

## DERLEME MAKALESİ / REVIEW ARTICLE

FROM AN AMBIVALENCE IN IDENTITY FORMATION TO THE  
DICHOTOMY IN INTEREST FORMATION

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Rahmi İNCEKARA\*

\* İstanbul Kent Üniversitesi,  
İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Fakültesi

e-posta: rahmi.incekara@kent.edu.tr

ORCID 0000-0001-8052-9315

Öğr. Gör. Ferdi T. GÜÇYETMEZ \*\*

\*\*Ph.D., Yeni Yüzyıl Üniversitesi,  
Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Siyaset Bilimi

e-posta: ferdigucyetmez26@gmail.com

ORCID 0000-0003-1204-2606

## ÖZET

While becoming a member of international community on the one side, and insisting on preserving values and norms of Hobbesian culture on the other side, sovereigns face an intricate dilemma from within domestic inhibitions in conducting integration with the norms from outside. Dichotomy in interest formation with respect to foreign policy relations with the others reveals the fact that no mature international collective identity is possible since there already exists a serious problem, or paradox, in identity formulation from within, considering the complex interdependence feature of globalization and sub-nation identity in contradiction with state identity within the Westphalian territory. The underlying cause of problems in Lockean interest formation in foreign policy is the polarizing domination of Hobbesian culture in domestic politics.

Holding constant the unit of analysis as state, interest and identity are the dependable variables, the interaction (socialization) is independent variable in this article. Theoretically, such a strong argument based upon Wendt's approach to the relations of behavior, interest and identity in respective; States organize their actions by some interests defined by their identity. We will try to come to the conclusion by defending the importance of the phenomenon of identity in the process in which global powers have a voice in the economy and that the powers that do not have international organizations can never have an economic hegemonic measure.

**Keywords:** Economy, Economic Dependence, Identity, Lockean Practice, Hobbesian Mind

**Jel Codes:** E00, E60, F40

KİMLİK FORMASYONUNDAKİ BELİRSİZLİKTEN ÇIKAR FORMASYONUNDAKİ  
ZİTLİKLARA

## ABSTRACT

Bir tarafta uluslararası topluluğun bir üyesi olurken, diğer tarafta Hobbes kültürünün değerlerini ve normlarını korumakta ısrar eden egemenler, dışarıda normlarla entegrasyonun gerçekleştirilme çabasında olurken, içerde ise engellemelerle karşı karşıyadır. Küreselleşme ile ekonomik altyapının karşılıklı bağımlılığı dış politika ilişkilerinde ülke çıkarlarına ters düşmekte ve ikilem oluşturabilmektedir. Ülkelerin karşılıklı bağımlılığı göz önünde bulundurarak kendi ulus kimliğini üstte tutması ve uluslararası kuruluşlarla iş birliği yapmasının mümkün olmadığını söylemesi küreselleşme adına bir paradoks oluşturacaktır. Bu noktada çatışma kuramları devreye girmekte, dış politikada 'Lock'çu faiz oluşumundaki sorunların altında yatan neden, 'Hobbes'çu kültürünün iç politikada kutuplaştırıcı hakimiyetidir.

Bu karşılıklı bağımlılıkların ve paradoksun analizini bu makale içerisinde inceleyeceğiz. Burada devlet ve kimlik olgusu bağımlı değişkenler olurken, etkileşim (sosyalleşme) ise bağımsız değişken olacaktır. Teorik olarak, Alexander Wendt'in teorik davranışını ele aldığımız çalışma, kimlik ilişkileri ve yaklaşımlarının güçlü bir argüman olduğunu; Devletlerin eylemlerini gerçekleştirirken kimlikleriyle tanımlanan bazı grupların çıkarlarına göre işleri organize ettiğinden bahsedeceğiz. Küresel güçlerin ekonomi üzerinde söz sahibi olduğu süreçte kimlik olgusunun önemi ve uluslararası kuruluşlara sahip olmayan güçlerin hiçbir zaman tam anlamı ile ekonomik hegemon ölçüsüne sahip olamayacağı tezini savunarak sonuca varmaya çalışacağız. **Keywords:** Keyword 1, keyword 2, keyword 3 (keywords should not exceed 3- 5 words)

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Ekonomi, Ekonomik Bağımlılık, Kimlik, Lockean Uygulaması, Hobbes Düşüncesi

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## INTRODUCTION

In accordance with the deductive reasoning of the social sciences while conducting theoretical and methodological framework in epistemological approach, the article formulated its discussion with the purpose of making original contribution in the literature of IR theory by starting with Wendtian approach of systemic constructivism.

The article has no objective of engaging in either theoretical discussions or historical descriptive study. Analyzing Wendt's constructivism word by word is stemming from the concern of constraining the subject of the article within the limitations of systemic constructivism, and from that of not transcending beyond the theoretical boundary of the Wendtian constructivism even though no single theory is strong enough to account for a political phenomenon whether domestic or international.

The primary concern in this paper is to figure out why sovereign states has been constantly failing to develop corporate identity<sup>1</sup>, and still struggling for the sake of establishing Kantian type of international system. Why do states fail to transform Lockean culture of anarchy into Kantian type of culture in international relations? Wendt comes to the conclusion that without reciprocal interaction over time, there will be a lack of positive cognitive identification. However, the core point of the article is to analyze the accommodation problem between Hobbesian identity formulation in domestic politics and Lockean interest formulations of actors in their foreign policy matters. Paving the way to Kantian type of identity is not possible due to the great illusion of "Lockean practice in Hobbesian mind".

Wendt implying Hobbesian culture as the reason for conflictual anarchy put forward his conviction that states are considered as the sole autonomy to deal with the collective related behavior (action) by force in domestic politics while socializing citizens with the defined-by-state common goods, but for international matters, states, due to the non-existence of world government, can not follow the same means proceeded in domestic politics in anarchic system (Wendt, 1994: 384).

As discerned from the quotations of his article, Wendt provides his rival approach against the "Hobbesian culture of anarchy" in which interests and identities are given (exogenous) in a self-help world. If the Wendtian systemic constructivism is applied on domestic politics of the Hobbesian cultures of the states, nation-state sovereigns will find themselves in confrontation with heresy from sub-nations while sovereigns have already entangled with the intricate problem of identity formulation within the Westphalian type of borders. Thus, pressure on territorial integrity has been the challenge from a culturally diverse society who has been experiencing an integration problem with the state-identity (corporate identity).

