

ONE BELT ONE ROAD: SHOULD NIGERIA SIEVE THE CHINESE BENEVOLENCE, OR ACCEPT IT AS A FREE LUNCH?

ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

R. A. Lukman QUADRI

National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies

Kuru near Jos, Plateau State. Nigeria

mvdwallay.quadri@gmail.com

ORCID: 0000-0002-1352-030X

Gönderim Tarihi: 06.05.2020 Kabul Tarihi: 30.05.2020

Alıntı: QUADRI, L. (2020). One Belt One Road: Should Nigeria Sieve the Chinese Benevolence, or Accept It as a Free Lunch. *AHBV Akdeniz Havzası ve Afrika Medeniyetleri Dergisi*, 2(1),43-77.

ABSTRACT: With the BRI according to its initiator 'China', claimed that it is a win-win deal. However, the findings of this scientific study brought to the fore that it is not a win-win but a visually and mentally appealing subterfuge, especially when viewed through a modernisation theoretical prism. The BRI occupied the warmest space in the heart of African leaders and the AU, as it is evident in the presence of the African Heads of State, and the core technocrats of the African Union (AU) in the third Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Central to the attendance of the African leaders at the summit is the unanimous conjecture, better said, hope that the OBOR would translate to economic prosperity and speedy infrastructural growth. In the view of the African leaders, the OBOR loan is a better alternative compared to the ones offered by the Western axis. However, it is a typology of loan that takes away the power of the sovereign to decide what the loan would be used for, and equally thickens the chain of dependency in multiple folds. It was discovered in this study that China stands to benefit from OBOR in five folds "returns on loan, patronage of Chinese companies (outbound investment), access to host nations natural resources, consumption of Nigeria's demographic dividend (young population), and winning of Nigeria's trust (geopolitical and geostrategic accomplishment)"; while Nigeria will simply enjoy some degree of infrastructure growth, and increased production of primary goods. This is an indication that OBOR will simply facilitate a dependent development (unsustainable development) that will enhance export capability of primary goods needed by China. This study adopted political theory of the first order which is knowledge required to perform practical political actions or used by a practicing politician in his or her political career. The political theory of the first order was used to dissect the strategic approach adopted by the colonial masters at the onset of their convergence with the precolonial African leaders. Consequently, political theory of the second order was adopted; this is the substantive domain of political science where political theories are used for the appraisal of cases. From the second order political theories structural realist and classical development theories were adopted for a scientific analysis of this discourse. Nevertheless, this study acknowledged the good intent of OBOR, therefore, highlighted its impressive advantages but did not exclude the need to include its possible disadvantages. The advantages of OBOR is premised around responding to the urgent infrastructure needs of Nigeria and its positive impacts on the economy. Conversely, the disadvantages are embedded in the feasibility of dependency, protracted loan servicing, inevitable asymmetric nature of the Sino-Nigeria relations, China's disregard to host nations labour law, total absence of transfer of knowledge and importation of materials that can easily be purchased from Nigeria local companies. Further- more, the study discovered that the OBOR approach, in a fundamental nous is not absolutely distinct from the approach of the colonial masters, in that, central to it was advancement of geopolitical and geostrategic aspirations. The colonial masters gave Africa dependent development that accelerated the exportation of raw materials needed in their continent. A painstaking observation of the type of infrastructure targeted by OBOR appeared to be synonymous to those targeted by the colonial masters prior to decolonisation. From this premise, it is prudent that Nigerian nay African leaders critically revise the terms and conditions of the OBOR agreement for the attainability of a true win-win deal. Furthermore, a multilateral as opposed to the unilateral approach to OBOR by the African states can possibly enhance the bargaining power of Africa in the context of OBOR. However, China is not culpable as a tactical and patriotic political player in international trade especially when viewed from a structural realist perspective. But the fact remains that China's trade approach with its partners is not linear, in that the aspect of China experienced by a partner, is highly dependent on the stance maintained by or conduct of the partner. The Western European axis are a potential trade partner to China, just how they are trade partner to Africa, but the conduct of China in Europe is highly acceptable compared to Africa.

Keywords: Dependent development; Silk Road, Outbound investment, Demographic dividend, Geostrategic, Geopolitical

Introduction

The One Belt One Road, Silk Economic Road Belt, Belt and Road Initiative" with the acronym OBOR, SERB, BRI are synonymous and used interchangeably. It is a development strategy designed by China to facilitate development in recipient countries, and acceleration of trade ties. However, the aim of China through its OBOR initiative might transcend trade and development in the recipient states of OBOR. However, this study will investigate whether it is a development strategy beneficial to China as the initiator and sponsor of the 21st century Silk Road.

In 2013, President Xi Jinping of China made it known to the world that their foreign policy 'OBOR' is designed to link China to different parts of the world. By supporting infrastructure projects through loans and promoting investment in OBOR countries (Silin, Kapustina, Trevisan, & Drevalev, 2017, p. 2; The Economist 2016, p. 3; Cai, 2017, p. 1; Sarker et al., 2018, p. 624). OBOR appears to be a cutting-edge

in international trade, to the recipient states, especially Nigeria and Africa. The African Union shared the same aspiration, and it is evident in the presence of the erstwhile African Union Chairperson Musa Faki in the FOCAC summit. The FOCAC summit 2016 titled 'China and Africa: Towards an Even Stronger Community with a Shared Future through Win-win Cooperation' saw the attendance of African heads of state and the core representatives from the AU (Anayagafu, 2018).

The ancient Silk Road appears to be a forebear to the much paraded BRI initiative spearheaded by President Xi Jinping. Silin et al (2017, p. 2) explicated in detail that "the eastern part of the ancient Silk Road was popularly used by emperor Qin Shi Huangdi as far back 211 BC. The Silk Road had unified rules of trade. But there were raids on caravans on the Silk Road with haul of nomads from neighbouring states; however, the raid problem on the Silk Road was solved diplomatically. The Emperor was the first dynasty of the Chinese Empire." In Silin et al. submission, this was the first Silk Road, and it went into extinction, following the fall of the Qin Dynasty. The Silk Road is synonymous to trade routes (ibid).

Furthermore, Silin et al (2017, pp. 2-3) claimed that "the extinct Silk Road was brought into existence by Emperor Wudi of the Han Dynasty, who presided over China between 141-87 BC; he was famous for his heroic achievement of recapturing the Gansu corridor, and this extended the Great Wall of China. Following the recapture of Hexi, gradually China exercised control over the cities of Tarim Basin. Concurrently, the Silk Road, coupled with political victories led to the convergence of the Chinese and Western people in the Fergana Valley. The exotic good traded between the Chinese and the noble Romans was the Chinese silk. Additionally, the Romans exchanged their metals, dishes, glassware for spices and silk of the East. But Oriental (Eastern) commodities were compensated with gold and silver. However, the first Silk Road was not established for trade purposes but what simply for military expedition by the Emperor. Silk Road only came into existence as a trade route following the political victories of Wudi which triggered cultural exchange between the Chinese and Western people in the Fergana valley. From this premise, it is arguable that the term 'Silk Road' was not necessarily trade inclined but a route used by commuters, fighters, and traders."

The Silk Road terminology as a trade route, gained currency in literatures as scholars are commonly inclined to the assumption that the BRI idea emanated from it. Contrary to the popular views that sees the ancient Silk Road as the BRI forebear; Selbitschka (2018), is of the view that China's initial onrush into Central Asia in the second century BCE was strictly politically motivated and had minuscule link to silk trade. This view was tacitly captured by Silin et al. (2017) because it acknowledged the validity of the first 'Silk Road' which was characterised by military activism. Consequently, the transaction of the exotic fabric can best be regarded as a corollary of cultural exchange that unfolded between the Western and Eastern Han Empires, and the strongly organised extensive plain nomads, the Xiongnu precisely. Furthermore, Selbitschka (2018:2) argued that "distinguishing the emergence of the Silk road and interpreting its historical processes are not synonymous. In his view, neither silk nor trade can be considered as the main force behind the emergence of the ancient Silk Road. And on the other hand, the assumption that the Silk Road emanated in the mid-Western Han period (206 BCE-9CE) is invalid. In Selbitschka's view, the conventional thought of the emergence of the Silk Road is a misnomer.

Selbitschka (2018, p. 4), further argued that "Silk Road is a misnomer because it is simply a term that emanated Richfonten because he wrote about his observation of the transaction of silk along the paths that he studied. Furthermore, early 20th century generation of scholars embraced the term 'Silk Road' has a mercantile highway, simply designed for the supply of the Mediterranean axis with Chinese silk. Furthermore, the Silk Road according to the records in the work of early Chinese historiographers, such as Shi Ji by Sima Qian and Han shu by Ban Gu traced the actual root of the 'Silk Road' to the reign of Emperor Wu also known as Wudi between 141-87 BCE."

However, many authors are of the view that term 'Silk Road' came into existence as a result of trading of Silk materials which characterised Chinese export 2000 years ago, and the trading routes were christened 'Silk Road'. It is a symbolic name for the trade routes. Nonetheless, the etymology of the second 'Silk Road' is unanimously traced to the work of Ferdinand Freiherrere von Richthofen, a German geographer (Selbitschka, 2018, p. 3); and it points to trade, political activities, and cultural converge. The imperial envoy of Zhang Qian initiated the ancient Silk Road, which accelerated trade between Arab and Central Asia (Sarker et al., 2018, p. 624). The Chinese linking of faraway territories to China through business is not something alien to the Chinese culture.

The Belt and Road initiative aims to create economic incentives in developing and underdeveloped axis by sponsoring infrastructural projects and investments outside China through loans. The Economist (2018, p. 3), and Johnston (2016, p. 6) labelled this approach an outbound investment opportunity. This initiative in an ultimate reasoning happened to be a national policy designed to address the issue of excess industrial capacity and increasing old population problems plaguing the Chinese economy at large (Johnston, 2016, p. 5). Aims of OBOR as put by Sarker, et al.:

"OBOR initiative wants to connect the world from Asia to Europe and Africa through its two mega projects by roadways, airways, and seaways. It intends to connect about 60 countries across Asia, Europe, and Africa. One of the significant objectives of China behind the OBOR initiative is to implement the Go West policy (2018, p. 631)."

OBOR aims to establish trade corridors that would connect Asian, European, and African countries solely for mutually economic benefits on a larger scale (Wu, 2017). It can be pictured or regarded as a model of integration that aims to melt continental border barriers, for instance, 65 countries along the Belt and Road are participating in the OBOR initiative despite ideological, geographical, and cultural barriers. Central to the argument of scholars that developed a critical interest in OBOR is the claim that it is geopolitically motivated. Conversely, others maintained that OBOR is predicated simply on geo-economic interest.

However, at this stage, this work cannot maintain a specific stance regarding the primary aim of the BRI. Therefore, this work seeks to dissect the achievements of OBOR, its policy documents, and to garner details from some OBOR beneficiaries in a bid to identify who benefits more between China and the host countries. This approach aims to spot the real motives of OBOR by putting scores of socio-political, socio-economic, and sociocultural factors into consideration. Kenya's experience of OBOR can serve as a cautionary factor to all African states willing to absorb OBOR without filtering or dissecting its policy documents scrupulously.

When OBOR is viewed through the prism of the beauty it embodies, one might be tempted to or speedily conclude that it is predicated on geo-economic interest. Such a conclusion might erode the consciousness of the geostrategic and geopolitical aspects it embodies. Mackinder, cited in Rice (n.d., p. 3) argues that "any country that wields economic influence over the heartland has the privilege to exert power owing to its critical geostrategic position." From this school of thought, the geostrategic interest of China can easily be highlighted due to the increasing and random presence of the Chinese in Africa.

Cai (2017, p. 5) maintains that "many analysts of OBOR seem obsessed with the geopolitical aspects, while increasingly undermining the economic agenda of the initiative, which is the main push factor. The geo-economics and geostrategic interests are not contradictory due to their interwovenness. China is simply using the OBOR initiative to reinforce its presence in Asia through an inclusive transnational economic integration which spans beyond the Asian continental frontiers."

Nevertheless, here is a caution, should one look too deep into the geostrategic aspect of OBOR, the geo-economic reality would be obscured. It is pertinent to maintain an objective stance in the analysis of the BRI for a better outcome of this case study. The critical analysis of OBOR is fundamental due to the increasing and random presence of the Chinese people in Africa. It is a known fact that the Chinese presence in Africa is not characterised by leisure, but by heavy involvement in infrastructural development, such as the digital and maritime silk road. Examples of the Chinese Silk Road are the Mombasa port in Kenya, railway projects across Africa, and the heavy flow of Chinese investment into Africa. These protruding facts should be a significant concern to Africans because the intention of the Chinese government is not conspicuous.

However, the beauty of OBOR is glaring in its policy documents; albeit, the fact that it meets with the urgent infrastructural needs of the receiving states, gave the initiative a win-win kind of image in the eyes of the receiving African states. As a scholar schooled in the theories of international relations, the beauty of OBOR should not erode one's ability to question the core motive of OBOR. It is this fact that triggered the burning desire to research OBOR's benevolence in a bid to uncover its primary aim. It is a common fact, especially when viewed from a realist prism, that states find it obligatory to engage in international trade to satisfy their national interest. The question in this context is, won't the OBOR initiator axis interests impinge on the national interest of Nigeria in the long run?

However, one cannot expressly claim that China has a colonial tendency like the Western colonial states based on traceable historical records. From the well documented historical past, one can expressly claim that Africa lost her autonomy to the aliens/usurpers from the Western world due to early African leaders' acceptance of the largesse offered by the explorers/exploiters. Africa's colonial historical experience was characterized by exploitation and manipulation, which could trigger scepticism regarding the contemporary Chinese benevolence. Nigeria nay Africa embraced OBOR loans, but the disadvantages of these loans seem to be uncritically checked by the Nigerian government.

This work will consider international politics 'realism' and development theories such as modernization and dependency theories. Furthermore, it will also consider an elementary dive into the history of how the relationship began between Pre-colonial African leaders and the Western explorers.

The first aspect of this work will consider the historical background of the Silk Road, the trade culture of the Chinese people, and the pre-colonial Chinese relation with Africa. Followed by the push and pull factors of OBOR, which aims to know the socio-political and socioeconomic factors that spurred the creation of OBOR. The rationale for a holistic approach to this study is simply to bring the concealed aspects of OBOR to the fore. The final part of this work focused on the advantages and disadvantages of OBOR in Nigeria. The primary aim of this work is to identify the motives behind OBOR not covered in the OBOR policy record.

Historical Background of the Silk Road in Africa

Chinese earliest presence in Africa can be traced back to the maritime Silk Road adventure in periods earlier than the 14th Century. There was an ancient Silk Road that linked ancient China to East Africa, precisely the modern-day Kenya. Johnston claimed that this could be the reason why China considered Kenya as OBOR hub in Africa (2016, p. 4). According to Markovitz (1977), African kingdoms stretched contacts beyond the continental frontiers of Africa. There is a report of an African ambassador who visited China in 1083 AD, and by the 15th Century, vast fleets of Chinese ships and tens of thousands of Chinese explorers visited African coastal ports. However, by 1450 the Chinese maritime Silk Road to Africa ceased. Ancient Chinese exposure to the East African beaches was triggered by the African ambassador that visited China in the 1083 AD.

Markovitz further stressed that a study of science in China encouraged sinologists to reveal that conflict in the Court led to the elimination of Chinese interest in Africa in the period in question. The incongruities in the Court were not with the Africans but were within the imperial Court between the sea-based and land-based factions in China. As a result of the differences in the Imperial Court of China, by 1500, the great Chinese shipyard in East Africa was forced into extinction and the Chinese passion for ocean trade in Africa debacle. It accounts for the first extinction of the Chinese Silk Road in Africa. However, the Chinese presence simply returned to Africa following their participation in the Tanzanian-Zambian railway of our Century 'early postcolonial era' (1977, pp. 32-33).

