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

The Relationship Between Trust and Political Participation: A Comparison of Four Nations

Rengin B. FIRAT

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRUST AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: A COMPARISON OF FOUR NATIONS

Rengin B. FIRAT*

ÖZ

Geçmiş çalışmalar güven ve politik katılım arasında güçlğ bir ilişki olduğunu gözlemlemiştir. Ancak, bu araştırmalar güven ve politik katılımın çok boyutlu esasını nadiren göz önünde bulundurur ve genelde Batı toplumları ile kısıtlıdır. Bu makale European Social Survey 2. Tur'unu (2004) kullanarak, farklı unsurlar içeren güven (dikey ve yatay) ve politik katılım (geleneksel ve gelenek-dışı) arasındaki bağlantıyı, birbirinden politik istikrar ve ekonomik güvenlik açısından ayrılan dört topluma (Çek Cumhuriyeti, Almanya, Norveç ve Türkiye) odaklanarak incelemektedir. Sonuçlar farklı güven unsur boyutlarının (dikey ve yatay) politik katılım biçimine bağlı olarak değişik etkilerinin olduğunu ve bir kaç istisna dışında güven ve politik katılım arasındaki ilişkinin politik istikrar ve ekonomik güven arasında değişen ülkelerde birbirine benzer olduğunu açığa çıkarmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güven, Politik Katılım, Sosyal Sermaye, Ülkelerarası Karşılaştırma

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ABSTRACT

Previous literature has observed that trust has a strong relationship with political participation. However, research rarely takes into account the multi-dimensional nature of trust or participation and is often limited to Western nations. By using the European Social Survey Round 2 (2004), this paper examines the relationship between different dimensions of trust (vertical and horizontal) and political participation (traditional and non-traditional) in four nations that depart from each other in terms of political stability and economic security: the Czech Republic, Germany, Norway and Turkey. Results show that while different dimensions of trust (horizontal and vertical trust) have distinct impact on political participation depending on the type of participation, the strength of the relationship between trust and participation is similar across countries with different levels of political stability and economic security with a few exceptions.

Keywords: Trust, Political Participation, Social Capital, Cross-national Comparison

Previous studies show that a host of civic attitudes including generalized trust and pride in political institutions are connected to sustaining democracies, and nations high on these civic attitudes (such as the UK and the United States) have more stable democracies (Almond and Verba, 1963). Considering the key role of participation in democracy, recent trends in declining levels of voter turnout, increasing political apathy, and decreasing civic attitudes led to concerns and a growing body of research focusing on the possible link between political culture, including civic attitudes, and political participation (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Paxton, 1999; 2002; Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Putnam, 2000).

This paper focuses on the individual-level political culture operationalized by psychological underpinnings including vertical trust (trust in institutions) and horizontal trust (trust in fellow citizens). I bring a more complex analysis of the relationship between trust and political participation by conceptualizing both trust and political participation as multi-dimensional concepts. I distinguish between horizontal trust, which is a generalized form of trust in others situated at the same levels of the social power hierarchy as the trustor (or to put it more simply, trust in fellow citizens), and vertical trust, which involves trusting in institutions that are situated at the higher ranks of the social power hierarchy (such as government or parliament).

Accordingly, while horizontal trust facilitates overall cooperation and caring for others, and thus promotes civic and political engagement, vertical trust encourages only activities that perpetuate the political system and are aligned with the interest of the institutions in power.[1] I also focus on two distinct forms of political participation: traditional political participation (specifically voting) and non-traditional political participation (such as protesting or boycotting). While traditional forms of political participation reinforce the existing political structures and therefore likely have a positive relationship with both horizontal and vertical forms of trust, non-traditional political participation often challenges the existing forms of political structures (such as anti-government protests) and thus might have a positive association with horizontal trust and a negative one with vertical trust.

Moreover, as an attempt to provide a nuanced understanding of political culture, this paper looks at whether trust has the same impact on political participation by comparing four nati-

ons with different socio-political and economic backgrounds (some of which –like Turkey—are rarely studied). The nations under study here depart from each other mainly in terms of political stability and economic security: Turkey (low political stability/economic security), the Czech Republic (low political stability/ medium economic security), Germany (high political stability/ medium-high economic security), and Norway (high political stability /economic security).

I suggest that the relationship between trust and political participation vary with levels of political stability and economic security. One of the major implications of social psychological research is that if risk is greater, the potential for trust to develop is greater (Molm et al., 2000) (since if there is no risk involved, there is no need to trust anyone). Moreover, cross-national research on trust and risk perception demonstrates that trust promotes risk-taking behavior (Viklund, 2003). Therefore, I expect that trust is likely a greater facilitator of political behavior (which can be considered as a risk taking behavior as the outcome of the behavior is not known with certainty) in social environments where there is greater risk involved (such as countries with lower political stability and economic security).

TRUST AND PARTICIPATION

Generalized trust is a general positive evaluation involving cognitive, emotional and behavioral aspects that is not directed towards a particular individual for a particular action. In this paper, I focus on two dimensions of generalized trust: horizontal trust and vertical trust. Horizontal trust is among the most widely studied forms of trust and refers to the subjective type of ties between people that involve positive emotions and reciprocity (Glanville and Paxton, 2007; Paxton, 1999; 2002; Putnam, 1995; Uslaner, 1999). While it is most commonly referred to as social trust, I use the term horizontal trust to emphasize the absence of a power differential between the trustee and the trustor and to contrast it to vertical trust. In contrast to horizontal trust, vertical trust happens between actors with different levels of social power. Since vertical trust is considered here as a form of generalized trust, it can be thought of as a basic evaluative or affective orientation toward institutions that are (most of the time) not associated with a particular individual such as the parliament or the legal force (Miller, 1974; Stokes, 1962). Also employed by previous researchers (Fukuyama, 1999; Putnam, 1993), this distinction between vertical and horizontal trust helps us better understand the nature of trust.

