POLICING PROTEST AND POLICE ENVIRONMENTAL CULTURE IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA

ALEXANDER NIKIFOROV

Alexander Nikiforov, Policing protest and police environmental culture in contemporary Russia, assistant professor, Saint-Petersburg State University

Abstract

Exploring policing protest often becomes a part of research on political regime openness and law enforcement. The classical study of policing protest provides analytical framework and typologies for defining relations between political openness and the use of coercion policing. The main goal of my current research is to move from in-depth analysis of Russian political regime to explore Russian police environmental culture and professional knowledge formation. Conclusions are based on bibliometric analysis of the "extremism" research field to define influence of institutional science on police knowledge formation. Discourse analysis explores Russian police networked community for defining public issue agenda and main intentions towards actors of contentious politics. On the other hand, research notifies stereotypes on protest actions and activists. Initial results of research show narrow institutional science effect on the process of corporate knowledge formation. Classic distinction between «good» and «bad» demonstrators in Russia is largely based on the type of public claims (social/political), mobilization and contentious repertoire.

Introduction

Exploring policing protest often becomes a part of research on political regime openness and policy of repression enforcement. The classical study of policing styles by Donatella della Porta and Reiter (1995; 1998), McPhail (1998), Fillieule and Jobard (1998), and other scholars provides analytical framework and typology for defining relations between the factors of political openness, management style of executive bodies, institutional autonomy of police and the number of others. Hybrid regimes could employ tactics of escalated force or negotiated management depends on protesting repertoire or its organizers. The source of media could be used to instill fear or delegitimize political opposition (Gel'man, 2015).

For this reason the present paper will make a preliminary effort to explore the question of what ideas, issue agenda, stereotypes on protest activists can tell us about environmental culture and common knowledge of Russian police and its special units (riot police). The main question that the paper will address is that of the factors that influence on certification of the protest action as "right" or "wrong" and emotional support of the claimants or its ideas. Is a police prone to be successful in policing of any sort of protest contention obediently following the orders of the government? What are the dominant trends in the process of professional knowledge formation for administrative field of police?

Research design contains two dimensions. Both could be generalized in on logic but each one has specifics.

First one is based on exploring the connection between public research area and professional knowledge formation for administrative field of police departments and follows the Foucault's concept of knowledge/power (Foucault, 1980, p.92-108), especially the function of normalization. Two-step approach was used to analyze the largely unexplored intersection between protest/extremism research area and the Institutional attribution of the publications on these topics. At first, there was bibliometric analysis of the scientific production in the respected field in Russia. It is generally based on the method that is widely

acknowledged as being reliable (Aguillo, 2011). Then I identify contribution of the academies of Interior Ministry for this research area. Finally I try to "join the dots" of research agenda and normative discourse in order to develop theoretical perspectives for the next part of research.

Second one is based on issue agenda and discourse analyze of public interviews that were given by the Russian riot police officers (former *OMON*) to the journalists (Gulova, 2010; Akhmedova, 2013) and, on the other hand, intentional statements from professional forum of police. The largest share of the materials is dated between 2008 and 2013 that limits research conclusions in some respect. Statistical implications have only relative significance due to sampling and source quality. This type of analysis helps to define the actual intentions regarding protest repertoire, ideology, state authorities, and opposition. Hence, intentions were defined and classified along the research objects (political actors) and position of the speaker (positive/negative). Most evident, direct, and emotional-driven statements on research objects were analyzed separately by generalizing the descriptions of object's attributes.

Narrow institutional science in making protest policing narrative
Russian police succeeds deep ties with the system of special professional a higher education that had been forming for decades since the Soviet period. These specifics based on high social and political profile of police (former *militsiya)* in Soviet Union. Outgrowth of the Soviet administrative system in 1960-1970 provided the numbers of departmental and research institutes. Legal studies had coherence with Soviet regime and state hierarchy that shared the general logic of structural-functional integrity with bureaucratic interests on administrative market. These specifics were not overcome after the collapse of Soviet state bodies. Rebirth of the administrative markets in post-soviet Russia after the fail of structural-administrative revolution (Kordonski, 2008) in the middle of 1990th gave sources and channels for institutionalized professional "estates" (corporations).

