political and military threats of the Turks, even deprive them of being an independent state. These recommendations, which I verified during my working years, but was able to understand, unfortunately, only when it was too late, were:

It is not possible to destroy the Turks physically. For they are very patient and resistant. They are very proud. These qualities originate from their attachment to their religion, their surrender to faith, their attachment to their strong traditions, their obedience to their sultans, commanders and elders.

The Turks are intelligent and hard working as long as they possess leaders who guide them to success. They are easily satisfied. Their total qualities, even their heroism originates from their attachment to traditions and ethics. Their feeling of obedience and religious beliefs should be weakened first. The best way of

achieving this would be injecting foreign ideas and trends not suitable to their national and moral traditions. Turks decline foreign aid. Their pride prevents them from accepting it. They should be trained to accept foreign aid even if it may enforce them temporarily.

The days Turks loose their morale, they will loose their power which guides them to victory even against multiplied forces and it will then be possible to destroy them with superior arms. Therefore, beating them in battlefields is not enough, for this would hurt their pride and may even lead them to realizing the truth. The thing to do is to complete an inner destruction of the Turks first. This diagnosis was fully apparent during my duty in the Ottoman Empire⁹⁵."

"The above letter of the Greek Patriarch Gregorius V clearly displays the organic collaboration of the church and the rebels as well as the collaboration between the rebels and the foreign powers. The relationship of the Patriarch and the Patriarchite with the Greek rebellion was not determined only by the letter written to the Russian Czar. During a search conducted at the Patriarchite, many letters written to the rebels in Morea, information containing details on preparations made in Istanbul, spying evidences of Greek interpreters and civil servants of the Foreign Ministry information from French and Russian embassies, knowledge on the Russian preparations, arms sent from the Etniki Hetairia society, declarations to request aid from the world Orthodox society and number of invoices were found and captured. Gregorius V did not deny any of these, and accepted the claims. Still, this did not save him or the others found guilty from being hanged⁹⁶."

In the meantime, Halet Efendi, who had given wrong information about the Greek uprising, was killed. After the suppression of the revolt of Ali Pasha in Albania, the Mayor of

95. Yavuz Ercan, *The Ninetenth Century Balkanic Church*, Ankara, 1987, pp. 4-5.

96. *Ibid*, pp. 5-6.

Morea, Hursit Pasha, returned to suppress the uprising in his region 1822⁹⁷.

7.4. International Reactions to the Greek Rebellion

As the uprising and the clashes continued, the matter began to obtain international dimensions. Russia, having prepared the ripening of these revolts for so many years, was prevented by the other super powers, on international grounds, to collect the fruits of its seeds. But Russia couldn't stay silent about the punishment of the Patriarch. Czar Alexander sent an ultimatum to the Ottoman State. Referring to the statement of the Kuchuk Kainardji Agreement of 1774 on his protectorate of Orthodox subjects in the Ottoman state, he asked for a guarantee on behalf of the Orthodox people. He also suggested the removal of Turkish forces from Rumania. He asked the great powers of Europe about their attitudes in an Ottoman-Russian war. Furthermore, he proposed to destroy the Ottoman State altogether⁹⁸. Russia recalled its Ambassador from Istanbul.

England and Austria declared that they would continue to respect the agreements of the 1815 Vienna Congress. They reminded Russia of the fact that its activities violated these agreements. Russia was left isolated. At the same time the Greek rebels announced their wish to found an independent Greek state. However, Russia had always dreamt of a Greek State dependent on it. During the rebellion, the various gangs and bandit groups had been in conflict with the Philike Hetairia who had now successfully gained control over these groups. Hetairians in 1822 declared their independence and their liberal constitution. Under these circumstances the Czar left the rebellious activists on their own. Consequently in the Verona Congress of October 1822 no decision on intervention or support in favour of the revolt was made.