There is little dispute on the contribution of horizontal trust, which we can think of as generalized social trust, to civic life and democracy. Horizontal trust is often considered as a necessary element of contemporary civic life prompting various civic attitudes and actions such as tolerance, civic engagement or political participation (Paxton, 2002; Putnam, 1993a; 1993b; 1995; Stolle, 1998). However, the literature on the effects of vertical trust, namely political trust on participation, is compartmentalized into two camps (Levi and Stoker, 2000). The researchers in the first camp argue that trust is positively associated with political participation (Almond and Verba, 1963; Lenard, 2008; Miller, 1974) while the second line of thought argues that a certain degree of distrust in political institutions is necessary to stimulate critical skepticism of the citizens, which is beneficial for democracies (Gamson, 1968; Hardin, 2001; Mishler and Rose, 1997; Warren, 1996).

In the first camp, vertical trust is considered to be necessary as institutions have an important intermediary role for our relationships with others. As we rely on institutions like government and its agents (such as contract law and court enforcement) to achieve successful cooperation in contexts in which, without such protective institutions we would not risk cooperating with others (Hardin, 2001). Higher levels of vertical trust indicate citizen support for the government, which is necessary for more effective governments (Almond and Verba, 1963; Lenard, 2008; Miller, 1974), and "when generalized distrust characterizes a community, democracy is at risk (Lenard, 2008: 316)." According to Lenard (2008), when vertical distrust prevails, the voluntary compliance that represents effective and efficient democracies is absent, free riding becomes prevalent, and citizen are unwilling to engage in reciprocity.

On the other hand, the second camp argues that trust is double-edged: while democracies require trust, distrust is also required (Gamson, 1968; Mishler and Rose, 1997). Hardin (2001) concisely summarizes how representative democracy and distrust go together in political theory: "That is, a certain amount of distrust may be useful to a society or government. Certainly, large, modern democracies work better if we can be sure that there are professional distrusters or cynics or skeptics, people who act as watchdogs, raise alarms, or provide contrary information (p. 13)." An evidence of this comes from a study focusing on Detroit where a higher level of community activism is accompanied with elevated levels of vertical distrust

(Bockmeyer, 2000).

In addition to the double-edged nature of trust, the relationship between trust and participation might also vary in different countries (Catterberg and Moreno, 2005). Although the political orientation of people vary depending on the social groups in which they have been raised, people in similar social groups share somewhat similar political orientations (Rosenbaum, 1975). In this manner, political socialization changes tremendously between nations. For example, Rosenbaum (1975: 15) argues that in politically stable systems with considerable continuity of governmental institutions and stable civic processes, political socialization is more likely to be a conservative process (inducing relatively modest change). Contemporary research comparing civic attitudes and values across nations also shows that values and attitudes at the core of political culture like egalitarianism and interpersonal trust vary cross-culturally with differences in the economic and political structures of the nations (Catterberg and Moreno, 2005; Inglehart, 1990; 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Kaasa and Parts, 2008).

In line with these political socialization arguments, I focus on the political stability and economic security of the countries being studied, and argue that variations in these dimensions facilitate the strength of the trust-participation relationship. Scholars have long theorized the importance of risk and uncertainty in the social environment for the development of trust (Blau, 1964; Luhmann, 1979). Trust and commitment in others are more likely to be nourished in risky, uncertain contexts (Gambetta, 1988; Molm et al., 2009; Yamagishi et al., 1998); cross-national research on risk perception, however, shows that the relationship between trust and risk perception is not always straightforward and the degree of this relationship varies across countries (Viklund, 2003). In this view, risk is more than just an antecedent for trust, it is also a consequence of trust. Trust can be considered as an attitude that predisposes people for risk taking behavior (Viklund, 2003), so it can be argued that while risky environments promote trust, trust in turn facilitates risk-taking behavior.[2]

I suggest that the political stability and economic security of nations generate different levels of risk and uncertainty such that politically less stable and economically less secure nations stimulate a riskier and more uncertain social environment for their citizens. Much of previous research also supports this view by showing that economic inequality and political

corruption is strongly related to trust (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Uslaner and Brown, 2005). However, studies often do not directly look at how macro-level factors like inequality or corruption impact the relationship between trust and political behavior. The analyses I present in this article provide insights on these issues by comparing the trust-political participation relationship in four countries with distinct socio-political contexts. I contend that in countries where political stability and economic security are low, the relationship between trust and political participation is stronger.

A COMPARISON OF FOUR NATIONS

In this article, I will attempt to situate the political stability and economic security of the four countries under study relative to each other. As the below graph suggests, while on political stability dimension both Germany and Norway rank high (relative to Turkey and the Czech Republic), on economic security Norway ranks the highest, followed by Germany, the Czech Republic and then Turkey[3].



Figure 1. Relative positions of nations on political stability and economic security.

Political Stability

Politically, Norway has always been a stable country with a strong social democratic tradition. The Labor Party, which has stayed in charge of the government for more than 40 years

for different periods of time after World War II led to this social democratic order that can be characterized as the strong state presence in the economy, state redistribution of wealth to the benefit of both social and geographical peripheries, a welfare state, and a uniform and universal education system (Heidar, 2001). Germany, on the other hand, has experienced frequent, sudden political changes (such as Nazi rule or unification of East and West Germany). However, after the World War II, the German political system has been very stable and supported by a vital political interest and engagement of the public. Germany has a vital political culture and over time Germans have become more interested in politics and more inclined to use politics for social change and personal development (Conradt, 2005). While even in the periods of economic recession there were not any anti-establishment movements, citizen movements campaigning for social and political issues are widespread and election campaigns see extensive citizen participation (Conradt, 2005). In Norway on the other hand, there has been a recent decline in the voter turnout in the last 25 years, but a 2007 study shows that the broader political activity of citizens has increased (Listhaug and Grønflaten, 2007). So, it can be concluded that both Germany and Norway are politically stable nations with civically engaged populations.