Simon Kordonski concepts of administrative market and estates society for Soviet and post-soviet studies give institutional background for the research perspective on knowledge/power relations in case of executive bodies of Russia. I would define this relation as a narrow institutional science that would be argued as an important element in the process of organizational framing. This process coincides with the general problem of bending science (McGarity and Wagner, 2008) but in different conditions. This type of relations between knowledge formation and political power follows increasing influence of institutions and its subsequent initiatives that could be backed by the internal experts, studies, and actual issue agenda. Focal research agenda and narrow institutional science make gaps and fragmentations in science and knowledge maps. This process gives us the implication of organization theory when academia and society weakens its influence in a face of enclosure of the state bodies. Following DiMaggio and Powel approach to institutional isomorphic change (1983), narrow institutional science and education tend to use coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms for altering the organizational field. In case of police these processes work together: regime transformations and politics set new agenda (policy-relevant research issues and study courses); closed or semi-open knowledge field tends to nurture a Parsonian-style imperative with overestimation of professional limitations and goals; law, regulations and guidelines make systemic reference marks for framing process. On the other hand, there are political and public perspectives for expansion of such vision.

Russian Interior Ministry has 40 educational units: 30 universities and its regional units (including 4 academies), 3 professional schools and its regional units, and 7 military schools. These universities and its regional units issue 30 referenced scientific journals and have dissertation boards, which define them as a part of national educational and scientific space.

Bibliometric research protocol implies the analysis of Russian scientific literature in the fields of "*ekstremizm*" (extremism) and is based on a statistical search of all journal papers and conference proceedings that include the pertinent keyword as a title, abstract or a keyword. Results were filtered by the year, number of citations, organizational affiliation. In order to build a representative dataset, I adopted the high-profile Russian digital library *eLIBRARY.RU* with its search and statistical service.

After the computer-aided extraction, the resulting publications included 7163 manuscripts on extremism for available time period (1992-2016). Publication activities show significant annual growth by year from 2000 to 2016. This process could be supported by the policy-relevant background of Second Chechen War, terrorist actions and anti-extremist law implementation. The analysis of the publication's keywords shows the main categories (in descending order): terrorism, youth, religion (predominantly Islam), tolerance, radicalism, (national) security, extremism prevention. These categories have become quite stable for annual variations since 2006. Comparative analysis of two selections - on the base of high number of citations and institutional affiliation (Interior Ministry) – gives no significant changes in core categories. Institutionally filtered selection gives only one new significant core category of Internet. Such result generally follows contemporary state-leaded anti-extremist policy and shows the influence of the normative vision on research agenda. This tendency to link quite a broad understanding of extremism with terrorism, youth activism and radical agenda - usually on a level of conceptualization – supports a conceptual frame that lead to regression logic in case of its implementation for participants of contentious actions.

The second step of bibliometric research involved analyzing the institutional affiliation of selected publications. Results were clustered on the base of organizational affiliation. Represented data (see Table 1) shows the relative influence of narrow institutional publications in scientific field. This argument is supported by the parallel analysis of another selection (N=488) that includes publications with a high number of citations (more than 5 per publication). Relatively share of Institutional affiliation for this selection is slightly higher (26.94%).

Dynamic analysis shows the time period of 2004 when universities with Interior Ministry affiliation provided high share in annual publication activity.