97. Karal, p. 113.

98. Fahir Armaoğlu, *Siyasî Tarih (1789-1960)*, Ankara, 1973, p. 101.

The attitude of Czar Alexander in the Greek matter was very complex. In principle he accepted the ideas of Metternich on the revolutionary movements in Europe. He defended the practical explanation that "political rebellions could be suppressed, but Holy War is another matter"⁹⁹. The independence-demands of Greece discouraged the Russians. Therefore from 1821 on Russia preferred to deal with the status of the Orthodox in the Balkans in general rather than with Greek independence¹⁰⁰. In case of an independent state, Russia would lose a strategic instrument of its power. On the contrary it preferred a region where it could threaten and provoke all the time.

By the Russian withdrawal from the Greek matter after 1821-1822, external intervention was transferred from Russia to the Western European states.

Until the beginning of the 18th century, the Europeans didn't have any knowledge about the Greeks under Ottoman rule. During the Renaissance and the Enlightenment the Classical Greek manuscripts were reviewed. The educated class of Greeks in European centres and in particular, St. Petersburg were dreaming about Greek heroes¹⁰¹. The picture of the Greeks in European eyes was idealistic like the Greek statues, honest, noble, beautiful and heroic¹⁰². These ideal figures of classical civilization were fighting against the barbarian Moslems. The admiration of the Europeans for the Greeks is called the Philhellen movement, which started in the second half of the 17th century¹⁰³.

This public opinion grew steadily and reached a climax in the period of the Greek uprising. This idealistic view of the Greeks was brought up to date by increasing contact with Greek students, mercants, Church, and the European Committees of Philike

99. Jelavich, EBNS, p. 47.

100. Ibid, p. 47.

101. Hearder, p. 36.

102. Jelavich, EBNS, p. 48.

103. Wilharm, pp. 19-22, 258.

Hetairia. The attempts to enlist statesmen of the 1815 Vienna Congress as Philhellen members accomplished even more. Beside the Russian statesmen, European statesmen and diplomats such as Ludwig I, King of Bavaria were enlisted, as were members of the artistic communities such as Byron and Shelley the poets, Victor Hugo the author, Delacroix the painter, Beethoven and Chateaubriand the composers, Voltaire and André Chéneuv were some of the thinkers writing for the Greeks and against the Ottomans¹⁰⁴.

As many Philhellens were functioning in Europe, still another group of Philhellens were coming to Greece as volunteers to fight for Greek independence against the Ottomans. There were also professional soldiers such as the French commander Fabvier, who had served in the Army of Napoleon, and the English Richard Church and Lord Cochrane, who brought with them, soldiers from the English Army and Navy as well as many volunteers from the German states¹⁰⁵. Those Europeans coming to fight in Greece left a deep impression in Western Europe, especially the writers and artists, who were not professional soldiers but idealists. Each Philhellen was trying to do his best. L. Stanhope brought presses to publish books in Greece. Beuthomite came to Greece to spread utilitarianism. The American Samuel Gridley Home established hospitals and refugee camps. The Irishman W. Stevenson also gave his time and effort for the Philhellen course¹⁰⁶.

The Greek committees established in Paris, London and other centers performed important activities. The Paris committee opened signature campaigns on the streets and among the French society ladies. In 1824-25, the London committee¹⁰⁷ raised funds to support the Greeks financially. In 1824, the City of London sent three

104. Jelavich, EBNS, p. 48; Talmon, p. 110.

105. For the list of British volunteers active in Greece between 1821-1829. See: Woodhouse, pp. 179-181.

106. Clogg, SHMG, p. 62.

107. For the list of London Greek Committee members, See: Woodhouse, pp. 182-184.

million pounds to Greece. This money was used to keep hold of land deserted by their Turkish inhabitants who were fleeing from the revolts. These activities were not well organized. There were many scandals and bribes. However, the aim of these activities was to give self-confidence and support to the Greeks and to show them that they were not alone. This goal was certainly achieved¹⁰⁸.

With their ideals of civilization, religious purposes and the spirit of adventure, many Philhellens came to help Greece in the realization of its dreams. Most of them returned back home disappointed because they didn't find their classical dreams. The Greeks were unfriendly, factions, superstitious, lazy, liar, etc... They were in an awkward position, for the Greek public couldn't understand the purposes of the Philhellens and refused to participate or appreciate their dreams¹⁰⁹.