Compared to Germany and Norway, the Czech Republic and Turkey have less stable political systems. The Czech Republic is a relatively new democracy. After the overthrown of the communist regime through a non-violent revolution (the 'velvet revolution' in 1989), the Czech Republic as a democratic regime was formed in 1993 (Holy, 1996) and has established a relatively stable political trajectory ever since (Neuman, 2011). However, while being considered as a model of transition for ex-Soviet countries, around the years 1997 and 1998, the Czech Republic has experienced various scandals such as the bribery of top political officials, bank fraud, and tax evasion (Appel, 2001). High levels of political corruption also impeded people's perceptions of the political system; according to a survey by Transparency International (2004a) more than half of those surveyed in the Czech Republic were concerned that corruption had a substantial impact on political life. In contrast to the recent political restructuring of the Czech Republic, Turkey has been a democratic regime since 1923. Turkey is one of the very few developing countries that have been able to sustain a relatively stable democratic system for a considerable length of time despite the rapid socio-economic changes it has been going through (Özbudun, 1976). Another significant feature of Turkey is that in 1983, voting became compul-

sory, and fines started to be imposed on non-voters. Yet, it is noteworthy that voting participation has been higher than many European countries (and the US) in Turkey (reaching 89 per cent in 1950, and averaging 76 per cent for the 1950-80 period) even before 1980s (Rustow, 1991). The Turkish political regime has undergone several turbulences in its history, including three military interventions (1960-61, 1971-1973, and 1980-1983) (Rustow 1991). Moreover, similar to the Czech Republic, political corruption in Turkey also is a major problem. According to the annual index of the Transparency International (2004b) Turkey ranks 81st out of 145 countries on a corruption scale (in which higher ranks indicate higher corruption rates) with a score of 3.2 out of 10 (10 being 'highly clean' and 0 'highly corrupt') and more than fifty percent of those surveyed in Turkey felt that corruption had influenced political life to a large extent.

Table 1. Comparison of Countries on Selected Dimensions

	Czech Republic	Germany	Norway	Turkey
Population in 2004 (in millions) *	10.207	82.501	4.591	67.734
*Gross domestic product/ capita (2004) US $ **	19,301	29,895	42,250	10,164
*GINI***	25.4 (1996)	28.3 (2000)	25.8 (2000)	43.6 (2003)
The year the current political regime established	1993	1949	1905	1923
Government structure	Multi-Party Parliamentary Representative Democratic Republic	Federal Parliamentary Representative Democratic Republic	Parliamentary Democracy Under Constitutional Monarchy	Multi-Party Parliamentary Representative Democratic Republic

*Source: UNECE Statistical Division Database, compiled from national and international (CIS, EUROSTAT, IMF, OECD) official sources (http://www.unece.org).
** Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2004 Human Development Report (http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2004/) (Year the GINI value calculated is in parenthesis)

Economic Security

Norway and Germany can be considered economically more secure than the Czech Republic and Turkey. As seen from Table 1, these two countries have much higher GDPs than

the other two. Norway is a typical Scandinavian nation the culture of which is shaped by shared forces including a Protestant state religion and languages that are mutually understandable (Heidar, 2001) with a post-industrial, information-based, and service-dominant economy (Arter, 2008). In Germany, the economy was deeply impeded by the World War II, yet both East and West Germany reconstructed their economies successfully in the post-war period and experienced rapid development (although East Germany did not have production levels and economic advancement as high as West Germany) (Lewis, 2001), and today it has one of the world's strongest economies.

Both Germany and Norway provide extensive social security to their citizens. In Norway, the welfare state offers "capitalism with a human face" by creating a comfortable, solid support to anyone forced out of the labor market through a security net of transfer payments (such as unemployment, disability, and old age pensions) and social services (such as medical and dental care, and child care) (Einhorn and Louge, 2003, preface: ix). Similarly, Germany is also an extensive welfare state covering sickness, accident, disability, retirement, unemployment, and providing housing subsidies for low income families and direct cash payment to all of the parents to reduce the costs of child raising (Conradt 2005). However, Germany and Norway's welfare regimes also differ in some notable aspects. For example, the German welfare system is a conservative system and the Norwegian system is a social democratic one (Esping-Andersen 1990). For example, in contrast to Germany's welfare regime favoring traditional household types by not providing less beneficial assistance options to single parents, the Norwegian system is a universal form of welfare offering even supplementary benefits to single-parents in addition to covering childcare facilities leading to lower rates of income poverty and material deprivation in Norway than Germany (Hansen, 2006). Moreover, when we look at their Gini index scores that reflect economic inequality, we also see that both countries rank very low on this index indicating lower economic inequality, yet Norway is slightly lower than Germany.[4]

Compared to Germany and Norway, the Czech Republic and Turkey have less stable economic systems. They both have relatively low GDPs (although Turkey's GDP is much lower), yet an important distinction between the Czech Republic and Turkey lies in the levels of economic inequality that can also be observed in their Gini coefficients. While the

Czech Republic has a very low Gini coefficient (28.3 in 2000), Turkey's Gini coefficient (43.6 in 2003) is quite large pointing to high levels of economic inequality within the nation. After the 1980s, the Turkish economy was marked by a neo-liberal paradigm promoting international trade, and an export sector based on manufactured industrial goods (Gedik, 2003; Elveren and Galbraith, 2008). While the progress of a neo-liberal economy has led to income growth, it also gave rise to widening income disparity (Casanova, 2006). Turkey has a very high rate of national inequality, with the groups at the top of the income hierarchy holding an income of almost four times higher than that of the poorest ones' (Casanova, 2006). Income disparity is even more prominent between regions, with the western regions being very affluent compared to the eastern regions of Turkey (Gezici and Hewings, 2004; Elveren and Galbraith, 2008).