Namely, creating centralized and homogenous nation-state which was put into practice in top-down fashion should be described as the nature of the Hobbesian culture. Furthermore, in the context of problem-solving theories, in the foreign relations between states, enmity is the common representation of the subject position of the Others by any sovereign state (Self). In return, the Others, in accordance with the Wendt's "mirror theory", do recognize neither the autonomy of the Self nor its territorial integrity. None of them see any constraint on their behavior to activate violence at the expense of each other (Wendt, 1999: 260).

For Wendt, the possibility of such a situation always exists even in domestic political matters, or civil society. He propounds that constantly developing such worst-case scenarios will make it impossible for society, whether domestic or international, to come into existence in a sustainable regard. Decisions made according to probabilities are produced by socialization (socialization) between sovereigns (Wendt, 1992: 404). Sovereignty without the Other is not to be a rational expectation. More specifically, identities, and even interests, are all relational and mutually constituted (Wendt, 1992: 412).

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<sup>1</sup> For further analysis, John Hewitt, *Dilemmas of the American Self* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989); John Greenwood, "A Sense of Identity: Prolegomena to a Social Theory of Personal Identity," *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior* 24 (1991): 25-46; Michael Schwalbe, "The Autogenesis of the Self," *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior* 21 (1991): 269-295.

The concept “self-determination” since the Wilson principles of 1919 created heavy burden on the shoulders of sovereigns since the Westphalian type of borders drawn by disregarding ethnicity. Such discrepancy which eventually gave birth to a variety of ethnic conflicts was profoundly discussed by Samuel Huntington in his seminal study “Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington, 1993: 72). The resolution of conflict for Wendt lies in the output of interaction by which sovereigns will begin to revise their definition of survival traditionally based on the concern about territorial integrity. Practices by any Sovereign will eventually change the traditional understanding about power and security.

The survival will not be conceptualized eventually by sovereign actors as the protection of territorial integrity. To support such a claim, he exemplifies his theory by the former Soviet Union which gave up some parts of its land, and by the former Yugoslavia as well- out of its dissolution Croatia and Slovenia obtained their independence (Wendt, 1992: 414).

Bargaining on territory is not as easy as what it seems considering Turkey, Israel or any non-western states. Furthermore, in the circle of mutual respect to each other’s autonomy for executing their legitimacy within the borders, sovereigns have been challenged by international terrorism which became such a strong driving force for sovereigns to act in collaboration under international institutions. However, another conflict arose out of the discussions on the permanent membership and its veto power in the Security Council of the United Nations in the context of reciprocity.<sup>2</sup> “The inference obtained from the Wendtian systemic constructivism based on the hypothetical assumption is that sovereigns who are obsessed by worst-case scenario inescapably pass through an order problem, apart from leading to another inescapable order problem of security dilemma rooted in static identity formation” (Herz, 1950: 157).

While becoming a member of international community on the one side, and insisting on preserving values and norms of Hobbesian culture on the other side, sovereigns face an intricate dilemma from within domestic inhibitions in conducting integration with the norms from outside. Dichotomy in interest formation with respect to foreign policy relations with the others reveals the fact that no mature international collective identity is possible since there already exists a serious problem, or paradox, in identity formulation from within, considering the complex interdependence feature of globalization and sub-nation identity in contradiction with state identity within the Westphalian territory. The underlying cause of problems in Lockean interest formation in foreign policy is the polarizing domination of Hobbesian culture in domestic politics. Holding constant the unit of analysis as state, interest and identity are the dependable variables, the interaction (socialization) is independent variable in this article. Theoretically, such a strong argument based upon Wendt’s approach to the relations of behavior, interest and identity in respective; States organize their actions by some interests defined by their identity. No roles, or any failure in conceptualizing their role identity, may well result in both relatively challenging situations for states while defining any political matter in the context of interest and confusion in their corporate identity formation in return.

## 1. Identity Approach and Relations Of States

Wendt describes himself as statist just to make his own emphasize stand as a counter-argument that even in realist world, interaction will prove no logical, or causal power of anarchy, and, in addition, interest and identity are ontological assumptions rooted in the realist thought of material distribution of power, and mistakenly nothing else matters for problem-solving theories if the matter is about the self and interest. His groundbreaking contribution into IR theory should not be underestimated, having especially read in detail his novel article published in 1992. Wendt claims that knowledge in theoretical sense is made of by interaction which in turn transform the knowledge over time. In response to neorealists claim that anarchy has a behavioral constraining power over state action, identity and interests, which are in interaction redefined and transformed, are the true structures of international life. This structure is subject to change by intersubjective meanings which exists over time in practice even if the density of

<sup>2</sup> For details see Kugel, A. (2009), “Reform of the Security Council: A New Approach, Friedrich Ebert Shifting, Brief Paper number, 12.

the process and what states do are roughly important requirements for such transformations of the international structure (Wendt, 1992: 424).

Friedrich Kratochwill and John Ruggie make their original contribution into the same point that "its (read realists) individualist ontology directly contradicted the intersubjectivist epistemology necessary for regime theory to realize its full promise" (Kratochwill and Ruggie 1986: 753). Theoretically, such an argument based upon Wendt's approach toward the relations of behavior, interest and identity in respective; Interest as a motivating force for state action lies in the roots of state identity (Wendt, 1999: 234).

For Wendt the source of identity formation is the process, by which sovereigns will develop collective meaning for sustainable reciprocal recognition. By achieving mutually constitutive meaning, which is simply called intersubjective meaning, actors over time begin to redefine their conceptualizations for identity and interest. Thus, interaction is the independent variable while identity and interest are dependent variable. Hobbesian Leviathan was born due to concern about the absence of world government. Due to the domestic considerations primarily with domestic order, each state reserves the right and force within its borders. Interaction and practices not just determine the character of anarchy, but also the nature of sovereigns. In theoretical collaboration with Wendtian systemic theory, not just the distribution of power, but also distribution of knowledge plays important role in understanding state behavior in general.<sup>3</sup> Thus, anarchy can be either consensual or conflictual as described by Wendt that anarchy is made of by states themselves (Wendt, 1992: 395). The main principle of constructivism thus should be based upon the premise that "people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them"<sup>4</sup> (Went, 1992: 396-7).