Among these events, the adventures of Lord Byron, one of the greatest Romantic poets and an idol and symbol of Greek ideology, is impressing and dramatic: Byron was a deep melancholic and romantic poet. Politically, he favored liberalism. He did not have a balanced or healthy childhood in his family, was punished often by his mother and nurse, and had alternative sexual experiences and an affinity for children. His lifestyle continued in the same way in Cambridge and Greece. He was impressed with the moral tolerance of the Greek islands. He went to Greece for the first time in 1809. He wished to do noble actions in Greece on the behalf of his nation. The English Greek committee asked him in 1823 to be their spy in the independence war of Greece and to participate in it. They prepared supplies and financial support for the revolts. Byron went to Genova and Herkulas and settled on the Islands at the village

108. Clogg, SHMG, p. 62.

109. Leake found them suffering from the percious effects of the spirit of party, Dodwell remarked on their extreme credulity, Gell declared that "no people on earth ever equalled these peasants of Greece", Hobhous discovered that "the Greeks will do nothing without the stick" ... See, Woodhouse, pp. 33-35; How the Philhellenes were disappointed, what they found, who returned to his country, who remained etc., See: Eustathiades Quack, *Regine der Deutsche Philhellenismus (1821-1827)*. München, 1984.

Metaxata. He was surrounded by Greeks who saw that he had a lot of money; he was impressive. He personally made a gift of 4.000 pounds to the Greek Navy. He participated actively in the attacks on the Lepanto Fortress, together with Maurokordates. He hired soldiers at his own expense. He wanted to unify the Eastern and Western Greeks, who were disorganized. In 1824 he wanted to organize a meeting with the leaders at Odessa. He discovered that the Greeks were not as eager to fight as he had imagined. He suffered from a depression. His awkward relations with a Greek boy named Loukas Chaladritsanos caused him much pain. He became very ill in 1824 and died from a heavy bleeding. He was accepted as a Greek national hero and buried in England¹¹⁰.

The Philhellens to a certain degree made a direct contribution to Greek independence. Their actual help was in preparing European public opinion in favour of the Greeks.

On international political ground, in 1821-22 the Greek uprising was not supported by the European states. Furthermore, sticking to their decisions of the Vienna Congress, the European states prohibited the Russians to help the Greeks. The English Minister of Foreign Affairs Lord Castlereagh, who was devoted to the Greek matter, committed suicide. Throughout his life Castlereagh had tried to prevent Russian intervention into Greek matters¹¹¹. The new Minister, Canning, had less affinity with the Greek matter than his predecessor. However, even if there was no special direct help for the rebels, the Ottomans were unable to suppress the Greek revolt for two years because there were other revolts going on as well and because the Empire was becoming weak. These events indicate that the Greeks had started a serious rebellion and that the Ottomans were losing strength in this region. If the Ottomans could not suppress the uprising, it was meaningless and impossible to hold the Russians from their plans. If Greece was to be independent, the British felt that this should be achieved

110. "Lord Byron" in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Vol. IV, 1964.

111. Cowie & Walfson, pp. 30-31.

under English control. The uprising, lasting so long, affected English commerce on the islands¹¹². Also, the pressure of the Philhellenes changed the politics of the great powers in favour of the Greek uprising.

The first sign of a change in English policy towards to Greece was the recognition in March 1823 that Greek rebels were legitimate freedom fighters. The British accepted that Greek sailors should have the right to stop and search neutral ships sailing in the vicinity of the Greek Islands and mainland¹¹³. This attitude was appreciated by France and Russia. After a disagreement with the Ottomans, the ambassadors of these three countries left Istanbul¹¹⁴.

Consequently this was the end of the Metternich politics of prohibiting revolutionary and nationalistic movements from developing. These stability politics were to be changed. The new politics tried to give most help to the side where most gains were expected.