In consonance with the above submission by Markovitz, New African (2015) reports that:

"Jan Julius Lodewijk Duyvendak, the late eminent Dutch sinologist, an author of 'China's Discovery of Africa,' wrote that "Yongle Emperor licensed the Chinese explorers' expedition of the maritime Silk Road to Africa because of the desire to acquire foreign products felt particularly at Court. The Emperor had a burning desire to enhance his status and reputation by re-establishing the overseas renown of the Chinese Empire."

From this historical evidence, the Ancient Chinese Silk Road push and pull factors, are similar to the contemporary OBOR initiative consolidated by President Xi Jinping of the Peoples Republic of China.

According to Chibundu (2000, p. 1), "historical contact between China and Africa commenced way before contact with the colonialist axis. He further stressed that historians uncovered fairly abundant evidence of the indirect contact between China and North Africa during the period leading up to the 2nd Century. The evidence echoed the pre-colonial ties with China; it includes traces of Chinese silk discovered on Egyptian excavated mummy 3000 years ago. Among the evidence is the Cleopatra, the known last Queen of Egypt often graced in the beauty of Chinese silk clothing."

Before the official launching of OBOR in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, the Chinese and Kenyan maritime archaeologist collectively explored the East African seacoast to find conclusive evidence of a shipwreck, whether or not it belonged to Zheng He's fleet. From the maritime research, a 15th century Chinese

"Yongle Tongbao" coin, a small disk of copper or brass and silver with a square hole in the centre, at Mambrui village, north of Malindi on Kenya's north coast were found.

Contrary to the popular narrative about Vasco da Gama, the explorer who pioneered the exploration of the East African maritime trade route between the 15th and 16th Centuries, the Chinese traders and maritime explorers, according to archaeological findings remain the pioneering foreign traders in Africa. Zheng He, a eunuch administrator and diplomat during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) in Imperial China, arrived on the East African coast several decades earlier than Vasco da Gama (New African, 2015). As put by a reporter:

Despite the current frenetic media salvo unrelentingly declaring China's 'new inroads' into Africa, nothing could be further from the truth. China's presence in Africa dates back centuries and spanned several ancient dynasties. Curtis Abraham traces China's ancient and imperial past into Africa and sees how it still affects the relationship of today. Zheng He's maritime travels took place from 1405 to 1433, and it is documented that in 1418 he led a vast fleet of no less than 62 ships ferrying 37,000 soldiers across the Indian Ocean "Western Ocean." (New African, 2015).

Most scholars of the historical background of the Silk Road narratives simply channelled scholarly attention to Eurasia transatlantic Silk Road, but with the help of the likes of Markovitz in his work 'Africa's Dual Heritage' that brought into global awareness the Chinese transatlantic

Silk Road, which linked Ancient China to the Eastern coast of Africa as far back as periods which preceded 1450, is now gaining attention in the literature regarding China-Africa relations, especially in this era that OBOR is making waves across the globe.

Okpoh et al. acknowledged China's earliest contact with Africa, which predated colonial occupation. According to him, the China Africa relations were interrupted by the emergence of colonial imperialism, which affected both China and Africa at different times due to European conquest and occupation in both continents to varying times in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (2009, p. 1). Scholars of China's African relations gave different reasons for the elongated disconnection between Africa and China. Still, the common ground remains the mutuality that characterized the China Africa pre-colonial relationship.

The fantastic aspect of the early Chinese exploration of the East African beaches is that the Chinese military explorers and merchants did not put colonial occupation into consideration when they came into contact with the black race. From this historical reality, one can conclude that the Chinese geostrategic interest through OBOR will not undermine the sovereignty of African countries. However, the above is a conclusion reached from a careful study of the Africa-China history. Still, one should not allow it to sway one from the need to study the interest of OBOR in Nigeria critically.

Chibundu (2000, p. 2) brings into global awareness that the Chinese and African government relationship existed before colonial usurpation of the African continent. He further stressed some historical events that portrayed the warm relationship between African and Chinese ancestors. In Chibundu's words:

"The period from the 11th – 16th Century was characterized by attempts on both sides to acquire more excellent knowledge and understanding of each other. For example, a Chinese traveller known as Wang Boayan noted in his memoirs that he travelled to parts of North and East Africa between 1337-9, and 1347-8. Similarly, a Moroccan scholar, who paid a visit to China around 1358 documented his experience of Chinese traditional customs, scenery, and people. Official visits were also known to have taken place during this period. A naval explorer, Zhen He, was sent several times by the Ming dynasty to parts of East Africa to forge closer official and trade links. On the other hand, the likes of the King of Malindi in Kenya sent delegates to China in return. Unfortunately, the King, accompanied by his wife, died en route to China and was buried in Fuzhou Province. It was reasonable to organize grand reception, banquets, and exchange of gifts and goods during such visits" (2000, p. 2).

The above extract from Chibundu (2002) prudently highlighted the warm relationship between the pre-colonial Africans and the Chinese; this was a relationship that transcends Western civilisation and influence in Africa. From this historical background, it is claimable that the Chinese ancestors were lenient to the African ancestors compared to the Western ancestors that used diplomacy and military might in the disruption of African ways. However, in as much as promising OBOR appears, African leaders should be cautious of the Chinese benevolence euphoria.

The Silk Road is a melting pot in that it links continents together through trade. The Silk Road triggered the formation of institutions and legal backing for international trade. From this historical point of view,

much of 21st century civilization can be linked to the Silk Road. This is evident in Vaissiere's account of Silk Road cited in (Peters, 2019, p. 2) maintained that "the trade pattern in the Second-Century BCE is a form of trade-based globalization that indicated a primordial form of merchant-capitalism between the first along Middle Eastern cities like Babylon and the Greek-city states, existed prior to western pattern of capitalism. However, this is an account omitted in the writings of western scholars due to scarcity of information, and most of the accounts were written in ancient languages and text. And also, history has been Eurocentric and takes much of Ancient China's account from the work of Marco Polo which excluded events that happened prior to his contact with China. Marco Polo visited China and sojourned there for a decade and seven years between 1271-95. However, the account of China in his book 'The Book of Marvels' that was written between 1298-1299 in collaboration with Romance writer, Rustichello of Pisa excluded huge chunk of China's history. Central to the book of Marco Polo were fictions written down to entice the European medieval readers. It is an indication of how late it was before the Westerners and China came into convergence."

However, there is a considerable incongruity between scholars regarding Silk Road as China's conserved heritage. But the common ground between those for and against is that indeed there was trade activities between ancient China, neighbouring states, and with the Western axis starting from the Fergana Valley as put by Silin et I. (2017). Some authors are of the view that the ancient 'Silk Road' had nothing to do with trade, while others are of the view that it is a route that emanated from trade.

The purpose of the above brief historical background of Silk Road is simply to draw the attention of readers or global audiences to the fact that Silk Road is not a new concept to China, and it seems to be a conserved cultural heritage.

The Chinese contact with early Africans was facilitated through trade routes in India, Persia, and Syria. The connections were few, but it was characterised by mutual goodwill, and this aided the relationship with Africa in the postcolonial era (Chibundu, 2000, p. 1).

The contemporary Silk Road in the way of BRI is similar to the occupation which characterized the 1960's return of the Red Dragon 'China' to Africa. In the 1960s, the Chinese were dominantly involved in infrastructural projects. Such as Zambia to Tanzania railway construction, provision of technical expertise, doctors, scholarships, and various forms of aid. The railway project covered 1,100-mile-distance across Tanzania to Zambia for the ease of copper logistics, from landlocked Zambia to the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam boycotting links to Apartheid South Africa (Okpeh, 2009, pp. 1-2).

Furthermore, Okpeh stresses that "the railway project consolidated by the Chinese was a cutting-edge, in that it costs China the sum of \$500 million; during that phase, it was the largest foreign-aid project undertaken by the Chinese. Many Chinese engineers died in the process of the project, but still, the project was completed by the Chinese. The 1960s were characterised by incongruities between the Western and Eastern blocs; during this period, the Chinese financial strength was nothing compared to that of the Cold War giants, but still, the Chinese invested vehemently in the liberation of Africa. The Chinese used its experience of colonial oppression and liberty of freedom to establish a relationship with African states coming out of colonial oppression. The Non-Aligned Movement, forged by the African countries, fostered the China-Africa multilateral relations (Okpeh, 2009, p. 2).

However, historical data, according to Okpeh (2009, p. 3), echoes some discrepancies regarding how Chinese firms conduct businesses in host African countries where Chinese companies invested. Chinese companies are notorious for paying low wages, undermining international labour law, famous for undermining human and environmental rights. In Okpeh's word:

In some parts of Africa, Chinese enterprises have turned out to be just as greedy and cut-throat as their old Western counterparts, with behaviour on the margins of legality. Authorities in the Democratic Republic of Congo have been investigating, for example, the circumstances in which nearly 18 tons of radioactive minerals from primarily Chinese-owned mines were dumped in a river recently poisoning the water supply to a big mining town (2009, p. 3).

The above extract is a brief cautionary historical fact that recommended the necessity of filtering the Chinese benevolence in Nigeria. The Economist (2018), for instance, highlighted the challenges receiving states might encounter in OBOR. Risk such as inter-alia inflated expenses, lack of transparency, and trade imbalance. As stated earlier, this study will use historical data and political theories to dissect

OBOR projects. Since it is informed by the aim to comprehend the fundamental purpose of the OBOR China's foreign policy.

The above historical analysis is very vital to this work because it helps shed some light on China and Africa relations. Similarly, the historical analysis is equally pertinent to this work in that it will be of help to the African audience. It will richly enhance their understanding of the Silk Road, specifically the push and pull factors. The subsequent pages will highlight the push and pull factors of OBOR with a specific reference to Nigeria.

OBOR Push and Pull Factors

Integration at the regional or international level is spurred by the need to achieve one or two things, which is why China created the OBOR 'transnational integration' initiative. An initiative established or reformed to meet the interest of the Chinese people and also the infrastructural needs of the recipient states in Africa. This is why the 'push and pull' factors of the Belt and Road Initiative would be considered to explain why China picked interest in Nigeria. This section aims to answer questions such as: what are the factors that triggered OBOR, especially in the context of outbound investment? What attracted China to Nigeria? Highlights of the push and pull factors of OBOR will bring the aims of OBOR to visual reality. Then the application of theories and historical facts would be considered to help in sieving Chinese benevolence.

The OBOR push factors

The OBOR push factors should be viewed from a geo-economics and geopolitical prism because it is an initiative that has political and economic interests designed to accomplish the needs of the Chinese people. OBOR's five areas of focus are: coordinating development policies, forging infrastructure and facilities networks, strengthening investment and trade relations; enhancing financial cooperation; and deepening social and cultural exchanges (Johnston, 2016, p. 4). The above focus areas of the BRI encapsulates strategic and economic interest. What could be the motivating or push factors behind the Belt and Road Initiative?

Economic slowdown

In 2013 when President Xi Jinping visited Tanzania, China's economic growth had already slowed down. It was a situation that inevitably called for the urgency of outbound investment to boost the Chinese economy (Johnston, 2016, p. 5). Although, according to OBOR's policy document, it is a win-win deal. Silin et al. (2017, p. 4) assert that "the Chinese perceive the Silk Road Economic Belt as an initiative to achieve its national interest in the world in general, with a focus primarily on its neighbouring states. Nevertheless, coincidentally, the interest of the BRI blended with the interest of its partners or recipient states." The BRI has gone beyond the Asian continental frontiers and becoming ubiquitous on the African continent.

The above facts gave a panoramic view of the push factor of the Belt and Road Initiative.

China is a large per-capita-resources-scarce developing economy with an old population, while Africa is a large resource-rich developing continent with a vast young diligent population. The former has excessive financial savings and international standard infrastructure capacity; conversely, the latter dearth's both (Johnston, 2016, p. 5).

The above submission by Johnston, is an encapsulation of push and pull factors. China has substantial financial savings garnered from the inbound investment but threatened economically after the global financial crisis, which reduced American demand for Chinese products. As a result of the fall, the American demand for Chinese products diminished. Unfortunately, the Chinese economy was hit by a steady increasing old population, as a result of the strict family planning policies that led to a steady decline in the youth population. The Chinese period of demographic dividend is now considered a historical reality due to the strict family planning policy (Johnston, 2017, p. 2). The drastic fall in the Chinese youth population has reduced the country's competitive labour force capacity needed to drive a vibrant economy. The demographic backlash, in a way, is a push factor of the OBOR, which necessitated an outbound investment, especially to continent such as Africa, where there is a prospective demographic dividend. It is an encapsulation of push and pulls factors.

The reality of the Chinese society compelled the Chinese government to consider continent such as Africa, where infrastructure capacity needs a vibrant boost. The Economist (2017) highlighted the Chinese Standard Gauge Railway 'SGR' project in Kenya as an outbound investment example, which is part of the strategy to aid stability of the Chinese economic crisis by providing jobs for Chinese companies in OBOR territories:

"As China grapples with transforming its maturing economy towards consumption-driven growth while moving away from the fixed capital formation that has previously fuelled expansion, projects such as the Standard Gauge Railway 'SDG' offer a means for Chinese industries to venture abroad in the face of shrinking domestic markets (The Economist, 2018, p. 10)."

Silin et al. (2017) accordingly stress that "China is seeking to have a notable share of structural economic power wielded by the western axis. It sheds light on why China is devoted to the maximisation of exports of goods and services to OBOR countries. It is a stratagem to overcome the limiting barriers or restrictions on Chinese investments strategically imposed by the United States of America.

In a bid to achieve her geo-economics objective, China invested benevolently in the creation of trade corridors. By sponsoring infrastructure projects such as railways, 21st century maritime, and digital silk road like Alibaba. The aim is to simplify Chinese exports, which would trigger its economic development and stability.

The OBOR initiative in due time might change the economic landscape in Asia and Africa. Simultaneously, this approach will equally trigger the volume of payments in yuan to the detriment of US dollar domination. The economic aspect of the OBOR push factors has a glaring connotation of geostrategic interest. However, it is primarily motivated by the urgent need to address industrial excess capacity problems plaguing the Chinese economy following the international financial crisis, which triggered a reduction in the demand for Chinese products. As put by Lin et al.:

Many countries perceive the active promotion of the OBOR initiative as China's attempt to claim the role of an economic leader. People's Daily (or Renmin Ribao) newspaper has noted that Western politicians consider the OBOR initiative a geopolitical tool used by China to ensure domination in the region and create a new sphere of influence. The United States and Europe are afraid of losing their leading positions in the world financial system due to the strengthening of the Yuan (Silin et al., 2017, p. 8).

The Chinese see the infrastructural laggardness of the African continent as an avenue to boost its dwindling economy. Therefore, the provision of loans for the sponsorship of infrastructure and investment is urgently needed in all African states. The dominant push factor of the OBOR initiative primarily rests on the urgency to boost the Chinese economy and encourage the acceptance of the Chinese standard in the world (Cia, 2017, p. 9).

The above aphoristic extract from the work of Silin et al. (2017), should serve as a cautionary light to African leaders and decision makers when negotiating the OBOR benevolence with the initiators. According to The Economist (2018, p. 4) "observers that analogise the OBOR and the Marshall Plan 'the European Recovery Programme,' maintained that the OBOR initiative is similar to the unprecedentedly tremendous package aid that flowed from the USA government to European governments that participated in the Second World War. The purpose of the funding was to help them stabilise their dwindled economy. However, the difference is that OBOR is not based on aid or foreign direct investment but solely on loan financing for national projects." Chinese Premier Li Keqiang expressly stated in his speech to leaders of ASEAN countries in 2014 at Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar that:

"We have a lot of surplus equipment for making steel, cement, and pleat glass for the Chinese market. The equipments are of great quality. We want companies to move this excess production capacity through foreign investment to ASEAN countries who need to build their infrastructure. These goods should be produced in the country where they are needed" (Cia, 2017, p. 13).