Unlike Turkey, communist Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic) had one of the lowest income inequality levels across Europe (Večerník, 2009). While before the overthrow of the communist regime in 1989, wages were set centrally depending on qualities such as the demographic characteristics of workers, job tenure, or physical demand in some industries, and the ideological value of certain jobs (Mysíková, 2011), after 1989 the Czech economy underwent several changes including the privatization of formerly state-owned companies, increased competition in the production market, several market deregulations and increasing global competition as a result of joining the EU, and skill-based technological change (Eriksson et al., 2008). These changes led to a gradual shift towards decentralized wage bargaining system in which wages started to be determined by characteristics such as education, experience, and skills and resulting in a more polarized income distribution or the phenomenon referred to as the *hollowing of the middle* (Alderson and Doran, 2010; Mysíková, 2011). However, income inequality has remained low after 1996 (Mysíková, 2011), and is still considerably low compared to many other European countries.

HYPOTHESES

Based on previous literature discussed in earlier sections, horizontal trust (generalized trust in fellow citizens) facilitates cooperation and caring among citizens, therefore it is predicted to promote both traditional (voting) (Hypothesis 1) and non-traditional forms of political participation (Hypothesis 2) in all countries. However, as also discussed earlier, trust has a

double-edged nature, and in vertical trust relationships there is an asymmetry of power between the trustor and the trustee. Therefore, again in all countries, I expect vertical trust (trust in institutions) to be positively related to voting since this form of activity affirms the political hierarchy (choosing a representative that will have greater control over the decision-making than the common public) (Hypothesis 3) and negatively associated with non-traditional forms of political participation as these activities often take place to challenge power hierarchies and reflect discontent with the socio-political hierarchy (Hypothesis 4). I also expect the strength of the relationship between trust and political participation to vary depending on the relative position of the countries' political stability and economic security as these dimensions stimulate different levels of risk and uncertainty. Accordingly, I expect that in countries where political stability and economic security are low, the relationship between trust and political participation will be stronger than countries that rank higher on those dimensions. More specifically, I predict that the relationship between trust and political participation will be the strongest for Turkey, followed by the Czech Republic, Germany and then Norway (Hypothesis 5).

METHODS

Data

The data used in this paper come from the European Social Survey (the ESS), Round 2, which was conducted in 2004 and includes 26 countries (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom). Data from only four countries (the Czech Republic, Germany, Norway and Turkey) are used for the analyses. The response rates for these countries are 55.3, 51, 66.2 and 50.07 % for the Czech Republic, Germany, Norway and Turkey, respectively. All the missing cases are listwise deleted; respondents who were not eligible to vote and under the age of 18 have been deleted from the sample (N, Czech R.=1973, Germany=2207, Norway=1546, Turkey=1220).

Measures

Horizontal trust is measured by averaging three variables from the European Social Sur-

vey, which were first formed by Rosenberg (1956) and commonly used by many contemporary researchers (Glanville and Paxton, 2007; Paxton 1999; 2002; Putnam, 1995; Uslaner, 1999). Horizontal trust variable is calculated by averaging respondents' answers on a scale ranging from zero to ten to the following questions: "Would you say that most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful in dealing with people?," "Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?," "Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves" (The Cronbach's alpha for these items are 0.75, 0.71, 0.65 and 0.76 for the Czech R., Germany, Norway and Turkey, respectively). Even though only one of these indicators directly asks about trust in other people, they all reflect feelings of moral obligation and integrity that has been theorized by Barber (1983). The European Social Survey also includes items tapping into trust of the participants in various institutions by prompting them to rate (on a scale from zero to ten) how much they trust each of those institutions. Vertical trust is calculated by averaging respondents' answers to how much they trust in politicians, political parties, the legal system and the police (The Cronbach's alpha for these items are 0.87, 0.81, 0.81 and 0.76 for the Czech R., Germany, Norway and Turkey, respectively).

Depending on the conceptual distinctions suggested by previous research (Quintelier, 2007) and the ESS Codebook, I distinguish between different forms of political participation: (1) traditional political participation (operationalized with voting) and (2) non-traditional political participation (operationalized with signing a petition, attending a public demonstration and boycotting a product). Voting is coded as a dummy variable by using the following question: "Did you vote in the last national election?" (1=yes, 0=no). Non-traditional political participation is measured by summing three items asking the participants whether during the last 12 months they have: "signed a petition," "taken part in a lawful public demonstration" and "boycotted certain products." This variable is an ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 3 and measures how many different non-traditional political activities the respondents have been engaged in during the last 12 months. Unfortunately, this measure does not take into account how many times a respondent participates within each category, and therefore underestimates the level of participation of the respondents who engage in only one type of activity but multiple times. However, it is still a valid measure since engagement in different types of activities reflects higher levels

of non-traditional political participation.

Other explanatory variables in the analyses include political interest (measured by the single item of the survey asking "How interested would you say are you in politics?" The answer to the question is a 4 item scale ranging from very interested to not at all interested (recoded so that higher values meant higher political interest), political ideology (respondents' replacement on a left-right scale ranging from 0-left to 10-right), religious attendance (respondents are asked to report how often they attend religious services apart from special occasions ranging from "1" everyday to "7" never), education (measured in years as a continuous variable), urban residency (dummy variable coded as "1" if the respondents reported living in a big city or suburbs or outskirts of a big city, "0" if not), respondents' age, marital status (dummy variable coded as "1" if married, "0" if not), and gender (dummy variable coded as "1" if male, "0" if female). Descriptive statistics for all of the variables in the analysis are summarized in Table 1 of Appendix.