7.5. Greek Internal Affairs

There was no unity between the Greek revolts. Each group fought against the Ottoman forces in its own region. The group of liberal constitutional rebels had D. Ypsilantes as their leader, and Maurokordatos afterwards came in his place. In deserted areas, gang leaders were in power. As different groups won their struggles with the Ottomans, internal friction between the groups increased. Finally, the rebels supporting a constitution and the village gangs fought against each other. The leader of the gangs, Kolokotronis, lost the war. He ended-up in jail. Nevertheless, a complete unity was not accomplished¹¹⁵. As the revolts lost their

112. Jelavich, EBNS, p. 47.

113. Clogg, SHMG, p. 62.

114. Yücel Özkaya, "Yunan (Eflak-Boğdan) İsyanları ve Avrupalıların İsyan Karşısındaki Tutumları. Türk Yunan İlişkileri (20 Temmuz 1974'e Kadar)" in *Üçüncü Askeri Tarih Semineri, Bildiriler*, Ankara, 1986, pp. 114-132.

115. Karal, p. 115; Jelavich, EBNS, p. 39.

Russian support by demanding independence for Greece, they turned to England and France. During this period there were three different ideological groups in Greece¹¹⁶:

1. The Party of Kapodistrias. The former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kapodistrias was planning to be prime minister of an independent Greece. As the Russians withdrew their help from Greece, he resigned as a Russian Minister and came to Greece.

2. The French Party. In this group there were supporters of the French Duke of Nemours, Louis; they wanted to make him the first king of Greece.

3. The Group of Lord Byron. These are the English supporters, who lost their unity after the death of Byron. Afterwards, Guilford brought the group back together.

Maurokordatos provoked the French and the English against Austria and Russia, who didn't want Greek independence. He was in favour of a solution of the Greek matter at the European level. The English influence in Greek internal affairs were¹¹⁷:

1. The new English Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canning, accepted the rights of the Greeks.

2. As will be explained later, he also rejected the proposal of the Russians to grant autonomy to the Greeks.

3. A second financial aid campaign was started in England in favour of Greece.

4. The English Navy and Armed Forces helped the Greeks.

5. As the supporters of the French Party couldn't provide much aid to Greece, the English party developed more. When in 1825 Mehmet Ali Pasha suppressed the Greek rebellion, the Greeks thought they had lost everything. Therefore they sought help from

116. "Greek Independence" in *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

117. *Ibid*.

Canning, to save and protect them by providing a King for the Greeks¹¹⁸.

7.6. Suppression of the Greek Uprising

As the Greek uprising continued, Sultan Mahmud II, advised by Metternich, called the Mayor of Egypt Mehmet Ali Pasha to suppress it¹¹⁹. Ali Pasha, even though he was a Mayor of the Ottomans, had an autonomous position in Egypt. He was in a very powerful situation and was even stronger than the Ottomans. This fact was known by the Ottomans but not dealt with. Mehmet Ali Pasha accomplished reforms in Egypt and his army was well-organized. A son of Ali Pasha, Ibrahim, arrived at Rhodes in April 1824 as the Mayor of Morea. The Egyptian forces and the Ottoman Navy joined in fighting the revolts in February 1825. The whole rebellion was suppressed in June 1826. The Sultan rewarded the son of Ali Pasha, Ibrahim, with an appointment as a Mayor of Crete.

8. Greek Independence

After the Greeks had expressed their wish for independence in 1822, the Russians began to hesitate in their support for the Greeks. However, they did not want to loose all the opportunities and to let others eat the cake. In 1824, Czar Alexander I gathered a congress in St. Petersburg and tried to propose three autonomous Greek states to be declared to the other great states. Anyway, he wanted to keep the initiative in his own hands. The English statesman Canning had similar hopes. He knew that if he would accept this proposal, the Greeks would still be left under Russian control. Therefore, Canning refused the proposal and did not go to St. Petersburg. As the Greeks were asking for independence, they did not accept it either¹²⁰.

118. Ibid.

119. Armaoğlu, pp. 101-102.

120. For the role of England, See: Charles Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822*, G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., London, 1947; Harold Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827*, Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., London, 1966.

In 1825, Czar Alexander I died. Nicholas I was chosen in his place. The new Czar was tougher than his father and was ready to use his power. He was more enthusiastic about Greece. He didn't agree with the presence of Ali Pasha in Greece in an advantageous position, objecting that this was to the disadvantage of Russia¹²¹. He wanted first to make use of the period in which the Ottomans were reorganizing their army. This period was the most suitable since the Ottomans were at their weakest: they could not even suppress the Greek revolt.