Cia (2017, p. 6) claims that "the Chinese government crafted OBOR to encourage regional development in China through better integration with neighbouring economies; upgrading Chinese industry while exporting Chinese standards and addressing the problem of excess capacity." From this analytical premise, one can argue that China aims to upgrade its economy from the accustomed inbound investment to an outbound investment economy. It is an economic strategy designed to address the problem of excess capacity and promote Chinese technological standards. It spurred the Chinese government to rejuvenate its ancient cultural Silk Road heritage.

The OBOR pull factors

A comprehensive analysis of push and pull factors of OBOR is required for an explicit and conspicuous understanding of the transnational Chinese foreign policy. However, much has been said regarding factors that propelled the emergence of the BRI, in the same light, thoughtful attention would be appropriated to the pull factors. The low cost of labour and the abundance of natural resources, among other things, infrastructure development needs in Africa caught the overwhelming attention of Chinese investors. The increasing Chinese need for natural resources, especially energy, coupled with the demographic dividend in the African continent, attracted the Chinese. Johnston (2017) stresses that "wage comparison between China and Africa echoes why Africa was shortlisted as one of the OBOR centres in the world. In 2016, in Guangdong, the minimum wage was US\$300, while in Hawassa Industrial Park, that same 2016 in Ethiopia, the average cost of labour was US\$50 dollars monthly." Africa is clearly in its demographic dividend era and thus serves as a potential pull factor of OBOR. The growing old population in China and the ever-increasing young population in Africa is a combination of push and pull factors.

The other pull factors of OBOR in Africa are the abundance of natural resources and the pressing need to finance large infrastructure projects in Africa to eradicate the growth of excess industrial capacity in China and also the need to accumulate energy. The People's Republic of China needs access to natural resources, precisely fuel and gas in Africa (Silin et al., 2017, p. 7). This could be why China is considering the consolidation of oil and gas pipelines in Africa, linking them to maritime trade corridors for Chinese ease of access. However, on a critical note, African leaders should be critical and cautious in this respect because this same pull factor characterised the earliest and present presence of Europeans in Africa hitherto. Rice (n.d., 2) alarmed a note of caution to the foreign beneficiaries of OBOR that "China is replicating some of the tactics the colonisers used against the Chinese during the reign of European colonialism." Historical data proved that European benevolence preceded the European colonisation of Africa, and the pull factor was the resources discovered in Africa.

The pull factor of OBOR in Africa is simply the abundance of natural resources, the vast young population, and low infrastructure capacity calling for a boost. The following page will look at the push and pull factors of OBOR from the perspective of Nigerian socio-political and socioeconomic reality.

Sino-Nigeria Relations

Nigeria is a democratic nation with large oil reserves, agricultural reserves coupled with a vast young economic active population. The Sino-Nigeria bilateral relation predates 1970. Although informal activities characterized the initial relationship due to historical distrust between the Nigerian and Chinese government caused by China's support for the separatist movement in Nigeria, and the Chinese communist ideology which opposes liberalism (Chibundu, 2007).

The relationship was thwarted to some extent by internal and external factors; this was the period Cold War waxed hot. Nevertheless, Nigeria advocated the recognition of China over Taiwan despite the political distrust. However, the relationship between Nigeria and China transmuted from an informal one to a formal one on the 10th of February 1971; and China consolidated a diplomatic office of the Peoples Republic of China in Lagos on the 6th of April, 1971, but so shocking that it Nigeria spent seven months to establish a diplomatic office in

Beijing in 1971 (Chibundu, 2000, p. 7). This historical fact shows Nigeria's sluggishness in getting things done in a situation of urgency, and it also shows China's willingness to get things done speedily when an agreement is reached.

Chibundu (2007, p. 9), posits that "Nigeria and China embody few similarities such as a history of the fight against feudalism, imperialism, and colonialism before decolonisation. Both countries have a monotheist and polytheist population. One in every four Africans is a Nigerian, and one in every three Asian is Chinese.

One in every five black men/women is a Nigerian, and one in every four people in the world is Chinese." In the African continent, Nigeria has the highest population while in the Asian continent, and in the world, China controls the highest population. Nigeria is globally known for its vast natural resources. At the same time, it is general knowledge that China significantly absorbs raw resources across the world as a country that produces final goods. As put by Akinterinwa:

"Nigeria and China are demographic giants, and their significance in global and regional politics cannot be jettisoned. Nigeria is Africa's most populous nation, while China is Asia's and the world's most populous. Furthermore, both countries are equally compelling in their own right, China as an emerging power in the world, and leading power in Asia. At the same time, Nigeria is the powerhouse of West Africa, and an influential figure in African politics" (cited in Ezechinyere, 2017).

The submission by Chibundu (2007), echoes the resourcefulness of both countries; therefore, a bilateral relationship is expected to be beneficial to them since both equally have something to offer each other. The Sino-Nigeria relationship predates OBOR 'an obvious fact,' but the initiative seems to have strengthened the tie due to its unique package. However, there are nuances from scholars that the Chinese are enjoying the dual privilege of opportunity and being opportunistic (Umejei, 2015).

However, before the emergence of OBOR, Nigeria have a cordial relationship, although it was strictly in economic terms. Despite the cultural difference in the context of political ideology, both countries maintained good bilateral relations. Before OBOR, Nigeria and China engaged in the trade of oil, military equipment, capacity building, and also scores of government-sponsored Chinese investment in Nigeria.

However, the relationship, according to Umejei (2015), favours Chinese more compared to Nigeria. Nigeria only export raw materials to China, whereas China dumps its final products in Nigeria, and also exploit the Nigeria young economic active population. The push and pull factors of OBOR comes to the fore when the activities that characterised the Sino-Nigeria relations is critically observed.

It is essential to highlight the underlying values of the Nigeria China bilateral ties. The Chinese relation with Nigeria draws from the principles of peaceful co-existence, which is traceable to the Indian-Sino Treaty of 1953, popularly known as '*Panch Shilla*'. The principles are:

"Sincerity, friendship and equality; mutual benefit, reciprocity, and shared prosperity; mutual support and close coordination; learning from each other and seeking joint development; and the One-China principle" (McDowell, 2012).

- *Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity*
- *Non-aggression*
- *Non-interference in each other's internal affairs*
- *Equality and mutual benefit and*
- *Peaceful co-existence (Chibundu, 2000, p. 10).*

The Sino-Nigeria relation was founded on progressive principles designed to buttress smooth frictions between both states. From this premise, it should be considered fair to take a critical look into the activities that characterised the ties between both states. The Panch Shilla principle is conspicuously evident in the OBOR initiative; according to Chibundu (2000, p. 10), "Nigeria and China are stalwart advocates of the South-South Cooperation, which aims to create a new and beneficial international economic order which is lacking in the existing international economic order." Sino-Nigeria's relation in Chibundu's view will bring fortune to Nigeria due to the South-South founding principles, which would create an alternative to Western economic dominance. Chibundu's view of China premised around the South-South Cooperation, can lure observers or the Nigerian government into thinking that OBOR is genuinely a win-win approach. Any opinion that agrees that OBOR is a win-win approach

Factors that pushed and pulled China to Nigeria, and pushed and pulled Nigeria to China

Nigeria has an absolute advantage in mineral and human resources, while China is abundantly rich in intellectual resources. Although Nigeria sits on vast essential natural resources but confronted with infrastructure challenges, and lack of adequate funds to finance infrastructural needs. On the other hand, China's appetite for energy is unmatched. However, this country lacks energy, which is mostly needed for industrial power machinery, and the economy active in the mass production of final goods.

The socioeconomic and sociocultural realities of both societies can be regarded as the pull and push factors of the Sino-Nigeria relations. Nigeria has a vast reserve of oil and gas coupled with a young population but plagued by a lack of infrastructure. In contrast, China has an absolute advantage in production capacity but disadvantaged by a lack of essential natural resources coupled with an old population.

Diplomat Shinn quoted in McDowell (2012, p. 13), highlighted four interest China has in Africa nay Nigeria and they are:

1. *Access to natural resources, especially petroleum but also minerals and, increasingly, agricultural products.*
2. *China seeks good relations with African countries to gain their support in regional and global forums.*
3. *China's diplomatic relations with Africa automatically end's Taiwan diplomatic recognition in Africa.*
4. *China wants Africa for its exports.*

The above highlights are an encapsulation of the pull and push factors that triggered bilateral relations between Nigeria and China; it equally accounts for the flow of OBOR to Nigeria.

Access to natural resources

China needs Nigeria's oil for the daily powering of its industrial machines and also for domestic consumption. Oil and gas are essential natural resources lacking in China, which Nigeria has in large quantities. This essential need spurred China to Nigeria for the acquisition of oil and gas. It is a pull factor that attracted China to Nigeria, among other things. McDowell (2012, p. 14) asserts that interest in Africa's natural resources attracted the Peoples Republic of China to Africa, just like other external powers from the West, precisely.

According to a study done by Ezechinyere (2011) on Sino-Nigeria relations, it was discovered that "China's speedy economic expansion accelerated her demand for Nigeria's oil. The need for Nigeria's oil triggered a watertight relationship between Nigeria and China, which has now resulted in guaranteed long-term access to Nigeria's underexploited resources, and this tops the Chinese agenda in Nigeria. In 2018, China signed a deal of \$80 million with Nigeria through its corporation Petro-China to locate upstream oil and gas that will generate 30,000 barrels daily for China. Furthermore, China has invested over \$4 billion in Nigeria in exchange for oil. China's primary interest in Nigeria is access to natural resources such as crude oil, and Nigeria is also seen as a source of income to China's industrial excess capacity. The above-detailed fact predates OBOR in Nigeria, and it shows the pull factors responsible for the OBOR's presence in Nigeria.

China seeks good relations with African states to gain their support in regional and global forums:

China's trade policy has connotations of geostrategic interest. China engages countries in the South axis in the OBOR initiative to boost its economic interest, assist them with their infrastructure needs. The OBOR is galvanising support for the Chinese government, and it has created an alternative to the western market through the establishment of trade corridors financed through OBOR loans, digital silk road, silk economic road belt, and 21st-century maritime silk road. As put by NIIA:

Nigeria and China are "burdened by destiny in their respective regions." Both countries, apart from being the most populated in their respective regions, are well endowed in mineral resources, for these reasons, and others, Nigeria and China are to play prominent roles in the politics and security of their respective regions. These informed the "nurturing of close bilateral relations between the two countries while fostering their collaboration in multilateral diplomacy on a wide range of issues of general international concern" (cited in Ezechinyere 2011).

China's Trick on the Intelligence of Africans

China maintains a warm relationship with the African continent to acquire strategic space necessary for the accomplishment of its national interest. However, the relationship between Africa and China is politically positive but economically unfair due to the trade imbalance. Nevertheless, China offered Africans an alternative to the western axis, although China claims to belong to the global south. Nevertheless, should the political and economic strength of China be measured, in a fundamental sense, China will not fit in the global south category.

China is categorized as a nation belonging to the south axis, which mostly describes the reality of most developing and underdeveloped axis such as Africa. African states feel more attached to China compared to the West due to the fallacy that China is equally a developing nation. Furthermore, the Chinese are categorised as people of colour.

Palmer and Perkins cited in Ezechinyere (2011) posit that:

"The Chinese have had some success in identifying themselves with the black Africans as fellow coloured people. It is a plot to turn Africans away from the Soviet Union as well as the West. Both countries have pledged cooperation in strategic partnership characterised by mutual assistance in international affairs within the framework of South-South Cooperation. China also resolved to support African Representation in the United Nation's Security Council, which Nigeria is in the race to occupy. She promises to support the New Partnership for African Development, which is a new vision of the African Union to get African continent out of underdevelopment."

The South-South Cooperation founding principles tallies with the OBOR objective of helping the African continent in building its infrastructures. The Chinese relations with Africa are a geostrategic initiative designed by China to advance its geopolitical and economic. Arguably, Nigeria is attracted to China and vice-versa. In a bid to strengthen cultural ties, China has made it a national policy to build Confucius institute in selected African countries; as a matter of fact, there are two Confucius Institutes in Nigeria merged with local universities. The institute aims to acquaint Africans with Chinese culture, especially the Mandarin language (Ezechinyere, 2011). These are initiatives of China designed to build trust and acceptance of the Chinese standard and

China wants Africa for its export

China is a global economic power, a home to massive inbound investment. China has made an economic fortune from years of inbound investment, cheap labour, and demographic dividend. Still, China was affected by the global financial crisis, and this subjected the giant of Asia to a problem of excess industrial capacity. During the global financial crisis, China was obliged to inflate the prices of its export simply to protect its economy from the global financial crisis. Amazingly the approach worked, but after the financial crisis debacle, major trade partners decelerated their trade with China, and this resulted in the industrial excess capacity problem, which forced China to seek a new market for its export. Subsequently, annual steel production in China escalated from 512 million tonnes in 2008 to 803 million tonnes in 2015.

The need to solve the problem of the excess capacity problem in China might be the reason for the emergence of the 2013 OBOR initiative, which is now making waves across the globe (Cai, 2017:12). The excess capacity problem created a common ground for both Nigeria and China. Still, the question which might come to the fore in this regard is the debt trap on the side of Africa nay Nigeria, as suggested by (Rice, n.d.). The debt trap diplomacy assumption might become a reality in Africa nay Nigeria, due to a culture of inaccurate debt service payment. For instance, the Structural Adjustment Program, debt relief initiative, was introduced to Africa due to African states' inability to refund loans to the donor community (Watkins, 1994). The lesson learned from the failure to service debt payments in the past should serve as a caution to Nigerian leaders concerning Chinese benevolence. It is to avoid finding herself in the Chinese debt trap in the nearest future. Still, the need to use the Chinese kindness to satisfy urgent infrastructural development subjected Nigeria to OBOR.

The push and pull factors of the Sino-Nigeria relation is worthy of critical dissection to crystallise the limpid or implicit aspects, also to understand the advantages and disadvantages of the BRI. Few theoretical frameworks coupled with comparative historical analysis would be considered in this study for an explicit knowledge of the intents behind OBOR, which will be of importance in administering recommendations to Nigeria and other African beneficiaries of the Chinese loan package.

Theoretical approaches to the study OBOR

The OBOR initiative appears to be a very tricky and complex one to scholars attempting to unravel/decipher the motives behind it, as a result of these complexities surrounding the initiative, analysts turned out to be equivocal on the extracurricular motives of OBOR. Some scholars claimed that the initiator of OBOR has a geo-economics interest. In contrast, others argued that it is geopolitically motivated; but the most objective of the scholars maintained that OBOR has both geopolitical and geo-economics interests.

The equivocal speculations regarding the intent of OBOR can be linked to scholars' subjective stance or schools of thought, such as Eurocentrism, Europhobia, Sinocentrism, sinophobia, humanitarianism, and liberalism. However, this work will dissect the OBOR policy framework using scores of theoretical frameworks such as neorealism of Kenneth Walt, dependency, and modernisation theory, which collectively form the pool of substantive domain of political science known as political theories of the second-order theory. The first order political theory would also be considered; political thought, governmental policy, and practice are collectively conceptualised as a political theory of the first order.

Critical analysis of the relationship between early African ancestors and the colonial explorers would be compared to OBOR benevolence to Nigeria, nay Africa; it would be a short comparative analysis. The first and second-order political theory would be used for critical dissection of the garnered data. Below is a brief elucidation of the first and second-order political theories:

"First order political theory is the knowledge required to perform practical political actions or used by a practicing politician in his or her political career, for example, the experience used by a state president to achieve success (or failure) in practical politics. Theories are aimed at acquiring the knowledge to act or function politically. Second-order political theories are alternative theoretical explanations of practical politics. In other words, practical events form the subject matter of these theories which attempt to explain political behaviour. Ever since our disciplines have become "scientifically aware," there have also been attempts to predict political action employing political theories. This is the substantive domain of the political sciences as exemplified by theories of nation-building, Marxist theories of class, and theories of conflict. The second-order theory includes both philosophical and empirical (explanatory) theories (UNISA, 2016:8)."