## 2. Sovereign States and Other Nations

The motivating imperatives behind the Hobbesian culture, by which sovereign states constitute the identity of self in a selfish manner, and ultimately constructing an enemy as the other, were clearly analyzed by George Mead. He claims that the existence of state identity deeply depends on the existence of an "enemy other". The Self encourages the so-called the Other to absorb the Self-imposed idea of the "enemy identity" to achieve its solidarity within its border. He gives as an example of the Cold War relations between the U.S.A. and the former Soviet Union to let us figure out how the Self, and in turn the Other, position each other as enemy while conducting their interests and (role and corporate) identities (Mead, 1934: 154-156).

Hitler's Nazi Germany as an appropriate state formation of bloody fascism founded its state autonomy in the context of Arian race without granting no living space for the rest (read sub-nations) living on in Germany. Its propaganda machine was revolving around the ideology of "stabbed in the back" by putting an unfair blame solely on the Jews. The inevitable consequence was under the title of the "final solution" massacring particularly European Jews in the extermination camps. Such an unforgettable anti-Semitic policy was remembered in disgrace in the human history as the "Holocaust" (genocide) in which millions of innocent Jews were exterminated, and this vast bloodshed, to be regarded without question as a shameful and humiliating violence, can never be washed out from the memory of either the European history or world history.

David Campbell made his contribution in similar theoretical approach. He put forward that domestic solidarity for the Self necessitates defining the Other as enemy to satisfy its national interest, especially if the matter is security (Campbell, 1998: 28).

Jonathan Mercer brought forward a similar argument into the IR literature. For him, enemy formation does always exist within a Hobbesian world. With open heart, he underlines in his

<sup>3</sup> See, The phrase "distribution of knowledge" is Barry Barnes's, as discussed in his work *The Nature of Power* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988); see also Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York: Anchor Books, 1966).

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Herbert Blumer, "The Methodological Position of Symbolic Interactionism," in his *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 2.

approach by presenting the example that the U.S. invents and overstates threats to construct an “us” against “them” (Mercer, 1995: 229-252).

Wendt takes a step more forward by an argument that internal dissent is mostly diverted by particularly subordinate states by means of engaging on purpose in external conflicts<sup>5</sup> (Wendt, 1999: 275). The U.S.A., as the “Self-hegemon”, wanted to reconsolidate its damaged role identity for the sake of establishing a strong corporate identity after the Cold War when the communist threat was eradicated from the scene.

The actual problem is that U.S.A., particularly, with the arise of China as a challenge, and its hegemony that began to decay, and in order to realize the resurgence of its popularity in and outside its border, especially to compensate its domestic order, it embarked on offensive trans-border military strategy as of September 11. The post-Cold war mission of the Self-hegemon has been summoned up for putting an end and destroying completely the so-called Islamic terrorism. The motto by the Trump administration that is to “make America great again” is actually for in-group solidarity.

By discourse analysis, current researchers can notice, for instance, that Turkey has been constantly criticizing the United States for financing illegal Kurdish military activities in the north of Syria and Iraq, as discussed by considerable numbers of intellectuals, in terms of proxy wars. From the standpoint of Turkey, Turkey has been claiming on and on legitimate right to suppress all such kind of illegal activities which has been regarded as a threat to its territorial integrity.

Considering the death toll of Turkey for forty years in its struggle against terrorism, Turkey managed to consolidate its in-group solidarity by means of its policy completely designed against any separatist movements. We recommend a deep investigation of so far casted votes of Turkish citizens in times of intense fight against terrorism. Nevertheless, the application of Wendt’s approach that subordinate states divert their domestic conflicts by engaging in external aggression will be either overgeneralization or underestimation, if we make a claim that the current economic stagnation put pressure on the AK Party and the ruling power wanted to divert this domestic dissent by creating enemy for the sake of consolidating its power and reasserting the corporate identity of Turkey at the expense of its neighbors.

By the same token, Wendt put forward his sui generis proposal with regards to order problem of Hobbesian cultures. Just for consolidating the self-esteem, states do mobilize (in/out) group solidarity even by disregarding the highly possible case of attributional error”. Through collective self-esteem, by which states constitute each other in the context of the motto of “one for all and all for one”, the concept “enmity” will be evaluated only as a value in itself.

Thus, the attributional error” will be minimized to a significant extent (Wendt, 1999: 276). Wendt’s main purpose is to block at the state system the emergence of the so-called “attributional error”. Due to the attributional error and ordering problem of realism, Wendt blames, in particular, realists for becoming self-fulfilling prophecy. Competitive power politics inevitably results in “order problem” since realists insist on the idea that interests and identities are natural (given) in anarchy. For them, in anarchy there exists a self-help system which produces only two kinds of order; the Balance of power order and hegemonic order. In this self-help system, states in fear of cheating without doubt obsessed by the (relative) gain of the Other. For Wendt, even in such political system, competitive identities and interests are directly subject to intersubjective understanding between states. By the same token, he states that such identity-interest formation is the output of interaction in between them (Ashley, 1992: 81).

On this approach, he produced a new terminology in IR theory; “Conceptions of self and interest tend to “mirror” the practices of significant others over time” (Wendt, 1992: 404). In his critical response to neorealist, he underlines the word “reciprocity” in interaction, which provides states

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<sup>5</sup> See.. Jack Levy, “A Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique,” in Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 259-288; John A. Tures, “Rattling the Hesperian: International Distractions from Internal Problems in Iran,” *Asian Politics and Policy* 1, no. 1 (2009): 50-78.



mutual recognition necessary to legitimize their autonomy in either domestic realm or international relations in particular (Wendt, 1992: 406). Jeff Coulter broadens the circle of the subject discussion by a claim that intersubjective meaning is neither subjective nor objective, but a situation mutually organized by sovereign actors each of whom gets engaged in social interactions and contributes to the re-adjustment of the configurations of the institutions (Coulter, 1982: 42-43).