In February, 1826 he set an ultimatum to the Ottoman State. He objected to the functioning of the Bucharest Agreement of 1812. Since the Ottomans had no way of standing against him, they accepted negotiations in order to stop the interference. In October, 1826 the Akkerman Convention was signed. With this agreement, the Russians acquired more rights to Danubia and Serbia, as well as more advantages for their commercial ships. The Greek situation was not mentioned.

Right after the Akkerman Convention, Russia called upon England to negotiate about Ali Pasha, who was still holding Greece in his hands. England was also uneasy about Ali Pasha, and it had not yet given an answer to the call for protection of the Greeks. It found Russian cooperation reasonable. The negotiations between England and Russia began in St. Petersburg. The proposal was to investigate the abuse of power during the suppression of the Morea revolt by Ibrahim Pasha. In April 1827 they declared that "Greece will become an autonomous state linked to the Ottoman Empire by paying taxes and all Turks shall be removed from Greece¹²²."

This protocol was announced to Austria, Prussia and France. Austria, however, still supported the Metternick policy which had been signed at the Agreement of Vienna Congress. They also believed that the new Anglo-Russian agreement would place

121. Cowie & Walfson, p. 33.

122. Karal, p. 117.

excessive power in Russian hands. Consequently they refused it¹²³. Prussia by the same reasoning rejected the new proposal. The French King Charles X was a Philhellen and supported the proposal for two reasons. First, he wished to break up the Vienna Agreement which was originally aimed at limiting the power of Revolutionary France. Second, the Anglo-Russian agreement did not allow for a third party to have influence in Greek matters, and France wished to maintain in these matters¹²⁴. France had also cooperated with England and Russia in 1823 by recalling its ambassador from Istanbul.

The three countries accepting this proposition came together in London in July 1827 to prepare the London Agreement. According to this decision, if the Ottomans would accept the statements of St. Petersburg, an agreement was to be concluded between the Greek revolutionaries and the Ottomans for the establishment of an independent Greece. Otherwise these three states, England, France and Russia would support the revolts against the Ottomans¹²⁵.

From the Ottoman point of view these proposals were awkward because the rebellion was already suppressed when pressure to accept the demands of the revolutionaries came. Therefore, the Ottoman statesmen refused the combined plan of the English, French, and Russians by pointing out that it was an interference into the internal affairs of the Ottoman state. After this refusal of the Ottoman State, the three powers combined their navies to block the Morean peninsula and force the Ottoman forces to accept their decisions. Ibrahim Pasha refused to leave Morea before he got the permission of the Ottoman Sultan. The combined Navy force approached to the bay of Navarino without hoisting the war flag, pretending they were coming for negotiations. On this

123. For Austria and Greek revolution, see: Paul W. Schroeder, *Metternich's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1962.

124. Jelavich, EBNS, p. 49; For the role of France in Greek independence. See: Edouard Driault, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours*, Vol. I, les Presses universitaires de France, 1925.

125. Karal, p. 117.

occasion, in November, 1827, they sunk all Ottoman and Egyptian ships. Consequently, the Ottoman State changed from a victorious to a defeated position. The Ottomans asked for indemnification because their ships were sunk while there was no war going on. The alliance only expressed its apologies but it did not intend to pay indemnification. The three powers, who had since re-established their embassies in Istanbul, once again recalled their ambassadors. As a result, the links of the Ottoman State with the English and Russians were cut again¹²⁶.

Russia wanted to create such tension to start a war with the Ottomans. However, England and France did not want to participate because a war in Greece would put the Russians in a dominant position. Instead the English in cooperation with the Ottoman State provided ships for Ibrahim Pasha to send his troops back to Egypt. France also invaded Morea establishing a temporary presence there. Russia wished to help the rebellious Greek forces by declaring war against the Ottomans. Realising that England and France did not wish a war, Czar Nicholas I said that his goal was not to invade Ottoman land but only to help realise the Greek matter as it was stated in the London Agreement. After the guaranteed neutrality of France and England, Russia declared war in April, 1828.