First-order political theory approach to OBOR

The first order political theory will briefly explain the relationship between the precolonial African leaders and their western counterparts, with a specific focus on how the aliens won the trust of precolonial African leaders through benevolence. The case of modern-day Ghana would be used as an example of the relationship between African ancestors and the Western intruders. It is a general historical fact that Africa naturally attracts aliens in need of its natural resources, and it continues drawing aliens hitherto in the same pattern.

A retrospective analysis is pertinent to this work since the aim of this topic is to scrutinise the forces that spurred OBOR to Africa and to know what China wants from Africa. This work will look into the result of the African relationship with the earliest Western explorers that established relationships with pre-colonial African leaders.

It is a general knowledge that the budding relationship between African ancestors and the Western exploiters was cordial and characterised by trade, especially the slave trade. Precolonial African leaders were showered gifts by the colonialist before they usurped their ancestral territories from them. Africaw (2019), clarified the earliest relationship between pre-colonial African and European ancestors in a dissected manner which scrupulously and chronologically highlighted activities, and deeds that characterised their relationships. The relationship was marked by cunning diplomacy, the Trans-Saharan and coming of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, the exchange of materials such as mirrors, textiles, and luxurious items. As put by Africaw:

The strategy used to win the heart of African ancestors

"When the White strangers first came to Africa, we (our ancestors) were not sure about their intentions, so most communities drove them away from their land. Nevertheless, the White strangers managed to convince some of our traditional rulers that they had not come to cause any harm but just to preach the good news (the bible) and also to trade with the local people. Some of the local chiefs along the coast started accepting white strangers by giving them a place to stay. The white strangers started building missionary centers where they stayed and preached the gospel and also traded with the local people. However, the white strangers later on expanded those missionary centers into forts and castles, where they packed slaves before shipping them abroad (2019)."

The above extract clearly stated the diplomacy adopted by early White men, used in cajoling pre-colonial African leaders; the foreign men approached the African ancestors in a disguised manner that tricked the pre-colonial African society. Gradually, the visitors penetrated locals using kind gestures and later transformed cathedrals into slave harbours. This past reality of the African society should not be forgotten, should not be eroded; it should instead serve as a cautionary heritage of our history. From this historical premise, the Nigerian government nay Africa should be cautious of any form of gift or goodies flowing into the continent from territories outside Africa. However, the account of African regarding the preliminary relationship between the African and European ancestors should not be taken as the reality

of the entire African continent as their historical accounts and deeds are diverse. But the common ground remains colonial usurpation and slave trade.

The take-home in this regard is that African leaders should be careful of largesse received from foreign partners because it could be bait.

The budding relationship between African ancestors and the Europeans had the glaring connotation of distrust on the side of the Africans, and cunningness on the side of the early Western explorers, but the explorers/exploiters outwitted the pre-colonial leaders. Africaw gave details of how the pre-colonial African leaders were influenced as follows:

The diplomacy of manipulation adopted by the early White explorers in Africa

"The white strangers did not understand the local language, and the local people did not understand a word the white strangers were saying, so it made communication very difficult. To help break the language barrier, the white strangers went to the local rulers. They asked the local rulers to give them some of the local people to train so they could speak the foreign language, which would make communication more accessible, but none of those local rulers were ready to give them out to stay with strangers. Later on, some of the local rulers came up with the idea that, instead of killing those criminals, they could give those criminals to the white strangers so the white strangers could preach the good news they said they came to teach to those criminals. Moreover, train them in a foreign language to aid communication, which was better than killing those criminals. So, the traditional rulers gave those criminals out to the white strangers and to show appreciation. Those white strangers gave gifts like bottles of wine and mirrors. To the traditional rulers. That was how the white strangers got their first "local servers" (2019)."

The first coming of the Europeans to Africa was masked as good intents, which beguiled our ancestors. Still, they only realised the negative gravity of their kindness to the White men after their internal autonomy was challenged and later usurped.

The coming of Islam to Africa, just like the coming of the Europeans was in a cordial form, although the arrival of Islam preceded the coming of Europeans to Africa. It is not strange that the coming of both axes was characterised by diplomacy because diplomacy seems to be the principal tool used in those days to encroach in established territories. However, this approach exists hitherto, although in a more advanced form. More importantly, trade was used as a logic to encroach and accumulate new territories by the Arab vanguards of Islam: As put by Markovitz:

"The earliest African empires, most notably Ghana, resisted the coming of Islam mightily. However, for hundreds of years, Muslims, mainly traders, were accepted as individuals and lived in a special section of town set aside for them. Muslims also sat in court, acting as interpreters and even holding offices as ministers. Nevertheless, in the middle of the eleventh century, Ghana's ruling classes still wished to maintain their allegiances to their ancestral religion. In the eleventh century, however, a puritan revivalist Islamic movement, the Almoravids, swept out of the desert in western Sudan in two great wings, driving north and south. The northern wing overran Morocco and, by 1103, dominated all of Muslim Spain. The southern branch collided with ancient Ghana about 1062 and did not overcome serious resistance until 1076 when the Muslims captured and sacked the Ghanaian capital. Although Ghana eventually reasserted its independence, its rulers never were able to reassert the empire's former power. After this Muslim invasion, the Ghanaian empire disintegrated into its various "tribal" components. Once a religious split occurred between a ruling class that was a Muslim and the commoners who remained pagan, the rulers attempted to moderate their beliefs (1977, p. 42)."

The above historical elucidation borrowed from the work of Markovitz (1977), expressed how strangers approached the African societies, hiding under good intentions with the hidden aim of desocialising and resocialising host territories. If the African ancestor knew the intentions of the strangers they hosted, they would not have embraced them, let alone giving them a place in their territory. The Ghanaian ancestors embraced the first and second coming of the aliens, but in the end, the Africans became victims of their kind gestures. It should serve as a cautionary history to contemporary Africans and the posterity.

The above extracts do not have a direct link or whatsoever to the coming of OBOR to Nigeria nay Africa, but it should serve as a cautionary past to receivers of China's benevolence. China's increasing and random presence in Africa should not be held lightly, should not be undermined, and should not be short of attention in Africa, to avoid historical reoccurrence or repetition of the past which diluted Africa's pre-colonial heritage. What if Chinese benevolence to Africa is a debt-trap or a strategy to drain Africa's natural resources? China is aware of Africa's poor debt servicing culture but still indulged in giving considerable loans to African countries. What will happen if African states fail to pay back the loans, or are unable to pay the loans due to known and unknown factors that might arise?

Kenya, the pioneering beneficiary of OBOR, is starting to alarm the discrepancies encapsulated in the OBOR policy, for instance, the case of the railway 'SGR', the ban on fish importation from China, which triggered a threat from China (Einashe, 2018). Kenya is a perfect example of an African country trapped in the Chinese net, due to its inability to service her debts to China; as a result of this, China is at the brink of controlling Kenya's Mombasa port (MAREX, 2018). It should be a source of concern to Africa because national ports are a crucial sector of income and security of a nation, a region, and a continent.

Coastal lines, especially those with established ports, are key aspects of the national border. When a country is not in control of its ports, in a fundamental sense, such a country is not in full control of its territory, because such geographical orifice can be an avenue of alien or migrant intrusion. Could this be a part of the Chinese geostrategic interest in Africa? Can one say that China is deliberately exploiting Africa's vulnerabilities as a means of fostering its geostrategic interest?

One might be tempted to say 'yes' when discrepancies surrounding the OBOR projects, and the recent past negative development between China and Kenya are considered.

However, highlighted caution stated earlier that one should not be drowned in the geostrategic aspects of the BRI because it would erode the beauty of the geo-economic aspect, which is essential for the elevation of the infrastructural condition in Nigeria. Nigeria, for instance, like other African countries, is suffering from infrastructure laggardness, which increasingly threatens her infrastructure development, economic viability, and logistics. The geo-economic aspect of OBOR can be viewed as a double-edged sword in that it is economically beneficial, but the sad aspect of it remains the intertwined geopolitical or geostrategic aspect, which is conspicuously inevitable. It reminds one of the famous sayings in economics "no free lunch."

These same OBOR loans enjoyed by Kenya, which suddenly transmuted to a source of threat to its sovereignty is equally enjoyed and praised by Nigerians and most African states. Should African states default debt payment in the nearest future, China's access to Africa's assets/resources would be unstoppable. It can be regarded as the third coming of China to Africa, but a different alien, from a different continent, and in a different form.

The OBOR is viewed by all its beneficiaries as the fastest approach to attain modernisation, or the only means to attain their respective infrastructural dreams. Such inclination can be traced back to development theories, such as dependency and modernisation theories, and Rostow's theory of development. These theories are models of modernising underdeveloped states; the OBOR development package in a way fits in, in the theories above.

Matunhu faulted the development theories for eroding African leaders' ability to generate solutions to development challenges in the continent internally; he claimed that modernization theory would further develop the Western societies to the future detriment of Africa (2011:66). Should one juxtapose the development theories with the push and pull factors of OBOR, the same conclusion might be reached regarding China, although the package appears as a win-win deal.

Modernisation theory of development approach to OBOR (second-order political theory)

Modernisation theory, according to its pioneers such as Marx Weber and Talcott Parsons, is a theory used to explain the transition from pre-modern or pre-colonial phase to modern phase. This theory puts socioeconomic, socio-political, and sociocultural realities of societies into consideration, and as a measure to decide whether a society is modern or pre-modern. It primarily focuses on the means of production. For instance, an agrarian or subsistence society, according to the modernisation theory, necessitates the need to acquire technology to help boost agricultural production, since human resources production cannot satisfy internal let alone external demands (Inglehart & Christian, 2007:3073). Rostow's conception of economic modernisation theory is relevant to the analysis of OBOR because policy document is a guiding framework to how China should modernize host nations. Nevertheless, can state A genuinely modernise state B?

Rostow's model, stratified the economy of host least developing and developing states into phases, for ease of solution to the problem of modernisation in host societies.

If underproduction and lack of infrastructure is the problem plaguing underdeveloped or developing countries, Rostow suggests that support should be provided to them in the form of technology, expertise,

and capital. For example, the Marshall Plan was informed by Rostow's political theories (Reyes, 2001). The OBOR package should be appropriated kudos in this respect, due to loans offered to Nigeria, nay Africa for infrastructure development.

According to this theory, traditional or pre-modern societies can slide into modernity or development by following the transitional pattern of the developed countries. This theory gears a society towards industrialisation and urbanisation to enhance production capacity. The modernisation theory can ideally be used to describe or theorise the OBOR initiatives, especially when the aims of the project are critically highlighted. Nevertheless, most aspects of OBOR do not fit into modernisation theory except the modernisation of socioeconomic structure explicated by Rostow in which he listed five stages of development which are:

"Traditional society, a precondition for take-off, the take-off process, the drive to maturity, and high mass consumption society."

It is no doubt that the OBOR, is designed to help Nigeria nay Africa attain some aspects of the above stages, but our concern should be the possible future consequences of OBOR.

Below are the aims of OBOR which coincide with values encapsulated in the Rostow's economic theory of modernisation:

"According to PWC, the OBOR countries require at least USD 5 trillion for infrastructure development from 2016 to 2020. The Asian Development Bank requires USD 8 trillion for infrastructure development by 2020 for the proposed connection of OBOR countries and getting the full benefit from the OBOR initiative. Since most of the OBOR partners are developing countries, therefore, infrastructure development should be the top priority for global future development under the OBOR initiative. Another most important step should be taken to remove the constraints of trade and investment, to reduce trade cost, and to motivate economic development" (Sarker et al., 2018, p. 626).

"China's growing outbound investment ambitions could be as transformative for today's emerging countries as inbound investment was for China. It will depend upon how recipient developing economies, in particular in Africa, utilise China's investor interest for their own sustainable development" (Johnston, 2016, p. 1).

"China has emerged from acting as a relatively minor player in African economies at the start of this century to now serving as a principal source for trade and investment. Today, China represents Africa's single largest funder and builder of infrastructure. China's role in supporting African development pre-dates official pronouncement of one Belt, One Road, but OBOR now provides a galvanising framework for which the Chinese government, corporate leaders, and their counterparts can formulate their engagements (The Economist, 2018, p. 6)."

"Currently, more than 60 countries are involved in negotiations. Their economic and foreign policy interests are not uniform and do not always coincide. An analysis of experts' opinions and documents describing China's initiative made it possible to identify the interests of China and the actual goals of OBOR from the initiators' perspective. (Silin, et al., 2017:5). The initiator, according to this author, is the founder of OBOR."

The above extracts from different scholars are quite unequivocal on the modernisation aspect of OBOR which is the geo-economics interest of the initiative. The common ground in the assumptions opined by the scholars that picked interest in the OBOR discourse is China's interest in funding infrastructure projects in Africa through loans, to improve logistics to and out of Africa, to boost production capacities, and also to curtail Western influence on African trade. The economic modernisation intentions of the OBOR is quite convincing, in that it coincides with urgent infrastructural needs of Nigeria, nay Africa. The following lines will highlight values encapsulated in the economic modernisation theory as explicated by Rostow, and it applies to OBOR in Nigeria:

Primitive society

This stage is dominated by subsistence farming and trade by barter. A socioeconomic system of human resources and commodity exchange for another commodity. It is a system that predates the modernisation of African societies. Historians argued that cowries were the dominant medium of goods exchange before the coming of Europeans. Subsistence farming is a setback limiting Africa in the context of the production of Agricultural goods. Subsistence farming is still highly practiced in many parts of Nigeria. The impact of subsistence farming on the economy is adverse due to its inability to satisfy both

internal and external demands. OBOR initiative is willing to intervene in this respect to boost export capacity in Nigeria. Below are agricultural Public-Private Partnership projects in Nigeria that are covered by OBOR initiative:

“A leading Chinese green industry company, Elion Resources Group, has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Nigeria as part of its exploration of investment opportunities in the country in the areas desertification control, agriculture, and development of new energy resources. Elion President, Wang Wenbiao, who led the company's delegation to Owerri weekend, signed the MoU with Imo State Government (THIS DAY, 2018).”

“Wang noted that under the guidance of China's B&R Initiative, "ELION is willing to work on combating desertification in Nigeria to push ahead, drawing on the Kubuqi Model, the progress of desertification control in West Africa, and even the whole African continent." Based on its unique desert control model and eco-restoration technologies developed over the past 30 years, ELION is committed to promoting environmental progress despite the distance between Africa and China. One of the largest developing countries in the world has established a close relationship with Africa, which is home to the world's most developing countries. As a global leader in ecological protection, ELION has also developed a close connection with the continent. Wang was granted in 2013 by the United Nations Environment Programme the title of "World Dryland Champion" in Windhoek, the capital of Namibia, and in December 2017, the Lifetime Achievement Award as a Champion of the Earth in Nairobi, Kenya” (Nigerian Tribune, 2018).

The above partnerships were designed to transform subsistence agricultural farming in Nigeria to a modernised one in order to meet local and external demands of agricultural products.

Preparation for take-off

OBOR is practically helping Nigeria attain this height. This stage is characterised by specialisation in the production of certain commodities, production of surplus goods and trade, development of transport infrastructure to foster trade. This is a stage that promotes savings and investment (Matunhu, 2011:66).

The preparation stage for take-off changes the socioeconomic and socio-cultural landscape of production in a bid to enhance output; at this stage, the input is massively enhanced through the purchase of advanced machinery capable of triggering mass production. Such a change in production culture and specialisation in the production of a specific product or commodity will encourage investment and savings provided there is order. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is an initiative of the OBOR designed to help host states of OBOR, such as Nigeria, to achieve urgent infrastructural needs, which aims to foster the production of goods, encourage investment and savings. President Buhari disclosed the following at the FOCAC meeting where African Heads of State met with President Xi Jinping and other Chinese elites:

“For Nigeria, our partnership with China through the FOCAC platform has resulted in the construction of the first urban rail system in West Africa. This \$500 million project in Abuja was commissioned in July this year. This 180km rail line that connects Abuja and Kaduna was commissioned two years ago at the cost of \$500 million. Today, the rail line is functioning efficiently with no issues – indeed, a sign that Chinese technology is world-class. Nigeria is leveraging Chinese funding to execute \$3.4 billion worth of projects at various stages of completion. Furthermore, less than three months ago, Nigeria signed an additional \$1 billion loan from China for additional rolling stock for the newly constructed rail lines as well as road rehabilitation and water supply projects. Nigeria will continue to support the FOCAC initiative and also seek to key into the Belt and Road Initiative. Some of the debts incurred are self-liquidating. Our country can repay loans as and when due in keeping with our policy of fiscal prudence and sound housekeeping” (Premium Times, 2018).