In addition to constituting a state identity encouraging the other to develop the “enemy other” and “in-group solidarity”, in the Hobbesian culture legitimizing its national interest by the third mechanism for interest formulation, we observe the “Projective identification”. Wendt elaborates on this concept in a simple way. Since sovereigns in anarchy suffer from their unconscious destructive utopias with the dream of achieving their hegemonic ambitions unilaterally and in arbitrary manner, they unfairly attribute all such thoughts to the Other. If such projections are responded by the Other in return, then the Other would contribute to the projective identification of the Self and commence to perform action in similar manner. Thus, the Other will take an action to meet the needs of the aggressive national interest of the Self whose primary objective is to destroy the Other (Wendt, 1999: 276-77).

Actually, it will be rational to revise Wendt’s statement in such a way that, eventually, the Other will be obliged to take active measures to protect itself against the actual threat of the Self. In retrospect, the Self can be confronted with “chimerical enemy image” if the Other denies cooperation with the Self to satisfy its projective identification. Turkey, as of its early membership of NATO till the first decade of 21<sup>st</sup> century, in accordance with the changing conjuncture in global and regional politics, since it experienced great disappointment by Johnson letter, began to question periodically its role in NATO established at early stage for containment policy against the former Soviet Union. It was not until 2007-9, Turkey transformed its so-called reactive foreign policy into the pro-active policy even though it was criticized whether there occurred a shift of axis in Turkish foreign policy. However, without getting involved in ongoing discussion in IR literature, the point is that Turkey through proactive independent and assertive foreign policy began to develop its own national interest in foreign policy to criticize the USA’s projective identification. For instance, when Turkey became the non-permanent member of the UNSC, it stood still, by its formal declarations, against the USA imposed sanctions on Iran because of the nuclear weapon proliferation in 2009.<sup>6</sup>

### 3. National Interests and Mutual Investments

Three categories of national interest were explicated by both Alexander George and Robert Keohane in the context of life, liberty, and property; territorial integrity (*lebensraum*), autonomy, economic well-being in association with type, role and corporate identities of the sovereign units (Wendt, 1999: 234). He goes further in his explanation that “in the long run a failure to bring subjective interests into line with objective ones will in the end lead to an actor’s demise” (Ibid). Wendt developed fourth national interest called collective self-esteem out of the economic well-being that is succeeded by “maintenance of the mode of production in a society and, by extension, the state’s resource base” (Ibid, 236).

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<sup>6</sup> See: For further reading, Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 10, No. 1, (2008), pp. 77-96. Ahmet Sözen “A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges” *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, (March 2010), pp. 103–123. Alexander Murinson, “The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Middle Eastern Studies* (November 2006), 945-964 Ziya Onis “Multiple Faces of the “New” Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and Critique” *GLODEM Working Paper Series* (2010). Sabri Sayarı, (2013) “New Directions in Turkey–USA Relations” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 15:2, 129–142. Şaban Kardaş (2011) “Turkish-American Relations in the 2000s: Revisiting the Basic Parameters of Partnership?” *Perceptions*, 16:3, 25-52. Mustafa Aydın (2004) “Foucault’s Pendulum: Turkey in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” *Turkish Studies*, 5:2, 1-22. Şener Aktürk, “Turkish-Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992-2002), *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 7, No: 3, (2006), pp. 337-364. Calabrese, John. 1998. “Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship.” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 25 (1): 75–94; Keyman, E. Fuat, and Onur Sazak. 2015. “Turkey and Iran: The Two Modes of Engagement in the Middle East.” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 17 (3): 321–36. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, and Süleyman Elik. 2011. “Turkey’s Growing Relations with Iran and Arab Middle East.” *Turkish Studies* 12 (4): 643–62.

Collective self-esteem based on the relations with the Other. States (hereby refers to the Self-Hegemon) are in need of recognition of their sovereign status by the other for sustainability of its national interest within the objective of obtaining the approach of the other that the Self perceives itself (Ibid, 336-37). Perceived disrespect may well prompt the Self to take on aggressive attitude to the Other in the context of negative self-esteem. Getting access to the subject position of the Other that the Self sees itself, even making soft/hard adjustments on it from within and from without at the expense of the Other, is simply the product of the hegemonic ambitions of the Self.

Identity is assumed by Wendt as a structural property of actors (states). In Hobbesian culture, the subject position (read the representation of the Other by the Self in general) is the enemy while in Lockean culture it is rival, and in Kantian culture the subject position is friend. Such revolutionary conceptualizations of culture of anarchy were made by Wendt himself on the basis of philosophical premises to be categorized as Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian in respective. Subject positions and structural property of actors, even the anarchy as well, are all made of by states themselves in interaction over time.

Thus, Wendt presents his hypothetical assumption that by means of taking actively part in collective understanding, states (the Others) get a variety of identities and expectations about the Self. Identities as the foundation of the interests are relation-related concepts emerging out of socialization among the Self and the Other. Thus, not just identities, but interests are not independent of social factors (1992; 397-98). As can be seen, Wendt here presents his rival ontological approach against the problem-solving theories. Sheldon Stryker shares the common approach by penning that for construction and reconstruction of the Self and social relationships, the process is an important means (Wendt, 1987: 289).

He classifies three distinct security systems in anarchy: competitive security systems in which realism is an appropriate approach to describe how states behave in anarchic system. While classical realists attribute the anarchic nature of the international system to the unit level actors which are inherently aggressive and constantly seeking to maximize their power, Neorealists attribute the state behavior to the causal power of anarchy.<sup>7</sup> In collective security system, states as a primary actor are not concerned deeply about the relative power position of the Other (Jervis, 1988: 45). But regards identity and interest as exogenously given. Alliances are possible, but from neorealist side of rationalism, only limited learning is possible due to the possibility of ad hoc type of alliance for states, while neoliberals engage in thought of possibility for transformation of state behavior by means of transnational institutions. Wendt providing us a unique lens to look beyond the behaviors makes elaborations on problem-solving theories that if states fail to live up to the expectations in a self-help world, they will be forced and driven out from the system without doubt<sup>8</sup>; "only simple learning or behavioral adaptation is possible" (1992; 392). Simple learning is due to the parameters of the anarchic system for both neorealists and even neoliberals. Kenneth Waltz goes further by indicating that states are functionally the same, and their primary objective is to maintain their position to survive as an ultimate end.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> For more details see, Kenneth N. Waltz International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2. (Autumn, 1993), pp. 44-79; Kenneth Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics," in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, pp. 322-45.