Models

Multivariate models examining the relationship between different dimensions of trust and political participation are estimated for each country. Binary logistic regression analyses are conducted for the dichotomous outcome "voting," and ordered logistic regression analyses are conducted for the ordinal outcome "non-traditional political participation." All models control for political interest, political ideology, religious attendance, education, urban residency, age, marital status and gender.

RESULTS

Horizontal trust

The results of the multivariate analyses are summarized in Table 2 and 3. To help aid the interpretations of the logistic analyses, the odds ratios are presented. The odds ratio refers to the ratio indicating how often an event occurs relative to how often it does not occur. An odds ratio greater than '1' means the event is more likely to occur than not, while an odds ratio less than '1' means it is less likely to occur than not. Table 2 presents the full models of the relationship

between horizontal trust and political participation. As I stated previously, based on literature emphasizing the importance of horizontal trust (generalized trust in others) for civic life and political participation, I predicted horizontal trust to be positively associated with both voting behavior (H1) and non-traditional forms of political participation (H2). However, results of my analyses provide only partial support for Hypothesis 1, while it fails to support Hypothesis 2. First, as summarized in Table 2 and Figure 2, horizontal trust is significantly related to the odds of voting in the Czech Republic and Germany, and as hypothesized (H1) this relationship is positive. The odds ratios of 1.124 and 1.137, for example, indicate that for a one unit increase in horizontal trust there is a 12.4 and 13.7 percent increase in the odds of voting holding all other factors constant, for the Czech R. and Germany respectively. Horizontal trust is positively associated with voting in Norway as well, but this relationship is not statistically significant. For Turkey, on the other hand, in contrast to the first hypothesis there is a negative yet non-significant association between horizontal trust and voting. Additionally, we see that the relationship between horizontal trust and non-traditional political participation is not significant for any of the countries and in a negative direction for all countries except Turkey (in contrast to H2).

Table 2. Odds Ratios of Political Participation with Horizontal Trust

	VOTE				NON-TRADITIONAL POL. PARTICIPATION			
	Czech R.	**Germany**	**Norway**	**Turkey**	**Czech R.**	**Germany**	**Norway**	**Turkey**
Horizontal Trust	1.124**	1.137**	1.074	.933	.997	.951	.972	1.072
	(.031)	(.042)	(.059)	(.038)	(.031)	(.024)	(.035)	(.046)
Political Interest	2.322**	2.300**	2.177**	1.063	1.668**	1.576**	1.541**	2.198**
	(.193)	(.199)	(.268)	(.974)	(.140)	(.091)	(.112)	(.227)
Political Ideology	1.026	.946	.921*	.963	.965	.880**	.838**	.939
	(.022)	(.033)	(.038)	(.032)	.023	(.021)	(.021)	(.032)
Religious Attend.	1.098*	1.292**	1.024	1.061	1.111*	1.064	1.016	1.059
	(.043)	(.072)	(.072)	(.066)	(.047)	(.035)	(.044)	(.065)
Education	1.140**	1.112**	1.126**	.994	1.132**	1.106**	1.094**	1.168**
	(.028)	(.028)	(.033)	(.024)	(.027)	(.016)	(.017)	(.026)
Urban	.772*	.851	1.066	.821	1.459**	1.637**	1.028	1.630*
	(.092)	(.115)	(.185)	(.159)	(.186)	(.147)	(.110)	(.324)
Age	1.024**	1.020**	1.03**	1.050**	.978**	.984**	.973**	.993
	(.004)	(.004)	(.006)	(.009)	(.004)	(.003)	(.004)	(.007)
Married	1.518**	1.401**	2.572**	2.14**	.969	1.110	.992	.927
	(.154)	(.183)	(.453)	(.434)	(.113)	(.100)	(.107)	(.200)
Male	.863	1.401	1.226	.928	.902	.799*	.943	1.296
	(.088)	(.149)	(.203)	(.216)	(.105)	(.070)	(.097)	(.307)
LR chi² (df)	304.25 (9)	298.63 (9)	186.90 (9)	82.15 (9)	126.41 (9)	296.30 (9)	227.36 (9)	222.31 (9)
Pseudo R²	.116	.153	.153	.092	.051	.061	.065	.175
N	1973	2207	1546	1220	1973	2207	1546	1220

Values represent coefficients (log odds) from logistic regressions converted to odds ratios for ease of interpretation.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%



Figure 2. Odds Ratios of Participation Outcomes with Horizontal Trust

Vertical Trust

Unlike the horizontal trust-political participation relationship, results of my analyses of vertical trust-political participation provide more consistent support for my hypotheses. As explained in the previous sections, vertical trust pertains to trusting in hierarchical institutions; therefore it is expected to be positively associated with traditional forms of political participation that reinforces hierarchical political system (Hypothesis 3). Results of my analyses mostly support this hypothesis by revealing that vertical trust is positively related to the odds of voting (see Table 3 and Figure 3), and this relationship is significant across all models except in the Turkish sample (although the sign of the estimated coefficients for vertical trust in these models are in the predicted direction). For example, a one unit increase in vertical trust is associated with a 18 and 22.4 percent increase in the odds of voting in the most recent national elections in the Czech Republic and Germany, respectively.