FOCAC is an initiative of the OBOR, and it is entirely instrumental in helping Nigeria prepare for the take-off stage, which will augur well if effectively and critically managed by Nigeria.

The other three stages of the Rostowian theory are **the take-off**, **drive to maturity**, and the production of final goods characterises **the period of mass consumption stage** (Matunhu, 2011, s. 66). Nevertheless, so unfortunate that the take-off and the other two are stages Nigeria is yet to attain, judging from the fact that Nigeria indulges in the importation of final products of crude oil and other material goods (final and capital goods) which are mainly consumed by the Nigerian population.

The question is, why is the Nigerian government not using the OBOR fund to finance the building of oil refineries, or renovation of existing oil refineries? This question would be addressed in the following pages. The drive to maturity stage is still far to be reached, because a large proportion of Nigeria's national income is from crude oil, and a vital portion of the income is used for the purchase of imported goods such as petrol, kerosene, diesel, automobiles, machinery, chemicals, and other materials like

textiles. The sad truth is that OBOR cannot help Nigeria, nay Africa reach the take-off and drive to maturity stage, due to scores of factors ranging from cultural, psychological, philosophical to political factors.

The Rostowian theory of economic development succinctly painted a positive image of OBOR due to its formidable economic package, but this theory paid little or no attention to its geostrategic and geopolitical aspects. However, the dependency theory will address the grey sides of OBOR left out by Rostow's theory of economic modernisation. The Rowstorian logic made no critical evaluation regarding the push and pull factors of the initiator of the development aid because it sees the initiator as a provider with ulterior motives. Should we solely consider the Rowstorian economic development theory, the concealed forces behind the push and pull factors would not come to the fore; therefore, to filter the BRI benevolence to Nigeria nay Africa objectively, multiple theories should be considered. Dependency theory would be used for a critical analysis of China's benevolence to Nigeria nay Africa.

The Dependency theory approach to OBOR

The dependency theory is attributable to the consciousness aroused by the critical views propounded by the Marxist school of thought. The likes of Wallerstein, Raul Prebisch, Theotonio dos Santos, and Andre Gunder Frank maintained that underdevelopment of Less Developed Countries should be levied on their inferior position in the global capitalist system. The theorist, as mentioned above, further maintained that the world capitalist system is highly beneficial solely to the advanced capitalist societies (Mansbach & Taylor, 2012, s. 465). It is the reality of the global North and South divide, and, arguably, developed China exploited this divide by aligning with the global south as it is evident in the South-South Cooperation.

From the premise of the above dependency theorists, advanced capitalist societies have an absolute advantage in the production of final or processed goods, which cost more in the global market compared to the prices of raw or primary goods. It explains why the dependency theorists are unequivocal regarding the robust economic position of advanced capitalist societies. China is a communist society, but in an economic context, the country is strictly capitalistic. This section aims to filter OBOR's benevolence, contrary to the modernisation theory, that did not put filtering of the initiative into consideration. **Can China help Nigeria nay Africa reach the third, fourth and fifth stages of economic modernisation highlighted by Rostow?** In a basic sense, can one sovereign state help another sovereign state reach the period of mass consumption in a global capitalist order?

The dependency theory emerged as a harsh opposition to the modernisation theory, which debunked the majority of the economic strategies suggested by the modernisation theory (Matunhu, 2011:68). The criticism advanced by the dependency theorists are:

“Classical development theories such as modernisation theory, is quite misleading, based on the fact that it failed to put into account the reality of the relationship between the global north and south (Andre Gunder Frank, cited in Matunhu, 2011:68). The Brandt Commission (1980), set up by the United Nations in 1977, reported that development informed by modernity theory had failed” (Andre Gunder Frank cited in Matunhu, 2011, s. 68).

“Reid (1995:47-48) reports that the expectation that a speedy economic growth 'modernisation' in developing countries itself would be beneficial to the poor masses is yet to manifest, and no concept of development that subjects millions of people to penury and starvation is palatable” (cited in, Matunhu, 2011, s. 68).

“The above assertions echoed by the dependency theorists expressly found strength in the weaknesses of the modernisation theory. Furthermore, the main argument is that the modernisation framework or logic fails to go critical on the imbalanced trade relations between the global south and the global north. The developed states stand to benefit the most from international trade, compared to the global south because the developing and underdeveloped axis depends on developed axis for both development funds and for technology essential for the production of goods to create national revenue. (Markovitz, 1977, s. 72)”

China's foreign policy under the image of OBOR preaches the beauty of its interest such as helping underdeveloped and developing nations to boost their infrastructure capacities such as standard roads

necessary for logistics, international airports, marine ports, railways, 5G internet, and importation of industrial machinery to help accelerate the production of raw materials for exportation.

From a critical point of view, informed by the dependency school of thought, the Chinese BRI is only sponsoring projects that will enhance its national interest. However, the BRI will satisfy the short-term needs of its foreign beneficiaries, but in the long run, the receiving countries might become indebted to China. They would become reliant on Chinese products and technology, just how most contemporary African states are reliant on final goods from Western Europe and Japan, which consumes a huge chunk of their national income. The statistical data below is evidence of Nigerian exports and imports transaction.

Import data

"Imports to Nigeria advanced 15.7 percent year-on-year to NGN 949.3 billion in September of 2018 from NGN 820.5 billion in the same month a year earlier, mostly due to higher purchases of agricultural goods (11.4 percent) and manufactured goods (27.8 percent). The most important import partners were: South Korea (29.1 percent of total imports), China (14.2 percent), Netherlands (11.6 percent), Belgium (7 percent), and the US (5.4 percent). Imports in Nigeria averaged 201097.41 NGN Millions from 1981 until 2018, reaching an all-time high of 1554732.90 NGN Millions in March of 2011 and a record low of 167.88 NGN Millions in May of 1984. Nigeria imports mainly: industrial supplies (27% of the total in 2014), capital goods (23%), food and beverage (17%), fuel and lubricants (14%), transport equipment and parts (12%) and consumer goods (7%). 43% of total imports come from Asia; 34% from Europe; 15% from America; and 7% from Africa. This page provides - Nigeria Imports - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar, and news. Nigeria Imports - actual data, historical chart, and calendar of releases - was last updated in January of 2019" (Trading Economics, 2018).

According to the above statistical data, Nigeria's imports is characterised mostly by refined/manufactured goods and fewer capital goods. In September 2018, the manufactured good was 27.8 percent, while agricultural goods were 11.4 percent which the aggregate was 39.2%. China's import to Nigeria was 14 percent at the period in question. Forty-three percent of Nigeria's total imports come from Asia, and the final/processed goods characterised 50% of Nigeria's imports. From this statistical analysis, it becomes evident that 50% of Nigeria's revenue is spent on the importation of final goods, which cost more compared to primary goods that is the major annual export of Nigeria. The terms of trade in this respect are not favourable due to the inferior price of primary goods in the global market.

It is an indication that Nigeria's status in the global capitalist economy is inferior; and **the OBOR initiative according to its mandate, aims to help Nigeria develop its export capacity of primary goods not the production of processed or final goods**, which would have been pivotal in enhancing Nigeria's status in the global capitalist economy. The global capitalist model is not highly rewarding to countries excessively dependent on the exportation of primary or raw goods, and such countries are bound to suffer from economic shock, should the price of their specialised raw good fall in the global market. **It is the main external factor responsible for the contemporary recession Nigeria found herself; the culture of dissaving and other factors are secondary.**

However, Nigeria's indulgence in the exportation of primary goods should not be blamed on BRI because China, as an astute primary actor, is pursuing her foreign policy, while Nigeria as a rational primary actor, is equally pursuing her overriding national interest. The political and economic affairs of Nigeria is of less importance to China because China is simply fixated on fulfilling her national interest. The neorealist school of thought consolidated by Kenneth Walt succinctly echoes states state of nature at the global level, which elucidates states conducts in reaching their respective national interest. In a competitive global capitalist arena, what could be the implications of the indulgence in excessive exportation of primary or raw goods? The next phase will make a dissected analysis of Nigeria's export culture and check the possible consequences of indulgence in such trade pattern or culture. Below is a statistical report on Nigeria's export:

Exports data

"Nigerian Exports rose by 36.2 percent year-on-year to NGN 1754.6 billion in September of 2018 from NGN 1288.2 billion in the same month a year earlier, mainly driven by higher sales of crude oil (36.5 percent). Manufactured goods (85.4 percent); raw material (36.7 percent); energy goods (42.3 percent); and solid mineral (47.9 percent). Main export partners were India (15.8 percent of total exports), Spain (10.8 percent), France (10.3 percent), South Africa (6.9 percent), and Netherlands (5.7 percent). Exports in Nigeria averaged 403013.99 NGN Millions from 1981 until 2018, reaching an all-time high of 2648881.76 NGN Millions in December of 2011 and a record low of 322.93 NGN Millions in February of 1983. The export of unprocessed goods (oil and natural gas), is the main factor behind Nigeria's growth, and it accounts for more than 91% of total exports. In 2014, 43% of

total sales went to Europe, 29% to Asia, 13% to America, and 12% to Africa. This page provides - Nigeria Exports - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar, and news. Nigeria Exports - actual data, historical chart, and calendar of releases - was last updated in January of 2019" (Trading Economics, 2018).

The above statistical analysis shows that Nigeria's primary source of revenue is the exportation of oil and natural gas, which account for **91 percent** of total export. Exports of the aforementioned primary goods escalated by **36.2% annually** up to September 2018. The increase in the quantity of exported crude oil might be the consequence of the sharp drop in the international price of oil.

The OBOR initiative aims to help Nigeria reinforce its export capacity by providing essential infrastructure logistics such as an airport, standard roads, stable electricity, and 21st-century maritime silk road. It is an excellent initiative when viewed uncritically or through the **modernisation prisms**, but when viewed through **the dependency theory**, it paints a grey or divergent picture of the formidable One Belt One Road. The excessive exportation of primary products is an indication of inferior economic status in the global capitalist hierarchy. China, in the past, used to be a nation in the periphery, but now in the centre. In other words, China used to be at the bottom of the capitalist pyramid but now competes with nations in the core/centre.

However, the blurry aspect is that a nation that knows the actual path to economic prosperity indulged in providing infrastructure loans through OBOR to Nigeria on a developmental path that will subject Nigeria to the bottom of the capitalist pyramid. China's increasing financial support to the production of primary goods in Nigeria, and export logistics, in a way, brought the primary intentions of OBOR to the fore. China is constructing A Nigeria that will be dependent on Beijing; Just how the Colonial United Kingdom constructed a 'colony' Nigeria that is dependent on the West for survival in a world of self-help.

A view expounded by Markovitz regarding external powers intentions in Africa, to some extent, shows a similarity between the contemporary OBOR policy and the timeliest European occupation in Africa. He claimed that:

"Without the grain of Africa," Marc Bloch tells us, "the existence of Imperial Rome is as little conceivable as Catholic theology without the African Augustine." Even earlier than Rome, overseas empires began to drain the African continent of her raw materials. The Phoenicians, sailing in the twelfth century B.C. from the biblical cities of Sidon and Tyre, established their main base at Carthage, near Tunisia, and spread settlements over the whole of the western Mediterranean coast of Africa. At approximately the same time, Greek city-states founded colonies at Cyrenaica, opposite the Iberian Peninsula. Later, in 596 B.C., Phoenician sailors under the orders of Pharaoh Necho of Egypt circumnavigated the continent in three years-landing for three months each year to grow crops. After Rome destroyed Carthage in the Third Punic War in 146 B.C., Romans became masters of the Mediterranean from Morocco to Egypt. All of the interior below the Mediterranean they called Ethiopia. As far South as Kenya, Rome shook loose Africa's Ivory, precious stones, gold dust, ostrich feathers, slaves, and animals for the amphitheatres- and spurred caravan trade forward with the introduction of the camel at about the time of Christ. Nevertheless, then the disintegration of the Roman Empire, the spread of Islam, and the chaos and decline that led to the small-scale organisation's characteristic of Europe throughout the Dark Ages broke the contact between Europe and Africa until the Renaissance" (Markovitz, 1977, s. 57).

"Western Europe's rediscovery of Africa did not occur until the end of the fifteenth century, when Prince Henry of Portugal, seeking silk and spices, ventured around the African coast to reach India. The disintegration of the Roman Empire, the spread of Islam, chaos, and decline triggered small-scale organisations characteristic of Europe and Africa until the renaissance. Furthermore, the relations of these powers with Africa fall into three main periods. First, the slave trade dominated economic relations from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, after which it was replaced by 'legitimate commerce'-palm oil, gold dust, timber for firearms, tobacco, beads, and rum. Then, private 'traders' functioned as governments until the mid-nineteenth century, when metropolitan legislatures inaugurated 'crown colonies.' Then, in the third period, colonies gained economic value as a result of exploding industrialisation in Western Europe, which required significant new supplies of raw materials (such as manganese and bauxites) and expanding markets for, colonial powers imposed their equivalent of Pax Britannica. They improved transportation, introduced new systems of communications, and established governments that were strong but limited in scope (Markovitz, 1977, p. 58)."

This work considered the above piece just to show the history of the economic development pattern in Africa. From the cradle of African convergence with the external world, Africa has been socially and economically constructed, to find pleasure solely in the production and exportation of primary goods needed by the countries that initiated the modernisation of the African continent.

Before decolonisation, the colonial masters in their little way modernised the African continent, but in a way that promoted their national interest, and each colony was designed to specialise in the production of cash crops needed by the colonial masters. The African leaders in the era mentioned above embraced

the **dependent development**, due to a myopic understanding of the global capitalist economy, and weak bargaining position; therefore, one cannot wholly blame the budding postcolonial African leaders for the wrong economic choice. The disturbing aspect of the pattern of production in Africa is the fact that, hitherto, Africa remains in the production pattern inherited from the colonial masters. China seems interested in fostering the colonial pattern of production in Africa for its economic interest too.

Dependency comes in multiple shades, such as aids, foreign direct investments, loans, technology, final and capital goods, and the introduction of foreign cultures such as democracy and monotheism. It explains why African pilgrims take resources to Saudi Arabia, Rome, and Israel; it is an indication of the dependency value chain.

African countries that are enjoying the benevolence of OBOR risk the possibility of being leashed to China's technology, investments, and conditionality, although China claimed that they have no intention of interfering in host states' domestic affairs. Conversely, an incident that transpired between Kenya and China of recent echoes future possibility of China to threaten OBOR receiving states to succumb to certain conditions. For instance, China threatened to bring an abrupt halt to loan supply to Kenya due to Kenyan's government ban on importation of Chinese tilapia fish, which flooded the Kenyan domestic market (Maruiki, 2018).

In the realist school of thought, it is unethical for one state to rely on another state or international organisation for survival. When the national interest of the supplying state clashes with the interest of receiving or host states, the supplying state might indulge in or consider the use of soft or hard threats.

In such a situation, the receiving state is bound to operate from a weak point because it is leashed to aids, machinery, loans, or foreign direct investment.

The OBOR zeitgeist, appeared to contemporary African leaders as the sole approach to economic and infrastructure development; as a result of this perception, most of these leaders indulged heavily in the absorption of BRI loans to satisfy their economic and infrastructural needs. It was based on this premise that 51 African leaders flooded the 2018 FOCAC summit in Beijing (Dahir, 2018).

This same pattern of behaviour characterised the early relationship between colonialists and their colonies.

As put by Markovitz:

These new countries still depended on the colonial powers, both for development funds and for the technology necessary to achieve a higher standard of living for their peoples. The conditions of exploitation remained: the new states are still producers of raw materials; and there are still markets for more sophisticated goods (1977, p. 72).