<sup>8</sup> For different approaches see, Philip Tetlock, "Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy," in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, eds., Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 24-27. About the difference between behavioral and cognitive learning, see ibid., pp. 20-61; Joseph Nye, "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 371-402; and Ernst Haas, When Knowledge Is Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 17-49.

<sup>9</sup> There occurred a very deep discussion between Waltz and Mearsheimer about state behavior. Mearsheimer also assumes that power is the means in oppose to the classical realists who regards power as the end for inherently aggressive sovereigns. The discussion stemmed from the question of how much power is needed. Mearsheimer claimed that sovereigns must maximize their power as much as possible, if possible, in bipolar system. He defends that it is regional hegemony never permitting peer competitors. However, Waltz opposed such an idea due to the possibility of security dilemma. For further reading about offensive neorealism, Mearsheimer, John. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: WW Norton and Company; Mearsheimer, John. 2006. "Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I)". *International Relations* 20(1): 105-23; Mearsheimer, John. 2010. "Structural Realism". *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity 2nd Edition*, edited by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, 77-94. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Mearsheimer, John. 2011. "Imperial by Design". *Foreign Affairs* 70(111): 16-34.

Rather than contributing to the ongoing discussions on whether anarchy has a causal power in determining state behavior, the objective of the article is to present a hypothetical assumption that cognitive dissonance in defining identity in domestic politics will result in confusion in foreign policy interest. Thus, misperceived orientation of subject position in foreign policy is due to confusions in corporate identity, or absent role identity, in domestic politics. Making up for absence or confusions through designing the “enemy other” or the “projective identifications” are some of the means to achieve domestic solidarity. One additional note necessary to be taken into account how Wendt was mistaken if we consider his hypothetical sentence that “If collective security identity is high[...] any member of the collective...will come to the victim's defense[...] even if the predator is not presently a threat” (Wendt, 1992: 408). Take as an instance the UK's splendid isolationist stance in international relations together with the Palmerston's thought on national interest of the U.K. that there is no permanent enemy or eternal friend, but only permanent national interest of the United Kingdom (Kissinger, 1994: 96). UK never activated her military force in case of potential forces, but rather waited for its transformation into actual power. Palmerston constantly repeated that England, whose long-term interest is firstly not to permit the emergence of a hegemon in the continental Europe and secondly preserving under its domination of the far-east Asia, North and South African lands for raw materials for the maintenance of the modes of its production, would never get itself entangled with any political disputes “with reference to cases which have not actually arisen... because England stood to lose more than it could gain from alliance” (Kissinger 1992: 97).

The term aloofness of the England from world politics differ from that of the United States of America; while U.S. insisted on its democratic values as the guiding principle of the world politics, U.K. has no such foreign policy objective whatsoever (1992: 101). Gramscian approach or Robert Cox's new Gramscian approach may well account for the social construction and conceptualization of hegemony if quotations are to be analyzed, but the objective of the article is not solely about hegemony, or a cultural hegemon, but primarily the identity and interest formation for states who, living on in a great illusion, want to keep their Hobbesian culture while conducting strategy in the context of Lockean culture in their foreign policy relations.

#### 4. Transnational Institutions, Dependence and Sustainability

What should be paid attention is that the United States of America, through transnational institution, has engaged in the primary objective that is to reach Kantian type of culture in international system with her own norms and values as indicated by Wilson's principles. The source of fear for subordinate states, or developing countries, in terms of foreign policy relations is the unreliability of alliance system for the potential threat which can anytime turn out to be actual threat, and eventually subordinate state trusting collective alliance may well be caught unprepared.

The fear in anarchy is precisely elaborated by Glenn H. Snyder whose actual purpose was to unfold the actual reason of security dilemma; “uncertainty about others' intentions urges sovereign actors to take, mostly mistakenly, some kinds of top-priority protective measures that may well seem to be threatening to others” (Snyder, 2011: 155). In Corporate (Kantian) security system, according to Wendt, as the fourth national interest, collective self-esteem rooted in collective identity is a now-or-never condition for states to realize a “single” identity by which the Self begins to define the national interest of the Other as part of its identity, and exhibits altruistic behavior (Wendt, 1999: 229). In support of this conviction, Wendt articulates that society is not possible to achieve sustainable order by the parameters of the worst-case scenario. Instead, decisions in foreign policy should be declared on the basis of probabilities produced by interaction. “What states do” carries crucial importance to achieve collective identity (Wendt, 1992: 404).



Covert operations of the C.I.A. (Central Intelligence Agency of the U.S.A.) which were clearly penned by Stephen E. Ambrose<sup>10</sup> were mentioned in none of his articles. However, Wendt defines some interests rooted in identity in reference to some prominent IR theories like projective interests. Through covert operations previously, and at last stage by direct offensive military operation, the U.S.A. military intervention in Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein, without waiting for the final decision of the UNSC (Security Council of the United Nations), under the pretext of preemptive threat, proved eventually that U.S.A.'s Lockean foreign policy has been built upon Hobbesian culture against those states who are in conflict with the values of the Self-Hegemon (read the U.S.A.).

In accordance with theoretical words of Wendt, the U.S.A. projected its self-hatred onto an "Other" even without concern about international legitimacy. Wendt perfectly defines the source of legitimacy as having respectful attitude toward the territorial rights and integrity of other sovereigns; "a mutual recognition of one another's right to exercise exclusive political authority within territorial limits (Wendt, 1992: 412).

For Wendt, enduring social structures is possible only through reciprocal interaction, by which the identity and interest formation will give no living space for any attributional error (1992: 406). The constraint is to be placed on the collective self-esteem, which is to be based on the reciprocal relations with the other. The fourth national interest, as mentioned previously, called as the collective self-esteem, emerges out of the economic well-being that is succeeded by sustainable mode of production and resource base of the Self and the Other (1999: 236).

More in detail, Wendt, out of his observations in global politics, determined a puzzle as a constraint on the Lockean Cultures who enjoy prosperity in material capacity and capability. It is actually the Self enjoying prosperity and preponderance on the means of production and having problems with adjusting itself according to the learning of the collective recognition via institutions if compared with that of the Others who have no such material capacity and capability (1992: 415).