Table 3. Odds Ratios of Political Participation with Vertical Trust

	VOTE				NON-TRADITIONAL POL. PARTICIPATION			
	Czech R.	Germany	Norway	Turkey	Czech R.	Germany	Norway	Turkey
Vertical Trust	1.180**	1.224**	1.152**	1.059	.961	.944*	.910**	.887**
	(.323)	(.046)	(.056)	(.043)	(.030)	(.023)	(.030)	(.039)
Political Interest	2.260**	2.330**	2.091**	1.067	1.684**	1.575**	1.598**	2.206**
	(.188)	(.202)	(.259)	(.097)	(.142)	(.090)	(.118)	(.227)
Political Ideology	1.024	.941	.924	.942	.967	.884**	.838**	.975
	(.022)	(.033)	(.039)	(.033)	(.023)	(.021)	(.021)	(.034)
Religious Attend.	1.090*	1.254**	1.016	1.056	1.115*	1.070*	1.022	1.077
	(.043)	(.070)	(.072)	(.066)	(.048)	(.036)	(.044)	(.067)
Education	1.143**	1.110**	1.117**	.995	1.133**	1.104**	1.101**	1.667**
	(.028)	(.028)	(.033)	(.024)	(.027)	(.016)	(.018)	(.026)
Urban	.781*	.830	1.067	.849	1.449**	1.655**	1.022	1.604*
	(.094)	(.113)	(.185)	(.163)	(.185)	(.148)	(.110)	(.319)
Age	1.024**	1.020**	1.030**	1.048**	.978**	.984**	.973**	.995
	(.004)	(.004)	(.006)	(.009)	(.004)	(.003)	(.004)	(.007)
Married	1.574**	1.100*	2.500**	2.147**	.964	1.114	1.007	.904
	(.161)	(.184)	(.442)	(.438)	(.112)	(.100)	(.109)	(.197)
Male	.866	1.155	1.199	.942	.900	.803*	.959	1.227
	(.089)	(.151)	(.199)	(.220)	(.104)	(.070)	(.098)	(.292
LR chi² (df)	323.57 (9)	316.46 (9)	193.65	81.27 (9)	128.07 (9)	297.76 (9)	235.24 (9)	227.12 (9)
Pseudo R²	.123	.162	.158	.091	.051	.061	.068	.179
N	1973	2207	1546	1220	1973	2207	1546	1220

Values represent coefficients (log odds) from logistic regressions converted to odds ratios for ease of interpretation.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%



While vertical trust is expected to be positively related to traditional forms of political participation (H3), it is expected to be negatively associated with non-traditional forms of political participation as they often challenge the status quo (H4). As also summarized in Table 3 and Figure 3, in line with Hypothesis 4, vertical trust is negatively related to the odds of having a higher level of non-traditional political participation across all countries. While this relationship is not statistically significant for the Czech sample, it is in the predicted direction. Accordingly, holding all other variables constant, a one unit increase in vertical trust is associated with a 5.6, 9, and 11.3 percent decrease in the odds of having higher level non-traditional political participation for Germany, Norway and Turkey respectively.

The relative strength of the relationship between trust and political participation across countries

In order to determine the relative strength of the relationship between trust and political participation across countries, I conducted logistic regression analyses pooling two of the country samples together, and then adding a dummy country variable and an interaction variable between the country dummy and the trust variable (in addition to all the other variables from main regression analyses) [5]. Next, I examine the magnitude and statistical significance of

the estimated coefficient for the interaction variable; this coefficient will indicate whether the relationship between trust and political participation differs for the two countries. A total of 24 models are analyzed (separately for different dimensions of trust and political participation for six possible country pairs).

Results of these analyses fail to support the prediction that trust-political participation is stronger in countries that rank relatively lower on political stability and economic security dimensions (H5). First, with respect to the horizontal trust-voting relationship, the strength of this relationship is not significantly different across countries with one exception (results not shown). The relationship between horizontal trust and voting is significantly different in Germany versus Turkey, and in contrast to my predictions, this difference reveals that horizontal trust-voting relationship is stronger in Germany than it is in Turkey. Statistical tests also reveal that the strength of the relationship between horizontal trust and non-traditional political participation is not significantly different across countries. Looking at the relationship between vertical trust and voting, the only statistically significant differences between the coefficients of vertical trust (on voting) are between Turkey and the Czech Republic, and Turkey and Germany, which again do not support Hypothesis 5. Finally, the relationship between vertical trust and non-traditional political participation is not significantly different across the four countries.

In summary, while results provide some support for Hypothesis 1, 3 and 4, they show no support for Hypothesis 2 and 5. Accordingly, while as predicted horizontal trust is positively related to the propensity of voting in the Czech and German samples, there is no significant association between trust and participation in the other countries (H1). In contrast to predictions, horizontal trust is not associated with non-traditional political participation (H2). Again, consistent with the predictions, vertical trust has a positive relationship with voting (H3) and a negative relationship with non-traditional political participation (H4). In contrast to hypothesis 5, for the most part, the strength of the relationship between trust and political participation is similar across countries, with some exceptions. The relationship between trust and voting is significantly stronger in Germany (for horizontal and vertical trust), and in the Czech Republic (for vertical trust) than Turkey (which contrasts H5).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

I extend the trust-political participation scholarship by analyzing the relationship between different dimensions of trust and political participation in four countries with different socio-political histories and economic standings. While the primary message of this study is that the relationship between trust and political participation is complex and context dependent, the results of my analyses reveal three interesting patterns and partial support for my hypotheses.

First, in line with previous literature emphasizing the double-edged nature of trust (Mishler and Rose, 1997; Hardin, 2001), this article reveals not only that different dimensions of trust (horizontal and vertical trust) have distinct impact on political participation, but also that the impact of a single dimension of trust might vary depending on the type of political participation. So, trust is a multi-dimensional and complex concept. For example, it is found in this paper that while horizontal trust is not associated with non-traditional political participation, vertical trust is negatively associated. Moreover, for the most part while vertical trust is positively related to voting, a traditional form of political participation, it is negatively related to non-traditional forms of political participation.