The Ottomans were in a weak condition to enter a war. They did not have any Navy and they had reorganized their army just two years before. The new Army was not ready to fight. They stood alone in international politics. They did not want to show their precarious situation and wanted to keep their prestige, although they were aware of the fact that they would be defeated if they entered war.

Consequently the Ottomans asked for peace after having been defeated in Eastern Anatolia and the Balkans. In the Edirne Peace

126. For the Battle of Navarin, see: C.M. Woodhouse, "The 'Untoward Event': The Battle of Navarino 20 October 1827" in *Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence*, Richard Clogg (ed.), pp. 1-17.

Agreement of 1829, the Ottomans accepted to pay war reparations and there were new advantages for Russia in the Balkans and changes of the boundaries on behalf of Russia. The most important of all was the acceptance of the St. Petersburg Protocol. As a result the Greek revolt, which had begun with the expectancy of Russian support in 1821, though it was suppressed in 1826 by the Ottomans, again achieved a form of independence with foreign support. As Yabb stated "Greece... owed her independence especially to the interference of the Western European powers¹²⁷." The Ottomans after the war, were in such a position that they were forced to accept Greek independence.

A new London protocol was organized between Russia, England and France in February, 1830 after the validity of the Adrianople Agreement. With the new London protocol, the independence of Greece was declared. This protocol established a Greek Kingdom, with frontiers and international acceptance. England, France and Russia were protector states. The frontiers of this new Kingdom were to be decided between the Ottomans and the protector states. Greece was not a part in these negotiations and had to accept what it would be given¹²⁸. The Ottoman State accepted this new kingdom in April 1830.

The statements of the London Protocol II were declared by the great powers to Kapodistrias, the Greek leader, in 1828. They proposed Leopold I as the Greek King. He came from the dynasty of Sachsen-Coburg. Leopold I did not accept the proposal for two reasons: Kapodistrias had previously been intimate with the Russians and had not favoured Leopold; and, King George IV of England was a relative of Leopold I and did not desire other members of the family to be a king¹²⁹. Later on, he was chosen to be King of Belgium.

127. Yapp, p. 63.

128. Clogg, SHMG, p. 69.

129. C. W. Crawley, *The Question of Greek Independence*, Second Ed., New York, 1973, pp. 177-188.

France asked state protection over the Catholic missionaries-- which had already been granted in the area during the Ottoman rule. Kapodistrias asked the islands in return. France accepted to give the islands in order to get the permission to protect the Catholic missionaries in Greece.

Despite the establishment of the Kingdom in 1830, the internal struggles between various Greek factions which had been in conflict since 1821, continued. In October 1831, Kapodistrias was killed by opposition groups. The following two years continued in chaos and struggles. The different parties, the English, Russian and French supporters, continued to exist. They still depended upon aid from external forces. In May 1832, in order to end this chaos, Russia, England and France decided to appoint the Prince of the Bavaria Wittelsback dynasty, Otto, as a King of Greece. Otto was not yet seventeen years old. Therefore a group of Bavarians ruled Greece until he was ready for it in 1835. Otto's reign, beginning in 1835, didn't end the internal struggles and the expectancy of external interventions.

Conclusion

This short study emphasizes only one aspect of "Greek Nationalism" in view of the limited number of sources. Greek nationalism was not fully covered in this work; it is a highly complex matter with different dimensions. As English Prime Minister the Duke of Wellington said, "there never was such a humbug as the Greek affairs all together¹³⁰." This study does not deny the internal dynamics of Greek nationalism but concentrates on external influences, especially those of Russia and England.

Main points which were made in the course of this study were, consecutively:

1. The Ottoman State, constructed in 1299 in Western Anatolia, spread all over the world including the Balkans and

130. Clogg, SHMG, p. 36.

Eastern Europe, ruled an immense amount of land and people. During its 600 years of sovereignty over all kinds of climates and races, although it had a chance to exercise absolute power, it did not try to assimilate other religions or nationalities. It enabled its subjects to maintain their original identities.

2. This tolerance for non-Moslems was probably the key factor behind its maintenance of sovereignty for hundreds of years.