One may come to a conclusive statement for conflict resolution of such puzzle by a conviction that dynamic density may overcome constraints on the learning in Wendtian way. However, Wendt himself suggests that there occurs vulnerability in interdependence constructed by intensity in relations; "growing dynamic densi. not ensure joint gains; interdependence if exploited become a source of conflict rather than cooperation" (Ibid, 416).

In connection with this discussion, there emerges another cornerstone creating a profound divergence between rationalist and reflectivist (labelled by Robert Keohane<sup>11</sup>); Order problem of problem-solving theorists, whose ontological assumptions regard anarchy as ordering principle, is constrained within their behavioral explanations, while the cooperation problem in collective (or Lockean) cultures was stemming from cognitive factors. Not the output (behavior), but rather utilities (preferences) matter for systemic constructivists. They insist that expectations about the behavior can only be figured out by concentration on interest and identity formation, and identity and interest are socially constructed institutions. If there is a self-help system, this is due to what states has been doing. Nothing is given (by nature), but endogenously inherent in relations for systemic constructivists.<sup>12</sup>

The question should be that which matter is significant to an important extent; sharing common values (e.g. democracy, free market economy), or not to be in conflict with the interest or role identity of the Self for the Other? In searching for a rational answer, the concern should be, for instance, U.S.A. Foreign relations with undemocratic states like Saudi Arabia. Kissinger is also mistaken that U.S.A.'s aloofness is different from that of U.K. They are similar in kind since the

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<sup>10</sup> For further reading, Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism American Foreign Policy Since 1938*, Penguin Books, 2011

<sup>11</sup> For more reading in detail, Robert Keohane, "Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics," in his collection of essays entitled *International Institutions and State Power* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 1-20.

<sup>12</sup> Wendt perfectly elaborates on his intersubjectivist epistemological approach under the title of his groundbreaking article; "the meaning of anarchy at the international level... depend... upon the perceptions they hold of one another. US military buildup in the Middle East... conveys different meanings to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran" (1992)

priority for U.S.A. is not democratic values, but first and foremost condition to conduct relations between Self and the Other is the compatibility of interests in between both.

Let us ask then whether the undemocratic type identity of Venezuela is the reason for the indirect intervention by the U.S.A. to destroy the ruling power? From the standpoint of the subordinate Other, there is a multi-dimensional pressure upon it; The Self-Hegemony and the sub-nations of the Other. Attempts by the Other to break the block of the “in/out-pressure” will be confronted with inescapable no way out as long as the members of the international community save themselves from the Lockean practice designed in Hobbesian mind. Reciprocity can only be achieved if institutions take on autonomous character, which favors no single identity and interest. More specifically, contemporary institutions and their decision-makers should not proceed any policy at the expense of the Others who are actually more capable to absorb collective identity and interest in relative to the Self.

My primary objective is actually to drive the attentions of readers to the point which was bracketed by Wendt, which is the domestic factor(s); “domestic or genetic factors... I bracketed...are important determinants of states' identities and interests than are systemic factor” (1992: 423).

Diplomacy is the seminal study of Dr. Henry Kissinger who is the most prominent intellectual, not just for American foreign policy, but also in world politics. Primary references are taken from his groundbreaking book called “Diplomacy” published in 1994 when the international structure was at the brink of great transformation with the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Kissinger provides us a sui generis approach in theoretical conjunction with the purpose of this article. Kissinger claims that the fundamental reason for the non-existence of well-structured foreign policy of Germany obsessed by pure power-oriented realpolitik is the lack of intellectual roots. Germany has an excuse for such bellicose rhetoric, according to Kissinger, since all wars passed on the German lands, and with this memory of history German statesmen did not want to experience such unpleasant catastrophic events once again. Unfortunately, such political conviction “produced a deep-seated sense of insecurity in the German people... readying themselves for worst-case scenario” (1994: 169-170).

There is an ongoing discussion about the appeasement policy of the United Kingdom, but Kissinger almost perfectly penned a prescription to figure out the source of the inter-war conflict between 1919 and 1939. Kissinger put forward another approach; “...rather than as an expression of popular will, its legitimacy derived from (Prussia’s) power, not from the principle of national self-determination” (Ibid, 133). He, furthermore, makes additions that “Bismarck... abandoned legitimacy as the guiding principle of the international order” (Ibid, 117).

Also, he states that “self-fulfilling prophecy became a dominant part of the international anarchic system” as repeated in following pages of “*Diplomacy*” that Germany made her worst-case scenario a reality (Ibid, 138). What makes his analytical approach sui generis with regards to the affairs of the then political affairs of the Continental Europe is his theoretical formulation of the challenge during the Congress system of the nineteenth century; Power without legitimacy will eventually cause to complex conflict, and if a vice versa matters, then no sustainable security and peace will be possible according to Kissinger. The balance in between both, power and legitimacy, was both the challenge and achievement of the Congress system called the “long peace” in IR literature (Ibid, 77).

Kissinger demonstrates practical consequences of Hobbesian culture by presenting us the source of it. Once intersubjective meanings of interest and identity are institutionalized, practice, or interaction, does not guarantee change. Wendt provides us a theoretical elaboration that once identity gets institutionalized “practices and information that challenge it are likely to create cognitive dissonance” about the perception of threat (1992: 412).

Regarding the Holocaust -Genocide of the European Jews by the Nazi Germany- during the Second World War and bankruptcy of U.K.’s appeasement policy, Wendt should be regarded as an illusionary optimist even while taking his reference from the past. The subject position of the Other by the Self may well stem from the past experience- being victimized in the past. However, for Wendt, it “***might be transformed by future social interaction in the form of appeasement,***

*reassurances” (1992; 409).* However, his confusing assertion that even Hobbesian cultural identity is socially constructed phenomena, and what is to be underlined is that once meaning, no matter intersubjective or subjective, became norm, or institutionalized, actors will resist its transformation. Density and frequency of socialization (interaction over time) and dissatisfaction with the system are assumed by Wendt as a significant prerequisite for change in meanings. Again, Wendt says that the process is slower than supposed, even harder once institutionalized. Even though he inserted in his article as the sample case Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” for the conviction that conscious transformation of intersubjective meaning is possible, he drops an additional footnote; **“Learning to cooperate may change those parameters, but this occurs as an unintended consequence...to transcend existing institutions” (1992: 418).** To sum up, institutionalized meanings in domestic realm may well obstruct sovereigns to organize sustainable collective type identity in international relations. Non-efficiency of collective type identity of the international organizations & institutions is due to the impact of the Hobbesian cultures of the Self and the Other. The dichotomy in interest formation in global politics in general, and in the Self and the Other in specific, actually rooted in the polarizing domination of the Hobbesian culture on domestic corporate identity of each members of the international community.