Besides showing the nuanced nature of trust, these non-homogenous effects of trust are also important in articulating the need to take into account the character of the power relationship between the trustor and the trustee when conceptualizing trust. Power differentials between the trustor and the trustee especially become important for political participation, which in many democratic institutions takes the form of a hierarchical mode of action (as it is often a direct or indirect form of interaction with abstract political bodies that are positioned higher in the power hierarchy, like political parties or systems). Accordingly, horizontal trust, which does not carry a power differential between the trustor and the trustee, can be thought of as a facilitator of actions (including political actions) that encompass cooperation and caring in the general sense. Vertical trust, on the other hand, involves an asymmetry of power between the trustor and the trustee, and thus reinforces actions endorsing the hierarchical power status quo (or political status quo in the case of political actions) and hinders those challenging the socio-political power hierarchies. One important implication of these findings for future research investigating political participation or social movements would be to look at factors that might increase or

decrease vertical trust and in turn non-traditional forms of participation.

Second, even though previous literature has repeatedly emphasized its importance in civic participation, my analyses show that horizontal (or social) trust does not appear as a significant positive contributor to non-traditional political participation. One possible explanation for this could be that previous research fails to capture the dimensionality of political participation and mainly focuses on traditional forms of participation, like voting behavior. So, like various mainstream investigations of political participation (Quintelier, 2007), social capital and trust research might also be suffering from overgeneralizations about the nature of the trust-political participation relationship by focusing only on traditional types of participation. An alternative explanation for not observing a positive relationship between horizontal trust and political participation might be the inability of the models conducted here to capture a reciprocal relationship between trust and participation. As suggested by Brehm and Rahn (1997) the causal path from participation to trust might be more important than vice versa. Therefore, future studies should look at the reciprocal relationship between trust and political participation by using longitudinal data.

Lastly, contrary to my predictions, results of my analyses indicate that the strength of the relationship between trust and participation is similar across countries with different levels of political stability and economic security with a couple notable exceptions. These findings have an important implication for the psychological underpinnings of political behavior as they suggest a shared mechanism underlying the individual-level political participation and trust relationship, and also challenge the social psychological and organizational research on trust suggesting that risky and uncertain environments bolster trust and risk taking behavior. The only exceptions to this pattern come from the relationship between trust and voting in Turkey where the strength of the relationship is significantly weaker than Germany and the Czech Republic (for vertical trust-voting relationship only). These differences in the strength of the trust-voting relationship in Turkey might be due to the institutionalized nature of voting in Turkey such that since voting is compulsory, trust might no longer matter for voting behavior. However, considering that the nature of the relationship between horizontal trust and non-traditional political participation (not just voting) is also opposite to those of other countries, alternative explanati-

ons might also be plausible.

One such explanation is the possibility of a tipping point for political instability and economic insecurity triggering a riskier or more uncertain environment. While, up to that point the differences in political or economic environment might not be related to any significant differences in the trust-participation relationship, once it is reached, differences might be observed. Unfortunately, the data analyzed in this paper does not provide any longitudinal information on the historical events and conditions from which different patterns in the trust participation relationship may arise. For a better understanding of how the relationship between trust and political participation varies cross-culturally, further research, taking into account the historical conditions, including political and economic change, is required on nations other than the 'classic' West.

Notes:

1. It should be noted that, in this paper, activities perpetuating the hierarchical political status quo (like voting) are described as those that affirm a hierarchical political system in which certain institutions are situated at the higher ranks of the socio-political power hierarchy. So, these activities reinforce institutions like the government or parliament independent of who is in the government or parliament.

2. The view that risk is both an antecedent and a consequence of trust might be better understood by distinguishing between different levels on which political culture operates. Political culture operates on two levels: the individual and the system level (Rosenbaum, 1975). At the individual level political culture has a psychological focus revolving around what a person feels and thinks about the symbols, institutions and rules that are fundamental to the political order of his/her society: what bonds exist between the person and the political system and how these bonds affect behavior. The system level considers how masses of individuals evaluate their political institutions and officials. While individual-level trust and risk-taking behavior can be categorized under the first level, system (societal) level risk and uncertainty can be categorized under the second. This way, we can see how the system level risk (like other societal or cultural factors) potentially define political reality for people and shape their political behavior and attitudes including trust and risk-taking behavior at the individual-level.

3. It should be noted that these rankings are neither fixed nor absolute positions. They are rather theoretical generalizations that provide insights into the relative positions of the nations relative to these dimensions.

4. The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or consumption) among individuals or households within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. The Gini index lies between 0 and 100. A value of 0 represents absolute equality and 100 absolute inequality. The Gini coefficient ranges from around 26 in Europe to 33 in South Asia, 57 in Latin America and to more than 70 in Sub-Saharan

Africa (United Nations Development Programme, http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/).

5. These tests detect whether or not coefficients of trust for two countries are different from each other rather than the difference in their magnitudes (the strength of the relationship). While this does not constitute a problem for testing the difference between coefficients in the same direction (with same signs), it might cause some issues if the coefficients have opposite signs if the purpose is to gain understanding about the relative strength or magnitude of the coefficients. For example, if two coefficients are equal in magnitude (let's say they are both associated with a change of 0.18 in the outcome variable, and have similar standard errors), but their coefficients have opposite signs (e.g. b1= -0.18, b2= 0.18), these tests might rightfully confirm that these coefficients are significantly different from each other. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that they are different in their strength; the variables with the coefficients -0.18 and 0.18 might have equally strong relationships with the outcome variable. Since my purpose in this paper is to compare the relative strength of the coefficients for trust, in order to avoid any misinterpretations about relative magnitudes, I included a reverse coded horizontal trust variable for Turkey in these analyses (since only trust coefficients in the Turkish sample have signs opposite to other countries').