The above submission, to some extent, has connotations of similarity to the OBOR occupation in Africa. African states are dependent on China for infrastructure development sponsored through loans offered by the Chinese government. The nature of the loans needs to be dissected for the dependency aspect of it to come to the fore. China offers loans to Africa in specific public sectors such as railway, highway, electricity, seaports, and production of cash crops simply to enhance exports of primary raw materials. If China truly meant well for Nigeria nay Africa, knowledge in the creation and development of artificial intelligence would have been heavily sponsored and promoted in Africa.

The new OBOR approach is quite different from the past and contemporary West European development approach in Africa, but the fact that both axes has overwhelming ambition in promoting the production of primary goods in Africa should raise suspicions. It sums up Matunhu (2011) criticism of the development theories because these theories shaped African societies into thinking that the approach to development or economic success is by the exportation of primary goods.

Rodney, cited in Matunhu (2011, p. 70), asserts that "from the late 19th century, up to the emergence of decolonisation consciousness, Africa was shaped to be the main supplier of undervalued primary goods to Europe, and the consumer of overvalued final goods from the West." Similarly, Mansbach and Taylor (2012) assert that the "dependency theory sees the world economic structure, as simply beneficial to the advanced capitalist countries. Terms of trade worked against the Less Developed Countries because the prices of imported manufactured goods rise faster than primary goods destined for export."

Such a pattern of trade will continuously force producers of primary goods to the bottom of the capitalist kyriarchy.

In conclusion, OBOR can be categorised as a beneficiary of the global capitalist system, since its approach aims to support Africa mainly in the exportation of raw materials. Such an initiative will place China in a superior position in the global capitalist economy, while it would subject Nigeria nay Africa to an inferior status in the global capitalist economy. It echoes the neorealist assumption that the logic of the international system shape states' conducts.

OBOR is quite formidable compared to the World Bank and IMF developmental policies, but the common ground is that Africa's external trading partners have a common hidden motive of promoting the production of raw materials in Africa. Although there is nothing irrational in the production and exportation of primary goods, the problem simply lies in when the production of primary goods is seen as the only or main source of national income. It is a problem of consolidated dependency culture, a worshipped status quo in Africa, which is more disturbing to observers when influential trade partners strategically indulge in the reinforcement of dependency, which subjects Africans to the bottom of the pyramid gravity.

Neorealist approach to OBOR

Neorealism is vital to this discourse because it is an analytical tool used for the explanation of foreign policy or interstate relations, and it emphasises the unit and state level of analysis. It tells us why states behave in specific ways and how national interest spurs interdependency/cooperation between states at the global level characterised by anarchy, which means lack of a central authority to enforce order in the global domain. The pioneer of this school of thought is Kenneth Waltz, and below is his submission regarding the theory of international politics:

A theory of international politics can describe the range of likely outcomes of the actions and interactions of states within a given system and show how the range of expectations varies as systems change. It can tell us what pressures are exerted and what possibilities are posed by systems of different structures (Gideon, 1998, p. 145).

China created the OBOR to achieve a lion share of the global capitalist economy. In contrast, Nigeria, a global south nation, is bound to suffer an adjunct share of the global capitalist economy dividend due to its inherited culture of production and export of primary goods.

Furthermore, the formidable OBOR, which is the Chinese foreign policy, can be attributed to President Xi Jinping and like-minds that introduced the policy. Although it is a policy that is indigenous to the Chinese people. China sees herself as a global power; therefore, bent on wielding structural influence. It could be the reason behind China's creation of OBOR for the advancement of its geostrategic and geopolitical interest. This theory proves relevant to the discourse of OBOR, especially when colonial and postcolonial occurrences are critically dissected. Mearsheimer:

Waltz relies on 'the process of selection,' which means that 'those who conform to accepted and successful practices more often rise to the top' while those who do not 'fall by the wayside' (Mearsheimer, 2009, p. 242).

From the above assertion, one can argue that OBOR is a Chinese strategy of rising to the top, while foreign states that embraced the initiative are tools in the hand of the initiator. Arguably, Nigeria, as a beneficiary of OBOR, is falling by the wayside as it is highly indebted to China. The question is, how will exporters of primary products rise to the top in a global capitalist economy? Will OBOR help Nigeria rise to the top?

From this premise, one can suggest that China sees OBOR as foreign policy 'a means to an end,' while Nigeria nay Africa sees it as a developmental policy. Any country that sees another country, as its helper to prosperity, is undermining the reality of the logic of international political economy and system where states individually pursue national interest.

Kenneth Waltz, as quoted by Gideon (1998), "a theory of international politics can describe the outcome of relations and interaction between actors." Therefore, to describe the outcome of OBOR and the interaction of China with OBOR countries, realist theories would be explored. This theory can bring the motives behind the push and pull factors of OBOR to the fore. It seeks to explain what states aim to

achieve in foreign relations and analyse factors that appear relevant in a specific case (Gideon, 1998, p. 145); the specific factors that appear relevant in the case of OBOR "**China's foreign policy**" is the interest in Nigeria's resources, and the type of development China is promoting in Nigeria.

These factors show China's motives for developing a Nigeria that will find the exportation of raw materials as the primary source of national revenue. The underlying assumption of the Nigerian decision makers is that China is helping them in achieving some national objectives. However, should they put the neoclassical caution of Kenneth Waltz highlighted by Thelami (2010:159) into consideration, they will consider sieving the benevolence flowing in from China. Below is what Thelami has to say regarding Waltz's neorealism:

"From the simple assumption that states seek, at a minimum, **self-preservation in an anarchic self-help environment**, several general propositions could be inferred. First, when a state's security is at stake, this consideration dominates all others in determining that state's behaviour. Second, states, when they are threatened, tend to attempt balancing the threatening power, alone if they can, or with others if necessary. Third, relative military and economic power is a critical determinant of states' behaviour; the more powerful states are more likely to achieve their objectives. Fourth, a change in the distribution of military and economic power is likely to result in corresponding new alignments among states. Fifth, to the extent that superpowers are the most powerful states, their relations, their power about each other, their competition, and their foreign policies can affect the behaviour of smaller states in dominant ways: Sixth, the number of superpowers and the incremental differences in their power are significant in determining the behaviour of states."

The above structural realist assumptions from the work of Thelami (2010), dissected Kenneth Waltz's logic of international domain and how primary actors in it behave. Central to this logic is the assumption that when states are threatened, be it military or economic threat, they tend to look to create or join an association 'international regime' in a form of balance of power. China the initiator of OBOR is obviously confronted by demographic threat such as old population and industrial excess capacity. To balance against the visible economic and demographic threat, China established the BRI. In this regard, it is arguable that China is using the OBOR to advance its national economic security through the establishment of an economic alliance with the developing nations such as Nigeria and other African nations. However, China is an influential power willing to wield structural influence or a share of it. To achieve such lofty aim, geopolitical and geostrategic approach would not be wanting in its foreign policy or relations.

First, when a state's security is at stake, this consideration dominates all others in determining that state's behaviour:

Economically China is facing a security threat of excess capacity and old population, which changed its foreign policy from encouragement of inbound investment to promotion of outbound investment across the globe especially states along the One Belt One Road axis (Johnston, 2016, p. 2). Chinese OBOR approach can be viewed in a geopolitical sense, in that China seems to be seeking structural influence through its newfound foreign policy 'OBOR' which is increasingly precipitating dissatisfaction on existing wielders of structural influence. Beijing is pursuing a foreign policy objective that aims to create an alternative global financial institution to the current US-oriented ones 'IMF and WB'. The new foreign behaviour also aims to provide China a strong position in the global political and economic realm. The Chinese foreign policy aims at pitting the renminbi against the USD in the international market (Aris, 2016, p. 2). China sees its waning economic status as a security threat caused by industrial excess capacity problems, coupled with waning demographic dividends due to the increasing old population caused by its strict birth control policy. OBOR can be seen in this regard as a behaviour spurred by internal and external factors.

Second: States, when they are threatened, tend to attempt balancing the threatening power, alone if they can, or with others if necessary:

China under President Xi Jinping adopted a foreign policy that differs sharply from that of Deng Xiaoping, who believed that a state should not show its strength to other states because it might turn around to threaten its sovereignty; this is a view belonging to the realist school of thought. Deng Xiaoping famous quote on foreign policy 'Keep a cool head and maintain a low profile. Never take the lead - but aim to do something big', seems to be abandoned by Xi Jinping due to the distinct economic and demographic challenges. Below is what Cia has to say regarding Xi Jinping's newfound foreign policy:

"Xi sees China's considerable economic resources as a critical tool in his efforts to maintain regional stability and assert China's leadership in the country's neighbourhood. Analyst regards the work conference as a significant

turning point in the evolution of China's foreign policy. Douglas Paal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argues that the conference saw the Chinese leadership effectively bury former leader Deng Xiaoping's famous dictum, "hide your strength and bide your time." According to Paal, in its place, the new Chinese leadership has advanced more proactive diplomacy in surrounding regions" (2017, p. 4).

Xi Jinping did not limit OBOR coverage to surrounding regions, but across the globe, OBOR has covered vast territories that the policy now threatens Western influence. When the OBOR is assessed from a geopolitical and geostrategic lens, it appears to be a balancing initiative against the real wielders of structural power. China is shaking the status quo with its newfound foreign policy, the BRI. OBOR seems to be a strategy, aiming to question the status quo, but in a subtle manner, by encroaching in economic zones occupied by the existing superpowers, and by establishing trade ties with countries under international sanction. OBOR, according to the realist view, is a balance of power strategy.

Third: Relative military and economic power is a critical determinant of states' behaviour; the more powerful states are more likely to achieve their objectives:

The OBOR is heavily sponsored by politically influential and financially buoyant Chinese institutions such as: The Chinese government sees the OBOR as an economic strategy capable of breaking all historical barriers and stigma imposed on its technology and goods, by the West. Under this initiative, China is aiming to expose the world to its technological standards, economic strength, and ability to sponsor essential infrastructure needed by OBOR host states. China used its financial power, identity, and technical skills to win the trust of nations in Africa. In Nigeria, China seems to be seen as a viable alternative to the West, because of OBOR founding principles tallies with the economic and infrastructure needs of the country. Below is an assertion made by President Xi Jinping in 2018 FOCAC Beijing summit regarding Nigeria:

"President Xi told President Buhari that he would support the reform of the UN "to increase the voice of developing countries in Africa." He equally promised continued support for Nigeria's infrastructure projects, citing the country's railway modernisation project, Lekki Deep Sea Port, Zungeru Power Project, Abuja Light Rail, ICT, and infrastructure backbone. And Abuja Water supply as laudable developmental projects. The Chinese leader announced the establishment of "a manufacturing section" so that Nigeria can gain from China's leading production role in the world. "In some, we lead, in others, we need to catch up," he added. On a parting note, President Xi told President Buhari that he was fully cognisant of the status and influence of Nigeria in Africa, saying, "We will step up cooperation and will provide assistance. The relationship between China and Nigeria is as best as ever, given the deeper mutual trust. China will continue to stand with Nigeria" (Shehu, 2018).

The above aims can only be achieved if a country has significant economic strength. China's financial advantage at the moment overflows; instead of keeping it in their national vaults, they transformed it into a tool of foreign policy, designed to help achieve their national interest. The OBOR approach, when viewed in a critical sense, appears like a co-optation strategy used by the USA during the Cold War. The European Recovery Plan "ERP" was used by the USA to rebuild the devastated Western economies. At the same time, the socialist axis also engaged in support of their allies one way or the other.

Contrary to the USSR approach, during the Cold War, the USA used both military and economic strength to promote and actualise its foreign policy, which was perceived as a developmental policy by the receiving states then. USA had leverage over the USSR due to its economic strength that was bolstered by the broad emergence of capitalism. At the moment, the OBOR is foreign policy to China but perceived as a developmental policy by the receiving states such as Nigeria and other African nations. The neo-realist assumption succinctly made the future of OBOR predictable. The more powerful a country, the more likely it is capable of attaining its national objectives in a self-help and anarchical international realm.

Fourth: A change in the distribution of military and economic power is likely to result in corresponding new alignments among states:

China seems to be a revisionist state, especially when we look at it from the angle of its economic and political behaviour in the global arena. China appears to be vying for structural influence; this is because there are pointers that China has the intention of creating an alternative currency to the dollar for international trade. China's political and economic activities outside its borders seem to be infringing on the strategic interest of America. For instance, America and most Western states are reliable trade partners with Africa.

China is a strong ally to Russia, a historical enemy axis to the USA, and also a member of the BRICS, an alliance questioning America's hegemony. Chinese foreign occupation seems to be drawing the attention of small powers while creating a wedge between them and the West. China is also using the South-South Climate Cooperation to ally with Africa in a bid to achieve its national interest in wielding structural power. China is promoting scores of development projects across the globe, especially in the global South. As part of China's objective, the country spearheaded the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and BRICS Development Bank, both based in Beijing.

The BRICS Development Banks is an association of influential and critical developing countries. In 2014, US\$40 billion was appropriated to the Silk Road Fund along with China's Silk Road infrastructure, which cut across India and the Indian Ocean. US\$3 billion was also allotted to the South-South Climate Cooperation Fund to assist developing countries affected by climate issues. In August 2016,

China AXIM Bank pledged a US\$1 billion industrialisation programme with African Export-Import Bank. The funds aim to establish the construction of industrial parks and special economic zones, with a focus on the processing of raw materials as intended by OBOR (Johnston, 2016, p. 4). It is an initiative designed to reinforce the extant culture of raw materials production and export.

Brown (2018) reports that "What kind of primary actor is China, especially under the rule of Xi Jinping? Following the constitutional change of March 11, the above question began to reinforce scores of assumptions. China's escalation in military expenditure over the recent years, and the declaration at the 19th Party Congress, that China has assumed the role of leading a path of diplomatic behaviour others have to emulate." In a way, this might have shaped the way the less influential countries see China and the countries in the global North, thereby seeing China as a better alternative.

Across the globe, China's footprint is ubiquitous one way or the other. It would be like burying our heads in the sand to ignore the country's hunger for a more central role in global affairs, and not to prepare a response (Brown, 2018).

OBOR seems to be aligning African states with China, creating a wedge between Africa and the West to some extent (Thral, 2015). An example of the growing collaboration between the Nigerian military and the "PLA" People's Liberation Army is the new alliance between Nigeria and China. Although the alignment covers other African countries too. Since 2006 China has been providing training and assistance to African militaries (Thral, 2015, p. 56).

China's foreign policy is strategically garnering support from small states in Africa, which in the long run, might create a wedge between Nigeria nay Africa and the West.

Fifth: Influential States Shapes Global Affairs and their Foreign Policies Influences Smaller States

It was strongly evident in the Cold War era, but the post-Cold War era still features such relations between superpowers, and it impacts on small states one way or the other. OBOR, for instance, is a project of a superpower that might have one effect or the other in the nearest future on small states. It is a foreign policy that shows that China is vying for structural power or influence to some extent.

At the moment, most of the Nigerian crude oil exports are destined for Europe. Still, with the increased precipitation of OBOR in Nigeria nay Africa, this might change in the nearest future.

If Nigeria, in the long run, feels more attached to China, Nigeria's democratic culture might get diluted over time, because small states tend to emulate the ways of a big state they see as a model. The proliferation of democracy in Africa is attributable to Western influence because of the Western nations are the core vanguards of liberal democratic values. If Chinese influence prevails, it might trigger the proliferation of communism in Africa at the long-run or affect some aspects of liberal democracy in Nigeria. OBOR is a foreign policy that is capable of changing its members' behaviour in that it might trigger Nigeria's reliability in China.