ORGANİZATİONAL AFFİLATİON	NUMBER OF PUBLİCATİONS	RELATİVE SHARE (İN %)
Academia, NGO and foreign organizations	3589	65.25
Interior Ministry	1324	24.07
Ministry of Justice and Federal Penitentiary Service	186	3.38
President	168	3.05
Prosecution agencies	111	2.01
Government of Russia, federal services, etc.	65	1.18
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	41	0.74
Ministry of Defense	24	0.43
Judicial bodies	14	0.25
Ministry of Emergency Situations	10	0.18
Federal Security Service	9	0.16
Regional bodies	5	0.09
Representative bodies	4	0.07
Selection number = 7163;		
Number of publications with institutional reference = 5550		

Table 1. Institutional reference of publications in Russian research of extremism

However, the most important result of such analysis is a relatively high scientific relation within the network of narrow institutional science. Special selection (N=499) that was aggregated all publications with Interior Ministry affiliation shows pattern of frequent mutual citation among the authors. The share of cross-citing is near of 56% that supports relative internal consistency of the share of research area.

This landscape of organizational knowledge makes logical consistence of counter-extremism policing strategy, law enforcement, and issue agenda (global and national challenges). For this reasons the preventive detention and harassment of political activists to preempt protest actions, so as imposing of new regulations on NGOs (Robertson, 2009; Gorbunova and Baranov, 2013), are determined on the multi-level base. Research narrative places political contest in conceptual frame with systemic imperatives for suppressing actions in case of decertification of civil and political organizations as functionally safe. This long-run shift from hard-line policing of the counter-government contention to multi-level administrative regime for channeling and policing of contentious politics seems to have self-developing logic that are based rather on juridical background and social vision of structural functionalism then on ideological one.

Neither the king nor a citizen: political discourse of Russian police
The primary task for this part of analysis was to define the main elements of issue agenda, the level of politicization of police networked community, specific socio-political topics that provoke discussion. Defining of issue agenda also was used as an instrument to identify core elements for the further analysis of discourse structure: the main objects of evaluation and their attributes. For this purpose the news section of the largest professional police forum *police-russia.ru* was analyzed along with its issue-topic structure. News section was defined as a relevant field due to research perspective and high discussion density (on the level of the most discussed sections). Research protocol included the coding of topics with social or political agenda via category selection, which were determined by repeated subject of discussion. Each relevant topic was coded with keywords for a more complete definition of issue agenda. Final issue agenda map combined 301 relevant topics. Table 2 presents generalized result and reflects the most important objects of discourse and its relative share weight in general volume.

DISCSSED OBJECTS	RELATİVE SHARE (İN %)	KEY PUBLIC ISSUE AGENDA	RELATİVE SHARE (İN %)
Contention and protest actions	26.57	Civil protest actions	5.98
Ethnicity	17.6	Violent forms of contention	5.64
Government and state authorities	16.94	Legitimacy of the state bodies	5.64
International relations and world politics	16.27	Hard-line policing style of the protest action	5.31
Political opposition	6.64	Ethnic labor migrants	4.31
European experience	3.98	Events in world politics	3.98
Human rights activists and press	3.65	Protest actions of SMO and grassroots	4.98
Ramzan Kadyrov	1.66	Police stuff claim making	2.65
Political legitimacy	1.66	Nationalist protest	2.65
Soviet heritage	1.66	Domestic and world politicians	2.65
Terrorism	1.32	Hard-line policing style of ethnic contention	2.32
Vladimir Putin	0.99	Social protest	1.99
Religion	0.99	Retirements of the state authorities	1.99
		Violence in world politics	1.66
		Reduction of social spending in Russia	1.32
		Legitimacy of the protest actions	1.32

Hard-line policing against political opposition	1.32
Other and no specified issues	44.18
Selection number = 301	

Table 2. Public issue agenda of Russian police networked community

Results show that networked social-political discourse of the police gives a significant role not only for the evident issue of protest behavior, but also for ethnic, world politics and of state authorities. Key issues are often associated with the above-mentioned topics. At the same time the issue of political legitimacy of the Russian authorities is quite clearly shown, which generates the question of possible limits of subordination. The problem of ethnicity and nationalism is quite sharp because internal structure of this agenda detects connection with nationalist ideology. The issue of violence detects multiple reconnections with other objects of discourse (ethnic groups, the political opposition, and world politics) so it could be defined as a possible priority strategy for countering the various groups.