3. In the Ottoman system of administration, religion was the main concern. Therefore, the state permitted and promoted organization around religious institutions such as the church, the synagogue, and so on. This approach enabled two developments: First, the Christian subjects of the state were never left in an unorganized situation. This religious institution was also a socio-political organization. As a matter of fact the following nationalistic movements were easily based upon these organized institutions. Therefore the nationalistic movements could spread easily¹³¹. Second, as it accepted the church as a centre, this system protected the authority of the clergy.

4. Greeks made good use of the advantages afforded by Ottoman rule to the Orthodox Church. In fact, they tried to impose Greek culture and identity on other Orthodox nations through the power of the church. Even under such circumstances, the Ottomans did not intervene. Though the Catholics have only one center, the Orthodox nations had to establish their national church centres apart from the Greeks in order to escape Greek domination.

5. In this study the situation of non-Moslems under Ottoman administration was reviewed with emphasis on the exceptional positions of the Greeks. This is contradictory to the proposition of

131. Even if it is not studied in this review, an independent subject of attention could be the role of the Church in Greek nationalism and in the Greek Independence movement. See, Charles A. Frazee, *The Orthodox Church and Greek Independence: 1821-1852*. London 1969; and M. Süreyya Şahin, *Fener Patrikhanesi ve Türkiye*, İstanbul, 1980.

Snyder about Greek nationalism as an "oppression nationalism"¹³². "Opposing this statement, this study draws attention to the origins of the case, to the stages of independence and to the international dimensions. Furthermore, after independence, the internal balance was not accomplished and external support was needed. The habit of using external support on every occasion in order to regulate internal problems, continued. In order to establish internal unity, beside external supports, external threats were also used. Providing internal unity by turning attention to the external world¹³³, i.e. "irredentist nationalism", in the light of this study, could explain Greek nationalism more correctly¹³⁴.

6. The idea of saving the Greeks and other non-Moslems from the Ottoman State and of achieving various benefits was not of the 18th and 19th centuries but can be traced back to the 15th and even to the Crusaders.

7. Greek nationalism was never just a simple matter for external forces supporting and provoking states. The matter was emphasized and used to their own advantages, as well.

8. As to the Russian aspects, the roots of the matter go back to 1700. From that date on, Russia tried to take away Greece from the Ottomans and to attack Balkan nations, especially Greece, through the Orthodoxy of its state.

9. Until 1820-1822, the problem of Russian control over the Balkans aimed at a general uprising in favour of Russia. The Morea Rebellion of 1770 and the goals of the Philike Hetairia society, the Greek Projects, the 1821 Danubian Revolts are only some of the

132. Snyder, pp. 32-33.

133. Xydis, p. 51; Hatiboğlu, p. 26; also John S. Koliopoulos, *Brigands with a Cause (Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece 1821-1912)*, Oxford, 1987.

134. 14 years later after the independence, in 1844, the Greek Prime Minister said that "the Kingdom of Greece is not Greece; it is only the smallest and poorest part of Greece. Greece includes (every place) where Greek history or the Greek race was present". Even in those years, Greeks dreamed of a revival of the Byzantine Empire, as a new Greek Empire with its capital at Constantinople (Istanbul). See. Yapp, pp. 63-64.

well-known Russian activities. The Russians did not want Greek independence, and when there was a call for independence, they withdrew their interest and support. These attitudes indicated that the Russians sought control over the Greeks.

10. After the Ottomans were left defeated, England started to take part in the Greek case because it was afraid that the Russians would become too powerful in the region. By the active participation of England in this matter the problem turned from a general Balkan war to the struggle for an independent Greece.

11. In previous studies, contemporary Greek identity and Greek nationalism are based upon and traced back to: Philhellenism; ideas of Byron; the place of the Orthodox Church; the Enlightenment; the Ancient Greeks; the French Revolution, and, many other sources. Though there is truth in these observations, they are not complete. The realization and the emergence of ideas are as important as their value and effects. The mould and the basis of ideas in the period of emergence of ideologies later on shapes their contents. In this view, as Greek national identity and the formation of Greek nationalism is studied, the background of the events on the way to independence should be evaluated in order to understand how they affected the remaining characteristics of Greek nationalism. Further evaluations of Greek nationalism on social and psychological grounds demand more detailed research which would make use of social and group psychology disciplines.