Sixth: The Number of Superpowers and the Incremental Differences in their Power is Significant in Determining the Behaviour of States:

In a multipolar international system, the possibility of rivalry is inevitable. In the contemporary world, nuclear power, coupled with economic strength, is the dominant determinant of state power. China is a

nuclear power and an industrial giant across the globe. China's military force, coupled with economic vitality and its political affairs in the global arena, is increasingly determining the behaviour of small states. Small states courageous in the past by the might of their principal hegemon, seem to find confidence in China's backing in the contemporary world. For instance, Sudan is a glaring and perfect example in this context (Vanguard, 2018). Countries that were sanctioned by the Western axis enjoyed political and economic support from China. China's foreign policy, 'OBOR,' can also be regarded as a determinant of receiving states' behaviour.

China's influence in Nigeria can, in the long run, spur Nigeria's action one way or the other, which might infringe on the interest of the Western axis or their imported liberal democratic ethos in Nigeria.

The above theories were considered in analysing the OBOR benevolence to Nigeria nay Africa, due to scores of factors such as the reality of African society and history, and also the burning desire to bring the concealed motives behind rejuvenated ancient China's policy to the fore. Three out of the four adopted schools of thought yielded findings characterized by national interest. While the exception is the modernisation theory, which believes that the developed nations can assist the developing countries in reaching economic prosperity and competitive development.

The considered schools of thought used to analyse China's benevolence to Nigeria nay Africa painted equivocal assumptions regarding the motives behind the OBOR. From this point of view, it is unethical to confidently regard the initiative as bad or too formidable for criticism because the primary actors involved found common ground, which is beneficial to both of them. But the problem that might arise from the relationship is the possibility of Nigeria's unmeasured reliance on China, which might threaten her relationship with potential trade partners in the long run.

The initiator of OBOR conceives it as foreign policy, while Nigeria nay Africa perceives it as a development policy instead of a foreign policy. Such a misguided or misconstrued view on the side of Nigeria nay Africa can be a potential threat to Nigeria's economic and political flexibility in the long run. Meaning it can cripple Nigeria politically and economically in the long term by tying Nigeria to irredeemable dependency.

Advantages of OBOR to Nigeria

OBOR is a transnational project, and a symbol of the Chinese 21st-century foreign policy established to promote China's national interest, and the domestic needs of host states in a strategic manner that conceals China's core interest.

Double edge sword

The positive aspects of OBOR only come to the fore when assessed through modernisation theory prisms. But OBOR's initiatives will simply help Nigeria to attain a dependent development, not an independent economic development. OBOR developmental approach aims at boosting infrastructure capacity, which will simply foster the production of raw materials and cash crops designated for export. Such an event or benevolence can be quite misleading. It cannot be wholly regarded as a sustainable growth or development because such development will increase the supply of exports, which will invariably escalate national revenue, but provided the price of the export good is high and stable.

The OBOR initiative could be a platform for 21st-century development in Nigeria. Nigeria's bilateral tie with China, coupled with the multilateral relationship under the auspices of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) as part of OBOR, has triggered scores of infrastructure development across Nigeria valued at over US\$5 billion in the last three years (This Day, 2018).

The BRI will make life comfortable to Nigerians in that there will be ease of access to 21st-century basic amenities such as standard roads, stable electricity supply, and increased production of agricultural goods, which would be locally consumed and exported.

Furthermore, the BRI project will address regional integration barriers impeding trade between Nigeria and its neighbouring countries. It will foster international trade by connecting Nigeria to all trade corridors along the Silk Road axis. China's intention as put by Africa Oil and Power:

“China has stepped up to fill those gaps. Africa has abundant natural resources, a wealth of infrastructure opportunities. It is a convenient location and a perfect match for China's global infrastructure plan,

"One Belt One Road." China sets out to create new land and sea trade routes to ensure energy supplies, increase foreign trade, and promote Chinese enterprise and products (AOP, 2017)."

Roads and railways

OBOR will link Nigeria to many African countries, by building transnational highways and railway, which will foster regional integration. Regional integration needs standard cross-border roads and an excellent road network.

Standard transnational roads will reduce logistics costs, which will boost the movement of goods and persons in and out of the country. If the arteries linking Nigeria to other African countries are functional, it will be a privilege to Nigeria as a country wielding relational power to export its manufactured goods and other raw materials needed by neighbouring states. An excellent road network is an ancillary to regional integration; it will boost inter and intraregional trade and cooperation.

In as much as the OBOR project will foster international trade, regional integration, it will equally enhance domestic businesses. OBOR project aims at linking the interior of Nigeria to major Nigerian cities by the consolidation of road infrastructure, which would reduce traffic clusters, accidents, and logistic costs. The absence of standard roads is a challenge plaguing commuters, traders, producers, and transporters.

A moving belt would be a potential ancillary to economic growth and solidification of value-chain such as the forward and backward linkages of goods and services.

OBOR project will help the Nigerian government fill infrastructural vacuums such as needed roads omitted by the Nigerian government due to lack of funds.

Since Nigeria got her independence, the dominant means of transportation within the country has been the main road, which is increasingly becoming frustrating due to its bad condition, and lack of viable interior alternative means of transportation.

However, the financial support of FOCAC through the AIIB would help Nigeria scoop the colossal sum of loan for consolidation of the 21st-century standard railway network, which is designed to cut across the four geopolitical zones and might link Nigeria to neighbouring states in the nearest future.

Such infrastructure will shrink territorial barriers such as the cost of logistics, laggard journey, security challenges and might trigger the creation of a common currency, which is an indication of true integration like that of the European Union. A standard railway system embodies scores of beneficial qualities such as safety, reduced cost of logistics, an alternative to road transportation, and competitive velocity.

Hydroelectric power project

The Nigerian government increasingly received bitter criticism from its citizens and tourists due to its inability to guarantee a steady electricity supply across the nation. However, the Nigerian government advanced multiple reasons for this deficiency.

The unstable power supply is a reality of the Nigerian society that attracts ridicule daily. The daily escalation of the essential need for electricity in Nigeria spurred the citizens' fury against the government.

Power supply instability has triggered the domestic demand for household power plants and industrial power plants across Nigeria. It is quite unworthy of celebration because, on the economic side, it is a minus, and on the environmental aspect, it is a potential source of pollution.

Lack of steady power supply is a threat to households and business owners in the context of cost; it is also a threat to individuals and societal security in the sense that power outage or blackout is an advantage to citizens plotting to carry out heinous activities in the dark. Lack of power supply can also pose a threat to motorists, commuters, and pedestrians at night, and this is when a power supply is essential, although no study has been carried out on this.

Lack of steady electricity supply impacts negatively on small businesses such as business centres, hair salons, tailoring shops, cinemas, and small-scale construction companies that thrive on the daily use of electricity. Stable electricity will reduce excessive reliance on petrol, kerosene, and diesel, which consumes a huge chunk of Nigeria's national revenue.

Large scale companies are equally affected by the erratic power supply in Nigeria, which subjected them to the regular use of oil energy needed for powering all sorts of machinery. The high cost of petroleum products in Nigeria might be a determinant of the high cost of goods and services. In a bid to address power supply challenges, the government has privatised the power sector, with the assumption that, when a private company handles the power, there might be a positive change, but so unfortunate that power supply turned worst (Awosope, 2014, p. 8).

Due to the successive failure of the Nigerian government and the electricity sector in addressing power supply erraticism, the Chinese government, as part of the OBOR project, Nigeria aims to build a 3050 Megawatts Mambilla Hydroelectric Power Project.

Nigeria's Minister of Finance Kemi Adesoun and Wang Xiaotao, Director-General, International Development Agency, in the presence of President Muhammadu Buhari and President Xi Jinping of China, signed the concessional loan agreement between Galaxy Backbone Limited and Huawei Technologies Limited "HUAWEI" (AIT, 2018). The success of this power plant will eradicate the majority of problems caused by the erratic power supply.

Airport

The OBOR projects will change the face of infrastructure in Nigeria; the existing infrastructure crippled by lack of funds and maintenance would be renovated in a manner that blends with the 21st-century predilection or visual appeal. As part of the OBOR initiative, the Nigerian international airport in Port Harcourt Omagwa Rivers State underwent a speedy transformation, which is a manifestation of the OBOR benevolence to Nigeria. The Chinese and Nigerian governments in 2013 struck a loan deal to build four new airport terminals in Nigeria (Oyebade, 2018).

International airports are a national geographical orifice that his mostly desired by high dignitaries and frequent travellers due to flight swiftness and reliability. The look of an international airport, to some extent, echoes the level of infrastructure development in a country. A country as big as Nigeria should possess a visually enticing and globally competitive international airport. Before the infrastructure loan offered by China, the state of the Nigerian airports dominates public complaints and dissatisfaction. The government also admitted the need to change the look of the airports. Still, the lack of financial power crippled the government's intentions of renovating international airports.

The development of an international airport is vital for national revenue because it is a substantial geographical orifice mostly used by travellers entering and exiting the country. Standard airports will equally foster forward and backward linkages. It explains why the Chinese government offered loans for the renovation of the international airport. Such infrastructural development, to some extent, restores government dignity and boosts its reputation home and abroad.

Construction of the international airport terminals, especially that of Port Harcourt, will trigger forward and backward linkages between Nigeria and China, and it will serve as an alternative to the famous and busy Abuja and Lagos airports. The airport terminal in Port Harcourt is highly significant to Nigeria and China because the state is a primary gateway into the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

Trade and agriculture

China finds Nigeria as a significant partner, probably due to its vast natural resources, and the largest economy in Africa. Among other things, Nigeria is highly considered by China as one of the major consumers of her final goods.

OBOR will improve Nigeria's exports by investing in critical sectors such as agriculture, transport, and electricity; because these are the three sectors mitigating vast export capabilities. The OBOR aims at improving agriculture in Nigeria by training farmers and providing the necessary funds to enhance agricultural production. OBOR loaned US\$4.5 billion to Nigeria for the boost of agriculture. The loan would be used for the purchase of farming essentials such as machinery and irrigation types of equipment. The Chinese terms and conditions of the loans are quite fair because of the 20 years' credit at an interest rate of 1% per annum. It will enable farmers to use the loan to their satisfaction and repay at the appropriate time. A loan of this nature will boost the volume of economic activities and will enhance export quality and performance, which will increase national revenue.

As reported by Oladeinde Olawoyin (2017), of all the trading partners Nigeria has, China showed the willingness to help mitigate her problems, because three decades ago, China was confronted by similar issues. China observed that Nigeria is a nation confronted by difficulties identical to the one experienced in her past.

So, it prompted the commitment of China to help Nigeria solve the problem of agriculture. The Chinese government is dedicated to the modernisation of agriculture in Nigeria because modernised agriculture will automatically boost agriculture output that will meet domestic and external demands.

In a growing capitalist world, any society with a ballooning population, an agrarian model of agricultural production, would be confronted by challenges of satisfying domestic demands, let alone external demand. Modernisation of the Agricultural sector cannot be achieved simply by the introduction of machinery. It explains why skills are essential in this sector; Beijing considered training Nigerian farmers to feel this gap in the agriculture sector.

To further boost Agriculture output in Nigeria, China reviewed the training of Nigerian farmers in the production of rice, maize, and sorghum, which is dominantly consumed by the Nigerian population. The importation of rice to Nigeria skyrocketed at a point, and this spurred the government to impose a ban on the importation because it consumes much of Nigeria's GDP.

The government adopted a developmental policy aimed at encouraging the local production of rice. Hopefully, in a few years, Nigeria will become a major exporter of rice if this pace of agricultural support is maintained. The Chinese government and President Buhari deserve apotheosis for resurrecting the Nigerian agricultural sector.

The Digital Silk Road

It is the e-transnational integration of OBOR, designed to link all countries on the silk belt and road to Beijing. The digital Silk Road is an essential part of the OBOR. As put by Sarker et al.:

OBOR includes the Digital Silk Road initiative for connecting the world digitally. And it is administered by the Cyberspace Administration of China (2018, p. 626).

The DSR aims at accelerating the pace of information and communication, e-commerce, internet banking, smart cities, and industrial computer networks. The digital Silk Road will equip all OBOR countries with 5G communication internets, which is swifter and advanced compared to the existing 3G and 4G (Silin et al., 2017, pp. 5-6).

The digital Silk Road will foster trade between Nigeria and China; it will trigger direct trade ties between Nigerian traders and consumers, and Chinese producers and traders. Goods can be purchased directly from Alibaba's website using a naira account; this model of transaction in a way undermines the need to convert naira to the dollar, as local currency can directly purchase goods from Alibaba in bulk. It made life easier for traders because the digital Silk Road logic has removed the need to travel to China. Products bought through this medium, are delivered to Nigeria at an agreed date, or between an agreed timeframe.

The convenience Nigerians enjoy trading through the local 'Jumia' would also be experienced by directly purchasing from China's Alibaba due to its swiftness and security under the platform of OBOR. This logic will equally reduce travel-related risks such as accidents or robbery, which can happen anytime or anywhere. Nigerians that fear traveling abroad due to transport-related threats will find it effortless to purchase goods directly from China because of the introduction of the Digital Silk Road.

The DSR will tighten trade ties between Nigeria and China, which in the future might trigger economic union and political union. The Digital Silk Road is the modernisation of the international transaction model. This e-commerce initiative will reduce buyers' cost of logistics, such as visas, transport, and hotel bills, and risk.

The advantages of OBOR are discernible when viewed uncritically from the prism of the modernisation theory of economic development. Rostow's highlighted five stages of development that a developing country must pass to gain industrial capacity and prosperity. But it is quite unfortunate that Nigeria is still struggling to reach the take-off stage despite the inflow of revenue from China, the Western donor community, international financial institutions, and income from international trade.

Disadvantages of OBOR to Nigeria

The disadvantages of OBOR can be almost indiscernible due to the formidability of the package. It is an initiative that appears to its foreign beneficiaries as a package designed to spur them speedily to Eldorado, forgetting that free lunch, both in the capitalist and socialist world, is bait or snare. OBOR embodies multiple advantages to the initiator and to the receivers. Still, the inevitable problem is that one axis will become a paternal figure in the short and long run, while the other axis will become dependent. Just like the political and economic relationship between France and its colonies in Africa, except for Tunisia.

China sees Nigeria nay Africa as an Answer to its Economic Problem

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, blessed with a young population and vast natural resources. The above dual qualities Nigeria possesses are of utmost importance to China. It is necessary to critically look into the push and the pull factors of OBOR for a glaring understanding of its disadvantages to Nigeria.

On the push side, China was affected by the 2008 global recession that subjected the Asian giant to excess industrial capacity. Additionally, this country was worst hit by the increasing old population caused by its strict policy on birth control.

As a result of the two factors above plaguing China, the need to seek foreign markets for its excess products and idle companies became a national question. And it triggered the foreign policy labelled One Belt One Road, linking all the countries on the Silk Road to Beijing.

The second factor is demographic profit. China passed her phase of demographic dividend, which led to an increase in the cost of production, which is almost unbearable. For maximisation profit, China found it inevitable to shift to outbound investment in territories that are still in the phase of their demographic benefit. Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with a vast young population, coupled with an abundance of natural resources. Nigeria is an embodiment of human and natural resources China needs for the protection of her economy.

China's foreign policy coincides with Nigeria's infrastructural needs. Still, in the long run, the loans offered by China will simply accelerate Nigeria's steady supply of raw materials needed by China or any country involved in the production of final goods. The pattern of production OBOR is promoting in Nigeria will simply make Nigeria dependent on China for the importation of final/processed products. It means that a large portion of the income generated from exportation would be for the import of capital and final goods to Nigeria.

Promotion of dependent development in Nigeria

Another factor to be considered regarding the pattern of production promoted by OBOR is the terms of trade. According to the terms of trade logic, primary goods characterised the export of developing states, such as Nigeria. And it is a verifiable fact that the monetary value of primary products is inferior to processed or final goods. Roads, railways, electricity, and modernisation of agriculture sponsored by China will simply aid the logistics of raw materials out of Nigeria. This type of development will simply raise Nigeria's GDP but will not take Nigeria out of the dependency trap.

The kind of development China is sponsoring in Nigeria through its OBOR benevolence is only beneficial to Nigeria in the context of infrastructure, and acceleration of primary goods exports. But to China, it will be helpful in many respects, such as gains on the outbound investment "market for its goods and services abroad," access to Nigeria's natural and human resources, and loyalty from Nigeria due to water-tight bilateral ties.