More detailed discourse analysis covers topics on contention and protest actions and follows the classical conception of ''legitimate'' protest (distinction between ''good'' and ''bad'' demonstrators), general value principle of police (''citizens' police'' vs. ''King's police''), and stereotypes attribution (Della Porta and Fillieule, 2004, pp.225-227). Discourse research model implies coding of intentions (positive or negative) towards state policy and ideology (anti-extremism law, nationalism), forms of contention (political protest, social protest) and policing style (insurgency, hard-line policing style), political actors (political opposition, nationalist movement, high-rank state authorities,) and the subjects of contention (youth, workers, human right activists, press, SMO's activists, police stuff).

OBJECT OF EVALUATİON	RELATİVE LEGİTİMACY
Hard-line policing style (including police violence)	3
Nationalism	3
Police (self-evaluation)	2
Police stuff protests	2
Police policing (current practice)	2
Right to civil discontent (citizen-state reactions, peaceful forms)	2
Press	1
Nationalist actions	1
Leaders of political opposition	1
Protest actions	1
Right to civil self-resistance (citizen-state reactions, insurgency)	1
Anti-extremism policy	1
Human right activists	0
Government and state authorities (including state-promoted initiatives)	0
SMO	0
Third party interference (protest mobilization or funding by hidden domestic actors or by the foreign states)	0
Religious extremism	0

Comments:	
3 – high legitimacy (relative consensus among debaters)	2 – medium legitimacy (significant share of opposite evaluations among debaters)
1 – low legitimacy (huge share of opposite evaluations among debaters)	0 – zero level of legitimacy (relative consensus among debaters)
Selection number = 80	

Table 3. Evaluations of contentious politics by Russian police networked community

Table 3 results of object evaluations do not simply support classical dichotomy of ''citizen's police'' and ''King's police''. Government and state authorities (especially federal government, high-rank police authorities, regional and local administrations, deputies) in negative context so as political opposition or political activists. This vision supports two processes. On the one hand, front-line police members become alienated from moral integrity with political regime. Formal status of police in Russia bans strikes of other type of civil disobedience that goes along with passive grievance and the fall of moral motivation (focus on city-periphery inequality, dependence on salary and fellowship, etc.). On the other, this increases the closeness of professional community (police and military) and enforces moral solidarity and the logic of internal corporate standards and values that could differ from the civil one. This idea explains the high level of disrespect to human right activists and press. Commenters frequently blame them for immorality, professional disturbance making, and acts of social sabotage (police and military critics). This logic often supports the idea of the use of force against such groups or justifies such behavior.

It is hard to simply define elements of legitimate protest for this reason. SMO, political activists and the leaders of opposition (Boris Nemtsov, Garry Kasparov, Alexei Navalny) were described as agents provocateurs (youths and radicals) and status-motivated persons (leaders) with narrow social base, ideological inconsistence (critic of liberal democracy), and foreign foundation (political opposition). The idea of foreign-sponsored protest is quite popular and has public references to patriotic discourse on counter-revolution and "USA-lead export of democracy", that had been disseminated by political and academic agenda after the waves of political revolutions and civil wars in Eastern Europe, post-soviet courtiers, and the Middle East, where mass protest in the streets resulted in the ouster of former leaders or widespread warfare.

The difference in moral support of nationalism ideas and protest actions is based on the following vision of legitimate protest itself that is a quite complex. The image of political activists and ordinary participants of the rally predominantly depends on the type of claim-making, mobilization type (level of organization, social status of participants), contentious repertoire and personal behavior. Protest could be defined as legitimate in case the following: a) of social or local agenda; b) trade union or grassroots – leaded mobilization of industrial or public sector workers, pensioners, local citizens; b) high level of organization (small share of youth: no alcohol, performances or provocative actions). On the other hand, this vision often implies mutually exclusive reproaches. One opinion is quite influential for understanding of cognitive logic. It states that civil grievance should be channeled with the use of formal institutions (elections, petition campaigns, lawsuits) without occupation of public spaces (sidewalks, highways, railway or any city space that could be crowded). In other words, protesters should solve their problems by their own sources and means to protect others from the bothering and additional expenses. In some cases the same logic was used to blame of extremist actions and support of the right to civil self-resistance. The blame of the anarchists and Islam extremists for bombing, so as blocking roads repertoire by the social claimants, was focused on the fact that actions were mistargeted (i.e. actions should be moved to personal or official space of the high-ranking state executives).