Previously in the article, I mentioned that in case of absent interest rooted in identity there may well occur identity confusion. John Ikenberry questions whether NATO will keep surviving when the former Soviet Union collapsed.<sup>13</sup> Wendt makes contradictory claims to some extent that disappearance of threat for identifying security with one another will not push sovereigns to turn back to the previous insecure order<sup>14</sup> since **“collective identities became embedded”** in Europe (1992: 418). However, Wendt exhibits cautious attitude by underlying the point that any ambivalence in role-specific interest to identify threat may lead to identity confusion which is necessary to achieve solidarity within borders as happened with end of Cold War after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union in the last decade of the twentieth century (Ibid, 397-98).

Let us get entangled more with the analysis of the source of Hobbesian cultures by taking reference of Wendtian approach; **“...not to mean... never treat either identities or interests as exogenously given”** (1992: 423).

Wendt developed actually a rival approach by his claim that anarchy does not determine state behavior. Rather, we should focus on identity and interest formulation to figure out that anarchy is what states made of according to his systemic constructivism. However, he refrains from using absolute terms like never, and to some degree build a bridge between anarchy and institutions made of by states (Güçyetmez, 2007:78). Wendt claims that if the mutually constituted structure, no matter if it is domestic or international, changes relatively slow, then system turns out to be one based on de facto parameters. Under such condition, rationalist assumption that interests and identities are given would be appropriate (1992; 423). Again, everything depends on what states do. Even though he softens his intellectual stance, the focal point in systemic constructivism based on the conviction propounded particularly by Wendt himself that there is **“no logic of anarchy apart from the practices” (1992: 394-395).**

## 5. International Domination, Self and Other

Wendt makes an overestimation by putting landmark on the Westphalian system as the arise of the early collective system just on the basis of recognition that the Westphalian system provided “the live and let live logic of the Lockean anarchical society” by its replacement of “the kill or be killed logic of the Hobbesian state of nature” (1999: 279). In international relations theory, Westphalia system emerged at the end of the Thirty Years Wars (1618-1648) as the beginning of the modern-state system.

<sup>13</sup> For further reading, G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory*, Princeton University Press, 2019.

<sup>14</sup> On “embeddedness,” see John Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in a Postwar Economic Order,” in Krasner, *International Regimes*, pp. 195-23

However, the system until the Vienna System of 1815 was completely competitive, the dominant culture was Hobbesian during the pre-Vienna system. Kissinger says that if the stronger attempts to dominate, the weaker will resist in defensive manner through “*setting up wartime coalitions to increase their individual power*” (1994; 67). What changed since then? Is it the emergence of relatively more complex functions of the institutions? Kissinger perfectly presented perceptual paradox for contemporary political affairs in international arena; “Power... too difficult to make a rational assessment... the balance of power discourages and hinder the capacity to overthrow the international order; agreement on shared values holds back any desire to overthrow and discard the international order” (1992: 77).

Under such potential threat, states cannot make themselves free from the imperatives of Hobbesian Culture, no matter if self-help is socially constructed. It is somewhat ironic to make such a strong assumption that “balancing is not effect of anarchy... but that of mutual recognition of sovereignty” (1999: 28485). It may be true, but incomplete if we take warning by Machiavelli into consideration, mentioned by William Hale in his seminal study; “in chapter 21 of the Prince, Machiavelli warns the ruler of a small state not to forge an alliance with a more powerful state unless he is forced to do so, since he will end up being under the will and pleasure of his ally” ( Hale 2013: 2).

If self-help is to be regarded as an institution made of by sovereigns, nothing wrong to say anarchy provides enabling conditions for states to conduct their relations. Thus, we do not take anarchy as given, but as being created by interactions in between the Self and the Other. If institutions set up by intersubjective understanding shape in turn the identity and interests of the sovereigns, then again, nothing wrong to say that anarchy determines, not just the behavior, the identity and interest formation of the participants (the Self and the Other) over time.

Anarchy can be consensual or conflictual according to what states do. Once institutions are internalized, it will be a great challenge for sovereigns to take risk to transform the system. Even though the authors of this article are aware that this approach is in need for more elaborations to be sure, Wendtian approach is in need for more intellectual contributions as well. Moreover, uncertain intentions make states “black boxes”, let alone unbeatable worst-case scenario in anarchic international system as indicated constantly by John Mearsheimer.<sup>15</sup>

Thus, mutual recognition of sovereignty by itself does not guarantee any long-term reciprocal relations in international relations. This is an external constraint upon the actors in their any attempt to transform the Hobbesian culture. The internal constraint is from within if sub-nations are to be taken into account.

## CONCLUSION

In this article it is attempted to develop a tentative approach in association with the Self-other context of constructivism for the purpose of constructing a distinct foundation by which we can figure out the subject positions (role) and structural property (identity) of the Self and the other in interaction. These concepts are invented for the lack of reciprocity problem in Wendtian approach even though Wendt underlined in many cases the reciprocity, but disregarding the reality in contemporary world: The self of the Self; The Other of the Self; The Self of the Other; the other of the Other. Let us get into the details for conceptualization.

The self is the world hegemon, which was perfectly illustrated by Robert Cox in New Gramsci approach.<sup>16</sup> We'll discuss in the next article the construction of hegemony with the help of Coxian approach in detail together with Wendtian systemic constructivism to have a

<sup>15</sup> Also see, John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5–57; Glenn H. Snyder, *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer 2002), pp. 149–173; Eric J. Labs, “Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 1–49

<sup>16</sup> For details see, Cox, R. (1986) ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders’, in R. Keohane (ed.) *Neo-Realism and its Critics*. Columbia University Press, New York; Cox. R., (1987a) *Production, Power, and World Order*. Columbia University Press, New York; Cox. R.(1987b) ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations’, *Millennium* 12(2).



comprehensive understanding about the state identity and interest formation. Before passing to the following concepts, a brief account for the self of the Self will be beneficial for the readers. Again, the Self and the Other by capital letters briefly refer to state while the self and the other by small letters are to refer to citizens.