China aims to shift its excess capacity to Nigeria through OBOR, which will exploit investment opportunities; it will also flood the Nigerian market with final goods, which would threaten domestic infant companies. Infant domestic companies cannot compete with firms sponsored by the government, and this will discourage local investment or erode existing local investments in Nigeria. OBOR is quite formidable compared to development consolidated by the Europeans. Still, the bottom line is that both Europe and China won't risk giving Nigeria sustainable development and economic prosperity because it will infringe on their strategic interest.

A culture of undermining host territories labour

China's disinclination to international labour law will impact negatively on the Nigerian labour market in that China has a culture of bringing workers from China to host territories, and this will not help in reducing unemployment in Nigeria. also, China's intention of exploiting

Nigeria's demographic dividend should be a point of concern, too, because if the Nigerian labour Union fails to monitor the relationship between Chinese employers and Nigerian employees. The employees might be subjected to underpayment since maximisation of profit is the primary interest of the Chinese employers/investors. Chinese investors seem less inclined to employees' welfare; a culture of this nature will not be an advantage to Nigerians working with the Chinese.

China's reliance on Chinese labourers impedes the transfer of knowledge from China to Nigerian labourers. It has a connotation of China's disregard for transparency.

Manipulation of deals

Another disadvantage of OBOR is that the receivers of the loans do not have the liberty to select the desired construction company. Chinese companies and technology are imposed on beneficiaries of the loans. It is an aberration from the conventional model whereby beneficiaries decide how the loan is to be used. China gives credit and leash the receiver to Chinese companies.

Such an approach can lead to manipulation of project cost because the beneficiaries of the loan are deprived of the liberty to patronise non-Chinese firms.

According to The Economist (2018, p. 9), "the OBOR package is highly formidable, but China's unwillingness regarding transparency in the context of cost and contracting process is capable of subjecting the projects to risks and national scrutiny. As a matter of fact, after the launching of the Kenyan Standard Gauge Railway 'SGR' two parliamentary committees 'transport and public,' and the government's Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission consolidated investigation due to allegations of China's misdemeanour. A question surrounding the controversy is why did the transportation officials simply considered a single-source deal instead of making it open to contractors, from which the government will select one; according to the ethics committee, this is a violation of the Kenyan law."

Similarly, another question arose from the estimated cost of the SGR project.

"The international estimate of such a project is about US\$2m/km, whereas that of China was estimated at US\$5.6m/km. Ethiopia did a similar project which is more sophisticated and broader but estimated at the cost of US\$4.8m/km. The Ethiopian track is electrified, dualised, and it passed through rough terrains (ibid)." It is a case of China's manipulation and exploitation of Kenya under the platform of the esteemed OBOR.

Furthermore, The Economist (2018, p. 9) maintained that "China Road and Bridge Corporation is guilty of breaching the agreement on sourcing at least 40% of goods and services from local firms."

This work considered the above realities of Kenya's experience with OBOR, simply to arouse the Nigerian government consciousness to the possible disadvantages of OBOR.

The Chinese are apt players of international politics and trade, so, therefore, in the process of pursuing their national interest, morality, and ethics varnishes. The Nigerian government might risk the possibility of being exploited by the initiator of OBOR if scrutiny is not maintained. China, through the OBOR projects, used and manipulated a sincere partner, Kenya. If China can do such to its historical partner, which is also the hub of OBOR in Africa, Nigeria should be extraordinarily cautious and maintain an objective stance when reaching an agreement with the OBOR initiator.

The Kenyan narratives regarding its ugly experience with projects sponsored under the OBOR auspices should remind Africans of their ancestor's involvement with budding Western explorers that came to Africa. The bottom-line of Sino-Nigeria relations sums up Kenneth Walt's conception of states' state of nature characterized by national interest and absence of central authority to enforce morality and ethics.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In conclusion, OBOR should not be viewed as merely a foreign policy or development policy because it is a dual socio-political and socioeconomic policy that embodies development and foreign policy. These sums up the geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic linkages of the initiative.

The OBOR is China's means to an end; similarly, it is conceived as a means to an end by Nigeria, which explains the win-win claim of the initiative. But in a fundamental sense, it is not a win-win deal due to the nature of the relationship, which is a strictly asymmetric relationship. OBOR is merely beneficial to Nigeria in the context of assisting in pushing Nigeria out of infrastructure stagnancy and acceleration of its capacity to export primary goods adequately.

Arguably the OBOR is more beneficial to China in that it creates a market for its excess products and services in Nigeria, and exploitation of Nigeria's demographic dividend.

Furthermore, China gains more by offering strict loans to Nigeria. Although the loan is beneficial to Nigeria, and it will indirectly boost political and economic ties between the two states. But it will make Nigeria's natural resources more accessible to China, especially crude oil, which dominates China's appetite for natural resources.

The OBOR is more beneficial to China compared to Nigeria because of its terms and conditions, which favours China more than Nigeria. For instance, the loan agrees that it would award a contract solely to Chinese companies. Such an agreement will deprive the beneficiary of the loan the liberty to patronise other affordable service providers.

The terms and conditions of the OBOR loans to Nigeria are of benefit to China in five contexts, while it is beneficial to Nigeria only in two regards. China stands to gain geostrategic privilege, outbound investment, and access to Nigeria's human and natural resources. Conversely, Nigeria stands to gain infrastructure transformation and improvement in the supply of primary goods. The relationship between China and Nigeria is asymmetrical in that China wins more compared to Nigeria. Therefore, the win-win claim of China's OBOR is a subterfuge.

Furthermore, the type of development China is promoting through the OBOR initiative in Nigeria is not sustainable when critically viewed from dependency and realist prisms. The facts of the OBOR initiative in Nigeria glaringly validated the criticisms exuded by realists and dependency theorists. China needs Nigeria for the fulfilment of her national interest, which puts Nigeria in the position of supplier of China's needs. China, through the OBOR initiative, is strategically leashing Nigeria to gigantic loans that will trigger dependence on her for survival.

It is admissible that OBOR is aiding infrastructure development in Nigeria, which would help in solving some national challenges. Conversely, China is giving Nigeria dependent development, but the type of development that will aid forward and backward linkages between Beijing and Nigeria. A critical view of the kinds of infrastructure China is building in Nigeria brought the motives of China to the fore.

China indulged in the renovation and building of infrastructure that will aid the accomplishment of her geostrategic national interest in Nigeria. It reminds one of the infrastructures built by the colonial masters during the reign of colonialism in Nigeria nay Africa. Substantial infrastructures focused on the aiding of raw materials from the interior of colonies to seaports for export to Europe. Similarly, OBOR infrastructure concentration bore similarities to that consolidated by the colonial masters in the context of purpose. In simpler terms, the OBOR projects are centred on the consolidation of Chinese culture in Nigeria and the acceleration of logistics infrastructure for the reinforcement of import and export. Exportation of raw materials to China, and importation of final goods from China. OBOR is plausible but will never give Nigeria the knowledge and infrastructure needed for the transformation of raw products to final goods. China aims to use the sponsored infrastructure to establish a silk economic road and belt for the smooth outflow of natural resources to China and the inflow of China's final goods to Nigeria. The terms of trade favour China due to her production of final products.

The OBOR will force Nigeria to the bottom of the global capitalist economic pyramid, while China would remain at the peak, just like the Western countries. Nigeria found herself in a bilateral relationship with a pure realist country. In the realist school of thought, states are primary actors, and their national interest shapes their behaviour in global politics and bilateral relations. China cannot be labelled a monster

because all nations are opportunists; they do whatever it takes to advance their national interest, even if it requires going against international ethics and morality. These are facts of international politics Nigeria should factor in in its relationship with China. In the principle of self-help, it is unethical a state relies on another country or institution for her survival. The ethos of international politics does not permit trust, honour, and friendship. From this premise, Nigeria is questionable for the belief in the existence of free lunch.

Recommendations

It is evident, according to this study, that the Sino-Nigeria bilateral tie is asymmetric. The Nigerian government should consult its most excellent policy developers, social scientists, and international relations experts to critically review the terms and conditions of the OBOR.

Colonialism bequeathed to Nigeria democratic culture, monotheism, institutionalisation, education, and national identity but not a transfer of technological knowledge. To avoid a repetition of the past, the Nigerian government should urge the Chinese government to consolidate a policy of employing Nigerians and exposing them to their technological skills for the guarantee of transfer of technical know-how. However, China might be reluctant in this regard because it will infringe on her strategic interest.

Nigeria, as the most populous African country, should convene a multilateral seminar of African OBOR beneficiaries to discuss with other African states how the unfavourable terms and conditions of the OBOR can be revised. African states will have to adopt a multilateral approach in this regard to boost their bargaining power. A unilateral bargaining approach might not yield the desired response. China will not scorn such approach because the FOCAC summit in Beijing lumped all African States together.

Little can OBOR do in helping Nigeria achieve goal 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, and 15 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). Economic prosperity and state survival are products of self-help by looking inwardly for solution to national problems. Nigeria should embrace OBOR but should not make the mistake of relying on OBOR for economic success and survival of Nigeria.

REFERENCES

- Africaw, n.d. Africa and the World. [Online] Available at: <https://www.africaw.com/africans-did-not-sell-their-own-people-into-slavery> [Accessed 28 December 2018].
- AIT. (2018). *Africa Independent Television*. [Online] Available at: http://www.aitonline.tv/postchina_to_support_nigeria_in_building_mambila_hydroelectric_power_project [Accessed 09 January 2019].
- Anayagafu, S. V. (2018). Buhari, AU chair, others for China-Africa Summit Read more at: <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/09/buhari-au-chair-others-for-china-africa-summit/> [Accessed 29 May 2020].
- AOP. (2017). *Africa Oil and Power*. [Online] Available at: <https://africaoil-andpower.com/2017/07/13/china-makes-inroads-into-african-energy/>[09 January 2019].
- Aris, S. (2016). One Belt, One Road: China's Vision of "Connectivity". *Centre for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich*, 195, pp. 1-4.
- Awosope, C. A. (2014). Nigeria Electricity Industry: Issues, Challenges, and Solutions. *Covenant University Press*, 3(2), pp. 1-40.
- Brown, K. (2018). The Diplomat. [Online] Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/chinas-quest-to-be-a-status-super-power/> [Accessed 07 January 2019].
- Cai, P. (2017). Understanding China's Belt and Road Initiative. *Lowy Institute for International Policy*, pp. 1-22.
- Chibundu, V. N. (2000). *Nigeria-China Foreign Relations (1960-1999)*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.
- Einasse, I. (2018). The National. [Online] Available at: <https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/china-in-africa-an-increasingly-uneasy-marriage-of-interests-1.793439> [Accessed 28 December 2018].
- Gideon, R. (1998). Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. *JSTOR*, 51(1), pp.144-172.
- Greene, R. (1998). *The 48 Laws of Power*. United State of America: Joost Elfers and Robert Greene.
- Inglehart, R. & Christian, w. (2007). Modernization. [Online] Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236749001_Modernization [Accessed 30 December 2018].
- Johnston, L. A. (2016). Africa, and China's One Belt, One Road initiative: Why now and what next? *China | Bridges Africa*, 5(7), pp. 1-6
- Mansbach, R. W. & Taylor, K. L. (2012). *The causes of war and the changing nature of global violence*. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.
- Marex, (2018). *The Maritime Executive*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/kenya-risks-losing-port-of-mombasa-to-china> [Accessed 28 December 2018].
- Maruiki, B. (2018). *China walks back trade war threat with Kenya over fish ban*. [Online] Available at: <https://citizentv.co.ke/news/china-walks-back-trade-war-threat-with-kenya-over-fishban217107/> [Accessed 03 January 2019].
- Matunhu, J. (2011). A critique of modernisation and dependency theories in Africa: Critical Assessment. *African Journal of History and Culture*, 3(5), pp. 65-72.
- McDowell, M. A. (2012). *China in Nigeria*, Newport: Naval War College, Newport, R.I. UNISA, 2016. *The Political Sciences and Research*. Muckleneuk: University of South Africa
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2009). *Reckless States and Realism*. [Online] Available at: <http://ire.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/23/2/241> [Accessed 5 January 2019].
- Newnetwork, (2015). *NewAfrican*. [Online] Available at: <https://newafricanmagazine.com/news-analysis/history/chinas-long-history-africa/> [Accessed 3 December 2018].

- Nigerian Tribune (2018). *Chinese Company ELION to Develop Ecological, agriculture and Power Projects in Nigeria*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.tribuneonline.com/169118/> [Accessed 31 December 2018].
- Okpeh, O. O. J. (2009). Introduction. In: O. O. Okpeh, T. Wuam & J. M. Ayuba, eds. *CHINA and AFRICA Threats and Opportunities*. Makurdi-Abuja-Ibadan: Aboki Publishers, pp. 1-11.
- Olawoyin, O. (2017). *Premium Times*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/business-news/227939-china-loannigeria-45-billion-boost-agriculture.html> [Accessed 10 December 2019].
- Oyebade, W. (2018). *The Guardian*. [Online] Available at: <https://guardian.ng/features/uneasy-silence-over-500-million-new-terminals-atlagosabuja-airports/> [Accessed 10 January 2018].
- Peters, M. A. (2019). The ancient Silk Road and the birth of merchant capitalism. Available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00131857.2019.169148> [Accessed 29 May 2020].
- Reyes, G. E. (2001). Four Main Theories of Development: Modernisation, Dependency, World-System, and Globalisation. *Publications asociada a la Revista Nomads. Mediterranean Perspectives*.
- Rice, D. (n.d.) *ONE BELT, ONE ROAD: Chinese Industrialisation and Neo-Imperialism in Central Asia*. University of Tasmania, pp. 1-17.
- Sarker, N., I. S. M., Hossin, A. M., Yin, X. & Sarker, K. M. (2018). One Belt One Road Initiative of China: Implication for Future of Global Development. *Modern Economy*, 9, pp. 623-638.
- Selbitschka, A. (2018). Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History. In: D. Ludden, ed. *The Early Silk Road(s)*. Munich: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-23.
- Shehu, G. (2018). *Vanguard*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/09/president-buharis-takeaways-from-focacbeijingsummit-by-garba-shehu/> [Accessed 06 January 2019].
- Silin, Y., Kapustina, L., Trevisan, I. & Drevalev, A. (2017). China's economic interests in the "One Belt, One Road" initiative. *s.l., EDP Sciences*, pp. 1-10.
- This Day, (2018). *Chinese Company to Invest in Agriculture, Power Projects in Nigeria*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2018/10/16/chinese-company-to-investinagriculture-power-projects-in-nigeria/> [Accessed 31 December 2018].
- This Day, (2018). *This Day*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2018/09/04/nigeria-china-partnership-yields-5bninfrastructure-projects/> [Accessed 08 January 2019].
- Thral, L., (2015). *China's Expanding African's Relations: Implication for U.S. national security*. [Online] Available at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR905.html [Accessed 07 January 2019].
- Trading Economics, (2018). *Nigeria Exports*. [Online] Available at <https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/exports> [Accessed 02 January 2019].
- Trading Economics, (2018). *Nigeria Imports*. [Online] Available at: <https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/imports> [Accessed 01 January 2018].
- Umejei, E. (2015). China's Engagement with Nigeria: Opportunity or Opportunist. *ResearchGate*, 3(4), pp. 54-78.
- Vanguard, (2018). *Vanguard*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/09/chinese-funds-not-for-vanityprojectsinafricapresident-xi/> [Accessed 08 January 2019].
- Watkins, K. (1994). Debt Relief for Africa. *Taylor & Francis Ltd.*, 21(62), pp. 599-609.
- Wu, P. S. (2017). *Understanding One Belt One Road Initiative of China*. China, Wuan University of Technology, The Economist, 2018. *One Belt, One Road": an economic roadmap*, Beijing, Hong Long, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Seoul, Shanghai, Singapore, Tokyo: The Economist Corporate Network.