Negative stereotypes in Russia generally repeat the main conclusions that were made by the scholars before. Persons who produce disorders are references to "young", "drunk", "guided by mob". Political activists are references to the categories of "loafer", "easy manipulated", and "fools" (Della Porta and

Fillieule, 2004, p.227). Stereotype analysis defines some distinguish patterns for recognizing of young political activists. They are mainly describes as "unsupervised persons without ideas" with "to much personal time". A rough overlook gives us single logical connection of stereotypes: "society is infected with legal nihilism", "people live one's own life and hate any kind of political power", "democracy leads to chaos", "youth are prone to be manipulated", "uncontrolled protest actions lead to disorders", "revolution leads to mass disorders and murders".

Consequently, the popular claim on political rallies ''Police among the people!'' is going to fail in change of policing frame. However, the issue of political legitimacy is still important because of historical background of Russian police: juridical and moral uncertainty during the widespread interstate contention of 1991 and 1993; police insubordination during the political revolution in the "neighbor" states (Ukraine and Georgia), "sell-out" of police interests in the second political revolution in Ukraine ("Euromaidan"). Analysis shows slight difference in interpretation of liability and order execution. Police discourse shows distrust position and doubts on efficient of hard-line social policing with intention of passive action ("have to"; "no other way out"). On the contrary, riot police discourse exemplifies more active position ("riot police should live by an order"; "the force should be used").

Conclusion

Police environmental culture is defined as images of policing area and cognitive patterns that define forms and local regimes of law enforcement. Post-soviet transformations did not change the principles and organization sources of knowledge framing formation fundamentally. Anti-extremism Russian state policy was backed by the effect of narrow institutional science that provides policy relevance and forms analytical framework for a broader conceptualization for the protest policing.

Public issue agenda of Russian police networked community is focused mainly on protest behavior, ethnicity, political authorities, and world politics. Additionally, agenda composition relates to contemporary social attitudes.

On the other hand, the content of public discourse problems detects a high level of distrust either to public authorities and nor to society. High legitimacy of police violence is accompanied by informal corporate ethics of police community demonstrates the process of alienation of the police from the national policy and society.

Such a perception of the external environment and actors neither as unreliable and illegitimate (political power) nor as a hostile and legal nihilism affected (population). This vision expects an autocratic governance and hard-line protest policing on the base of institutional autonomy and external motivation model of police.

Police agenda and discourse affect the political context that was formed by high-profile court cases and conflicts: a) public campaign after video address of police officer Alexey Dymovsky with an information about abuse and corruption in 2009; b) the series of armed attacks on police that were organized by the youth group (so-called "Primorsky partisans") and justified by the reasons of "total corruption and lawlessness of police" in 2009 and 2010; c) the murder of a former army officer Yuri Budanov in 2011 who was jailed after resonant criminal cases on the killing of civilian in Chechnya; d) a guilty verdict for the former military intelligence officer Vladimir Kvachkov in 2013 on the charge of extremism. These events were coincided with reform of the Interior Ministry structures that could sharply polarize political discourse. Although the effects of these crises could be exhausted for the present police agenda, its structure remains quite relevant, especially for setting agenda of protest activity and the key elements of the main stereotypes on activists and the political opposition. The dominance of the general negative attitudes towards protesters delegitimizes mainly political protest, the organizers and participants which are considered in terms of "irresponsibility", "international influence" and "social alien". This frame of group exclusion is particularly explicit in case of youth, which is considered in terms of "radicalism", "prone to manipulation", and "lack of ideas".

Consequently, police stereotypes on protesters generally legitimize hard-line policing strategy and pastoral-like vision on the actors of contentious politics.

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