The Self is the hegemon, in which at first stage social and economic transformative revolution provides suitable conditions for the emergence of the new modes of production stimulating the rise of the new social actors in civil society. These new social actors (called bourgeoisies) began to make its own contribution to the state formation in terms of identity and interest. They do need a state particularly for the cross-border political, cultural and economic investments. The state turns out to be a national hegemon at first. Furthermore, due to scarcity of resources and overproduction (including surplus of income), and also for the security needed for the transportation of the surplus of the manufactured goods, the energy of the revolution at social level has the tendency to transcend beyond the national border. Here again, the social actors who actually began to have a voice in national state formation are in need of state to make their investment in foreign countries in secure. The second stage following the first one that is the national hegemony, is the international hegemony.

The Self now begins to export not just its industrial outputs, but also cultural norms and values into the developing or underdeveloped states. The United States of America together with its social actors, “the self (read social actors in U.S.A.) of the Self (The U.S.A.)”, in global politics became the dominant power by achieving the transportation of its values and norms into the subordinate states.

The Second concept is “the Other of the Self”. Alexander Wendt particularly developed his analysis by focusing on the interaction between the Self and the Other. Namely, our second preliminary conceptualization is actually the objective of the systemic constructivism. The Other is the subordinate states, which can be Hobbesian or Lockean in accordance with the Wendtian constructivism. The discussion hold by Wendt was to put satisfactory emphasize upon mutually constituted meanings which was hoped to be institutionalized over time by means of mutual (reciprocal) recognition between the Self and the Other.

Socialization is a prerequisite for Wendt to prevent attributional error between sovereigns, or in between the Self and the Other. However, due to material capability and capacity of the Self, in addition to institutional power and ideas of the Self, the Self may exhibit unilateral attitudes or arbitrary behavior in international relations. Wendt’s comment on the behavior of the Great Powers may well seem to be different, but he actually criticizes Great powers for not being responsive in their responsibility in collective security system. Being not responsive means they insist on not to change their subject position (role identity), and their collective learning is weaker relatively; “ironically, it is the great powers, the states with the greatest national means, that may have the hardest time learning this lesson; small powers do not have the luxury of relying on national means and may therefore learn faster that collective recognition is a cornerstone of security” (1992: 415).

The interest and identity formation of the Other is under the constant cultural, political and economic pressure of the Self as explicitly indicated by such motivational forces of the Hobbesian culture as projective identification, collective self-esteem identity, “enemy other”, in-group solidarity and so on. The Other may well question its and Self’s subject position to emphasize its own identity and interest as a revolt against the West.

The Self, who defines its identity and interest in parallel with that of the “original Self”, in the Self of the Other is to be regarded as an imitated version of the Self. The Other is the Other in the eyes of the Self, and ironically, the Other produces its Self to prove to the original Self that there exists no discrepancy between the original Self and the imitated Self. Problems in the second stage on the side of the Other in identity and interest formation turns out to be the early stage of alienation for the Other in the second stage. The Other is already under the internationalization of the Self. Wendt’s “mirror theory” is to show that the Other will react in response to what the Self do. To prevent misperception, both must get engage in interaction to produce intersubjective meanings. This is a great illusion in reality. Whoever begins to question the role

identity of the original “Self” will find itself under sanctions of, say, the United States of America. Evaluations in objective manner could be made that the Other behaves the same way with the original self to earn its sovereign status in peace eventually. Take Kurdish issue for instance. The claim that Kurds has been the only nation without a state is seen as a pretext by Turkey to break into pieces its territorial integrity. Iraqi people against Saddam’s dictatorship, or Libyan citizens against Gaddafi’s authoritarian regime revolted with the help of the Western Powers with the hope of achieving democracy in their countries. However, today, the Middle East is in the circle of fire. No sustainable order has been achieved since the Arab Spring. The situation in the Middle East has been getting worse and worse if compared with previous periods. Again, Machiavelli’s warning comes to mind; **“the ruler of a small state not to forge an alliance with a more powerful state unless he is forced to do so, since he will end up being under the will and pleasure of his ally”** (Hale 2013: 2).

The last stage is about internationalization of the Other with the other produced by the hands of the Other. The other of the Other refers to a case in which the latter Other behaving like the Self creates its own other (former) in its domestic and foreign affairs. Regional hegemonic ambitions of the mid-powers, which attempt to create its material capabilities and capacities, ideas, and institutions in top-down fashion, without achieving industrial transformative revolution in society as indicated by Coxian New Gramsci in the construction of hegemony, like “Big Brother” or “Neo Ottomanism”, ended each time in a great disappointment since the Other who attempt to create its other has no structural capability to define its identity and interest. Notwithstanding that these attempts are produced out of illusion, some non-Western states, like Turkey, even though not achieved mature collective identity among themselves against subjective interest of the West, have been trying to get “voice opportunity”. However, due to lack of mutually constitutive intersubjective meanings among the non-western states, each is obliged to behave with the norms of Hobbesian culture.

Unfortunately, in international relations for sustainable collective security there is no living space for the Lockean foreign policy in Hobbesian mind. No matter if Turkey shares common values with the Middle East in religious terms, or with the Central Asia in terms of ethnicity, Western methodology will be useless to build a bridge with the regions without developing original interest rooted in identity in domestic realm. Top-down fashion in creating actors with the financial power designed at the expense of sub-groups, which is completely in opposition with the motto of “unity in diversity”, will lead to attributional error in its relations with those sharing common history and culture. Coxian model cannot have explanatory power to account for the Ottoman-style hegemony since Western type of hegemony differs in nature. More specifically, the Western World never experienced any developing period, meaning their transformation was from underdeveloped to developed while the non-western world, at least some, managed to pass to the developing stage and still struggling to catch the West at the developed stage. Since 18th century, Ottoman State, and as of 1923, Turkey has been developing a variety of catch-up strategies to be recognized by the West. Considering the top-down intervention in non-Western world in hegemon formation, the dichotomy in Lockean interest formation in foreign policy is stemming from the polarizing domination of the Hobbesian understanding in the identity formation of the state.

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