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ÖZET

Geçmiş çalışmalar başta güven duygusu olmak üzere 'politik kültür' adı altında toplanan bir çok psikolojik yurttaşlık tutumlarının politik davranışlar ile ilgili olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Ancak bu çalışmalar çoğunlukla güven duygusu ve politik davranışların çok boyutlu esasına önem vermeyip, Batı toplumları ile sınırlı kalmıştır. Bu makale bu açıkları kapamak amacıyla yatay ve dikey güven unsurları ile geleneksel ve gelenek-dışı politik davranış biçimleri arasındaki ilişkiyi sosyo-politik ve ekonomik yapıları birbirinden farklı dört topluma odaklanarak incelemektedir.

Yatay güven, sosyal güç hiyerarşisinde aynı seviyede kişilere duyulan genel bir güven şeklinde tanımlanabilirken, dikey güven sosyal güç hiyerarşisinin yüksek seviyelerinde bulunan kurumlara (hükümet veya parlemento gibi) karşı duyulan güveni içerir. Buna gore, yatay güven genel olarak toplumsal dayanışmayı artırıp vatandaşlık hizmetleri ve politik katılımı desteklerken, dikey güven hiyerarşik statükoyu devam ettirici ve güç sahibi kurumların çıkarlarıyla aynı doğrultuda faaliyetleri teşvik eder.

Bu makalenin amacı yatay ve dikey güvenin geleneksel (oy verme) ve gelenek-dışı politik katılım biçimleriyle (dilekçe imzalama, gösteriye katılma, çeşitli ürünleri politik sebeple boykot etme) arasındaki ilişkiyi ve bu ilişkinin farklı sosyo-politik ve ekonomik alt yapılarda olan dört toplumlarda nasıl değiştiğini ortaya koymaktır. Analizlerin yapıldığı ülkeler birbirine göreceli olarak politik istikrar ve ekonomik güvenliklerine göre categorize edilebilir: Türkiye (düşük seviyede politik istikrar ve ekonomik güvenlik), Çek Cumhuriyeti (düşük politik istikrar, orta ekonomik güvenlik), Almanya (yüksek politik istikrar, orta-yüksek ekonomik güvenlik), ve Norveç (yüksek politik istikrar, yüksek ekonomik güvenlik). Güven üzerine sosyal-psikoloji alanında yapılan daha önceki çalışmalara göre, riskli ortamlarda güven ve politik katılım arasında daha kuvvetli bir ilişki beklenmektedir. Buna göre, politik istikrar ve ekonomik güvencesi daha düşük olan ülkelerde güven ve politik katılım arasındaki ilişkinin daha güçlü olması beklenmektedir. Bu araştırma bu ilişkileri ortaya koyarak politik kültüre daha ayrıntılı bir anlayış getirmeyi ummaktadır.

Sonuçlar yatay ve dikey güvenin farklı etkilerini ortaya koymaktadır. Hiyerarşik güç farkı olmayanlara karşı duyulan yatay güvenin geleneksel bir politik biçimi olan oy kullanma üzerine olumlu bir etkisi varken, genelde güç hiyerarşisine meydan okuyan gelenek-dışı politik davranışlar üzerine bir etkisi yoktur. Dikey güven ise çoğunlukla oy vermeyi artırırken, gelenek-dışı politik katılım biçimlerini azaltıcı bir etki göstermiştir. Ayrıca, ülkeler arası karşılaştırma, bir kaç istisna dışında, güven ve politik davranış arasındaki ilişkinin benzer bir nitelikte olduğunu göstermiştir. Bu bulgular güven ve politik katılım arasındaki kompleks ilişkiyi vurgulayıp, politik davranış biçimlerinin altında yatan sosyal-psikolojik mekanizmaları için önemli bulgular ortaya koymuştur.

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APPENDIX

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics

	Czech Republic Mean*	Germany Mean*	Norway Mean*	Turkey Mean*	Range Low-High
Vote	0.62 (0.49)	0.84 (0.37)	0.86 (0.34)	0.88 (0.32)	0-1
Non-traditional Political Par.	0.25 (0.54)	0.69 (0.84)	0.73 (0.86)	0.21 (0.58)	0-3
Horizontal Trust	4.49 (1.86)	5.15 (1.72)	6.54 (1.45)	3.33 (2.31)	0-10
Vertical Trust	3.35 (1.89)	4.56 (1.75)	5.52 (1.62)	4.72 (2.47)	0-10
Political interest	2.08 (0.71)	2.75 (0.83)	2.56 (0.75)	2.21 (1.08)	1-4
Political ideology	5.42 (2.52)	4.52 (1.82)	5.09 (2.08)	6.35 (2.96)	0-10
Religious Attendance	1.95 (1.35)	2.17 (1.32)	2.17 (1.19)	3.35 (2.08)	1-7
Education	12.47 (2.35)	13.31 (3.25)	13.30 (3.57)	6.63 (4.37)	6-26
Living in urban area	0.24 (.43)	0.33 (0.47)	0.35 (.48)	0.53 (.50)	0-1
Age	49.68 (16.19)	49.44 (16.11)	47.77 (15.98)	41.99 (15.02)	20-96
Married	0.58 (.49)	0.59 (0.49)	0.57 (.50)	0.77 (.42)	0-1
Male	0.47 (.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.53 (.50)	0.51 (.50)	0-1
N	1973	2207	1546	1220	

*Means for dummy variables indicate percentages of that variable in total sample.

Standard deviations in parentheses.